{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-001a0c2e289b39a5448f8570109a2a3a6614df7386468acffb691c751b017b20","text":"All comparisons of text strings are performed byte-by-byte (and therefore necessarily case-sensitive). Where arithmetic is used, this specification uses the notation familiar from the programming language C, except that the operator \"**\" stands for exponentiation. 4. Each SenML Pack carries a single array that represents a set of"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-0026c438f24d04ba7de2db3a941dfc35f019890ad3aa77fc4bc178f7135925bb","text":"However, QUIC DATAGRAM frames do not provide a means to demultiplex application contexts. This document describes how to use QUIC DATAGRAM frames when the application protocol running over QUIC is HTTP/3 H3. It defines logical flows identified by a non-negative integer that are present at the start of the DATAGRAM frame payload. Flows are associated with HTTP messages using the Datagram-Flow-Id header field, allowing endpoints to match unreliable DATAGRAMS frames to the HTTP messages that they are related to. This design mimics the use of Stream Types in HTTP/3, which provide a demultiplexing identifier at the start of each unidirectional stream. HTTP/3 H3. It associates datagrams with client-initiated bidirectional streams and defines an optional additional demultiplexing layer. Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the MASQUE IETF mailing list (masque@ietf.org [2]) or on the GitHub repository which"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-003f1ca3b81109c904ba101580a252b2c3f431db6412d7fffce629a1e78bb4c6","text":"multiple layers of derivation or resolution, such as DNS service resolution and DNS hostname resolution. For example, if the application has indicated both a preference for WiFi over LTE and for a feature only available in SCTP, branches will be first sorted accord to path selection, with WiFi at the top. Then, branches with SCTP will be sorted to the top within their subtree according to the properties influencing protocol selection. However, if the implementation has cached the information that SCTP is not available on the path over WiFi, there is no SCTP node in the WiFi subtree. Here, the path over WiFi will be tried first, and, if connection establishment succeeds, TCP will be used. So the Selection Property of preferring WiFi takes precedence over the Property that led to a preference for SCTP. 4.3. Implementations should sort the branches of the tree of connection"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-005cc829f578097d00762537ea15f8bb62c0b3d6b237dda90dd4493c384bb274","text":"First four (4) octets of the SHA-256 message digest RFC6234 of the ESNIKeys structure starting from the first octet of \"keys\" to the end of the stucture. end of the structure. The list of keys which can be used by the client to encrypt the SNI. Every key being listed MUST belong to a different group. The length to pad the ServerNameList value to prior to encryption. This value SHOULD be set to the largest ServerNameList the server expects to support rounded up the nearest multiple of 16. [[OPEN ISSUE: An alternative to padding is to instead send a hash of the server name. This would be fixed-length, but have the disadvantage that the server has to retain a table of all the server names it supports, and will not work if the mapping between the client-facing server and hidden server uses wildcards.]] expects to support rounded up the nearest multiple of 16. If the server supports wildcard names, it SHOULD set this value to 256. The moment when the keys become valid for use. The value is represented as seconds from 00:00:00 UTC on Jan 1 1970, not"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-0066707ca589eda8ac46f013922b5405a50877262c879476acf4d4db4de2a27c","text":"Tree hash: The root hash of the above ratchet tree Confirmed transcript hash: the zero-length octet string Confirmed transcript hash: The zero-length octet string Interim transcript hash: the zero-length octet string Interim transcript hash: The zero-length octet string Init secret: a fresh random value of size \"KDF.Nh\" Init secret: A fresh random value of size \"KDF.Nh\" Extensions: Any values of the creator's choosing For each member, construct an Add proposal from the KeyPackage for that member (see add)"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-007e24648114d515bb25dfe91bbefef1eb512258a26785a5c43100e41bf82c55","text":"The following example shows a case where \"example.com\" has a server running on port 443, with an alternate port of 8443 for QUIC. 6.1.3. 6.1.4. The following examples of Endpoints show common usage patterns."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-homenet-hna-00b56a7fb8a01f85d1f493708179dedfeada1a6e77ca16e03222f854db33761d","text":"secure delegation. The zone signing and secure delegation may be performed either by the Homenet Naming Authority or by the Outsourcing Infrastructure. sec-dnssec-deplyment discusses these two alternatives. sec-views discusses the consequences of publishing multiple representations of the same zone also commonly designated as views. This section provides guidance to limit the risks associated with multiple views. sec-reverse discusses management of the reverse zone. sec-renumbering discusses how renumbering should be handled. alternatives. sec-reverse discusses management of the reverse zone. sec-renumbering discusses how renumbering should be handled. Finally, sec-privacy and sec-security respectively discuss privacy and security considerations when outsourcing the Homenet Zone. The Homenet Zone is expected to host public information only. It is not the scope of this DNS service to define local home network boundaries. Instead, local scope information is expected to be provided to the home network using local scope naming services. mDNS RFC6762 DNS-SD RFC6763 are two examples of these services. Currently mDNS is limited to a single link network. However, future protocols are expected to leverage this constraint as pointed out in RFC7558. 3. Customer Premises Equipment: (CPE) is a router providing"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-00bbcfb48077d6744023172a1e42e94fc6ae9a2dcbda2bc1620f6996c081c5ec","text":"also send-idempotent. This is a strict requirement. The default is to not have this option. 5.2.5. 5.2.6. Type: Preference"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-00e5a4b72d3b07ff57654f4c20997e0a2c2c1e86e0ffd3a5e83fe6c51abe345f","text":"Every time a client issues a new Observe request, a new Partial IV MUST be used (see cose-object), and so the payload and OSCORE option are changed. The server uses the Partial IV of the new request as the 'request_piv' of all associated notifications (see AAD). The Partial IV of the registration is also used as 'request_piv' of associated cancellations (see AAD). the 'request_piv' of all associated notifications (see AAD). Intermediaries are not assumed to have access to the OSCORE security context used by the endpoints, and thus cannot make requests or"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-00eaf7b485a927933653accfc3146fb6497d12b9b7cef5e5c1456d9d2df78733","text":"isolating a single location within a document. Path is a query syntax that can also be used to pull multiple locations. [no-dot-length] We probably want to use an expression that does not use "}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-011ee509567eece081d2ffe72960622ef39c48b697823128b92043e5ead617f0","text":"of their element or member values then. Applied to other value types, it will select nothing. : The zero number/empty string exceptions are no longer true. Booleans work the same everywhere. Negation operator \"neg-op\" allows to test of values. Applying negation operator twice \"!!\" gives us DELETE-ME: (( We currently don't need this. But we commit a version in case we do need it later. The negation operator \"neg-op\" can be applied to any JSON value and returns \"true\" only when applied to \"false\" or \"null\": of values. Consequently, applying the negation operator twice \"!!\" returns \"true\" for all values except \"false\" or \"null\". )) Some examples:"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-016752551cb8d843b5013a8d4d44ac82f83772bf7d3ec106aa36f3b690f88044","text":"which is in milliseconds. Sending a value smaller than the \"min_ack_delay\" advertised by the peer is invalid. Receipt of an invalid value MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. On receiving a valid value in this field, the endpoint MUST update its \"max_ack_delay\" to the value provided by the peer. A variable-length integer that indicates how many out of order packets can arrive before eliciting an immediate ACK. If no"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-0173de7fa4f75b9c4e9afaaf042f2d22bc0e1faa95e90d131e9894c00b20bfd9","text":"7.3.2. This method is indicated by \"mtls\" in the \"proof\" field. The signer presents its TLS client certificate during TLS negotiation with the verifier. This method is indicated by the method value \"mtls\". This method defines no additional parameters. The signer presents its TLS client certificate during TLS negotiation with the verifier. In this example, the certificate is communicated to the application through the \"Client-Cert\" header from a TLS reverse proxy, leading to"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-01880e2f5ac072064dbf8a5341838af6ad3b2ba5fd8de1eb79e39726cb3e80e1","text":"Changed the lookup interface to accept endpoint and Domain as query string parameters to control the scope of a lookup. Editorial Comments [_1] cabo: What is _sub here? "}
{"_id":"q-en-webpush-protocol-01d3bdca205cdbb360ce9234f6675f78fef7334657a87c1a0a8282b2c9facf87","text":"to an entity body that is 4096 bytes or less in size. To limit the number of stored push messages, the push service MAY either expire messages prior to their advertised Time-To-Live or reduce their advertised Time-To-Live. respond with a shorter Time-To-Live than proposed by the application server in its request for push message delivery (ttl). Once a message has been accepted, the push service MAY later expire the message prior to its advertised Time-To-Live. If the application server requested a delivery receipt, the push service MUST return a failure response (acknowledge_message). 7.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-01d7e2691bee5be4e4c3870dc6c6daf78f2983922b7f7aad7b48f454fccc2ed7","text":"prioritization. Note that this property is not a per-message override of the connection Priority - see conn-priority. Both Priority properties may interact, but can be used independently and be realized by different mechanisms. connection Priority - see conn-priority. The Priority properties may interact, but can be used independently and be realized by different mechanisms; see priority-in-taps. 8.1.3.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-032902ef9a901b9b9ec968adb378675a20741adf2468e1474b036de6718a9fcd","text":"transport layer, in line with developments in modern platforms and programming languages; Selection between alternate network paths that can be informed by additional information that is available about the networks over Selection between alternate network paths that can be informed when additional information is available about the networks over which an endpoint can operate (e.g. Provisioning Domain (PvD) information RFC7556);"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-0357b074f1b49f4767519e8192306f64646fbd86148d78f12dc0d420fb8fc716","text":"The ciphersuites are defined in section mls-ciphersuites. Depending on the Diffie-Hellman group of the ciphersuite, different rules apply to private key derivation and public key verification. For all ciphersuites defined in this document, the Derive-Key-Pair function begins by deriving a \"key pair secret\" of appropriate length, then converting it to a private key in the required group. The ciphersuite specifies the required length and the conversion. 6.1.1. For X25519, the key pair secret is 32 octets long. No conversion is required, since any 32-octet string is a valid X25519 private key. The corresponding public key is X25519(SHA-256(X), 9). For X448, the key pair secret is 56 octets long. No conversion is required, since any 56-octet string is a valid X448 private key. The corresponding public key is X448(SHA-256(X), 5). Implementations MUST use the approach specified in RFC7748 to calculate the Diffie-Hellman shared secret. Implementations MUST check whether the computed Diffie-Hellman shared secret is the all- zero value and abort if so, as described in Section 6 of RFC7748. If implementers use an alternative implementation of these elliptic curves, they MUST perform the additional checks specified in Section 7 of 6.1.2. For P-256, the key pair secret is 32 octets long. For P-521, the key pair secret is 66 octets long. In either case, the private key derived from a key pair secret is computed by interpreting the key pair secret as a big-endian integer. ECDH calculations for these curves (including parameter and key generation as well as the shared secret calculation) are performed according to IEEE1363 using the ECKAS-DH1 scheme with the identity map as key derivation function (KDF), so that the shared secret is the x-coordinate of the ECDH shared secret elliptic curve point represented as an octet string. Note that this octet string (Z in IEEE 1363 terminology) as output by FE2OSP, the Field Element to Octet String Conversion Primitive, has constant length for any given field; leading zeros found in this octet string MUST NOT be truncated. (Note that this use of the identity KDF is a technicality. The complete picture is that ECDH is employed with a non-trivial KDF because MLS does not directly use this secret for anything other than for computing other secrets.) Clients MUST validate remote public values by ensuring that the point is a valid point on the elliptic curve. The appropriate validation procedures are defined in Section 4.3.7 of X962 and alternatively in Section 5.6.2.3 of keyagreement. This process consists of three steps: (1) verify that the value is not the point at infinity (O), (2) verify that for Y = (x, y) both integers are in the correct interval, (3) ensure that (x, y) is a correct solution to the elliptic curve equation. For these curves, implementers do not need to verify membership in the correct subgroup. 6.2. A member of a group authenticates the identities of other"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-homenet-hna-03686a3755928c025e3c001dc0a85d157a881a0e37ffa2d4b7222bb9a5d3a67b","text":"As depicted in fig-naming-arch and fig-auth-servers, the Public Homenet Zone is hosted on the Public Authoritative Server(s), whereas the Homenet Zone is hosted on the HNA. Motivations for keeping these two zones identical are detailed in sec-views, and this section considers that the HNA builds the zone that will be effectively published on the Public Authoritative Server(s). In other words \"Homenet to Public Zone transformation\" is the identity also commonly designated as \"no operation\" (NOP). the Homenet Zone is hosted on the HNA. This section considers that the HNA builds the zone that will be effectively published on the Public Authoritative Server(s). In other words \"Homenet to Public Zone transformation\" is the identity also commonly designated as \"no operation\" (NOP). In that case, the Homenet Zone should configure its Name Server RRset (NS) and Start of Authority (SOA) with the values associated with the"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-03697fb2a0ada97294a513a0a5cf7d03136027abd8f794005a8f3acbcab2e3a0","text":"specified via Provisioning Domain attributes (see prop-pvd) or another specific property. Note that this property is not used to specify an interface scope for a particular endpoint. ifspec provides details about how to qualify endpoint candidates on a per-interface basis. 6.2.12. pvd"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-03898ec68b018d88b7e3e754cc7c1dd7d8e39dcdd3c73370b15f8f08293f75c8","text":"ppm-urn-space). Clients SHOULD display the \"detail\" field of all errors. The \"instance\" value MUST be the endpoint to which the request was targeted. The problem document MUST also include a \"taskid\" member which contains the associated PPM task ID, encoded with base64 using the standard alphabet RFC4648 (this value is always known, see task-configuration). \"taskid\" member which contains the associated PPM task ID, encoded in Base 64 using the URL and filename safe alphabet with no padding as defined in sections 5 and 3.2 of RFC4648 (this value is always known, see task-configuration). In the remainder of this document, we use the tokens in the table above to refer to error types, rather than the full URNs. For"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-03c53b6b70270334ddf4648e189ffc88bbc931b35b68f9493d8a6ad2afbb99da","text":"It was noted in XPROT that certificates in use by servers that support outdated protocols such as SSLv2 can be used to forge signatures for certificates that contain the keyEncipherment KeyUsage (RFC5280 section 4.2.1.3) In order to prevent this type of cross- (RFC5280 section 4.2.1.3). In order to prevent this type of cross- protocol attack, we define a new DelegationUsage extension to X.509 that permits use of delegated credentials. (See certificate- requirements.)"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-03dba025d3298095f9970e343dd2320eb2f7a2abca697fa70e8da3b20b9223a2","text":"in the system policy. The valid values for the access network interface kinds are implementation specific. 5.2.10. 5.2.11. Type: Enumeration"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-04cccdb1d4a3fc1f7b42cd7d5b2a339d7059d28cc4fb63e98d5127775753d363","text":"A serialized authorized key object, base64-encoded. The \"key\" field in this object MUST match the client's account key. In response to the challenge, the client MUST parse the authorized key object and verify that its \"key\" field contains the client's account key. The client then computes the SHA-256 digest Z of the JSON-encoded authorized key object (without base64-encoding), and encodes Z in hexadecimal form. The client will generate a self-signed certificate with the subjectAlternativeName extension containing the dNSName \"..acme.invalid\". The client will then configure the TLS server at the domain such that when a handshake is initiated with the Server Name Indication extension set to \"..acme.invalid\", the generated test certificate is presented. Number of DVSNI iterations In response to the challenge, the client MUST decode and parse the authorized keys object and verify that it contains exactly one entry, whose \"token\" and \"key\" attributes match the token for this challenge and the client's account key. The client then computes the SHA-256 digest Z0 of the JSON-encoded authorized key object (without base64-encoding), and encodes Z0 in UTF-8 lower-case hexadecimal form. The client then generates iterated hash values Z1...Z(n-1) as follows: The client generates a self-signed certificate for each iteration of Zi with a single subjectAlternativeName extension dNSName that is \"..acme.invalid\", where \"Zi[0:32]\" and \"Zi[32:64]\" represent the first 32 and last 32 characters of the hex- encoded value, respectively (following the notation used in Python). The client then configures the TLS server at the domain such that when a handshake is initiated with the Server Name Indication extension set to \"..acme.invalid\", the corresponding generated certificate is presented. The response to the DVSNI challenge simply acknowledges that the client is ready to fulfill this challenge."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-04d2cac7f9f59d8557e3585532d155e0796bcb972cfc1b6a0748e6f429e295b9","text":"client's control of the domain by verifying that the TLS server was configured appropriately. Compute the Z-value from the authorized key object in the same way as the client. Choose a subset of the N DVSNI iterations to check, according to local policy. For each iteration, compute the Zi-value from the authorized keys object in the same way as the client. Open a TLS connection to the domain name being validated on port 443, presenting the value \"..acme.invalid\" in the SNI field (where the comparison is case-insensitive). Open a TLS connection to the domain name being validated on the requested port, presenting the value \"..acme.invalid\" in the SNI field (where the comparison is case-insensitive). Verify that the certificate contains a subjectAltName extension with the dNSName of \"..acme.invalid\". with the dNSName of \"..acme.invalid\", and that no other dNSName entries of the form \"*.acme.invalid\" are present in the subjectAltName extension. It is RECOMMENDED that the ACME server verify a random subset of the N iterations with an appropriate sized to ensure that an attacker who can provision certs for a default virtual host, but not for arbitrary simultaneous virtual hosts, cannot pass the challenge. For instance, testing a subset of 5 of N=25 domains ensures that such an attacker has only a one in 25/5 chance of success if they post certs Zn in random succession. (This probability is enforced by the requirement that each certificate have only one Zi value.) It is RECOMMENDED that the ACME server validation TLS connections from multiple vantage points to reduce the risk of DNS hijacking"}
{"_id":"q-en-mediatypes-05086a608ec2fcef25a0034f8c0c537d652ea0ce3f326c3e20e24b0f0195592e","text":"Change controller: n/a 3.2. 2.2. The OpenAPI Specification Media Types convey OpenAPI document (OAS) files as defined in oas for version 3.0.0 and above. Those files can be serialized in JSON or yaml. Since there are multiple OpenAPI Specification versions, those media-types support the \"version\" parameter. The following examples conveys the desire of a client to receive an OpenAPI Specification resource preferably in the following order: openapi 3.1 in yaml openapi 3.0 in yaml any openapi version in json 2.2.1. The following information serves as the registration form for the \"application/openapi+json\" media type. Type name: application"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-0530f5fda1540ff6299e7dc554149ffdb99380c52d228f6bdd56f6597f89fe88","text":"Various HTTP versions have been used for media delivery. HTTP/1.0, HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 are carried over TCP, and TCP's transport behavior is described in tcp-behavior. HTTP/3 is carried over QUIC, and QUIC's transport behavior is described in quic-behavior. behavior is described in reliable-behavior. HTTP/3 is carried over QUIC, and QUIC's transport behavior is described in quic-behavior. Unreliable media delivery using RTP and other UDP-based protocols is also discussed in ultralow, udp-behavior, and hop-by-hop-encrypt, but it is difficult to give general guidance for these applications. For instance, when packet loss occurs, the most appropriate response may depend on the type of codec being used. also discussed in ultralow, unreliable-behavior, and hop-by-hop- encrypt, but it is difficult to give general guidance for these applications. For instance, when packet loss occurs, the most appropriate response may depend on the type of codec being used. 3."}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-05bca13fa5beb34c3eac6e01243af0ad459eaf3c5cb7363b47af4c9bf1a802f2","text":"identified by \"aead_id\". The then constructs an , \"enc_request\", from a binary encoded HTTP request, \"request\", as follows: request BINARY, \"request\", as follows: Construct a message header, \"hdr\", by concatenating the values of \"key_id\", \"kem_id\", \"kdf_id\", and \"aead_id\", as one 8-bit integer"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-05c06bed4a2da84cb657758d26b278fb61c83396df9e699354077a0005fdb5de","text":"Served DNS Zones\" registry for 'resolver.arpa.' with the description \"DNS Resolver Special-Use Domain\", listing this document as the reference. 8.2. In accordance with Section 5 of RFC6761, the answers to the following questions are provided relative to this document: Are human users expected to recognize these names as special and use them differently? In what way? No. This name is used automatically by DNS stub resolvers running on client devices on behalf of users, and users will never see this name directly. Are writers of application software expected to make their software recognize these names as special and treat them differently? In what way? No. There is no use case where a non-DNS application (covered by the next question) would need to use this name. Are writers of name resolution APIs and libraries expected to make their software recognize these names as special and treat them differently? If so, how? Yes. DNS client implementors are expected to use this name when querying for a resolver's properties instead of records for the name itself. DNS servers are expected to respond to queries for this name with their own properties instead of checking the matching zone as it would for normal domain names. Are developers of caching domain name servers expected to make their implementations recognize these names as special and treat them differently? If so, how? Yes. Caching domain name servers should not forward queries for this name to avoid causing validation failures due to IP address mismatch. Are developers of authoritative domain name servers expected to make their implementations recognize these names as special and treat them differently? If so, how? No. DDR is designed for use by recursive resolvers. Theoretically, an authoritative server could choose to support this name if it wants to advertise support for encrypted DNS protocols over plain-text DNS, but that scenario is covered by other work in the IETF DNSOP working group. Does this reserved Special-Use Domain Name have any potential impact on DNS server operators? If they try to configure their authoritative DNS server as authoritative for this reserved name, will compliant name server software reject it as invalid? Do DNS server operators need to know about that and understand why? Even if the name server software doesn't prevent them from using this reserved name, are there other ways that it may not work as expected, of which the DNS server operator should be aware? This name is locally served, and any resolver which supports this name should never forward the query. DNS server operators should be aware that records for this name will be used by clients to modify the way they connect to their resolvers. How should DNS Registries/Registrars treat requests to register this reserved domain name? Should such requests be denied? Should such requests be allowed, but only to a specially- designated entity? IANA should hold the registration for this name. Non-IANA requests to register this name should always be denied by DNS Registries/ Registrars. "}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-05c29b646e357d82c3492c9e0ef3ef9f043dfa6b263a3ca9de61245db56a0c9b","text":"assigned by IANA and MUST NOT appear in the listing of assigned values. 10.5. 9.4. This document establishes a registry for HTTP context extension type codes. The \"HTTP Context Close Codes\" registry governs a 62-bit"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-05c98b950a66194fd3acc94efe29790fa207dd60f59bf2932643830d8e7561be","text":"during the lifetime of an ongoing DTLS session then the receiver will be unable to locate the correct security context. The new ciphertext record format with CID also provides content type encryption and record-layer padding. 1. The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) RFC6347 protocol was"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-061ed2ada256761adf3e9da586e3e83b406b26fbf38ef075ed5aa7e8c0c92c1f","text":"9. Please update the \"Media Types\" registry at https://iana.org/assignments/media-types [1] for the media types https://iana.org/assignments/media-types [3] for the media types \"application/ohttp-keys\" (iana-keys), \"message/ohttp-req\" (iana-req), and \"message/ohttp-res\" (iana-res). Please update the \"HTTP Problem Types\" registry at https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types [2] for the types https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types [4] for the types \"date\" (iana-problem-date) and \"ohttp-key\" (iana-problem-ohttp-key). 9.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-06423c38ab671893c3e375adabeb7184589144da9d723dcfc72cd4b18e515bb6","text":"QUIC, and applications ought not to use private keys intended for server authentication as keys for client authentication. Moreover, Transport Services systems MUST NOT automatically fall back Moreover, Transport Services systems must not automatically fall back from secure protocols to insecure protocols, or to weaker versions of secure protocols. For example, if an application requests a specific version of TLS, but the desired version of TLS is not available, its connection will fail. Applications are thus responsible for implementing security protocol fallback or version fallback by creating multiple Transport Services Connections, if so desired. Alternatively, a Transport Services system MAY allow applications to specify that fallback to a specific other version of a protocol is allowed. secure protocols (see equivalence). For example, if an application requests a specific version of TLS, but the desired version of TLS is not available, its connection will fail. Applications are thus responsible for implementing security protocol fallback or version fallback by creating multiple Transport Services Connections, if so desired. Alternatively, a Transport Services system MAY allow applications to specify that fallback to a specific other version of a protocol is allowed. "}
{"_id":"q-en-api-067bc65da38442d0520ec90c71776a814bb3fe884d73907e1d1d27f1ac2c3f88","text":"it wishes to share with the user (e.g., store info, maps, flight status, or entertainment). \"can-extend-session\" (optional, boolean): indicates that the URL specified as \"user-portal-url\" allows the user to extend a session once the client is no longer in a state of captivity. This provides a hint that a client system can suggest accessing the portal URL to the user when the session is near its limit in terms of time or bytes. \"seconds-remaining\" (optional, integer): indicates the number of seconds remaining, after which the client will be placed into a captive state. The API server SHOULD include this value if the"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-068128bc494b73d9a70d61faaebb799112e1d0308c4c725ea7574b29abdb2621","text":"IP address (IPv4 or IPv6 address): Interface name (string): Interface name (string), e.g., to qualify link-local or multicast addresses (see ifspec for details): Note that an IPv6 address specified with a scope (e.g. \"2001:db8:4920:e29d:a420:7461:7073:0a%en0\") is equivalent to"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-06ec585faf73fc8d0e105ffbb91943e87b18bbe5d92b5c459d77a5c06a53c002","text":"The best way to obscure an encoding is to appear random to observers, which is most rigorously achieved with encryption. 6.2. 7.2. While sufficiently robust connection ID generation schemes will mitigate linkability issues, they do not provide full protection."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-070f26971a24477f959580146b1b5a8876fb7075b1079a5d0631d97190f56057","text":"4. Servers MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in ServerKeyExchange messages. If no other signature algorithms are available (for example, if the client does not send a signature_algorithms extension), the server MUST abort the handshake with a handshake_failure alert or select a different cipher suite. If the client receives a ServerKeyExchange message indicating MD5 or SHA-1, then it MUST abort the connection with an illegal_parameter alert. 5. Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateVerify messages. If a server receives a CertificateVerify message with MD5 or SHA-1 it MUST abort the connection with handshake_failure or insufficient_security alert. MUST abort the connection with an illegal_parameter alert. 6."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-073de40dfba689bd6bcfd4f5de3c945a6ec198e9df732401504fb904fe26f3e6","text":"\"connect-udp\". For example, if the client is configured with URI template \"https://proxy.example.org/{target_host}/{target_port}/\" and wishes to open a UDP proxying tunnel to target 192.0.2.42:443, it could send the following request: \"https://proxy.example.org/.well-known/masque/ udp/{target_host}/{target_port}/\" and wishes to open a UDP proxying tunnel to target 192.0.2.42:443, it could send the following request: 3.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-0772346fac11c3531e0f705ba5de558d751e08ee0082ae2bdd87f6429d300d10","text":"queries being dropped either maliciously or unintentionally, clients can re-send their SVCB queries periodically. DoH resolvers that allow discovery using DNS SVCB answers over unencrypted DNS MUST NOT provide differentiated behavior based on the HTTP path alone, since an attacker could modify the \"dohpath\" parameter. While the IP address of the Unencrypted Resolver is often provisioned over insecure mechanisms, it can also be provisioned securely, such as via manual configuration, a VPN, or on a network with protections"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-0773c68fe2b1937742f582512e6267f4b4c643bada82cee136b0bbfae18b1d8d","text":"4.5. In order to be usable for 0-RTT, TLS MUST provide a NewSessionTicket message that contains the \"early_data\" extension with a max_early_data_size of 0xffffffff; the amount of data which the client can send in 0-RTT is controlled by the \"initial_max_data\" transport parameter supplied by the server. A client MUST treat receipt of a NewSessionTicket that contains an \"early_data\" extension with any other value as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. To communicate their willingness to process 0-RTT data, servers send a NewSessionTicket message that contains the \"early_data\" extension with a max_early_data_size of 0xffffffff; the amount of data which the client can send in 0-RTT is controlled by the \"initial_max_data\" transport parameter supplied by the server. Servers MUST NOT send the \"early_data\" extension with a max_early_data_size set to any value other than 0xffffffff. A client MUST treat receipt of a NewSessionTicket that contains an \"early_data\" extension with any other value as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. A client that wishes to send 0-RTT packets uses the \"early_data\" extension in the ClientHello message of a subsequent handshake (see"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-079d88b35545b1faa3704e70777def54e4c24dfb646997db9d74ba747e30c7e0","text":"interaction models in general, the following set of prerequisites MUST be in place to support the implementation of interaction models: A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser without accompanying evidence about its validity, used as proof of identity. The provenance of Evidence with respect to a distinguishable Attesting Environment MUST be correct and unambiguous. An Attester Identity MAY be a unique identity, it MAY be included in a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), or it MAY be part of a group signature, or it MAY be a randomised DAA credential DAA. An Attester Identity MAY be a unique identity, MAY be included in a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), MAY be part of a group signature, or it MAY be a randomized DAA credential DAA. Attestation Evidence MUST be authentic. In order to provide proofs of authenticity, Attestation Evidence SHOULD be cryptographically associated with an identity document (e.g. an PKIX certificate or trusted key material, or a randomised (e.g. an PKIX certificate or trusted key material, or a randomized DAA credential DAA), or SHOULD include a correct and unambiguous and stable reference to an accessible identity document."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-07b0c777433d2fcb423529863e2d1af1ab109094366c51c4abf287af84e368d9","text":"encounter \"tripped circuit breakers\", with resulting user-visible impacts. 6.2. 6.3. For most of the history of the Internet, we have trusted TCP to limit the impact of applications that sent a significant number of packets,"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-07f5d9774529d59a49c1f9697fa142a83d5e2781027e4d75be1504d6fec9e374","text":"will not result in a SendError separate from the InitiateError signaling the failure of Connection establishment. 8.2.7. The Transport Services interface provides two properties to allow a sender to signal the relative priority of data transmission: the Priority Message Property msg-priority, and the Connection Priority Connection Property conn-priority. These properties are designed to allow the expression and implementation of a wide variety of approaches to transmission priority in the transport and application layer, including those which do not appear on the wire (affecting only sender-side transmission scheduling) as well as those that do (e.g. I-D.ietf-httpbis-priority. A Transport Services system gives no guarantees about how its expression of relative priorities will be realized; for example, if a transport stack that only provides a single in-order reliable stream is selected, prioritization information can only be ignored. However, the Transport Services system will seek to ensure that performance of relatively-prioritized connections and messages is not worse with respect to those connections and messages than an equivalent configuration in which all prioritization properties are left at their defaults. The Transport Services interface does order Connection Priority over the Priority Message Property. In the absense of other externalities (e.g., transport-layer flow control), a priority 1 Message on a priority 0 Connection will be sent before a priority 0 Message on a priority 1 Connection in the same group. 8.3. Once a Connection is established, it can be used for receiving data"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-taps-transport-security-0806adf5ea24ab52c206028ab504811e2d9181a6ac084b0bf3b4c325ca6b6ec3","text":"4. There exists a common set of features shared across the transport protocols surveyed in this document. The mandatory features should be provided by any transport security protocol, while the optional features are extensions that a subset of the protocols provide. For clarity, we also distinguish between handshake and record features. protocols surveyed in this document. Mandatory features constitute a baseline of functionality that an application may assume for any TAPS implementation. Optional features by contrast may vary from implementation to implementation, and so an application cannot simply assume they are available. Applications learn of and use optional features by querying for their presence and support. Optional features may not be implemented, or may be disabled if their presence impacts transport services or if a necessary transport service is unavailable. 4.1. 4.1.1. Segment encryption and authentication: Transit data must be protected with an authenticated encryption algorithm. Forward-secure segment encryption and authentication: Transit data must be protected with an authenticated encryption algorithm. Forward-secure key establishment: Negotiated keying material must come from an authenticated, forward-secure key exchange protocol. Private key interface or injection: Authentication based on public key signatures is commonplace for many transport security"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-080794fddfd93fd81b90f4213abcc489cded4c7bd3994ce3f5272a0362ab2487","text":"or split-tunnel. In this case, the client does not specify any scope in its request. The server assigns the client an IPv6 address prefix to the client (2001:db8::/64) and a full-tunnel route of all IPv6 addresses (::/0). The client can then send to any IPv6 host using a source address in its assigned prefix. The server assigns the client an IPv4 address to the client (192.0.2.11) and a full-tunnel route of all IPv4 addresses (0.0.0.0/0). The client can then send to any IPv4 host using a source address in its assigned prefix. A setup for a split-tunnel VPN (the case where the client can only access a specific set of private subnets) is quite similar. In this case, the advertised route is restricted to 2001:db8::/32, rather than ::/0. case, the advertised route is restricted to 192.0.2.0/24, rather than 0.0.0.0/0. 6.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-0827b2437aa50947e51dc83c27957f155ad8c6ae989a5d9b95f4af80159b762f","text":"To properly indicate use of DTLS, the field MUST be set to \"UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVPF\", as specified in RFC5764, Section 8, if the default candidate uses UDP transport, or \"TCP/DTLS/RTP/SAVPF\", as specified in I-D.nandakumar-mmusic-proto-iana-registration if the default candidate uses TCP transport. specified in RFC7850 if the default candidate uses TCP transport. If codec preferences have been set for the associated transceiver, media formats MUST be generated in the corresponding order, and"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-0832f7b4e9e30a417875589a53b95c6b9e574adb4e6ceba549015fac9104bda4","text":"The backend server begins by generating a message ServerHelloECHConf, which is identical in content to a ServerHello message with the exception that ServerHelloECHConf.random is equal to 24 random bytes followed by 8 zero bytes. It then computes a string where Derive-Secret and Handshake Secret are as specified in RFC8446, Section 7.1, and ClientHelloInner...ServerHelloECHConf refers to the sequence of handshake messages beginning with the first ClientHello and ending with ServerHelloECHConf. Finally, the backend server constructs its ServerHello message so that it is equal to followed by 8 zero bytes. It then computes an 8-byte string where HKDF-Expand-Label and Transcript-Hash are as defined in RFC8446, Section 7.1, \"0\" indicates a string of Hash.length bytes set to zero, and ClientHelloInner...ServerHelloECHConf refers to the sequence of handshake messages beginning with the first ClientHelloInner and ending with ServerHelloECHConf. (Note that ClientHelloInner and ServerHelloECHConf messages replace the ClientHello and ServerHello messages in the transcript hash sequence as specified in Section 4.1.1 of RFC8446. Finally, the backend server constructs its ServerHello message so that it is equal to ServerHelloECHConf but with the last 8 bytes of ServerHello.random set to the first 8 bytes of accept_confirmation. set to \"accept_confirmation\". The backend server MUST NOT perform this operation if it negotiated TLS 1.2 or below. Note that doing so would overwrite the downgrade"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-dnssd-srp-08361c329faa7649a40e1050ddca32c18d8689876f3320ca6489dcb9eb201953","text":"Because the DNS-SD registration protocol is automatic, and not managed by humans, some additional bookkeeping is required. When an update is constructed by the SRP requestor, it MUST include an EDNS(0) Update Lease Option I-D.sekar-dns-ul. The Update Lease Option contains two lease times: the Lease Time and the Key Lease Time. EDNS(0) Update Lease Option I-D.ietf-dnssd-update-lease. The Update Lease Option contains two lease times: the Lease Time and the Key Lease Time. These leases are promises, similar to RFC2131, from the SRP requestor that it will send a new update for the service registration before"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-0838aa6ee3a50445c3703765e4acb2b1a9c7e0a8366543cc8c02bbe9675ee887","text":"the \"tree\" array divided by two. Construct a new group state using the information in the GroupInfo object. The new member's position in the tree is \"index\", as defined above. object and verify the integrity of the tree using the \"tree_hash\". The new member's position in the tree is \"index\", as defined above. Identify the lowest node at which the direct paths from \"index\" and \"signer_index\" overlap. Set private keys for that node and"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-0861bdb0f994293d4ec012fc74a97040c6777d22d0cbcc929c832ee1ff51dea1","text":"Terminology specific to tree computations is described in ratchet- tree-terminology. 2.1. We use the TLS presentation language RFC8446 to describe the structure of protocol messages. structure of protocol messages. In addition to the base syntax, we add two additional features, the ability for fields to be optional and the ability for vectors to have variable-size length headers. 2.1.1. An optional value is encoded with a presence-signaling octet, followed by the value itself if present. When decoding, a presence octet with a value other than 0 or 1 MUST be rejected as malformed. 2.1.2. In the TLS presentation language, vectors are encoded as a sequence of encoded elements prefixed with a length. The length field has a fixed size set by specifying the minimum and maximum lengths of the encoded sequence of elements. In MLS, there are several vectors whose sizes vary over significant ranges. So instead of using a fixed-size length field, we use a variable-size length using a variable-length integer encoding based on the one in Section 16 of RFC9000. (They differ only in that the one here requires a minimum-size encoding.) Instead of presenting min and max values, the vector description simply includes a \"V\". For example: Such a vector can represent values with length from 0 bytes to 2^62 bytes. The variable-length integer encoding reserves the two most significant bits of the first byte to encode the base 2 logarithm of the integer encoding length in bytes. The integer value is encoded on the remaining bits, in network byte order. The encoded value MUST use the smallest number of bits required to represent the value. When decoding, values using more bits than necessary MUST be treated as malformed. This means that integers are encoded on 1, 2, 4, or 8 bytes and can encode 6-, 14-, 30-, or 62-bit values respectively. For example, the eight-byte sequence c2 19 7c 5e ff 14 e8 8c (in hexadecimal) decodes to the decimal value 151288809941952652; the four byte sequence 9d 7f 3e 7d decodes to 494878333; the two byte sequence 7b bd decodes to 15293; and the single byte 25 decodes to 37 (as does the two byte sequence 40 25). The following figure adapts the pseudocode provided in RFC9000 to add a check for minimum-length encoding: The use of variable-size integers for vector lengths allows vectors to grow very large, up to 2^62 bytes. Implementations should take care not to allow vectors to overflow available storage. To facilitate debugging of potential interoperatbility problems, implementations should provide a clear error when such an overflow condition occurs. 3."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-087b2fa93aebb78dc13180c464c23a47cbad1c52b5909021d32e62a6c6b171d8","text":"maximum_name_length is greater than 256. A list of extensions that the client can take into consideration when generating a Client Hello message. The purpose of the field is to provide room for additional features in the future. The format is defined in RFC8446; Section 4.2. The same interpretation rules apply: extensions MAY appear in any order, but there MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type in the extensions block. An extension may be tagged as mandatory by using an extension type codepoint with the high order bit set to 1. A client which receives a mandatory extension they do not understand must reject the ECHOConfig content. when generating a ClientHello message. The purpose of the field is to provide room for additional functionality in the future. See config-extensions for guidance on what type of extensions are appropriate for this structure. The format is defined in RFC8446, Section 4.2. The same interpretation rules apply: extensions MAY appear in any order, but there MUST NOT be more than one extension of the same type in the extensions block. An extension can be tagged as mandatory by using an extension type codepoint with the high order bit set to 1. A client which receives a mandatory extension they do not understand MUST reject the ECHOConfig content. Clients MUST parse the extension list and check for unsupported mandatory extensions. If an unsupported mandatory extension is"}
{"_id":"q-en-sframe-089a695cd4c8cdedad58d5ffc0cdfcbc2af9d9df63434efac4905064e7404406","text":"3.2.3. The sending client maps the outgoing streams and give them unique indices: 0, 1,.. etc. As mentioned above SFrame supports up to 16 outgoing stream. After encoding the frame and before packetizing it, the necessary media metadata will be moved out of the encoded frame buffer, to be used later in the RTP header extension. The encoded frame, the metadata buffer and the stream index are passed to SFrame encryptor which internally keeps track of the number of frames encrypted so far for that stream. The encryptor constructs SFrame header using the stream index and frame counter and derive the encryption IV. The frame is encrypted using the encryption key and the header, encrypted frame and the media metadata are authenticated using the authentication key. The authentication tag is then truncated (If supported by the cipher suite) and prepended at the end of the ciphertext. After encoding the frame and before packetizing it, the necessary media metadata will be moved out of the encoded frame buffer, to be used later in the RTP header extension. The encoded frame and the metadata buffer are passed to SFrame encryptor which internally keeps track of the number of frames encrypted so far. The encryptor constructs SFrame header using frame counter and key id and derive the encryption IV. The frame is encrypted using the encryption key and the header, encrypted frame and the media metadata are authenticated using the authentication key. The authentication tag is then truncated (If supported by the cipher suite) and prepended at the end of the ciphertext. The encrypted payload is then passed to a generic RTP packetized to construct the RTP packets and encrypts it using SRTP keys for the"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-08a8be52e4ef749518ed952809605fd4ae3de5666ef98c44d21a3ce9bdc67c7c","text":"the ratchet tree the provisional GroupContext, to update the ratchet tree and generate the \"commit_secret\": Apply the DirectPath to the tree, as described in Apply the UpdatePath to the tree, as described in synchronizing-views-of-the-tree, and store \"key_package\" at the Committer's leaf."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-08b3d8ae4288acd6e36efa16e5271d8dd2d08c3650f7ae539c56d760236a4e39","text":"obtained via some other mechanism such as being configured in the Verifier by an administrator. For example, for some claims the Verifier might check the values of claims in the Evidence against constraints specified in the Appraisal Policy for Evidence. Such constraints might involve a comparison for equality against reference values, or a check for being in a range bounded by reference values, or membership in a set of reference values, or a check against values in other claims, or any other test. Such reference values might be specified as part of the Appraisal Policy for Evidence itself, or might be obtained from a separate source, such as an Endorsement, and then used by the Appraisal Policy for Evidence. The actual data format and semantics of a known-good value are specific to claims and implementations. There is no general purpose format for them or general means for comparison defined in this architecture document. Similarly, for some claims the Verifier might check the values of claims in the Evidence for membership in a set, or against a range of values, or against known- bad values such as an expiration time. These reference values may be conveyed to the Verifier as part of an Endorsement or as part of Appraisal Policy or both as these are the two input paths to the Verifier. The Relying Party uses Attestation Results by applying its own Appraisal Policy to make application-specific decisions such as authorization decisions. The Attestation Result Appraisal Policy"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-0916289c620020299b2f888e149cc7668b51e904da0db6db7555e56770c137bd","text":"Applications may need to annotate the Messages they send with extra information to control how data is scheduled and processed by the transport protocols in the Connection. A messageContext object contains parameters for sending Messages, and can be passed to the transport protocols in the Connection. A MessageContext object contains properties for sending Messages, and can be passed to the Send Action. Note that these properties are per-Message, not per- Send if partial Messages are sent (send-partial). All data blocks associated with a single Message share properties. For example, it"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-094102e53bdcf54dbe812f2e8fe39614dedab02210d2f2902fc9d18f4127ff1c","text":"changes under discussion, via issues and pull requests in GitHub current as of the time of writing. 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2. In this section, we discusses those aspects of the QUIC transport"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-0a2adc7e5f5f8ce01d1a53ebe01a1abf51217de5fd337e3358e735f812c51e5f","text":"9. RFC7626 discusses DNS Privacy Considerations in both \"On the wire\" (Section 2.4), and \"In the server\" (Section 2.5) contexts. This is also a useful framing for DoH's privacy considerations. 9.1. DoH encrypts DNS traffic and requires authentication of the server. This mitigates both passive surveillance RFC7258 and active attacks that attempt to divert DNS traffic to rogue servers (RFC7626 Section 2.5.1). DNS over TLS RFC7858 provides similar protections, while direct UDP and TCP based transports are vulnerable to this class of attack. Additionally, the use of the HTTPS default port 443 and the ability to mix DoH traffic with other HTTPS traffic on the same connection can deter unprivileged on-path devices from interfering with DNS operations and make DNS traffic analysis more difficult. 9.2. A DoH implementation is built on IP, TCP, TLS, and HTTP. Each layer contains one or more common features that can be used to correlate queries to the same identity. DNS transports will generally carry the same privacy properties of the layers used to implement them. For example, the properties of IP, TCP, and TLS apply to DNS over TLS implementations. The privacy considerations of using the HTTPS layer in DoH are incremental to those of DNS over TLS. DoH is not known to introduce new concerns beyond those associated with HTTPS. At the IP level, the client address provides obvious correlation information. This can be mitigated by use of a NAT, proxy, VPN, or simple address rotation over time. It may be aggravated by use of a DNS server that can correlate real-time addressing information with other personal identifiers, such as when a DNS server and DHCP server are operated by the same entity. TCP-based solutions may seek performance through the use of TCP Fast Open RFC7413. The cookies used in TCP Fast Open allow servers to correlate TCP sessions together. TLS based implementations often achieve better handshake performance through the use of some form of session resumption mechanism such as session tickets RFC5077. Session resumption creates trivial mechanisms for a server to correlate TLS connections together. HTTP's feature set can also be used for identification and tracking in a number of different ways. For example, authentication request header fields explicitly identify profiles in use, and HTTP Cookies are designed as an explicit state tracking mechanism between the client and serving site and often are used as an authentication mechanism. Additionally, the User-Agent and Accept-Language request header fields often convey specific information about the client version or locale. This facilitates content negotiation and operational work- arounds for implementation bugs. Request header fields that control caching can expose state information about a subset of the client's history. Mixing DoH requests with other HTTP requests on the same connection also provides an opportunity for richer data correlation. The DoH protocol design allows applications to fully leverage all the features of the HTTP ecosystem, including features not enumerated here. Implementations of DoH clients and servers need to consider the benefit and privacy impact of these features, and their deployment context, when deciding whether or not to enable them. Implementations are advised to expose the minimal set of data needed to achieve the desired feature set. Determining whether or not a DoH implementation requires HTTP cookie RFC6265 support is particularly important because HTTP cookies are the primary state tracking mechanism in HTTP. HTTP Cookies SHOULD NOT be accepted by DOH clients unless they are explicitly required by a use case. 10. Running DNS over HTTPS relies on the security of the underlying HTTP transport. This mitigates classic amplification attacks for UDP- based DNS. Implementations utilizing HTTP/2 benefit from the TLS"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-0a6a5bdc99829f3f8d94bb76b009d5b21f35e18934e3e6eb9252b842c24ad4e9","text":"direct path of the new node Set the leaf node in the tree at position \"index\" to a new node containing the public key from the ClientInitKey in the Add corresponding to the ciphersuite in use, as well as the credential under which the ClientInitKey was signed containing the public key from the ClientInitKey in the Add, as well as the credential under which the ClientInitKey was signed The \"update_secret\" resulting from this change is an all-zero octet string of length Hash.length."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-0b19070de3b102b62661567adbea05b518b5d9e5e23b55bff725e9b9ae002a8a","text":"ack-eliciting packets, to avoid an expensive consecutive PTO expiration due to a single lost datagram. It is possible that the sender has no new or previously-sent data to send. As an example, consider the following sequence of events: new When the PTO timer expires, and there is new or previously sent unacknowledged data, it MUST be sent. Data that was previously sent with Initial encryption MUST be sent before Handshake data and data previously sent at Handshake encryption MUST be sent before any ApplicationData data. It is possible the sender has no new or previously-sent data to send. As an example, consider the following sequence of events: new application data is sent in a STREAM frame, deemed lost, then retransmitted in a new packet, and then the original transmission is acknowledged. In the absence of any new application data, a PTO timer expiration now would find the sender with no new or previously- sent data to send. When there is no data to send, the sender SHOULD send a PING or other ack-eliciting frame in a single packet, re-arming the PTO timer. acknowledged. When there is no data to send, the sender SHOULD send a PING or other ack-eliciting frame in a single packet, re-arming the PTO timer. Alternatively, instead of sending an ack-eliciting packet, the sender MAY mark any packets still in flight as lost. Doing so avoids"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-architecture-0b1f09713c8c4a5b2f5d7ae18b54ac7bed6eac5e17304b28e6c7f020f2582867","text":"When, and under what circumstances, a reinitialization proposal is allowed. When proposals from external senders are allowed. When proposals from external senders are allowed and how to authorize those proposals. When external joiners are allowed and how to authorize those external commits. Which other proposal types are allowed. A policy of when members should commit pending proposals in a group. When external joiners are allowed. A policy of how to protect and share the GroupInfo objects needed for external joins. A policy for when two credentials represent the same client. Note that many credentials may be issued authenticating the same"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-0b366823e099da26a3d69559c4d530e499badf9ba584f854d609ec80d15d664a","text":"MLS Signature Labels (mls-signature-labels) MLS Public Key Encryption Labels (mls-public-key-encryption- labels) MLS Exporter Labels (mls-exporter-labels) All of these registries should be under a heading of \"Messaging Layer"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-0b81d906bfb7dfccdeb443fc88e7b76cd1762e87f165e4a4c79dcdc87bf0bf67","text":"to RTCP. If more accurate control of bandwidth is needed, \"TIAS\" should be used instead of \"AS\". For any \"RR\" or \"RS\" bandwidth values, handle as specified in RFC3556, Section 2. Any specified \"CT\" bandwidth value MUST be ignored, as the meaning of this construct at the media level is not well defined. For any \"RR\" or \"RS\" bandwidth values, handle as specified in RFC3556, Section 2. [TODO: handling of CN, telephone-event, \"red\"] If the media section if of type audio:"}
{"_id":"q-en-t2trg-rest-iot-0bac5065b042aaf0f2a9627c0b3dbef40adc11ff3a17d0a391f7c7f7248ebbba","text":"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: HTTP security: Section 9 of RFC7230, Section 9 of RFC7231, etc. HTTP security: Section 11 of RFC9112, Section 17 of RFC9110, etc. CoAP security:"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-0beabfb434c16d1387e59353d6c1bca90a4f1dc4d0d82bf3e92ce5f6321dc34f","text":"applications using QUIC, as well. Application developers should note that any fallback they use when QUIC cannot be used due to network blocking of UDP SHOULD guarantee QUIC cannot be used due to network blocking of UDP should guarantee the same security properties as QUIC; if this is not possible, the connection SHOULD fail to allow the application to explicitly handle connection should fail to allow the application to explicitly handle fallback to a less-secure alternative. See fallback. 14."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-datagram-0c44f582abae049610da1d17ec98a92d546d4375827f455055c8b379d41d12e0","text":"max_datagram_frame_size Indicates that the connection should enable support for unreliable DATAGRAM frames. An endpoint that advertises this transport parameter can receive datagrams frames from the other endpoint, up to and including the length in bytes provided in the transport parameter. A non-zero value indicates that the endpoint supports receiving unreliable DATAGRAM frames. An endpoint that advertises this transport parameter can receive DATAGRAM frames from the other endpoint, up to and including the length in bytes provided in the transport parameter. The default value is 0. This document also registers a new value in the QUIC Frame Type registry:"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-rrc-0c687f450a55421de9ab056bab3d3852a270d9bc0e6b013cfded4315dc82541a","text":"The \"return_routability_check\" message MUST be authenticated and encrypted using the currently active security context. The receiver that observes the peer's address and or port update MUST 5. The receiver that observes the peer's address or port update MUST stop sending any buffered application data (or limit the data sent to a TBD threshold) and initiate the return routability check that proceeds as follows: the unvalidated address to the anti-amplification limit) and initiate the return routability check that proceeds as follows: A cookie is placed in a \"return_routability_check\" message of type path_challenge; An unpredictable cookie is placed in a \"return_routability_check\" message of type path_challenge; The message is sent to the observed new address and a timeout T is started; The message is sent to the observed new address and a timer T (see timer-choice) is started; The peer endpoint, after successfully verifying the received \"return_routability_check\" message echoes the cookie value in a \"return_routability_check\" message of type path_response; \"return_routability_check\" message responds by echoing the cookie value in a \"return_routability_check\" message of type path_response; When the initiator receives and verifies the \"return_routability_check\" message contains the sent cookie, it"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-0cb309cd282861bd434ccea1c759afd6383562dbb453bed20b824e9cb53d147c","text":"This document registers one new ND option type under the sub-registry \"IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Option Formats\": Resource Directory address Option (38) Resource Directory Address Option (38) 9.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-0cb41513d88910a3af49d4bb2f2f97a618b2d681bbf33ddef51ca3f35be91a2c","text":"ECHClientHello.config_id since it can be used as a tracking vector. In such cases, the second method should be used for matching the ECHClientHello to a known ECHConfig. See optional-configs. Unless specified by the application using (D)TLS or externally configured, implementations MUST use the first method. specified by the application profile or otherwise externally configured, implementations MUST use the first method. The server then iterates over the candidate ECHConfig values, attempting to decrypt the \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-0cc001869e5faf7fbfbb6ed2fe2203712d62e36baf6d20428edf336c3e77d8fc","text":"MTUs can vary. TODO: Describe how the path MTU can be computed, specifically propagation across HTTP proxies. 4.5. In WebTransport over HTTP/3, the client MAY send its SETTINGS frame, as well as multiple WebTransport CONNECT requests, WebTransport data streams and WebTransport datagrams, all within a single flight. As those can arrive out of order, a WebTransport server could be put into a situation where it receives a stream or a datagram without a corresponding session. Similarly, a client may receive a server- initiated stream or a datagram before receiving the CONNECT response headers from the server. To handle this case, WebTransport endpoints SHOULD buffer streams and datagrams until those can be associated with an established session. To avoid resource exhaustion, the endpoints MUST limit the number of buffered streams and datagrams. When the number of buffered streams is exceeded, a stream SHALL be closed by sending a RESET_STREAM and/ or STOP_SENDING with the \"H3_WEBTRANSPORT_BUFFERED_STREAM_REJECTED\" error code. When the number of buffered datagrams is exceeded, a datagram SHALL be dropped. It is up to an implementation to choose what stream or datagram to discard. 5. An WebTransport session over HTTP/3 is terminated when either"}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-0cdbfd87f7782f824194a6b5ca42e53e25b91abf8a223d8c0d39b18c61fb8208","text":"Compute a COSE_Encrypt0 object as defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct, with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher suite, using the encryption key K_3, the initialization vector IV_3, the plaintext P, and the following parameters as input (see COSE): initialization vector IV_3, the plaintext PLAINTEXT_3, and the following parameters as input (see COSE): protected = h''"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-0d4513365cfb9af50dd4f89ad2845f4bdba1c0fed606e9fb7606788327ffdb12","text":"A hash function A Diffie-Hellman finite-field group or elliptic curve group A key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) An AEAD encryption algorithm A signature algorithm The ciphersuite's Diffie-Hellman group is used to instantiate an HPKE I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke instance for the purpose of public-key encryption. The ciphersuite must specify an algorithm \"Derive-Key-Pair\" that maps octet strings with length Hash.length to HPKE key pairs. The ciphersuite's KEM used to instantiate an HPKE I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke instance for the purpose of public-key encryption. Each ciphersuite has a \"Derive-Key-Pair\" function that maps octet strings of length \"Nsk\" (a KEM-specific constant defined by HPKE) to HPKE key pairs. This function is defined to be HPKE's \"DeriveKeyPair\" function. Ciphersuites are represented with the CipherSuite type. HPKE public keys are opaque values in a format defined by the underlying Diffie- Hellman protocol (see the Ciphersuites section of the HPKE specification for more information). keys are opaque values in a format defined by the underlying protocol (see the Cryptographic Dependencies section of the HPKE specification for more information). The signature algorithm specified in the ciphersuite is the mandatory algorithm to be used for signatures in MLSPlaintext and the tree"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-0d4cfca5f497e45ee2c68a9abb7a71865d6263f71095c23eaae433770938673c","text":"Endpoint and group lookups result in links to the selected registration resource and group resources. Endpoint registration resources are annotated with their endpoint names (ep), domains (d, if present), context (con), endpoint type (et, if present) and lifetime (lt, if present). Additional endpoint attributes are added as link attributes to their endpoint link unless their specification says otherwise. Group resources are annotated with their group names (gp), domain (d, if present) and multicast address (con, if present). if present), context (con) and lifetime (lt, if present). Additional endpoint attributes are added as link attributes to their endpoint link unless their specification says otherwise. Group resources are annotated with their group names (gp), domain (d, if present) and multicast address (con, if present). While Endpoint Lookup does expose the registration resources, the RD does not need to make them accessible to clients. Clients SHOULD NOT"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ctls-0d510ea1ec1579529dd3a8192cd1279748e02e3d3f8a90c7ae4ba33be368ffc9","text":"2.3. The cTLS handshake framing is same as the TLS 1.3 handshake framing, except for two changes: The length field is omitted. The HelloRetryRequest message is a true handshake message instead of a specialization of ServerHello. When \"template.handshakeFraming\" is not \"true\", cTLS uses a custom handshake framing that saves space by relying on the record layer for message lengths. (This saves 3 bytes per message compared to TLS, or 9 bytes compared to DTLS.) This compact framing is defined by the \"CTLSHandshake\" and \"CTLSDatagramHandshake\" structs. Any handshake type registered in the IANA TLS HandshakeType Registry can be conveyed in a \"CTLS[Datagram]Handshake\", but not all messages are actually allowed on a given connection. This definition shows the messages types supported in \"CTLSHandshake\" as of TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3, but any future message types are also permitted. Each \"CTLSHandshake\" or \"CTLSDatagramHandshake\" MUST be conveyed as a single \"CTLSClientPlaintext.fragment\", \"CTLSServerPlaintext.fragment\", or \"CTLSCiphertext.encrypted_record\", and is therefore limited to a maximum length of \"2^16-1\" or less. When operating over UDP, large \"CTLSDatagramHandshake\" messages will also require the use of IP fragmentation, which is sometimes undesirable. Operators can avoid these concerns by setting \"template.handshakeFraming = true\". 3. In general, we retain the basic structure of each individual TLS handshake message. However, the following handshake messages have been modified for space reduction and cleaned up to remove pre-TLS 1.3 baggage. In general, we retain the basic structure of each individual TLS or DTLS handshake message. However, the following handshake messages have been modified for space reduction and cleaned up to remove pre- TLS 1.3 baggage. 3.1. The cTLS ClientHello is defined as follows. The \"profile_id\" field MUST identify the profile that is in use. A zero-length ID corresponds to the cTLS default protocol. 3.2. We redefine ServerHello in the following way. 3.3. The HelloRetryRequest has the following format. In cTLS, the HelloRetryRequest message is a true handshake message instead of a specialization of ServerHello. The HelloRetryRequest has the following format. The HelloRetryRequest is the same as the ServerHello above but without the unnecessary sentinel Random value."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-taps-transport-security-0d588ef20cb650560cbe618be779fb460255233256c50a21a7d56d033305fe89","text":"connection must be authenticated before any data is sent to said party. Source validation: Source validation must be provided to mitigate server-targeted DoS attacks. This can be done with puzzles or cookies. 4.1.2. Pre-shared key support: A record protocol must be able to use a pre-shared key established out-of-band to encrypt individual messages, packets, or datagrams. Pre-shared key support: A security protocol must be able to use a pre-shared key established out-of-band or from a prior session to encrypt individual messages, packets, or datagrams. 4.2. 4.2.1. Mutual authentication: Transport security protocols must allow each endpoint to authenticate the other if required by the application. Transport dependency: None. Application dependency: Mutual authentication required for application support. Connection mobility: Sessions should not be bound to a network connection (or 5-tuple). This allows cryptographic key material and other state information to be reused in the event of a connection change. Examples of this include a NAT rebinding that occurs without a client's knowledge. Transport dependency: Connections are unreliable or can change due to unpredictable network events, e.g., NAT re-bindings. Application dependency: None. Source validation: Source validation must be provided to mitigate server-targeted DoS attacks. This can be done with puzzles or cookies. Transport dependency: Packets may arrive as datagrams instead of streams from unauthenticated sources. Application dependency: None. Application-layer feature negotiation: The type of application using a transport security protocol often requires features configured at the connection establishment layer, e.g., ALPN"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-0d7986b2c4f7706cc089bd75172feb1c7abdca2ea098593441d86afbad2a9935","text":" Privacy Pass: The Protocol draft-davidson-pp-protocol-latest Privacy Pass Protocol Specification draft-ietf-privacypass-protocol-latest Abstract"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-0d885e900c3c0919413c2e569c801fc8e6409609e30bc7c21100efc523f45a8b","text":"that supports this extension if the extension is received when the transport is not QUIC. Negotiating the quic_transport_parameters extension causes the EndOfEarlyData to be removed; see remove-eoed. 8.3. The TLS EndOfEarlyData message is not used with QUIC. QUIC does not"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-0d950d59ae50cac67fae8dd51860b1173b80e4de43d8e1ba5bdb0a4b4c1fd985","text":"5.2. Upon receiving an \"encrypted_server_name\" extension, the server MUST first perform the following checks: Upon receiving an \"encrypted_server_name\" extension, the client- facing server MUST first perform the following checks: If it is unable to negotiate TLS 1.3 or greater, it MUST abort the connection with a \"handshake_failure\" alert."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-0dfbabeb323c4eb320b86c76bc3d0c1f10d388801ba5517bd90df3aa79a3dc94","text":"used later as described in private-finalize. The Client then generates an HTTP POST request to send to the Issuer, with the TokenRequest as the body. The media type for this request is \"message/token-request\". An example request is shown below. \"application/private-token-request\". An example request is shown below. Upon receipt of the request, the Issuer validates the following conditions:"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-0e0d073f5fd930afc399f1ff3811e179c47386e39d3ae91062dfecbb4b968fc7","text":"No supported codec is present in the offer. The bundle policy is \"max-bundle\", the m= section is not in a bundle group, and this is not the first m= section. The bundle policy is \"max-bundle\", and this is not the first m= section or in the same bundle group as the first m= section. The bundle policy is \"balanced\", the m= section is not in a bundle group, and this is not the first m= section for this media type. The bundle policy is \"balanced\", and this is not the first m= section for this media type or in the same bundle group as the first m= section for this media type. The RTP/RTCP multiplexing policy is \"require\" and the m= section doesn't contain an \"a=rtcp-mux\" attribute."}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-0e9e00a714a8ec1015747f786e748d9af0e4600135a1034869a3b5f955913a85","text":"4.2.2. To provide forward secrecy in an even more efficient way than re- running EDHOC, EDHOC provides the function EDHOC-KeyUpdate. When EDHOC-KeyUpdate is called, the old PRK_out is deleted and the new PRK_out is calculated as a \"hash\" of the old key using the Expand function as illustrated by the following pseudocode: running EDHOC, EDHOC provides the optional function EDHOC-KeyUpdate. When EDHOC-KeyUpdate is called, a new PRK_out is calculated as a \"hash\" of the old PRK_out using the Expand function as illustrated by the following pseudocode. The change of PRK_out causes a change to PRK_exporter and derived keys using EDHOC-Exporter. where hash_length denotes the output size in bytes of the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-0f1da30a7424230d43607de9590dd76505d642deeb492f2060fdff70902e4e57","text":"The key and nonce provided to the AEAD are computed as the KDF of the first \"KDF.Nh\" bytes of the ciphertext generated in the previous section. If the length of the ciphertext is less than \"KDF.Nh\", the whole ciphertext is used without padding. In pseudocode, the key and nonce are derived as: whole ciphertext is used. In pseudocode, the key and nonce are derived as: The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) for the SenderData ciphertext is the first three fields of MLSCiphertext:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-0fcfdd78334a5574e85f07cd5165614e808e40f04f28ad57397c06eccff21d0d","text":"Upon receiving the ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule, an endpoint MAY start routing IP packets in that prefix to its peer. If an endpoint receives multiple ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsules, all of the advertised routes can be used. For example, multiple ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsules are necessary to provide routing to both IPv4 and IPv6 hosts. Routes are removed using ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsules. 4.2.4. The ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsule allows an endpoint to communicate to its"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-0ff99c8f058012fb4b7d9f85b02f495757f71260f72d87f3410cfd10d38ddc9f","text":"section 4.3. For simplicity, if both RTX and FEC are supported, the FEC SSRC MUST be the same as the RTX SSRC. [OPEN ISSUE: Handling of a=imageattr] If a data channel m= section has been offered, a m= section MUST also be generated for data. The field MUST be set to \"application\" and the field MUST be set to exactly match the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-104c67bf925e1e7c9e1fcbf791213c01c3785e9caba19b851c0a5c08be067cef","text":"A secondary use case is web applications that want to access DNS information. Standardizing an HTTPS mechanism allows this to be done in a way consistent with the cross-origin resource sharing CORS security model of the web and also integrate the caching mechanisms of DNS with those of HTTP. These applications may be interested in in a way consistent with the cross-origin resource sharing security model of the web CORS and also integrate the caching mechanisms of DNS with those of HTTP. These applications may be interested in using a different media type than traditional clients. [ This paragraph is to be removed when this document is published as an RFC ] Note that these use cases are different than those in a [[ This paragraph is to be removed when this document is published as an RFC ]] Note that these use cases are different than those in a similar protocol described at I-D.ietf-dnsop-dns-wireformat-http. The use case for that protocol is proxying DNS queries over HTTP instead of over DNS itself. The use cases in this document all"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-1094926021bb330ba5937ff6ed6ff8e59c8ace28f77f4a4c5906dfecf285f5a5","text":"indicate that the client configuration used to construct the request is incorrect or out of date. 5.3. The problem type PROBLEM of \"https://iana.org/assignments/http- problem-types#ohttp-key\" is defined. An MAY use this problem type in a response to indicate that an used an outdated or incorrect . fig-key-problem shows an example response in HTTP/1.1 format. As this response cannot be encrypted, it might not reach the . A cannot rely on the using this problem type. A might also be configured to disregard responses that are not encapsulated on the basis that they might be subject to observation or modification by an . A might manage the risk of an outdated using a heuristic approach whereby it periodically refreshes its if it receives a response with an error status code that has not been encapsulated. 6. In this design, a wishes to make a request of a server that is"}
{"_id":"q-en-sframe-109602f26f8ef2703969ef581891ca0346bb239c51e87169f37ff097ecf26d55","text":"3- Authentication key to authenticate the encrypted frame and the media metadata The IV is 128 bits long and calculated from the SRC and CTR field of the Frame header: The IV is 128 bits long and calculated from the CTR field of the Frame header: 3.2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-113cf1ff84b990416b8c2432848df043cf4a3e05ca853292271e7653c74356b7","text":"assumed to be implicitly reset. After sending a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, an endpoint immediately enters the closing state. enters the closing state; see closing. After receiving a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, endpoints enter the draining state; see draining. During the closing period, an endpoint that sends a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame SHOULD respond to any incoming packet that can be decrypted with another packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. Such an endpoint SHOULD limit the number of packets it generates containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. For instance, an endpoint could wait for a An immediate close can be used after an application protocol has arranged to close a connection. This might be after the application protocol negotiates a graceful shutdown. The application protocol can exchange messages that are needed for both application endpoints to agree that the connection can be closed, after which the application requests that QUIC close the connection. When QUIC consequently closes the connection, a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with an application-supplied error code will be used to signal closure to the peer. The closing and draining connection states exist to ensure that connections close cleanly and that delayed or reordered packets are properly discarded. These states SHOULD persist for at least three times the current Probe Timeout (PTO) interval as defined in QUIC- RECOVERY. Disposing of connection state prior to exiting the closing or draining state could cause could result in an endpoint generating a stateless reset unnecessarily when it receives a late-arriving packet. Endpoints that have some alternative means to ensure that late-arriving packets do not induce a response, such as those that are able to close the UDP socket, MAY end these states earlier to allow for faster resource recovery. Servers that retain an open socket for accepting new connections SHOULD NOT end the closing or draining states early. Once its closing or draining state ends, an endpoint SHOULD discard all connection state. The endpoint MAY send a stateless reset in response to any further incoming packets belonging to this connection. 10.2.1. An endpoint enters the closing state after initiating an immediate close. In the closing state, an endpoint retains only enough information to generate a packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame and to identify packets as belonging to the connection. An endpoint in the closing state sends a packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame in response to any incoming packet that it attributes to the connection. An endpoint SHOULD limit the rate at which it generates packets in the closing state. For instance, an endpoint could wait for a progressively increasing number of received packets or amount of time before responding to a received packet. An endpoint is allowed to drop the packet protection keys when entering the closing period (draining) and send a packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE in response to any UDP datagram that is received. However, an endpoint without the packet protection keys cannot identify and discard invalid packets. To avoid creating an unwitting amplification attack, such endpoints MUST limit the cumulative size of packets containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame to 3 times the cumulative size of the packets that cause those packets to be sent. To minimize the state that an endpoint maintains for a closing connection, endpoints MAY send the exact same packet. before responding to received packets. An endpoint's selected connection ID and the QUIC version are sufficient information to identify packets for a closing connection; the endpoint MAY discard all other connection state. An endpoint that is closing is not required to process any received frame. An endpoint MAY retain packet protection keys for incoming packets to allow it to read and process a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. An endpoint MAY drop packet protection keys when entering the closing state and send a packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame in response to any UDP datagram that is received. However, an endpoint that discards packet protection keys cannot identify and discard invalid packets. To avoid being used for an amplication attack, such endpoints MUST limit the cumulative size of packets it sends to three times the cumulative size of the packets that are received and attributed to the connection. To minimize the state that an endpoint maintains for a closing connection, endpoints MAY send the exact same packet in response to any received packet. Allowing retransmission of a closing packet is an exception to the requirement that a new packet number be used for each packet in"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-114b03a1c24c1358c38eebce5ad3253a4244d5624f938d573a7d1dc45a0a41a9","text":"meaning that the server is not willing to receive any WebTransport sessions. Because WebTransport over HTTP/3 requires support for HTTP/3 datagrams and the Capsule Protocol, both the client and the server MUST indicate support for HTTP/3 datagrams by sending a SETTINGS_H3_DATAGRAM value set to 1 in their SETTINGS frame (see Section 2.1.1 of HTTP-DATAGRAM). WebTransport over HTTP/3 also requires support for QUIC datagrams. To indicate support, both the client and the server MUST send a max_datagram_frame_size transport parameter with a value greater than 0 (see Section 3 of QUIC-DATAGRAM). 3.2. RFC8441 defines an extended CONNECT method in Section 4, enabled by"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-1214107adf22ee1691ce76cf1eb8e6ace3f4c4b794755384491c8e87cea976db","text":"packets in response to Initial packets that don't include a valid token. Both server and service must have access to Universal time, though tight synchronization is unnecessary. Both server and service must have time synchronized with respect to one another to prevent tokens being incorrectly marked as expired, though tight synchronization is unnecessary. The tokens are protected using AES128-GCM AEAD, as explained in token-protection-with-aead. All tokens, generated by either the"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-123d0cd8d884bc6a128968dac62ed2a2a18bd407be13ce04641e1ad30c21d45f","text":"information that does not reveal information about the encapsulated response. An Oblivious Gateway Resource acts as a gateway for requests to the Target Resource (see HTTP). The one exception is that any information it might forward in a response MUST be encapsulated, unless it is responding to errors it detects before removing encapsulation of the request; see errors. In order to achieve the privacy and security goals of the protocol an Oblivious Gateway Resource also needs to observe the guidance in server-responsibilities."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-124a24f35410bf26480897787dbbec34b49be943d3fa17fabd3ae3b16c1e4566","text":"13.2. Endpoints acknowledge all packets they receive and process. However, only ack-eliciting packets (see QUIC-RECOVERY) trigger the sending of an ACK frame. Packets that are not ack-eliciting are only only ack-eliciting packets cause an ACK frame to be sent within the maximum ack delay. Packets that are not ack-eliciting are only acknowledged when an ACK frame is sent for other reasons. When sending a packet for any reason, an endpoint should attempt to"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-125872ab0dbebda3aa8cdfcdf046cffe64506df2bc8e8f531cc15aa822828b57","text":"endpoint that receives packets for routes it has rejected MUST NOT treat that as an error. ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT and ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsules are applied in order of receipt: if a prefix is covered by multiple received ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT and/or ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsules, only the last received capsule applies as it supersedes prior ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT and ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsules for this prefix. 5. IP packets are sent using HTTP Datagrams I-D.ietf-masque-h3-datagram."}
{"_id":"q-en-coap-tcp-tls-1266bd9206ec8ca041b206ccdb517c188493b6b2e06a5a4116e81ed2e8d4d6f5","text":"successful connection to the Alternative-Address inherits all the security properties of the current connection. SNI vs. Default-Uri-Host: Any security negotiated in the TLS handshake is for the SNI name exchanged in the TLS handshake and checked against the certificate provided by the server. The Default-Uri-Host Option cannot be used to extend these security properties to the additional server name. 9. 9.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-webpush-protocol-12769a0124da07be73bcbe08deb2b43d56bd172d59805d455f199ab259f197b1","text":"The application server requests the delivery of receipts from the push server by making a HTTP GET request to the receipt subscription resource. The push service does not respond to this request, it instead uses I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2 to send push receipts when messages are acknowledged (acknowledge_message) by the user agent. instead uses RFC7540 to send push receipts when messages are acknowledged (acknowledge_message) by the user agent. Each receipt is pushed in response to a synthesized GET request. The GET request is made to the same push message resource that was"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-131f57da28e55d28ef49019a21df8087dbfd0547e3ff498d4a3b0c9aec15a3a4","text":"2. This document uses the following set of terms, roles, and concepts as defined in I-D.ietf-rats-architecture: Attester, Verifier, Relying Party, Conceptual Message, Evidence, Endorsement, Attestation Result, Appraisal Policy, Attesting Environment, Target Environment defined in I-D.ietf-rats-architecture: Attester, Verifier, Relying Party, Conceptual Message, Evidence, Endorsement, Attestation Result, Appraisal Policy, Attesting Environment, Target Environment A PKIX Certificate is an X.509v3 format certificate as specified by RFC5280."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-13346d60d915f585f4210e124ed847a6635a8d590fbddf8a062511231bb737bd","text":"The security model takes the following form: A server is created that runs \"PP_Server_Setup\" and broadcasts the A server is created that runs \"ServerSetup\" and broadcasts the \"ServerUpdate\" message \"s_update\". The adversary runs \"PP_Client_Setup\" on \"s_update\". The adversary runs \"ClientSetup\" on \"s_update\". The adversary specifies a number \"Q\" of issuance phases to initiate with the server, where each phase \"i in 1..Q\" consists of"}
{"_id":"q-en-coap-tcp-tls-13396e3a639289e6079a2382a47b708f783f0ecdba77ad07a8c997f3140b1fcb","text":"Retransmission and deduplication of messages is provided by the TCP/ TLS protocol. Since the TCP protocol provides ordered delivery of messages, the mechanism for reordering detection when RFC7641 is not needed. The value of the Observe Option in notifications MAY be empty on transmission and MUST be ignored on reception. 3. CoAP over WebSockets can be used in a number of configurations. The"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-13ab1515ac8302d10be46c6ecf991425eb098512b92a40744eede3a480811c2a","text":"Characters in the String Value are encoded using a definite length text string (type 3). Octets in the Data Value are encoded using a definite length byte string (type 2) . a definite length byte string (type 2). For compactness, the CBOR representation uses integers for the map keys defined in tbl-cbor-labels. This table is conclusive, i.e., there is no intention to define any additional integer map keys; any extensions will use string map keys. This allows translators converting between CBOR and JSON representations to convert also all future labels without needing to update implementations. For compactness, the CBOR representation uses integers for the labels, as defined in tbl-cbor-labels. This table is conclusive, i.e., there is no intention to define any additional integer map keys; any extensions will use string map keys. This allows translators converting between CBOR and JSON representations to convert also all future labels without needing to update implementations. For streaming SensML in CBOR representation, the array containing the records SHOULD be an CBOR indefinite length array while for non streaming SenML, a definite length array MUST be used. the records SHOULD be a CBOR indefinite length array while for non-streaming SenML, a definite length array MUST be used. The following example shows a dump of the CBOR example for the same sensor measurement as in co-ex."}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-13ac983c567fac09fcf4bf4c9b22080340bdbeef88c99a3305a6647c95f69ca9","text":"QUIC QUIC has numerous extension points, including the version number that occupies the second through fifth bytes of every long header (see RFC8999). If experimental versions are rare, and QUIC version 1 constitutes the vast majority of QUIC traffic, there is the potential for middleboxes to ossify on the version bytes always being (see QUIC-INVARIANTS). If experimental versions are rare, and QUIC version 1 constitutes the vast majority of QUIC traffic, there is the potential for middleboxes to ossify on the version bytes always being 0x00000001. Furthermore, version 1 Initial packets are encrypted with keys derived from a universally known salt, which allow observers to inspect the contents of these packets, which include the TLS Client Hello and Server Hello messages. Again, middleboxes may ossify on In QUIC version 1, Initial packets are encrypted with the version- specific salt as described in Section 5.2 of QUIC-TLS. Protecting Initial packets in this way allows observers to inspect their contents, which includes the TLS Client Hello or Server Hello messages. Again, there is the potential for middleboxes to ossify on the version 1 key derivation and packet formats. Finally QUIC-VN provides two mechanisms for endpoints to negotiate"}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-13b6c4d8003d1771c1aef8d920049cff60e5ac6e9b7abbec13bdb17041fd3046","text":"This contains a pointer to the public specification for the field if one exists This registry will be initially populated by the values in COSE_KEY_PARAM_KEYS. The specification column for all of these entries will be this document. This registry will be initially populated by the values in --Multiple Tables--. The specification column for all of these entries will be this document. 15.8."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-13d4f0c868026d9cf0c904f644a5320911fb78484e1e89da16691c0ac92207ef","text":"not specify how protocols add security with TLS; how to initiate TLS handshaking and how to interpret the authentication certificates exchanged are left to the judgment of the designers and implementors of protocols that run on top of TLS. of protocols that run on top of TLS. Application protocols using TLS MUST specify how TLS works with their application protocol, including how and when handshaking occurs, and how to do identity verification. I-D.ietf-uta-rfc6125bis provides useful guidance on integrating TLS with applicaiton protocols. This document defines TLS version 1.3. While TLS 1.3 is not directly compatible with previous versions, all versions of TLS incorporate a"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-141ca0e0a12f3dd47a6c7ef0005f2b103ce522d4c08c0498f0e40b0d7cc5ad65","text":"\"index-wild-selector\", \"filter-selector\", or \"list-selector\" acting on objects or arrays, or a \"slice-selector\" acting on arrays. Note that there is no \"bald\" descendant selector \"..\". Note that there is no \"bald\" descendant selector (\"..\" on its own). 3.5.7.2. The \"descendant-selector\" selects certain descendants of a node: A \"descendant-selector\" selects certain descendants of a node: the \"..\" form (and the \"..[]\" form where \"\" is a \"quoted-member-name\") selects those descendants that are member"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-1425b7c29234ce296c17d2c3eda367ddf5a309a1acfd64009e01f81ad654447b","text":"enc-request. request describes the process for constructing and processing an Encapsulated Request. The Nenc parameter corresponding to the HpkeKdfId can be found in HPKE. Responses are bound to responses and so consist only of AEAD- protected content. response describes the process for constructing and processing an Encapsulated Response."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-1463027436534c05f1c2dfb3607196cfdf6775a1bd347e2cfe7ed35aba858045","text":"\"HTTP fields\"; see Sections RFC9110 and RFC9110 of RFC9110. For a listing of registered HTTP fields, see the \"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry\" maintained at . . Like HTTP/2, HTTP/3 has additional considerations related to the use of characters in field names, the Connection header field, and pseudo-header fields. Field names are strings containing a subset of ASCII characters. Properties of HTTP field names and values are discussed in more detail in RFC9110. As in HTTP/2, characters in field names MUST be converted to lowercase prior to their encoding. A request or response containing uppercase characters in field names MUST be treated as . detail in RFC9110. Characters in field names MUST be converted to lowercase prior to their encoding. A request or response containing uppercase characters in field names MUST be treated as . Like HTTP/2, HTTP/3 does not use the Connection header field to indicate connection-specific fields; in this protocol, connection- specific metadata is conveyed by other means. An endpoint MUST NOT generate an HTTP/3 field section containing connection-specific fields; any message containing connection-specific fields MUST be treated as . HTTP/3 does not use the Connection header field to indicate connection-specific fields; in this protocol, connection-specific metadata is conveyed by other means. An endpoint MUST NOT generate an HTTP/3 field section containing connection-specific fields; any message containing connection-specific fields MUST be treated as . The only exception to this is the TE header field, which MAY be present in an HTTP/3 request header; when it is, it MUST NOT contain"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-14dc07b53af945d28768d055c3e116d9f954b5622f502655227f6a4f2837a1ad","text":"Exporters Labels marked as \"Yes\" are those allocated via Standards Track RFCs. Exporter Labels marked as \"No\" are not. If an item is not marked as recommended it does not necessarily mean that it is flawed; rather, it indicates that either the item has not been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases. IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for this registry to also refer to this document."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-1506a2e31d3a66084fcabf69d0bdff769e4d090b1b23126851b40a8bec7dcd24","text":"mechanism for DNS clients to use DNS records to discover a resolver's encrypted DNS configuration. This mechanism can be used to move from unencrypted DNS to encrypted DNS when only the IP address of a resolver is known. It can also be used to discover support for encrypted DNS protocols when the name of an encrypted resolver is known. This mechanism is designed to be limited to cases where unencrypted resolvers and their designated resolvers are operated by the same entity or cooperating entities. resolver is known. This mechanism is designed to be limited to cases where unencrypted resolvers and their designated resolvers are operated by the same entity or cooperating entities. It can also be used to discover support for encrypted DNS protocols when the name of an encrypted resolver is known. 1."}
{"_id":"q-en-documentsigning-eku-15486b45d61d09eaa2eca0cf51a5c0d68e968029d0040cd78a7a82e766396387","text":"1. RFC5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers for X.509 certificates. In addition, several extended key purpose identifiers were addedRFC7299 as public OIDs under the IANA PKIX Extended key purpose identifiers arc. While usage of the any extended key usage value is bad practice for publicly trusted certificates, there is no public and general extended key purpose identifier explicitly assigned for Document Signing certificates. The current practice is to use id-kp-emailProtection, id-kp-codeSigning or vendor defined Object IDs for general document signing purposes. RFC5280 specifies several extended key usages for X.509 certificates. In addition, several extended key usage had been addedRFC7299 as public OID under the IANA repository. While usage of any extended key usage is bad practice for publicly trusted certificates, there are no public and general extended key usage explicitly assigned for Document Signing certificates. The current practice is to use id-kp- emailProtection, id-kp-codeSigning or vendor defined Object ID for general document signing purposes. In circumstances where code signing and S/MIME certificates are also widely used for document signing, the technical or policy changes"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-rrc-1560c29906e959cf806cae4f6412f4bf7f3f29903dd5899d9d95d7eaab3e6f85","text":"After this point, any pending send operation is resumed to the bound peer address. 5. path-challenge-reqs and path-response-reqs contain the requirements for the initiator and responder roles, broken down per protocol phase. 5.1. The initiator MAY send multiple \"return_routability_check\" messages of type path_challenge to cater for packet loss on the probed path. Each path_challenge SHOULD go into different transport packets. (Note that the DTLS implementation may not have control over the packetization done by the transport layer.) The transmission of subsequent path_challenge messages SHOULD be paced to decrease the chance of loss. Each path_challenge message MUST contain random data. The initiator MAY use padding using the record padding mechanism available in DTLS 1.3 (and in DTLS 1.2, when CID is enabled on the sending direction) up to the anti-amplification limit to probe if the path MTU (PMTU) for the new path is still acceptable. 5.2. The responder MUST NOT delay sending an elicited path_response message. The responder MUST send exactly one path_response messages for each received path_request. The responder MUST send the path_response on the network path where the corresponding path_challenge has been received, so that validation succeeds only if the path is functional in both directions. The initiator MUST NOT enforce this behaviour The initiator MUST silently discard any invalid path_response it receives. Note that RRC does not cater for PMTU discovery on the reverse path. If the responder wants to do PMTU discovery using RRC, it should initiate a new path validation procedure. 5.3. When setting T, implementations are cautioned that the new path could have a longer round-trip time (RTT) than the original. In settings where there is external information about the RTT of the active path, implementations SHOULD use T = 3xRTT. If an implementation has no way to obtain information regarding the RTT of the active path, a value of 1s SHOULD be used. Profiles for specific deployment environments - for example, constrained networks I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile - MAY specify a different, more suitable value. 6. The example TLS 1.3 handshake shown in fig-handshake shows a client and a server negotiating the support for CID and for the RRC"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-1598a2db162712e35bc4b5f19663ec91dd73a62ac130723ef18180141135105e","text":"When sending ClientHello, the client first computes ClientHelloInner, including any PSK binders, and then MAY substitute extensions which it knows will be duplicated in ClientHelloOuter. To do so, the client computes a hash of the entire ClientHelloInner message with the same hash as for the KDF used to encrypt ClientHelloInner. Then, the client removes and replaces extensions from ClientHelloInner with a single \"outer_extensions\" extension. The list of \"outer_extensions\" include those which were removed from client computes a hash of the entire ClientHelloInner message as: where \"inner\" is the ClientHelloInner structure and \"Extract\", \"Expand\", and \"Nh\" are as defined by the KDF API in I-D.irtf-cfrg- hpke. Then, the client removes and replaces extensions from ClientHelloInner with a single \"outer_extensions\" extension. The list of \"outer_extensions\" include those which were removed from ClientHelloInner, in the order in which they were removed. The hash contains the full ClientHelloInner hash computed above."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-15c6bfb65f5f63fff1077a5aca9770f49a2919670d231109b6aeedb9b9b9892b","text":"if they define semantics for such HTTP Datagrams and negotiate mutual support. 3.1. Implementations of HTTP/3 that support HTTP Datagrams can indicate that to their peer by sending the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with a value of 1. The value of the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter MUST be either 0 or 1. A value of 0 indicates that HTTP Datagrams are not supported. An endpoint that receives the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with a value that is neither 0 or 1 MUST terminate the connection with error H3_SETTINGS_ERROR. Endpoints MUST NOT send QUIC DATAGRAM frames until they have both sent and received the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with a value of 1. When clients use 0-RTT, they MAY store the value of the server's H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter. Doing so allows the client to send QUIC DATAGRAM frames in 0-RTT packets. When servers decide to accept 0-RTT data, they MUST send a H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter greater than or equal to the value they sent to the client in the connection where they sent them the NewSessionTicket message. If a client stores the value of the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with their 0-RTT state, they MUST validate that the new value of the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter sent by the server in the handshake is greater than or equal to the stored value; if not, the client MUST terminate the connection with error H3_SETTINGS_ERROR. In all cases, the maximum permitted value of the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter is 1. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations that support receiving HTTP Datagrams using QUIC always send the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with a value of 1, even if the application does not intend to use HTTP Datagrams. This helps to avoid \"sticking out\"; see security. 3.1.1. [[RFC editor: please remove this section before publication.]] Some revisions of this draft specification use a different value (the Identifier field of a Setting in the HTTP/3 SETTINGS frame) for the H3_DATAGRAM Settings Parameter. This allows new draft revisions to make incompatible changes. Multiple draft versions MAY be supported by either endpoint in a connection. Such endpoints MUST send multiple values for H3_DATAGRAM. Once an endpoint has sent and received SETTINGS, it MUST compute the intersection of the values it has sent and received, and then it MUST select and use the most recent draft version from the intersection set. This ensures that both endpoints negotiate the same draft version. 4. This specification introduces the Capsule Protocol. The Capsule"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-15cfadbc0804eb3271546714ead68155222337fa23ec2f8364b825ed0c40fa36","text":"2.1.2. A dynamic table entry is considered blocking and cannot be evicted until its insertion has been acknowledged and there are no outstanding unacknowledged references to the entry. In particular, a dynamic table entry that has never been referenced can still be blocking. A blocking entry is unrelated to a blocked stream, which is a stream that a decoder cannot decode as a result of references to entries that are not yet available. Any encoder that uses the dynamic table has to keep track of blocked entries, whereas blocked streams are optional. An encoder MUST NOT insert an entry into the dynamic table (or duplicate an existing entry) if doing so would evict an entry with unacknowledged references. For header blocks that might rely on the newly added entry, the encoder can use a literal representation. duplicate an existing entry) if doing so would evict a blocking entry. In this case, the encoder can send literal representations of header fields. To ensure that the encoder is not prevented from adding new entries, the encoder can avoid referencing entries that are close to eviction."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-16660e76c757bfc6dcf09e148a5d3e9ba3c6ea4c1d402d332416a813914ba371","text":"For each offered m= section, if any of the following conditions are true, the corresponding m= section in the answer MUST be marked as rejected by setting the port in the m= line to zero, as indicated in RFC3264, Section 6., and further processing for this m= section can be skipped: RFC3264, Section 6, and further processing for this m= section can be skipped: The associated RtpTransceiver has been stopped. No supported codec is present in the offer. None of the offered media formats are supported and, if applicable, allowed by codec preferences. The bundle policy is \"max-bundle\", and this is not the first m= section or in the same bundle group as the first m= section."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-167557c0285024592a184de97ed09f672f2a6655960a033f0d37b38a25c79ecf","text":"any of these checks fail, then the CA MUST reject the new-account request. 7.3.3. 7.3.6. A client may wish to change the public key that is associated with an account in order to recover from a key compromise or proactively"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-16a58c3b33631c2588ffa2eff1359d3c636732d947f8099d129ef52cf5574923","text":"11.1.1. An Add proposal requests that a client with a specified KeyPackage be added to the group. added to the group. The proposer of the Add MUST validate the KeyPackage in the same way as receipients are required to do below. The proposer of the Add does not control where in the group's ratchet tree the new member is added. Instead, the sender of the Commit"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-172168172432e70084aa2ce07417220e51ce66971c5be6c72806e9ac50251f0b","text":"7.3.2.1. When the server cannot decrypt or does not process the When the server rejects ECH or otherwise ignores \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension, it continues with the handshake using the plaintext \"server_name\" extension instead (see server- behavior). Clients that offer ECH then authenticate the connection"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-resource-servers-172681916c804782357dd0139e2a61071d431ea2655e484290d2b105b4d8b5ee","text":"This document contains non-normative examples of partial and complete HTTP messages, JSON structures, URLs, query components, keys, and other elements. Some examples use a single trailing backslash '' to other elements. Some examples use a single trailing backslash \"\" to indicate line wrapping for long values, as per RFC8792. The \"\" character and leading spaces on wrapped lines are not part of the value."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-172a887822b3a0a8fa3eba03dfea3d317d8ebbc819e5a9224af9d54f047bfa84","text":"TRANSPORT categories for bundled m= sections, as described in I- D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-bundle-negotiation, Section 8.1. Note that if media m= sections are bundled into a data m= section, then certain TRANSPORT and IDENTICAL attributes may appear in the data m= section even if they would otherwise only be appropriate for a media m= section (e.g., \"a=rtcp-mux\"). This cannot happen in initial offers because in the initial offer JSEP implementations always list media m= sections (if any) before the data m= section (if any), and at least one of those media m= sections will not have the \"a=bundle-only\" attribute. Therefore, in initial offers, any \"a=bundle-only\" m= sections will be bundled into a preceding non-bundle-only media m= section. The \"a=group:BUNDLE\" attribute MUST include the MID identifiers specified in the bundle group in the most recent answer, minus any m= sections that have been marked as rejected, plus any newly added or"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-1759d1f26a8c90d791ba98c27117d5c30d2e36d1b9e11720d0f4d63c017fcdb8","text":"approach 2^(-L/2), that is, the birthday bound. For the algorithms described in this document, that probability is one in 2^64. In some cases, inputs shorter than the full size required by the packet protection algorithm might be used. To prevent an attacker from modifying packet headers, the header is transitively authenticated using packet protection; the entire packet header is part of the authenticated additional data. Protected"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-1885c10e55f3298a8ee68b6aae69e7fd67eeb955ca3757e92713c6ff5f65a5c8","text":"private key that signs the delegated credential also implictly revokes the delegated credential. 6.3. 6.4. Delegated credentials can be valid for 7 days and it is much easier for a service to create delegated credential than a certificate"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-189ac07382050563d9c161ccde4d2e2501e147d9da7cee9b3bafea77ab2d887c","text":"is the first three fields of MLSCiphertext: When parsing a SenderData struct as part of message decryption, the recipient MUST verify that the LeafNodeRef indicated in the \"sender\" field identifies a member of the group. recipient MUST verify that the leaf index indicated in the \"leaf_index\" field identifies a non-blank node. 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-18c092a11377c496e6b6f521a0fb2cced7c2835dc5f1626d167cd2189250515c","text":"2. The document defines the term \"Remote Attestation\" as follows: A process by which one entity (the \"Attester\") provides evidence about its identity and state to another remote entity (the \"Relying Party\"), which then assesses the Attester's trustworthiness for the Relying Party's own purposes. This document then uses the following terms: Appraisal Policy for Evidence: A set of rules that direct how a verifier evaluates the validity of information about an Attester. Compare /security policy/ in [RFC4949]. Appraisal Policy for Attestation Result: A set of rules that direct how a Relying Party evaluates the validity of information about an Attester. Compare /security policy/ in [RFC4949]. Attestation Result: The evaluation results generated by a Verifier, typically including information about an Attester, where the Verifier vouches for the validity of the results. Attester: An entity whose attributes must be evaluated in order to determine whether the entity is considered trustworthy, such as when deciding whether the entity is authorized to perform some operation. Endorsement: A secure statement that some entity (typically a manufacturer) vouches for the integrity of an Attester's signing capability. Endorser: An entity that creates Endorsements that can be used to help evaluate trustworthiness of Attesters. Evidence: A set of information about an Attester that is to be evaluated by a Verifier. Relying Party: An entity that depends on the validity of information about another entity, typically for purposes of authorization. Compare /relying party/ in [RFC4949]. Relying Party Owner: An entity, such as an administrator, that is authorized to configure Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results in a Relying Party. Verifier: An entity that evaluates the validity of Evidence about an Attester. Verifier Owner: An entity, such as an administrator, that is authorized to configure Appraisal Policy for Evidence in a Verifier. [EDITORIAL NOTE] The term Attestation and Remote Attestation are not defined in this document, at this time. This document will include pointers to industry uses of the terms, in an attempt to gain consensus around the term, and be consistent with the charter text defining this term. 3. 4. dataflow depicts the data that flows between different roles, independent of protocol or use case. An Attester creates Evidence that is conveyed to a Verifier. The Verifier uses the Evidence, and any Endorsements from Endorsers, by applying an Evidence Appraisal Policy to assess the trustworthiness of the Attester, and generates Attestation Results for use by Relying Parties. The Evidence Appraisal Policy might be obtained from an Endorser along with the Endorsements, or might be obtained via some other mechanism such as being configured in the Verifier by an administrator. The Relying Party uses Attestation Results by applying its own Appraisal Policy to make application-specific decisions such as authorization decisions. The Attestation Result Appraisal Policy might, for example, be configured in the Relying Party by an administrator. 5. 6. An Attester consists of at least one Attesting Environment and Attested Environment. In some implementations, the Attesting and Attested Environments might be combined. Other implementations might have multiple Attesting and Attested Environments. 7. The scope of this document is scenarios for which a Relying Party trusts a Verifier that can evaluate the trustworthiness of information about an Attester. Such trust might come by the Relying Party trusting the Verifier (or its public key) directly, or might come by trusting an entity (e.g., a Certificate Authority) that is in the Verifier's certificate chain. The Relying Party might implicitly trust a Verifier (such as in the Verifying Relying Party combination). Or, for a stronger level of security, the Relying Party might require that the Verifier itself provide information about itself that the Relying Party can use to evaluate the trustworthiness of the Verifier before accepting its Attestation Results. In solutions following the background-check model, the Attester is assumed to trust the Verifier (again, whether directly or indirectly via a Certificate Authority that it trusts), since the Attester relies on an Attestation Result it obtains from the Verifier, in order to access resources. The Verifier trusts (or more specifically, the Verifier's security policy is written in a way that configures the Verifier to trust) a manufacturer, or the manufacturer's hardware, so as to be able to evaluate the trustworthiness of that manufacturer's devices. In solutions with weaker security, a Verifier might be configured to implicitly trust firmware or even software (e.g., a hypervisor). That is, it might evaluate the trustworthiness of an application component, or operating system component or service, under the assumption that information provided about it by the lower-layer hypervisor or firmware is true. A stronger level of security comes when information can be vouched for by hardware or by ROM code, especially if such hardware is physically resistant to hardware tampering. The component that is implicitly trusted is often referred to as a Root of Trust. 8. 9. 10. The conveyance of Evidence and the resulting Attestation Results reveal a great deal of information about the internal state of a device. In many cases, the whole point of the Attestation process is"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-18c631eca55303c9bd0861fd413bb586665a1e75e0144e17dea243527a924366","text":"REQUIRED. The URI at which the client instance can make continuation requests. This URI MAY vary per request, or MAY be stable at the AS if the AS includes an access token. The client instance MUST use this value exactly as given when making a continue-request. stable at the AS. The client instance MUST use this value exactly as given when making a continue-request. RECOMMENDED. The amount of time in integer seconds the client instance SHOULD wait after receiving this continuation handle and"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-18dc443cb07662fdf9ead7bdd4fdc350370301bf11f88ddeaf13bd38dc08edc2","text":"2.4.6. The \"match\" function extension provides a way to check whether (the The \"match()\" function extension provides a way to check whether (the entirety of, see search below) a given string matches a given regular expression, which is in I-D.draft-ietf-jsonpath-iregexp form."}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-18edb0b14c3a0f612e5f521ba89aadef92aac9512392a538b16eaaad44debae8","text":"This version of QUIC provides no change from QUIC version 1 relating to the capabilities available to applications. Therefore, all Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) (RFC7301) codepoints specified to operate over QUICv1 can also operate over this version of QUIC. In particular, both the \"h3\" I-D.ietf-quic-http and \"doq\" I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic ALPNs can operate over QUICv2. specified to operate over QUIC version 1 can also operate over this version of QUIC. In particular, both the \"h3\" I-D.ietf-quic-http and \"doq\" I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic ALPNs can operate over QUIC version 2. All QUIC extensions defined to work with version 1 also work with version 2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-19081d29ae60b7c3c964dc621f91c84e601a88103450f22afdd694ce1a6890f4","text":"directions. In HTTP/1.x, the data stream consists of all bytes on the connection that follow the blank line that concludes either the request header section, or the 2xx (Successful) response header section. In HTTP/2 and HTTP/3, the data stream of a given HTTP request consists of all bytes sent in DATA frames with the corresponding stream ID. The concept of a data stream is particularly relevant for methods such as CONNECT where there is no HTTP message content after the headers. section. (Note that only a single HTTP request starting the capsule protocol can be sent on HTTP/1.x connections.) In HTTP/2 and HTTP/3, the data stream of a given HTTP request consists of all bytes sent in DATA frames with the corresponding stream ID. The concept of a data stream is particularly relevant for methods such as CONNECT where there is no HTTP message content after the headers. Note that use of the Capsule Protocol is not required to use HTTP Datagrams. If a new HTTP Upgrade Token is only defined over"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-191773d19d7ff6e378601607a84767282bef9f85d751806ea9ab642c2c9691d7","text":"The following fields are defined in this document; all other fields are as defined in the cited documents. Value of the negotiated CID. Value of the negotiated CID (variable length). 1 byte field indicating the length of the negotiated CID. The length (in bytes) of the serialised DTLSInnerPlaintext. The length (in bytes) of the serialised DTLSInnerPlaintext (two- byte integer). The length MUST NOT exceed 2^14. Note \"+\" denotes concatenation."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-1926e8386022b281813295bec0d945cc00e76a3fce7541381dda138e702eb86e","text":"validity period. In the absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise, the maximum validity period is set to 7 days. Peers MUST NOT issue credentials with a validity period longer than the maximum validity period. This mechanism is described in detail in client-and-server-behavior. the maximum validity period or that extends beyond the validity period of the delegation certificate. This mechanism is described in detail in client-and-server-behavior. It was noted in XPROT that certificates in use by servers that support outdated protocols such as SSLv2 can be used to forge"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-1969479e6e86cb02d083b01fa49de710cd4ad4d73ec1b92553948d54ea74497b","text":"Security considerations for JSONPath can stem from attack vectors on JSONPath implementations, and attack vectors on JSONPath implementations, attack vectors on how JSONPath queries are formed, and the way JSONPath is used in security-relevant mechanisms."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-19edba21d97df83f8d1d695fb3f25f3abb49584e460ddb942347c1f2bd41f81e","text":"member name \"\"a\"\". The result is again a list of one node: \"[{\"b\":0},{\"b\":1},{\"c\":2}]\". Next, \"[*]\" selects from any input node -- either an array or an object -- all its elements or members. The result is a list of three nodes: \"{\"b\":0}\", \"{\"b\":1}\", and \"{\"c\":2}\". Next, \"[*]\" selects from an input node of type array all its elements (if the input note were of type object, it would select all its member values, but not the member names). The result is a list of three nodes: \"{\"b\":0}\", \"{\"b\":1}\", and \"{\"c\":2}\". Finally, \".b\" selects from any input node of type object with a member name \"b\" and selects the node of the member value of the input"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-1a1f3a7819b8e05ace7cc7fbe8da487dc9c45a9a2546377eebedc938977292e0","text":"4.2.2. The stopped property indicates whether the transceiver has been stopped, either by a call to stopTransceiver or by applying an answer that rejects the associated \"m=\" section. In either of these cases, it is set to \"true\" and otherwise will be set to \"false\". stopped, either by a call to stop or by applying an answer that rejects the associated \"m=\" section. In either of these cases, it is set to \"true\" and otherwise will be set to \"false\". A stopped RtpTransceiver does not send any outgoing RTP or RTCP or process any incoming RTP or RTCP. It cannot be restarted."}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-1a40b1fbc6963eeb361c10720893ab563a2f19ea73d189c87eed36764d9ed70b","text":"bhttp request\", a zero byte, \"key_id\" as an 8-bit integer, plus \"kem_id\", \"kdf_id\", and \"aead_id\" as three 16-bit integers. Create a receiving HPKE context by invoking \"SetupBaseR()\" (HPKE) with \"skR\", \"enc\", and \"info\". This produces a context \"rctxt\". Create a receiving HPKE context, \"rctxt\", by invoking \"SetupBaseR()\" (HPKE) with \"skR\", \"enc\", and \"info\". Decrypt \"ct\" by invoking the \"Open()\" method on \"rctxt\" (HPKE), with an empty associated data \"aad\", yielding \"request\" or an"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-1a545e310af1a3df455c078d4cefe76a5bdf8e44309be6087c31143b7ccc2817","text":"Abstract This document provides an overview of the architecture of Transport Services, a system for exposing the features of transport protocols to applications. This architecture serves as a basis for Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and implementations that provide flexible transport networking services. It defines the common set of terminology and concepts to be used in more detailed discussion of Transport Services. Services, a model for exposing transport protocol features to applications for network communication. In contrast to what is provided by most existing Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), it is based on an asynchronous, event-driven interaction pattern; it uses messages for representing data transfer to applications; and it assumes an implementation that can use multiple IP addresses, multiple protocols, multiple paths, and provide multiple application streams. This document further defines the common set of terminology and concepts to be used in definitions of APIs and implementations. 1."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-1a6f0ff71ee027651c5d8cd7f61e5383d77472ead53f63648e4cde01651118bd","text":"Queries: The examples in tbl-wild show the \"wildcard\" selector in use by a child segment: The examples in tbl-wild show the wildcard selector in use by a child segment: The example above with the query \"$.o[*, *]\" shows that the wildcard selector may produce nodelists in distinct orders each time it"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-1a736f6bafa1b2975b672d6acbe5c7628b5436e1916f416b9f84b700a49bcb27","text":"An AEAD encryption algorithm A signature algorithm The ciphersuite's Diffie-Hellman group is used to instantiate an HPKE I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke instance for the purpose of public-key encryption. The ciphersuite must specify an algorithm \"Derive-Key-Pair\" that maps"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-1a97cc6b1636843981f24c8d9fa7dd7e856ea6e431b397851afc6e97ff589dce","text":"include padding. As an Authentication Parameter (\"auth-param\" from RFC9110, Section 11.2), the value can be either a token or a quoted-string, and might be required to be a quoted-string if the base64url string includes \"=\" characters. This attribute MAY be base64url string includes \"=\" characters. This parameter MAY be omitted in deployments where clients are able to retrieve the issuer key using an out-of-band mechanism. \"max-age\", an optional attribute that consists of the number of \"max-age\", an optional parameter that consists of the number of seconds for which the challenge will be accepted by the origin. Clients can ignore the challenge if the token-key is invalid or otherwise untrusted. The header field MAY also include the standard \"realm\" attribute, if desired. Issuance protocols MAY require other attributes. The header field MAY also include the standard \"realm\" parameter, if desired. Issuance protocols MAY require other parameters. Clients SHOULD ignore unknown parameters in challenges, except if otherwise specified by issuance protocols. As an example, the WWW-Authenticate header field could look like this:"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-1ab5e5360ea3e4e9193d8a0e137d03f87a2fe2445be0f4c86715c0d286dd214e","text":"the IP header can be obtained (GET_ECN.UDP(-Lite)). Calling \"Close\" on a UDP Connection (ABORT.UDP(-Lite)) releases the local port reservation. the local port reservation. The Connection then issues a \"Closed\" event. Calling \"Abort\" on a UDP Connection (ABORT.UDP(-Lite)) is identical to calling \"Close\", except that the Connection will send a ConnectionError Event rather than a Closed Event. a \"ConnectionError\" Event rather than a \"Closed\" Event. Calling \"CloseGroup\" on a UDP Connection (ABORT.UDP(-Lite)) is identical to calling \"Close\" on this Connection and on all"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-1ad15ca4158f4edc1fb3d6387a6837368a5206c72099ba0c287248d1f02b0649","text":"3.2. ECH allows the client to encrypt sensitive ClientHello extensions, e.g., SNI, ALPN, etc., under the public key of the client-facing server. This requires the client-facing server to publish the public key and metadata it uses for ECH for all the domains for which it serves directly or indirectly (via Split Mode). This document defines the format of the ECH encryption public key and metadata, referred to as an ECH configuration, and delegates DNS publication details to HTTPS-RR, though other delivery mechanisms are possible. In particular, if some of the clients of a private server are applications rather than Web browsers, those applications might have the public key and metadata preconfigured. When a client wants to establish a TLS session with the backend server, it constructs its ClientHello as indicated in real-ech. We will refer to this as the ClientHelloInner message. The client encrypts this message using the public key of the ECH configuration. It then constructs a new ClientHello, the ClientHelloOuter, with innocuous values for sensitive extensions, e.g., SNI, ALPN, etc., and with an \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension, which this document defines (encrypted-client-hello). The extension's payload carries the encrypted ClientHelloInner and specifies the ECH configuration used for encryption. Finally, it sends ClientHelloOuter to the server. Upon receiving the ClientHelloOuter, a TLS server takes one of the following actions: If it does not support ECH, it ignores the \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension and proceeds with the handshake as usual, per RFC8446, Section 4.1.2. If it is a client-facing server for the ECH protocol, but cannot decrypt the extension, then it terminates the handshake using the ClientHelloOuter. This is referred to as \"ECH rejection\". When ECH is rejected, the client-facing server sends an acceptable ECH configuration in its EncryptedExtensions message. If it supports ECH and decrypts the extension, it forwards the ClientHelloInner to the backend server, who terminates the connection. This is referred to as \"ECH acceptance\". A client-facing server enables ECH by publishing an ECH configuration, which is an encryption public key and associated metadata. The server must publish this for all the domains it serves via Shared or Split Mode. This document defines the ECH configuration's format, but delegates DNS publication details to HTTPS-RR. Other delivery mechanisms are also possible. For example, the client may have the ECH configuration preconfigured. When a client wants to establish a TLS session with some backend server, it constructs a private ClientHello, referred to as the ClientHelloInner. The client then constructs a public ClientHello, referred to as the ClientHelloOuter. The ClientHelloOuter contains innocuous values for sensitive extensions and an \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension (encrypted-client-hello), which carries the encrypted ClientHelloInner. Finally, the client sends ClientHelloOuter to the server. The server takes one of the following actions: If it does not support ECH or cannot decrypt the extension, it completes the handshake with ClientHelloOuter. This is referred to as rejecting ECH. If it successfully decrypts the extension, it forwards the ClientHelloInner to the backend server, which completes the handshake. This is referred to as accepting ECH. Upon receiving the server's response, the client determines whether or not ECH was accepted and proceeds with the handshake accordingly. (See client-behavior for details.) or not ECH was accepted (handle-server-response) and proceeds with the handshake accordingly. When ECH is rejected, the resulting connection is not usable by the client for application data. Instead, ECH rejection allows the client to retry with up-to-date configuration (rejected-ech). The primary goal of ECH is to ensure that connections to servers in the same anonymity set are indistinguishable from one another."}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-1ade32097a3dc8cfc7196a0b563cb6d236d44c3da5230118735d7f734e126726","text":"Each PSK MUST be at least 128-bits long. Each PSK SHOULD be seeded from a source with at least 128-bits of entropy. 5. PSK privacy properties are orthogonal to security properties"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-1afcae53caf2cbc38e9682d60deb4952b0bfaaf103fa352061ba5462b3b91959","text":"attributes to provide better information about the statistical properties of the measurement. A SenML object is referred to as \"expanded\" if it does not contain any base values and has no relative times. 4.4. Sometimes it is useful to be able to refer to a defined normalized format for SenML records. This normalized format tends to get used for big data applications and intermediate forms when converting to other formats. A SenML Record is referred to as \"resolved\" if it does not contain any base values and has no relative times, but the the base values of the SenML Pack (if any) are applied to the Record. That is, name and base name are concatenated, base time is added to the time of the Record, if Record did not contain Unit the Base Unit is applied to the record, etc. In addition the records need to be in chronological order. An example of this is show in resolved-ex. 4.5. SenML is designed to carry the minimum dynamic information about measurements, and for efficiency reasons does not carry significant static meta-data about the device, object or sensors. Instead, it is"}
{"_id":"q-en-rfc8447bis-1b30cd986c2d450df8ae8156100fc73de4eb2650080bedf88efa7618afd32142","text":"Changed the registry policy to: Updated the \"Reference\" to also refer to this document. Updated the \"Reference\" to refer to this document instead of RFC8447. See expert-pool for additional information about the designated expert pool."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-1b33243bb8dcba5a6e4a34458a2122867977316621411c84b40cc17484e30320","text":"arbitrary values. These values MUST NOT be assigned by IANA and MUST NOT appear in the listing of assigned values. 10.4. 9.3. This document establishes a registry for HTTP datagram context extension type codes. The \"HTTP Context Extension Types\" registry"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-1b6802f0d091acb6bb350e82f54d1805d849cb782c1ef2394020108d3e8b958e","text":"with B and probably retry the request, leading to duplication on the server system as a whole. The first class of attack can be prevented by the mechanism described in this section. Servers need not permit 0-RTT at all, but those which do SHOULD implement either the single-use tickets or ClientHello recording techniques described in the following two sections. The first class of attack can be prevented by sharing state to guarantee that the 0-RTT data is accepted at most once. Servers SHOULD provide that level of replay safety, by implementing one of the methods described in this section or by equivalent means. It is understood, however, that due to operational concerns not all deployments will maintain state at that level. Therefore, in normal operation, clients will not know which, if any, of these mechanisms servers actually implement and hence MUST only send early data which they deem safe to be replayed. In addition to the direct effects of replays, there is a class of attacks where even operations normally considered idempotent could be exploited by a large number of replays (timing attacks, resource limit exhaustion and others described in replay-0rtt). Those can be mitigated by ensuring that every 0-RTT payload can be replayed only a limited number of times. The server MUST ensure that any instance of it (be it a machine, a thread or any other entity within the relevant serving infrastructure) would accept 0-RTT for the same 0-RTT handshake at most once; this limits the number of replays to the number of server instances in the deployment. Such a guarantee can be accomplished by locally recording data from recently-received ClientHellos and rejecting repeats, or by any other method that provides the same or a stronger guarantee. The \"at most once per server instance\" guarantee is a minimum requirement; servers SHOULD limit 0-RTT replays further when feasible. The second class of attack cannot be prevented at the TLS layer and MUST be dealt with by any application. Note that any application whose clients implement any kind of retry behavior already needs to implement some sort of anti-replay defense. In normal operation, clients will not know which, if any, of these mechanisms servers actually implement and therefore MUST only send early data which they are willing to have subject to the attacks described in replay-0rtt. 8.1. The simplest form of anti-replay defense is for the server to only"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-1bea3343d41d10a28cbcd34b536b9fddf7238d81487afa7204ac127cc4dc46d0","text":"both packet and header protection as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. Discarding such a packet after only removing header protection can expose the endpoint to attacks; see Section 9.3 of QUIC-TLS. Section 9.5 of QUIC-TLS. In packet types that contain a Packet Number field, the least significant two bits (those with a mask of 0x03) of byte 0 contain"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-dnsop-terminology-bis-1c2383f7cff85e3642576ad6f88a6b42578854501b82397299bd3663a3707187","text":"5. This section defines the terms used for the systems that act as DNS clients, DNS servers, or both. clients, DNS servers, or both. In the RFCs, DNS servers are sometimes called \"name servers\", \"nameservers\", or just \"servers\". There is no formal definition of DNS server, but the RFCs generally assume that it is an Internet server that listens for queries and sends responses using the DNS protocol defined in RFC1035 and its successors. For terminology specific to the public DNS root server system, see RSSAC026. That document defines terms such as \"root server\", \"root"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-1c536c8e8645b5682b250b78f19257ecd2a1e3391a2efb27d68ce0f5bafd50bc","text":"The setConfiguration method allows the global configuration of the PeerConnection, which was initially set by constructor parameters, to be changed during the session. The effects of this method call be changed during the session. The effects of calling this method depend on when it is invoked, and they will differ, depending on which specific parameters are changed: This call may result in a change to the state of the ICE agent. Calling this method may result in a change to the state of the ICE agent. 4.1.17."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-1cccdaa43c019f3b30c05a062a92f69e4afb8ebe9f3ea2e29ec600b413d6adc2","text":"confirmation_tag by way of the key schedule will confirm that all members of the group agree on the extensions in use. 13.1.9. 13.1.8. Add and Remove proposals can be constructed and sent to the group by a party that is outside the group. For example, a Delivery Service"}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-1d229481eaca49157f8e86f5284d7512cfbd8374f829feff7a354c9ef9e61d4b","text":"7.1. Senders MUST manage per-path congestion status, and MUST NOT send more data on a given path than congestion control on that path allows. This is already a requirement of QUIC-TRANSPORT. When the QUIC multipath extension is used, senders manage per-path congestion status as required in Section 9.4 of QUIC-TRANSPORT. However, in QUIC-TRANSPORT only one active path is assumed and as such the requirement is to reset the congestion control status on path migration. With the multipath extension, multiple paths can be used simultaneously, therefore separate congestion control state is maintained for each path. This means a sender is not allowed to send more data on a given path than congestion control for that path indicates. When a Multipath QUIC connection uses two or more paths, there is no guarantee that these paths are fully disjoint. When two (or more"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-1d3d6d03407ce0c7494e4f2fd7c7eae62336ebc05742c93039e07a740ad8afbb","text":"Connection IDs), the short header exposes at most only a single Connection ID. 6.1. 7.1. QUIC supports a server-generated Connection ID, transmitted to the client during connection establishment (see Section 6.1 of QUIC)."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-1d6ca122cd9244e85df4a165f329057c52def222cf67e1d7f0c7d61a9a285ab6","text":"the CA may consider the new account associated with the external account corresponding to the MAC key, and MUST reflect value of the \"external-account-binding\" field in the resulting account object. If any of these checks fail, then the CA MUST reject the new- registration request. any of these checks fail, then the CA MUST reject the new-account request. 6.3.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-1d7511eef2179829b0b0decc41951f483a15c8ef582493c3fc2a849fd8817527","text":"Attempts to clone a Connection can result in a CloneError: The Connection Property \"Priority\" operates on entangled Connections as in msg-priority: when allocating available network capacity among Connections in a Connection Group, sends on Connections with higher Priority values will be prioritized over sends on Connections with lower Priority values. A transport system implementation should, if possible, assign each Connection the capacity share (M-N) x C / M, where N is the Connection's Priority value, M is the maximum Priority value used by all Connections in the group and C is the total available capacity. However, this Priority setting is purely advisory, and provides no guarantees about the way capacity is shared. Each implementation is free to implement a way to share capacity that it sees fit. The Connection Priority Connection Property operates on entangled Connections using the same approach as in msg-priority: when allocating available network capacity among Connections in a Connection Group, sends on Connections with lower Priority values will be prioritized over sends on Connections with higher Priority values. Capacity will be shared among these Connections according to the Connection Group Transmission Scheduler property (conn- scheduler). See priority-in-taps for more. 7."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-1d91aff07d47ebb3e0a2930b5f1e30adfdc00d2a9767127e38f56d81ad8ddf8f","text":"node for which this node has a private key * Decrypt the secret value for the parent of the copath node using the private key from the resolution node * Derive secret values for ancestors of that node using the KDF keyed with the decrypted secret node using the KDF keyed with the decrypted secret * The recipient SHOULD verify that the received public keys agree with the public keys derived from the new node_secret values Merge the updated secrets into the tree * Replace the public keys for nodes on the direct path with the received public keys * For"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-1da4fd79193e2e163aa2065ad4b5f48cdf16cd94bef9d4ec8262b4b076b725fb","text":"4.1.4. As keys for new encryption levels become available, TLS provides QUIC with those keys. Separately, as keys at a given encryption level become available to TLS, TLS indicates to QUIC that reading or writing keys at that encryption level are available. These events are not asynchronous; they always occur immediately after TLS is provided with new handshake bytes, or after TLS produces handshake bytes. As keys at a given encryption level become available to TLS, TLS indicates to QUIC that reading or writing keys at that encryption level are available. These events are not asynchronous; they always occur immediately after TLS is provided with new handshake bytes, or after TLS produces handshake bytes. TLS provides QUIC with three items as a new encryption level becomes available:"}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-1df9c8f12beeccbfc4f49a304b3714231ab156e19915ad2743475aa87230b271","text":"iv_length - length of the initialization vector of the EDHOC AEAD algorithm P = ( ? PAD, ? EAD_4 ) PLAINTEXT_4 = ( ? PAD, ? EAD_4 ) PAD = 1*true is padding that may be used to hide the length of the unpadded plaintext."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-1e36753d5654266ab6ec1c75c00873d7bab2924b0d22841c982037481bbd9bf6","text":"The path secret value for a given node is encrypted for the subtree corresponding to the parent's non-updated child, that is, the child on the copath of the leaf node. There is one encrypted path secret for each public key in the resolution of the non-updated child. In particular, for the leaf node, there are no encrypted secrets, since a leaf node has no children. for each public key in the resolution of the non-updated child. The recipient of a path update processes it with the following steps:"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-1e434458ee1bb470484db8c068d4d051dc50b9f8ae658354251cd80143fe24f1","text":"accordingly, as described in I-D.ietf-mmusic-sdp-bundle-negotiation, Section 8.2. If the description is of type \"answer\", and there are still remaining candidates in the ICE candidate pool, discard them. 6. Note: The following algorithm does not yet have WG consensus but is"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-1e5f67bd770fd05e273f79388a8e4412f5d48a9faad52a332eb854226f53a883","text":"Protocol-specific Properties are defined in a transport- and implementation-specific way to permit more specialized protocol features to be used. Too much reliance by an application on protocol-specific Properties can significantly reduce the flexibility Protocol-specific Properties can significantly reduce the flexibility of a transport services implementation to make appropriate selection and configuration choices. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that Protocol Properties are used for properties common across different protocols and that Protocol-specific Properties are only used where specific protocols or properties are necessary. Protocol-specific Properties are used for properties common across different protocols and that Protocol-specific Properties are only used where specific protocols or properties are necessary. The application can set and query Connection Properties on a per- Connection basis. Connection Properties that are not read-only can"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-1e87c2c79659c8969ce0812f542d1d95a27a67f9620d3ab2e31b9cc1e1c07a13","text":"local group state. New members MUST verify the \"signature\" using the public key taken from the credential in the leaf node of the member with LeafNodeRef \"signer\". The signature covers the following structure, comprising all the fields in the GroupInfo above \"signature\": from the credential in the leaf node of the ratchet tree with leaf index \"signer\". The signature covers the following structure, comprising all the fields in the GroupInfo above \"signature\": 13.2.3.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-1e93e211f052e78f4970f68a140f3e325adc2e668fb437bdd6da4f4ad62095b5","text":"the other hand, the Remote Endpoint specifies a hostname but no addresses, the Connection can perform name resolution and attempt using any address derived from the original hostname of the Remote Endpoint. Endpoint. Note that multiple Remote Endpoints can be added to a Preconnection, as discussed in add-endpoints. The Transport Services system resolves names internally, when the Initiate(), Listen(), or Rendezvous() method is called to establish a"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-1ea9262bbc3b128d5cbb8a620f163eea6e5d53837a4b2a5d906a786f847a58a1","text":"7.3.1. This method is indicated by \"httpsig\" in the \"proof\" field. The signer creates an HTTP Message Signature as described in I-D.ietf- httpbis-message-signatures. This method is indicated by the method value \"httpsig\". The signer creates an HTTP Message Signature as described in I-D.ietf-httpbis- message-signatures. This method defines the following parameters: The covered components of the signature MUST include the following:"}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-1eacceca6c9d555905f5137d31df00a1815ca58b0e3a62d00c4636d27b38b304","text":"3. This document builds on the specification of MPLS over UDP and IP defined in RFC7510. It replaces the F-Label(s) used in I-D.ietf- detnet-mpls with UDP and IP headers. The UDP and IP header information is used to identify DetNet flows, including member flows, per I-D.ietf-detnet-ip. The resulting encapsulation is shown in IP- encap-dn. defined in RFC7510. It may replace partly or entirely the F-Label(s) used in I-D.ietf-detnet-mpls with UDP and IP headers. The UDP and IP header information is used to identify DetNet flows, including member flows, per I-D.ietf-detnet-ip. The resulting encapsulation is shown in IP-encap-dn. There may be zero or more F-label(s) between the S-label and the UDP header. Note that this encapsulation works equally well with IPv4, IPv6, and IPv6-based Segment Routing I-D.ietf-6man-segment-routing-header."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-1f2a39bb24f1b745df3a511b9f5fef3c815de75375db38fbb1f6cb928d38e246","text":"use for encryption. Its value is immutable once the security context is established. Base Key (master_secret). Variable length, uniformly random byte string containing the key used to derive traffic keys and IVs. Its value is immutable once the security context is established. Master Secret. Variable length, uniformly random byte string containing the key used to derive traffic keys and IVs. Its value is immutable once the security context is established. Master Salt (OPTIONAL). Variable length byte string containing the salt used to derive traffic keys and IVs. Its value is immutable once the security context is established. The Sender Context contains the following parameters:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-1f51c26afb6cd349693b5f4a00d9f3044344edc454fff24a4baf8f5295b7e197","text":"server in the same session. Set the \"config_digest\" field to a randomly-generated string of hash_length bytes, where hash_length is the length of the hash function associated with the chosen HpkeCipherSuite. \"Nh\" bytes, where \"Nh\" is the output length of the \"Extract\" function of the KDF associated with the chosen cipher suite. (The KDF API is specified in I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke.) Set the \"enc\" field to a randomly-generated valid encapsulated public key output by the HPKE KEM."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-1f9cafa02657bb4793a8ee995bc4456a4ec5fb260660c4c323701bd59dd2be1a","text":"certainly as examining decrypted traffic. Because HTTPS has historically layered HTTP on top of TLS, which is in turn layered on top of TCP, intermediaries do have access to unencrypted TCP-level transport information, such as retransmissions, and some carriers exploited this information in attempts to improve transport-layer performance RFC3135. The most recent standardized version of HTTPS, HTTP/3 I-D.ietf-quic-http, uses the QUIC protocol RFC9000 as its transport layer. QUIC relies on the TLS 1.3 initial handshake RFC8446 only for key exchange RFC9001, and encrypts almost all transport parameters itself except for a few invariant header fields. In the QUIC short header, the only transport-level parameter which is sent \"in the clear\" is the Destination Connection ID RFC8999, and even in the QUIC long header, the only transport-level parameters sent \"in the clear\" are the Version, Destination in turn layered on top of TCP, intermediaries have historically had access to unencrypted TCP-level transport information, such as retransmissions, and some carriers exploited this information in attempts to improve transport-layer performance RFC3135. The most recent standardized version of HTTPS, HTTP/3 RFC9114, uses the QUIC protocol RFC9000 as its transport layer. QUIC relies on the TLS 1.3 initial handshake RFC8446 only for key exchange RFC9001, and encrypts almost all transport parameters itself except for a few invariant header fields. In the QUIC short header, the only transport-level parameter which is sent \"in the clear\" is the Destination Connection ID RFC8999, and even in the QUIC long header, the only transport- level parameters sent \"in the clear\" are the Version, Destination Connection ID, and Source Connection ID. For these reasons, HTTP/3 is significantly more \"opaque\" than HTTPS with HTTP/1 or HTTP/2."}
{"_id":"q-en-certificate-compression-1f9e7feb7768db5108d6d7187055d1eb956e193480fcce1d2410dba09f9d63ca","text":"The length of the Certificate message once it is uncompressed. If after decompression the specified length does not match the actual length, the party receiving the invalid message MUST abort the connection with the \"bad_certificate\" alert. connection with the \"bad_certificate\" alert. The presence of this field allows the receiver to pre-allocate the buffer for the uncompressed Certificate message and to enforce limits on the message size before performing decompression. The compressed body of the Certificate message, in the same format as it would normally be expressed in. The compression algorithm"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-1fcaecbc1cc11aaabe9d47f34625d20d489dbd64856db3a91a06b570521f152a","text":"If not populating the \"path\" field: Set the \"path\" field in the Commit to the null optional. Define \"commit_secret\" as the all- zero vector of the same length as a \"path_secret\" value would be. In this case, the new ratchet tree is the same as the provisional ratchet tree. zero vector of length \"KDF.Nh\" (the same length as a \"path_secret\" value would be). In this case, the new ratchet tree is the same as the provisional ratchet tree. Derive the \"psk_secret\" as specified in pre-shared-keys, where the order of PSKs in the derivation corresponds to the order of"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-1fe24ca638cf0bb8255533c7a202d39578315e0ca27aa62c8b6fc92212542de0","text":"2.4. New QUIC connections are established using a handshake, which is distinguishable on the wire and contains some information that can be passively observed. distinguishable on the wire (see sec-identifying for details), and contains some information that can be passively observed. To illustrate the information visible in the QUIC wire image during the handshake, we first show the general communication pattern"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-2005c4994f46b557daf251c281a7a564de7e579f41133ded5159ca3ec0bf144c","text":"empty redemption contexts must be stored and shared across all requests until token-key expiration or rotation. Origins that share redemption contexts, i.e., by using the same redemption context, choosing the same issuer, and providing the same origin_info field in the TokenChallenge, must necessarily share state required to enforce double spend prevention. Origins should consider the operational complexity of this shared state before choosing to share redemption contexts. Failure to successfully synchronize this state and use it for double spend prevention can allow Clients to redeem tokens to one Origin that were issued after an interaction with another Origin that shares the context. 2.1.2. Clients can generate multiple tokens from a single TokenChallenge,"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-202f041560cc46156b05862b0d448e00d8e72f9e24f284c58b50d7ca7b029a0a","text":"5. A DNS client that already knows the name of an Encrypted Resolver can use DEER to discover details about all supported encrypted DNS use DDR to discover details about all supported encrypted DNS protocols. This situation can arise if a client has been configured to use a given Encrypted Resolver, or if a network provisioning protocol (such as DHCP or IPv6 Router Advertisements) provides a name"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-20306f6a7b267cc37aae9ed86739422797418bc4424af53d5a2297fd2542388c","text":"server has selected for the negotiated key exchange. Servers MUST NOT send a KeyShareEntry for any group not indicated in the \"supported_groups\" extension and MUST NOT send a KeyShareEntry when using the \"psk_ke\" PskKeyExchangeMode. If a HelloRetryRequest was received by the client, the client MUST verify that the selected NamedGroup in the ServerHello is the same as that in the using the \"psk_ke\" PskKeyExchangeMode. If using (EC)DHE key establishment, and a HelloRetryRequest containing a \"key_share\" extension was received by the client, the client MUST verify that the selected NamedGroup in the ServerHello is the same as that in the HelloRetryRequest. If this check fails, the client MUST abort the handshake with an \"illegal_parameter\" alert."}
{"_id":"q-en-certificate-compression-209320c7b344ee4993693e38d801fecab0429190da1a84dc39d3956955920dd5","text":"message MUST be compressed with the ZLIB compression algorithm, as defined in RFC1950. If the specified compression algorithm is brotli, the Certificate message MUST be compressed with the Brotli compression algorithm as defined in RFC7932. compression algorithm as defined in RFC7932. If the specified compression algorithm is zstd, the Certificate message MUST be compressed with the Zstandard compression algorithm as defined in RFC8478. It is possible to define a certificate compression algorithm that uses a pre-shared dictionary to achieve higher compression ratio."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-20dbf71a4fca84054094714aafcee3ceb67474466c66b3b01bf89e8450ff0461","text":"to match the protocol version that is negotiated by the client and server. The credential's public key, a DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo as defined in RFC5280. The credential's public key, a DER-encoded X690 SubjectPublicKeyInfo as defined in RFC5280. The delegated credential has the following structure:"}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-21922ab861037d5f622bcfe850890489b67d15c7f785b02cae8f02f4ab869b53","text":"including the signature algorithm identifier in the data to be signed. 9.2. The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is defined in RFC3447. The RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm is parametized with a hash function, a mask generation function and a salt length (sLen). For this specification, the mask generation function is fixed to be MGF1 as defined in RFC3447. It has been recommended that the same hash function be used for hashing the data as well as in the mask generation function, for this specification we following this recommendation. The salt length is the same length as the hash function output. Three algorithms are defined in this document. These algorithms are: This uses the hash algorithm SHA-256 for signature processing. The value used for this algorithm is -10. The key type used for this algorithm is 'RSA'. This uses the hash algorithm SHA-384 for signature processing. The value used for this algorithm is \"PS384\". The key type used for this algorithm is 'RSA'. This uses the hash algorithm SHA-512 for signature processing. The value used for this algorithm is -11. The key type used for this algorithm is 'RSA'. There are no algorithm parameters defined for these signature algorithms. A summary of the algorithm definitions can be found in table-rsa-algs. 9.2.1. Key size. is there a MUST for 2048? or do we need to specify a minimum here? 10. Message Authentication Codes (MACs) provide data authentication and"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-21d019660d7461271a0b95f78dff7eb2aaa1727a64d5428b4c5c0c62c3f313ab","text":"needs to initialize a GroupContext object that can be updated to the current state using the Add message. This information is encrypted for the new member using HPKE. The recipient key pair for the HPKE encryption is the one included in the indicated ClientInitKey, corresponding to the indicated ciphersuite. The \"add_key_nonce\" field contains the key and nonce used to encrypt the corresponding Add message; if it is not encrypted, then this field MUST be set to the null optional value. encryption is the one included in the indicated ClientInitKey. The \"add_key_nonce\" field contains the key and nonce used to encrypt the corresponding Add message; if it is not encrypted, then this field MUST be set to the null optional value. In the description of the tree as a list of nodes, the \"credential\" field for a node MUST be populated if and only if that node is a leaf"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-221a12ed80f5a1b7ca63ddbfd8d8b687f2a0dfeb90a06791988d36b64f027c1f","text":"Certain characters are escaped in Normalized Paths, in one and only one way; all other characters are unescaped. Note: Normalized Paths are Singular Queries, but not all Singular Queries are Normalized Paths. For example, \"$[-3]\" is a singular Note: Normalized Paths are singular queries, but not all singular queries are Normalized Paths. For example, \"$[-3]\" is a singular query, but is not a Normalized Path. The Normalized Path equivalent to \"$[-3]\" would have an index equal to the array length minus \"3\". (The array length must be at least \"3\" if \"$[-3]\" is to identify a"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-22343c36011cae65257d06b245cd0d7775feb130fcc6b704c3f3eeb37731f8bc","text":"can be mounted using spoofed source addresses. In determining this limit, servers only count the size of successfully processed packets. Clients MUST pad UDP datagrams that contain only Initial packets to at least 1200 bytes. Once a client has received an acknowledgment Clients MUST ensure that UDP datagrams containing Initial packets are sized to at least 1200 bytes, adding padding to packets in the datagram as necessary. Once a client has received an acknowledgment for a Handshake packet it MAY send smaller datagrams. Sending padded datagrams ensures that the server is not overly constrained by the amplification restriction."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-223bf72d71f37bee05c1b6f75255c9e6e4bc462ed97aaddba799d7ea485a1564","text":"the sender will not have the keys necessary to construct an MLSCiphertext object. 13.1.9.1. 13.1.8.1. The \"external_senders\" extension is a group context extension that contains credentials of senders that are permitted to send external"}
{"_id":"q-en-mediatypes-2269219a5e045df6c22be455c5d6d13d46cb6640ae95c0db59a1a48e94d41398","text":"This document uses the Augmented BNF defined in RFC5234 and updated by RFC7405. 1.2. The OpenAPI Specification Media Types convey OpenAPI Specification (OAS) files as defined in oas for version 3.0.0 and above. Those files can be serialized in JSON or yaml. Since there are multiple OpenAPI Specification Specifications versions, those media- types support the \"version\" parameter. The following examples conveys the desire of a client to receive an OpenAPI Specification resource preferably in the following order: openapi 3.1 in yaml openapi 3.0 in yaml any openapi version in json 2. Security requirements for both media type and media type suffix registrations are discussed in Section 4.6 of MEDIATYPE. This section describes the information required to register the above media types. 3. 2.1. This specification defines the following new Internet media types MEDIATYPE. 3.1. The following information serves as the registration form for the \"application/yaml\" media type. Type name: application"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mptcp-rfc6824bis-229468f66a25221b95176f648986b81a6b0107afbe04a468f8de064b57b8d54d","text":"If Host A does not receive a TCP RST in reply to its MP_FASTCLOSE after one retransmission timeout (RTO) (the RTO of the subflow where the MPTCP_RST has been sent), it SHOULD retransmit the where the MP_FASTCLOSE has been sent), it SHOULD retransmit the MP_FASTCLOSE. The number of retransmissions SHOULD be limited to avoid this connection from being retained for a long time, but this limit is implementation specific. A RECOMMENDED number is 3. If no TCP RST is received in response, Host A SHOULD send a TCP RST itself when it releases state in order to clear any remaining state at middleboxes. RST with the MP_FASTCLOSE option itself when it releases state in order to clear any remaining state at middleboxes. Upon receipt of a RST with MP_FASTCLOSE, containing the valid key, Host B tears down all subflows. Host B can now close the whole MPTCP connection (it transitions directly to CLOSED state). 3.6."}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-229e09f210f7b16a6659a2549de6efd0a18dabe60beec55506ebfa580261f3b2","text":"6. For protocols where 4-tuple load balancing is sufficient, it is straightforward to deliver ICMP packets from the network to the correct server, by reading the echoed IP and transport-layer headers to obtain the 4-tuple. When routing is based on connection ID, further measures are required, as most QUIC packets that trigger ICMP responses will only contain a client-generated connection ID that contains no routing information. To solve this problem, load balancers MAY maintain a mapping of Client IP and port to server ID based on recently observed packets. Alternatively, servers MAY implement the technique described in Section 14.4.1 of RFC9000 to increase the likelihood a Source Connection ID is included in ICMP responses to Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) probes. Load balancers MAY parse the echoed packet to extract the Source Connection ID, if it contains a QUIC long header, and extract the Server ID as if it were in a Destination CID. QUIC-LB requires no per-connection state at the load balancer. The load balancer can extract the server ID from the connection ID of each incoming packet and route that packet accordingly. However, once the routing decision has been made, the load balancer MAY associate the 4-tuple with the decision. This has two advantages: The load balancer only extracts the server ID once per incoming 4-tuple. When the CID is encrypted, this substantially reduces computational load. Incoming Stateless Reset packets and ICMP messages are easily routed to the correct origin server. In addition to the increased state requirements, however, load balancers cannot detect the CONNECTION_CLOSE frame to indicate the end of the connection, so they rely on a timeout to delete connection state. There are numerous considerations around setting such a timeout. In the event a connection ends, freeing an IP and port, and a different connection migrates to that IP and port before the timeout, the load balancer will misroute the different connection's packets to the original server. A short timeout limits the likelihood of such a misrouting. Furthermore, if a short timeout causes premature deletion of state, the routing is easily recoverable by decoding an incoming Connection ID. However, a short timeout also reduces the chance that an incoming Stateless Reset is correctly routed. Servers MAY implement the technique described in Section 14.4.1 of RFC9000 in case the load balancer is stateless, to increase the likelihood a Source Connection ID is included in ICMP responses to Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) probes. Load balancers MAY parse the echoed packet to extract the Source Connection ID, if it contains a QUIC long header, and extract the Server ID as if it were in a Destination CID. 7."}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-22a069343b22a1791880b2bc328ef95c166b2b9685c3c2fbadf2e3e0a2abc6a8","text":"The sn_key is computed as follows: [sender] denotes the sending side. The Secret value to be used is described in Section 7.3 of TLS13. described in Section 7.3 of TLS13. Note that a new key is used for each epoch: because the epoch is in the clear, this does not result in ambiguity. The encrypted sequence number is computed by XORing the leading bytes of the Mask with the sequence number. Decryption is accomplished by the same process. of the Mask with the on-the-wire representation of the sequence number. Decryption is accomplished by the same process. This procedure requires the ciphertext length be at least 16 bytes. Receivers MUST reject shorter records as if they had failed"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-22c731e7e2f5131a3b961314ded0f654cb3c5239013ea571503196b11afa844c","text":"do this, CoSWID tags can be created by any party and the CoSWID tags collected from an endpoint could contain a mixture of vendor and non- vendor created tags. For this reason, a CoSWID tag might contain potentially malicious content. Input sanitization and loop detection are two ways that implementations can address this concern. potentially malicious content. Input sanitization, loop detection, and signature verification are ways that implementations can address this concern. 10."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-22ddbb9842a738f23cf583b858cd4b77ab824b53329ededd439f322dcf38cb88","text":"a solution to this problem. However, hiding information about the change of the IP address or port conceals important and security- relevant information from QUIC endpoints and as such would facilitate amplification attacks (see section 9 of QUIC-TRANSPORT). An NAT amplification attacks (see Section 9 of QUIC-TRANSPORT). A NAT function that hides peer address changes prevents the other end from detecting and mitigating attacks as the endpoint cannot verify connectivity to the new address using QUIC PATH_CHALLENGE and"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-23bde9b11f196e88ab3b434af6e04257f6afe9447f9f550dd7ee08825bbc29a8","text":"are independent and fully compatible protocols, each solving different problems. The use of one does not diminish the need nor the usefulness of the other. It is the choice of a client to either perform full DNSSEC validation of answers or to treat answers from a DNS API server as DNSSEC-authenticated, and this choice may be affected by the response media type. perform full DNSSEC validation of answers or to trust the DNS API server to do DNSSEC validation and inspect the AD (Authentic Data) bit in the returned message to determine whether an answer was authentic or not. As noted in http-response, different response media types will provide more or less information from a DNS response so this choice may be affected by the response media type. caching describes the interaction of this protocol with HTTP caching. An adversary that can control the cache used by the client can affect"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-23c2639b9ee0a8239f865b4f2bd50e55146058aaef4d27bf9cee02233f248e58","text":"QUIC exposes some information to the network in the unencrypted part of the header, either before the encryption context is established or because the information is intended to be used by the network. QUIC has a long header that exposes some additional information (the version and the source connection ID), while the short header exposes only the destination connection ID. In QUIC version 1, the long header is used during connection establishment, while the short header is used for data transmission in an established connection. because the information is intended to be used by the network. For more information on manageability of QUIC see also I-D.ietf-quic- manageability. QUIC has a long header that exposes some additional information (the version and the source connection ID), while the short header exposes only the destination connection ID. In QUIC version 1, the long header is used during connection establishment, while the short header is used for data transmission in an established connection. The connection ID can be zero length. Zero length connection IDs can be chosen on each endpoint individually, on any packet except the"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-23e3c9c7fb6d61223addb9e0cbfc6ce8ff9f3be09d1dfcf81bfb9a0ba5bafaaa","text":"until a gathering phase occurs, and so any necessary filtering can still be done on any pooled candidates. Any changes to the ICE candidate pool size take effect The ICE candidate pool size MUST NOT be changed after applying a local description. If a local description has not yet been applied, any changes to the ICE candidate pool size take effect immediately; if increased, additional candidates are pre-gathered; if decreased, the now-superfluous candidates are discarded."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-2419ae7405dcae8819cd00999759d341157a4731ef36975c95121d0fd4e5d0ac","text":"unblock the server until it is certain that the server has finished its address validation (see Section 8 of QUIC-TRANSPORT). That is, the client MUST set the probe timer if the client has not received an acknowledgement for one of its Handshake or 1-RTT packets. acknowledgement for one of its Handshake or 1-RTT packets, and has not received a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame. Prior to handshake completion, when few to none RTT samples have been generated, it is possible that the probe timer expiration is due to"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-2439c5adc161af10abc43158d2d2aa0992434677426578f136809e7c3b5e066e","text":"_mandatory_ A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser without accompanying evidence about its validity - used as proof of identity. _mandatory_ A statement representing an identifier list that MUST be associated with corresponding Authentication Secrets used to protect Claims included in Evidence."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-247161536fa6857ec4a76552e733e097b1e6080505af1a1f750bf00b9eaafcf8","text":"should be able to use those records while safely ignoring the third record. To avoid name lookup deadlock, Designated Resolvers SHOULD follow the guidance in Section 10 of RFC8484 regarding the avoidance of DNS- based references that block the completion of the TLS handshake. To avoid name lookup deadlock, clients that use Designated Resolvers need to ensure that a specific Encrypted Resolver is not used for any queries that are needed to resolve the name of the resolver itself or to perform certificate revocation checks for the resolver, as described in Section 10 of RFC8484. Designated Resolvers need to ensure this deadlock is avoidable as described in Section 10 of RFC8484. This document focuses on discovering DoH, DoT, and DoQ Designated Resolvers. Other protocols can also use the format defined by I-"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-24736b94f3b2beb77b3dd715b3f57487e21577359c5849443d624f9c2ba63596","text":"Oblivious Relay Resource also needs to observe the guidance in relay- responsibilities. An Oblivious Gateway Resource acts as a gateway for requests to the Target Resource (see HTTP). The one exception is that any information it might forward in a response MUST be encapsulated, unless it is responding to errors it detects before removing encapsulation of the request; see errors. An Oblivious Gateway Resource, if it receives any response from the Target Resource, sends a single 200 response containing the encapsulated response. Like the request from the client, this"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-248548e8171bac59da9750135037fc6fe9d7844c9e6da991186ffb04e9dd326b","text":"versions are four-byte sequences with no additional constraints on format. Leading zeros SHOULD be omitted for brevity. Syntax: Syntax of the \"quic\" parameter value: Where multiple versions are listed, the order of the values reflects the server's preference (with the first value being the most"}
{"_id":"q-en-using-github-2498d8decdd02fe83f40b4c162b3b1937e3f2eae9e839a044a6dc76be24b58f6","text":"to those mailing lists should be given. An example of this is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/quic/charter/. 2.3.1. One important policy is the IETF IPR policy (see RFC5378, RFC3979, and RFC4879). Part of this policy requires making contributors aware of the policy. The IETF Trust license file for open source repositories [5] MUST be included prominently in any document repository. Including this information in the CONTRIBUTING file is sufficient. In addition to the boilerplate text there can be a benefit to including pointers to other working group materials, the IETF datatracker, specific drafts, or websites. Adding such text is at the discretion of the Working Group Chairs. 3. A Working Group Chairs are responsible for determining how to best"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-24baa7a583457d56a28d24ae935de7c44f84f3fe98ece029ffbe8e24de7ee82f","text":"encapsulation key \"enc\". Construct associated data, \"aad\", by concatenating the values of \"keyID\", \"kdfID\", and \"aeadID\", as 8-, 16- and 16-bit integers respectively, each in network byte order. \"keyID\", \"kemID\", \"kdfID\", and \"aeadID\", as one 8-bit integer and three 16-bit integers, respectively, each in network byte order. Encrypt (seal) \"request\" with \"aad\" as associated data using \"context\", yielding ciphertext \"ct\"."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-250ad487aedd62ebeb8a75a853cf664081798736a79a7ec3533aec0a22008f87","text":"semantics and encodings for any version-specific field. In particular, different packet protection keys might be used for different versions. Servers that do not support a particular version are unlikely to be able to decrypt the payload of the packet. Servers SHOULD NOT attempt to decode or decrypt a packet from an unknown version, but instead send a Version Negotiation packet, provided that the packet is sufficiently long. are unlikely to be able to decrypt the payload of the packet or properly interpret the result. Servers SHOULD respond with a Version Negotiation packet, provided that the datagram is sufficiently long. Packets with a supported version, or no version field, are matched to a connection using the connection ID or - for packets with zero-"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-251ae94513b1d9a2bb2aa0b60128054cf0601adead9320c03019c12837be487b","text":"as expected. Form a URI by populating the URI template RFC6570 \"{scheme}://{domain}/.well-known/acme-challenge/{token}\", where: * the scheme field is set to \"http\" if the \"tls\" field in the response is present and set to false, and \"https\" otherwise; * the \"http://{domain}/.well-known/acme-challenge/{token}\", where: * the domain field is set to the domain name being verified; and * the token field is set to the token in the authorized key object."}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-25205d68dcad3a0fffedec5618c2037b89159a58cc170e31d65abf44ecfded6e","text":"Extensions that add a label that is intended for use with EXI need to create a new XSD Schema that includes all the labels in the IANA registry then allocate a new EXI schemaId value. Moving to the next letter in the alphabet is the suggested way to create the new value for the EXI schemaId. Any labels with previously blank ID values SHOULD be updated in the IANA table to have their ID set to this new schemaId value. registry and then allocate a new EXI schemaId value. Moving to the next letter in the alphabet is the suggested way to create the new value for the EXI schemaId. Any labels with previously blank ID values SHOULD be updated in the IANA table to have their ID set to this new schemaId value. Extensions that are mandatory to understand to correctly process the Pack MUST have a label name that ends with the '_' character."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-253e9b53cc575fa76ba64428a0e8fa9c8845258448162247099d43723d2031a8","text":"detected using heuristics similar to those used to detect TLS over TCP. A client initiating a connection may also send data in 0-RTT packets directly after the Initial packet containing the TLS Client Hello. Since these packets may be reordered in the network, 0-RTT Hello. Since packets may be reordered or lost in the network, 0-RTT packets could be seen before the Initial packet. Note that in this version of QUIC, clients send Initial packets"}
{"_id":"q-en-coap-tcp-tls-25e2f1de983e37b307b1663ae7498db36f753de5dbe244e8bbf4bf47bc473b48","text":"Release messages can indicate one or more reasons using elective options. The following options are defined: The elective Bad-Default-Uri-Host Option indicates that the default indicated by the CSM Default-Uri-Host Option is unlikely to be useful for this server. The elective Alternative-Address Option requests the peer to instead open a connection of the same scheme as the present connection to the alternative transport address given. Its value is in the form"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-25ef8297559510523fd8cbf0f0859952572f5ae303a645fcfa2b3fd24b4bce5b","text":"affects the direction property of the associated \"m=\" section on future calls to createOffer and createAnswer. The permitted values for direction are \"recvonly\", \"sendrecv\", \"sendonly\", and \"inactive\", mirroring the identically named directional attributes defined in mirroring the identically named direction attributes defined in RFC4566. When creating offers, the transceiver direction is directly reflected"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-25fff7397f3447be3f356f7d0f4deebe9443ed50d2c69ccddd859be1408f8463","text":"Most applications operating over IP networks and requiring latency this low use the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) RFC3550 or WebRTC RFC8825, which uses RTP for the media transport as well as several other protocols necessary for safe operation in browsers. RFC8825, which uses RTP as its Media Transport Protocol, along with several other protocols necessary for safe operation in browsers. Worth noting is that many applications for ultra low-latency delivery do not need to scale to more than a few users at a time, which"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-27541521fc03ce597ca48b56356d766f818feeccefad99fe995d092991fe8603","text":"4. Several mechanisms can be employed for discovering the RD, including assuming a default location (e.g. on an Edge Router in a LoWPAN), assigning an anycast address to the RD, using DHCP, or discovering the RD using .well-known/core and hyperlinks as specified in CoRE Link Format RFC6690. Endpoints that want to contact a Resource Directory (RD) can obtain candidate IP addresses of RD servers dependent on the operational conditions. It is assumed that the nodes looking for a Resource Directory are connected to a Border Router (6LBR). Given the various existing network installation procedures, the 6LBR is either connected or disconnected from the Internet and its services like DHCP and DNS. Two conditions are separately considered: (1) Internet services present, and (2) no Internet services present. When no Internet services are present, the following techniques are used (in random order): Sending a Multicast to [ff02::1]/.well-known/core with ?rt=core.rd*. The receiving RDs will answer the query. The Authoritative Border Router Option (ABRO) present in the Router Advertisements (RA), contains the address of the border router. Assuming that an RD is located at the 6LBR. Confirmation can be obtained by sending a Unicast to [6LBR]/.well-known/core with ?rt=core.rd*. Address of 6LBR is obtained from ABRO. The 6LBR can send the Resource Directory Address Option (RDAO) during neighbour Discovery containing one or more RD addresses, as explained in The installation manager can decide to preconfigure an ANYCAST address with as destination the interface of the RDs. Clients send a discovery message to the predefined RD anycast address. Each target network environment in which some of these preconfigured nodes are to be brought up is then configured with a route for this anycast address that leads to an appropriate RD. Instead of using an ANYCAST address, a multicast address can be preconfigured. All RD directory servers need to configure one of their interfaces with this multicast address. After installation of mDNS on all nodes, mDNS can be queried for the IP-address of RD. When Internet services are present, the techniques cited above are still valid. Using standard techniques to obtain the addresses of DNS or DHCP servers, the RD can be discovered in the following way: Using a DNSSD query to return the Resource Records (RR) describing A device coming up may want to find one or more resource directories to make itself known with. The device may be pre-configured to exercise specific mechanisms for finding the resource directory: It may be configured with a specific IP address for the RD. That IP address may also be an anycast address, allowing the network to forward RD requests to an RD that is topologically close; each target network environment in which some of these preconfigured nodes are to be brought up is then configured with a route for this anycast address that leads to an appropriate RD. (Instead of using an anycast address, a multicast address can also be preconfigured. The RD directory servers then need to configure one of their interfaces with this multicast address.) It may be configured with a DNS name for the RD and a resource- record type to look up under this name; it can find a DNS server to perform the lookup using the usual mechanisms for finding DNS servers. It may be configured to use a service discovery mechanism such as DNS-SD RFC6763. The present specification suggests configuring the service with name rd._sub._coap._udp, preferably within the domain of the querying nodes. Using DHCPv6 with options to be defined. Assisting the 9 techniques above, requires manual intervention or may be done automatically. Manual management: IP address of RD is present in each node. ANYCAST address or Multicast address of RD is present in each node [see 5,6]. 6LBR receives IP address of RD for distribution via RDAO [see 4]. RD address is configured in DHCP [see 9]. DNS is configured with Resource Record specifying address of RD service [see 8]. Automatic management Multicasting to all nodes to return IP address [see 1]. Querying mDNS to receive IP address [see 7]. 6LBR contains RD service [see 2, 3]. As some of these RD addresses are just (more or less educated) guesses, endpoints MUST make use of any error messages to very strictly rate-limit requests to candidate IP addresses that don't work out. For example, an ICMP Destination Unreachable message (and, in particular, the port unreachable code for this message) may indicate the lack of a CoAP server on the candidate host, or a CoAP error response code such as 4.05 \"Method Not Allowed\" may indicate unwillingness of a CoAP server to act as a directory server. domain of the querying nodes. [_1] For cases where the device is not specifically configured with a way to find a resource directory, the network may want to provide a suitable default. If the address configuration of the network is performed via SLAAC, this is provided by the RDAO option rdao. If the address configuration of the network is performed via DHCP, this could be provided via a DHCP option (no such option is defined at the time of writing). Finally, if neither the device nor the network offer any specific configuration, the device may want to employ heuristics to find a suitable resource directory. The present specification does not fully define these heuristics, but suggests a number of candidates: In a 6LoWPAN, just assume the Edge Router (6LBR) can act as a resource directory (using the ABRO option to find that RFC6775). Confirmation can be obtained by sending a Unicast to coap://[6LBR]/.well-known/core?rt=core.rd*`. In a network that supports multicast well, discovering the RD using a multicast query for /.well-known/core as specified in CoRE Link Format RFC6690: Sending a Multicast GET to \"coap://[ff02::1]/.well-known/core?rt=core.rd*\". RDs within the multicast scope will answer the query. As some of the RD addresses obtained by the methods listed here are just (more or less educated) guesses, endpoints MUST make use of any error messages to very strictly rate-limit requests to candidate IP addresses that don't work out. For example, an ICMP Destination Unreachable message (and, in particular, the port unreachable code for this message) may indicate the lack of a CoAP server on the candidate host, or a CoAP error response code such as 4.05 \"Method Not Allowed\" may indicate unwillingness of a CoAP server to act as a directory server. 4.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-2762a1e57ba673d362995f85752e39d5d8e165f86aa9268348d887b9dc01551a","text":"If the EAP-TLS peer authenticates successfully, the EAP-TLS server MUST send an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS containing TLS records conforming to the version of TLS used. The message flow ends with the EAP-TLS server sending an EAP-Success message. flow ends with a protected success indication from the EAP-TLS server, follwed by an EAP-Response packet of EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data from the EAP-TLS peer, follwed by EAP-Success from the server. If the EAP-TLS server authenticates successfully, the EAP-TLS peer MUST send an EAP-Response message with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS containing"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-279ddcf9344083b66ea51bcaca605bd93c5206608d9149df76bf1846635c77c9","text":"all streams other than the first will be marked as bundle-only. This policy aims to minimize candidate gathering and maximize multiplexing, at the cost of less compatibility with legacy endpoints. When acting as answerer, if there if no bundle group in the offer, the implementation will reject all but the first m= section. endpoints. When acting as answerer, the implementation will reject any m= sections other than the first m= section, unless they are in the same bundle group as that m= section. As it provides the best tradeoff between performance and compatibility with legacy endpoints, the default bundle policy MUST"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-27a1bdaadabc1073f2351a2ad1665347b2c62ba61a1edd10ba5f201ee5ee1954","text":"Run by the client when processing the server response in the issuance phase of the protocol. The output of this function is an array of \"RedemptionToken\" objects that are unlinkable from the server's computation in \"PP_Issue\". computation in \"Issue\". Inputs:"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-27aa0cfd77df544fd7ac1e462c963642bfd93a56eca0c5806643982e5656a31e","text":"between a specific local address and a specific peer address, where an address is the two-tuple of IP address and port. Path validation tests that packets can be both sent to (PATH_CHALLENGE) and received from (PATH_RESPONSE) a peer on the path. Importantly, it validates that the packets received from the migrating endpoint do not carry a spoofed source address. Path validation tests that packets sent on a path to a peer are received by that peer. Path validation is used to ensure that packets received from a migrating peer do not carry a spoofed source address. Path validation does not validate that a peer can send in the return direction. The peer performs independent validation of the return path. Path validation can be used at any time by either endpoint. For instance, an endpoint might check that a peer is still in possession"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-27bd156afe7ec803a374d44faf31a9d089a79dccb685d57deb508f3649657772","text":"2.4.5. The \"count\" function extension provides a way to obtain the number of nodes in a nodelist and make that available for further processing in the filter expression: The \"count()\" function extension provides a way to obtain the number of nodes in a nodelist and make that available for further processing in the filter expression: Its only argument is a nodelist. The result is a value, an unsigned integer, that gives the number of nodes in the nodelist. Note that"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-2816a23385742a06c33e38073081c5c71b4fe17ff4053e580af6e929eefc1eb6","text":"This document uses the following terms: Appraisal Policy for Evidence: A set of rules that direct how a verifier evaluates the validity of information about an Attester. Verifier evaluates the validity of information about an Attester. Compare /security policy/ in [RFC4949]. Appraisal Policy for Attestation Result: A set of rules that direct how a Relying Party evaluates the validity of information about an Attester. Compare /security policy/ in [RFC4949]. direct how a Relying Party uses the evaluation results about an Attester generated by the Verifiers. Compare /security policy/ in [RFC4949]. Attestation Result: The evaluation results generated by a Verifier, typically including information about an Attester, where"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-282f7ffbb4669146fe010e75e20608a9f4e1b9d44e7f15b9affae3cb788fd215","text":"As QUIC is a general purpose transport protocol, there are no requirements that servers use a particular UDP port for QUIC. For applications with a fallback to TCP that do not already have an alternate mapping to UDP, the registration (if necessary) and use of the UDP port number corresponding to the TCP port already registered for the application is RECOMMENDED. For example, the default port for HTTP/3 QUIC-HTTP is UDP port 443, analogous to HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 over TLS over TCP. alternate mapping to UDP, usually the registration (if necessary) and use of the UDP port number corresponding to the TCP port already registered for the application is appropriate. For example, the default port for HTTP/3 QUIC-HTTP is UDP port 443, analogous to HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 over TLS over TCP. Applications could define an alternate endpoint discovery mechanism to allow the usage of ports other than the default. For example,"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-286a7184fcaa4e7d5c1458bcdf5fb0d8bee0636ecc35f126b3bf33cb99337dfb","text":"13.1.3. A Remove proposal requests that the member with LeafNodeRef \"removed\" be removed from the group. A Remove proposal requests that the member with the leaf index \"removed\" be removed from the group. A member of the group applies a Remove message by taking the following steps:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-288126b272082edd0503a6820c85cef2563c51930163b65b1043da0ffd7cc051","text":"extension, the endpoint MUST abruptly terminate the corresponding stream with a stream error of type H3_GENERAL_PROTOCOL_ERROR. 4.4. 4.4.4. The DATAGRAM capsule (see iana-types for the value of the capsule type) allows an endpoint to send a datagram frame over an HTTP"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-28b9747c3b73a5a2cf04c63ca42121545781a94875bb4bce64925aa72c48c733","text":"sequence 7b bd decodes to 15293; and the single byte 25 decodes to 37 (as does the two byte sequence 40 25). Versions (versions) and error codes (error-codes) are described using integers, but do not use this encoding. Versions (versions) and packet numbers sent in the header (packet- encoding) are described using integers, but do not use this encoding. 17."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-28ba63285f19073a0e2fc6d98975c420ec4d981cffda5336253ea604c4938a8b","text":"in the credential field of the KeyPackage objects in the leaves of the tree (including the InitKeys used to add new members). To disambiguate different signatures used in MLS, each signed value is prefixed by a label as shown below: Here, the functions \"Signature.Sign\" and \"Signature.Verify\" are defined by the signature algorithm. The ciphersuites are defined in section mls-ciphersuites. 6.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-28e64f245c73e9fe331066af5385ae280486676281d74b954aeca593f2b5f342","text":"mapping for an overiew. A comparison between HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 frames is provided in h2-frames. Certain frames can only occur as the first frame of a particular stream type; these are indicated in stream-frame-mapping with a (1). Specific guidance is provided in the relevant section. 4.1. All frames have the following format:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-292dd2537cd3eba0339dff69fbba0ebe0020d5d4da48cc70caf2298998f80201","text":"4. CAPSULE allows reliably sending request-related information end-to- This specification introduces the Capsule Protocol. The Capsule Protocol is a sequence of type-length-value tuples that allows endpoints to reliably communicate request-related information end-to- end, even in the presence of HTTP intermediaries. CAPSULE is an HTTP/3 Frame (as opposed to a QUIC frame) which SHALL only be sent in client-initiated bidirectional streams. Intermediaries forward received CAPSULE frames on the same stream where it would forward DATA frames. Each Capsule Type determines whether it is opaque or transparent to intermediaries: opaque capsules are forwarded unmodified while transparent ones can be parsed, added, or removed by intermediaries. 4.1. This specification defines the \"data stream\" of an HTTP request as the bidirectional stream of bytes that follow the headers in both directions. In HTTP/1.x, the data stream consists of all bytes on the connection that follow the blank line that concludes either the request header section, or the 2xx (Successful) response header section. In HTTP/2 and HTTP/3, the data stream of a given HTTP request consists of all bytes sent in DATA frames with the corresponding stream ID. The concept of a data stream is particularly relevant for methods such as CONNECT where there is no HTTP message content after the headers. Definitions of new HTTP Methods or of new HTTP Upgrade Tokens can state that their data stream uses the Capsule Protocol. If they do so, that means that the contents of their data stream uses the following format (using the notation from the \"Notational Conventions\" section of QUIC): A variable-length integer indicating the Type of the capsule. Endpoints that receive a capsule with an unknown Capsule Type MUST silently skip over that capsule. The length of the Capsule Value field following this field, encoded as a variable-length integer. Note that this field can have a value of zero. The payload of this capsule. Its semantics are determined by the value of the Capsule Type field. 4.2. This specification of CAPSULE currently uses HTTP/3 frame type 0xffcab5. If this document is approved, a lower number will be requested from IANA. If the definition of an HTTP Method or HTTP Upgrade Token states that it uses the capsule protocol, its implementations MUST follow the following requirements: The Type and Length fields follows the definition of HTTP/3 frames from H3. The payload consists of: A server MUST NOT send any Transfer-Encoding or Content-Length header fields in a 2xx (Successful) response. If a client receives a Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding header fields in a successful response, it MUST treat that response as malformed. The type of this capsule. A request message does not have content. Data whose semantics depends on the Capsule Type. A successful response message does not have content. Responses are not cacheable. 4.3. Intermediaries MUST operate in one of the two following modes: In this mode, the intermediary forwards the data stream between two associated streams without any modification of the data stream. In this mode, the intermediary terminates the data stream and parses all Capsule Type and Capsule Length fields it receives. Each Capsule Type determines whether it is opaque or transparent to intermediaries in participant mode: opaque capsules are forwarded unmodified while transparent ones can be parsed, added, or removed by intermediaries. Intermediaries MAY modify the contents of the Capsule Data field of transparent capsule types. Unless otherwise specified, all Capsule Types are defined as opaque to intermediaries. Intermediaries MUST forward all received opaque"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-295643758ae70a0324395604e94549dc897d8326f4d5cdb0edae1324804326a3","text":"registration if it were not to be used in lookup or attributes, but would make a bad parameter for lookup, because a resource lookup with an \"if\" query parameter could ambiguously filter by the registered endpoint property or the RFC6690 target attribute). It is expected that the registry will receive between 5 and 50 registrations in total over the next years. endpoint property or the RFC6690 target attribute). 9.3.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-297d9c219c8a34921a5c484e05db852023639989eb146d3101733127195218ca","text":"For each stored security context, the first time after boot the server receives an OSCORE request, the server uses the Repeat option I-D.amsuess-core-repeat-request-tag to get a request with verifiable freshness and uses that to synchronize the replay window. If the server can verify the fresh request, the Partial IV in the fresh request is set as the lower limit of the replay verifiable freshness. The Request option in the server's response MUST be encrypted, and the server MUST NOT use the same nonce as the request in its reply. If the server can verify a second request as fresh, the Partial IV of the second request is set as the lower limit of the replay window. 6.5.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-2999b202688dcf5fcd45df040d47d3f191c01a1066aa631cf97463c1ffd0deee","text":"3.4. From the flow control perspective, WebTransport sessions count against the stream flow control just like regular HTTP requests, since they are established via an HTTP CONNECT request. This document does not make any effort to introduce a separate flow control mechanism for sessions, nor to separate HTTP requests from WebTransport data streams. If the server needs to limit the rate of incoming requests, it has alternative mechanisms at its disposal: \"HTTP_REQUEST_REJECTED\" error code defined in HTTP3 indicates to the receiving HTTP/3 stack that the request was not processed in any way. This document defines a SETTINGS_MAX_WEBTRANSPORT_SESSIONS parameter that allows the server to limit the maximum number of concurrent WebTransport sessions on a single HTTP/3 connection. The client MUST NOT open more sessions than indicated in the server SETTINGS parameters. The server MUST NOT close the connection if the client opens sessions exceeding this limit, as the client and the server do not have a consistent view of how many sessions are open due to the asynchronous nature of the protocol; instead, it MUST reset all of the CONNECT streams it is not willing to process with the \"HTTP_REQUEST_REJECTED\" status defined in HTTP3. Just like other HTTP requests, WebTransport sessions, and data sent on those sessions, are counted against flow control limits. This document does not introduce additional mechanisms for endpoints to limit the relative amount of flow control credit consumed by different WebTransport sessions, however servers that wish to limit the rate of incoming requests on any particular session have alternative mechanisms: The \"HTTP_REQUEST_REJECTED\" error code defined in HTTP3 indicates to the receiving HTTP/3 stack that the request was not processed in any way. HTTP status code 429 indicates that the request was rejected due to rate limiting RFC6585. Unlike the previous method, this signal"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-29c8a3fb1cc0d91be1c76bf7e3eb729751918d0cd25d5522ea6b57d183c1b9f6","text":"A name or label for the capsule type. The value of the Capsule Type field (see capsule-frame) is a 62bit integer. The value of the Capsule Type field (see capsule-protocol) is a 62bit integer. An optional reference to a specification for the type. This field MAY be empty."}
{"_id":"q-en-sframe-2a50760c72649ce810e7414cc2eed4fc74389ac96e256cd537d59d41786f131e","text":"sizes or frames per second. In order to support it, the sender MUST encode each spatial layer of a given picture in a different frame. That is, an RTP frame may contain more than one SFrame encrypted frame with same source (SRC) and incrementing frame counter. frame with an incrementing frame counter. 5.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-2ad6f07070d2fe13a20e7c333702e73f72987debeb5b2e33bba45e0e0d2fa8f3","text":"On-demand media streaming refers to the playback of pre-recorded media based on a user's action. In some cases, on-demand media is produced as a by-product of a live media production, using the same segments as the live event, but freezing the manifest after the live event has finished. In other cases, on-demand media is constructed out of pre-recorded assets with no streaming necessarily involved during the production of the on-demand content. segments as the live event, but freezing the manifest that describes the media available from the media server after the live event has finished. In other cases, on-demand media is constructed out of pre- recorded assets with no streaming necessarily involved during the production of the on-demand content. On-demand media generally is not subject to latency concerns, but other timing-related considerations can still be as important or even"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-2adbcbefd2d0888b7fb6c9281bcf846d73b7d0e35fc218eb4bfd8f824aa48084","text":"1.2. draft-09 The maximum permittion record expansion for AEAD has been reduced from 2048 to 256 octets. draft-08 Remove support for weak and lesser used named curves."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-2b63f4f762979ee6d4ce45bd84f29f925129046f7c7c6e42374ba17711240a6f","text":"making further progress. At this stage connections can be terminated via idle timeout or explicit close; see sec-termination). An application that uses QUIC might communicate a cumulative stream limit but require the connection to be closed before the limit is An application that uses QUIC and communicated a cumulative stream limit might require the connection to be closed before the limit is reached. For example, to stop the server to perform scheduled maintenance. Immediate connection close causes abrupt closure of actively used streams. Depending on how an application uses QUIC streams, this could be undesirable or detrimental to behavior or performance. A more graceful closure technique is to stop sending increases to stream limits and allow the connection to naturally terminate once remaining streams are consumed. However, the period of time it takes to do so is dependent on the client and an unpredictable closing period might not fit application or operational needs. Applications using QUIC can be conservative with open stream limits in order to reduce the commitment and indeterminism. However, being overly conservative with stream limits affects stream concurrency. Balancing these aspects can be specific to applications and their deployments. Instead of relying on stream limits to avoid abrupt closure, an application-layer graceful close mechanism can be used to communicate the intention to explicitly close the connection at some future point. HTTP/3 provides such a mechanism using the GOAWAY frame. In HTTP/3, when the GOAWAY frame is received by a client, it stops opening new streams even if the cumulative stream limit would allow. Instead the client would create a new connection on which to open further streams. Once all streams are closed on the old connection, it can be terminated safely by a connection close or after expiration of the idle time out (see also sec-termination). performance. A more graceful closure technique is to stop sending increases to stream limits and allow the connection to naturally terminate once remaining streams are consumed. However, the period of time it takes to do so is dependent on the peer and an unpredictable closing period might not fit application or operational needs. Applications using QUIC can be conservative with open stream limits in order to reduce the commitment and indeterminism. However, being overly conservative with stream limits affects stream concurrency. Balancing these aspects can be specific to applications and their deployments. Instead of relying on stream limits to avoid abrupt closure, an application-layer graceful close mechanism can be used to communicate the intention to explicitly close the connection at some future point. HTTP/3 provides such a mechanism using the GOAWAY frame. In HTTP/3, when the GOAWAY frame is received by a client, it stops opening new streams even if the cumulative stream limit would allow. Instead the client would create a new connection on which to open further streams. Once all streams are closed on the old connection, it can be terminated safely by a connection close or after expiration of the idle time out (see also sec-termination). 5."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-2bcd71a66d46db2d94317aac1cb316ea62b56d76b8da40dc9fb56fda57c89bcd","text":"Provider (SP) as described in I-D.ietf-mls-architecture. In particular, we assume the SP provides the following services: A long-term signature key provider which allows clients to authenticate protocol messages in a group. A signature key provider which allows clients to authenticate protocol messages in a group. A broadcast channel, for each group, which will relay a message to all members of a group. For the most part, we assume that this"}
{"_id":"q-en-webpush-protocol-2bcef2f6cc7f7e06b9a3eb2342634d9f23474e39a3b337426c336a52f3dc5ee2","text":"3. The push service shares the same default port number (443/TCP) with HTTPS, but MAY also advertise the IANA allocated TCP System Port 1001 using HTTP alternative services RFC7838. The push service MUST use HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] following the recommendations in [RFC7525]. The push service shares the same default port number (443/TCP) with HTTPS, but MAY also advertise the IANA allocated TCP System Port 1001 using HTTP alternative services RFC7838. While the default port (443) offers broad reachability characteristics, it is most often used for web browsing scenarios"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-2c7690e4b6cc4ee28c12a0619431c7f758c5b43a9f787e1ab934c7c23e65bae9","text":"identical to the \"signature_key\" in the LeafNode containing this credential. Each new credential that has not already been validated by the application MUST be validated against the Authentication Service. Applications SHOULD require that a client present the same set of identifiers throughout its presence in the group, even if its Credential is changed in a Commit or Update. If an application allows clients to change identifiers over time, then each time the client presents a new credential, the application MUST verify that the set of identifiers in the credential is acceptable to the application for this client. 6.3.1. The application using MLS is responsible for specifying which identifiers it finds acceptable for each member in a group. In other words, following the model that RFC6125 describes for TLS, the application maintains a list of \"reference identifiers\" for the members of a group, and the credentials provide \"presented identifiers\". A member of a group is authenticated by first validating that the member's credential legitimately represents some presented identifiers, and then ensuring that the reference identifiers for the member are authenticated by those presented identifiers. The parts of the system that perform these functions are collectively referred to as the Authentication Service (AS) I-D.ietf-mls- architecture. A member's credential is said to be _validated with the AS_ when the AS verifies the credential's presented identifiers, and verifies that those identifiers match the reference identifiers for the member. Whenever a new credential is introduced in the group, it MUST be validated with the AS. In particular, at the following events in the protocol: When a member receives a KeyPackage that it will use in an Add proposal to add a new member to the group. When a member receives a GroupInfo object that it will use to join a group, either via a Welcome or via an External Commit When a member receives an Add proposal adding a member to the group. When a member receives an Update proposal whose LeafNode has a new credential for the member. When a member receives a Commit with an UpdatePath whose LeafNode has a new credential for the committer. When an \"external_senders\" extension is added to the group, or an existing \"external_senders\" extension is updated. In cases where a member's credential is being replaced, such as Update and Commit cases above, the AS MUST also verify that the set of presented identifiers in the new credential is valid as a successor to the set of presented identifiers in the old credential, according to the application's policy. 6.3.2. MLS implementations will presumably provide applications with a way to request protocol operations with regard to other clients (e.g., removing clients). Such functions will need to refer to the other"}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-2ca433349ec9ce9dbb098db0fe4a6663bd134a7353a38284f4b95459fac5b847","text":"and validate the version_information transport parameter specified in QUIC-VN to prevent version downgrade attacks. Note that version 2 meets that document's definition of a compatible Note that version 2 meets the QUIC-VN definition of a compatible version with version 1, and version 1 is compatible with version 2. Therefore, servers can use compatible negotiation to switch a connection between the two versions. Endpoints that support both"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-2cb1c6c67a70a98cb4a00300af224efa2652649607eca32dad3fc04f99215dbc","text":"extension with the value \"Yes\", a Standards Track document RFC8126 is REQUIRED. IESG Approval is REQUIRED for a Yes->No transition. IANA [SHALL update/has added] the following notes: Experts are to verify that there is in fact a publicly available specification. An Internet Draft that is posted and never published or a specification in another standards body, industry consortium, university site, etc. suffices. As specified in RFC8126, assignments made in the Private Use space are not generally useful for broad interoperability. It is the responsibility of those making use of the Private Use range to ensure that no conflicts occur (within the intended scope of use). For widespread experiments, temporary reservations are available. Extensions marked as \"Yes\" are those allocated via Standards Track RFCs. Extensions marked as \"No\" are not. If an item is not marked as recommended it does not necessarily mean that it is flawed; rather, it indicates that either the item has not been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases. The following is from I-D.ietf-tls-tls13 and is included here to ensure alignment between these specifications."}
{"_id":"q-en-7710bis-2ccdc60d9b7eacc0ef95d834addf65c3cbaf771a4c4f5ef5a1e3634742046f48","text":"4.1. 4.1.1. This document registers a new entry under the IETF URN Sub-namespace defined in RFC3553: Registry name: Captive Portal Unrestricted Identifier Captive Portal Unrestricted Identifier URN: urn:ietf:params:capport-unrestricted urn:ietf:params:capport-unrestricted Specification: RFC TBD (this document) RFC TBD (this document) Repository: RFC TBD (this document) RFC TBD (this document) Index value: Only one value is defined (see URN above). No hierarchy is defined and therefore no sub-namespace registrations are possible. Only one value is defined (see URN above). No hierarchy is defined and therefore no sub-namespace registrations are possible. 4.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-2cd7aa3c930955d96e0be11290246744ea2f990a5b9cfc1ebd9f449fa01b5001","text":"Indicates that interaction through some set of defined mechanisms needs to take place. Claims about the RO as known and declared by the AS. Claims about the RO as known and declared by the AS, as described in response-subject. An identifier this client instance can use to identify itself when making future requests. An identifier this client instance can use to identify its current end-user when making future requests. An error code indicating that something has gone wrong. In this example, the AS is returning an response-interact-redirect, a"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-2ce580dea0efaa75dfa151bbb8cb7ffeabf854838b3702deb5b37c2ba5cf5c0f","text":"attributes to provide better information about the statistical properties of the measurement. A SenML object is referred to as \"expanded\" if it does not contain any base values and has no relative times. 4.4. Sometimes it is useful to be able to refer to a defined normalized format for SenML records. This normalized format tends to get used for big data applications and intermediate forms when converting to other formats. A SenML Record is referred to as \"resolved\" if it does not contain any base values and has no relative times, but the the base values of the SenML Pack (if any) are applied to the Record. That is, name and base name are concatenated, base time is added to the time of the Record, if Record did not contain Unit the Base Unit is applied to the record, etc. In addition the records need to be in chronological order. TODO add example 4.5. SenML is designed to carry the minimum dynamic information about measurements, and for efficiency reasons does not carry significant static meta-data about the device, object or sensors. Instead, it is"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-2cf7a41cd92a3b90617eaa4ccf3c4321158d3b3c07e536cbe0a8a23ba32ccd63","text":"the \"confirmation\" value in the MLSPlaintext. Sign the MLSPlaintext using the current epoch's GroupContext as context. Complete the GroupInfo by populating the following fields: Update the tree in the provisional state by applying the direct path Confirmed transcript hash: The confirmed transcript hash including the current Commit object Construct a GroupInfo reflecting the new state: Interim transcript hash: The interim transcript hash including the current Commit object Group ID, epoch, tree, confirmed transcript hash, and interim transcript hash from the new state Confirmation: The confirmation from the MLSPlaintext The confirmation from the MLSPlaintext object Sign the GroupInfo using the member's private signing key Encrypt the GroupInfo using the key and nonce derived from the \"init_secret\" for the current epoch (see welcoming-new-members) \"epoch_secret\" for the new epoch (see welcoming-new-members) For each new member in the group: Identify the lowest common ancestor in the tree of the new member's leaf node and the member sending the Commit Compute the path secret corresponding to the commonn ancestor node Compute an EncryptedKeyPackage object that encapsulates the \"init_secret\" for the current epoch and the path secret for the common ancestor. For each new member in the group, compute an EncryptedKeyPackage object that encapsulates the \"init_secret\" for the current epoch. Construct a Welcome message from the encrypted GroupInfo object and the encrypted key packages."}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-2d0a70abe6c985acbbbcbb1b0047a9e4f3ecf1ba27aa1ef38ed8c5df6206962d","text":"fields to provide better information about the statistical properties of the measurement. In summary, the structure of a SenML record is laid out to support a single measurement per record. If multiple data values are measured at the same time (e.g., air pressure and altitude), they are best kept as separate records linked through their Time value; this is even true where one of the data values is more \"meta\" than others (e.g., describes a condition that influences other measurements at the same time). 4.4. Sometimes it is useful to be able to refer to a defined normalized"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-2d4c04e759c9804822104f9fa0b18d7c57658de43127c59624ce27caf935acae","text":"4.2. JSONPath queries are often not static, but formed from variables that provide index values, member names, or values to compare with in a filter expression. These variables need to be translated into the form they take in a JSONPath query, e.g., by escaping string delimiters, or by only allowing specific constructs such as \".name\" to be formed when the given values allow that. Failure to perform these translations correctly can lead to unexpected failures, which can lead to Availability, Confidentiality, and Integrity breaches, in particular if an adversary has control over the values (e.g., by entering them into a Web form). The resulting class of attacks, (e.g., SQL injections), is consistently found among the top causes of application security vulnerabilities and requires particular attention. 4.3. Where JSONPath is used as a part of a security mechanism, attackers can attempt to provoke unexpected or unpredictable behavior, or take advantage of differences in behavior between JSONPath"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-2d5b12a6661c21584a281e18ad5c21774e15176daadc11c1af2ded7991a26fa6","text":"An endpoint can verify support for Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) in the first packets it sends, as described in ecn-validation. The CRYPTO frame can be sent in different packet number spaces. The sequence numbers used by CRYPTO frames to ensure ordered delivery of cryptographic handshake data start from zero in each packet number space. The CRYPTO frame can be sent in different packet number spaces (packet-numbers). The sequence numbers used by CRYPTO frames to ensure ordered delivery of cryptographic handshake data start from zero in each packet number space. Endpoints MUST explicitly negotiate an application protocol. This avoids situations where there is a disagreement about the protocol"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-2d631f8b7a43503b0f17c243dd0e2097192ba820c9956e41a0f6e39b13901c13","text":"A base value is added to the value found in an entry, similar to Base Time. A base sum is added to the sum found in an entry, similar to Base Time. Version number of media type format. This attribute is an optional positive integer and defaults to 5 if not present. [RFC Editor: change the default value to 10 when this specification is"}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-2dbbc0c3c9803e333a6b5ccb2513025a47198f8bac4fa0ec6124ee51917288e6","text":"If the 'alg' field present, it MUST match the HMAC algorithm being used. If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'sign' when creating an HMAC authentication tag. If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'MAC create' when creating an HMAC authentication tag. If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'verify' when verifying an HMAC authentication tag. If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'MAC verify' when verifying an HMAC authentication tag. Implementations creating and validating MAC values MUST validate that the key type, key length, and algorithm are correct and appropriate"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-dnssd-srp-2e5bc05496865277274b3b7a072057010b157ac10601c1ffef6a0a481fc8d0cf","text":"An instruction is a Host Description Instruction if, for the appropriate hostname, it contains A and/or AAAA records that are not of of sufficient scope to be validly published in a DNS zone can be ignored by the SRP server, which could result in a host description effectively containing zero reachable addresses even when it contains one or more addresses. For example, if a link-scope address or IPv4 autoconfiguration address is provided by the SRP requestor, the SRP registrar could not publish this in a DNS zone. However, in some situations, the SRP registrar may make the records available through a mechanism such as an advertising proxy only on the specific link from which the SRP update originated; in such a situation, locally-scoped records are still valid. 2.3.2. An SRP Update MUST include zero or more Service Discovery"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-2e63fea9c64f1a7ffc2b5c3355a8a881cec06a177a53fd06f92a5b7dbc4e418c","text":"The types HpkeKemId, HpkeKdfId, and HpkeAeadId identify a KEM, KDF, and AEAD respectively. The definitions for these identifiers and the semantics of the algorithms they identify can be found in HPKE. semantics of the algorithms they identify can be found in HPKE. The Npk parameter corresponding to the HpkeKdfId can be found in HPKE. 4.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-2f14f6a3e549ecd233c46b8b1070c542365d360913e18506db2a1e0347494a11","text":"If an endpoint receives an ADDRESS_REQUEST capsule that contains zero Requested Addresses, it MUST abort the IP proxying request stream. Note that the ordering of Requested Addresses does not carry any semantics. Similarly, the Request ID is only meant as a unique identifier, it does not convey any priority or importance. 4.7.3. The ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule (see iana-types for the value of the"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-datagram-2f76d091b9e64b31dbc3a3099f776b29efe9f07c88a8d90cd7458230fc61ab30","text":"7. 7.1. This document registers a new value in the QUIC Transport Parameter Registry: Registry maintained at . 0x0020 (if this document is approved) 0x20 (if this document is approved) max_datagram_frame_size A non-zero value indicates that the endpoint supports receiving unreliable DATAGRAM frames. An endpoint that advertises this transport parameter can receive DATAGRAM frames from the other endpoint, up to and including the length in bytes provided in the transport parameter. The default value is 0. permanent This document This document also registers a new value in the QUIC Frame Type registry: 7.2. This document registers two new values in the QUIC Frame Type registry maintained at . 0x30 and 0x31 (if this document is approved) DATAGRAM Unreliable application data permanent This document 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-2fbdcf9f5392a546caf7ccbcc6890dd67cdc2bd206257e7cf11668740ff98c01","text":"6.3. The past success of the largely TCP-based Internet is evidence that the mechanisms TCP used to achieve equilibrium quickly, at a point where TCP senders do not interfere with other TCP senders for sustained periods of time (RFC5681), have been largely successful. The Internet has continued to work even when the specific TCP mechanisms used to reach equilibrium changed over time (RFC7414). Because TCP provides a common tool to avoid contention, even when significant TCP-based applications like FTP were largely replaced by other significant TCP-based applications like HTTP, the transport behavior remained safe for the Internet. Modern TCP implementations (I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis) continue to probe for available bandwidth, and \"back off\" when a network path is saturated, but may also work to avoid growing queues along network paths, which prevent TCP senders from detecting quickly when a network path becoming saturated. Congestion control mechanisms such as COPA COPA18 and BBR I-D.cardwell-iccrg-bbr-congestion-control make these decisions based on measured path delays, assuming that if the measured path delay is increasing, the sender is injecting packets onto the network path faster than the network can forward them (or the receiver can accept them) so the sender should adjust its sending rate accordingly. Although common TCP behavior has changed significantly since the days of Jacobson-Karels and RFC2001, even adding new congestion controllers such as CUBIC RFC8312, the common practice of implementing TCP as part of an operating system kernel has acted to limit how quickly TCP behavior can change. Even with the widespread use of automated operating system update installation on many end- user systems, streaming media providers could have a reasonable expectation that they could understand TCP transport protocol behaviors, and that those behaviors would remain relatively stable in the short term. 6.4. The QUIC protocol, developed from a proprietary protocol into an IETF standards-track protocol RFC9000, turns many of the statements made in udp-behavior and tcp-behavior on their heads. in reliable-behavior and unreliable-behavior on their heads. Although QUIC provides an alternative to the TCP and UDP transport protocols, QUIC is itself encapsulated in UDP. As noted elsewhere in"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-303438d40adebdf0606256b524ded0f0af6686cb932fd15179496c3890c5e74c","text":"Tokens, it is not accessible from Web Platform APIs (such as those commonly accessed via JavaScript in web browsers). Definitions of new HTTP Upgrade Tokens that use the Capsule Protocol need to perform a security analysis that considers the impact of HTTP Datagrams and Capsules in the context of their protocol. 5. 5.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-303989c631cfdea5274f62f5ac6181477087ca69c0352aaaf3238c893deaef0e","text":"bytes associated with an HTTP request or response payload. DATA frames MUST be associated with an HTTP request or response. If a DATA frame is received on either control stream, the recipient MUST a DATA frame is received on a control stream, the recipient MUST respond with a connection error (errors) of type HTTP_WRONG_STREAM. 7.2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-307ca60ad51114146483abbff23c05c9cd971a67694a823e75083e59630e99e2","text":"\"ExtensionType Values\" registry, defined in RFC5246, for connection_id(TBD1) as described in the table below. IANA is requested to add an extra column to the TLS ExtensionType Values registry to indicate whether an extension is only applicable to DTLS. registry to indicate whether an extension is only applicable to DTLS and to include this document as an additional reference for the registry. Note: The value \"N\" in the Recommended column is set because this extension is intended only for specific use cases. This document describes an extension for DTLS 1.2 only; it is not to TLS (1.3). The DTLS 1.3 functionality is described in I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13. describes the behavior of this extension for DTLS 1.2 only; it is not applicable to TLS, and its usage for DTLS 1.3 is described in I- D.ietf-tls-dtls13. IANA is requested to allocate tls12_cid(TBD2) in the \"TLS ContentType Registry\". The tls12_cid ContentType is only applicable to DTLS 1.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-3088f40e31ffe453e077f62b9ce2543c5c4a9cfabe2796997e6dce358ad7e43b","text":"different _Strength of Function_ strengthoffunction, which results in the Attestation Results being qualitatively different in strength. A result that indicates non-compliance can be used by an Attester (in the passport model) or a Relying Party (in the background-check model) to indicate that the Attester should not be treated as authorized and may be in need of remediation. In some cases, it may even indicate that the Evidence itself cannot be authenticated as being correct. An Attestation Result that indicates compliance can be used by a Relying Party to make authorization decisions based on the Relying Party's appraisal policy. The simplest such policy might be to simply authorize any party supplying a compliant Attestation Result signed by a trusted Verifier. A more complex policy might also entail comparing information provided in the result against Reference Values, or applying more complex logic on such information. An Attestation Result that indicates non-compliance can be used by an Attester (in the passport model) or a Relying Party (in the background-check model) to indicate that the Attester should not be treated as authorized and may be in need of remediation. In some cases, it may even indicate that the Evidence itself cannot be authenticated as being correct. By default, the Relying Party does not believe the Attester to be compliant. Upon receipt of an authentic Attestation Result and given the Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results is satisfied, then the Attester is allowed to perform the prescribed actions or access. The simplest such Appraisal Policy might authorize granting the Attester full access or control over the resources guarded by the Relying Party. A more complex Appraisal Policy might involve using the information provided in the Attestation Result to compare against expected values, or to apply complex analysis of other information contained in the Attestation Result. Thus, Attestation Results often need to include detailed information about the Attester, for use by Relying Parties, much like physical"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-30adb465a36eb798e84d1476702d84d60f39756dcf5b4a81ade70884bcc9f021","text":"requests over time. However, this increases the risk that their request is rejected as outside the acceptable window. 6.9. The media type defined in ohttp-keys represents keying material. The content of this media type is not active (see RFC6838), but it governs how a might interact with an . The security implications of processing it are described in sec-client; privacy implications are described in privacy. The security implications of handling the message media types defined in req-res-media is covered in other parts of this section in more detail. However, these message media types are also encrypted encapsulations of HTTP requests and responses. HTTP messages contain content, which can use any media type. In particular, requests are processed by an Oblivious , which - as an HTTP resource - defines how content is processed; see HTTP. HTTP clients can also use resource identity and response content to determine how content is processed. Consequently, the security considerations of HTTP also apply to the handling of the content of these media types. 7. One goal of this design is that independent requests are only"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-30bae07658098e380e7a4e52f847a136c2bc19c43a578eb656763a8e35b095b7","text":"initial timeout (that is, 2*kInitialRtt) as defined in QUIC-RECOVERY is RECOMMENDED. That is: This timeout allows for multiple PTOs to expire prior to failing path validation, so that loss of a single PATH_CHALLENGE or PATH_RESPONSE frame does not cause path validation failure. Note that the endpoint might receive packets containing other frames on the new path, but a PATH_RESPONSE frame with appropriate data is required for path validation to succeed."}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-30e7e8f02c5adfb4ebccc5898b2e2dfe5bd9a2675fc5ac665fe3cde7ff834579","text":"packets. That document could specify that compatible version negotiation causes 0-RTT data to be rejected by the server. 7. 8. Because QUIC version 1 was the only IETF Standards Track version of QUIC published before this document, it is handled specially as"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-317bcaad4bd9713731698867c1316597595917b2dcfd33fb81e478796f5a5587","text":"4.2.1. The ADDRESS_ASSIGN capsule allows an endpoint to inform its peer that it has assigned an IP address to it. It allows assigning a prefix which can contain multiple addresses. This capsule uses a Capsule Type of 0xfff100. Its value uses the following format: The ADDRESS_ASSIGN capsule (see iana-types for the value of the capsule type) allows an endpoint to inform its peer that it has assigned an IP address or prefix to it. The ADDRESS_ASSIGN capsule allows assigning a prefix which can contain multiple addresses. Any of these addresses can be used as the source address on IP packets originated by the receiver of this capsule. IP Version of this address assignment. MUST be either 4 or 6."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-3190ff64b0a3e3825c9203044292bdbe41a9cb13dc6939f9b81739fb901eb697","text":"The currentDirection property indicates the last negotiated direction for the transceiver's associated \"m=\" section. More specifically, it indicates the directional attribute RFC3264 of the associated \"m=\" indicates the direction attribute RFC3264 of the associated \"m=\" section in the last applied answer (including provisional answers), with \"send\" and \"recv\" directions reversed if it was a remote answer. For example, if the directional attribute for the associated \"m=\" For example, if the direction attribute for the associated \"m=\" section in a remote answer is \"recvonly\", currentDirection is set to \"sendonly\"."}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-31a5e9a33d4ce443c37d90e1315f88d30a824e216becbe96fe31cb668e1340c6","text":"A relay MAY add information to requests if the client is aware of the nature of the information that could be added. The client does not need to be aware of the exact value added for each request, but needs to know the range of possible values the relay might use. It is important to note that information added by the relay can reduce the to know the range of possible values the relay might use. Importantly, information added by the relay - beyond what is already revealed through encapsulated requests from clients - can reduce the size of the anonymity set of clients at a gateway. Moreover, relays MAY apply differential treatment to clients that"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-31c081f980003a3d8febf1a0d9d1852a9aedcf39a43aba72ec1790063f1e8d8c","text":"\"bytes-remaining\" (optional, integer): indicates the number of bytes left, after which the host will be in a captive state Note that the use of the hmac-key is not defined in this document, but is intended for use in the enforcement step of the Captive Portal Architecture. 3.3. To request the Captive Portal JSON content, a host sends an HTTP GET"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-31dc5bfe287166c4192d8335f08fba06109616b0a4384ef615fd14c011c70caa","text":"possible. If these checks fail, the client MUST NOT automatically use the discovered Designated Resolver. Additionally, the client SHOULD discovered Designated Resolver if this designation was only discovered via a \"_dns.resolver.arpa.\" query (if the designation was advertised directly by the network as described in dnr-interaction, the server can still be used). Additionally, the client SHOULD suppress any further queries for Designated Resolvers using this Unencrypted DNS Resolver for the length of time indicated by the SVCB record's Time to Live (TTL) in order to avoid excessive queries that"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-31ef9083cc3e9b8ffd21b45dadf4e97a456a7c03fd936321e8a6124e69714667","text":"Namespaces for each of the keywords provided in the IANA protocol numbers registry (see https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol- numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml) are reserved for protocol-specific numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml) are reserved for Protocol-specific Properties and MUST NOT be used for vendor or implementation-specific properties. Avoid using any of the terms listed as keywords in the protocol numbers registry as any part of a vendor- or implementation-"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ctls-3200eb79a60cf2ca5e7ec7d745e5594b57aadf9c7af2b7397efac36dcdcc4c39","text":"6.3. This document requests that IANA change the name of entry 6 in the TLS HandshakeType Registry from \"hello_retry_request_RESERVED\" to \"hello_retry_request\", and set its Reference field to this document. 6.4. This document requests that IANA open a new registry entitled \"Well- known cTLS Profile IDs\", on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters page, with the following columns:"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-321114f814ffe4646b5f73c732873d1dac18ce2e13b2b3ad34f0ffcff7cf1407","text":"Issuer identity. Tokens identify which issuers are trusted for a given issuance protocol. Interactive or non-interactive. Tokens can either be interactive or not. An interactive token is one which requires a freshly issued token based on the challenge, whereas a non-interactive token can be issued proactively and cached for future use. Redemption context. Tokens can be bound to a given redemption context, which influences a client's ability to pre-fetch and cache tokens. For example, an empty redemption context always allows tokens to be issued and redeemed non-interactively, whereas a fresh and random redemption context means that the redeemed token must be issued only after the client receives the challenge. See Section 2.1.1 of HTTP-Authentication for more details. Per-origin or cross-origin. Tokens can be constrained to the Origin for which the challenge originated, or can be used across Origins. Depending on the use case, Origins may need to maintain state to track redeemed tokens. For example, Origins that accept non- interactive, cross-origin tokens SHOULD track which tokens have been redeemed already, since these tokens can be issued and then spent multiple times in response to any such challenge. See double-spend for discussion. track redeemed tokens. For example, Origins that accept cross-origin across shared redemption contexts tokens SHOULD track which tokens have been redeemed already in those redemption contexts, since these tokens can be issued and then spent multiple times in response to any such challenge. See Section 2.1.1 of HTTP-Authentication for discussion. Origins that admit cross-origin tokens bear some risk of allowing tokens issued for one Origin to be spent in an interaction with"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-3241e6c1e90aa5d1e89726697c907ec5d20460c84d7f43c2df448065f517440e","text":"8.3. To initiate path validation, an endpoint sends a PATH_CHALLENGE frame containing a random payload on the path to be validated. containing an unpredictable payload on the path to be validated. An endpoint MAY send multiple PATH_CHALLENGE frames to guard against packet loss. However, an endpoint SHOULD NOT send multiple"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-32499d7e5fba31622b22b52fbfa16b930a175aa62f3789780a0400c8a0aac191","text":"feedback mechanisms, UDP-based applications that send and receive substantial amounts of information are expected to provide their own feedback mechanisms, and to respond to the feedback the application receives. This expectation is most recently codified in Best Current Practice RFC8085. receives. This expectation is most recently codified as a Best Current Practice RFC8085. In contrast to adaptive segmented delivery over a reliable transport as described in adapt-deliver, some applications deliver streaming"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-32f803edbad98fa381e1c10bc96c9d902b087fcf1130f0ec4de14985dd683e51","text":"signed with the requested new account key. This \"inner\" JWS becomes the payload for the \"outer\" JWS that is the body of the ACME request. The outer JWS MUST meet the normal requirements for an ACME JWS (see request-authentication). The inner JWS MUST meet the normal requirements, with the following differences: The outer JWS MUST meet the normal requirements for an ACME JWS request body (see request-authentication). The inner JWS MUST meet the normal requirements, with the following differences: The inner JWS MUST have a \"jwk\" header parameter, containing the public key of the new key pair."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-33427d598b12d954e99f02491230c099bdc5a4358ad58caf090d56c92d3164a9","text":"in RFC5956, section 4.3. For simplicity, if both RTX and FEC are supported, the FEC SSRC MUST be the same as the RTX SSRC. [OPEN ISSUE: Handling of a=imageattr] If the BUNDLE policy for this PeerConnection is set to \"max- bundle\", and this is not the first m= section, or the BUNDLE policy is set to \"balanced\", and this is not the first m= section"}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-33483a3ddba4971cb88e7b2c2937012e0da7000bba03763d0435547bff2d10ae","text":"If the 'alg' field present, it MUST match the AES-MAC algorithm being used. If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'sign' when creating an AES-MAC authentication tag. If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'MAC create' when creating an AES-MAC authentication tag. If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'verify' when verifying an AES-MAC authentication tag. If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'MAC verify' when verifying an AES-MAC authentication tag. 9.2.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-33534733e9b6b449657365318794f0f36cb19246ab6a01f0088692a4b384814e","text":", as described in fnex. A JSONPath implementation MUST raise an error for any query which is not well-formed and valid. The well-formedness and the validity of not well formed and valid. The well-formedness and the validity of JSONPath queries are independent of the JSON value the query is applied to. No further errors relating to the well-formedness and the validity of a JSONPath query can be raised during application of"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-33a2cb11c5ae1135d192d711c298b02477a69a703eb9c6ac0f87c01838d7e0a2","text":"first act as an Attester, providing Evidence that the Owner can appraise, before the Owner would give the Relying Party an updated policy that might contain sensitive information. In such a case, mutual attestation might be needed, in which case typically one side's Evidence must be considered safe to share with an untrusted entity, in order to bootstrap the sequence. mutual authentication or attestation might be needed, in which case typically one side's Evidence must be considered safe to share with an untrusted entity, in order to bootstrap the sequence. 7.4."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-33ba1b98c2b8cbf12180012d0ab5f155c6e8b9f6931def91c2604a0629332eef","text":"If the Designated Resolver and the Unencrypted DNS Resolver share an IP address, clients MAY choose to opportunistically use the Designated Resolver even without this certificate check (opportunistic). (opportunistic). If the IP address is not shared, opportunistic use allows for attackers to redirect queries to an unrelated Encrypted Resolver, as described in security. If resolving the name of a Designated Resolver from an SVCB record yields an IP address that was not presented in the Additional Answers section or ipv4hint or ipv6hint fields of the original SVCB query, the connection made to that IP address MUST pass the same TLS certificate checks before being allowed to replace a previously known and validated IP address for the same Designated Resolver name. Connections to a Designated Resolver can use a different IP address than the IP address of the Unencrypted DNS Resolver, such as if the process of resolving the SVCB service yields additional addresses. Even when a different IP address is used for the connection, the TLS certificate checks described in this section still apply for the original IP address of the Unencrypted DNS Resolver. 4.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-architecture-33da8fdc445a0cebe69f9af94f0451320d4b483e16efa9ccfbc8888db552918d","text":"Delivering Welcome messages to new members of a group. Downloading KeyPackages for specific clients, and uploading new KeyPackages for a user's own clients. Uploading new KeyPackages for a user's own clients. Downloading KeyPackages for specific clients. Typically, KeyPackages are used once and consumed. Additional services may or may not be required depending on the application design:"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-exported-authenticator-33e9a4a4c13591b7a5526595976cc47060e231624f6dbfcf1573861505ee06b0","text":"7. This document has no IANA actions. 7.1. IANA is requested to update the entry for server_name(0) in the registry for ExtensionType (defined in TLS13) by replacing the value in the \"TLS 1.3\" column with the value \"CH, EE, CR\". 7.2. IANA is requested to add the following entries to the registry for Exporter Labels (defined in RFC5705): \"EXPORTER-server authenticator handshake context\", \"EXPORTER-client authenticator finished key\" and \"EXPORTER-server authenticator finished key\". 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-33f0265fdb5964118d67997ab323be92e8fc45142fcb521de3fe2ae3265db7bb","text":"Connection Properties: The Connection Properties are used to configure protocol-specific options and control per-connection behavior of the Transport Services system; for example, a protocol-specific Connection Property can express that if UDP is used, the implementation ought to use checksums. Note that the presence of such a property does not require that a specific protocol will be used. In general, these properties do not explicitly determine the selection of paths or protocols, but can be used in this way by an implementation during connection protocol-specific Connection Property can express that if TCP is used, the implementation ought to use the User Timeout Option. Note that the presence of such a property does not require that a specific protocol will be used. In general, these properties do not explicitly determine the selection of paths or protocols, but can be used in this way by an implementation during connection establishment. Connection Properties are specified on a Preconnection prior to Connection establishment, and can be modified on the Connection later. Changes made to Connection"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-3401df27cd1ace92441aa8c39a0ab11c2023d18e838019ea922c8e06a6000c4b","text":"4.2.1. Immediate, or simultaneous, racing should be avoided by implementations. This approach can consume network resources and establish state that will not be used. Immediate racing is when multiple alternate branches are started without waiting for any one branch to make progress before starting the next alternative. This means the attempts are effectively simultaneous. Immediate racing should be avoided by implementations, since it consumes extra network resources and establishes state that might not be used. 4.2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-341dc5e1398ddd80f1bd4025645ef39a92011fa28e889ce6ca4411ab68a37b44","text":"The DUPLICATE_PUSH frame carries a single variable-length integer that identifies the Push ID of a resource that the server has previously promised (see frame-push-promise). previously promised (see frame-push-promise), though that promise might not be received before this frame. A server MUST NOT use a Push ID that is larger than the client has provided in a MAX_PUSH_ID frame (frame-max-push-id). A client MUST treat receipt of a DUPLICATE_PUSH that contains a larger Push ID than the client has advertised as a connection error of type HTTP_MALFORMED_FRAME. This frame allows the server to use the same server push in response to multiple concurrent requests. Referencing the same server push"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-3426eee94f35c45398f4fdf8d3ffcec4de3a8b2a3e783c4005f0d7305f7dae37","text":"Base Unit is allowed. Value of the entry. Optional if a Sum value is present, otherwise required. Values are represented using three basic data types, Floating point numbers (\"v\" field for \"Value\"), Booleans (\"vb\" for \"Boolean Value\"), Strings (\"vs\" for \"String Value\") and Binary Data (\"vd\" for \"Data Value\") . Exactly one of these four fields MUST appear unless there is Sum field in which case it is allowed to have no Value field or to have \"v\" field. required. Values are represented using basic data types. This specification defines floating point numbers (\"v\" field for \"Value\"), booleans (\"vb\" for \"Boolean Value\"), strings (\"vs\" for \"String Value\") and binary data (\"vd\" for \"Data Value\"). Exactly one value field MUST appear unless there is Sum field in which case it is allowed to have no Value field. Integrated sum of the values over time. Optional. This attribute is in the units specified in the Unit value multiplied by seconds."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-345286e7ca1bf3fd80044ae90f5dac653cea39a73c3fba30dfbbfe35d23f6cab","text":"versions. format defines how QUIC DATAGRAM frames are used with HTTP/3. setting defines an HTTP/3 setting that endpoints can use to advertise support of the frame. setting defines an HTTP/3 setting that endpoints can use to advertise support of the frame. capsule introduces the Capsule Protocol and the \"data stream\" concept. Data streams are initiated using special-purpose HTTP"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-34b5449ac4305ca821fcd1a0a15ef336753602301b465e6e9151c1bf47cfb7d7","text":"support removing a Message from its buffer, this property may be ignored. Niceness: this represents the ability to de-prioritize a Message in favor of other Messages. This can be implemented by the system re-ordering Messages that have yet to be handed to the Protocol Stack, or by giving relative priority hints to protocols that support priorities per Message. For example, an implementation of HTTP/2 could choose to send Messages of different niceness on streams of different priority. Priority: this represents the ability to prioritize a Message over other Messages. This can be implemented by the system re-ordering Messages that have yet to be handed to the Protocol Stack, or by giving relative priority hints to protocols that support priorities per Message. For example, an implementation of HTTP/2 could choose to send Messages of different Priority on streams of different priority. Ordered: when this is false, it disables the requirement of in- order-delivery for protocols that support configurable ordering."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-35063e968ddea52ee6c66f34229147bcecbff0cf344b91ebcb97835934f93534","text":"connection error of type \"HTTP_QPACK_ENCODER_STREAM_ERROR\". Reducing the dynamic table capacity can cause entries to be evicted (see eviction). This MUST NOT cause the eviction of entries with outstanding references (see reference-tracking). Changing the capacity of the dynamic table is not acknowledged as this instruction does not insert an entry. (see eviction). This MUST NOT cause the eviction of blocking entries (see blocked-insertion). Changing the capacity of the dynamic table is not acknowledged as this instruction does not insert an entry. 4.4."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-3509532ddc1e8d0eb94826a92ffcf99fdf629a8f4b7c943215d0b2609a5899f3","text":"ratchet tree and the members' ClientInitKeys. The hash of a tree is the hash of its root node, which we define recursively, starting with the leaves. The hash of a leaf node is the hash of a \"LeafNodeHashInput\" object: recursively, starting with the leaves. While hashes at the nodes are used to check the integrity of the subtrees, signatures are required to provide authentication and group agreement. Siganatures are especially important in the case of newcomers and MUST be verified when joining. All nodes in the tree MUST be signed to provide authentication and group agreement. The content within the leaf of a ratchet tree is composed of a \"ClientInitKey\" when the leaf is populated. The \"info\" field is equal to the null optional value when the leaf is blank (i.e., no member occupies that leaf). Elements of the ratchet tree are called \"RatchetNode\" objects and contain optionally a \"ClientInitKey\" when at the leaves or an optional \"ParentNode\" above. The intermediate nodes contain less information, the hash of a parent node (including the root) is the hash of a \"ParentNodeHashInput\" struct: When computing the hash of a parent node AB the \"ParentNodeHash\" structure is used: The \"left_hash\" and \"right_hash\" fields hold the hashes of the node's left and right children, respectively. The \"public_key\" field holds the hash of the public key stored at this node, represented as an \"optional\" object, which is null if and only if the node is blank. left (A) and right (B) children, respectively. The signature within the \"ParentNode\" is computed over the its prefix within the serialized \"ParentNodeHash\" struct to cover all information about the sub-tree. The \"committer_index\" is required for a member to determine the signing key needed to perform the signature verification. To compute the hash of a leaf node is the hash of a \"LeafNodeHash\" object: Note that unlike a ParentNode, a ClientInitKey already contains a signature. 7.4."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-352e58643372ac87529050ab53afe07f0b4fd476b38f90c35bc7f15a2d73231e","text":"The step of gathering candidates involves identifying which paths, protocols, and endpoints may be used for a given Connection. This list is determined by the requirements, prohibitions, and preferences of the application as specified in the Path Selection Properties and Protocol Selection Properties. of the application as specified in the Selection Properties. 4.1.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-353768f68b5f60a0c5d5bfa112ca57556d32130ffa15dd7ac774fe025668f76e","text":"suite it will use for encryption. It MUST NOT choose a cipher suite not advertised by the configuration. Next, the client constructs the ClientHelloOuter message just as it Next, the client constructs the ClientHelloInner message just as it does a standard ClientHello, with the exception of the following rules: It MUST offer to negotiate TLS 1.3 or above. It MUST include an \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension with a payload constructed as described below. It MUST NOT offer to negotiate TLS 1.2 or below. Note this is necessary to ensure the backend server does not negotiate a TLS version that is incompatible with ECH. The value of \"ECHConfig.public_name\" MUST be placed in the \"server_name\" extension. It MUST NOT offer to resume any session for TLS 1.2 and below. It MUST NOT include the \"pre_shared_key\" extension. (See flow- clienthello-malleability.) It SHOULD contain TLS padding RFC7685 as described in padding. The client then constructs the ClientHelloInner message just as it The client then constructs the ClientHelloOuter message just as it does a standard ClientHello, with the exception of the following rules: It MUST NOT offer to negotiate TLS 1.2 or below. Note this is necessary to ensure the backend server does not negotiate a TLS version that is incompatible with ECH. It MUST NOT offer to resume any session for TLS 1.2 and below. It MUST offer to negotiate TLS 1.3 or above. It MAY offer any other extension in the ClientHelloOuter except those that have been incorporated into the ClientHelloInner as described in outer-extensions. Any extensions compressed as described in outer-extensions must match the ClientHelloInner. [[OPEN ISSUE: When #331 and compression ordering is resolved, be a bit more precise here.]] It MAY copy any other field from the ClientHelloOuter except ClientHelloOuter.random. Instead, It MUST generate a fresh ClientHelloInner.random using a secure random number generator. It MAY copy any other field from the ClientHelloInner except ClientHelloInner.random. Instead, It MUST generate a fresh ClientHelloOuter.random using a secure random number generator. (See flow-client-reaction.) It SHOULD contain TLS padding RFC7685 as described in padding. If implementing TLS 1.3's compatibility mode (see Appendix D.4 of RFC8446), it MUST copy the legacy_session_id field from ClientHelloOuter. This allows the server to echo the correct ClientHelloInner. This allows the server to echo the correct session ID when ECH is negotiated. It MUST include an \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension with a payload constructed as described below. The value of \"ECHConfig.public_name\" MUST be placed in the \"server_name\" extension. It MUST NOT include the \"pre_shared_key\" extension. (See flow- clienthello-malleability.) The client might duplicate non-sensitive extensions in both messages. However, implementations need to take care to ensure that sensitive extensions are not offered in the ClientHelloOuter. [[OPEN ISSUE: We"}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-3557b91444f954ec6db3c6316bcc013bbd780ccee52066859213daf93588f0dd","text":"typically that which is not possible to infer from routing information in the lower layers. EDHOC messages might change in transit due to a noisy channel or through modification by an attacker. Changes in message_1 and message_2 (except PAD_2) are detected when verifying Signature_or_MAC_2. Changes to PAD_2 and message_3 are detected when verifying CIPHERTEXT_3. Changes to message_4 are detected when verifying CIPHERTEXT_4. Compared to SIGMA, EDHOC adds an explicit method type and expands the message authentication coverage to additional elements such as algorithms, external authorization data, and previous plaintext"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ctls-356de50c347f7be61356ac39ba3a4445836e7586e11f7b13653982acf50253da","text":"[[OPEN ISSUE: Should we require standards action for all profile IDs that would fit in 2 octets.]] 6.2. This document requests that IANA open a new registry entitled \"cTLS Template Keys\", on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters page, with a \"Specification Required\" registration policy and the following initial contents: "}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-359728dc44817f7b2f2f5a28894f7cee0248abf9c37ecef560da8b824c9d7c7c","text":"3.5.7.2. The \"descendant-selector\" is inspired by ECMAScript for XML (E4X). It selects the node and all its descendants. The \"descendant-selector\" selects the node and all its descendants. 3.5.8."}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-35cec274ecdd5b2302d95e6ce52bfc78273b27c231b6db1fcdd7004d05433fb9","text":"1. QUIC QUIC has numerous extension points, including the version number that occupies the second through fifth bytes of every long header (see QUIC-INVARIANTS). If experimental versions are rare, and QUIC version 1 constitutes the vast majority of QUIC traffic, there is the potential for middleboxes to ossify on the version bytes always being 0x00000001. QUIC version 1QUIC has numerous extension points, including the version number that occupies the second through fifth bytes of every long header (see QUIC-INVARIANTS). If experimental versions are rare, and QUIC version 1 constitutes the vast majority of QUIC traffic, there is the potential for middleboxes to ossify on the version bytes always being 0x00000001. In QUIC version 1, Initial packets are encrypted with the version- specific salt as described in QUIC-TLS. Protecting Initial packets"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-365e24793718188cbad491b778de6caf40004f1440a4145b1eab8d3e1932b2a2","text":"The total length of time over which consecutive PTOs expire is limited by the idle timeout. The probe timer MUST NOT be set if the time threshold (time- threshold) loss detection timer is set. The time threshold loss detection timer is expected to both expire earlier than the PTO and be less likely to spuriously retransmit data. The PTO timer MUST NOT be set if a timer is set for time threshold loss detection; see time-threshold. A timer that is set for time threshold loss detection will expire earlier than the PTO timer in most cases and is less likely to spuriously retransmit data. 6.2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-3694868c6226090714eace2ffcd6991f64be05db7cfb63a7b5a427374ed42c3e","text":"Target KDF: The KDF for which a PSK is imported for use. Imported PSK (IPSK): A PSK derived from an EPSK, external identity, optional context string, and target protocol and KDF. Imported PSK (IPSK): A PSK derived from an EPSK, External Identity, optional context string, and target protocol and KDF. Imported Identity: A sequence of bytes used to identify an IPSK. 4. A key importer diversifies an input EPSK into one or more PSKs advertised on the wire via a target protocol, KDF identifier, and optional context string. Additionally, the resulting PSK binder key is modified with a new derivation label to prevent confusion with non-imported PSKs. This section describes the diversification mechanism and binder key computation change. This section describes the PSK Importer interface and its underlying diversification mechanism and binder key computation modification. 4.1. A key importer takes as input an EPSK with external identity \"external_identity\" and base key \"epsk\", as defined in terminology, along with an optional context, and transforms it into a set of PSKs and imported identities for use in a connection based on supported (target) protocols and KDFs. In particular, for each supported target protocol \"target_protocol\" and KDF \"target_kdf\", the importer The PSK Importer interface takes as input an EPSK with External Identity \"external_identity\" and base key \"epsk\", as defined in terminology, along with an optional context, and transforms it into a set of PSKs and imported identities for use in a connection based on target protocols and KDFs. In particular, for each supported target protocol \"target_protocol\" and KDF \"target_kdf\", the importer constructs an ImportedIdentity structure as follows: The list of \"target_kdf\" values is maintained by IANA as described in"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-36ba087ae9311c3f97e795a429ac51448c46f5eb2c5ff947e2a82fddb4ba3acb","text":"If information about the RO is requested and the AS grants the client instance access to that data, the AS returns the approved information in the \"subject\" response field. This field is an object with the following OPTIONAL properties. in the \"subject\" response field. The AS MUST return the \"subject\" field only in cases where the AS is sure that the RO and the end-user are the same party. This can be accomplished through some forms of authorization. This field is an object with the following OPTIONAL properties. An array of subject identifiers for the RO, as defined by I- D.ietf-secevent-subject-identifiers."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-36bf4ce10c0ac53b62943cebbdb17d3908c79b6396ef5c8444b03d9669e18813","text":"result is \"Nothing\". Note: a singular query may be used anywhere where a ValueType is expected, so there is no need to use the \"value\" function extension expected, so there is no need to use the \"value()\" function extension with a singular query. 2.4.9."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-36e8024d02b11d28471db8e5b799a7278dea9cb77b691036a3561289dd64571e","text":"7.1. This document will request IANA to register \"masque-udp\" in the HTTP This document will request IANA to register \"connect-udp\" in the HTTP Upgrade Token Registry maintained at <>. masque-udp connect-udp Proxying of UDP Payloads."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-376f11b4d81d61b5e062c95aa7f3a54a6378a436de95d4d939c49a9e6721d22a","text":"clients using some identifier. MLS clients have a few types of identifiers, with different operational properties. The Credentials presented by the clients in a group authenticate application-level identifiers for the clients. These identifiers may not uniquely identify clients. For example, if a user has multiple devices that are all present in an MLS group, then those devices' clients could all present the user's application-layer identifiers. Internally to the protocol, group members are uniquely identified by their leaves, expressed as LeafNodeRef objects. These identifiers are unstable: They change whenever the member sends a Commit, or whenever an Update proposal from the member is committed. MLS provides two unique client identifiers that are stable across epochs: their leaf index. However, a leaf index is only valid for referring to members in a given epoch. The same leaf index may represent a different member, or no member at all, in a subsequent epoch. The index of a client among the leaves of the tree The \"epoch_id\" field in the key package The application may also provide application-specific unique identifiers in the \"extensions\" field of KeyPackage or LeafNode The Credentials presented by the clients in a group authenticate application-level identifiers for the clients. However, these identifiers may not uniquely identify clients. For example, if a user has multiple devices that are all present in an MLS group, then those devices' clients could all present the user's application-layer identifiers. If needed, applications may add application-specific unique identifiers to the \"extensions\" field of KeyPackage or LeafNode objects. 7."}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-37efbf7fea217c536f9ddef1deb8d8c0f5016ac0164ea49aee16b716549e112e","text":"the Sequence Number value in the frame is not greater than the largest processed thus far. An endpoint will have committed a \"max_ack_delay\" value to the peer, which specifies the maximum amount of time by which the endpoint will delay sending acknowledgments. When the endpoint receives an ACK_FREQUENCY frame, it MUST update this maximum time to the value proposed by the peer in the Request Max Ack Delay field. 5. A sender can use an ACK_FREQUENCY frame to reduce the number of"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-3806f81585fd7de3cfb3c1b7cddc85ca2cdc9838cc911933c662e7db75371085","text":"where: master_secret is defined above salt is the Master Salt as defined above salt is a string of zeros of the length of the hash function output in octets IKM is the Master Secret is defined above info is a serialized CBOR array consisting of: output_length is the size of the AEAD key/IV in bytes encoded as an 8-bit unsigned integer L is the key/IV size of the AEAD algorithm in octets without leading zeroes. For example, if the algorithm AES-CCM-64-64-128 (see Section 10.2 in I-D.ietf-cose-msg) is used, output_length for the keys is 128 bits and output_length for the IVs is 56 bits. I-D.ietf-cose-msg) is used, L is 16 bytes for keys and 7 bytes for IVs. 3.2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-382aad124d02eba3650c3a0379d72086af8dea741d296fa68e202f44870e9be6","text":"this limit even applies when no connection ID is exposed in the QUIC header. This extension does not change the definition of any transport parameter defined in Section 18.2. of QUIC-TRANSPORT. Inline with the definition in QUIC-TRANSPORT disable_active_migration also disables multipath support, except \"after a client has acted on a preferred_address transport parameter\" Section 18.2. of QUIC- TRANSPORT. Further, it is out of scope for this document to specify if the old address can also be used for multipath after a client has migrated to the address provided in the preferred_address transport parameter. However, it SHOULD NOT be assumed that it is possible to use both addresses simultaneously without further confirmation from the other host. 3. After completing the handshake, endpoints have agreed to enable"}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-38497838d8acf9c0543a36522722ff9838580c2372d9edc070c371e5478be929","text":"attacker injected packets in order to influence the version negotiation process, see downgrade. Only servers can start incompatible version negotiation: clients MUST NOT send Version Negotiation packets and servers MUST ignore all received Version Negotiation packets. 2.2. If A and B are two distinct versions of QUIC, A is said to be"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-386360dd9f33357b79f826c71104cdb4e0b53f51bf9404e9f0d783db1f4f0e6f","text":"to configure the proxy host and the proxy port. Client implementations of this specification that are constrained by such limitations MUST use the default template which is defined as: \"https://$PROXY_HOST:$PROXY_PORT/{target_host}/{target_port}/\" where $PROXY_HOST and $PROXY_PORT are the configured host and port of the proxy respectively. Proxy deployments SHOULD use the default template to facilitate interoperability with such clients. \"https://$PROXY_HOST:$PROXY_PORT/.well-known/masque/ udp/{target_host}/{target_port}/\" where $PROXY_HOST and $PROXY_PORT are the configured host and port of the proxy respectively. Proxy deployments SHOULD use the default template to facilitate interoperability with such clients. 3."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-388934b7d03c309509c9c843e7df5dccc65da9ed5a21b61167138ebd5304c0c5","text":"8.1. Several of the challenges in this document make use of a key All challenges defined in this document make use of a key authorization string. A key authorization is a string that expresses a domain holder's authorization for a specified key to satisfy a specified challenge, by concatenating the token for the challenge with a key fingerprint, separated by a \".\" character: The \"JWK_Thumbprint\" step indicates the computation specified in RFC7638, using the SHA-256 digest FIPS180-4. As noted in JWA RFC7518 any prepended zero octets in the fields of a JWK object MUST be stripped before doing the computation. RFC7638, using the SHA-256 digest FIPS180-4. As noted in RFC7518 any prepended zero octets in the fields of a JWK object MUST be stripped before doing the computation. As specified in the individual challenges below, the token for a challenge is a string comprised entirely of characters in the URL-"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-3898aee3c187b5811ef4f718909cac89651d3eded4d83494703843a790bc0a01","text":"certain that it has not processed another packet with the same packet number from the same packet number space. Duplicate suppression MUST happen after removing packet protection for the reasons described in Section 9.3 of QUIC-TLS. Section 9.5 of QUIC-TLS. Endpoints that track all individual packets for the purposes of detecting duplicates are at risk of accumulating excessive state."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-389bc4a8fe2fa3a1ea56b0892d664ca3be137efdf7c9e295db446aa930bdf1e2","text":"in the cookie, rather than requiring it to export the entire intermediate hash state (see cookie). For concreteness, the transcript hash is always taken from the following sequence of handshake messages, starting at the first ClientHello and including only those messages that were sent: ClientHello, HelloRetryRequest, ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, Server CertificateRequest, Server Certificate, Server CertificateVerify, Server Finished, EndOfEarlyData, Client Certificate, Client CertificateVerify, Client Finished. In general, implementations can implement the transcript by keeping a running transcript hash value based on the negotiated hash. Note, however, that subsequent post-handshake authentications do not"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-38f045a29a6c5a70e1575ae98fe2f38a21b9eab9d03ce09b55e8831cc18c90a8","text":"RFC4566 is the base SDP specification and MUST be implemented. RFC5764 MUST be supported for signaling the UDP/TLS/RTP/SAVPF RFC5764, TCP/DTLS/RTP/SAVPF I-D.nandakumar-mmusic-proto-iana- registration, \"UDP/DTLS/SCTP\" I-D.ietf-mmusic-sctp-sdp, and \"TCP/DTLS/SCTP\" I-D.ietf-mmusic-sctp-sdp RTP profiles. RFC5764, TCP/DTLS/RTP/SAVPF RFC7850, \"UDP/DTLS/SCTP\" I-D.ietf- mmusic-sctp-sdp, and \"TCP/DTLS/SCTP\" I-D.ietf-mmusic-sctp-sdp RTP profiles. RFC5245 MUST be implemented for signaling the ICE credentials and candidate lines corresponding to each media stream. The ICE"}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-39bf4b11196e7fcf45bf29f5f4d9776f971233cb936d2b12c08eb45ec7e0bd6f","text":"3. QUIC version 2 endpoints MUST implement the QUIC version 1 specification as described in QUIC, QUIC-TLS, and RFC9002, with the following changes. specification as described in QUIC, QUIC-TLS, and RFC9002. However, the following differences apply in version 2. 3.1. The version field of long headers is 0x709a50c4. The Version field of long headers is 0x709a50c4. 3.2. Initial packets use a packet type field of 0b01. 0-RTT packets use a packet type field of 0b10. Handshake packets use a packet type field of 0b11. Retry packets use a packet type field of 0b00. All version 2 long header packet types are different. The Type field values are: Initial: 0b01 0-RTT: 0b10 Handshake: 0b11 Retry: 0b00 3.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-3a1ac5c4c9c97f29ac4292591b2e5d4097e43c599681f754b69a297f2dcb0d79","text":"\"encrypted_server_name\" extension. If the client does not retry in either scenario, it MUST report an error to the calling application. If the server sends a HelloRetryRequest in response to the ClientHello and the client can send a second updated ClientHello per the rules in RFC8446, the \"encrypted_server_name\" extension values which do not depend on the (possibly updated) ClientHello.KeyShareClientHello, i.e,, ClientEncryptedSNI.suite, ClientEncryptedSNI.key_share, and ClientEncryptedSNI.record_digest, MUST NOT change across ClientHello messages. Moreover, ClientESNIInner.nonce and ClientESNIInner.realSNI MUST not change across ClientHello messages. Informally, the values of all unencrypted extension information, as well as the inner extension plaintext, must be consistent between the first and second ClientHello messages. 5.1.3. When the server cannot decrypt or does not process the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-3a23b5029232c422e795d169ded0987171024bfd9703a57abb9edea5ad0925ac","text":"extension and MUST NOT use the retry keys. Offering a GREASE extension is not considered offering an encrypted ClientHello for purposes of requirements in client-behavior. In particular, the client MAY offer to resume sessions established without ECH. ClientHello for purposes of requirements in real-ech. In particular, the client MAY offer to resume sessions established without ECH. 7."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-3a3011a6020a4e8aa42af8617e22e934454c7a4568f7940c7a09185f27eb67f1","text":"the \"..[*]\" and \"..*\" forms select all the descendants. The resultant nodelist is ordered as if: An nodes are visited before their children, and of the descendants of a node is a sequence of all the descendants in which: nodes of an array are visited in array order. nodes of any array appear in array order, Children of an object may be visited in any order, since JSON objects are unordered. nodes appear immediately before all their descendants. Implementations may visit descendants in any way providing the resultant nodelist could have been produced by visiting descendants as above. This definition does not stipulate the order in which the children of an object appear, since JSON objects are unordered. The resultant nodelist of a \"descendant-selector\" applied to a node must be a sub-sequence of an array-sequenced preorder of the descendants of the node. 3.5.7.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-3a462cb2c5e91e3b6c43a81a9c5f112aafca76fe73f68b02718db55778883204","text":"For example: 3.8. 3.9. TLS defines two generic alerts (see alert-protocol) to use upon failure to parse a message. Peers which receive a message which"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-3a4edbe8eb8ba6465992a397d82f54d93d1cd3b8500e2adbb6bdc00353fb0059","text":"3. Key importers mirror the concept of key exporters in TLS in that they diversify a key based on some contextual information before use in a connection. In contrast to key exporters, wherein differentiation is done via an explicit label and context string, the key importer defined herein diversifies external one PSK into one or more PSKs for use via a target protocol, KDF identifier, and optional context string. Additionally, the resulting PSK binder key is modified with a new derivation label to prevent confusion with non-imported PSKs. Imported keys do not require negotiation for use, as a client and server will not agree upon identities if not imported correctly. Endpoints may incrementally deploy PSK importer support by offering The PSK Importer interface mirrors that of the TLS Exporters interface in that it diversifies a key based on some contextual information. In contrast to the Exporters interface, wherein differentiation is done via an explicit label and context string, the PSK Importer interface defined herein takes an external PSK and identity and \"imports\" it into TLS, creating a set of \"derived\" PSKs and identities. Each of these derived PSKs are bound a target protocol, KDF identifier, and optional context string. Additionally, the resulting PSK binder keys are modified with a new derivation label to prevent confusion with non-imported PSKs. Imported keys do not require negotiation for use since a client and server will not agree upon identities if imported incorrectly. Endpoints may incrementally deploy PSK Importer support by offering non-imported keys for TLS versions prior to TLS 1.3. Non-imported and imported PSKs are distinct since their identities are different on the wire. See rollout for more details. Clients which import external keys TLS MUST NOT use these keys for any other purpose. Moreover, each external PSK MUST be associated with at most one hash function. Clients which import external keys MUST NOT use either the external keys or the derived keys for any other purpose. Moreover, each external PSK MUST be associated with at most one hash function, as per the rules in Section 4.2.11 from RFC8446. See security- considerations for more discussion. 3.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-3a4ede3b6055bc6a0deef691f2a2b6c8834ba6cb082f7cd9d9f82c0d9148df04","text":"negotiating-connection-ids describes the use of this field in more detail. The remainder of the packet, if any, is type-specific. In this version of QUIC, the following packet types with the long header are defined:"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-3acb6125446f631a958fac94c4531206658823d659583fe47c3433595e65b965","text":"4. As discussed above, frames are carried on QUIC streams and used on control streams, request streams, and push streams. This section describes HTTP framing in QUIC. For a comparison with HTTP/2 frames, see h2-frames. HTTP frames are carried on QUIC streams, as described in stream- mapping. HTTP/3 defines three stream types: control stream, request stream, and push stream. This section describes HTTP/3 frame formats and the streams types on which they are permitted; see stream-frame- mapping for an overiew. A comparison between HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 frames is provided in h2-frames. 4.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-3adc70bb8ecb6ed7cb0fe5452c3d9bef6da41413e44f8b0559fa05b724805285","text":"connection's congestion controller, providing some transport-level congestion avoidance measures, which UDP does not. As noted in tcp-behavior, there is an increasing interest in As noted in reliable-behavior, there is an increasing interest in congestion control algorithms that respond to delay measurements, instead of responding to packet loss. These algorithms may deliver an improved user experience, but in some cases, have not responded to"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-3b140e2b066ff4149fd2e4d76dbd0155082e8df435a8bba7e2870d6601f97baa","text":"Given the prevalence of the assumption in network management practice that a port number maps unambiguously to an application, the use of ports that cannot easily be mapped to a registered service name might lead to blocking or other interference by network elements such as firewalls that rely on the port number for application identification. lead to blocking or other changes to the forwarding behavior by network elements such as firewalls that use the port number for application identification. 7."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-3b3a71315040ff2eaf9e4effd9dd14aad3b38c03ec67a7b4d451b307182caf5e","text":"The \"extension_data\" field of this extension contains a \"NamedGroupList\" value: %%% Named Group Extension %%% Supported Groups Extension Indicates support of the corresponding named curve. Note that some curves are also recommended in ANSI X9.62 X962 and FIPS 186-4"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-3b9182bb3c74de7366402689330dea9dc2a5e7c41148267092501075ab4f3a4e","text":"receivers to ignore obsolete frames. A variable-length integer representing the maximum number of ack- eliciting packets the recipient of this frame can receive without sending an acknowledgment. In other words, an acknowledgement is sent when more than this number of ack-eliciting packets have been received. Since this is a maximum value, a receiver can send an acknowledgement earlier. A value of 0 results in a receiver immediately acknowledging every ack-eliciting packet. eliciting packets the recipient of this frame receives before sending an acknowledgment. A receiving endpoint SHOULD send at least one ACK frame when more than this number of ack-eliciting packets have been received. A value of 0 results in a receiver immediately acknowledging every ack-eliciting packet. By default, an endpoint sends an ACK frame for every other ack-eliciting packet, as specified in Section 13.2.2 of QUIC-TRANSPORT, which corresponds to a value of 1. A variable-length integer representing the value to which the endpoint requests the peer update its \"max_ack_delay\""}
{"_id":"q-en-rfc8447bis-3ba8c79c617fa48e479a22c1c2e4ce336c6ccd9e11440be3e4ec6bde6890034a","text":"Add a \"Recommended\" column with the contents as listed below. This table has been generated by marking Standards Track RFCs as \"Y\" and all others as \"N\". The \"Recommended\" column is assigned a value of \"N\" unless explicitly requested, and adding a value with a \"Recommended\" value of \"Y\" requires Standards Action RFC8126. IESG Approval is REQUIRED for a Y->N transition. \"Y\", \"truncated_hmac\" (4) and \"connection_id (deprecated)\" (53) as \"D\", and all others as \"N\". The \"Recommended\" column is assigned a value of \"N\" unless explicitly requested, and adding a value with a \"Recommended\" value of \"Y\" requires Standards Action RFC8126. IESG Approval is REQUIRED for a Y->N, Y->D, and D->Y|N transitions. IANA [SHALL update/has added] the following notes: The extensions added by I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis are omitted from the above table; additionally, token_binding is omitted, since RFC8472 specifies the value of the \"Recommended\" column as for this extension. above table. Likewise, extensions defined after RFC8447 are also not listed in the table as those RFCs specify the value of the extension's \"Recommended\"; extensions points defined after RFC8447 include token_binding, compress_certificate, record_size_limit, pwd_protect, pwd_clear, password_salt, ticket_pinning, tls_cert_with_extern_psk, delegated_credentials, supported_ekt_ciphers, connection_id, external_id_hash, external_session_id, quic_transport_parameters, ticket_request, and dnssec_chain. I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis also uses the TLS ExtensionType Values registry originally created in RFC4366. The following text is from"}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-3bb845062c55204b0c19f9af081ce1ab3d0ad9b43403cc868e15bb76a848a9dd","text":"version of QUIC. In particular, both the \"h3\" I-D.ietf-quic-http and \"doq\" I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic ALPNs can operate over QUIC version 2. All QUIC extensions defined to work with version 1 also work with version 2. Unless otherwise stated, all QUIC extensions defined to work with version 1 also work with version 2. 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-3c11504a626a5fa6132aa89510b72bd2d1cfa3636ea7d82e1fc6bacc6b397ce7","text":"Tokens, it is not accessible from Web Platform APIs (such as those commonly accessed via JavaScript in web browsers). 8. 7. 8.1. 7.1. This document will request IANA to register the following entry in the \"HTTP/3 Settings\" registry:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-3c5e118c129f593b1978592441a8e64da9b284d6b3cb750b418b3607e01e3af0","text":"A tag is considered \"authoritative\" if the CoSWID tag was created by the software provider. An authoritative CoSWID tag contains information about a software component provided by the maintainer of information about a software component provided by the supplier of the software component, who is expected to be an expert in their own software. Thus, authoritative CoSWID tags can be trusted to represent authoritative information about the software component. software. Thus, authoritative CoSWID tags can represent authoritative information about the software component. The degree to which this information can be trusted depends on the tag's chain of custody and the ability to verify a signature provided by the supplier if present in the CoSWID tag. The provisioning and validation of CoSWID tags are handled by local policy and is outside the scope of this document. A signed CoSWID tag (see coswid-cose) whose signature has been validated can be relied upon to be unchanged since it was signed. By contrast, the data contained in unsigned tags cannot be trusted to be unmodified. When an authoritative tag is signed, the software provider can be authenticated as the originator of the signature. A trustworthy association between the signature and the originator of the signature can be established via trust anchors. A certification path between a trust anchor and a certificate including a pub-key enabling the validation of a tag signature can realize the assessment of trustworthiness of an authoritative tag. Having a signed authoritative CoSWID tag can be useful when the information in the tag needs to be trusted, such as when the tag is being used to convey reference integrity measurements for software components. contrast, the data contained in unsigned tags can be altered by any user or process with write-access to the tag. To support signature validation, there is the need associate the right key with the software provider or party originating the signature. This operation is application specific and needs to be addressed by the application or a user of the application; a specific approach for which is out- of-scope for this document. When an authoritative tag is signed, the originator of the signature can be verified. A trustworthy association between the signature and the originator of the signature can be established via trust anchors. A certification path between a trust anchor and a certificate including a public key enabling the validation of a tag signature can realize the assessment of trustworthiness of an authoritative tag. Verifying that the software provider is the signer is a different matter. This requires an association between the signature and the tag's entity item associated corresponding to the software provider. No mechanism is defined in this draft to make this association; therefore, this association will need to be handled by local policy. CoSWID tags are intended to contain public information about software components and, as such, the contents of a CoSWID tag does not need"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-3c7edbad4903d80ce5271c3b9d8db0b673044e7f09e1ae3c8c73414dc679bed0","text":"define signaling to allow endpoints to communicate their prioritization preferences. 7. 6. Since transmitting HTTP Datagrams using QUIC DATAGRAM frames requires sending an HTTP/3 Settings parameter, it \"sticks out\". In other"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-3cc73fad21721534541fba1adaff025baba54c83208023ae29e5efcfc72f154d","text":"The examples in tbl-example use the expression mechanism to obtain the number of elements in an array, to test for the presence of a member in a object, and to perform numeric comparisons of member values with a constant. values with a constant. For further illustration, the table shows XPath expressions that would be used with a comparable XML document; see also xpath-overview. 3."}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-3cd3d55c8229b4d658ca04d1feee8e77ea2e05ed1b11452d039dcc488431b431","text":"configure DetNet IP over TSN: DetNet IP related configuration information according to the DetNet role of the DetNet IP node, as per I-D.ietf-detnet-ip. DetNet role of the DetNet IP node, as per RFC8939. TSN related configuration information according to the TSN role of the DetNet IP node, as per IEEE8021Q, IEEE8021CB and IEEEP8021CBdb. Mapping between DetNet IP flow(s) (as flow identification defined in I-D.ietf-detnet-ip, it is summarized in Section 5.1 of that document, and includes all wildcards, port ranges and the ability to ignore specific IP fields) and TSN Stream(s) (as stream identification information defined in IEEE8021CB and IEEEP8021CBdb). Note, that managed objects for TSN Stream identification can be found in IEEEP8021CBcv. in RFC8939, it is summarized in Section 5.1 of that document, and includes all wildcards, port ranges and the ability to ignore specific IP fields) and TSN Stream(s) (as stream identification information defined in IEEE8021CB and IEEEP8021CBdb). Note, that managed objects for TSN Stream identification can be found in IEEEP8021CBcv. This information must be provisioned per DetNet flow."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-3d2bc46b107c39274a8834887e5ed4a69242e7b825381cea90db92405348989b","text":"maximum supported frame sizes out of all codecs included above, as specified in RFC4566, Section 6. If this m= section is for video media, an \"a=imageattr\" line, as specified in sec.imageattr. If this m= section is for video media, and there are known limitations on the size of images which can be decoded, an \"a=imageattr\" line, as specified in sec.imageattr. If \"rtx\" is present in the offer, for each primary codec where RTP retransmission should be used, a corresponding \"a=rtpmap\" line"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-3d40144d6316150a8afc5c212f251bb4decf5b0168d02c7ed2639cb2a59f3ec5","text":"A \"revoke-certificate\" resource A \"key-change\" resource For the \"new-X\" resources above, the server MUST have exactly one resource for each function. This resource may be addressed by multiple URIs, but all must provide equivalent functionality."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-3d835cb90c8f4ca51c4cc4d2b75242931c055541fe3e9ee6ea11f410bd4438a0","text":"In the following cases, failure should be detected during pre- establishment: A request by an application for Protocol Properties that cannot be A request by an application for properties that cannot be satisfied by any of the available protocols. For example, if an application requires \"perMsgReliability\", but no such feature is available in any protocol on the host running the transport system this should result in an error, e.g., when SCTP is not supported by the operating system. A request by an application for Protocol Properties that are in conflict with each other, i.e., the required and prohibited properties cannot be satisfied by the same protocol. For example, if an application prohibits \"reliability\" but then requires A request by an application for properties that are in conflict with each other, i.e., the required and prohibited properties cannot be satisfied by the same protocol. For example, if an application prohibits \"reliability\" but then requires \"perMsgReliability\", this mismatch should result in an error. To avoid allocating resources that are not finally needed, it is"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-3dd80f0cb63afc29d7b3226b263e080fc2155eeb622d4f5b6cd766f214fa5b78","text":"19.4. An endpoint uses a RESET_STREAM frame (type=0x04) to abruptly terminate a stream. terminate the sending part of a stream. After sending a RESET_STREAM, an endpoint ceases transmission and retransmission of STREAM frames on the identified stream. A receiver"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-3e2a7f1d1af1fc0b416937aa7185b245dea9a4bf84f145dbddaff1e4836bf820","text":"the QUIC header, if present. This supports cases where address information changes, such as NAT rebinding, intentional change of the local interface, or based on an indication in the handshake of the server for a preferred address to be used. server for a preferred address to be used. As such if the client is known or likely to sit behind a NAT, use of a connection ID for the server is strongly recommended. A non-empty connection ID for the server is also strongly recommended when migration is supported. Currently QUIC only supports failover cases. Only one \"path\" can be used at a time, and only when the new path is validated all traffic"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-3e6835669c0d88cde4093a3e3aada8e314376d737aa58eb1e679edca3561a22a","text":"6. Because networking resources are shared between users, a good place to start our discussion is how contention between users, and mechanisms to resolve that contention in ways that are \"fair\" between users, impact streaming media users. These topics are closely tied to transport protocol behaviors. As noted in sec-abr, ABR response strategies such as HLS RFC8216 or DASH MPEG-DASH are attempting to respond to changing path characteristics, and underlying transport protocols are also attempting to respond to changing path characteristics. For most of the history of the Internet, these transport protocols, described in udp-behavior and tcp-behavior, have had relatively consistent behaviors that have changed slowly, if at all, over time. Newly standardized transport protocols like QUIC RFC9000 can behave differently from existing transport protocols, and these behaviors may evolve over time more rapidly than currently-used transport protocols. For this reason, we have included a description of how the path characteristics that streaming media providers may see are likely to evolve over time. 6.1. Within sec-trans, the term \"Media Transport Protocol\" is used to describe to describe the protocol of interest. This is easier to understand if the reader assumes a protocol stack that looks something like this: Within this document, the term \"Media Transport Protocol\" is used to describe any protocol that carries media metadata and media in its payload, and the term \"Transport Protocol\" describes any protocol that carries a Media Transport Protocol, or another Transport Protocol, in its payload. This is easier to understand if the reader assumes a protocol stack that looks something like this: where \"Media\" would be something like the output of a codec, or other media source such as closed-captioning, \"Media Format\" would be something like an RTP payload format RFC2736 or ISOBMFF ISOBMFF, RFC2736 or an ISOBMFF ISOBMFF profile, \"Media Transport Protocol\" would be something like RTP or HTTP, and \"Media Transport Protocol\" would be something like RTP or DASH MPEG-DASH, and \"Transport Protocol\" would be something like TCP or UDP. \"Transport Protocol\" would be a protocol that provides appropriate transport services, as described in Section 5 of RFC8095. Not all possible streaming media applications follow this model, but for the ones that do, it seems useful to have names for the protocol layers between Media Format and Transport Layer for the ones that do, it seems useful to distinguish between the protocol layer that is aware it is transporting media, and underlying protocol layers that are not aware. As described in the RFC8095 Abstract, the IETF has standardized a number of protocols that provide transport services. Although these protocols, taken in total, provide a wide variety of transport services, sec-trans will distinguish between two extremes: Transport protocols used to provide reliable, in-order media delivery to an endpoint, typically providing flow control and congestion control (reliable-behavior) and Transport protocols used to provide unreliable, unordered media delivery to an endpoint, without flow control or congestion control (unreliable-behavior). Because newly standardized transport protocols such as QUIC RFC9000 can evolve their transport behavior more rapidly than currently-used transport protocols, we have included a description of how the path characteristics that streaming media providers may see are likely to evolve in quic-behavior. It is worth noting explicitly that the Media Transport Protocol and Transport Protocol layers might each include more than one protocol. For example, a Media Transport Protocol might run over HTTP, or over WebTransport, which in turn runs over HTTP. It is worth noting explicitly that the Transport Protocol layer might include more than one protocol. For example, a specific Media Transport Protocol might run over HTTP, or over WebTransport, which in turn runs over HTTP. It is worth noting explicitly that more complex network protocol stacks are certainly possible - for instance, packets with this protocol stack may be carried in a tunnel, or in a VPN. If these stacks are certainly possible - for instance, when packets with this protocol stack are carried in a tunnel or in a VPN, the entire packet would likely appear in the payload of other protocols. If these environments are present, streaming media operators may need to analyze their effects on applications as well. 6.1. The HLS RFC8216 and DASH MPEG-DASH media transport protocols are typically carried over HTTP, and HTTP has used TCP as its only standardized transport protocol until HTTP/3 RFC9114. These media transport protocols use ABR response strategies as described in sec- abr to respond to changing path characteristics, and underlying transport protocols are also attempting to respond to changing path characteristics. The past success of the largely TCP-based Internet is evidence that the various flow control and congestion control mechanisms TCP has used to achieve equilibrium quickly, at a point where TCP senders do not interfere with other TCP senders for sustained periods of time (RFC5681), have been largely successful. The Internet has continued to work even when the specific TCP mechanisms used to reach equilibrium changed over time (RFC7414). Because TCP provided a common tool to avoid contention, even when significant TCP-based applications like FTP were largely replaced by other significant TCP- based applications like HTTP, the transport behavior remained safe for the Internet. Modern TCP implementations (I-D.ietf-tcpm-rfc793bis) continue to probe for available bandwidth, and \"back off\" when a network path is saturated, but may also work to avoid growing queues along network paths, which can prevent older TCP senders from detecting quickly when a network path is becoming saturated. Congestion control mechanisms such as COPA COPA18 and BBR I-D.cardwell-iccrg-bbr- congestion-control make these decisions based on measured path delays, assuming that if the measured path delay is increasing, the sender is injecting packets onto the network path faster than the network can forward them (or the receiver can accept them) so the sender should adjust its sending rate accordingly. Although common TCP behavior has changed significantly since the days of Jacobson-Karels and RFC2001, even adding new congestion controllers such as CUBIC RFC8312, the common practice of implementing TCP as part of an operating system kernel has acted to limit how quickly TCP behavior can change. Even with the widespread use of automated operating system update installation on many end- user systems, streaming media providers could have a reasonable expectation that they could understand TCP transport protocol behaviors, and that those behaviors would remain relatively stable in the short term. 6.2. Because UDP does not provide any feedback mechanism to senders to"}
{"_id":"q-en-qlog-3efc877b6986186321e1ee0fec5f92bf98ea4bc40d02dab5025b5c5080e48b29","text":"1. This document describes the values of the qlog name (\"category\" + \"event\") and \"data\" fields and their semantics for the QUIC protocol. This document is based on draft-34 of the QUIC I-Ds QUIC-TRANSPORT, QUIC-RECOVERY, and QUIC-TLS. HTTP/3 and QPACK events are defined in a separate document QLOG-H3. \"event\") and \"data\" fields and their semantics for QUIC; see QUIC- TRANSPORT, QUIC-RECOVERY, and QUIC-TLS. Feedback and discussion are welcome at https://github.com/quicwg/qlog [1]. Readers are advised to refer to the \"editor's draft\" at that"}
{"_id":"q-en-rfc-censorship-tech-3fac6cb6e17083e8fe3c49f0fe2b61e452f9fe6e6067ab56271881a7021f137c","text":"than potentially excluding content, users, or uses of their service. Certificate Authorities: Authorities that issue cryptographically secured resources can be a significant point of control. Certificate Authorities that issue certificates to domain holders for TLS/HTTPS or Regional/Local Internet Registries that issue Route Origination Authorizations to BGP operators can be forced to issue rogue certificates that may allow compromises in confidentiatlity guarantees - allowing censorship software to engage in identification and interference where not possible before - or integrity degrees - allowing, for example, adversarial routing of traffic. At all levels of the network hierarchy, the filtration mechanisms used to detect undesirable traffic are essentially the same: a censor sniffs transmitting packets and identifies undesirable content, and"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-3fd7700d8544de1e7a847c38feffdb7cb0dd82f69846b71d995c228c3aaef05c","text":"If the RTP/RTCP multiplexing policy is \"require\", each m= section MUST contain an \"a=rtcp-mux\" attribute. If an m= section contains an \"a=rtcp-mux-only\" attribute then that section MUST also contain an \"a=rtcp-mux\" attribute. an \"a=rtcp-mux-only\" attribute, that section MUST also contain an \"a=rtcp-mux\" attribute. If this m= section was present in the previous answer then the state of RTP/RTCP multiplexing MUST match what was previously negotiated. If an m= section was present in the previous answer, the state of RTP/RTCP multiplexing MUST match what was previously negotiated. If this session description is of type \"pranswer\" or \"answer\", the following additional checks are applied:"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-4012a5282917547d92ffe3d2a658d31d948cdf99fe9922051c96925f2ecf965f","text":"10.1. URIs [1] https://iana.org/assignments/media-types [1] https://www.iana.org/assignments/hpke/hpke.xhtml#hpke-kem-ids [2] https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types [2] https://www.iana.org/assignments/hpke/hpke.xhtml#hpke-aead-ids [3] https://iana.org/assignments/media-types [4] https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types Index"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-404cb451fc44c9f3e499c13a6f4ffdf49dd0e13ade33c50d851d6119a19c1a77","text":"semantics as needed for HTTP/2 QUIC-HTTP. Based on current deployment practices, QUIC is encapsulated in UDP and encrypted by default. The current version of QUIC integrates TLS QUIC-TLS to encrypt all payload data and most control information. Given QUIC is an end-to-end transport protocol, all information in the protocol header, even that which can be inspected, is is not meant to be mutable by the network, and is therefore integrity-protected to the extent possible. encrypt all payload data and most control information. Given that QUIC is an end-to-end transport protocol, all information in the protocol header, even that which can be inspected, is not meant to be mutable by the network, and is therefore integrity- protected. While less information is visible to the network than for TCP, integrity protection can also simplify troubleshooting because none of the nodes on the network path can modify the transport layer information. This document provides guidance for network operation on the management of QUIC traffic. This includes guidance on how to"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-40698de663babf7f4eb96e9c28302bf7ba03a02736e75c8a1900ee2ac8c1a699","text":"If the enclosing packet number is not greater than the recorded one, the endpoint MUST ignore this ACK-FREQUENCY frame. 6. 7. TBD. 7. 8. TBD."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-40738a90b26ba0f81f28c28a0fa3a311fa8ab9305eb11fe519976cf76134ee00","text":"This document The \"SETTINGS_WEBTRANSPORT_MAX_SESSIONS\" parameter indicates that the specified HTTP/3 server is WebTransport-capable and the number of concurrent sessions it is willing to receive. WEBTRANSPORT_MAX_SESSIONS 0x2b603743 0 This document 8.3. The following entry is added to the \"HTTP/3 Frame Type\" registry"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-4087793a9396eb051be54f423d1925fad91b82a5f2233a9cfaffa226ebef17e1","text":"ADDRESS_REQUEST capsules, endpoints MAY send ADDRESS_ASSIGN capsules unprompted. Note that the IP forwarding tunnels described in this document are not fully featured \"interfaces\" in the IPv6 addressing architecture sense IPv6-ADDR. In particular, they do not necessarily have IPv6 link-local addresses. Additionally, IPv6 stateless autoconfiguration or router advertisement messages are not used in such interfaces, and neither is neighbor discovery. 4.7.2. The ADDRESS_REQUEST capsule (see iana-types for the value of the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-408cac134d8fcd0b34c60219ea963fa50edc86149a45f1db6f6b5abf784be76a","text":"6.1. If a caching forwarder consults multiple resolvers, it may be possible for it to cache records for the \"resolver.arpa\" Special Use Domain Name (SUDN) for multiple resolvers. This may result in clients sending queries intended to discover Designated Resolvers for resolver \"foo\" and receiving answers for resolvers \"foo\" and \"bar\". A client will successfully reject unintended connections because the authenticated discovery will fail or the resolver addresses do not match. Clients that attempt unauthenticated connections to resolvers discovered through SVCB queries run the risk of connecting to the wrong server in this scenario. To prevent unnecessary traffic from clients to incorrect resolvers, DNS caching resolvers SHOULD NOT cache results for the \"resolver.arpa\" SUDN other than for Designated Resolvers under their control. A DNS forwarder SHOULD NOT forward queries for \"resolver.arpa\" upstream. This prevents a client from receiving an SVCB record that will fail to authenticate because the forwarder's IP address is not in the upstream resolver's Designated Resolver's TLS certificate SAN field. A DNS forwarder which already acts as a completely blind forwarder MAY choose to forward these queries when the operator expects that this does not apply, either because the operator knows the upstream resolver does have the forwarder's IP address in its TLS certificate's SAN field or that the operator expects clients of the unencrypted resolver to use the SVCB information opportunistically. Operators who choose to forward queries for \"resolver.arpa\" upstream should note that client behavior is never guaranteed and use of DDR by a resolver does not communicate a requirement for clients to use the SVCB record when it cannot be authenticated. 6.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-4091de469e07ea72df0bd4cc46f80bbd461f5c3746fabe1b0fdf3acda3e53e12","text":"are not modified by this document. In case of aggregates the A-Label is treated as an S-Label and it is not modified as well. To support outgoing DetNet MPLS over IP, an implementation MUST support the provisioning of IP/UDP header information in place of sets of F-Labels. Note that multiple sets of F-Labels can be provisioned to support PRF on transmitted DetNet flows and therefore, when PRF is supported, multiple IP/UDP headers MAY be provisioned. When multiple IP/UDP headers are provisioned for a particular 4. To support outgoing DetNet MPLS over UDP/IP, an implementation MUST support the provisioning of UDP/IP header information in addition or in place of sets of F-Label(s). Note that multiple sets of F-Labels can be provisioned to support PRF on transmitted DetNet MPLS flows and therefore, when PRF is supported, multiple UDP/IP headers MAY be provisioned. [Note: PRF is an MPLS function. It produces member flows. Member flows have 1to1 mapping to UDP/IP headers. So why are multiple headers provisioned? Delete next sentence?] When multiple UDP/IP headers are provisioned for a particular outgoing DetNet IP flow, a copy of the outgoing packet, including the pushed S-Label, MUST be made for each. The headers for each outgoing packet MUST be based on the configuration information and as defined in RFC7510, with one exception. The one exception is that the UDP Source Port value MUST be set to uniquely identify the DetNet (forwarding sub-layer) flow. The packet MUST then be handed as a DetNet IP packet, per I-D.ietf-detnet-ip. pushed S-Label (and optional F-label(s)), MUST be made for each. The headers for each outgoing packet MUST be based on the configuration information and as defined in RFC7510, with one exception. The one exception is that the UDP Source Port value MUST be set to uniquely identify the DetNet (forwarding sub-layer) flow. The packet MUST then be handed as a DetNet IP packet, per I-D.ietf-detnet-ip. [Note: What about IPv4 Type of Service and IPv6 Traffic Class Fields? Do we intend to set them?] To support receive processing an implementation MUST also support the provisioning of received IP/UDP header information. When S-Labels are taken from platform label space, all that is required is to provision that receiving IP/UDP encapsulated DetNet MPLS packets is permitted. Once the IP/UDP header is stripped, the S-label uniquely identifies the app-flow. When S-Labels are not taken from platform label space, IP/UDP header information MUST be provisioned. The provisioned information MUST then be used to identify incoming app- flows based on the combination of S-Label and incoming IP/UDP header. Normal receive processing, including PEOF can then take place. provisioning of received UDP/IP header information. 4. [Note: Are the receiving nodes T-PE nodes? Why?] When S-Labels are taken from platform label space, all that is required is to provision that receiving UDP/IP encapsulated DetNet MPLS packets is permitted. Once the UDP/IP header is stripped, the S-label uniquely identifies the app-flow. When S-Labels are not taken from platform label space, UDP/IP header information MUST be provisioned. The provisioned information MUST then be used to identify incoming app-flows based on the combination of S-Label and incoming IP/UDP header. Normal receive processing, including PEOF can then take place. 5. The following summarizes the set of information that is needed to identify individual and aggregated DetNet flows: IPv4 and IPv6 source address field. IPv4 and IPv6 source address prefix length, where a zero (0) value effectively means that the address field is ignored. IPv4 and IPv6 destination address field. IPv4 and IPv6 destination address prefix length, where a zero (0) effectively means that the address field is ignored. IPv4 protocol field. Only UDP is allowed, and the ability to ignore this field, e.g., via configuration of the value zero (0), is desirable. IPv6 next header field. Only UDP is allowed, and the ability to ignore this field, e.g., via configuration of the value zero (0), is desirable. IPv4 Type of Service and IPv6 Traffic Class Fields. IPv4 Type of Service and IPv6 Traffic Class Field Bitmask, where a zero (0) effectively means that theses fields are ignored. UDP Source Port. Exact and wildcard matching is required. Port ranges can optionally be used. This information MUST be provisioned per DetNet flow via configuration, e.g., via the controller or management plane. Information identifying a DetNet flow is ordered and implementations use the first match. This can, for example, be used to provide a DetNet service for a specific UDP flow, with unique Source and Destination Port field values, while providing a different service for the aggregate of all other flows with that same UDP Destination Port value. It is the responsibility of the DetNet controller plane to properly provision both flow identification information and the flow specific resources needed to provided the traffic treatment needed to meet each flow's service requirements. This applies for aggregated and individual flows. 6. The security considerations of DetNet in general are discussed in I- D.ietf-detnet-architecture and I-D.ietf-detnet-security. MPLS and IP"}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-40b1fb89c023975ea25ae30b91c9d9c1bc4c6e9eb998707ceaef3ee7c03c3e7d","text":"differ after the handshake, then A is compatible with B and B is compatible with A. Version compatibility is not bijective: it is possible for version A Version compatibility is not symmetric: it is possible for version A to be compatible with version B and for B not to be compatible with A. This could happen for example if version B is a strict superset of version A."}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-40d326d15861c7d506bd35ce0cf083b83a6685fd4eae24e68b6e1e595e08ce02","text":"to implement version negotiation to protect against downgrade attacks. I-D.duke-quic-version-aliasing is a more robust, but much more complicated, proposal to address these ossification problems. By design, it requires incompatible version negotiation. QUICv2 enables exercise of compatible version negotiation mechanism. 2. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-40ff693191342c907c9c94fc9a838f5ae8c3c7ded2fde6b199241955ff8b081c","text":"Initialize VDAF preparation and initial outputs as described in input-share-prep. [[OPEN ISSUE: consider moving the helper nonce check into #early- [[OPEN ISSUE: consider moving the helper nonce check into early- input-share-validation]] Once the helper has processed each valid report share in"}
{"_id":"q-en-manifest-spec-414820722cf07ca21154dc14caf3948f4015abbe2f6c50ec9581d0ff97520d8a","text":"MUST still contain the suit-authentication-wrapper element, but the content MUST be a list containing only the SUIT_Digest. The algorithms used in SUIT_Authentication are defined by the profiles declared in I-D.moran-suit-mti. 8.4. The manifest contains:"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-415b0c2e100cad06b069a1000925c1165791e39ba98890a0cb09f853da58391c","text":"Specification Required policy to avoid collisions with HTTP/2 error codes. Additionally, each code of the format \"0x1f * N + 0x21\" for non- negative integer values of N (that is, 0x21, 0x40, ..., through 0x3ffffffffffffffe) MUST NOT be assigned by IANA. Each code of the format \"0x1f * N + 0x21\" for non-negative integer values of N (that is, 0x21, 0x40, ..., through 0x3ffffffffffffffe) MUST NOT be assigned by IANA and MUST NOT appear in the listing of assigned values. 11.2.4."}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-418d696a41d8813aa2a61b45569b6b79d2bb2d97679f5154e02e05a94899a5d1","text":"9. Please update the \"Media Types\" registry at https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types [1] for the media types https://iana.org/assignments/media-types [1] for the media types \"application/ohttp-keys\" (iana-keys), \"message/ohttp-req\" (iana-req), and \"message/ohttp-res\" (iana-res). Please update the \"HTTP Problem Types\" registry at https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types [2] for the types \"date\" (iana-problem-date) and \"ohttp-key\" (iana-problem-ohttp-key). 9.1. The \"application/ohttp-keys\" media type identifies a used by"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-41e5842372f78950302a7a9e8518d6dbff416548887be648f6554c90ff68af7c","text":"D.ietf-taps-transport-security. As described above in equivalence, if a Transport Services system races between two different Protocol Stacks, both SHOULD use the same security protocols and options. However, a Transport Services system MAY race different security protocols, e.g., if the application explicitly specifies that it considers them equivalent. races between two different Protocol Stacks, both need to use the same security protocols and options. However, a Transport Services system can race different security protocols, e.g., if the application explicitly specifies that it considers them equivalent. Applications need to ensure that they use security APIs appropriately. In cases where applications use an interface to"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-4205dfb265520d7d6ebaf4828adebe515a4e28dad4b880dee13b8957e65cbde1","text":"5.4. Entangled Connections can be created using the Clone Action: Calling Clone on a Connection yields a group of Connections: the parent Connection on which Clone was called, and a resulting cloned Connection. The new Connection is actively openend, and it will send a Ready Event or an EstablishmentError Event. The Connections within a group are \"entangled\" with each other, and become part of a Connection Group. Calling Clone on any of these Connections adds another Connection to the Connection Group, and so on. \"Entangled\" Connections share all Connection Properties except \"Connection Priority\" (see conn-priority) . Like all other Properties, Connection Priority is copied to the new Connection when calling Clone(), but it is not entangled: Changing Connection Priority on one Connection does not change it on the other Connections in the same Connection Group. The stack of Message Framers associated with a Connection are also copied to the cloned Connection when calling Clone. In other words, a cloned Connection has the same stack of Message Framers as the Connection from which they are Cloned, but these Framers may internally maintain per-Connection state. Connection Groups can be created using the Clone Action: Calling Clone on a Connection yields a Connection Group containing two Connections: the parent Connection on which Clone was called, and a resulting cloned Connection. The new Connection is actively openend, and it will send a Ready Event or an EstablishmentError Event. Calling Clone on any of these Connections adds another Connection to the Connection Group. Connections in a Connection Group share all Connection Properties except \"Connection Priority\" (see conn-priority), and these Connection Properties are entangled: Changing one of the Connection Properties on one Connection in the Connection Group automatically changes the Connection Property for all others. For example, changing \"Timeout for aborting Connection\" (see conn-timeout) on one Connection in a Connection Group will automatically make the same change to this Connection Property for all other Connections in the Connection Group. Like all other Properties, \"Connection Priority\" is copied to the new Connection when calling Clone(), but in this case, a later change to the \"Connection Priority\" on one Connection does not change it on the other Connections in the same Connection Group. Message Properties are also not entangled. For example, changing \"Lifetime\" (see msg-lifetime) of a Message will only affect a single Message on a single Connection. A new Connection created by Clone can have a Message Framer assigned via the optional \"framer\" parameter of the Clone Action. If this parameter is not supplied, the stack of Message Framers associated with a Connection is copied to the cloned Connection when calling Clone. Then, a cloned Connection has the same stack of Message Framers as the Connection from which they are Cloned, but these Framers may internally maintain per-Connection state. It is also possible to check which Connections belong to the same Connection Group. Calling GroupedConnections() on a specific"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-4222e8d11cb93036447302505bd49675556bfa68b38ff19ad35c75c8bb4b2879","text":"Clients MUST discard Retry packets that contain an Original Destination Connection ID field that does not match the Destination Connection ID from its Initial packet. This prevents an off-path attacker from injecting a Retry packet. attacker from injecting a Retry packet. A client MUST discard a Retry packet with a zero-length Retry Token field. The client responds to a Retry packet with an Initial packet that includes the provided Retry Token to continue connection"}
{"_id":"q-en-webrtc-http-ingest-protocol-422c75d567254c76ca766c7cbacbfd0f5b17ae2cca27f57c09e5cc7bffce16d5","text":"candidates of the Media Server. The Media Server MAY use ICE lite, while the WHIP client MUST implement full ICE. The WHIP client MAY perform trickle ICE or ICE restarts RFC8863 by sending an HTTP PATCH request to the WHIP resource URL with a body containing a SDP fragment with MIME type \"application/trickle-ice- sdpfrag\" as specified in RFC8840. When used for trickle ICE, the body of this PATCH message will contain the new ICE candidate; when used for ICE restarts, it will contain a new ICE ufrag/pwd pair. The WHIP client MAY perform trickle ICE or ICE restarts as per RFC8838 by sending an HTTP PATCH request to the WHIP resource URL with a body containing a SDP fragment with MIME type \"application/ trickle-ice-sdpfrag\" as specified in RFC8840. When used for trickle ICE, the body of this PATCH message will contain the new ICE candidate; when used for ICE restarts, it will contain a new ICE ufrag/pwd pair. Trickle ICE and ICE restart support is OPTIONAL for a WHIP resource. If the WHIP resource supports either Trickle ICE or ICE restarts, but"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-4251c7f0f85f2734d374a772f6c09addc3008004430ee3eec6720885fb0d1709","text":"Note that the same limitation applies to other data sent by the server protected by the 1-RTT keys. 13.2.8. 13.2.7. Packets containing PADDING frames are considered to be in flight for congestion control purposes QUIC-RECOVERY. Packets containing only"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-428aeb356ba548d69fb10a28e613ef9df703b3660f1374a91aa0d80903c5011f","text":"12.3.23. Control Property [TODO: Discuss] Integer Preconnection, Connection This property specifies how long to wait before aborting a Connection during establishment, or before deciding that a Connection has failed after establishment. It is given in seconds. Integer Connection Property - see 12.3.24. Protocol Property (Generic) / Control Property [TODO: Discuss] Enum Preconnection, Connection This property specifies which scheduler should be used among Connections within a Connection Group, see groups. The set of schedulers can be taken from I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-ndata. Enum Connection Property - see 12.3.25. Protocol Property (Generic) Integer Connection (read only) This property represents the maximum Message size that can be sent before or during Connection establishment, see also msg-idempotent. It is given in Bytes. This property is read-only. Integer Connection Property (read-only) - see 12.3.26. Protocol Property (Generic) Integer Connection (read only) This property, if applicable, represents the maximum Message size that can be sent without incurring network-layer fragmentation or transport layer segmentation at the sender. This property is read- only. Integer Connection Property (read-only) - see 12.3.27. Protocol Property (Generic) Integer Connection (read only) This property represents the maximum Message size that can be sent. This property is read-only. Integer Connection Property (read-only) - see 12.3.28. Protocol Property (Generic) Integer Connection (read only) This numeric property represents the maximum Message size that can be received. This property is read-only. Integer Connection Property (read-only) - see 12.3.29."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-42a293ce49449996065ec0cd813c98f243ba528d4628a164aad0cc61f0e4b61e","text":"applicability, and issues that application developers must consider when using QUIC as a transport for their application. 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 2. QUIC uses UDP as a substrate. This enables both userspace"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-42c2a667868dc1826a811e498fda57d9fabcb28cac4218d75a890855e4b0319d","text":"performance of the QUIC handshake and use shorter timers for acknowledgement. Packets that contain only ACK frames do not count toward congestion control limits and are not considered in-flight. Packets containing frames besides ACK or CONNECTION_CLOSE frames count toward congestion control limits and are considered in- flight. PADDING frames cause packets to contribute toward bytes in flight without directly causing an acknowledgment to be sent."}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-42caeca7777723bb54b8f87256a438efdeeb31bafa7cf1d1657bbc20178765b8","text":"The key and nonce used for the Retry Integrity Tag (QUIC-TLS) change to: The secret is the sha256sum of \"QUICv2 retry secret\". The key and nonce are derived from this secret with the labels \"quicv2 key\" and \"quicv2 iv\", respectively. 4. QUIC version 2 is not intended to deprecate version 1. Endpoints"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-42e4dd847b696a207bd6645a4eb1d9e8607df34f99b6c8c6ef17d052642c498c","text":"Comparison expressions are available for comparisons between primitive values (that is, numbers, strings, \"true\", \"false\", and \"null\"). These can be obtained via literal values; Singular Queries, \"null\"). These can be obtained via literal values; singular queries, each of which selects at most one node the value of which is then used; or function expressions (see fnex) of type \"ValueType\"."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-irtf-nwcrg-network-coding-satellites-43271342ead7026127299a70cada77a8c4fd5dd2630f1485ba050b209ecc77d4","text":"A research challenge would be the optimization of the NFV service function chaining, considering a virtualized infrastructure and other SATCOM specific functions, to guarantee an efficient radio usage and easy-to-deploy SATCOM services. easy-to-deploy SATCOM services. Moreover, another challenge related to a virtualized SATCOM terminals is the management of limited buffered equipments. 5.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-43352717cd13a169057d8f5b712fd36d428c8fa876ccd1251a2916c1bd7fd64a","text":"basis. The number of out of order packets that can be processed also impacts the latency of a flow. The latency impact on the system resources needed to support a specific DetNet flow will need to be evaluated by the controller plane based on that flow's traffic specification. An example traffic specification that can be used with MPLS with Traffic Engineering (MPLS-TE) can be found in RFC2212. DetNet uses flow-specific requirements (e.g., maximum number of out- of-order packets, maximum latency of the flow) for configuration of POF-related buffers. POF implementation details are out-of-scope for this document and POF configuration parameters are implementation specific. The Controller Plane determines and sets the POF configuration parameters. If PEF is combined with POF, then their configurations need to be coordinated to ensure the combined functionality. 4.2.3. F-Labels support the DetNet forwarding sub-layer. F-Labels are used"}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-4355043ee2db41abb9f7fa52c473f1e8fb0f1563b5fc5bfa1b6f2bb28d3e57db","text":"Abstract The Real-Time Communications on the Web (RTCWEB) working group is tasked with standardizing protocols for enabling real-time communications within user-agents using web technologies (commonly called \"WebRTC\"). This document defines the security architecture for WebRTC. This document defines the security architecture for WebRTC, a protocol suite intended for use with real-time applications that can be deployed in browsers - \"real time communication on the Web\". 1."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-4355a5b150df735583f0596c5536f293ffa2139e142662329be2a4ea57a1e333","text":"QUIC DATAGRAM frames do not provide a means to demultiplex application contexts. This document describes how to use QUIC DATAGRAM frames when the application protocol running over QUIC is HTTP/3. It defines logical flows identified by a non-negative integer that are present at the start of the DATAGRAM frame payload. Flows are associated with HTTP messages using the Datagram-Flow-Id header field, allowing endpoints to match unreliable DATAGRAMS frames to the HTTP messages that they are related to. HTTP/3. It associates datagrams with client-initiated bidirectional streams and defines an optional additional demultiplexing layer. Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the MASQUE IETF mailing list (masque@ietf.org [1]) or on the GitHub repository which"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-43778c36d4ef47baf6d9e3cc9577f427d7b88d0fe8d8073d484b69a2b7b2fa92","text":"The \":method\" pseudo-header field SHALL be \"CONNECT\". The \":protocol\" pseudo-header field SHALL be \"masque-udp\". The \":protocol\" pseudo-header field SHALL be \"connect-udp\". The \":authority\" pseudo-header field SHALL contain the authority of the proxy."}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-43d91cd6d73508afc24681b2dc418cffa7bfde5c1d4b6a83c2dc98f405b2dc82","text":"PRK_exporter is derived from PRK_out: where hash_length denotes the output size in bytes of the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite. PRK_exporter MUST be derived anew from PRK_out if EDHOC-KeyUpdate is used, see keyupdate. algorithm of the selected cipher suite. Note that PRK_exporter changes every time EDHOC-KeyUpdate is used, see keyupdate. The (label, context) pair used in EDHOC-Exporter must be unique, i.e., a (label, context) MUST NOT be used for two different purposes."}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-44430e45d862f0ce089bcb8abe015dd9094b9b41166890d95c460c753c75ea08","text":"6.4.1. Fundamentally, the IdP proxy is just a piece of HTML and JS loaded by the browser, so nothing stops a Web attacker o from creating their own IFRAME, loading the IdP proxy HTML/JS, and requesting a signature. In order to prevent this attack, we require that all signatures be tied to a specific origin (\"rtcweb://...\") which cannot be produced by content JavaScript. Thus, while an attacker can instantiate the IdP proxy, they cannot send messages from an appropriate origin and so cannot create acceptable assertions. I.e., the assertion request must have come from the browser. This origin check is enforced on the relying party side, not on the authenticating party side. The reason for this is to take the burden of knowing which origins are valid off of the IdP, thus making this mechanism extensible to other applications besides WebRTC. The IdP simply needs to gather the origin information (from the posted message) and attach it to the assertion. the browser, so nothing stops a Web attacker from creating their own IFRAME, loading the IdP proxy HTML/JS, and requesting a signature. In order to prevent this attack, we require that all signatures be tied to a specific origin (\"rtcweb://...\") which cannot be produced by content JavaScript. Thus, while an attacker can instantiate the IdP proxy, they cannot send messages from an appropriate origin and so cannot create acceptable assertions. I.e., the assertion request must have come from the browser. This origin check is enforced on the relying party side, not on the authenticating party side. The reason for this is to take the burden of knowing which origins are valid off of the IdP, thus making this mechanism extensible to other applications besides WebRTC. The IdP simply needs to gather the origin information (from the posted message) and attach it to the assertion. Note that although this origin check is enforced on the RP side and not at the IdP, it is absolutely imperative that it be done. The"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-446f269c100f6c582622432cc7dad83ee92fece2e59099f82f74a9c561d9236e","text":"The method the client instance uses to send an access token depends on whether the token is bound to a key, and if so which proofing method is associated with the key. This information is conveyed in the \"key\" and \"proof\" parameters in response-token-single. the \"bound\" and \"key\" parameters in response-token-single and response-token-multiple responses. If the \"key\" value is the boolean \"false\", the access token is a bearer token sent using the HTTP Header method defined in RFC6750. If the \"bound\" value is the boolean \"true\" and the \"key\" is absent, the access token MUST be sent using the same key and proofing mechanism that the client instance used in its initial request (or its most recent rotation). The form parameter and query parameter methods of RFC6750 MUST NOT be used. If the \"bound\" value is the boolean \"true\" and the \"key\" value is an object as described in key-format, the access token MUST be sent using the key and proofing mechanism defined by the value of the \"proof\" field within the key object. If the \"key\" value is the boolean \"true\", the access token MUST be sent using the same key and proofing mechanism that the client instance used in its initial request (or its most recent rotation). The access token MUST be sent using the HTTP \"Authorization\" request header field and the \"GNAP\" authorization scheme along with a key proof as described in binding-keys for the key bound to the access token. For example, a \"jwsd\"-bound access token is sent as follows: If the \"key\" value is an object as described in key-format, the value of the \"proof\" field within the key indicates the particular proofing mechanism to use. The access token is sent using the HTTP authorization scheme \"GNAP\" along with a key proof as described in binding-keys for the key bound to the access token. For example, a \"jwsd\"-bound access token is sent as follows: If the \"bound\" value is the boolean \"false\", the access token is a bearer token that MUST be sent using the \"Authorization Request Header Field\" method defined in RFC6750. The \"Form-Encoded Body Parameter\" and \"URI Query Parameter\" methods of RFC6750 MUST NOT be used. [[ See issue #104 [47] ]] The client software MUST reject as an error a situation where the \"bound\" value is the boolean \"false\" and the \"key\" is present. 7.3. Any keys presented by the client instance to the AS or RS MUST be"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-44c49d4b9297357af605cff62b8e9d84e56d075889a9ffe0553b99646acec44d","text":"path via the attacker. This places the attacker on path, giving it the ability to observe or drop all subsequent packets. Unlike the attack described in on-path-spoofing, the attacker can ensure that the new path is successfully validated. This style of attack relies on the attacker using a path that is approximately as fast as the direct path between endpoints. The attack is more reliable if relatively few packets are sent or if"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-4535d5bc29cea7374b1d200e24c57c34e74c0f6af7010e50ae7b81196325f169","text":"whether a threshold has been met and an acknowledgement is to be sent in response. 5. 6. An endpoint can send multiple ACK-FREQUENCY frames, and each one of them can have different values."}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-4570b0ef8c9cfdee78f971dda0c2a3ad7232cde9d7ec691e4f22b7203fe7ed08","text":"as mile, foot, light year are not allowed. For most cases, the SI unit is preferred. (Note that some amount of judgement will be required here, as even SI itself is not entirely consistent in this respect. For instance, for temperature ISO-80000-5 defines a quantity, item 5-1 (thermodynamic temperature), and a corresponding unit 5-1.a (Kelvin), and then goes ahead to define another quantity right besides that, item 5-2 (\"Celsius temperature\"), and the corresponding unit 5-2.a (degree Celsius). The latter quantity is defined such that it gives the thermodynamic temperature as a delta from T0 = 275.15 K. ISO 80000-5 is defining both units side by side, and not really expressing a preference. This level of recognition of the alternative unit degree Celsius is the reason why Celsius temperatures exceptionally seem acceptable in the SenML units list alongside Kelvin.) Symbol names that could be easily confused with existing common units or units combined with prefixes should be avoided. For example, selecting a unit name of \"mph\" to indicate something that"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-457ee16854f743a6e3139e0a814a316cb01f2aba8e0b701905c5e69965489414","text":"6.4. DNS resolvers that support DDR by responding to queries for _dns.resolver.arpa SHOULD treat resolver.arpa as a locally served zone per RFC6303. In practice, this means that resolvers SHOULD respond to queries of any type other than SVCB for _dns.resolver.arpa with NODATA and queries of any type for any domain name under _dns.resolver.arpa MUST treat resolver.arpa as a locally served zone per RFC6303. In practice, this means that resolvers SHOULD respond to queries of any type other than SVCB for _dns.resolver.arpa with NODATA and queries of any type for any domain name under resolver.arpa with NODATA. 6.5."}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-459bd1a82d72458a60ac3bed51bcbf13010a5514254d13761f0d1747d27f46db","text":"In pseudocode, this procedure is as follows: The retains the HPKE context, \"rctxt\", so that it can encapsulate a response. 4.4. Given an HPKE context, \"context\"; a request message, \"request\"; and a response, \"response\", generate an , \"enc_response\", as follows: generate an , \"enc_response\", from a binary encoded HTTP response BINARY, \"response\". The uses the HPKE receiver context, \"rctxt\", as the HPKE context, \"context\", as follows: Export a secret, \"secret\", from \"context\", using the string \"message/bhttp response\" as the \"exporter_context\" parameter to"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-459cb5741d1d00fb579578751bb2a4367f9090ace10b804095be5e3d1048b7a2","text":"triggering Initial packet. This is in cleartext to be readable for the server, but authenticated later in the token. RSCIL: The retry source connection ID length. Original Destination Connection ID: This also in cleartext and authenticated later. Retry Source Connection ID: This also in cleartext and authenticated later. Opaque Data: This data MUST contain encrypted information that allows the retry service to validate the client's IP address, in accordance with the QUIC specification. It MUST also encode a secure hash of the original destination connection ID field to verify that this field has not been edited. with the QUIC specification. It MUST also provide a cryptographically secure means to validate the integrity of the entire token. Upon receipt of an Initial packet with a token that begins with '0', the retry service MUST validate the token in accordance with the QUIC specification. It must also verify that the secure hash of the Connect ID is correct. If incorrect, the token is invalid. specification. In active mode, the service MUST issue Retry packets for all Client initial packets that contain no token, or a token that has the first bit set to '1'. It MUST NOT forward the packet to the server. The service MUST validate all tokens with the first bit set to '0'. If successful, the service MUST forward the packet with the token intact. If unsuccessful, it MUST drop the packet. intact. If unsuccessful, it MUST drop the packet. The Retry Service MAY send an Initial Packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with the INVALID_TOKEN error code when dropping the packet. Note that this scheme has a performance drawback. When the retry service is in active mode, clients with a token from a NEW_TOKEN"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-45a5f6a0bfa2694d0d96de4cf9490c8c3c1086b2633745fe0b3b6074c8a006cb","text":"2.4.4. The \"length\" function extension provides a way to compute the length of a value and make that available for further processing in the filter expression: The \"length()\" function extension provides a way to compute the length of a value and make that available for further processing in the filter expression: Its only argument is an instance of \"ValueType\" (possibly taken from a singular query, as in the example above). The result also is an"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-45fcb9cecaa57bf6e8ede068857bc0e907907987fee4355ad1d2fbefe06707ff","text":"An endpoint MAY send ACK-FREQUENCY frames multiple times during a connection and with different values. 4. An endpoint could receive an ACK-FREQUENCY frame with either or both Time Tolerance and Packet Tolerance values specified. In addition, the endpoint will have committed a max_ack_delay value to the peer, An endpoint will have committed a max_ack_delay value to the peer, which specifies the maximum amount of time by which the endpoint will delay sending acknowledgments; see Section XX of QUIC-TRANSPORT. delay sending acknowledgments. When the endpoint receives an ACK- FREQUENCY frame, it MUST update this maximum time to the value proposed by the peer in the Update Max Ack Delay field. The endpoint MUST send an acknowledgement when any of the three thresholds are met. Doing so results in the fewest acknowledgements possible within the sender's tolerance and honors the receiver's commitment. loss and batch section describes exceptions to this strategy. 5. On receiving an ACK-FREQUENCY frame, an endpoint will have an updated maximum delay for sending an acknowledgement, and a packet threshold as well. The endpoint MUST send an acknowledgement when either of the two thresholds are met. loss and batch section describes exceptions to this strategy. An endpoint is expected to bundle acknowledgements when possible. Every time an acknowledgement is sent, bundled or otherwise, all counters and timers related to delaying of acknowledgments are reset. 4.1. 5.1. To expedite loss detection, endpoints SHOULD send an acknowledgement immediately on receiving an ack-eliciting packet that is out of"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-rrc-46230ad3da138165e40fca342b6b3a3e1dda62f7084916909beb82633fb33eab","text":"\"rrc\" extension to the \"TLS ExtensionType Values\" registry as described in tbl-ext. 8. 9. Issues against this document are tracked at https://github.com/tlswg/ dtls-rrc/issues 9. 10. We would like to thank Achim Kraus, Hanno Becker, Hanno Boeck, Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard, Mohit Sahni and Rich Salz for their input to this"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-462eebdefe9869a714e79049a994f29089fa7e0f98fea073c023e39716014cb5","text":"8.2.2. message application access-token-response private-token-response N/A"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-465acd541e9a5f3770a317c22d79d1757f1b0b269ca6b18d7cb1deaeb7032084","text":"For a KeyPackageRef, the \"value\" input is the encoded KeyPackage, and the ciphersuite specified in the KeyPackage determines the KDF used. For a LeafNodeRef, the \"value\" input is the LeafNode object for the leaf node in question. For a ProposalRef, the \"value\" input is the MLSMessageContentAuth carrying the proposal. In the latter two cases, the KDF is determined by the group's ciphersuite. For a ProposalRef, the \"value\" input is the MLSMessageContentAuth carrying the proposal. In the latter two cases, the KDF is determined by the group's ciphersuite. 6.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-46622eb735155e540f5fea4fb20645d21cf54cbc66e54db1ef77ee4f5df1aaa5","text":"that the epoch secret is confidential to the members in the current epoch. For each Commit that adds one or more members to the group, there is a single corresponding Welcome message. The Welcome message provides all the new members with the information they need to initialize For each Commit that adds one or more members to the group, there are one or more corresponding Welcome messages. Each Welcome message provides new members with the information they need to initialize their views of the key schedule and ratchet tree, so that these views align with the views held by other members of the group in this epoch."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-46b79d2239c5c9879fa8009b05906339909759bf8cf109f55c457914749a9880","text":"Freeze & deprecate record layer version field. Update format of signatures with context. draft-05 Prohibit SSL negotiation for backwards compatibility."}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-46bd78ff095578de517503eb714ba8231a80ff30c81f8244b6b684c8c1af4a52","text":"multiple access token structure containing one access token. If the AS has split the access token response, the response MUST include the \"split\" flag set to \"true\". include the \"split\" flag in the \"flags\" array. Each access token MAY be bound to different keys with different proofing mechanisms."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-470c85d4c627099b67a37bfd620889d2b3660b22997361985ed366b9d1103570","text":"The PeerConnection constructor allows the application to specify global parameters for the media session, such as the STUN/TURN servers and credentials to use when gathering candidates. The size of the ICE candidate pool can also be set, if desired; by default the candidate pool size is zero. [[OPEN ISSUE: this is an inconsistency with the W3C spec https://github.com/rtcweb-wg/jsep/issues/12.]] of the ICE candidate pool can also be set, if desired. If the application does not indicate a candidate pool size, the browser may select any default candidate pool size. In addition, the application can specify its preferred policy regarding use of BUNDLE, the multiplexing mechanism defined in I-"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-47232ff4cb198e33c2c6b868cbe045f1c1547234e4277c94acb7d63731a85ab6","text":"3.6. Although TCP/IP has been used with a number of widely used applications that have symmetric bandwidth requirements (similar bandwidth requirements in each direction between endpoints), many widely-used Internet applications operate in client-server roles, with asymmetric bandwidth requirements. A common example might be an HTTP GET operation, where a client sends a relatively small HTTP GET request for a resource to an HTTP server and often receives a significantly larger response carrying the requested resource. When HTTP is commonly used to stream movie-length videos, the ratio between response size and request size can become arbitrarily large. For this reason, operators may pay more attention to downstream bandwidth utilization when planning and managing capacity. In addition, operators have been able to deploy access networks for end users using underlying technologies that are inherently asymmetric, favoring downstream bandwidth (e.g., ADSL, cellular technologies, most IEEE 802.11 variants), assuming that users will need less upstream bandwidth than downstream bandwidth. This strategy usually works, except when it fails because application bandwidth usage patterns have changed in ways that were not predicted. One example of this type of change was when peer-to-peer file-sharing applications gained popularity in the early 2000s. To take one well- documented case (RFC5594), the BitTorrent application created \"swarms\" of hosts, uploading and downloading files to each other, rather than communicating with a server. BitTorrent favored peers who uploaded as much as they downloaded, so new BitTorrent users had an incentive to significantly increase their upstream bandwidth utilization. The combination of the large volume of \"torrents\" and the peer-to- peer characteristic of swarm transfers meant that end user hosts were suddenly uploading higher volumes of traffic to more destinations than was the case before BitTorrent. This caused at least one large Internet service provider (ISP) to attempt to \"throttle\" these transfers to mitigate the load these hosts placed on their network. These efforts were met by increased use of encryption in BitTorrent, and complaints to regulators calling for regulatory action. The BitTorrent case study is just one example. However, the example is included here to make it clear that unpredicted and unpredictable massive traffic spikes may not be the result of natural disasters, but they can still have significant impacts. Especially as end users increasingly use video-based social networking applications, it will be helpful for access network providers to watch for increasing numbers of end users uploading significant amounts of content. 3.7. The causes of unpredictable usage described in sec-unpredict were more or less the result of human choices. However, we were reminded during a post-IETF 107 meeting that humans are not always in control, and forces of nature can cause enormous fluctuations in traffic patterns. In his talk, Sanjay Mishra Mishra reported that after the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in early 2020, Comcast's streaming and web video consumption rose by 38%, with their reported peak traffic up 32% overall between March 1 to March 30, AT&T reported a 28% jump in core network traffic (single day in April, as compared to pre stay-at-home daily average traffic), with video accounting for nearly half of all mobile network traffic, while social networking and web browsing remained the highest percentage (almost a quarter each) of overall mobility traffic, and Verizon reported similar trends with video traffic up 36% over an average day (pre COVID-19)}. We note that other operators saw similar spikes during this period. Craig Labowitz Labovitz reported Weekday peak traffic increases over 45%-50% from pre-lockdown levels, A 30% increase in upstream traffic over their pre-pandemic levels, and A steady increase in the overall volume of DDoS traffic, with amounts exceeding the pre-pandemic levels by 40%. (He attributed this increase to the significant rise in gaming-related DDoS attacks (LabovitzDDoS), as gaming usage also increased.) Subsequently, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a COVID-19 Network Impacts Workshop IABcovid in November 2020. Given a larger number of reports and more time to reflect, the following observations from the draft workshop report are worth considering. It is also possible for usage profiles to change significantly and suddenly. These changes are more difficult to plan for, but at a minimum, recognizing that sudden changes are happening is critical. Two examples are instructive. 3.6.1. In the first example, described in \"Report from the IETF Workshop on Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Infrastructure, May 28, 2008\" (RFC5594), when the BitTorrent filesharing application came into widespread use in 2005, sudden and unexpected growth in peer-to-peer traffic led to complaints from ISP customers about the performance of delay- sensitive traffic (VoIP and gaming). These performance issues resulted from at least two causes: Many access networks for end users used underlying technologies that are inherently asymmetric, favoring downstream bandwidth (e.g. ADSL, cellular technologies, most IEEE 802.11 variants), assuming that most users will need more downstream bandwidth than upstream bandwidth. This is a good assumption for client-server applications such as streaming video or software downloads, but BitTorrent rewarded peers that uploaded as much as they downloaded, so BitTorrent users had much more symmetric usage profiles which interacted badly with these assymetric access network technologies. BitTorrent also used distributed hash tables to organize peers into a ring topology, where each peer knew its \"next peer\" and \"previous peer\". There was no connection between the application- level ring topology and the lower-level network topology, so a peer's \"next peer\" might be anywhere on the reachable Internet. Traffic models that expected most communication to take place with a relatively small number of servers were unable to cope with peer-to-peer traffic that was much less predictable. Especially as end users increase use of video-based social networking applications, it will be helpful for access network providers to watch for increasing numbers of end users uploading significant amounts of content. 3.6.2. Early in 2020, the CoViD-19 pandemic and resulting quarantines and shutdowns led to significant changes in traffic patterns, due to a large number of people who suddenly started working and attending school remotely and using more interactive applications (video conferencing, in addition to streaming media). Subsequently, the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) held a COVID-19 Network Impacts Workshop IABcovid in November 2020. The following observations from the workshop report are worth considering. Participants describing different types of networks reported different kinds of impacts, but all types of networks saw impacts."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-472ae27503e29ebcc9bf009453b4f0c6d63279b88d193466525035991ea4f63c","text":"The entries in iana-frame-table are registered by this document. Additionally, each code of the format \"0x1f * N + 0x21\" for non- negative integer values of N (that is, 0x21, 0x40, ..., through 0x3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFE) MUST NOT be assigned by IANA. Each code of the format \"0x1f * N + 0x21\" for non-negative integer values of N (that is, 0x21, 0x40, ..., through 0x3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFE) MUST NOT be assigned by IANA and MUST NOT appear in the listing of assigned values. 11.2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-capport-wg-architecture-47375127054afc08bc3518d5e59bef9a365018b619e03b518e200177a81b224c","text":"This document describes a captive portal architecture. Network provisioning protocols such as DHCP or Router Advertisements (RAs), an optional signaling protocol, and an HTTP API are used to provide the solution. The role of Provisioning Domains (PvDs) is described. the solution. 1."}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-478319ce3153b480779fd1e944f90eeaa533d0e531b463f13543ae1ad0376396","text":"5.1.4. The following shows the example from the previos section show in resolved format. 5.1.5. The following example shows a sensor that returns different data types. 5.1.6. The following example shows how to query one device that can provide multiple measurements. The example assumes that a client has fetched information from a device at 2001:db8::2 by performing a GET"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-47911b94a076029b7c3b08c185da1a030156d8d43a367aa72c1bf4e9eebd7f0d","text":"The optional \"connectionProperties\" parameter allows passing Transport Properties that control the behavior of the underlying stream or connection to be created, e.g., protocol-specific properties to request specific stream IDs for SCTP or QUIC. stream or connection to be created, e.g., Protocol-specific Properties to request specific stream IDs for SCTP or QUIC. Message Properties set on a Connection also apply only to that Connection."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-47ed0f64141992bed7f7e2994feaba67828b0bf4e9945a983b911bcf8be9dcf6","text":"HTTP_WG; HTTP working group; ietf-http-wg@w3.org 8.2. 7.2. This document will request IANA to register the following entry in the \"HTTP/3 Error Codes\" registry:"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-47f434f185275524fbb69e2f528cbc1bf473e47bcf440afedfe9f13d072c10f9","text":"A server MAY send Retry packets in response to Initial and 0-RTT packets. A server can either discard or buffer 0-RTT packets that it receives. A server can send multiple Retry packets as it receives Initial or 0-RTT packets. Initial or 0-RTT packets. A server MUST NOT send more than one Retry packet in response to a single UDP datagram. A client MUST accept and process at most one Retry packet for each connection attempt. After the client has received and processed an"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-47fe07ec38ede0d1e1050de20f559d82551ff1b82ceeb8fa8232c20fb87b7b99","text":"to support reordering, parallelism, priority, and header compression to acheive similar performance. Those features were introduced to HTTP in HTTP/2 RFC7540. Earlier versions of HTTP are capable of conveying the semantic requirements of DOH but would result in very conveying the semantic requirements of DOH but may result in very poor performance for many uses cases. 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-4814d4c33c9d9cf107b71b0316cef1d50ee4d668945c1214fb7ef8aa18edecfb","text":"WebTransport application error codes. This document. 8.6. The following entries are added to the \"HTTP Capsule Types\" registry established by HTTP-DATAGRAM: The \"CLOSE_WEBTRANSPORT_SESSION\" capsule. 0x2843 CLOSE_WEBTRANSPORT_SESSION permanent This document IETF WebTransport Working Group webtransport@ietf.org [1] None 9. References 9.1. URIs [1] mailto:webtransport@ietf.org "}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-4832682d7ce7306cd5271aff95775402a6f4ef21a26d8bf470261bbfc36745c4","text":"9. The conveyance of Evidence and the resulting Attestation Results reveal a great deal of information about the internal state of a device. In many cases, the whole point of the Attestation process is to provide reliable information about the type of the device and the firmware/software that the device is running. This information is particularly interesting to many attackers. For example, knowing that a device is running a weak version of firmware provides a way to aim attacks better. Protocols that convey Evidence or Attestation Results are responsible for detailing what kinds of information are disclosed, and to whom they are exposed. 10. 11."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-4895568a2a58d03e95dd7717b9a70b0633365b31fdb2aea865cd8c47755dd253","text":"Formally speaking the security model is the following: The adversary runs \"PP_Server_Setup\" and generates a key-pair \"(key, pub_key)\". The adversary runs \"ServerSetup\" and generates a key-pair \"(key, pub_key)\". The adversary specifies a number \"Q\" of issuance phases to initiate, where each phase \"i in 1..Q\" consists of \"m_i\" server evaluations. The adversary runs \"PP_Issue\" using the key-pair that it generated on each of the client messages in the issuance phase. The adversary runs \"Issue\" using the key-pair that it generated on each of the client messages in the issuance phase. When the adversary wants, it stops the issuance phase, and a random number \"l\" is picked from \"1..Q\"."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-48f537b28eaa9eeee194adae4eafe0bd9e81c01eefaa2d8672b3147b9148a45e","text":"but also will offer \"a=rtcp-mux\", thus allowing for compatibility with either multiplexing or non-multiplexing endpoints. The JSEP implementation will only gather RTP candidates. This halves the number of candidates that the offerer needs to gather. Applying a description with an m= section that does not contain an \"a=rtcp-mux\" attribute will cause an error to be returned. The JSEP implementation will only gather RTP candidates and will insert an \"a=rtcp-mux-only\" indication into any offers it generates. This halves the number of candidates that the offerer needs to gather. Applying a description with an m= section that does not contain an \"a=rtcp-mux\" attribute will cause an error to be returned. The default multiplexing policy MUST be set to \"require\". Implementations MAY choose to reject attempts by the application to"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-4935f3368cb5d936a221ba9b8a68d04a7c0386b684608b60cb66cf85669dde13","text":"identifies the packet as a Version Negotiation packet. QUIC version 1 uses version 0x00000001. Operators should expect to observe packets with other version numbers as a result of various Internet experiments, future standards, and greasing. All deployed versions are maintained in an IANA registry (see Internet experiments, future standards, and greasing (RFC7801). All deployed versions are maintained in an IANA registry (see Section 22.2 of QUIC-TRANSPORT). source and destination connection ID: short and long packet"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-497fc9835dc4589d1e54feab2ee6eaa73144ecae4c71ada8cc1c0f586747c5b3","text":"\"Connection Priority\" on one Connection does not change it on the other Connections in the same Connection Group. Message Properties are also not entangled. For example, changing \"Lifetime\" (see msg-lifetime) of a Message will only affect a single Message on a single Connection. Message Properties set on a Connection also apply only to that Connection. A new Connection created by Clone can have a Message Framer assigned via the optional \"framer\" parameter of the Clone Action. If this"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-49814523fdaaf665d6d999e1e5388ffb87de8a742cdd0e7c6203ceb46da7ee0a","text":"application. Framer: A Framer is a data translation layer that can be added to a Connection to define how application-layer Messages are transmitted over a Protocol Stack. This is particularly relevant when using a protocol that otherwise presents unstructured streams, such as TCP. a Connection. Framers allow extending a Connection's protocol stack to define how to encapsulate or encode outbound Messages, and how to decapsulate or decode inbound data into Messages. In this way, message boundaries can be preserved when using a Connection object, even with a protocol that otherwise presents unstructured streams, such as TCP. This is designed based on the fact that many of the current application protocols evolved over TCP, which does not provide message boundary preservation, and since many of these protocols require message boundaries to function, each application layer protocol has defined its own framing. For example, when an HTTP application sends and receives HTTP messages over a byte-stream transport, it must parse the boundaries of HTTP messages from the stream of bytes. 4.1.6."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-4a3dd3add51a134657a1be04e69868e6d2c80c6958d09253f34de05c3b29f7d1","text":"While QUIC is designed as a general-purpose transport protocol, and can carry different application-layer protocols, the current standardized mapping is for HTTP/3 I-D.ietf-quic-http, which describes how QUIC transport features are used for HTTP. The convention is for HTTP/3 to run over UDP port 443 Port443 but this is not a strict requirement. standardized mapping is for HTTP/3 RFC9114, which describes how QUIC transport services are used for HTTP. The convention is for HTTP/3 to run over UDP port 443 Port443 but this is not a strict requirement. When HTTP/3 is encapsulated in QUIC, which is then encapsulated in UDP, streaming operators (and network operators) might see UDP traffic patterns that are similar to HTTP(S) over TCP. Since earlier versions of HTTP(S) rely on TCP, UDP ports may be blocked for any port numbers that are not commonly used, such as UDP 53 for DNS. Even when UDP ports are not blocked and HTTP/3 can flow, streaming operators (and network operators) may severely rate-limit this traffic because they do not expect to see legitimate high-bandwidth traffic such as streaming media over the UDP ports that HTTP/3 is using. traffic patterns that are similar to HTTP(S) over TCP. UDP ports may be blocked for any port numbers that are not commonly used, such as UDP 53 for DNS. Even when UDP ports are not blocked and QUIC packets can flow, streaming operators (and network operators) may severely rate-limit this traffic because they do not expect to see legitimate high-bandwidth traffic such as streaming media over the UDP ports that HTTP/3 is using. As noted in hol-blocking, because TCP provides a reliable, in-order delivery service for applications, any packet loss for a TCP"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-4a7674f6338ade9419c252e8cecdcac69aed3b54979dd08461623feb4394c673","text":"Each report share has a corresponding task ID, report metadata (report ID and, timestamp), the public share sent to each Aggregator, and the recipient's encrypted input share. Let \"task_id\", \"metadata\", \"public_share\", and \"encrypted_input_share\" denote these values, respectively. Given these values, an aggregator decrypts the input share as follows. First, it constructs an \"InputShareAad\" message from \"task_id\", \"metadata\", and \"public_share\". Let this be denoted by \"input_share_aad\". Then, the aggregator looks up the HPKE config and corresponding secret key indicated by \"encrypted_input_share.config_id\" and attempts decryption of the payload with the following procedure: \"report_metadata\", \"public_share\", and \"encrypted_input_share\" denote these values, respectively. Given these values, an aggregator decrypts the input share as follows. First, it constructs an \"InputShareAad\" message from \"task_id\", \"report_metadata\", and \"public_share\". Let this be denoted by \"input_share_aad\". Then, the aggregator looks up the HPKE config and corresponding secret key indicated by \"encrypted_input_share.config_id\" and attempts decryption of the payload with the following procedure: where \"sk\" is the HPKE secret key, and \"server_role\" is the role of the aggregator (\"0x02\" for the leader and \"0x03\" for the helper)."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-4a7fbe1ef4a3b88a0db514053f51eaeac451d3cea32b0a705899fd4c25664280","text":"7. Since client can receive DNS SVCB answers over unencrypted DNS, on- Since clients can receive DNS SVCB answers over unencrypted DNS, on- path attackers can prevent successful discovery by dropping SVCB packets. Clients should be aware that it might not be possible to distinguish between resolvers that do not have any Designated"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-4aeeaa2253ec504d8ee671b50b20923828e695e4279d31a405c719df6a8f380d","text":"QUIC is an end-to-end transport protocol. No information in the protocol header, even that which can be inspected, is mutable by the network. This is achieved through integrity protection of the wire image WIRE-IMAGE. Encryption of most control signaling means that less information is visible to the network than is the case with TCP. image WIRE-IMAGE. Encryption of most transport-layer control signaling means that less information is visible to the network than is the case with TCP. Integrity protection can also simplify troubleshooting, because none of the nodes on the network path can modify transport layer"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-4af2a69d1bc7a54b8ed0f67cd32a490a39f895f5e8c68227ad58d1a6942627a2","text":"maximum value for a Push ID that the server can use in a PUSH_PROMISE frame. Consequently, this also limits the number of push streams that the server can initiate in addition to the limit set by the QUIC MAX_STREAM_ID frame. MAX_STREAMS frame. The MAX_PUSH_ID frame is always sent on the control stream. Receipt of a MAX_PUSH_ID frame on any other stream MUST be treated as a"}
{"_id":"q-en-capport-wg-architecture-4b39e02f06faace7c7afa210d17c44a78b31bcd4460d824d609d96e208a99a1c","text":"2.6. The following diagram shows the communication between each component. The following diagram shows the communication between each component in the case where the Captive Network has a User Portal, and the User Equipment chooses to visit the User Portal in response to discovering and interacting with the API Server. In the diagram:"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-4b6127754abea68f86384cacef28d5cc8e52b8e7c1a06d872b1dd22ce4c55384","text":"layer headers. Note that in some cases a zero-length HashValue (indicated by \"\") is passed to HKDF-Expand-Label. Note: with common hash functions, any label longer than 12 characters requires an additional iteration of the hash function to compute. The labels in this specification have all been chosen to fit within this limit. Given a set of n InputSecrets, the final \"master secret\" is computed by iteratively invoking HKDF-Extract with InputSecret_1, InputSecret_2, etc. The initial secret is simply a string of"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-4bba7aa6d8a4bca7e304f342d3671854174a5a20ada764ac4afa4cbf4d5096ce","text":"to the PA protocol: The helper handles each sub-request \"PAAggregateSubReq\" as follows. It first checks that checks that \"PAAggregateSubReq.proto == PAParam.proto\". If not, it aborts and alerts the leader with \"incorrect protocol for sub-request\". Otherwise, it computes the HPKE context as where \"sk\" is its HPKE key and computes the body of the \"PAAggregateSubResp\". It then updates its state according to the PA protocol. After processing all of the sub-requests, the helper encrypts its updated state and constructs its response to the aggregate request. It first looks up the HPKE config and corresponding secret key associated with \"helper_share.config_id\". If not found, then the sub-response consists of an \"unrecognized config\" alert. [TODO: We'll want to be more precise about what this means. See issue#57.] Next, it attempts to decrypt the payload with the following procedure: where \"sk\" is the HPKE secret key. If decryption fails, then the sub-response consists of a \"decryption error\" alert. [See issue#57.] Otherwise, the helper handles the request for its plaintext input share \"input_share\" and updates its state as specified by the PA protocol. After processing all of the sub-requests, the helper encrypts its updated state and constructs its response to the aggregate request. 3.4.2.1.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-4cc4e768704d2780940e2245a98fdc84f99cab21c53e959edd104ca76a2d30e9","text":"configured not to perform a cookie exchange. The default SHOULD be that the exchange is performed, however. In addition, the server MAY choose not to do a cookie exchange when a session is resumed or, more generically, when the DTLS handshake uses a PSK-based key exchange. Servers which process 0-RTT requests and send 0.5-RTT responses without a cookie exchange risk being used in an amplification attack if the size of outgoing messages greatly exceeds the size of those that are received. A server SHOULD limit the amount of data it sends toward a client address before it verifies that the client is able to receive data at that address. A client address is valid after a cookie exchange or handshake completion. A server MAY apply a higher limit based on heuristics, such as if the client uses the same IP address as the connection on which the cookie was created. Clients MUST be prepared to do a cookie exchange with every handshake. generically, when the DTLS handshake uses a PSK-based key exchange and the IP address matches one associated with the PSK. Servers which process 0-RTT requests and send 0.5-RTT responses without a cookie exchange risk being used in an amplification attack if the size of outgoing messages greatly exceeds the size of those that are received. A server SHOULD limit the amount of data it sends toward a client address to three times the amount of data sent by the client before it verifies that the client is able to receive data at that address. A client address is valid after a cookie exchange or handshake completion. Clients MUST be prepared to do a cookie exchange with every handshake. Note that cookies are only valid for the existing handshake and cannot be stored for future handshakes. If a server receives a ClientHello with an invalid cookie, it MUST terminate the handshake with an \"illegal_parameter\" alert. This"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-4ced3035495900bf86050b85d5f11c254330aa139fb02f7821f389610f21113b","text":"9. Running DNS over https:// relies on the security of the underlying HTTP connection. By requiring at least RFC7540 levels of support for TLS this protocol expects to use current best practices for secure Running DNS over HTTPS relies on the security of the underlying HTTP connection. By requiring at least RFC7540 levels of support for TLS, this protocol expects to use current best practices for secure transport. Session level encryption has well known weaknesses with respect to"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-4d09fc64dbb6052ab59a310560c66e28d3d677ca02c675de1dc64169597bd526","text":"related to the JSON literals \"true\" and \"false\" and have no direct syntactical representation in JSONPath. \"NodesType\" is an abstraction of a \"filter-path\" (which appears in a test expression or as a function argument). Members of \"NodesType\" is an abstraction of a \"filter-query\" (which appears in a test expression or as a function argument). Members of \"NodesType\" have no direct syntactical representation in JSONPath. The abstract instances above can be obtained from the concrete"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-4d74e099f5f268cdb78939f3e1dca683318da1cfb5d8cd30ae587facf839098f","text":"meanings. Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in RFC7252 and RFC7641. Readers are also expected to be familiar with RFC7049 and understand I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor- cddl. Terminology for constrained environments, such as \"constrained device\", \"constrained-node network\", is defined in RFC7228. described in CoAP RFC7252, Observe RFC7641, Blockwise RFC7959, COSE I-D.ietf-cose-msg, CBOR RFC7049, CDDL I-D.greevenbosch-appsawg-cbor- cddl, and constrained environments RFC7228. 2."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-4dd01627bb7547d88f67633be60de763e7bec67ddbc84a270e0d7e89abbac153","text":"old key. The \"outer\" JWS represents the current account holder's assent to this request. On receiving keyChange request, the server MUST perform the following steps in addition to the typical JWS validation: On receiving a keyChange request, the server MUST perform the following steps in addition to the typical JWS validation: Validate the POST request belongs to a currently active account, as described in message-transport."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-4dd278dc6fbf2610aecbb5b56bd675613fa31707462e1a2132c8cbb74ed647c0","text":"of the following octets. Note that the first two octets indicate the extension type (\"supported_groups\" extension): As of TLS 1.3, servers are permitted to send the \"supported_groups\" extension to the client. If the server has a group it prefers to the ones in the \"key_share\" extension but is still willing to accept the ClientHello, it SHOULD send \"supported_groups\" to update the client's view of its preferences. Clients MUST NOT act upon any information found in \"supported_groups\" prior to successful completion of the handshake, but MAY use the information learned from a successfully completed handshake to change what groups they offer to a server in subsequent connections. [[TODO: IANA Considerations.]] 6.3.2.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-4e94219166f27028856716780ca5ec68ffa7fbbbc015634bfec18c93d92d4f5f","text":"The status of the Connection, which can be one of the following: Establishing, Established, Closing, or Closed. Whether the connection can be used to send data. A connection can not be used for sending if the connection was created unidirectional receive only or if a message with the final property was sent over this connection. Whether the connection can be used to receive data. A connection can not be used for reading if the connection was created unidirectional send only or if a message with the final property received was received. The latter is only supported by certain transport protocols, e.g., by TCP as half-closed connection. Transport Features of the protocols that conform to the Required and Prohibited Transport Preferences, which might be selected by the transport system during Establishment. These features"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-4e955929289deb69442abc8b6366d2c86943eeb93dc6d9f29f4fd8c23875f39f","text":"implementation level only -- they do not influence the result of the evaluation.) A function argument is a \"filter-path\" or a \"comparable\". A function argument is a \"filter-query\" or a \"comparable\". According to filter-selector, a \"function-expr\" is valid as a \"filter-path\" or a \"comparable\". \"filter-query\" or a \"comparable\". Any function expressions in a query must be well-formed (by conforming to the above ABNF) and well-typed, otherwise the JSONPath"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-4ecd3e8981784685ec2230c245463b4aaf6ae1c6dead2620d60880c64ec018ab","text":"packets arrive. If a peer could timeout within an Probe Timeout (PTO, see Section 6.2.2 of QUIC-RECOVERY), it is advisable to test for liveness before sending any data that cannot be retried safely. Note that it is likely that only applications or application protocols will know what information can be retried. 10.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-dnssd-srp-4f359b098298d69545cc158cf3e46d7e8a6a68e53d9f87508e281fcde56118ea","text":"simplifications are available. Instead of being configured with (or discovering) the service registration domain, the (proposed) special- use domain name (see RFC6761) \"default.service.arpa\" is used. The details of how SRP server(s) are discovered will be specific to the constrained network, and therefore we do not suggest a specific details of how SRP registrar(s) are discovered will be specific to the constrained network, and therefore we do not suggest a specific mechanism here. SRP clients on constrained networks are expected to receive from the network a list of SRP servers with which to register. It is the responsibility of a Constrained-Node Network supporting SRP to provide one or more SRP server addresses. It is the responsibility of the SRP server supporting a Constrained-Node Network to handle the updates appropriately. In some network environments, updates may be accepted directly into a local \"default.service.arpa\" zone, which has only local visibility. In other network environments, updates for names ending in \"default.service.arpa\" may be rewritten internally to names with broader visibility. SRP requestors on constrained networks are expected to receive from the network a list of SRP registrars with which to register. It is the responsibility of a Constrained-Node Network supporting SRP to provide one or more SRP registrar addresses. It is the responsibility of the SRP registrar supporting a Constrained-Node Network to handle the updates appropriately. In some network environments, updates may be accepted directly into a local \"default.service.arpa\" zone, which has only local visibility. In other network environments, updates for names ending in \"default.service.arpa\" may be rewritten internally to names with broader visibility. 2.1.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-4f41cbc4fd8afb6346f2b6ae01f296474555d6306cd83ea419e9c42cdbe04ea8","text":"acknowledgement is received that establishes loss or delivery of packets. When an ACK frame is received that establishes loss after a threshold number of consecutive PTOs (pto_count is more than kPersistentCongestionThreshold, see cc-consts-of-interest), the network is considered to be experiencing persistent congestion, and the sender's congestion window MUST be reduced to the minimum congestion window (kMinimumWindow). This response of collapsing the congestion window on persistent congestion is functionally similar to a sender's response on a Retransmission Timeout (RTO) in TCP RFC5681. When an ACK frame is received that establishes loss of all in-flight packets sent prior to a threshold number of consecutive PTOs (pto_count is more than kPersistentCongestionThreshold, see cc- consts-of-interest), the network is considered to be experiencing persistent congestion, and the sender's congestion window MUST be reduced to the minimum congestion window (kMinimumWindow). This response of collapsing the congestion window on persistent congestion is functionally similar to a sender's response on a Retransmission Timeout (RTO) in TCP RFC5681. 7.6."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-4f71f80cd3fc09f93b843c9908e0c8530e441c8cea97a710c1a3ae219af57541","text":"malformed requests are handled as described in pa-error-common- aborts.) It first looks for the PA parameters \"PAParam\" for which \"PAAggregateReq.task_id\" is equal to the task id derived from \"PAParam\". Next, it looks up the HPKE config and corresponding secret key associated with \"PAAggregateReq.helper_hpke_config_id\". If not found, then it aborts and alerts the leader with \"unrecognized key config\". [NOTE: In this situation, the leader has no choice but to abort. This falls into the class of error scenarios that are addressable by running with multiple helpers.] [TODO: Don't require all sub-requests to pertain to the same HPKE config.] \"PAParam\". The response consists of the helper's updated state and a sequence of _sub-responses_, where the i-th sub-response corresponds to the sub-"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-4f91adfe556f31cacf919726a705447dcad5e4d4a37458dd1a1b2f5a55283d28","text":"match the one in the Welcome message, return an error. Decrypt the \"encrypted_group_secrets\" value with the algorithms indicated by the ciphersuite and the private key corresponding to \"init_key\" in the referenced KeyPackage. indicated by the ciphersuite and the private key \"init_key_priv\" corresponding to \"init_key\" in the referenced KeyPackage. If a \"PreSharedKeyID\" is part of the GroupSecrets and the client is not in possession of the corresponding PSK, return an error."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-webtransport-http2-4fb7aa003cb4875a6d924e9c8eea6940dc00d34b4e4d3a6d54eb0ee628c17171","text":"An endpoint uses a frame (type=0x04) to abruptly terminate the sending part of a stream. After sending a , an endpoint ceases transmission and retransmission of frames on the identified stream. A receiver of can discard any data that it already received on that stream. After sending a , an endpoint ceases transmission of frames on the identified stream. A receiver of can discard any data that it already received on that stream. The frame defines the following fields:"}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-4fd23bf7926930b1b5000af3f500094e712ef33fa79f0ada46e0482bb469166b","text":"method allowed for doing MAC-ed messages. In COSE, all of the key management methods can be used for MAC-ed messages. The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows: The 'protected', 'iv', 'aad', 'ciphertext' and 'recipients' fields MUST be null. The plain text to be encrypted is the key from next layer down (usually the content layer). At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field SHOULD contain the 'alg' parameter as well as a parameter identifying the shared secret. 5.2.2. In key wrapping mode, the CEK is randomly generated and that key is"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-4fe5fd1d0f9317d4311553dbb331d09a36e35701d023de29894333f014939c3f","text":"unless the client instance has specifically requested it by use of the \"split\" flag. Flag values MUST NOT be included more than once. Additional flags can be defined by extensions using IANA. The following non-normative example shows a single access token bound to the client instance's key used in the initial request, with a management URL, and that has access to three described resources (one"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-5005cafb58600c9c9360018cc09caba19ed2212c0b6cb508532b1f56e210fc70","text":"new leaf nodes), with each ciphertext being the encryption to the respective resolution node. The HPKECiphertext values are computed as where \"node_public_key\" is the public key of the node that the path secret is being encrypted for, group_context is the provisional GroupContext object for the group, and the functions \"SetupBaseS\" and \"Seal\" are defined according to RFC9180. The HPKECiphertext values are encrypted and decrypted as follows: Decryption is performed in the corresponding way, using the private key of the resolution node. Here \"node_public_key\" is the public key of the node for which the path secret is encrypted, \"group_context\" is the provisional GroupContext object for the group, and the \"EncryptWithLabel\" function is as defined in public-key-encryption. 7.7."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-edhoc-5064ab538357b2016b2bbf796f9c626d77c2a9cc4aba1ef80afcf523dea49448","text":"the CBOR sequence built at step 3. Signal the usage of this approach within the EDHOC + OSCORE request, by including the new EDHOC Option defined in signalling. request, by including the new EDHOC Option defined in edhoc- option. 4.2. 5.3. When receiving an EDHOC + OSCORE request, the Server performs the following steps. When receiving a request containing the EDHOC option, i.e. an EDHOC + OSCORE request, the Server MUST perform the following steps. Check the presence of the EDHOC option defined in signalling, to determine that the received request is an EDHOC + OSCORE request. If this is the case, the Server continues with the steps defined below. Check that the payload of the EDHOC + OSCORE request is a CBOR sequence composed of two CBOR byte strings. If this is not the case, the Server MUST stop processing the request and MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message. Extract CIPHERTEXT_3 from the payload of the EDHOC + OSCORE request, as the first CBOR byte string in the CBOR sequence."}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-50699dcc1dca0342d5ac52751cd78e0d0aa26cbb55b5eb63c22bb3f85becd9ea","text":"3.1. The Version field of long headers is 0x709a50c4. This randomly chosen value is meant to avoid creating patterns in specified version numbers. The Version field of long headers is 0x6b3343cf. This was generated by taking the first four bytes of the sha256sum of \"QUICv2 version number\". This version number will not change in subsequent versions of this draft, unless there is a behavior change that breaks compatibility."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-50869163ffb5898eab3d932c4e72737f36186580b9e374564bf75e2389b0259d","text":"reconstruct a Client's browsing history. Attestation and redemption context unlinkability requires that these events be separated over time, e.g., through the use of non- interactive tokens that can be issued without a fresh Origin challenge, or over space, e.g., through the use of an anonymizing proxy when connecting to the Origin. events be separated over time, e.g., through the use of tokens with an empty redemption context, or over space, e.g., through the use of an anonymizing proxy when connecting to the Origin. 4.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-edhoc-509aaae61e449a0588b0879031469f2f6349235873ecf74c89b4feca179870cb","text":"Without this optimization, it is not possible, not even in theory, to achieve the minimum number of flights. This optimization makes it possible also in practice, since the last message of the EDHOC possible also in practice since the last message of the EDHOC protocol can be made relatively small (see Section 1 of I-D.ietf- lake-edhoc), thus allowing additional OSCORE protected CoAP data within target MTU sizes."}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-50b8d318486ffe9adc4c11c95574cc0813d6743c9dff9c4674408b44cb4757a1","text":"First Use (TOFU) approach with a device completely unprotected before the first login did take place). Many devices have very limited UI. For example, they may only have a numeric keypad or perhaps an interface with even fewer buttons. When the TOFU approach is not suitable, entering the key may require typing it on a very constrained UI. Moreover, PSK production lacks guidance unlike user passwords. even less number of buttons. When the TOFU approach is not suitable, entering the key would require typing it on a constrained UI. Moreover, PSK production lacks guidance unlike user passwords. Some devices are provisioned PSKs via an out-of-band, cloud-based syncing protocol."}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-50c39dbeafe2e3251efde4de7e8c33c78193e54bac07135bffa9404b7a14efb5","text":"nonce = encrypted_nonce ^ AES-ECB(key, padded-server_id_intermediate) Pass 3: The load balancer decrypts the server ID using 128-bit AES Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode, much like QUIC header protection. The nonce octets are zero-padded to 16 octets. AES-ECB encrypts this nonce using its key to generate a mask which it applies to the intermediate server id. This provides the dercypted server ID. ECB mode. The nonce octets are zero-padded to 16 octets. AES-ECB encrypts this nonce using its key to generate a mask which it applies to the intermediate server id. This provides the decrypted server ID. server_id = server_id_intermediate ^ AES-ECB(key, padded-nonce) This three pass algorithm is a simplified version of the FFX This three-pass algorithm is a simplified version of the FFX algorithm. It has the same connection ID length requirements as the Stream Cipher CID Algorithm, with the additional property that each encrypted nonce value depends on all server ID bits, and each"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-5124c0c1b9bfe03698b62892794d6795e2c27ae26e56e2c8d550f0e90f75496d","text":"not ACK-only, and they are not acknowledged, declared lost, or abandoned along with old keys. All frames besides ACK or PADDING are considered ack-eliciting. All frames other than ACK, PADDING, and CONNECTION_CLOSE are considered ack-eliciting. Packets that contain ack-eliciting frames elicit an ACK from the receiver within the maximum ack delay and are called ack-eliciting"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-512c3a70ea88ed6ee1330624e6722c42737b109ae4898a870015b4b1089ac7a2","text":"This protocol MUST be used with the https scheme URI RFC7230. PrivacyConsiderations and Security discuss additional considerations for the integration with HTTP. 6.1. A DoH exchange can pass through a hierarchy of caches that include"}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-513df581bbde0c8605047124c845c350032d6f9e8f0b9bc422795f59be36c12a","text":"6. QUIC version 2 provides protection against some forms of ossification. Devices that assume that all long headers will contain encode version 1, or that the version 1 Initial key derivation formula will remain version-invariant, will not correctly process version 2 packets. ossification. Devices that assume that all long headers will encode version 1, or that the version 1 Initial key derivation formula will remain version-invariant, will not correctly process version 2 packets. However, many middleboxes such as firewalls focus on the first packet in a connection, which will often remain in the version 1 format due"}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-517d02bbe68fa24dd96b742a31a3b3bc293fbe3882bdb2e62350e7cab34df6c4","text":"payload = MAC_2 CIPHERTEXT_2 is calculated by using the Expand function as a binary additive stream cipher. binary additive stream cipher over the following plaintext: plaintext = ( ? PAD, ID_CRED_R / bstr / -24..23, PLAINTEXT_2 = ( ? PAD, ID_CRED_R / bstr / -24..23, Signature_or_MAC_2, ? EAD_2 ) If ID_CRED_R contains a single 'kid' parameter, i.e.,"}
{"_id":"q-en-coap-tcp-tls-517e7e812abbe6ec72067592c6bbf7336cc41c7029393b0089e9b4538360dabd","text":"environments, CoAP needs to support different transport protocols, namely TCP RFC0793, in some situations secured by TLS RFC5246. In addition, some corporate networks only allow Internet access via a HTTP proxy. In this case, the best transport for CoAP might be the RFC6455. The WebSocket protocol provides two-way communication between a WebSocket client and a WebSocket server after upgrading an RFC7230 connection and may be available in an environment that blocks CoAP over UDP. Another scenario for CoAP over WebSockets is a CoAP application running inside a web browser without access to connectivity other than HTTP and WebSockets. CoAP applications running inside a web browser without access to connectivity other than HTTP and the RFC6455 may cross-proxy their CoAP requests via HTTP to a HTTP-to-CoAP cross-proxy or transport them via the the WebSocket protocol, which provides two-way communication between a WebSocket client and a WebSocket server after upgrading an RFC7230 connection. This document specifies how to access resources using CoAP requests and responses over the TCP, TLS and WebSocket protocols. This allows"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-51b9b4081db4a15e5a7fd20ea4eb1349a64a0bed72ed45c79669cbcf970e15aa","text":"generated. An AEAD cipher MUST NOT produce an expansion of greater than 256 bytes. An endpoint that receives a record that is larger than 2^14+256 octets MUST generate a fatal \"record_overflow\" alert. bytes. An endpoint that receives a record that is larger than 2^14 + 256 octets MUST generate a fatal \"record_overflow\" alert. As a special case, we define the NULL_NULL AEAD cipher which is simply the identity operation and thus provides no security. This"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ctls-51e0cf54910e257ed9c0ceacd0b4e59dcbbfbab4507a135e54c9f534aac40456","text":"https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/ TugB5ddJu3nYg7chcyeIyUqWSbA. If true, handshake messages MUST be conveyed inside a \"Handshake\" (RFC8446, Section 4) struct on stream transports, or a \"DTLSHandshake\" (RFC9147, Section 5.2) struct on datagram transports, and MAY be broken into multiple records as in TLS and DTLS. Otherwise, each handshake message is conveyed in a \"CTLSHandshake\" or \"CTLSDatagramHandshake\" struct (ctlshandshake), which MUST be the payload of a single record. contains keys that are not required to be understood by the client. Server operators MUST NOT place a key in this section unless the server is able to determine whether the key is in use"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-522f8ad8ddf38d315abda734a49e901f7b043b6bee9ba5684190baaddae0af74","text":"even if TFO was successfully negotiated (see PaaschNanog). Any fallback mechanism is likely to impose a degradation of performance; however, fallback MUST not silently violate the performance; however, fallback must not silently violate the application's expectation of confidentiality or integrity of its payload data."}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-52589382840ffe4b440afa6e6c8a2254a79e64240d71b68cf6f49b6c7fe2dfe5","text":"All dynamically generated handles are returned as fields in the root JSON object of the response. This specification defines the following dynamic handle returns, additional handles can be defined in IANA. following dynamic handle return, additional handles can be defined in IANA. A string value used to represent the information in the \"client\" object that the client instance can use in a future request, as described in request-instance. A string value used to represent the current user. The client instance can use in a future request, as described in request- user-reference. This non-normative example shows two handles along side an issued This non-normative example shows one handle along side an issued access token. [[ See issue #77 [23] ]]"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-526ccc2c803e8c7465b1c46bc1eb05f1425fefecd7a5f8c3011c3fd148bea471","text":"endpoint that occasionally uses different connection IDs might introduce some uncertainty about this. Finally, the last 16 bytes of the packet are set to the value of the Stateless Reset Token. This stateless reset design is specific to QUIC version 1. An endpoint that supports multiple versions of QUIC needs to generate a stateless reset that will be accepted by peers that support any"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-527d6c2c9a3edce7071d4ad6fa9040b334fc15dffa9ca4824705b967ac95caba","text":"allocated via Standards Track RFCs. ClientCertificateTypes marked as \"No\" are not. If an item is not marked as recommended it does not necessarily mean that it is flawed; rather, it indicates that either the item has not been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases. 12. To align with TLS implementations and to align the naming"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-5284b670e5a8992f1ccd394d3ceea903e2de0aca2b97d20019de60712d3ffd03","text":"local answers, \"recvonly\" for remote answers, or \"sendrecv\" for either type of answer), choose the media format to send as the most preferred media format from the remote description that is also present in the answer, as described in RFC3264, Sections 6.1 and 7, and start transmitting RTP media once the underlying transport layers have been established. If an SSRC has not already been chosen for this outgoing RTP stream, choose a random one. If media is already being transmitted, the same SSRC SHOULD be used unless the clockrate of the new codec is different, in which case a new SSRC MUST be chosen, as also locally supported, as discussed in RFC3264, Sections 6.1 and 7, and start transmitting RTP media using that format once the underlying transport layers have been established. If an SSRC has not already been chosen for this outgoing RTP stream, choose a random one. If media is already being transmitted, the same SSRC SHOULD be used unless the clockrate of the new codec is different, in which case a new SSRC MUST be chosen, as specified in RFC7160, Section 3.1. The payload type mapping from the remote description is used to"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-dnsop-terminology-bis-5299c0006af87efa0c21b45b4990dfcf86dfa8c552610d3c84b42cdd4bd060ca","text":"of resolver (some of which are defined below), and understanding the use of the term depends on understanding the context. A related term is \"resolve\", which is not formally defined in RFC1034 or RFC1035. An imputed definition might be \"asking a question that consists of a domain name, class, and type, and receiving some sort of answer\". Similarly, an imputed definition of \"resolution\" might be \"the answer received from resolving\". A resolver that cannot perform all resolution itself. Stub resolvers generally depend on a recursive resolver to undertake the actual resolution function. Stub resolvers are discussed but"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-53a0fbcce70eb620935833a7ca9eb2f3f718ad0f2a74a114fe889448e6195835","text":"Sending a Message with Message Properties inconsistent with the Selection Properties of the Connection yields an error. The following Message Context Parameters are supported: The following Message Properties are supported: 7.3.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-53a463fd0899f65ee7f6bcbe46cb1343f193bfd87074c3db76939186635d631c","text":"representation of the challenge with the response object provided by the client. The server MUST ignore any fields in the response object that are not specified as response fields for this type of challenge. The server provides a 200 (OK) response with the updated challenge object as its body. Note that the challenges in this document do not define any response fields, but future specifications might define them. The server provides a 200 (OK) response with the updated challenge object as its body. If the client's response is invalid for any reason or does not provide the server with appropriate information to validate the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-53bc5a5e7f48086b2a7dba9873633baaf05d39ec55dd76d9db5187e1546cba96","text":"None 8.4. 7.4. This document establishes a registry for HTTP capsule type codes. The \"HTTP Capsule Types\" registry governs a 62-bit space."}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-53bf33ecc98d35553a3567f7c3e14d9df69e7dd0651e44e8e0e648d30ff19fe2","text":"also ignores a Version Negotiation packet that contains incorrect connection ID fields; see QUIC-INVARIANTS. Upon receiving the Version Negotiation packet, the client will search for a version it supports in the list provided by the server. If it doesn't find one, it aborts the connection attempt. Otherwise, it selects a mutually supported version and sends a new first flight with that version - this version is now the negotiated version. Upon receiving the Version Negotiation packet, the client SHALL search for a version it supports in the list provided by the server. If it doesn't find one, it SHALL abort the connection attempt. Otherwise, it SHALL select a mutually supported version and sends a new first flight with that version - this version is now the negotiated version. The new first flight will allow the endpoints to establish a connection using the negotiated version. The handshake of the"}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-53ce2032a29438e1a26b02e8625bf113ca7f92d5b413551abd49d2abf52a22d5","text":"Compute KEYSTREAM_2 = EDHOC-KDF( PRK_2e, TH_2, \"KEYSTREAM_2\", h'', plaintext_length ), where plaintext_length is the length of the plaintext. of PLAINTEXT_2. CIPHERTEXT_2 = plaintext XOR KEYSTREAM_2 CIPHERTEXT_2 = PLAINTEXT_2 XOR KEYSTREAM_2 Encode message_2 as a sequence of CBOR encoded data items as specified in asym-msg2-form."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-540cabf41e95fab0113cb72cdd3f883cc222769bf1808a70e0dce2337f6d53be","text":"that care about timing; the ability to provide control of reliability, choosing which messages to retransmit in the event of packet loss, and how best to make use of the data that arrived; messages to retransmit when there is packet loss, and how best to make use of the data that arrived; the ability to manage dependencies between messages, when the transport system could decide to not deliver a message, either"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-54413c8c386f70fea152a945827927c6c3fe4ebd65644cefcaa0a971923012e9","text":"If either the Base Time or Time value is missing, the missing field is considered to have a value of zero. The Base Time and Time values are added together to get the time of measurement. A time of zero indicates that the sensor does not know the absolute time and the measurement was made roughly \"now\". A negative value is used to indicate seconds in the past from roughly \"now\". A positive value is used to indicate the number of seconds, excluding leap seconds, since the start of the year 1970 in UTC. are added together to get the time of measurement. Values less than 268,435,456 (2*28) represent time relative to the current time. That is, a time of zero indicates that the sensor does not know the absolute time and the measurement was made roughly \"now\". A negative value indicates seconds in the past from roughly \"now\". Positive values up to 2*28 indicate seconds in the future from \"now\". Positive values can be used, e.g., for actuation use when the desired change should happen in the future but the sender or the receiver does not have accurate time available. Values greater than or equal to 2*28 represent an absolute time relative to the Unix epoch (1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time) and the time is counted same way as the Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) \"seconds since the epoch\" . Therefore the smallest absolute time value that can be expressed (2*TIME_T28) is 1978-07-04 21:24:16 UTC. Because time values up to 2*28 are used for presenting time relative to \"now\" and Time and Base Time are added together, care must be taken to ensure that the sum does not inadvertently reach 2*28 (i.e., absolute time) when relative time was intended to be used. Obviously, \"now\"-referenced SenML records are only useful within a specific communication context (e.g., based on information on when"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-dnsop-glue-is-not-optional-54b29ec24bf491fd36f5c1d8052df2f2b511084ab509eaae299e63399f680122","text":"defined for the DNS. Note that this document only clarifies requirements of name server software implementations. It does not change any requirements on data placed in DNS zones or registries. software implementations. It does not introduce or change any requirements on data placed in DNS zones or registries. In other words, this document only makes requirements on \"available glue records\" (i.e., those given in a zone), but does not make requirements regarding their presence in a zone. If some glue records are absent from a given zone, an authoritative name server may be unable to return a useful referral response for the corresponding domain. The IETF may want to consider a separate update to the requirements for including glue in zone data, beyond those given in RFC1034 and RFC1035. 1.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-55603b3a04c67e43d0e5d2d3f63ff2d8d6fa7ec381a93f67518ed8b3979c38da","text":"a PATH_CHALLENGE frame is not adequate validation, since the acknowledgment can be spoofed by a malicious peer. Note that receipt on a different local address does not result in path validation failure, as it might be a result of a forwarded packet (see off-path-forward) or misrouting. It is possible that a valid PATH_RESPONSE might be received in the future. 8.6. Path validation only fails when the endpoint attempting to validate"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-559901bb09bfb00f04df04640714da39838dc5585188d0d5a9db49b2da30f4e3","text":"map to the same server. It could then apply analytical techniques to try to obtain the server encoding. The Stream and Block Cipher CID algorithms provide robust entropy to making any sort of linkage. The Obfuscated CID obscures the mapping and prevents trivial brute-force attacks to determine the routing parameters, but does not provide robust protection against sophisticated attacks. The Stream and Block Cipher CID algorithms provide robust protection against any sort of linkage. The Plaintext CID algorithm makes no attempt to protect this encoding. Were this analysis to obtain the server encoding, then on-path observers might apply this analysis to correlating different client"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-55afc24358e16d8e7a26102e13084d3feea317f7858725cd543139e9936d13b7","text":"packet number: All packets except Version Negotiation and Retry packets have an associated packet number; however, this packet number is encrypted, and therefore not of use to on-path observers. The offset of the packet number is encoded in long observers. The offset of the packet number can be decoded in long headers, while it is implicit (depending on destination connection ID length) in short headers. The length of the packet number is cryptographically obfuscated."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-55b62f40550a8c3e1f77cd4647d55124664115e6e10752d083455978db011d35","text":"precisely two children, a _left_ child and a _right_ child. A node is the _root_ of a tree if it has no parents, and _intermediate_ if it has both children and parents. The _descendants_ of a node are that node, its children, and the descendants of its children, and we say a tree _contains_ a node if that node is a descendant of the root of the tree. Nodes are _siblings_ if they share the same parent. that node's children, and the descendants of its children, and we say a tree _contains_ a node if that node is a descendant of the root of the tree, or if the node itself is the root of the tree. Nodes are _siblings_ if they share the same parent. A _subtree_ of a tree is the tree given by the descendants of any node, the _head_ of the subtree. The _size_ of a tree or subtree is A _subtree_ of a tree is the tree given by any node (the _head_ of the subtree) and its descendants. The _size_ of a tree or subtree is the number of leaf nodes it contains. For a given parent node, its _left subtree_ is the subtree with its left child as head (respectively _right subtree_)."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-56a0de462a375c658bfb93d560e96e1e743f6c426f0f5d373ff276cfe2767b52","text":"The following example sends a Message in two separate calls to Send. All messageData sent with the same messageContext object will be treated as belonging to the same Message, and will constitute an in- order series until the endOfMessage is marked. Once the end of the Message is marked, the messageContext object may be re-used as a new Message with identical parameters. All data sent with the same MessageContext object will be treated as belonging to the same Message, and will constitute an in-order series until the endOfMessage is marked. Once the end of the Message is marked, the MessageContext object may be re-used as a new Message with identical parameters. 7.5."}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-56b767406727bc4cd0afa0613735443c1b0359a5d267f4b2dc0a773c6e8945f7","text":"4.1.3. The pseudorandom key PRK_out, derived as shown in fig-edhoc-kdf, is the only secret key shared between Initiator and Responder that needs to be stored after a successful EDHOC exchange, see m3. Keys for applications are derived from PRK_out, see exporter. The pseudorandom key PRK_out, derived as shown in fig-edhoc-kdf is the output of a successful EDHOC exchange. Keys for applications are derived from PRK_out, see exporter. An application using EDHOC- KeyUpdate needs to store PRK_out. If EDHOC-KeyUpdate is not used, an application only needs to store PRK_out or PRK_exporter as long as EDHOC-Exporter is used. (Note that the word \"store\" used here does not imply that the application has access to the plaintext PRK_out since that may be reserved for code within a TEE, see impl-cons). 4.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-57499393de15414b8dcf8e6b25bc8e36f4aea6f1ec7da019a9449855f02677eb","text":"creator, because they are derived from an authenticated key exchange protocol. Subsequent leaf keys are known only by their owner. Note that the long-term signature keys used by the protocol MUST be distributed by an \"honest\" authentication service for clients to authenticate their legitimate peers. Note that the signature keys used by the protocol MUST be distributed by an \"honest\" authentication service for clients to authenticate their legitimate peers. 14.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-57672f300cd9f475fc713c3a1ce1905de38fda8ce0ecc634d9d79160b20bbab6","text":"has been unable to develop a completely generic solution. I-D.ietf- tls-sni-encryption provides a description of the problem space and some of the proposed techniques. One of the more difficult problems is \"Do not stick out\" (I-D.ietf-tls-sni-encryption; Section 3.4): if is \"Do not stick out\" (I-D.ietf-tls-sni-encryption, Section 3.4): if only sensitive/private services use SNI encryption, then SNI encryption is a signal that a client is going to such a service. For this reason, much recent work has focused on concealing the fact that"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-edhoc-5782bafec8a644475d2fd7b2cce4e93419e878ca14c3e01d7252e5f8f6c185f8","text":"7. RFC Editor: Please replace \"[[this Document]]\" with the RFC number of this document and delete this paragraph. This document has the following actions for IANA. 7.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-57dd053b1e826b45b9f28b696d2b12c94d60aaa67f919c5efeae721fa1c36f9b","text":"default port for HTTP/3 QUIC-HTTP is UDP port 443, analogous to HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 over TLS over TCP. Additionally, Application-Layer Version Negotiation RFC7301 permits the client and server to negotiate which of several protocols will be used on a given connection. Therefore, multiple applications might be supported on a single UDP port based on the ALPN token offered. Applications using QUIC should register an ALPN token for use in the TLS handshake. Applications could define an alternate endpoint discovery mechanism to allow the usage of ports other than the default. For example, HTTP/3 (Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of QUIC-HTTP) specifies the use of HTTP Alternative Services RFC7838 for an HTTP origin to advertise the availability of an equivalent HTTP/3 endpoint on a certain UDP port by using the \"h3\" ALPN token. Note that HTTP/3's ALPN token (\"h3\") identifies not only the version of the application protocol, but also the version of QUIC itself; this approach allows unambiguous agreement between the endpoints on the protocol stack in use. Given the prevalence of the assumption in network management practice that a port number maps unambiguously to an application, the use of ports that cannot easily be mapped to a registered service name might"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-5807e98a0f7846d7cfa03dd6d478ce206ebd3b1794d4a3ef654baf7383477b2a","text":"committer's contribution to the group and provides PCS with regard to the committer. An \"add-only\" Commit that references only Add proposals, in which the path is optional. Such a commit provides PCS with regard to the committer only if the path field is present. A \"partial\" Commit that references Add, PreSharedKey, or ReInit proposals but where the path is empty. Such a commit doesn't provide PCS with regard to the committer. A \"full\" Commit that references proposals of any type, which provides FS with regard to any removed members and PCS for the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-58589d68b4880aedcc66e6b8c8e02b38863a8d7b231be46e94dd8757d3836e65","text":"This prohibition does not guarantee protection against invalid data, but it does reduce the risk. 10. 11. Local policy considerations and similar factors mean different DNS servers may provide different results to the same query: for instance"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-58956c3a1e2294049d6e3d5d303c91618f32ba025ef0301e0d5e1b788f5bfa7f","text":"6. Resolver deployments that support DEER are advised to consider the Resolver deployments that support DDR are advised to consider the following points. 6.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-58b8fe69dffe2cb6754acab8cb1db74702248cf6070115d899f8e49b21ebf418","text":"other, and become part of a Connection Group. Calling Clone on any of these Connections adds another Connection to the Connection Group, and so on. \"Entangled\" Connections share all Connection Properties except \"Priority (Connection)\", see conn-priority. Like all other Properties, Priority is copied to the new Connection when calling Clone(), but it is not entangled: Changing Priority on one Connection does not change it on the other Connections in the same Connection Group. except \"Connection Priority\", see conn-priority. Like all other Properties, Connection Priority is copied to the new Connection when calling Clone(), but it is not entangled: Changing Connection Priority on one Connection does not change it on the other Connections in the same Connection Group. It is also possible to check which Connections belong to the same Connection Group. Calling GroupedConnections() on a specific"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-58f4dbde18c31ba05db6688c6c04452037afd688768497a0280cbe8cf6bb9506","text":"To entities other than its intended recipient, a stateless reset will appear to be a packet with a short header. For the stateless reset to appear as a valid QUIC packet and be smaller than the received packet, the Unpredictable Bits field needs to include at least 46 bits of data (or 6 bytes, less the two fixed bits). To ensure the stateless reset packet is not smaller than other packets received on the connection, an endpoint SHOULD also ensure the total packet length is at least the minimum chosen CID length plus 22 bytes. 22 bytes allows for 1 type byte, 4 packet number and data bytes, 16 bytes for AEAD expansion, and an extra byte to allow the peer to send a smaller stateless reset than the packet it receives. The Stateless Reset Token corresponds to the minimum expansion of the packet protection AEAD. More unpredictable bytes might be necessary if the endpoint could have negotiated a packet protection scheme with a larger minimum AEAD expansion. An endpoint SHOULD NOT send a stateless reset that is significantly larger than the packet it receives. Endpoints MUST discard packets that are too small to be valid QUIC packets. With the set of AEAD functions defined in QUIC-TLS, packets that are smaller than 21 bytes are never valid. to appear as a valid QUIC packet, the Unpredictable Bits field needs to include at least 38 bits of data (or 5 bytes, less the two fixed bits). A minimum size of 21 bytes does not guarantee that a stateless reset is difficult to distinguish from other packets if the recipient requires the use of a connection ID. To prevent a resulting stateless reset from being trivially distinguishable from a valid packet, all packets sent by an endpoint SHOULD be padded to at least 22 bytes longer than the minimum connection ID that the endpoint might use. An endpoint that sends a stateless reset in response to packet that is 43 bytes or less in length SHOULD send a stateless reset that is one byte shorter than the packet it responds to. These values assume that the Stateless Reset Token is the same as the minimum expansion of the packet protection AEAD. Additional unpredictable bytes are necessary if the endpoint could have negotiated a packet protection scheme with a larger minimum expansion. An endpoint MUST NOT send a stateless reset that is three times or more larger than the packet it receives to avoid being used for amplification. reset-looping describes additional limits on stateless reset size. Endpoints MUST discard packets that are too small to be valid QUIC packets. With the set of AEAD functions defined in QUIC-TLS, packets that are smaller than 21 bytes are never valid. Endpoints MUST send stateless reset packets formatted as a packet with a short header. However, endpoints MUST treat any packet ending"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-592a036dc6bba2600456eaf7d4ab3025a3b0f914c77c8737dc8b903e753aa0a5","text":"Implementation note: The Leader considers a batch to be collected once it has completed a collection job for a CollectReq message from the Collector; the Helper considers a batch to be collected once it has responded to an CollectionReq message from the Collector; the Helper considers a batch to be collected once it has responded to an AggregateShareReq message from the Leader. A batches is determined by query (query) conveyed in these messages. Queries must satisfy the criteria covered in batch-validation."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-5934f8af4a5705a78d002a9f644d0e16a4d202078d03923d4b171c93920faf3e","text":"contains the unmodified payload of a UDP packet (referred to as \"data octets\" in UDP). Clients MAY optimistically start sending proxied UDP packets before receiving the response to its UDP proxying request. However, implementors should note that such proxied packets may not be processed by the proxy if it responds to the request with a failure, or if the proxied packets are received by the proxy before the request. Clients MAY optimistically start sending UDP packets in HTTP Datagrams before receiving the response to its UDP proxying request. However, implementors should note that such proxied packets may not be processed by the proxy if it responds to the request with a failure, or if the proxied packets are received by the proxy before the request. By virtue of the definition of the UDP header UDP, it is not possible to encode UDP payloads longer than 65527 bytes. Therefore, endpoints"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-593ab8b152c1ccce233ea32ef6acf6fa9d9b1fa56defd64eea63650668cbd24e","text":"The Attester boots up and thereby produces claims about its boot state and its operational state. Event Logs accompany the produced claims by providing an event trail of security-critical events of a claims by providing an event trail of security-critical events in a system. Claims are produced by all attesting Environments of an Attester system."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-599e524c73104a2d31cc5ee6dd70301cf54fdc8ad57356084dc7fd38b7cec8c4","text":"highest available capacity, based on the observed maximum throughput. As another example, branch sorting can also be influenced by bounds on the Send or Receive rate (Selection Properties \"minSendRate\" / \"minRecvRate\" / \"maxSendRate\" / \"maxRecvRate\"): if the application indicates a bound on the expected Send or Receive bitrate, an implementation may prefer a path that can likely provide the desired bandwidth, based on cached maximum throughput, see performance- caches. The application may know the Send or Receive Bitrate from metadata in adaptive HTTP streaming, such as MPEG-DASH. Implementations process the Properties (Section 6.2 of I-D.ietf-taps- interface) in the following order: Prohibit, Require, Prefer, Avoid. If Selection Properties contain any prohibited properties, the"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-59dc57081548166c9fe816da722262cdfd4dd376809fd2821aca7ec95692d55f","text":"dtls-example2 shows an example exchange where a CID is used uni- directionally from the client to the server. To indicate that a zero-length CID we use the term 'connection_id=empty'. zero-length CID is present in the \"connection_id\" extension we use the notation 'connection_id=empty'. Note: In the example exchange the CID is included in the record layer once encryption is enabled. In DTLS 1.2 only one handshake message is encrypted, namely the Finished message. Since the example shows how to use the CID for payloads sent from the client to the server only the record layer payloads containing the Finished messages include a CID. Application data payloads sent from the client to the server contain a CID in this example as well. how to use the CID for payloads sent from the client to the server, only the record layer payloads containing the Finished message or application data include a CID. 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-59e2354f19e0881122ebee54cfa415ef0b67ad1044267510696c997aede56eb3","text":"CAPSULE is an HTTP/3 Frame (as opposed to a QUIC frame) which SHALL only be sent in client-initiated bidirectional streams. Intermediaries MUST forward all received CAPSULE frames in their unmodified entirety on the same stream where it would forward DATA frames. Intermediaries MUST NOT send any CAPSULE frames other than the ones it is forwarding. Intermediaries respect the order of CAPSULE frames: if an intermediary receives two CAPSULE frames in a given order, it MUST forward them in the same order. Intermediaries forward received CAPSULE frames on the same stream where it would forward DATA frames. Each Capsule Type determines whether it is opaque or transparent to intermediaries: opaque capsules are forwarded unmodified while transparent ones can be parsed, added, or removed by intermediaries. This specification of CAPSULE currently uses HTTP/3 frame type 0xffcab5. If this document is approved, a lower number will be"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-5a508609d81f826f78a559709f08310fc49cd5d22f428144d79c42ae33dc9040","text":"key derivation. Moreover, it requires external PSKs to be provisioned for specific hash functions. To mitigate these problems, external PSKs can be bound to a specific KDF and hash function when used in TLS 1.3, even if they are associated with a different hash function when provisioned. This document specifies an interface by which external PSKs may be imported for use in a TLS 1.3 connection to achieve this goal. In particular, it describes how KDF-bound PSKs can be differentiated by the target (D)TLS protocol version and KDF for which the PSK will be used. This produces a set of candidate PSKs, each of which are bound to a specific target protocol and KDF. This expands what would normally have been a single PSK identity into a set of PSK identities. To mitigate these problems, this document specifies a PSK Importer interface by which external PSKs may be imported and subsequently bound to a specific KDF and hash function for use in TLS 1.3. In particular, it describes a mechanism for differentiating external PSKs by the target KDF, (D)TLS protocol version, and an optional context string. This process yields a set of candidate PSKs, each of which are bound to a target KDF and protocol. This expands what would normally have been a single PSK and identity into a set of PSKs and identities. 2."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-5a6800d2b0df5b7a84c3ee57dde26730a091d80850484e24bb77ab68030c6f1e","text":"The traditional model of using sockets for networking can be represented as follows: Applications create connections and transfer data using the socket Applications create connections and transfer data using the Socket API. The socket API provides the interface to the implementations of The Socket API provides the interface to the implementations of TCP and UDP (typically implemented in the system's kernel). TCP and UDP in the kernel send and receive data over the available"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-5a7b6ff7386934b18422b068146288c52dca3922b4fa9db2d90b9202bff44410","text":"and QUICv1 QUIC use 0x0304. Note that this means future versions of TLS will increase the number of PSKs derived from an external PSK. An Imported PSK derived from an EPSK with base key 'epsk' bound to this identity is then computed as follows: Given an ImportedIdentity and corresponding EPSK with base key \"epsk\", an Imported PSK IPSK with base key \"ipskx\" is computed as follows: L is corresponds to the KDF output length of ImportedIdentity.target_kdf as defined in IANA. For hash-based KDFs, such as HKDF_SHA256(0x0001), this is the length of the hash function output, i.e., 32 octets. This is required for the IPSK to be of length suitable for supported ciphersuites. L corresponds to the KDF output length of ImportedIdentity.target_kdf as defined in IANA. For hash-based KDFs, such as HKDF_SHA256(0x0001), this is the length of the hash function output, i.e., 32 octets. This is required for the IPSK to be of length suitable for supported ciphersuites. The identity of 'ipskx' as sent on the wire is ImportedIdentity, The identity of \"ipskx\" as sent on the wire is ImportedIdentity, i.e., the serialized content of ImportedIdentity is used as the content of PskIdentity.identity in the PSK extension. content of PskIdentity.identity in the PSK extension. The corresponding TLS 1.3 binder key is \"ipskx\". The hash function used for HKDF RFC5869 is that which is associated with the EPSK. It is not the hash function associated with"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-5aad30e3ec984a6c0cc741139a823b5605613b235a8733750cfad2fd7f26468a","text":"but be operated by an attacker that is trying to observe or modify user queries without the knowledge of the client or network. The constraints on validation of Designated Resolvers specified here apply specifically to the automatic discovery mechanisms defined in this documents, which are referred to as Authenticated Discovery and Opportunistic Discovery. Clients MAY use some other mechanism to validate and use Designated Resolvers discovered using the DNS SVCB record. However, use of such an alternate mechanism needs to take into account the attack scenarios detailed here. If the IP address of a Designated Resolver differs from that of an Unencrypted Resolver, clients applying Authenicated Discovery (authenticated) MUST validate that the IP address of the Unencrypted"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-5b1e7f9eb0090f0a6d00cf04c849ac56cab8619795bf0487f243bf0dbfb8748d","text":"In order to maximize interoperability, DNS API clients and DNS API servers MUST support the \"application/dns-message\" media type. Other media types MAY be used as defined by HTTP Content Negotiation (RFC7231 Section 3.4). (RFC7231 Section 3.4). Those media types MUST be flexible enough to express every DNS query that would normally be sent in DNS over UDP (including queries and responses that use DNS extensions, but not those that require multiple responses). 6."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-5b357e45c57fdf14e30083b7ff4da4ad609a598e20ad3709951f223422897941","text":"The Client then generates an HTTP POST request to send to the Issuer, with the TokenRequest as the body. The media type for this request is \"message/token-request\". An example request is shown below, where Nk = 512. is \"application/private-token-request\". An example request is shown below, where Nk = 512. Upon receipt of the request, the Issuer validates the following conditions:"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-5b64add7655a1b110ec8bd487abee6f43f66e8d845663c8f58c4b632bb7e0448","text":"Abstract The organizational separation between the operator of a TLS server and the certificate authority can create limitations. For example, and the certification authority can create limitations. For example, the lifetime of certificates, how they may be used, and the algorithms they support are ultimately determined by the certificate authority. This document describes a mechanism by which operators may delegate their own credentials for use in TLS, without breaking compatibility with clients that do not support this specification. algorithms they support are ultimately determined by the certification authority. This document describes a mechanism by which operators may delegate their own credentials for use in TLS, without breaking compatibility with clients that do not support this specification. 1."}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-5b69914ca1cfa96bc6e9e56680b8bc1da48bc0c9dfe62a76582106fcd953ed34","text":"Any keys presented by the client instance to the AS or RS MUST be validated as part of the request in which they are presented. The type of binding used is indicated by the proof parameter of the key object in key-format. Values defined by this specification are as follows: type of binding used is indicated by the \"proof\" parameter of the key object in key-format. This parameter is formally specified by an object with at least the following member: Individual methods MAY define additional parameters as members in this object. Values for the \"method\" defined by this specification are as follows: Additional proofing methods are defined by IANA. For example, the \"httpsig\" method can be specified with its parameters as: If additional parameters are not required or used for a specific method, the method MAY be passed as a string instead of an object. For example, the \"mtls\" method with no additional parameters could be sent by the client instance as: The AS would map this to the equivalent expanded form as follows: All key binding methods used by this specification MUST cover all relevant portions of the request, including anything that would change the nature of the request, to allow for secure validation of"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-5b8c4df1e732fb02bbbb48092e0d124449d7a3659e04ce7a41c476409357b893","text":"address prefix). An empty redemption context is not bound to any property of the client session. client session. Preventing double spending on tokens requires the origin to keep state associated with the redemption context. The size of this state varies based on the size of the redemption context. For example, double spend state for unique, per-request redemption contexts does only needs to exist within the scope of the request connection or session. In contrast, double spend state for empty redemption contexts must be stored and shared across all requests until token-key expiration or rotation. 2.1.2. Clients can generate multiple tokens from a single TokenChallenge, and cache them for future use. This improves privacy by separating the time of token issuance from the time of token redemption, and also allows clients to avoid any overhead of receiving new tokens via the issuance protocol. Cached tokens can only be redeemed when they match all of the fields in the TokenChallenge: token_type, issuer_name, redemption_context, and origin_info. Clients ought to store cached tokens based on all of these fields, to avoid trying to redeem a token that does not match. Note that each token has a unique client nonce, which is sent in token redemption (redemption). If a client fetches a batch of multiple tokens for future use that are bound to a specific redemption context (the redemption_context in the TokenChallenge was not empty), clients SHOULD discard these tokens upon flushing state such as HTTP cookies COOKIES, or changing networks. Using these tokens in a context that otherwise would not be linkable to the original context could allow the origin to recognize a client. 2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-5c138234e4622a732abe748e56fbf4be0ecc68c1f42c873ba1750f72f2419752","text":"2.3.2.2. A \"wildcard\" selector selects the nodes of all children of an object or array. The order in which the children of an object appear in the A wildcard selector selects the nodes of all children of an object or array. The order in which the children of an object appear in the resultant nodelist is not stipulated, since JSON objects are unordered. Children of an array appear in array order in the resultant nodelist. The \"wildcard\" selector selects nothing from a primitive JSON value The wildcard selector selects nothing from a primitive JSON value (that is, a number, a string, \"true\", \"false\", or \"null\"). 2.3.2.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-5c732ce75e20407cb45349cd7b69f7d0e9bdf726f58aabe01b9b0ff9fcf38fea","text":"12.2. Transport Properties - whether they apply to connections, preconnections, or messages - differ in the way they affect the transport system and protocols exposed through the transport system. The classification proposed below emphasizes two aspects of how properties affect the transport system, so applications know what to expect: Whether properties affect protocols exposed through the transport system (Protocol Properties) or the transport system itself (Control Properties) Whether properties have a clearly defined behavior that is likely to be invariant across implementations and environments (Protocol Properties and Control Properties) or whether the properties are interpreted by the transport system to provide a best effort service that matches the application needs as closely as possible (Intents). [TODO: This section is mostly obsolete due to our consensus on how to structure properties - double-check whether text needs to be moved and delete this section afterwards] 12.2.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-5c7dddc4b5e6ab8ee65ef0cd08b523ae020a7d7e2748edd349f75556d4c9ca9d","text":"17.7. The \"EncryptWithLabel\" function defined in public-key-encryption avoids the risk of confusion between ciphertexts produced for different purposes in different contexts. Each context is assigned a distinct label that is incorporated into the signature. This registry records the labels defined in this document, and allows additional labels to be registered in case extensions add other types of public-key encryption using the same HPKE keys used elsewhere in MLS. Template: Label: The string to be used as the \"Label\" parameter to \"EncryptWithLabel\" Recommended: Same as in Reference: The document where this credential is defined Initial contents: 17.8. The exporter function defined in exporters allows applications to derive key material from the MLS key schedule. Like the TLS exporter RFC8446, the MLS exporter uses a label to distinguish between"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-5cfbefcd01259d7e258f261b784147b57e57dcd11b9dd804ae33afb3bf64a9ef","text":"QUIC permits the use of a generic code in place of a specific error code; see Section 11 of QUIC-TRANSPORT. For TLS alerts, this includes replacing any alert with a generic alert, such as handshake_failure (0x128 in QUIC). Endpoints MAY use a generic error code to avoid possibly exposing confidential information. handshake_failure (0x0128 in QUIC). Endpoints MAY use a generic error code to avoid possibly exposing confidential information. 4.9."}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-5d24e8569827ca64a6c3886d8baab1c109098bd3cba3f064946813fb7464f37d","text":"details about record padding can be found in Section 5.4 and Appendix E.3 of RFC 8446. Finally, endpoints can use the CID to attach arbitrary metadata to each record they receive. This may be used as a mechanism to communicate per-connection information to on-path observers. There is no straightforward way to address this concern with CIDs that contain arbitrary values. Implementations concerned about this aspects SHOULD refuse to use CIDs. Finally, endpoints can use the CID to attach arbitrary per-connection metadata to each record they receive on a given connection. This may be used as a mechanism to communicate per-connection information to on-path observers. There is no straightforward way to address this concern with CIDs that contain arbitrary values. Implementations concerned about this aspect SHOULD refuse to use CIDs. 9."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-5d374c1ca5e150e0bdcff1979dd022637bf0e2856963cc009c8a54f034815824","text":"supported scheme but an invalid value then the server MUST return an error of type \"invalidContact\". If the server wishes to present the client with terms under which the ACME service is to be used, it MUST indicate the URL where such terms can be accessed in the \"terms-of-service\" subfield of the \"meta\" field in the directory object, and the server MUST reject new-account requests that do not have the \"terms-of-service-agreed\" set to \"true\". Clients SHOULD NOT automatically agree to terms by default. Rather, they SHOULD require some user interaction for agreement to terms. The server creates an account and stores the public key used to verify the JWS (i.e., the \"jwk\" element of the JWS header) to authenticate future requests from the account. The server returns this account object in a 201 (Created) response, with the account URL in a Location header field. 7.3.1. If the server already has an account registered with the provided account key, then it MUST return a response with a 200 (OK) status code and provide the URL of that account in the Location header field. This allows a client that has an account key but not the corresponding account URI to recover the account URL. corresponding account URL to recover the account URL. If the server wishes to present the client with terms under which the ACME service is to be used, it MUST indicate the URL where such terms can be accessed in the \"terms-of-service\" subfield of the \"meta\" field in the directory object, and the server MUST reject new-account requests that do not have the \"terms-of-service-agreed\" set to \"true\". Clients SHOULD NOT automatically agree to terms by default. Rather, they SHOULD require some user interaction for agreement to terms. If a client wishes to recover an existing account and does not want a non existing account to be created, then it SHOULD do so by sending a POST request with an empty update. That is, it should send a JWS whose payload is an empty object ({}). 7.3.2. If the client wishes to update this information in the future, it sends a POST request with updated information to the account URL. The server MUST ignore any updates to \"order\" fields or any other fields it does not recognize. fields it does not recognize. If the server accepts the update, it MUST return a response with a 200 (OK) status code and the resulting account object. For example, to update the contact information in the above account, the client could send the following request: 7.3.3. Servers SHOULD NOT respond to GET requests for account resources as these requests are not authenticated. If a client wishes to query the server for information about its account (e.g., to examine the"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-5d72684f16d97712c6c9d36f68308e202753a58d2c21903e050766e5e5944a50","text":"The \"jwk\" and \"kid\" fields are mutually exclusive. Servers MUST reject requests that contain both. For new-reg requests, and for revoke-cert requests authenticated by certificate key, there MUST be a \"jwk\" field. For new-account requests, and for revoke-cert requests authenticated by certificate key, there MUST be a \"jwk\" field. For all other requests, there MUST be a \"kid\" field. This field must contain the account URI received by POSTing to the new-reg resource. contain the account URI received by POSTing to the new-account resource. Note that authentication via signed JWS request bodies implies that GET requests are not authenticated. Servers MUST NOT respond to GET"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-5e0775305d74a462b4d2a66f9d26e51f3f746363744dc23b9df5fc28c0b30d5a","text":"behaviors, and that those behaviors would remain relatively stable in the short term. 6.3. 6.4. The QUIC protocol, developed from a proprietary protocol into an IETF standards-track protocol RFC9000, turns many of the statements made"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-5e6cdd325ff2fcfd23d5c6b814a56b41b871cd4f1f6ef65ba2ba2b5d275a5de8","text":"TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 would yield two PSKs, one for HKDF-SHA256 and another for HKDF-SHA384. In contrast, if TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 are supported, only one derived key is necessary. supported, only one derived key is necessary. Each ciphersuite uniquely identifies the target KDF. Future specifications that change the way the KDF is negotiated will need to update this specification to make clear how target KDFs are determined for the import process. EPSKs MAY be imported before the start of a connection if the target KDFs, protocols, and context string(s) are known a priori. EPSKs MAY also be imported for early data use if they are bound to protocol settings and configurations that would otherwise be required for early data with normal (ticket-based PSK) resumption. Minimally, that means Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation RFC7301, QUIC transport parameters (if used for QUIC), and any other relevant parameters that are negotiated for early data MUST be provisioned alongside these EPSKs. also be imported for early data use if they are bound to the protocol settings and configuration that are required for sending early data. Minimally, that means Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation value RFC7301, QUIC transport parameters (if used for QUIC), and any other relevant parameters that are negotiated for early data MUST be provisioned alongside these EPSKs. 4.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-5ea0346a085b4d8c9a6cfb1ff1cb21cdb1fff7d2ca79dd7978aa2f4c4f9a1f08","text":"6.6. During the handshake, some packet protection keys might not be available when a packet arrives. In particular, Handshake and 0-RTT packets cannot be processed until the Initial packets arrive, and 1-RTT packets cannot be processed until the handshake completes. Endpoints MAY ignore the loss of Handshake, 0-RTT, and 1-RTT packets that might arrive before the peer has packet protection keys to process those packets. available when a packet arrives and the receiver can choose to drop the packet. In particular, Handshake and 0-RTT packets cannot be processed until the Initial packets arrive and 1-RTT packets cannot be processed until the handshake completes. Endpoints MAY ignore the loss of Handshake, 0-RTT, and 1-RTT packets that might have arrived before the peer had packet protection keys to process those packets. Endpoints MUST NOT ignore the loss of packets that were sent after the earliest acknowledged packet in a given packet number space. 6.7."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest-5eca70594ba6850ba0b26b235ba0d0878aa77784e720d03b6d3673f577135563","text":"Connection racing: Happy Eyeballs V2 RFC8305 describes techniques for performing connection racing. The Transport Services Architecture implementation from I-D.ietf-taps-impl also describes how connections may race across interfaces and address families. In cases where clients have early data to send and want to minimize or avoid ticket re-use, unique tickets for each unique connection attempt are useful. Moreover, as some servers may implement single-use tickets (and even session ticket encryption keys), distinct tickets will be needed to prevent premature ticket Architecture implementation from TAPS also describes how connections may race across interfaces and address families. In cases where clients have early data to send and want to minimize or avoid ticket re-use, unique tickets for each unique connection attempt are useful. Moreover, as some servers may implement single-use tickets (and even session ticket encryption keys), distinct tickets will be needed to prevent premature ticket invalidation by racing. Connection priming: In some systems, connections may be primed or"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-5ef232a46176a339f2ec50e1ea23d55cf3a62857c424d9febd45d0155fd7b1e7","text":"Verify the signature on the GroupInfo object. The signature input comprises all of the fields in the GroupInfo object except the signature field. The public key and algorithm are taken from the credential in the leaf node of the member with LeafNodeRef \"signer\". If there is no matching leaf node, or if signature verification fails, return an error. credential in the leaf node of the ratchet tree with leaf index \"signer\". If the node is blank or if signature verification fails, return an error. Verify the integrity of the ratchet tree."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-5f053138412c25826b2f5d18ab593e703a8ca335f43a41e3cd212b5d1bd63bcc","text":"Issuer portrayed in fig-overview can be instantiated and deployed in a number of ways. This section covers some expected deployment models and their corresponding security and privacy considerations. The discussion below assumes non-collusion between entities when operated by separate parties. Mechanisms for enforcing non-collusion are out of scope for this architecture. The discussion below assumes non-collusion between entities that have access to the attestation context and entities that have access to the redemption context, as collusion between such entities would enable linking of these contexts. Generally, this means that entities operated by separate parties do not collude. Mechanisms for enforcing non-collusion are out of scope for this architecture. 4.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-5f10f46f1f7f2674658ef42e9a12efd744b1b5d4fac97591664e129a0d9b7f95","text":"by applications, not the core protocol. The table below is intended only to show the column layout of the registry. 17.8. 17.9. Specification Required RFC8126 registry requests are registered after a three-week review period on the MLS DEs' mailing list: mls-reg-"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-5fab569da75b1c9c7a4d3976e59bf67c1ad808e98d5c99531e30cc97e195ddef","text":"1. The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol was designed for securing connection-less transports, like UDP. DTLS, like TLS, starts with a handshake, which can be computationally demanding (particularly when public key cryptography is used). After a successful handshake, symmetric key cryptography is used to apply The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) RFC6347 protocol was designed for securing connection-less transports, like UDP. DTLS, like TLS, starts with a handshake, which can be computationally demanding (particularly when public key cryptography is used). After a successful handshake, symmetric key cryptography is used to apply data origin authentication, integrity and confidentiality protection. This two-step approach allows endpoints to amortize the cost of the initial handshake across subsequent application data protection. Ideally, the second phase where application data is protected lasts over a longer period of time since the established keys will only need to be updated once the key lifetime expires. over a long period of time since the established keys will only need to be updated once the key lifetime expires. In the current version of DTLS, the IP address and port of the peer In DTLS as specified in RFC 6347, the IP address and port of the peer are used to identify the DTLS association. Unfortunately, in some cases, such as NAT rebinding, these values are insufficient. This is a particular issue in the Internet of Things when devices enter"}
{"_id":"q-en-coap-tcp-tls-5fb513089cf88b15cb57e53287f331aedf57e3d2cdb4b4bff2cb97fe98639e35","text":"can send a CoAP Ping Signaling message (see sec-ping) to test the connection and verify that the CoAP server is responsive. When the underlying TCP connection is closed or reset, the signaling state and any observation state (see observe-cancel) associated with the reliable connection are removed. In flight messages may or may not be lost. 4. CoAP over WebSockets is intentionally similar to CoAP over TCP;"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-5fcc01b7192b7e6a21cbaeefa77238aaae7d62fa0706f82233c9a54cdee32dbd","text":"migrations to attempt to increase the number of simultaneous migrations at a given time, or through other means. 6.3. 7.3. QUIC provides a Server Retry packet that can be sent by a server in response to the Client Initial packet. The server may choose a new"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-600168961db00c1b6ce103e5d1934ba56d52d589e8678465020bf0755568eec9","text":"connection SHOULD fail to allow the application to explicitly handle fallback to a less-secure alternative. See fallback. 10. 11. This work is partially supported by the European Commission under Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 688421 Measurement and Architecture"}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-60672b04b1f5595348309d22b7a6525afb225d95206fb6f6432243000c5deb0b","text":"the future and private curves can be used as well. contains the x coordinate for the EC point. The integer is converted to an octet string as defined in SEC1. Zero octets MUST NOT be removed from the front of the octet string. [CREF21] contains either the sign bit or the value of y coordinate for the EC point. For the value, the integer is converted to an octet string as defined in SEC1. Zero octets MUST NOT be removed from the front of the octet string. For the sign bit, the value is true if the value of y is positive. converted to an octet string use ???. Note that the octet string represents a little-endian encoding of x. [CREF21] contains the private key."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-607b2f6d5bfbd1a6658928018eee3eaf98f714bfe896646b4f7e1afa7d273367","text":"during Connection establishment. This Message can potentially be received multiple times (i.e., multiple copies of the message data may be passed to the Remote Endpoint). See also msg- safelyreplayable. Note that disabling this property has no effect for protocols that are not connection-oriented and do not protect against duplicated messages, e.g., UDP. safelyreplayable. 4.2.6."}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-60b8051e15c63c40a260f269576aa4d426e7e64733416a3ec4d192dde47daa1d","text":"provided. Endpoints MUST NOT have more than one NewConnectionId message outstanding. If the client and server have negotiated use of the \"connection_id\" extension, either side can request a new CID using the RequestConnectionId message. In general, implementations SHOULD use a new CID whenever sending on a new path, and SHOULD request new CIDs for this purpose if path changes are anticipated. Implementations which either did not negotiate the \"connection_id\" extension or which have negotiated receiving an empty CID MUST NOT send NewConnectionId. Implementations MUST NOT send RequestConnectionId when sending an empty connection ID. Implementations which detect a violation of these rules MUST terminate the connection with an \"unexpected_message\" alert. Implementations SHOULD use a new CID whenever sending on a new path, and SHOULD request new CIDs for this purpose if path changes are anticipated. The number of CIDs desired."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-60ccc0bcfb5dbb220683b64251c7e8a88003e1e02f5bf81838d21709c85f8ade","text":"On receiving a PATH_CHALLENGE frame, an endpoint MUST respond by echoing the data contained in the PATH_CHALLENGE frame in a PATH_RESPONSE frame. An endpoint MUST NOT delay transmission of a packet containing a PATH_RESPONSE frame unless constrained by congestion control. PATH_RESPONSE frame. A PATH_RESPONSE frame does not need to be sent on the network path where the PATH_CHALLENGE was received; a PATH_RESPONSE can be sent on any network path. An endpoint MUST NOT delay transmission of a packet containing a PATH_RESPONSE frame unless constrained by congestion control. An endpoint MUST NOT send more than one PATH_RESPONSE frame in response to one PATH_CHALLENGE frame; see retransmission-of-"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-60f0d6b57f2a6e4d67a8c4848e05308b2c0e9ca3b3f8b5b0baafbcf83a88b7e0","text":"Cut and paste the CSR into a CA's web page. Prove ownership of the domain by one of the following methods: Prove ownership of the domain(s) in the CSR by one of the following methods: Put a CA-provided challenge at a specific place on the web server."}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-61056328e37f4dc9063e68bc58649b9398a2acef81f5b2d33b44f55c663d8ba9","text":"appearing in cleartext in a ClientHello. As a result, a passive adversary can link two or more connections together that use the same external PSK on the wire. Applications should take precautions when using external PSKs if these risks are a concern. using external PSKs if these risks. In addition to linkability in the network, external PSKs are intrinsically linkable by PSK receivers. Specifically, servers can"}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-6119c709e3ad4b8d133f94ccc2a4cffb0dfd4f94a855882832840f8b46dda0dd","text":"Let the group of peers who know the key be \"A\", \"B\", and \"C\". The attack proceeds as follows: \"A\" sends a \"ClientHello\" to \"B\", without including a key share. \"A\" sends a \"ClientHello\" to \"B\", without including a key share extension. The handshake completes as expected."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-615e960d44ac08a0eadffde03165649936f44de62cc3967fdc11cbc058f3cc8b","text":"MUST be in the same order. The leader's endpoint MUST be the first in the list. The order of the \"encrypted_input_shares\" in a \"Report\" (see uploading-reports) MUST be the same as the order in which aggregators appear in this list. which aggregators appear in this list. Aggregators MAY use the same endpoint for multiple tasks. \"max_batch_lifetime\": The maximum number of times a batch of reports may be used in collect requests."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-61641e204586f4344ed53a8b298495754b1e5c188f391b2b56e6afd4ca794eb8","text":"17.6. The \"SignWithLabel\" function defined in ciphersuites avoids the risk of confusion between signatures in different contexts. Each context is assigned a distinct label that is incorporated into the signature. The \"SignWithLabel\" function defined in signing avoids the risk of confusion between signatures in different contexts. Each context is assigned a distinct label that is incorporated into the signature. This registry records the labels defined in this document, and allows additional labels to be registered in case extensions add other types of signature using the same signature keys used elsewhere in MLS."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-617169d55b09f038a969a9af15d648cefe5b01a685ffe6e3b08972cacc6d7243","text":"Media servers can provide media streams at various bitrates because the media has been encoded at various bitrates. This is a so-called \"ladder\" of bitrates that can be offered to media players as part of the manifest that describes the media being requested by the media player, so that the media player can select among the available the manifest, so that the media player can select among the available bitrate choices. The media server may also choose to alter which bitrates are made"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-617ddea80240f6508766c8052f54e940d48f57ce4c6f2ab4de4c2600a0ed47ec","text":"lacking a \"server_name\" extension with a fatal \"missing_extension\" alert. Some of these extensions exist only for the client to provide additional data to the server in a backwards-compatible way and thus have no meaning when sent from a server. The client-only extensions defined in this document are: \"signature_algorithms\" & \"supported_groups\". Servers MUST NOT send these extensions. Clients receiving any of these extensions MUST respond with a fatal Servers MUST NOT send the \"signature_algorithms\" extension; if a client receives this extension it MUST respond with a fatal \"unsupported_extension\" alert and close the connection. 9."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-619966af90c05a8d9a81bbe3683b7cd53a86cc11731551c3279c5585809e2bb6","text":"below). The client specifies the cryptographic configuration for the 0-RTT data using the \"configuration\", \"cipher_suite\", and \"extensions\" data using the \"configuration_id\", \"cipher_suite\", and \"extensions\" values. For configurations received in-band (in a previous TLS connection) the client MUST:"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-61d246382488ec0f61361a4c68a7d7a88c8541a4e2e0972d8b94ce36e15eb162","text":"Any identifier of type \"dns\" in a new-order request MAY have a wildcard domain name as its value. A wildcard domain name consists of a single asterisk character followed by a single full stop character (\"_.\") followed by a domain name as defined for use in the Subject Alternate Name Extension by RFC 5280 . An authorization returned by the server for a wildcard domain name identifier MUST NOT include the asterisk and full stop (\"_RFC5280.\") prefix in the authorization identifier value. character (\"*.\") followed by a domain name as defined for use in the Subject Alternate Name Extension by RFC 5280 RFC5280. An authorization returned by the server for a wildcard domain name identifier MUST NOT include the asterisk and full stop (\"*.\") prefix in the authorization identifier value. The elements of the \"authorizations\" and \"identifiers\" array are immutable once set. The server MUST NOT change the contents either"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-61e579c14014e13c836f4c0c2b229d7736faf99b048864ea20578a7570a692c9","text":"the fact that there are applications using HTTP/3 datagrams enabled on this endpoint. 10. 10.1. This document will request IANA to register the following entry in the \"HTTP/3 Frames\" registry: 9. 10.2. 9.1. This document will request IANA to register the following entry in the \"HTTP/3 Settings\" registry: 10.3. 9.2. This document establishes a registry for HTTP capsule type codes. The \"HTTP Capsule Types\" registry governs a 62-bit space."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest-623c523cac64741896a37f50f5de8e86fb0ee3ab5caa02c9277f961707918035","text":"e.g., public key cryptographic operations, avoiding waste is desirable. Decline resumption: Clients may indicate they have no intention of resuming connections by sending a ticket request with count of zero. 3. Clients may indicate to servers their desired number of tickets via the following \"ticket_request\" extension: Clients may indicate to servers their desired number of tickets for a single connection via the following \"ticket_request\" extension: Clients may send this extension in ClientHello. It contains the following structure:"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-6284f510582a3f7feb48588c7132f1a8724569dbdb96dd5388b08b62feb0db13","text":"for detailing what kinds of information are disclosed, and to whom they are exposed. 10. 11. 12. This document does not require any actions by IANA. 12. 13. Special thanks go to David Wooten, Joerg Borchert, Hannes Tschofenig, Laurence Lundblade, Diego Lopez, Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay, Frank Xia,"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-62dc75230e56134f3a98384b75034128ba92f4297a5db94d8fe041ec0531b5d2","text":"elapsed time between the acknowledgements for specific TCP segments from a TCP receiver since TCP octet sequence numbers and acknowledgements for those sequence numbers are carried in the clear, even if the TCP payload itself is encrypted. See tcp-behavior for more information. even if the TCP payload itself is encrypted. See reliable-behavior for more information. As transport protocols evolve to encrypt their transport header fields, one side effect of increasing encryption is the kind of passive monitoring, or even \"performance enhancement\" (RFC3135) that was possible with the older transport protocols (UDP, described in udp-behavior and TCP, described in tcp-behavior) is no longer possible with newer transport protocols such as QUIC (described in quic-behavior). The IETF has specified a \"latency spin bit\" mechanism in Section 17.4 of RFC9000 to allow passive latency unreliable-behavior and TCP, described in reliable-behavior) is no longer possible with newer transport protocols such as QUIC (described in quic-behavior). The IETF has specified a \"latency spin bit\" mechanism in Section 17.4 of RFC9000 to allow passive latency monitoring from observation points on the network path throughout the duration of a connection, but currently chartered work in the IETF is focusing on endpoint monitoring and reporting, rather than on passive"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-62e11640900598a0cb01b66db1040649d2ac125f64ec57885d9df493cdce25f6","text":"Add \"post_handshake_auth\" extension to negotiate post-handshake authentication (*). Shorten labels for HKDF-Expand-Label so that we can fit within one compression block (*). draft-19 Hash context_value input to Exporters (*)"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-taps-transport-security-62edef83c4fccac2499ee39d68961e44f3b9c806de27fdb97bce39eaf335c3a1","text":"Non-exportable: CurveCP 5.3. Record interfaces are the points of interaction between a record protocol and the application, handshake protocol, and transport once in use. Pre-Shared Key Import Either the handshake protocol or the application directly can supply pre-shared keys for the record protocol use for encryption/ decryption and authentication. If the application can supply keys directly, this is considered explicit import; if the handshake protocol traditionally provides the keys directly, it is considered direct import; if the keys can only be shared by the handshake, they are considered non-importable. Explict import: QUIC, ESP Direct import: TLS, DTLS, MinimalT, tcpcrypt, WireGuard Non-importable: CurveCP Encrypt application data The application can send data to the record protocol to encrypt it into a format that can be sent on the underlying transport. The encryption step may require that the application data is treated as a stream or as datagrams, and that the transport to send the encrypted records present a stream or datagram interface. Stream-to-Stream Protocols: TLS, tcpcrypt Datagram-to-Datagram Protocols: DTLS, ESP, SRTP, WireGuard Stream-to-Datagram Protocols: QUIC ((Editor's Note: This depends on the interface QUIC exposes to applications.)) Decrypt application data The application can receive data from its transport to be decrypted using record protocol. The decryption step may require that the incoming transport data is presented as a stream or as datagrams, and that the resulting application data is a stream or datagrams. Stream-to-Stream Protocols: TLS, tcpcrypt Datagram-to-Datagram Protocols: DTLS, ESP, SRTP, WireGuard Datagram-to-Stream Protocols: QUIC ((Editor's Note: This depends on the interface QUIC exposes to applications.)) Key Expiration The record protocol can signal that its keys are expiring due to reaching a time-based deadline, or a use-based deadline (number of"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-63414d5bce6a53a3a8f7457d3eee6dbf0a9a736b10db01effa5e384ea5c9f25c","text":"This document will request IANA to register \"connect-udp\" in the HTTP Upgrade Token Registry maintained at <>. 8.2. This document will request IANA to register \"masque/udp\" in the Well- Known URIs Registry maintained at <>. "}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-635843cbbf1577b35748fa9a99aa05e3820892df91c9147486ef4def1599e3ac","text":"The QUIC transport protocol (QUIC-TRANSPORT) is designed to support HTTP semantics, and its design subsumes many of the features of HTTP/2 (RFC7540). HTTP/2 uses HPACK (RFC7541) for compression of the header and trailer sections. If HPACK were used for HTTP/3 (HTTP3), it would induce head-of-line blocking for field sections due to built-in assumptions of a total ordering across frames on all HTTP/2 (RFC9113). HTTP/2 uses HPACK (RFC7541) for compression of the header and trailer sections. If HPACK were used for HTTP/3 (RFC9114), it would induce head-of-line blocking for field sections due to built-in assumptions of a total ordering across frames on all streams. QPACK reuses core concepts from HPACK, but is redesigned to allow"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-639d80885a7cdf9eb19418a80b36632e35d27e0db3c22c47378476df17a3d226","text":"it describes what is and is not possible with the QUIC transport protocol as defined. This document focuses solely on network management practices that observe traffic on the wire. Replacement of troubleshooting based on observation with active measurement techniques, for example, is therefore out of scope. A more generalized treatment of network management operations on encrypted transports is given in RFC9065. QUIC-specific terminology used in this document is defined in QUIC- TRANSPORT."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-64150fb483cd34b3fcb7acd4e1c3b34cd411eb5e5eb375bce52c381b643ac6fd","text":"4.2.3. The ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule allows an endpoint to communicate to its peer that it is willing to route traffic to a given prefix. This indicates that the sender has an existing route to the prefix, and notifies its peer that if the receiver of the ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule sends IP packets for this prefix in HTTP Datagrams, the sender of the capsule will forward them along its preexisting route. This capsule uses a Capsule Type of 0xfff102. Its value uses the following format: The ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule (see iana-types for the value of the capsule type) allows an endpoint to communicate to its peer that it is willing to route traffic to a set of IP address ranges. This indicates that the sender has an existing route to each address range, and notifies its peer that if the receiver of the ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule sends IP packets for one of these ranges in HTTP Datagrams, the sender of the capsule will forward them along its preexisting route. Any address which is in one of the address ranges can be used as the destination address on IP packets originated by the receiver of this capsule. IP Version of this route advertisement. MUST be either 4 or 6. The ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule contains a sequence of IP Address Ranges. IP address of the advertised route. If the IP Version field has value 4, the IP Address field SHALL have a length of 32 bits. If the IP Version field has value 6, the IP Address field SHALL have a length of 128 bits. IP Version of this range. MUST be either 4 or 6. The number of bits in the IP Address that are used to define the prefix of the advertised route. This MUST be lesser or equal to the length of the IP Address field, in bits. If the prefix length is equal to the length of the IP Address, this route only allows sending packets to a single destination address. If the prefix length is less than the length of the IP address, this route allows sending packets to any destination address that falls within the prefix. Inclusive start and end IP address of the advertised range. If the IP Version field has value 4, these fields SHALL have a length of 32 bits. If the IP Version field has value 6, these fields SHALL have a length of 128 bits. The Start IP Address MUST be strictly lesser than the End IP Address. The Internet Protocol Number for traffic that can be sent to this prefix. If the value is 0, all protocols are allowed. range. If the value is 0, all protocols are allowed. Upon receiving the ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule, an endpoint MAY start routing IP packets in that prefix to its peer. If an endpoint receives multiple ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsules, all of the advertised routes can be used. For example, multiple ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsules are necessary to provide routing to both IPv4 and IPv6 hosts. Routes are removed using ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsules. routing IP packets in these ranges to its peer. 4.2.4. Each ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT contains the full list of address ranges. If multiple ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsules are sent in one direction, each ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule supersedes prior ones. In other words, if a given address range was present in a prior capsule but the most recently received ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule does not contain it, the receiver will consider that range withdrawn. The ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsule allows an endpoint to communicate to its peer that it is not willing to route traffic to a given prefix. This capsule uses a Capsule Type of 0xfff103. Its value uses the following format: If multiple ranges using the same IP protocol were to overlap, some routing table implementations might reject them. To prevent overlap, the ranges are ordered; this places the burden on the sender and makes verification by the receiver much simpler. If an IP Address Range A precedes an IP address range B in the same ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule, they MUST follow these requirements: IP Version of this route withdrawal. MUST be either 4 or 6. IP address of the withdrawn route. If the IP Version field has value 4, the IP Address field SHALL have a length of 32 bits. If the IP Version field has value 6, the IP Address field SHALL have a length of 128 bits. The number of bits in the IP Address that are used to define the prefix of the withdrawn route. This MUST be lesser or equal to the length of the IP Address field, in bits. IP Version of A MUST be lesser or equal than IP Version of B The Internet Protocol Number for traffic for this route. If the value is 0, all protocols are withdrawn for this prefix. If the IP Version of A and B are equal, the IP Protocol of A MUST be lesser or equal than IP Protocol of B. Upon receiving the ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsule, an endpoint MUST stop routing IP packets in that prefix to its peer. Note that this capsule can be reordered with DATAGRAM frames, and therefore an endpoint that receives packets for routes it has rejected MUST NOT treat that as an error. If the IP Version and IP Protocol of A and B are both equal, the End IP Address of A MUST be strictly lesser than the Start IP Address of B. ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT and ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsules are applied in order of receipt: if a prefix is covered by multiple received ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT and/or ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsules, only the last received capsule applies as it supersedes prior ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT and ROUTE_WITHDRAWAL capsules for this prefix. If an endpoint received a ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule that does not meet these requirements, it MUST abort the stream. 5."}
{"_id":"q-en-anima-brski-prm-642c8313c400a1144d12a92926a9a83f7b032b61c03371caf6497fb298c671c9","text":"This is necessary to allow the discovery of pledges by the registrar- agent using mDNS. The list may be provided by administrative means or the registrar agent may get the information via an interaction with the pledge, like scanning of product-serial-number information using a QR code or similar. with the pledge. For instance, RFC9238 describes scanning of a QR code, the product-serial-number would be initialized from the 12N B005 Product Serial Number. According to RFC8995 section 5.3, the domain registrar performs the pledge authorization for bootstrapping within his domain based on the"}
{"_id":"q-en-sframe-6430ce2363425ede0bf6788802e207518e394efffced9fc962c86fd315214288","text":"Secure Frame (SFrame) draft-omara-sframe-01 draft-ietf-sframe-enc-latest Abstract"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-646b25f6ee1aadb1bf2444c1b84272b5f49de329086edbd3455a8febad37a74e","text":"Upon receiving this event, a framer implementation is responsible for performing any necessary transformations and sending the resulting data to the next protocol. Implementations SHOULD ensure that there is a way to pass the original data through without copying to improve data back to the Message Framer, which will in turn send it to the next protocol. Implementations SHOULD ensure that there is a way to pass the original data through without copying to improve performance. To provide an example, a simple protocol that adds a length as a"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-64c81af55c0b1ca5dc4c7ef14a19ef82ed8f0314feb62f83479decdf66791138","text":"When a DTLS implementation receives a handshake message fragment corresponding to the next expected handshake message sequence number, it MUST buffer it until it has the entire handshake message. DTLS implementations MUST be able to handle overlapping fragment ranges. This allows senders to retransmit handshake messages with smaller fragment sizes if the PMTU estimate changes. Senders MUST NOT change handshake message bytes upon retransmission. Receivers MAY check that retransmitted bytes are identical and SHOULD abort the handshake with an \"illegal_parameter\" alert if the value of a byte changes. it MUST process it, either by buffering it until it has the entire handshake message or by processing any in-order portions of the message. DTLS implementations MUST be able to handle overlapping fragment ranges. This allows senders to retransmit handshake messages with smaller fragment sizes if the PMTU estimate changes. Senders MUST NOT change handshake message bytes upon retransmission. Receivers MAY check that retransmitted bytes are identical and SHOULD abort the handshake with an \"illegal_parameter\" alert if the value of a byte changes. Note that as with TLS, multiple handshake messages may be placed in the same DTLS record, provided that there is room and that they are"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-architecture-652abfaf8ced8a98ab71d0c02546f221229c2912784ec17e4c5db3d86164489e","text":"service, defines the types of credentials which may be used in a deployment and provides methods for: Issuing new credentials, Issuing new credentials with a relevant credential lifetime, Validating a credential against a reference identifier, and Validating a credential against a reference identifier, Validating whether or not two credentials represent the same client. client, and Optionally revoking credentials which are no longer authorized. A *Delivery Service*, described fully in delivery-service, provides methods for:"}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-6650d4bc233a1fdf65f8f83cc7fd7cf2d6025f7faf4e14647891e0c0d2a6d0c7","text":"requires negotiation between the two endpoints using a new transport parameter, as specified in nego. This proposal supports the negotiation of either the use of one packet number space for all paths or the use of separate packet number spaces per path. While both approaches are supported by the specification in this version of the document, the intention for the final publication of a multipath extension for QUIC is to choose one option in order to avoid incompatibility. More evaluation and implementation experience is needed to select one approach before final publication. Some discussion about pros and cons can be found here: https://github.com/mirjak/draft-lmbdhk-quic- multipath/blob/master/presentations/PacketNumberSpace_s.pdf As currently defined in this version of the draft the use of multiple packet number spaces requires the use of connection IDs is both directions. Today's deployments often only use destination connection ID when sending packets from the client to the server as this addresses the most important use cases for migration, like NAT rebinding or mobility events. Further discussion and work is required to evaluate if the use of multiple packet number spaces could be supported as well when the connection ID is only present in one direction. This extension uses multiple packet number spaces. When multipath is negotiated, each destination connection ID is linked to a separate packet number space. Using multiple packet number spaces enables direct use of the loss recovery and congestion control mechanisms defined in QUIC-RECOVERY. Some deployments of QUIC use zero-length connection IDs. When a node selects to use zero-length connection IDs, it is not possible to use different connection IDs for distinguishing packets sent to that node over different paths. This extension also specifies a way to use zero-length CID by using the same packet number space on all paths. However, when using the same packet number space on multiple paths, out of order delivery is likely. This causes inflation of the number of acknowledgement ranges and therefore of the the size of ACK frames. Senders that accept to use a single number space on multiple paths when sending to a node using zero-length CID need to take special care to minimize the impact of multipath delivery on loss detection, congestion control, and ECN handling. This proposal specifies algorithms for controlling the size of acknowledgement packets and ECN handling in Section using-zero-length and ecn- handling. This proposal does not cover address discovery and management. Addresses and the actual decision process to setup or tear down paths"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-665c5bc646d8ea73f0eccf8fc4a239837a7e1b30c2b1d494c6cbefe8345edb5e","text":"6. Recall that TLS 1.2 permits computing the TLS PRF with any hash algorithm and PSK. Thus, an EPSK may be used with the same KDF (and underlying HMAC hash algorithm) as TLS 1.3 with importers. However, critically, the derived PSK will not be the same since the importer differentiates the PSK via the identity and target KDF and protocol. Thus, PSKs imported for TLS 1.3 are distinct from those used in TLS 1.2, and thereby avoid cross-protocol collisions. Note that this does not preclude endpoints from using non-imported PSKs for TLS 1.2. Indeed, this is necessary for incremental deployment. Specifically, existing applications using TLS 1.2 with non-imported PSKs can safely enable TLS 1.3 with imported PSKs in clients and servers without interoperability risk. The mechanism defined in this document requires that an EPSK is only ever used as an EPSK and not for any other purpose. In particular, this requirement disallows direct use of the EPSK as a PSK in TLS 1.2. The importer process produces distinct IPSKs derived from the target protocol and KDF, which in turn protects against cross- protocol collisions for protocol versions using this process by ensuring that each IPSK can only be used with one protocol and KDF. This is a distinct contrast to TLS 1.2, where a given PSK might be used with multiple KDFs in different handshakes, and importers are not available. Furthermore, the KDF used in TLS 1.2 might be the same KDF used by the importer mechanism itself. In deployments that already have PSKs provisioned and in use with TLS 1.2, attempting to incrementally deploy the importer mechanism would then result in concurrent use of the already provisioned PSK both directly as a TLS 1.2 PSK and as an EPSK, which in turn could mean that the same KDF and key would be used in two different protocol contexts. There are no known related outputs or security issues that would arise from this arrangement. However, only limited analysis has been done, and as such is not a recommended configuration. However, the benefits of using TLS 1.3 and of using PSK importers may prove sufficiently compelling that existing deployments choose to enable this noncompliant configuration for a brief transition period while new software (using TLS 1.3 and importers) is deployed. Operators are advised to make any such transition period as short as possible. 7."}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-666d9653dbefd1de07a6710fb953a676e1a2854ff8a8ceef9e771e73aea3a3f2","text":"6. Pre-shared Key (PSK) ciphersuites were first specified for TLS in 2005. Now, PSK is an integral part of the TLS version 1.3 specification RFC8446. TLS 1.3 also uses PSKs for session resumption. It distinguishes these resumption PSKs from external PSKs which have been provisioned out-of-band (OOB). Below, we list some example use-cases where pair-wise external PSKs (i.e., external PSKs that are shared between only one server and one client) have been used for authentication in TLS. PSK ciphersuites were first specified for TLS in 2005. Now, PSKs are an integral part of the TLS version 1.3 specification RFC8446. TLS 1.3 also uses PSKs for session resumption. It distinguishes these resumption PSKs from external PSKs which have been provisioned out- of-band (OOB). Below, we list some example use-cases where pair-wise external PSKs (i.e., external PSKs that are shared between only one server and one client) have been used for authentication in TLS. Device-to-device communication with out-of-band synchronized keys. PSKs provisioned out-of-band for communicating with known"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-66ec534e4c9f7a046f905263b0c52e6745eac7deab51bb63f0d7d21f6328bd29","text":"The client verifies the validity of a LeafNode using the following steps: Verify that the credential in the LeafNode is valid according to the authentication service and the client's local policy. These actions MUST be the same regardless of at what point in the protocol the LeafNode is being verified with the following exception: If the LeafNode is an update to another LeafNode, the authentication service MUST additionally validate that the set of identities attested by the credential in the new LeafNode is acceptable relative to the identities attested by the old credential. For example: An Update proposal updates the sender's old LeafNode to a new one A \"resync\" external commit removes the joiner's old LeafNode via a Remove proposal and replaces it with a new one Verify that the credential in the LeafNode is valid as described in credential-validation. Verify that the signature on the LeafNode is valid using \"signature_key\"."}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-66f2906058383ec1a6e28bbcb097b7969dafb29a1d8ff3bc2eb01b76e219e0a3","text":"Please update the \"Media Types\" registry at https://iana.org/assignments/media-types [2] for the media types \"application/ohttp-keys\" (iana-keys), \"message/ohttp-req\" (iana-req), and \"message/ohttp-res\" (iana-res). and \"message/ohttp-res\" (iana-res), following the procedures of RFC6838. Please update the \"HTTP Problem Types\" registry at https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types [3] for the types"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-66f784f1dcc6ca837dd0926db68c19d56c553435dfeb1da440305ead7d605402","text":"4.2.1. DTLS uses an explicit sequence number, rather than an implicit one, carried in the sequence_number field of the record. Sequence numbers are maintained separately for each epoch, with each sequence_number initially being 0 for each epoch. DTLS uses an explicit or partly explicit sequence number, rather than an implicit one, carried in the sequence_number field of the record. Sequence numbers are maintained separately for each epoch, with each sequence_number initially being 0 for each epoch. The epoch number is initially zero and is incremented each time keying material changes and a sender aims to rekey. More details are"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-66f857b7140d650ea3085186b5f0d840a109b16cc3f6b5b6516f55a459460fb7","text":"The Frame Type field uses a variable length integer encoding (see integer-encoding) with one exception. To ensure simple and efficient implementations of frame parsing, a frame type MUST use the shortest possible encoding. Though a two-, four- or eight-byte encoding of the frame types defined in this document is possible, the Frame Type field for these frames is encoded on a single byte. For instance, though 0x4001 is a legitimate two-byte encoding for a variable-length integer with a value of 1, PING frames are always encoded as a single byte with the value 0x01. An endpoint MAY treat the receipt of a frame type that uses a longer encoding than necessary as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. possible encoding. For frame types defined in this document, this means a single-byte encoding, even though it is possible to encode these values as a two-, four- or eight-byte variable length integer. For instance, though 0x4001 is a legitimate two-byte encoding for a variable-length integer with a value of 1, PING frames are always encoded as a single byte with the value 0x01. This rule applies to all current and future QUIC frame types. An endpoint MAY treat the receipt of a frame type that uses a longer encoding than necessary as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. 13."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-675352123da871019d71a1d3568c1b44cf27df2d61c62d35d49e1c3488f0aadd","text":"6. \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" is a List Structured Field STRUCT-FIELD, whose members MUST all be Items of type Integer. Integers MUST be non- negative. Its ABNF is: The \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header field is used to associate one or more datagram flows with an HTTP message. As a simple example using a single flow, the definition of an HTTP method could instruct the client to use its flow ID allocation service to allocate a new flow ID, and then the client will add the \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header field to its request to communicate that value to the server. In this example, the resulting header field could look like: List members are flow ID elements, which can be named or unnamed. One element in the list is allowed to be unnamed, but all but one elements MUST carry a name. The name of an element is encoded in the key of the first parameter of that element (parameters are defined in Section 3.1.2 of STRUCT-FIELD). Each name MUST NOT appear more than once in the list. The value of the first parameter of each named element (whose corresponding key conveys the element name) MUST be of type Boolean and equal to true. The value of the first parameter of the unnamed element MUST NOT be of type Boolean. The ordering of the list does not carry any semantics. For example, an HTTP method that wishes to use four datagram flows for the lifetime of its request stream could look like this: In this example, 42 is the unnamed flow, 44 represents the name \"foo\", 46 represents \"bar\", and 48 represents \"baz\". Note that, since the list ordering does not carry semantics, this example can be equivalently encoded as: Even if a sender attempts to communicate the meaning of a flow before it uses it in an HTTP/3 datagram, it is possible that its peer will receive an HTTP/3 datagram with a flow ID that it does not know as it has not yet received the corresponding \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header field. (For example, this could happen if the QUIC STREAM frame that contains the \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header field is reordered and arrives afer the DATAGRAM frame.) Endpoints MUST NOT treat that scenario as an error; they MUST either silently discard the datagram or buffer it until they receive the \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header field. Distinct HTTP requests MAY refer to the same flow in their respective \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header fields. Note that integer structured fields can only encode values up to 10^15-1, therefore the maximum possible value of an element of the \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header field is lower then the theoretical maximum value of a flow ID which is 2^62-1 due to the QUIC variable length integer encoding. If the flow allocation service of an endpoint runs out of flow ID values lower than 10^15-1, the endpoint MUST fail the flow ID allocation. An HTTP message that carries a \"Datagram-Flow- Id\" header field with a flow ID value above 10^15-1 is malformed (see Section 8.1.2.6 of H2). We can provide DATAGRAM support in HTTP/2 by defining the CAPSULE frame in HTTP/2. 7. We can provide DATAGRAM support in HTTP/1.x by defining its data stream format to a sequence of length-value capsules. HTTP/3 DATAGRAM flows are specific to a given HTTP/3 connection. However, in some cases, an HTTP request may travel across multiple HTTP connections if there are HTTP intermediaries involved; see Section 2.3 of RFC7230. If an intermediary has sent the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with a value of 1 on its client-facing connection, it MUST inspect all HTTP requests from that connection and check for the presence of the \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header field. If the HTTP method of the request is not supported by the intermediary, it MUST remove the \"Datagram- Flow-Id\" header field before forwarding the request. If the intermediary supports the method, it MUST either remove the header field or adhere to the requirements leveraged by that method on intermediaries. If an intermediary has sent the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with a value of 1 on its server-facing connection, it MUST inspect all HTTP responses from that connection and check for the presence of the \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header field. If the HTTP method of the request is not supported by the intermediary, it MUST remove the \"Datagram- Flow-Id\" header field before forwarding the response. If the intermediary supports the method, it MUST either remove the header field or adhere to the requirements leveraged by that method on intermediaries. If an intermediary processes distinct HTTP requests that refer to the same flow ID in their respective \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header fields, it MUST ensure that those requests are routed to the same backend. TODO: Refactor this document into \"HTTP Datagrams\" with definitions for HTTP/1.x, HTTP/2, and HTTP/3. 8. 7. Since this feature requires sending an HTTP/3 Settings parameter, it \"sticks out\". In other words, probing clients can learn whether a"}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-6762a7931e55bd9dc1ef66939efb29a797e219f8303482d781a6b8df72394f3a","text":"of QUIC; i.e., require that clients not use them across multiple version and that servers validate this client requirement. 6.3. 7.3. QUIC version 1 allows sending data from the client to the server during the handshake, by using 0-RTT packets. If a future document"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-676e582274e291f1626df14da9210abba5412ec91bdcd8a19e98cdeca10afc46","text":"client being added to new groups by exhausting all available InitKeys. 15.5. It is possible for a malicious member of a group to \"fragment\" the group by crafting an invalid UpdatePath. Recall that an UpdatePath encrypts a sequence of path secrets to different subtrees of the group's ratchet trees. These path secrets should be derived in a sequence as described in ratchet-tree-evolution, but the UpdatePath syntax allows the sender to encrypt arbitrary, unrelated secrets. The syntax also does not guarantee that the encrypted path secret encrypted for a given node corresponds to the public key provided for that node. Both of these types of corruption will cause processing of a Commit to fail for some members of the group. If the public key for a node does not match the path secret, then the members that decrypt that path secret will reject the commit based on this mismatch. If the path secret sequence is incorrect at some point, then members that can decrypt nodes before that point will compute a different public key for the mismatched node than the one in the UpdatePath, which also causes the Commit to fail. Applications SHOULD provide mechanisms for failed commits to be reported, so that group members who were not able to recognize the error themselves can reject the commit and roll back to a previous state if necessary. Even with such an error reporting mechanism in place, however, it is still possible for members to get locked out of the group by a malformed commit. Since malformed Commits can only be recognized by certain members of the group, in an asynchronous application, it may be the case that all members that could detect a fault in a Commit are offline. In such a case, the Commit will be accepted by the group, and the resulting state possibly used as the basis for further Commits. When the affected members come back online, they will reject the first commit, and thus be unable to catch up with the group. Applications can address this risk by requiring certain members of the group to acknowledge successful processing of a Commit before the group regards the Commit as accepted. The minimum set of acknowledgements necessary to verify that a Commit is well-formed comprises an acknowledgement from one member per node in the UpdatePath, that is, one member from each subtree rooted in the copath node corresponding to the node in the UpdatePath. 16. This document requests the creation of the following new IANA"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-homenet-hna-67a6896670496dfe6abd943898d7f8f8bbbe50a93077e51f5bb34231337901a3","text":"otherwise a resolution with the Public Authoritative Server(s) would be performed. 2) Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to securely address the connectivity disruption independence detailed in RFC7368 section 4.4.1 and 3.7.5. As local lookups are possible in case of network disruption, communications within the home"}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-67b15d3515867f196c3ae8a01950ddec16df2fc1aa100589f45db1cbb27b79b2","text":"The specific IdP protocol which the IdP is using. This is a completely opaque IdP-specific string, but allows an IdP to implement two protocols in parallel. This value may be the empty string. implement multiple protocols in parallel. This value may be the empty string. Each IdP MUST serve its initial entry page (i.e., the one loaded by the IdP proxy) from a RFC5785. The well-known URI for an IdP proxy"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-67d21935fbbed08ed7dbb6b90e8135f8364b80b14d934df1a293e42a52e6793a","text":"filter-selectors enclosing the filter-selector that is directly enclosing the identifier). An existence expression may test the result of a function expression (see fnex). A test expression either tests the existence of a node designated by an embedded query (see extest) or tests the result of a function expression (see fnex). In the latter case, if the function expression is of type \"OptionalBoolean\" or one of its subtypes, it tests whether the result is \"true\"; if the function expression is of type \"OptionalNodes\" or one of its subtypes, it tests whether the result is different from \"Nothing\". Parentheses MAY be used within \"boolean-expr\" for grouping."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-6815d8e1b579783f345e3b933b663513288a86dbc9d2786f80b0d0a9641ac5fb","text":"The argument is a literal primitive value and the defined type of the parameter is \"ValueType\". The argument is a Singular Path or \"filter-path\" (which includes Singular Paths), or a function expression with The argument is a Singular Query or \"filter-query\" (which includes Singular Queries), or a function expression with declared result type \"NodesType\" and the defined type of the parameter is \"NodesType\". Where the declared type of the parameter is not \"NodesType\", a conversion applies."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-683284696e58750faac5ef1774f41edbc652a74f54cf0e2d60c77aa59f939ad6","text":"allow the end of a Message to still be sent. The simpler form of Send that does not take any messageContext is equivalent to passing a default messageContext with not values added. equivalent to passing a default MessageContext with not values added. If an application wants to override Message Properties for a specific message, it can acquire an empty messageContext Object and add all message, it can acquire an empty MessageContext Object and add all desired Message Properties to that Object. It can then reuse the same messageContext Object for sending multiple Messages with the same properties. Parameters may be added to a messageContext object only before the Properties may be added to a MessageContext object only before the context is used for sending. Once a messageContext has been used with a Send call, modifying any of its parameters is invalid. with a Send call, modifying any of its properties is invalid. Message Properties may be inconsistent with the properties of the Protocol Stacks underlying the Connection on which a given Message is"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-6841a671dfb415d5022be86e4e99093a074a49221b5c0edb7c562968c7a42a39","text":"\"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. All TLS notation comes from RFC8446; Section 3. as shown here. All TLS notation comes from RFC8446, Section 3. 3."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-6844f16f3e4eb96a4138cfedd1b28422bc38662d10efbca8c00018261ca72ffc","text":"applications adopt this interface, they will benefit from a wide set of transport features that can evolve over time, and ensure that the system providing the interface can optimize its behavior based on the application requirements and network conditions. application requirements and network conditions, without requiring a change to the application. Further, this flexibility does not only enable faster deployment of new feature and protocols, it can also support applications with racing and fallback mechanisms which today usually need to be implemented in each application separately. This document is developed in parallel with the specification of the Transport Services API I-D.ietf-taps-interface and Implementation I- D.ietf-taps-impl documents. D.ietf-taps-impl documents. Although following the Transport Services Architecture does of course not mean that all APIs and implementations have to be identical, agreeing on a common minimal set of features and representing them in a similar fashion improves the ability to easily port applications from one system to the another. 1.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-68663317687a816078443a63e7989941f02cb50d0fc8d85f8ec4cf97b34d3f0c","text":"maintain backwards compatibility. However, this document does provide additional guidance on authentication, authorization, and resumption for EAP-TLS regardless of the underlying TLS version used. This document only describes differences compared to RFC5216. All message flow are example message flows specific to TLS 1.3 and do not apply to TLS 1.2. Since EAP-TLS couples the TLS handshake state machine with the EAP state machine it is possible that new versions of TLS will cause incompatibilities that introduce failures or security issues if they are not carefully integrated into the EAP-TLS protocol. Therefore, implementations MUST limit the maximum TLS version they use to 1.3, unless later versions are explicitly enabled by the administrator. This document only describes differences compared to RFC5216. When EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3, some references are updated as specified in updateref. All message flow are example message flows specific to TLS 1.3 and do not apply to TLS 1.2. Since EAP-TLS couples the TLS handshake state machine with the EAP state machine it is possible that new versions of TLS will cause incompatibilities that introduce failures or security issues if they are not carefully integrated into the EAP-TLS protocol. Therefore, implementations MUST limit the maximum TLS version they use to 1.3, unless later versions are explicitly enabled by the administrator. This document specifies EAP-TLS 1.3 and does not specify how other TLS-based EAP methods use TLS 1.3. The specification for how other"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-688879e1e9c2249ae7ac053513e252940e845bec7bce10391fa3df203782b100","text":"If the AS determines that the request cannot be issued for any reason, it responds to the client instance with an error message. The error code is one of the following, with additional values available in IANA: [[ See issue #79 [15] ]] 3.7."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-68f5341ec1a72a0579538a2edd7c01da1703c71ef0ba749e2b9e987bdcbb9fb9","text":"8.2. The following entry is added to the \"HTTP/3 Settings\" registry The following entries are added to the \"HTTP/3 Settings\" registry established by HTTP3: The \"SETTINGS_ENABLE_WEBTRANSPORT\" parameter indicates that the"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-690bfd0b30625536c5bb330021ec2c8258388793580d8e25b0f5b328e829b1f4","text":"contain all m= sections that were previously bundled, as long as they are still alive, as well as any new m= sections. The \"LS\" groups are generated in the same way as with initial offers. 5.2.3. The createOffer method takes as a parameter an RTCOfferOptions"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-architecture-6971145d9609237e5a1174140cd8353555f70cc31570290faa516d2d4987049e","text":"set of acceptable behavior in a group. These policies must be consistent between deployments for them to interoperate: A policy on which ciphersuites are acceptable. A policy on any mandatory or forbidden MLS extensions. A policy on when to send proposals and commits in plaintext instead of encrypted."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-698338e4441a98d2547a4b3ce5b85fd77656b1b7abd60889206add4d58c1c27b","text":"Interface name (string): Note that an IPv6 address specified with a scope (e.g. \"2001:db8:4920:e29d:a420:7461:7073:0a%en0\") is equivalent to \"WithIPv6Address\" with an unscoped address and \"WithInterface \" together. An Endpoint cannot have multiple identifiers of a same type set. That is, an endpoint cannot have two IP addresses specified. Two separate IP addresses are represented as two Endpoint Objects. If a"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-699e205b5e467d2c2b0389a807beba0ed9c0c249c676eba5a8eb4afade6691c4","text":"tunnel. Along with a successful response, the proxy can send capsules to assign addresses and routes to the client (capsules). The client can also assign addresses and routes to the proxy for network-to-network routing. assign addresses and advertise routes to the client (capsules). The client can also assign addresses and advertise routes to the proxy for network-to-network routing. 4.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-69de4766b96cbdadb8cd5fe239310ca0db76ef984f633c1f8dd98916631cc4c2","text":"In order to parse a received flow of data into Messages, the Message Framer notifies the framer implementation whenever new data is available to parse. available to parse. The parameters to the the events and calls for receiving data with a framer align with the Receive call in the API (Section 9.3 of I-D.ietf-taps-interface). Upon receiving this event, the framer implementation can inspect the inbound data. The data is parsed from a particular cursor"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-69e34fe62bce4d69b1f8dc55220bf60d1709c96d869ff4dbbd411c9d3b2f0644","text":"could also cause issues for valid traffic. The security considerations described in HTTP-DGRAM also apply here. Since it is possible to tunnel IP packets over UDP, the guidance in TUNNEL-SECURITY can apply. 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-6ac9ae8cf64a1b0e3e8677fcd5d6fa1864a2ab925b676128c78b35c2d0f4faa8","text":"5. As QUIC is a general purpose transport protocol, there are no requirements that servers use a particular UDP port for QUIC in general. Instead, the same port number is used as would be used for the same application over TCP. In the case of HTTP the expectation is that port 443 is used, which has already been registered for \"http protocol over TLS/SSL\". However, QUIC-HTTP also specifies the use of Alt-Svc for HTTP/QUIC discovery which allows the server to use and announce a different port number. In general, port numbers serves two purposes: \"first, they provide a demultiplexing identifier to differentiate transport sessions between the same pair of endpoints, and second, they may also identify the application protocol and associated service to which processes connect\" RFC6335. Note that the assumption that an application can be identified in the network based on the port number is less true today, due to encapsulation, mechanisms for dynamic port assignments as well as NATs. However, whenever a non-standard port is used which does not enable easy mapping to a registered service name, this can lead to blocking by network elements such as firewalls that rely on the port number as a first order of filtering. 6. [EDITOR'S NOTE: give some guidance here about the steps an application should take; however this is still work in progress] 6. 7. QUIC exposes some information to the network in the unencrypted part of the header, either before the encryption context is established,"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-6aeb51a742d0e76d94954e220fa77ab08f035a8e599bc849c4c379c95bdfc654","text":"Connection Identifiers for DTLS 1.2 draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-07 draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-latest Abstract"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-6afb1470fe4aecb8aed780b91014704947f00ef8bfb72e26f2a46cc0f54b4b5d","text":"\"permitted\" (required, boolean): indicates whether or not the Captive Portal is open to the requesting host \"hmac-key\" (required, string): provides a per-host key that can be used to authenticate messages from the Captive Portal enforcement server \"user-portal-url\" (required, string): provides the URL of a web portal that can be presented to a user to interact with"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-6b30c5d9f0d9c664da6f60b651e5ef3efb3f3b679849abdd36ba58945dad3540","text":"The creator of the group constructs an Init message as follows: Fetch a ClientInitKey for each member (including the creator) Fetch one or more ClientInitKeys for each member (including the creator) Identify a protocol version and cipher suite that is supported by all proposed members."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-6b32bbd3465277ccc71336798ad965ecfda73971d5fea9830e89d00c410a0ca6","text":"way in which the same external PSK might produce related output in TLS 1.3 and prior versions, only limited analysis has been done. Applications SHOULD provision separate PSKs for TLS 1.3 and prior versions. versions. In cases where this is not possible, e.g., there are already deployed external PSKs or provisioning is otherwise limited, re-using external PSKs across different versions of TLS may produce related outputs, which may in turn lead to security problems; see RFC8446, Section E.7. To mitigate against any interference, this document specifies a PSK To mitigate against such problems, this document specifies a PSK Importer interface by which external PSKs may be imported and subsequently bound to a specific key derivation function (KDF) and hash function for use in TLS 1.3 RFC8446 and DTLS 1.3 DTLS13. In"}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-6b85e92abfbae668832e7ab20e500d04b97c6cb7885d28bb939ff1145d67af97","text":"version negotiation to negotiate versions other than QUIC version 1 will need to implement this draft. 8. 9. The security of this version negotiation mechanism relies on the authenticity of the Version Information exchanged during the"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-6bac084638306fca94d4f25823e665c7b18213a696b1a7c8c3bdc9cd7b4665d7","text":"stream by instructing QUIC to send a FIN bit in a STREAM frame. It cannot gracefully close the ingress direction without a peer- generated FIN, much like in TCP. However, an endpoint can abruptly close either the ingress or egress direction; these actions are fully independent of each other. close the egress direction or request that its peer abruptly close the ingress direction; these actions are fully independent of each other. QUIC does not provide an interface for exceptional handling of any stream. If a stream that is critical for an application is closed,"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-6bb1d9681fbf645da80b1a56f0e42cd01fb68857eec4546524e67bfd2d5cac6a","text":"of broken connections where only very small packets are sent; such failures might only be detected by other means, such as timers. 10.4. The closing and draining connection states exist to ensure that connections close cleanly and that delayed or reordered packets are properly discarded. These states SHOULD persist for at least three times the current Probe Timeout (PTO) interval as defined in QUIC- RECOVERY. An endpoint enters a closing period after initiating an immediate close; immediate-close. While closing, an endpoint MUST NOT send packets unless they contain a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame; see immediate- close for details. An endpoint retains only enough information to generate a packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame and to identify packets as belonging to the connection. The endpoint's selected connection ID and the QUIC version are sufficient information to identify packets for a closing connection; an endpoint can discard all other connection state. An endpoint MAY retain packet protection keys for incoming packets to allow it to read and process a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. The draining state is entered once an endpoint receives a signal that its peer is closing or draining. While otherwise identical to the closing state, an endpoint in the draining state MUST NOT send any packets. Retaining packet protection keys is unnecessary once a connection is in the draining state. An endpoint MAY transition from the closing period to the draining period if it receives a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame or stateless reset, both of which indicate that the peer is also closing or draining. The draining period SHOULD end when the closing period would have ended. In other words, the endpoint can use the same end time, but cease retransmission of the closing packet. Disposing of connection state prior to the end of the closing or draining period could cause delayed or reordered packets to generate an unnecessary stateless reset. Endpoints that have some alternative means to ensure that late-arriving packets on the connection do not induce a response, such as those that are able to close the UDP socket, MAY use an abbreviated draining period to allow for faster resource recovery. Servers that retain an open socket for accepting new connections SHOULD NOT exit the closing or draining period early. Once the closing or draining period has ended, an endpoint SHOULD discard all connection state. This results in new packets on the connection being handled generically. For instance, an endpoint MAY send a stateless reset in response to any further incoming packets. The draining and closing periods do not apply when a stateless reset (stateless-reset) is sent. An endpoint is not expected to handle key updates when it is closing or draining. A key update might prevent the endpoint from moving from the closing state to draining, but it otherwise has no impact. While in the closing period, an endpoint could receive packets from a new source address, indicating a connection migration; migration. An endpoint in the closing state MUST strictly limit the number of packets it sends to this new address until the address is validated; see migrate-validate. A server in the closing state MAY instead choose to discard packets received from a new source address. 11. An endpoint that detects an error SHOULD signal the existence of that"}
{"_id":"q-en-using-github-6bce98b91bab1aa2a9e17634c94485640fa4d691288bc0600acbecbbf5040c0d","text":"to all repositories and ownership does not grant any other significant privileges. When Area Directors or Working Group Chairs change, teams MUST be updated to reflect the new membership status. When a Working Group is closed, the responsible Area Director is responsible for removing existing members from teams in the organization. Repositories MUST be updated along to indicate that they are no longer under development. Details about creating organizations adhering to these guidelines can be found in GIT-CONFIG. 2.2. When an IETF Working Group is closed or when associated mailing lists are closed, mail archives and datatracker information from that work is backed up and accessible. The same applies to GitHub repositories. Any repositories including issues and discussion SHOULD be backed up on IETF resources. It is desirable for those to be accessible via the Working Group's datatracker page. For example, this might be via URLs listed in the More Info section on the Working Group Charter page. The IETF MAY decide to backup information associated with a Working Group's organization periodically. This decision can be made differently per Working Group in consultation with the responsible Area Director. 2.3. Each Working Group MAY set its own policy as to whether and how it uses GitHub. It is important that occasional participants in the WG and others accustomed to IETF tools be able to determine this and"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-6c1152a0517efa733b751061382c3b095d03a068180ddec0e8afe979980d64ec","text":"The number of bits in the IP Address that are used to define the prefix that is being assigned. This MUST be less than or equal to the length of the IP Address field, in bits. If the prefix length is equal to the length of the IP Address, the endpoint is only allowed to send packets from a single source address. If the prefix length is less than the length of the IP address, the endpoint is allowed to send packets from any source address that falls within the prefix. is equal to the length of the IP Address, the receiver of this capsule is only allowed to send packets from a single source address. If the prefix length is less than the length of the IP address, the receiver of this capsule is allowed to send packets from any source address that falls within the prefix. If an endpoint receives multiple ADDRESS_ASSIGN capsules, all of the assigned addresses or prefixes can be used. For example, multiple"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-6c331247a5354b578ad4c49cf4f28793cccfe55238a29794340d1d928d97e584","text":"10.1. The configuration of a group imposes certain requirements on clients in the group. At a minimum, all members of the group need to support the ciphersuite and protocol version in use. Additional requirements can be imposed by including a \"required_capabilities\" extension in the GroupContext. This extension lists the extensions and proposal types that must be supported by all members of the group. For new members, it is enforced by existing members during the application of Add commits. Existing members should of course be in compliance already. In order to ensure this continues to be the case even as the group's extensions can be updated, a GroupContextExtensions proposal is invalid if it contains a \"required_capabilities\" extension that requires capabililities not supported by all current members. 10.2. A new group may be tied to an already existing group for the purpose of re-initializing the existing group, or to branch into a sub-group. Re-initializing an existing group may be used, for example, to"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-6c450be9f642eaf9e997aac9f4d6f99bcffe529a03f734c227e97cbce36c9912","text":"3. [[ RFC Editor: Please remove this entire section before publication. ]] The protocol described here bases its design on the following protocol requirements:"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-6c47a1d7e96a5d568433a0a269698d8e04b5a29e1637f97f46ba44d37cd1afb7","text":"MSL: Maximum Segment Lifetime The reader is assumed to be familiar with the TLS 1.3 specification. As in TLS 1.3 the HelloRetryRequest has the same format as a ServerHello message but for convenience we use the term HelloRetryRequest throughout this document as if it were a distinct message. The reader is assumed to be familiar with TLS13. As in TLS 1.3, the HelloRetryRequest has the same format as a ServerHello message, but for convenience we use the term HelloRetryRequest throughout this document as if it were a distinct message. The reader is also assumed to be familiar with I-D.ietf-tls-dtls- connection-id as this document applies the CID functionality to DTLS"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-6c82b88b137e99e8f80c5c3d177abee4ea8b5c4fae3546fbe6d4ed80655cdb04","text":"produces a single ciphertext output from AEAD encryption (aligning with RFC5116), as opposed to a separate ciphertext and tag. Ciphersuites are represented with the CipherSuite type. HPKE public keys are opaque values in a format defined by the underlying protocol (see the Cryptographic Dependencies section of the HPKE specification for more information). Ciphersuites are represented with the CipherSuite type. The ciphersuites are defined in mls-ciphersuites. The signature algorithm specified in the ciphersuite is the mandatory algorithm to be used for signatures in FramedContentAuthData and the tree signatures. It MUST be the same as the signature algorithm specified in the credentials in the leaves of the tree (including the leaf node information in KeyPackages used to add new members). 5.1.1. Like HPKE public keys, signature public keys are represented as opaque values in a format defined by the ciphersuite's signature scheme. HPKE public keys are opaque values in a format defined by the underlying protocol (see the Cryptographic Dependencies section of the HPKE specification for more information). Signature public keys are likewise represented as opaque values in a format defined by the ciphersuite's signature scheme. For ciphersuites using Ed25519 or Ed448 signature schemes, the public key is in the format specified in RFC8032. For ciphersuites using"}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-6c9a1c40fae0caa84b4aeedf71e2c7d7a3497f8fe0a33480c8caa235a8ebe0bf","text":"The salt used to derive Initial keys in QUIC-TLS changes to: This is the first 20 bytes of the sha256sum of \"QUICv2 salt\". 3.3.2. The labels used in QUIC-TLS to derive packet protection keys"}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-6d092d43bc1d08c815b614f304d103681a959bf597a70fd01afc58638e791765","text":"NOT be permitted to control the local ufrag and password, though it of course knows it. While continuing consent is required, that ICE RFC5245; Section 10 keepalives STUN Binding Indications are one-way and therefore not sufficient. The current WG consensus is to use ICE Binding Requests for continuing consent freshness. ICE already requires that implementations respond to such requests, so this approach is maximally compatible. A separate document will profile the ICE timers to be used; see I-D.muthu-behave-consent-freshness. While continuing consent is required, the ICE RFC5245; Section 10 keepalives use STUN Binding Indications which are one-way and therefore not sufficient. The current WG consensus is to use ICE Binding Requests for continuing consent freshness. ICE already requires that implementations respond to such requests, so this approach is maximally compatible. A separate document will profile the ICE timers to be used; see I-D.muthu-behave-consent-freshness. 5.4."}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-6d10f9b5d3b7ee2e5b97584fbb1594b19b4254c78d45b0bf4a27ad6d81b5df00","text":"To avoid this, the configuration agent SHOULD issue QUIC-LB configurations to mutually distrustful servers that have different keys (for the block cipher or stream cipher algorithms) or routing masks and divisors (for the obfuscated algorithm). The load balancers can distinguish these configurations by external IP address, or by assigning different values to the config rotation bits (config-rotation). Note that either solution has a privay impact; see multiple-configs. keys for encryption algorithms. The load balancers can distinguish these configurations by external IP address, or by assigning different values to the config rotation bits (config-rotation). Note that either solution has a privacy impact; see multiple-configs. These techniques are not necessary for the plaintext algorithm, as it does not attempt to conceal the server ID."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-6d1b8dd64d0875dbc936727c85d8ef0328e95ebfeaed1566b32d63adaafb4d3e","text":"Certificate Types marked as \"Yes\" are those allocated via Standards Track RFCs. Certificate Types marked as \"No\" are not. If an item is not marked as recommended it does not necessarily mean that it is flawed; rather, it indicates that either the item has not been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases. IANA [SHALL update/has updated] the reference for this registry to also refer this document."}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-6d1d7c595c246e5b0028b15d680111f3b2918a91845363451938780e70b1604e","text":"endpoint: Either the client or server of the connection. epoch: one set of cryptographic keys used for encryption and decryption. handshake: An initial negotiation between client and server that establishes the parameters of the connection."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-6d3821b1efe3da501f90216393aca214fee02cdc357423d689934f033526af17","text":"on KeyUpdate messages sent using 1-RTT encryption keys. Endpoints MUST NOT send a TLS KeyUpdate message. Endpoints MUST treat the receipt of a TLS KeyUpdate message as a connection error of type 0x10a, equivalent to a fatal TLS alert of unexpected_message; see 0x010a, equivalent to a fatal TLS alert of unexpected_message; see tls-errors. ex-key-update shows a key update process, where the initial set of"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-6d4e39749c03dc0da45365bbee19dcf22b730e7d768e66aaa1e9c8b2bd906d38","text":"value in the challenge. The client's response to this challenge indicates its agreement to this challenge in particular, and whether it would prefer for the validation request to be sent over TLS: this challenge: The string \"simpleHttp\" The \"token\" value from the authorized key object in the challenge. If this attribute is present and set to \"false\", the server will perform its validation check over unencrypted HTTP (on port 80) rather than over HTTPS. Otherwise the check will be done over HTTPS, on port 443. On receiving a response, the server MUST verify that the \"token\" value in the response matches the \"token\" field in the authorized key object in the challenge. If they do not match, then the server MUST"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mptcp-rfc6824bis-6dd32cf3930220a173d116578038ed277a86ae69dac40af1aeb22b03324fcb17","text":"3.5. Regular TCP has the means of sending a reset (RST) signal to abruptly close a connection. With MPTCP, the RST only has the scope of the subflow and will only close the concerned subflow but not affect the remaining subflows. MPTCP's connection will stay alive at the data level, in order to permit break-before-make handover between close a connection. With MPTCP, a regular RST only has the scope of the subflow and will only close the concerned subflow but not affect the remaining subflows. MPTCP's connection will stay alive at the data level, in order to permit break-before-make handover between subflows. It is therefore necessary to provide an MPTCP-level \"reset\" to allow the abrupt closure of the whole MPTCP connection, and this is the MP_FASTCLOSE option."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-6e22862133752596622f090ff15e7ae5dc2dcf31b3d7ba847fb69a82adb905bb","text":"The ciphertext content is encoded using the MLSCiphertextContent structure. The \"padding\" field is set by the sender, by first encoding the content (via the \"select\") and the \"auth\" field, then appending the chosen number of zero bytes. A receiver identifies the padding field in a plaintext decoded from \"MLSCiphertext.ciphertext\" by first decoding the content and the \"auth\" field; then the \"padding\" field comprises any remaining octets of plaintext. The \"padding\" field MUST be filled with all zero bytes. A receiver MUST verify that there are no non-zero bytes in the \"padding\" field, and if this check fails, the enclosing MLSCiphertext MUST be rejected as malformed. In the MLS key schedule, the sender creates two distinct key ratchets for handshake and application messages for each member of the group. When encrypting a message, the sender looks at the ratchets it"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-6e357ceec006b9170327ab72ae1f26886fc42ea1ea7730ab54d070e48156c085","text":"SignatureAlgorithm registries to also refer to this document. [SHALL update/has updated] the TLS HashAlgorithm Registry to list values 7-223 as \"Reserved\" and the TLS SignatureAlgorithm registry to list values 4-223 as \"Reserved\". values 7 and 9-223 as \"Reserved\" and the TLS SignatureAlgorithm registry to list values 4-6 and 9-223 as \"Reserved\". Despite the fact that the HashAlgorithm and SignatureAlgorithm registries are orphaned, it is still important to warn implementers"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-6e3d3ac00b413ab190d4a992d69172c042d5edeede754cbe30d94cfc4014e5e0","text":"references. Like all search criteria, on a resource lookup it can match the target reference of the resource link itself, but also the registration resource of the endpoint that registered it, or any group resource that endpoint is contained in. group resource that endpoint is contained in. Queries for resource link targets MUST be in absolute form and are matched against a resolved link target. Queries for groups and endpoints SHOULD be expressed in path-absolute form if possible and MUST be expressed in absolute form otherwise; the RD SHOULD recognize either. Clients that are interested in a lookup result repeatedly or continuously can use mechanisms like ETag caching, resource"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-6ee8516c9249899910f273aee142cdc7708f679b7aeef5b27d02d20d2bca2396","text":"To request authorization for an identifier, the client sends a POST request to the new-authorization resource specifying the identifier for which authorization is being requested and how the server should behave with respect to existing authorizations for this identifier. for which authorization is being requested. The identifier that the account is authorized to represent:"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-6f582dca02ba912bdcb85d784ca89798893236b90923dd2e2a5beffa440c6c0f","text":"4.4.2. Upon receipt of a QUIC packet that is not of type Initial or 0-RTT, the load balancer extracts as many of the earliest octets from the destination connection ID as necessary to match the nonce length. The server ID immediately follows. Upon receipt of a QUIC packet, the load balancer extracts as many of the earliest octets from the destination connection ID as necessary to match the nonce length. The server ID immediately follows. The load balancer decrypts the nonce and the server ID using the following three pass algorithm:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-6f86d58bad4c14c22b751d20517bf0b2c4bc48ffd1041082a95f5ee33c47d34f","text":"connection error of type H3_DATAGRAM_ERROR. HTTP/3 Datagrams MUST NOT be sent unless the corresponding stream's send side is open. Once the receive side of a stream is closed, incoming datagrams for this stream are no longer expected so related state can be released. State MAY be kept for a short time to account for reordering. Once the state is released, the received associated datagrams MUST be silently dropped. send side is open. If a datagram is received after the corresponding stream's receive side is closed, the received datagrams MUST be silently dropped. If an HTTP/3 datagram is received and its Quarter Stream ID maps to a stream that has not yet been created, the receiver SHALL either drop"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-6f8c20e5b73bb9896d5ad8aa6f4cf93a1f3d95aaafc821f3bddf2dd0da97ba2d","text":"13.1.7. An AppAck proposal is used to acknowledge receipt of application messages. Though this information implies no change to the group, it is structured as a Proposal message so that it is included in the group's transcript by being included in Commit messages. An AppAck proposal represents a set of messages received by the sender in the current epoch. Messages are represented by the \"sender\" and \"generation\" values in the MLSCiphertext for the message. Each MessageRange represents receipt of a span of messages whose \"generation\" values form a continuous range from \"first_generation\" to \"last_generation\", inclusive. AppAck proposals are sent as a guard against the Delivery Service dropping application messages. The sequential nature of the \"generation\" field provides a degree of loss detection, since gaps in the \"generation\" sequence indicate dropped messages. AppAck completes this story by addressing the scenario where the Delivery Service drops all messages after a certain point, so that a later generation is never observed. Obviously, there is a risk that AppAck messages could be suppressed as well, but their inclusion in the transcript means that if they are suppressed then the group cannot advance at all. The schedule on which sending AppAck proposals are sent is up to the application, and determines which cases of loss/suppression are detected. For example: The application might have the committer include an AppAck proposal whenever a Commit is sent, so that other members could know when one of their messages did not reach the committer. The application could have a client send an AppAck whenever an application message is sent, covering all messages received since its last AppAck. This would provide a complete view of any losses experienced by active members. The application could simply have clients send AppAck proposals on a timer, so that all participants' state would be known. An application using AppAck proposals to guard against loss/ suppression of application messages also needs to ensure that AppAck messages and the Commits that reference them are not dropped. One way to do this is to always encrypt Proposal and Commit messages, to make it more difficult for the Delivery Service to recognize which messages contain AppAcks. The application can also have clients enforce an AppAck schedule, reporting loss if an AppAck is not received at the expected time. 13.1.8. A GroupContextExtensions proposal is used to update the list of extensions in the GroupContext for the group."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-7010cedc109db28ba90007e94f82a3790320b0d9e73f9282dfa1d3132d95af1d","text":"signature key depending on the sender's \"sender_type\": \"member\": The signature key contained in the Credential at the leaf with the sender's \"LeafNodeRef\" index indicated by \"leaf_index\" in the ratchet tree. \"external\": The signature key contained in the Credential at the index indicated by the \"sender_index\" in the \"external_senders\" group context extension (see Section external-senders-extension). In this case, the \"content_type\" of the message MUST NOT be \"commit\", since only members of the group or new joiners can send Commit messages. index indicated by \"sender_index\" in the \"external_senders\" group context extension (see Section external-senders-extension). In this case, the \"content_type\" of the message MUST NOT be \"commit\", since only members of the group or new joiners can send Commit messages. \"new_member\": The signature key depends on the \"content_type\":"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-rrc-7041ba5d168a69bae9051dcb071c4c8c1cfc4b22fd55aabc8cfbf045ee681f1c","text":"those datagrams are cryptographically authenticated). On-path adversaries can, in general, pose a harm to connectivity. 7. 8. IANA is requested to allocate an entry to the TLS \"ContentType\" registry, for the \"return_routability_check(TBD2)\" defined in this"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-705e61299a119a897bd524ccd323612e47f5c477d1f9fe7fe324faa2f7d55cf9","text":"If present, \"a=msid\" attributes MUST be parsed as specified in I- D.ietf-mmusic-msid, Section 3.2, and their values stored, ignoring any \"appdata\" field. any \"appdata\" field. If no \"a=msid\" attributes are present, a random msid-id value is generated for a \"default\" MediaStream for the session, if not already present, and this value is stored. Any \"a=imageattr\" attributes MUST be parsed as specified in RFC6236, Section 3, and their values stored."}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-706ad947f7af10d9a33edba7d5b6eda56027fab436de6964880879abd7c126b1","text":"(CID) to the DTLS record layer. The presence of the CID is negotiated via a DTLS extension. Adding a CID to the ciphertext record format presents an opportunity to make other changes to the record format. In keeping with the best practices established by TLS 1.3, the type of the record is encrypted, and a mechanism provided for adding padding to obfuscate the plaintext length. 2. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","}
{"_id":"q-en-capport-wg-architecture-71090c1e45b54ce17bbca92cf7efafd2d81a96c5e625391c585225a9fd7a0063","text":"The User Equipment's access to the outside network continues uninterrupted 4.3. A different Captive Portal API URI could be returned in the following cases: If DHCP is used, a lease renewal/rebind may return a different Captive Portal API URI. If RA is used, a new Captive Portal API URI may be specified in a new RA message received by end user equipment. Whenever a new Portal URI is received by end user equipment, it SHOULD discard the old URI and use the new one for future requests to the API. 5. The authors thank Lorenzo Colitti for providing the majority of the"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-710d6a685919784ee0a2bea30f87abc2a18009d7c37f9a72fe6def4e60576f43","text":"packet is visible to the network. Therefore stream multiplexing is not intended to be used for differentiating streams in terms of network treatment. Application traffic requiring different network treatment SHOULD therefore be carried over different five-tuples treatment should therefore be carried over different five-tuples (i.e. multiple QUIC connections). Given QUIC's ability to send application data in the first RTT of a connection (if a previous connection to the same host has been successfully established to"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-713d7ef10e107c04c75f3663d6bba5041fa869ea012eaa29ade94cf153f13ac3","text":"3.1. [EDITOR'S NOTE: Jana noted at the interim in Paris that we should point out that applications need to be re-thought slightly to get the benefits of zero RTT. Add a little text here to discuss this and why it's worth the effort, before we go straight into the dragons.] A transport protocol that provides 0-RTT connection establishment to recently contacted servers is qualitatively different than one that does not from the point of view of the application using it. Relative tradeoffs between the cost of closing and reopening a connection and trying to keep it open are different; see resumption- v-keepalive. Applications must be slightly rethought in order to make best use of 0-RTT resumption. Most importantly, application operations must be divided into idempotent and non-idempotent operations, as only idempotent operations may appear in 0-RTT packets. This implies that the interface between the application and transport layer exposes idempotence either ecplicitly or implicitly. 3.2. However, data in the frames contained in 0-RTT packets of a such a connection must be treated specially by the application layer. Replay of these packets can cause the data to processed twice. This is further described in HTTP-RETRY. 0-RTT data also does not benefit from perfect forward secrecy (PFS). Applications that cannot treat data that may appear in a 0-RTT connection establishment as idempotent MUST NOT use 0-RTT establishment. For this reason the QUIC transport SHOULD provide an interface for the application to indicate if 0-RTT support is in general desired or a way to indicate whether data is idempotent, and/ or whether PFS is a hard requirement Retransmission or (malicious) replay of data contained in 0-RTT resumption packets could cause the server side to receive two copies of the same data. This is further described in HTTP-RETRY. Data sent during 0-RTT resumption also cannot benefit from perfect forward secrecy (PFS). Data in the first flight sent by the client in a connection established with 0-RTT MUST be idempotent. Applications MUST be designed, and their data MUST be framed, such that multiple reception of idempotent data is recognized as such by the receiverApplications that cannot treat data that may appear in a 0-RTT connection establishment as idempotent MUST NOT use 0-RTT establishment. For this reason the QUIC transport SHOULD provide an interface for the application to indicate if 0-RTT support is in general desired or a way to indicate whether data is idempotent, and/or whether PFS is a hard requirement for the application. 3.3. [EDITOR'S NOTE: guidance/recommendation to us 0-RTT session resumption rather then sending keep-alives?] [EDITOR'S NOTE: see https://github.com/quicwg/ops-drafts/issues/6] 4."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-7183ee4f6b56ec1c6eb23bddbfb5daf8b3dffa0b3508e5dfcb84c8507a48aa56","text":"CONNECTION_CLOSE in response to any UDP datagram that is received. However, an endpoint without the packet protection keys cannot identify and discard invalid packets. To avoid creating an unwitting amplification attack, such endpoints MUST reduce the frequency with which it sends packets containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame. To minimize the state that an endpoint maintains for a closing amplification attack, such endpoints MUST limit the cumulative size of packets containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame to 3 times the cumulative size of the packets that cause those packets to be sent. To minimize the state that an endpoint maintains for a closing connection, endpoints MAY send the exact same packet. Allowing retransmission of a closing packet is an exception to the"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-718f2508526dddd182282a0164520064a941c3744963ca920acb0340ae2d785c","text":"12. Having discussed Transport Properties in connection-props and listed a number of Message Properties (\"Ordered\", \"Idempotent\" etc.) in message-props, we now provide a complete overview of a transport system's defined Transport Properties. Properties are structured in two ways: Having discussed Selection Properties in selection-props, Connection Properties connection-props, and Message Properties (message-props), we now provide a complete overview of a transport system's defined Transport Properties. By how they influence the transport system, which leads to a classification into \"Selection Properties\", \"Protocol Properties\", \"Control Properties\" and \"Intents\". Transport Properties are structured by the phase and object they are applied: - Selection Properties apply to Preconnections - see selection-props - Connections Properties apply to Connections - see connection-props - Messages Properties apply to Messages - see By the object they can be applied to: Preconnections, see connection-props, Connections, see introspection, and Messages, see message-props. Because some properties can be applied or queried on multiple objects, all Transport Properties are organized within a single namespace. All Transport Properties are organized within a single namespace. This enables setting them as defaults in earlier stages and querying them in later stages: - Connections Properties can be set on Preconnections - Message Properties can be set on Preconnections and Connections - The effect of Selection Properties can be queried on Connections and Messages. Note that it is possible for a set of specified Transport Properties to be internally inconsistent, or to be inconsistent with the later"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-71b085f27bb7b1230f62bbf61bcc517793c797e369f208c298d6ea2fbb485fd7","text":"Comparison expressions are available for comparisons between primitive values (that is, numbers, strings, \"true\", \"false\", and \"null\"). These can be obtained via literal values; Singular Paths, \"null\"). These can be obtained via literal values; Singular Queries, each of which selects at most one node the value of which is then used; and function expressions (see fnex) of type \"ValueType\" or \"NodesType\" (see type-conv)."}
{"_id":"q-en-using-github-71b3ad62b9c9b032758ad30131b0de028ef0adfc58c570565468b19d2fdedd7e","text":"Organizations are a way of forming groups of contributors on GitHub. Each Working Group SHOULD create a new organization for the working group. A working group organization SHOULD be named consistently so that it can be found. For instance, the name could be ietf- or ietf- -wg. group. A working group organization SHOULD be named consistently so that it can be found. For instance, the name could be ietf- or ietf--wg. A single organization SHOULD NOT be used for all IETF activity, or all activity within an area. Large organizations create too much"}
{"_id":"q-en-mediatypes-721f3ce5fd8e1bc607a69dc9fad738ffa0a7f140fc37367703e4bb5c5b3a8cf4","text":"Change controller: n/a 3.3. 2.2.2. The following information serves as the registration form for the \"application/openapi+yaml\" media type. Type name: application"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-722f37b14463629bf7e60827e3710e64de62608c325775c042f7996f3d30d172","text":"This alert notifies the recipient that the sender will not send any more messages on this connection. Any data received after a closure alert has been received MUST be ignored. closure alert has been received MUST be ignored. This alert MUST be sent with AlertLevel=warning. This alert notifies the recipient that the sender is canceling the handshake for some reason unrelated to a protocol failure. If a"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-72592accc12c3098d4d6852b9391abbb98f618b72bc567b5f2781d78e6982e20","text":"SHOULD be made accessible through a unified set of calls using the Transport Services API. As a baseline, any Transport Services API SHOULD allow access to the minimal set of features offered by transport protocols RFC8923. transport protocols RFC8923. If that minimal set is updated or expanded in the future, the Transport Services API ought to be extended to match. An application can specify constraints and preferences for the protocols, features, and network interfaces it will use via"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-725a96aa4a40006a0df78b69f94881d1fdb5cf1ba10c13b12d0d25a375e9d7df","text":"6.3.1. A client may wish to change the public key that is associated with a registration, e.g., in order to mitigate the risk of key compromise. To do this, the client first constructs a JSON object representing a request to update the registration: The string \"reg\", indicating an update to the registration. The JWK thumbprint of the new key RFC7638, base64url-encoded registration in order to recover from a key compromise or proactively mitigate the impact of an unnoticed key compromise. The client signs this object with the old key pair and encodes the object and signature as a JWS. The client then sends this JWS to the server in the \"rollover\" field of a request to update the registration. To change the key associate with an account, the client POSTs a key- change object with a \"key\" field containing a JWK representation of the new public key. The JWS of this POST must have two signatures: one signature from the existing key on the account, and one signature from the new key that the client proposes to use. This demonstrates that the client actually has control of the private key corresponding to the new public key. The protected header must contain a JWK field containing the current account key. On receiving a request to the registration URL with the \"rollover\" attribute set, the server MUST perform the following steps: On receiving key-change request, the server MUST perform the following steps in addition to the typical JWS validation: Check that the contents of the \"rollover\" attribute are a valid JWS Check that the JWS protected header container a \"jwk\" field containing a key that matches a currently active account. Check that the \"rollover\" JWS verifies using the account key corresponding to this registration Check that there are exactly two signatures on the JWS. Check that the payload of the JWS is a valid JSON object Check that one of the signatures validates using the account key from (1). Check that the \"resource\" field of the object has the value \"reg\" Check that the \"key\" field contains a well-formed JWK that meets key strength requirements. Check that the \"newKey\" field of the object contains the JWK thumbprint of the account key used to sign the request Check that the \"key\" field is not equivalent to the current account key or any other currently active account key. If all of these checks pass, then the server updates the registration by replacing the old account key with the public key carried in the \"jwk\" header of the request JWS. Check that one of the two signatures on the JWS validates using the JWK from the \"key\" field. If the update was successful, then the server sends a response with status code 200 (OK) and the updated registration object as its body. If the update was not successful, then the server responds with an error status code and a problem document describing the error. If all of these checks pass, then the server updates the corresponding registration by replacing the old account key with the new public key and returns status code 200. Otherwise, the server responds with an error status code and a problem document describing the error. 6.3.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-725e4343afe68a5514124fb6c14be72a81a8d29f477095d91784829879f2ea7d","text":"responds with an error status code and a problem document describing the error. 7.3.4. 7.3.7. A client can deactivate an account by posting a signed update to the server with a status field of \"deactivated.\" Clients may wish to do"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-72a4a987577bb9be43f32a4c684fe98494266a9f1415eb75f2feaad3431384eb","text":"7. The data payload for the application/dns-message media type is a single message of the DNS on-the-wire format defined in section 4.2.1 single message of the DNS on-the-wire format defined in Section 4.2.1 of RFC1035. The format was originally for DNS over UDP. Although RFC1035 says \"Messages carried by UDP are restricted to 512 bytes\", that was later updated by RFC6891. This media type restricts the maximum size of the DNS message to 65535 bytes. Note that the wire format used in this media type is different than the wire format used in RFC7858 (which uses the format defined in section 4.2.2 of in RFC7858 (which uses the format defined in Section 4.2.2 of RFC1035). DoH clients using this media type MAY have one or more EDNS options"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-72d5e425e6bbf316fee5403c9711afc44c1c09f437dfcbfd2e79bc2584c60f3f","text":"The client's TLS ClientHello may contain a Server Name Indication (SNI) RFC6066 extension, by which the client reveals the name of the server it intends to connect to, in order to allow the server to present a certificate based on that name. It may also contain an Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) RFC7301 extension, by which the client exposes the names of application-layer protocols it supports; an observer can deduce that one of those protocols will be used if the connection continues. present a certificate based on that name. SNI information is available to unidirectional observers on the client-to-server path, if present. The TLS ClientHello may also contain an Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) RFC7301 extension, by which the client exposes the names of application-layer protocols it supports; an observer can deduce that one of those protocols will be used if the connection continues. Work is currently underway in the TLS working group to encrypt the contents of the ClientHello in TLS 1.3 TLS-ECH. This would make SNI-"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-730fb8bfb0bef559f14e9df57319ffa54b3a238932fb21c05fa90ef3699e2e17","text":"All SenML Records in a Pack MUST have the same version number. This is typically done by adding a Base Version field to only the first Record in the Pack. Record in the Pack, or by using the default value. Systems reading one of the objects MUST check for the Version field. If this value is a version number larger than the version which the"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-732ed1503712cf414efcc68d82fb8bf1335db4cb0ad44d45fc51f22b422ff369","text":"reordered ack-eliciting packet. This extension modifies this behavior. If an endpoint has not yet received an ACK_FREQUENCY frame, the endpoint immediately acknowledges any subsequent packets that are received out of order, as specified in Section 13.2 of QUIC- TRANSPORT. An endpoint, that receives an ACK_FREQUENCY frame with a Reordering Threshold value other than 0x00, MUST immediately send an ACK frame when the packet number of largest unacknowledged packet since the last detected reordering event exceeds the Reordering Threshold. In order to ensure timely loss detection, the Reordering Threshold provided in the ACK_FREQUENCY frame SHOULD NOT be larger than the re- ordering threshold used by the data sender for loss detection. (Section 18.2 of QUIC-RECOVERY) recommends a default packet threshold for loss detection of 3. An endpoint, that receives an ACK_FREQUENCY frame with a Reordering Threshold value other than 0x00, MUST immediately send an ACK frame when the packet number of largest unacknowledged packet since the last detected reordering event exceeds the Reordering Threshold. If the most recent ACK_FREQUENCY frame received from the peer has a \"Reordering Threshold\" value of 0x00, the endpoint does not make this"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-73323c68e904dd447e0ed28eff052ef15d74fdf31272d51a1143db7a1c5dc4a3","text":"Abstract This memo defines Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP), a method for application layer protection of message exchanges with the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) format. OSCOAP provides end-to-end encryption, integrity and replay protection to CoAP payload, options, and header fields, as well as a secure binding between CoAP request and response messages. The use of OSCOAP is signaled with the CoAP option Object-Security, also defined in this memo. application layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). OSCOAP provides end-to-end encryption, integrity and replay protection to CoAP payload, options, and header fields, as well as a secure message binding. OSCOAP is designed for constrained nodes and networks and can be used across intermediaries and over any layer. The use of OSCOAP is signaled with the CoAP option Object-Security, also defined in this memo. 1. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) RFC7252 is a web application protocol, designed for constrained nodes and networks RFC7228. CoAP specifies the use of proxies for scalability and efficiency. At the same time CoAP references DTLS RFC6347 for security. Proxy operations on CoAP messages require DTLS to be terminated at the proxy. The proxy therefore not only has access to the data required for performing the intended proxy functionality, but is also able to eavesdrop on, or manipulate any part of the CoAP payload and metadata, in transit between client and server. The proxy can also inject, delete, or reorder packages without being protected or detected by DTLS. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a web application protocol, designed for constrained nodes and networks RFC7228. CoAP specifies the use of proxies for scalability and efficiency. At the same time CoAP RFC7252 references DTLS RFC6347 for security. Proxy operations on CoAP messages require DTLS to be terminated at the proxy. The proxy therefore not only has access to the data required for performing the intended proxy functionality, but is also able to eavesdrop on, or manipulate any part of the CoAP payload and metadata, in transit between client and server. The proxy can also inject, delete, or reorder packages without being protected or detected by DTLS. This memo defines Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP), a data object based security protocol, protecting CoAP message exchanges end-to- end, across intermediary nodes. An analysis of end-to-end security for CoAP messages through intermediary nodes is performed in I- D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs, this specification addresses the forwarding case. forwarding case. In addition to the core features defined in RFC7252, OSCOAP supports Observe RFC7641 and Blockwise RFC7959. The solution provides an in-layer security protocol for CoAP which does not depend on underlying layers and is therefore favorable for providing security for \"CoAP over foo\", e.g. CoAP messages passing over both unreliable and reliable transport I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp- tls, CoAP over IEEE 802.15.4 IE I-D.bormann-6lo-coap-802-15-ie. OSCOAP is designed for constrained nodes and networks and provides an in-layer security protocol for CoAP which does not depend on underlying layers. OSCOAP can be used anywhere that CoAP can be used, including unreliable transport RFC7228, reliable transport I- D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls, and non-IP transport I-D.bormann-6lo-coap- 802-15-ie. OSCOAP builds on CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) I-D.ietf- cose-msg, providing end-to-end encryption, integrity, and replay protection. The use of OSCOAP is signaled with the CoAP option Object-Security, also defined in this memo. The solution transforms an unprotected CoAP message into a protected CoAP message in the following way: the unprotected CoAP message is protected by including payload (if present), certain options, and header fields in a COSE object. The message fields that have been encrypted are removed from the message whereas the Object-Security option and the COSE object are added. We call the result the \"protected\" CoAP message. Thus OSCOAP is a security protocol based on the exchange of protected CoAP messages (see oscoap-ex). OSCOAP provides protection of CoAP payload, certain options, and header fields, as well as a secure binding between CoAP request and response messages. OSCOAP provides replay protection, but like DTLS, OSCOAP only provides relative freshness in the sense that the sequence numbers allows a recipient to determine the relative order of messages. For applications having stronger demands on freshness (e.g. control of actuators), OSCOAP needs to be augmented with mechanisms providing absolute freshness I-D.mattsson-core-coap- actuators. cose-msg, providing end-to-end encryption, integrity, replay protection, and secure message binding. The use of OSCOAP is signaled with the CoAP option Object-Security, defined in obj-sec- option-section. OSCOAP provides protection of CoAP payload, certain options, and header fields. The solution transforms an unprotected CoAP message into a protected CoAP message in the following way: the unprotected CoAP message is protected by including payload (if present), certain options, and header fields in a COSE object. The message fields that have been encrypted are removed from the message whereas the Object-Security option and the COSE object are added, see oscoap-ex. OSCOAP may be used in extremely constrained settings, where DTLS cannot be supported. Alternatively, OSCOAP can be combined with"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-733378c7aa62189ac60a86e515ce10ff65e29d62fa36c833293ab91fe510370c","text":"the PTO expiry, subject to address validation limits; see Section 8.1 of QUIC-TRANSPORT. Peers can also use coalesced packets to ensure that each datagram elicits at least one acknowledgement. For example, clients can Endpoints can also use coalesced packets to ensure that each datagram elicits at least one acknowledgement. For example, a client can coalesce an Initial packet containing PING and PADDING frames with a 0-RTT data packet and a server can coalesce an Initial packet containing a PING frame with one or more packets in its first flight."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-734ddbe206d0adcd1e9ca001e066dc64b274e828d66472c5a9fb202e9d61b11a","text":"1.4. This subsection provides a glossary of key terms related to the Transport Services architecture. It provides a simple description of Transport Services architecture. It provides a short description of key terms that are later defined in this document. Application: An entity that uses the transport layer for end-to-"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-73615d57253b931887f22f05bcb140b74e1c9af521d1ecbaa26795e58a9e8611","text":"Contains additional ranges of packets that are alternately not acknowledged (Gap) and acknowledged (ACK Range); see ack-ranges. The three ECN Counts; see ack-ecn-counts. The three ECN counts; see ack-ecn-counts. 19.3.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-73826ea4549cce5668e4f0281e8228e1a23758e138271b9758cccacd64c16aa8","text":"General background and concepts of DetNet can be found in the DetNet Architecture RFC8655. I-D.ietf-detnet-ip specifies the DetNet data plane operation for IP hosts and routers that provide DetNet service to IP encapsulated data. This document focuses on the scenario where DetNet IP nodes are interconnected by a TSN sub-network. RFC8939 specifies the DetNet data plane operation for IP hosts and routers that provide DetNet service to IP encapsulated data. This document focuses on the scenario where DetNet IP nodes are interconnected by a TSN sub-network. The DetNet Architecture decomposes the DetNet related data plane functions into two sub-layers: a service sub-layer and a forwarding sub-layer. The service sub-layer is used to provide DetNet service protection and reordering. The forwarding sub-layer is used to provides congestion protection (low loss, assured latency, and limited reordering). As described in I-D.ietf-detnet-ip no DetNet specific headers are added to support DetNet IP flows, only the forwarding sub-layer functions are supported inside the DetNet domain. Service protection can be provided on a per sub-network basis as shown here for the IEEE802.1 TSN sub-network scenario. limited reordering). As described in RFC8939 no DetNet specific headers are added to support DetNet IP flows, only the forwarding sub-layer functions are supported inside the DetNet domain. Service protection can be provided on a per sub-network basis as shown here for the IEEE802.1 TSN sub-network scenario. 2."}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-bit-grease-73a78a4e0c0ae8cb9e44eafd544a72ee533e266e32b4cb0fa34aede9cad8205c","text":"resulting in connection failures. A server MUST clear the QUIC bit only after processing transport parameters from a client. A server cannot remember that a client parameters from a client. A server MUST NOT remember that a client negotiated the extension in a previous connection and clear the QUIC Bit based on that information. An endpoint cannot clear the QUIC Bit without knowing whether the An endpoint MUST NOT clear the QUIC Bit without knowing whether the peer supports the extension. As Stateless Reset packets (Section 10.3 of QUIC) are only used after a loss of connection state, endpoints are unlikely to be able to clear the QUIC Bit on"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-73b9f4c6ee456ea4e09c5b6a3e5004aa37f154c59fffd50de1c55c18c7e844e9","text":"\"Upgrade\". the request SHALL include a single \"Upgrade\" header with value \"masque-udp\". \"connect-udp\". For example, if the client is configured with URI template \"https://proxy.example.org/{target_host}/{target_port}/\" and wishes"}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-73d545e0425a6f8d213af34f7d9bd86194f725a9625eb8dfb794f68c07cf0f3f","text":"The EDHOC-KeyUpdate takes a context as input to enable binding of the updated PRK_out to some event that triggered the keyUpdate. The Initiator and the Responder need to agree on the context, which can, e.g., be a counter or a pseudorandom number such as a hash. The Initiator and the Responder also need to cache the old PRK_out until it has verfied that the other endpoint has the correct new PRK_out. e.g., be a counter or a pseudorandom number such as a hash. To provide forward secrecy the old PRK_out and derived keys must be deleted as soon as they are not needed. When to delete the old keys and how to verify that they are not needed is up to the application. I-D.ietf-core-oscore-key-update describes key update for OSCORE using EDHOC-KeyUpdate."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-73fb8a7a7fcf92a68ea9443485911de22d9193dae18133cfe353499e483b1373","text":"QUIC carries TLS handshake data in CRYPTO frames, each of which consists of a contiguous block of handshake data identified by an offset and length. Those frames are packaged into QUIC packets and encrypted under the current TLS encryption level. As with TLS over TCP, once TLS handshake data has been delivered to QUIC, it is QUIC's encrypted under the current encryption level. As with TLS over TCP, once TLS handshake data has been delivered to QUIC, it is QUIC's responsibility to deliver it reliably. Each chunk of data that is produced by TLS is associated with the set of keys that TLS is currently using. If QUIC needs to retransmit that data, it MUST use the same keys even if TLS has already updated to newer keys. One important difference between TLS records (used with TCP) and QUIC CRYPTO frames is that in QUIC multiple frames may appear in the same QUIC packet as long as they are associated with the same packet number space. For instance, an endpoint can bundle a Handshake message and an ACK for some Handshake data into the same packet. Each encryption level corresponds to a packet number space. The packet number space that is used determines the semantics of frames. Some frames are prohibited in different packet number spaces; see Section 12.5 of QUIC-TRANSPORT."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-7411d3f9208057a716d4abfa6830d5a6c61d9eb1dc164bd82c13727f4614aea5","text":"An optional reference to a specification that describes the use of the setting. The value of the setting unless otherwise indicated. SHOULD be the most restrictive possible value. The entries in the following table are registered by this document. Additionally, each code of the format \"0x1f * N + 0x21\" for integer"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-edhoc-74157edbff2ed349df9304a7fd1f462a7c924e5f4195d11d1406ebbecc38213d","text":"[ The CoAP option numbers 13 and 21 are both consistent with the properties of the EDHOC Option defined in signalling, and they both properties of the EDHOC Option defined in edhoc-option, and they both allow the EDHOC Option to always result in an overall size of 1 byte. This is because:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-745bc0a2d51a76a6e069cb64e0851a9e37cc42b7068bdc28e4df11118d780a38","text":"D.draft-bormann-jsonpath-iregexp for performance issues in regular expression implementations.) Implementers need to be aware that good average performance is not sufficient as long as an attacker can choose to submit specially crafted JSONPath queries that trigger surprisingly high, possibly exponential, CPU usage. choose to submit specially crafted JSONPath queries or arguments that trigger surprisingly high, possibly exponential, CPU usage or, for example via a naive recursive implementation of the descendant selector, stack overflow. Implementations need to have appropriate resource management to mitigate these attacks. 5.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-749461ed073e3a4fb60d1907853d36094bb57c3fe6d8362098655103e387105d","text":"Message Properties can be set and queried using the Message Context: These Message Properties may be generic properties or protocol- These Message Properties may be generic properties or Protocol- specific Properties. For MessageContexts returned by send Events (see send-events) and"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-7498a9c75bb43e28b206fd667b1cba5d4d5a22e28ee16da0e61628b3707982b2","text":"guaranteed by a digital signature on each message from the sender's signature key. The signature keys held by group members are critical to the security of MLS against active attacks. If a member's signature key is compromised, then an attacker can create KeyPackages impersonating the member; depending on the application, this can then allow the attacker to join the group with the compromised member's identity. For example, if a group has enabled external parties to join via external commits, then an attacker that has compromised a member's signature key could use an external commit to insert themselves into the group - even using a \"resync\"-style external commit to replace the compromised member in the group. Applications can mitigate the risks of signature key compromise using pre-shared keys. If a group requires joiners to know a PSK in addition to authenticating with a credential, then in order to mount an impersonation attack, the attacker would need to compromise the relevant PSK as well as the victim's signature key. The cost of this mitigation is that the application needs some external arrangement that ensures that the legitimate members of the group to have the required PSKs. 15.3. Post-compromise security is provided between epochs by members"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-74c4740d5d7d5b59ec227072090237397e9fbb7ecd8fa86c48aa32bb22ed07a0","text":"connection ID. If the spin bit is enabled for the connection, the endpoint maintains a spin value and sets the spin bit in the short header to the currently stored value when a packet with a short header is sent out. The spin value is initialized to 0 in the endpoint at connection start. Each endpoint also remembers the highest packet number seen from its peer on the connection. When a server receives a short header packet that increments the highest packet number seen by the server from the client, it sets the spin value to be equal to the spin bit in the received packet. When a client receives a short header packet that increments the highest packet number seen by the client from the server, it sets the spin value to the inverse of the spin bit in the received packet. An endpoint resets its spin value to zero when sending the first packet of a given connection with a new connection ID. This reduces the risk that transient spin bit state can be used to link flows across connection migration or ID change. a spin value for each network path and sets the spin bit in the short header to the currently stored value when a packet with a short header is sent on that path. The spin value is initialized to 0 in the endpoint for each network path. Each endpoint also remembers the highest packet number seen from its peer on each path. When a server receives a short header packet that increases the highest packet number seen by the server from the client on a given network path, it sets the spin value for that path to be equal to the spin bit in the received packet. When a client receives a short header packet that increases the highest packet number seen by the client from the server on a given network path, it sets the spin value for that path to the inverse of the spin bit in the received packet. An endpoint resets the spin value for a network path to zero when changing the connection ID being used on that network path. With this mechanism, the server reflects the spin value received, while the client 'spins' it after one RTT. On-path observers can"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-datagram-74d8a37cf5e49b296879422e068324278920a018ab7da17b67297de23cacedc6","text":"integer value (represented as a variable-length integer) that represents the maximum size of a DATAGRAM frame (including the frame type, length, and payload) the endpoint is willing to receive, in bytes. An endpoint that includes this parameter supports the DATAGRAM frame types and is willing to receive such frames on this connection. Endpoints MUST NOT send DATAGRAM frames until they have received the max_datagram_frame_size transport parameter. Endpoints MUST NOT send DATAGRAM frames of size strictly larger than the value of max_datagram_frame_size the endpoint has received from its peer. An endpoint that receives a DATAGRAM frame when it has not sent the max_datagram_frame_size transport parameter MUST terminate the connection with error PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. An endpoint that receives a DATAGRAM frame that is strictly larger than the value it sent in its max_datagram_frame_size transport parameter MUST terminate the connection with error PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. Endpoints that wish to use DATAGRAM frames need to ensure they send a max_datagram_frame_size value sufficient to allow their peer to use them. It is RECOMMENDED to send the value 65535 in the max_datagram_frame_size transport parameter as that indicates to the peer that this endpoint will accept any DATAGRAM frame that fits inside a QUIC packet. bytes. The default for this parameter is 0, which indicates that the endpoint does not support DATAGRAM frames. A value greater than 0 indicates that the endpoint supports the DATAGRAM frame types and is willing to receive such frames on this connection. An endpoint MUST NOT send DATAGRAM frames until it has received the max_datagram_frame_size transport parameter with a non-zero value. An endpoint MUST NOT send DATAGRAM frames that are larger than the max_datagram_frame_size value it has received from its peer. An endpoint that receives a DATAGRAM frame when it has not indicated support via the transport parameter MUST terminate the connection with an error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. Similarly, an endpoint that receives a DATAGRAM frame that is larger than the value it sent in its max_datagram_frame_size transport parameter MUST terminate the connection with an error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. For most uses of DATAGRAM frames, it is RECOMMENDED to send a value of 65535 in the max_datagram_frame_size transport parameter to indicate that this endpoint will accept any DATAGRAM frame that fits inside a QUIC packet. The max_datagram_frame_size transport parameter is a unidirectional limit and indication of support of DATAGRAM frames. Application"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ctls-75c76297e14e13869a39545554bb34ca11ff2d66ff61b37930b33174347564f8","text":"6. 6.1. This document requests that a code point be allocated from the \"TLS ContentType registry. This value must be in the range 0-31 (inclusive). The row to be added in the registry has the following"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-75cc03f30f0ceaaaf67b5ea0d91e7ffca4133496acdca07cdb953db2acf6166e","text":"Error alert message. In earlier versions of TLS, error alerts could be warnings or fatal. In TLS 1.3, error alerts are always fatal and the only alerts sent at warning level are \"close_notify\" and \"user_cancelled\", both of which indicate that the connection is not \"user_canceled\", both of which indicate that the connection is not going to continue normally, see RFC8446. In TLS 1.3 RFC8446, error alerts are not mandatory to send after a"}
{"_id":"q-en-webrtc-http-ingest-protocol-75dadc7edc364ae9c5352e951c64b437974db5f3fa9dbbddfff809d3665228a4","text":"4.2. In the specific case of media ingestion into a streaming service, some assumptions can be made about the server-side which simplifies the WebRTC compliance burden, as detailed in WebRTC-gateway document draft-ietf-rtcweb-gateways. In order to reduce the complexity of implementing WHIP in both clients and media servers, WHIP imposes the following restrictions regarding WebRTC usage:"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-760224885a8720f2ea223114c82decb4e06c00e70c91f81abcb27d159a2f98d1","text":"12.3.16. Protocol Property (Generic) Integer Connection This property specifies the part of the received data that needs to be covered by a checksum. It is given in Bytes. A value of 0 means that no checksum is required, and a special value (e.g., -1) indicates full checksum coverage. Integer Connection Property - see 12.3.17."}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-763ac5c2bd795e8a588a4a06fc0b33bcdf99d35f4d679a01b38d8bc34412b024","text":"threshold, or the quality of RTT or loss rate is becoming worse) and wants to close the initial path. In Figure fig-example-path-close the server's 1-RTT packets use DCID C1, which has a sequence number of 1, for the first path; the client's 1-RTT packets use DCID S2, which has a sequence number of 2. For the second path, the server's 1-RTT packets use DCID C2, which has a sequence number of 2; the client's 1-RTT packets use CID S3, which has a sequence number of 3. Note that two paths use different packet number space. The client initiates the path closure for the path with ID 1 by sending a packet with an PATH_ABANDON frame. When the server received the PATH_ABANDON frame, it also sends an PATH_ABANDON frame in the next packet. Afterwards the connection IDs in both directions can be retired using the RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. fig-example-path-close1 illustrates an example of path closing when both the client and the server use non-zero-length CIDs. For the first path, the server's 1-RTT packets use DCID C1, which has a sequence number of 1; the client's 1-RTT packets use DCID S2, which has a sequence number of 2. For the second path, the server's 1-RTT packets use DCID C2, which has a sequence number of 2; the client's 1-RTT packets use DCID S3, which has a sequence number of 3. Note that the paths use different packet number spaces. In this case, the client is going to close the first path. It identifies the path by the sequence number of the received packet's DCID over that path (path identifier type 0x00), hence using the path_id 1. Optionally, the server confirms the path closure by sending an PATH_ABANDON frame using the sequence number of the received packet's DCID over that path (path identifier type 0x00) as path identifier, which corresponds to the path_id 2. Both the client and the server can close the path after receiving the RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame for that path. fig-example-path-close2 illustrates an example of path closing when the client chooses to receive zero-length CIDs while the server chooses to receive non-zero-length CIDs. Because there is a zero- length CID in one direction, single packet number spaces are used. For the first path, the client's 1-RTT packets use DCID S2, which has a sequence number of 2. For the second path, the client's 1-RTT packets use DCID S3, which has a sequence number of 3. Again, in this case, the client is going to close the first path. Because the client now receives zero-length CID packets, it needs to use path identifier type 0x01, which identifies a path by the DCID sequence number of the packets it sends over that path, and hence, it uses a path_id 2 in its PATH_ABANDON frame. The server SHOULD stop sending new data on the path indicated by the PATH_ABANDON frame after receiving it. However, The client may want to repeat the PATH_ABANDON frame if it sees the server continuing to send data. When the client's PATH_ABANDON frame is acknowledged, it sends out a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame for the CID used on the first path. The server can readily close the first path when it receives the RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame from the client. However, since the client will not receive a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame, after sending out the RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame, the client waits for 3 RTO before closing the path. 11."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-764ca5a1865875201787ff09d7e9d44c2086f01f6eae125e14fb50b4950d60f9","text":"stored or transported, as compared to the less efficient text-based form of the original vocabulary. Through use of CDDL-based integer labels, CoSWID allows for future expansion in subsequent revisions of this specification and through extensions (see model-extension). New constructs can be associated with a new integer index. A deprecated construct can be replaced by a new construct with a new integer index. An implementation can use these integer indexes to identify the construct to parse. The CoSWID Items registry, defined in iana-coswid-items, is used to ensure that new constructs are assigned a unique index value on a first-come, first-served basis. This approach avoids the need to have an explicit CoSWID version. The root of the CDDL specification provided by this document is the rule \"coswid\" (as defined in tagged):"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-7665c04dfd3c64f75dcd1b57cb0bd287fc5b5588991ef258c1fe58e6e1c45e65","text":"5.1. The media type is \"application/dns-udpwireformat\". The body is the DNS on-the-wire format is defined in RFC1035. The body MUST be encoded with base64url RFC4648. Padding characters for base64url MUST NOT be included. DNS on-the-wire format is defined in RFC1035. When using the GET method, the body MUST be encoded with base64url RFC4648. Padding characters for base64url MUST NOT be included. When using the POST method, the body is not encoded. DNS API clients using the DNS wire format MAY have one or more EDNS(0) extensions RFC6891 in the request."}
{"_id":"q-en-coap-tcp-tls-770ca919fa933fa5cc0cd092023e5fd9e8208e4acfcb48198078234eb3ebc5fe","text":"RFC2119. This document assumes that readers are familiar with the terms and concepts that are used in RFC6455 and RFC7252. concepts that are used in RFC6455, RFC7252, and RFC7641. The term \"reliable transport\" only refers to stream-based transport protocols such as TCP."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-7712c78977657775a640604107a957911578c82cb7aca48898a34bc4d7f8e066","text":"5.3. A server operating in Shared Mode uses PaddedServerNameList.sni as if it were the \"server_name\" extension to finish the handshake. It SHOULD pad the Certificate message, via padding at the record layer, such that its length equals the size of the largest possible Certificate (message) covered by the same ESNI key. 5.4. The Hidden Server ignores both the \"encrypted_server_name\" and the \"server_name\" (if any) and completes the handshake as usual. If in Shared Mode, the server will still know the true SNI, and can use it for certificate selection. In Split Mode, it may not know the true SNI and so will generally be configured to use a single certificate SNI and so will generally be configured to use a single certificate. communicating-sni describes a mechanism for communicating the true SNI to the hidden server. [[OPEN ISSUE: Do we want \"encrypted_server_name\" in EE? It's clearer communication, but gets in the way of stock servers.]] SNI to the hidden server. Similar to the Shared Mode behavior, the hidden server in Split Mode SHOULD pad the Certificate message, via padding at the record layer such that its length equals the size of the largest possible Certificate (message) covered by the same ESNI key. [[OPEN ISSUE: Do we want \"encrypted_server_name\" in EE? It's clearer communication, but gets in the way of stock servers.]] 6."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-773f8e28f9ae341ebc32bdc06c12bd5cd59cf513a9c83d8f05af74ca5e8e8397","text":"If the argument is \"Nothing\" or contains multiple nodes, the result is \"Nothing\". Note: a Singular Query may be used anywhere where a ValueType is Note: a singular query may be used anywhere where a ValueType is expected, so there is no need to use the \"value\" function extension with a Singular Query. with a singular query. 2.6.9."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-77472feacc8af25fb043d7e77e6159551d55a39d949c05b83574923c8949c9a8","text":"Specify a Local Endpoint using a STUN server: 6.1.4. 6.1.5. Specify a Local Endpoint using an Any-Source Multicast group to join on a named local interface:"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-783afff200d4a4aedce9a6a726b19846d554b0762708c5e382c4acf2c23e29ba","text":"where Ns is as defined in OPRF, Section 4. The Issuer generates an HTTP response with status code 200 whose body consists of TokenResponse, with the content type set as \"message/ token-response\". consists of TokenResponse, with the content type set as \"application/ private-token-response\". 5.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-7861c3bd950b3c02a5c3be69c1344a3b306717c760e956481764562ede9aceb0","text":"value than what was included in a previous ACK frame could cause ECN to be unnecessarily disabled; see ecn-validation. ack-tracking describes an exemplary approach for determining what packets to acknowledge in each ACK frame. Though the goal of this algorithm is to generate an acknowledgment for every packet that is processed, it is still possible for acknowledgments to be lost. 13.2.4. When a packet containing an ACK frame is sent, the largest acknowledged in that frame may be saved. When a packet containing an ACK frame is acknowledged, the receiver can stop acknowledging packets less than or equal to the largest acknowledged in the sent ACK frame. A receiver that sends only non-ack-eliciting packets, such as ACK frames, might not receive an acknowledgement for a long period of time. This could cause the receiver to maintain state for a large"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-78640cefa5a705fe80a09f1d54485af4ba0338b466dbf2b61713fdf553213794","text":"be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular MLS DE, that MLS DE SHOULD defer to the judgment of the other MLS DEs. 17.9. 17.10. This document registers the \"message/mls\" MIME media type in order to allow other protocols (e.g., HTTP RFC7540) to convey MLS messages."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-787fe3a7dfffbf774ad80ee17ccc90689c251e20f045435defe04d3b0fc3fb21","text":"Claims are assertions that represent characteristics of an Attester's Target Environment. Claims are part Conceptual Message and are, for example, used to appraise the integrity of Attesters via a Verifiers. The other Claims are part of a Conceptual Message and are, for example, used to appraise the integrity of Attesters via Verifiers. The other information elements in this section can be expressed as Claims in any type of Conceptional Messages. _optional_ Event Logs accompany Claims by providing event trails of security- critical events in a system. The primary purpose of Event Logs is to support Claim reproducibility by providing information on how Claims originated. _mandatory_ Reference Values as defined in I-D.ietf-rats-architecture. This"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-78b750e1ba1bade0d3f6c436b17de71fdb50c2a15fae5adcdccd03814735248d","text":"may be using a version of WebTransport extension that is different from the one used by the server. In addition to the setting above, the server MUST send a SETTINGS_MAX_WEBTRANSPORT_SESSIONS parameter indicating the maximum number of concurrent sessions it is willing to receive. The default value for the SETTINGS_MAX_WEBTRANSPORT_SESSIONS parameter is \"0\", meaning that the server is not willing to receive any WebTransport sessions. 3.2. RFC8441 defines an extended CONNECT method in Section 4, enabled by"}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-bit-grease-78b8177a3ccde883ff33088c6a1420390426af0edd56515018dfa4ead7e03153","text":"treat receipt of a non-empty value as a connection error of type TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR. Advertising the grease_quic_bit transport parameter indicates that packets sent to this endpoint MAY set a value of 0 for the QUIC Bit. The QUIC Bit is defined as the second-to-most significant bit of the first byte of QUIC packets (that is, the value 0x40). An endpoint that advertises the grease_quic_bit transport parameter MUST accept packets with the QUIC Bit set to a value of 0. The QUIC Bit is defined as the second-to-most significant bit of the first byte of QUIC packets (that is, the value 0x40). A server MUST respect the value it previously provided for the grease_quic_bit transport parameter if it accepts 0-RTT. A client"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-78c166bdfd711c5daef7d308432332d3214c8b6db1362bf1006b8b9f7dac5ebb","text":"3.4.1. If the ClientHello is not encrypted, it can be derived from the If the ClientHello is not encrypted, SNI can be derived from the client's Initial packet by calculating the Initial secret to decrypt the packet payload and parsing the QUIC CRYPTO Frame containing the TLS ClientHello."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-taps-transport-security-78cb6825890eb6e7fd5b18c6ce487aa9394a34ddc6b5ffc005131331b60a6597","text":"mechanism to allow for such application-specific features and options to be configured or otherwise negotiated. Transport dependency: None. Application dependency: Specification of application-layer features or functionality. Configuration extensions: The protocol negotiation should be extensible with addition of new configuration options. Transport dependency: None. Application dependency: Specification of application-specific extensions. Session caching and management: Sessions should be cacheable to enable reuse and amortize the cost of performing session establishment handshakes. 4.2.2. Transport dependency: None. Connection mobility: Sessions should not be bound to a network connection (or 5-tuple). This allows cryptographic key material and other state information to be reused in the event of a connection change. Examples of this include a NAT rebinding that occurs without a client's knowledge. Application dependency: None. 5. This section describes the interface surface exposed by the security protocols described above, with each interface. Note that not all protocols support each interface. protocols described above. Note that not all protocols support each interface. We partition these interfaces into pre-connection (configuration), connection, and post-connection interfaces. 5.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-78eaf509f18aa447bea192f1b2f4f737aa512d575fa75f6288dfaf530ed00bea","text":"The COSE_encrypt structure for the recipient is organized as follows: The 'protected', 'aad', 'iv', and 'tag' fields all use the 'null' value. At a minimum, the 'unprotected' field SHOULD contain the 'alg' parameter as well as a parameter identifying the asymmetric key. The 'unprotected' field MUST contain the 'epk' parameter. 5.2.5. Key Agreement with Key Wrapping uses a randomly generated CEK. The"}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-790fc4af0bd7d91187030de73580696bd04918d01da9775047013d9c5f5365e3","text":"6. When a client creates a QUIC connection, its goal is to use an application layer protocol. Therefore, when considering which versions are compatible, clients will only consider versions that support one of the intended application layer protocols. If the client's first flight advertises multiple Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) ALPN tokens and multiple compatible versions, it is possible for some application layer protocols to not be able to run over some of the offered compatible versions. It is the server's responsibility to only select an ALPN token that can run over the compatible QUIC version that it selects. A given ALPN token MUST NOT be used with a new QUIC version different from the version for which the ALPN token was originally defined, unless all the following requirements are met: The new QUIC version supports the transport features required by the application protocol. The new QUIC version supports ALPN. The version of QUIC for which the ALPN token was originally defined is compatible with the new QUIC version. When incompatible version negotiation is in use, the second connection which is created in response to the received version negotiation packet MUST restart its application layer protocol negotiation process without taking into account the original version. 7. In order to facilitate the deployment of future versions of QUIC, designers of future versions SHOULD attempt to design their new version such that commonly deployed versions are compatible with it."}
{"_id":"q-en-coap-tcp-tls-79676308f2677de165b3b7caeaa6aa3bbdf9282e7ef1742b5b5b5812ed040b86","text":"the option is sent with a modified value. Its starting value is its base value. 4.3.3. 4.3.2. A sender can use the elective Block-wise Transfer Option to indicate that it supports the block-wise transfer protocol RFC7959."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-799ce8c2c88087ca9600fe192ba4b5d756fcda09ce3a9f8a31c84231f39600e3","text":"The initial contents of this registry are shown in iana-tp-table. Additionally, each value of the format \"31 * N + 27\" for integer values of N (that is, 27, 58, 89, ...) are reserved and MUST NOT be assigned by IANA. Each value of the format \"31 * N + 27\" for integer values of N (that is, 27, 58, 89, ...) are reserved; these values MUST NOT be assigned by IANA and MUST NOT appear in the listing of assigned values. 22.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-79b50da7057046847dd9d1c2d316a1513d7ef525169660639db0f0a47952ca48","text":"4. Packet diagrams in this document use a format defined in QUIC- TRANSPORT to illustrate the order and size of fields. The format of packets is described using the notation defined in this section. This notation is the same as that used in QUIC-TRANSPORT. Complex fields are named and then followed by a list of fields surrounded by a pair of matching braces. Each field in this list is"}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-7a58861d271944364cbd68ea45630525cde6d7974c4c79b917c044f8aab54af2","text":"Time-Sensitive Networking, TSN is a Task Group of the IEEE 802.1 Working Group. 2.3. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. I-D.ietf-detnet-ip describes how IP is used by DetNet nodes, i.e., hosts and routers, to identify DetNet flows and provide a DetNet service. From a data plane perspective, an end-to-end IP model is followed. DetNet uses \"6-tuple\" based flow identification, where \"6-tuple\" refers to information carried in IP and higher layer protocol headers. RFC8939 describes how IP is used by DetNet nodes, i.e., hosts and routers, to identify DetNet flows and provide a DetNet service. From a data plane perspective, an end-to-end IP model is followed. DetNet uses \"6-tuple\" based flow identification, where \"6-tuple\" refers to information carried in IP and higher layer protocol headers. DetNet flow aggregation may be enabled via the use of wildcards, masks, prefixes and ranges. IP tunnels may also be used to support"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-7a881f41a3a44c6e6fe7b65b1272f3480a5c0b97434172d6a2a45211b72ecae5","text":"that the registry will receive between 5 and 50 registrations in total over the next years. 9.4. The Endpoint Type parameter is described as follows: An endpoint registering at an RD can describe itself with endpoint types, similar to how resources are described with Resource Types in RFC6690. An endpoint type is expressed as a string, which can be either a URI or one of the values defined in the Endpoint Type subregistry; it SHOULD be shorter than 63 bytes. Endpoint types can be passed in the \"et\" query parameter as part of extra-attrs at the Registration step, are shown on endpoint lookups using the \"et\" target attribute, and can be filtered for using \"et\" as a search criterion in resource and endpoint lookup. Multiple endpoint types are given as separate query parameters or link attributes. Note that Endpoint Type differs from Resource Type in that it uses multiple attributes rather than space separated values. As a result, Resource Directory implementations automatically support correct filtering in the lookup interfaces from the rules for unknown endpoint attributes. This specification establishes a new sub-registry under \"CoRE Parameters\" called \"Endpoint Type\". The registry properties (required policy, requirements, template) are identical to those of the Resource Type parameters in RFC6690. The registry is initially empty. 10. Two examples are presented: a Lighting Installation example in lt-ex"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-7a8898c224abdc324532f118cd703e49cf7cc73efb93c3e701258bd46ebdabb1","text":"_mandatory_ Collected Claims represent a (sub-)set of Claims created by an Attester. Collected Claims are gathered based on the Claims selected in the Claim Selection. If a Verifier does not provide a Claim Selection, then all available Claims on the Attester are part of the Collected Claims. _mandatory_ A set of Claims that consists of a list of Authentication Secret IDs that each identifies an Authentication Secret in a single Attesting Environment, the Attester Identity, Claims, and a"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-7ae5f4e1d67203d11ad27ffb7d18896bc54a2f33da5b0f6b120d55951df435e3","text":"domain RFC7556, measurements by the Protocol Stack, or other sources. 9.1.1. Boolean This property specifies whether an application considers it useful to be informed in case sent data was retransmitted more often than a certain threshold. When set to true, the effect is twofold: The application may receive events in case excessive retransmissions. In addition, the transport system considers this as a preference to use transports stacks that can provide this notification. This is not a strict requirement. If set to false, no notification of excessive retransmissions will be sent and this transport feature is ignored for protocol selection. The default is to have this option. 9.1.2. Integer This property specifies after how many retransmissions to inform the application about \"Excessive Retransmissions\". 9.1.3. Boolean This property specifies whether an application considers it useful to be informed when an ICMP error message arrives that does not force termination of a connection. When set to true, received ICMP errors will be available as SoftErrors. Note that even if a protocol supporting this property is selected, not all ICMP errors will necessarily be delivered, so applications cannot rely on receiving them. Setting this option also implies a preference to prefer transports stacks that can provide this notification. If not set, no events will be sent for ICMP soft error message and this transport feature is ignored for protocol selection. This property applies to Connections and Connection Groups. The default is not to have this option. 9.1.4. Integer This property specifies the part of the received data that needs to be covered by a checksum. It is given in Bytes. A value of 0 means that no checksum is required, and a special value (e.g., -1) indicates full checksum coverage. 9.1.5. Integer This Property is a non-negative integer representing the relative inverse priority of this Connection relative to other Connections in the same Connection Group. It has no effect on Connections not part of a Connection Group. As noted in groups, this property is not entangled when Connections are cloned. 9.1.6. Integer This property specifies how long to wait before aborting a Connection during establishment, or before deciding that a Connection has failed after establishment. It is given in seconds. 9.1.7. Enum This property specifies which scheduler should be used among Connections within a Connection Group, see groups. The set of schedulers can be taken from I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-ndata. 9.1.8. Integer (read only) This property represents the maximum Message size that can be sent before or during Connection establishment, see also msg-idempotent. It is given in Bytes. 9.1.9. Integer (read only) This property, if applicable, represents the maximum Message size that can be sent without incurring network-layer fragmentation or transport layer segmentation at the sender. 9.1.10. Integer (read only) This property represents the maximum Message size that can be sent. 9.1.11. Integer (read only) This numeric property represents the maximum Message size that can be received. 9.2. Slightly different from \"querying\", a SoftError Event can also occur, informing the application about the receipt of an ICMP error message related to the Connection. This will only happen if the underlying"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-7ae858ece0e4482e561d1e313bf9a2da286b6a61e3adf2e2f2322ddc18c55710","text":"4.2.4. The CANCEL_PUSH frame (type=0x3) is used to request cancellation of a server push prior to the push stream being created. The CANCEL_PUSH server push prior to the push stream being received. The CANCEL_PUSH frame identifies a server push by Push ID (see frame-push-promise), encoded as a variable-length integer."}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-7b2e271b57abeb78f84a1f81e61f3cb1c5895940dc2494b3ce3bf659f0d486cc","text":"2.1. This document uses the terminology and concepts established in the DetNet architecture RFC8655 and I-D.ietf-detnet-data-plane-framework, and I-D.ietf-detnet-mpls. The reader is assumed to be familiar with these documents and their terminology. DetNet architecture RFC8655 and RFC8938, and I-D.ietf-detnet-mpls. The reader is assumed to be familiar with these documents and their terminology. 2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-dnssd-srp-7b4c94e4f204d3bf28086ab6e3ec1eff4eb9b47c0ca350931348cf36e55bfda0","text":"record MUST contain the same public key. The update is signed using SIG(0), using the private key that corresponds to the public key in the KEY record. The lifetimes of the records in the update is set using the EDNS(0) Update Lease option I-D.sekar-dns-ul. using the EDNS(0) Update Lease option I-D.ietf-dnssd-update-lease. The KEY record in Service Description updates MAY be omitted for brevity; if it is omitted, the SRP registrar MUST behave as if the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-7bd88c4a16308eeb4c88ed5fcc9258e4791435ed7aa557335a28674548f209d6","text":"set to \"webtransport\", the HTTP/3 server can check if it has a WebTransport server associated with the specified \":authority\" and \":path\" values. If it does not, it SHOULD reply with status code 404 (Section 15.5.4, HTTP). If it does, it MAY accept the session by replying with a 2xx series status code, as defined in Section 15.3 of HTTP. The WebTransport server MUST verify the \"Origin\" header to (Section 15.5.5 of HTTP). When the request contains the \"Origin\" header, the WebTransport server MUST verify the \"Origin\" header to ensure that the specified origin is allowed to access the server in question. question. If the verification fails, the WebTransport server SHOULD reply with status code 403 (Section 15.5.4 of HTTP). If all checks pass, the WebTransport server MAY accept the session by replying with a 2xx series status code, as defined in Section 15.3 of HTTP. From the client's perspective, a WebTransport session is established when the client receives a 2xx response. From the server's"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-7c0574df5f5b1d86de532cef814d95fa41677ff5a321797e1cccde9fb3f3fc8b","text":"its own, but needs a framing protocol on top to determine message boundaries. Both stacks MUST offer the transport services that are required by the application. For example, if an application specifies that it requires reliable transmission of data, then a Protocol Stack Both stacks MUST offer the transport services that are requested by the application. For example, if an application specifies that it requires reliable transmission of data, then a Protocol Stack using UDP without any reliability layer on top would not be allowed to replace a Protocol Stack using TCP. However, if the application does not require reliability, then a Protocol Stack"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-architecture-7c0a83cd8304ca92060c2e6fb323015c004228c60e2ece0c09046c5aee0835fc","text":"setting, HSMs and secure enclaves can be used to protect signature keys. 6.6. Various academic works have analyzed MLS and the different security guarantees it aims to provide. The security of large parts of the protocol has been analyzed by [BBN19] (draft 7), [ACDT21] (draft 11) and [AJM20] (draft 12). Individual components of various drafts of the MLS protocol have been analyzed in isolation and with differing adversarial models, for example, [BBR18], [ACDT19], [ACCKKMPPWY19], [AJM20] and [ACJM20] analyze the ratcheting tree as the sub-protocol of MLS that facilitates key agreement, while [BCK21] analyzes the key derivation paths in the ratchet tree and key schedule. Finally, [CHK19] analyzes the authentication and cross-group healing guarantees provided by MLS. 7. ACDT19: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1189 ACCKKMPPWY19: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1489 ACJM20: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/752 AJM20: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1327 ACDT21: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1083 AHKM21: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1456 CHK19: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/137 BCK21: https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/137 BBR18: https://hal.inria.fr/hal-02425247 BBN19: https://hal.laas.fr/INRIA/hal-02425229 8. This document makes no requests of IANA."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-7c1a720821929be0af61b3c785c7851201f044a3b414f9d31c6d247ced177e7a","text":"object must be a randomly sampled nonce of length \"KDF.Nh\" to avoid key re-use. 10.1.1. 10.2.1. If a client wants to create a subgroup of an existing group, they MAY choose to include a \"PreSharedKeyID\" in the \"GroupSecrets\" object of"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-7c1f329f9b7ebf431d90dd45e5db840f4dceec482044aaa6a37e633799137b10","text":"groups marked \"No\" range from \"good\" to \"bad\" from a cryptographic standpoint. If an item is not marked as recommended it does not necessarily mean that it is flawed; rather, it indicates that either the item has not been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases. The designated expert RFC8126 only ensures that the specification is publicly available. An Internet Draft that is posted and never published or a standard in another standards body, industry"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-7c2e585e600f6ef8c578bc17289d141754a240b3b7bec142e48247936822f21c","text":"6.2. Message Framers generate an event whenever a Connection sends a new Message. Message. The parameters to the event align with the Send call in the API (Section 9.2 of I-D.ietf-taps-interface). Upon receiving this event, a framer implementation is responsible for performing any necessary transformations and sending the resulting"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-7c4ed48ebcb9743513b7e8f288e6ef3385011ccf6cdbf1650bdd172b46fe8307","text":"13. QUIC provides integrity protection for its version negotiation process. This process assumes that the set of versions that a server supports is fixed. This complicates the process for deploying new QUIC versions or disabling old versions when servers operate in QUIC version 1 does not specify a version negotation mechanism in the base spec but I-D.draft-ietf-quic-version-negotiation proposes an extension. This process assumes that the set of versions that a server supports is fixed. This complicates the process for deploying new QUIC versions or disabling old versions when servers operate in clusters. A server that rolls out a new version of QUIC can do so in three"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-7c755437830ebf188f21daae2d34c016c67a490303bea864268ff625e7f4c0f1","text":"be sent in multiple parts. Protocols that provide the framing (such as length-value protocols, or protocols that use delimiters) provide data boundaries that may be longer than the typical datagram. Each Message for framing protocols or protocols that use delimiters) may support Message sizes that do not fit within a single datagram. Each Message for framing protocols corresponds to a single frame, which may be sent either as a complete Message, or in multiple parts. Message in the underlying protocol, or in multiple parts. 5.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-7cce1894f9bd622caca1ee94bbc863530b6047faf13fb44ec01288ded3a8b3d5","text":"acknowledgment (see sending-acknowledgements). A packet that does not increase the largest received packet number for its packet number space by exactly one. A packet can arrive out of order if it is delayed or if earlier packets are lost or delayed. for its packet number space (packet-numbers) by exactly one. A packet can arrive out of order if it is delayed or if earlier packets are lost or delayed. An entity that can participate in a QUIC connection by generating, receiving, and processing QUIC packets. There are only two types"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-7ce2952f1eedec40009efa6903a9841740385c2099ec14c2f4d86fef61da61b9","text":"RFC7657 apply. The Capacity Profile for a selected protocol stack may be modified on a per-Message basis using the Transmission Profile Message Context Property; see send-profile. a per-Message basis using the Transmission Profile Message Property; see send-profile. 9.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-7d0ff7efc3248adb37a10e1a2a2477937fc065c6c90c2c84a597a83bfa539f97","text":"1.2. A frequently emphasized advantage of XML is the availability of powerful tools to analyse, transform and selectively extract data from XML documents. XPath is one of these tools. This document picks up Stefan Goessner's popular JSONPath specification dated 2007-02-21 JSONPath-orig and provides a normative definition for it. inspired-by-xpath provides a brief synopsis with XML's XPath XPath, which was the inspiration that led to the definition of JSONPath. JSONPath was intended as a light-weight companion to JSON implementations on platforms such as PHP and JavaScript, so instead of defining its own expression language like XPath did, JSONPath delegated this to the expression language of the platform. While the languages in which JSONPath is used do have significant commonalities, over time this caused non-portability of JSONPath expressions between the ensuing platform-specific dialects. The present specification intends to remove platform dependencies and server as a common JSONPath specification that can be used across platforms. Obviously, this means that backwards compatibility could not always be achieved; a design principle of this specification is to go with a \"consensus\" between implementations even if it is rough, as long as that does not jeopardize the objective of obtaining a usable, stable JSON query language. In 2007, the need for something solving the same class of problems for the emerging JSON community became apparent, specifically for: Finding data interactively and extracting them out of RFC8259 JSON values without special scripting. Specifying the relevant parts of the JSON data in a request by a client, so the server can reduce the amount of data in its response, minimizing bandwidth usage. So what does such a tool look like for JSON? When defining a JSONPath, how should expressions look? The XPath expression looks like or in popular programming languages such as JavaScript, Python and PHP, with a variable x holding the argument. Here we observe that such languages already have a fundamentally XPath-like feature built in. The JSONPath tool in question should: be naturally based on those language characteristics. cover only essential parts of XPath 1.0. be lightweight in code size and memory consumption. 1.3. be runtime efficient. JSONPath expressions are applied to a JSON value, the 1.3. . Within the JSONPath expression, the abstract name \"$\" is used to refer to the JSONPath expressions always apply to a value in the same way as XPath expressions are used in combination with an XML document. Since a value is anonymous, JSONPath uses the abstract name \"$\" to refer to the root node of the argument. of the argument, i.e., to the argument as a whole. JSONPath expressions can use the or the for paths input to a JSONPath processor. [1] Where a JSONPath processor uses JSONPath expressions as output paths, these will always be converted to Output Paths which employ the more general . [2] Bracket notation is more general than dot notation and can serve as a canonical form when a JSONPath processor uses JSONPath expressions as output paths. JSONPath allows the wildcard symbol \"*\" for member names and array indices. It borrows the descendant operator \"..\" from E4X and the array slice syntax proposal \"[start:end:step]\" SLICE from ECMASCRIPT 4. JSONPath was originally designed to employ an to build paths that are input to a JSONPath processor. Bracket notation is more general than dot notation and can serve as a canonical form (for instance, when a JSONPath processor uses JSONPath expressions as output paths). for computing expressions. The present specification defines a simple expression language that is independent from any scripting language in use on the platform. JSONPath allows the wildcard symbol \"*\" to select any member of an object or any element of an array (wildcard). The descendant operator \"..\" selects the node and all its descendants (descendant- selector). The array slice syntax \"[start:end:step]\" allows selecting a regular selection of an element from an array, giving a start position, an end position, and possibly a step value that moves the position from the start to the end (slice). JSONPath can use expressions, written in parentheses: \"()\", as an alternative to explicit names or indices as in: JSONPath employs an The symbol \"@\" is used for the current node. Filter expressions are supported via the syntax \"?()\" as in for computing values and making decisions. The present specification defines a simple expression language that is independent from any scripting language in use on the platform. JSONPath can use such expression language expressions, written in parentheses: \"()\", as an alternative to explicit names or indices as in [no-dot-length]: Here is a complete overview and a side by side comparison of the JSONPath syntax elements with their XPath counterparts. The symbol \"@\" is used for the current node, i.e., the node in the context of which the expression is evaluated. XPath has a lot more to offer (location paths in unabbreviated syntax, operators and functions) than listed here. Moreover there is a significant difference how the subscript operator works in Xpath and JSONPath: Filter expressions are supported via the syntax \"?()\" as in Square brackets in XPath expressions always operate on the resulting from the previous path fragment. Indices always start at 1. With JSONPath, square brackets operate on the or addressed by the previous path fragment. Array indices always start at 0. tbl-overview provides a quick overview of the JSONPath syntax elements. 2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-7d5c1122632a85817a4d3653db772ac9c592ab6fad7862d6cc85a85f0a6b0816","text":"The comparison \"a <= b\" yields true if and only if \"a < b\" yields true or \"a == b\" yields true. The comparison \"a >= b\" yields true if and only if \"a > b\" yields The comparison \"a > b\" yields true if and only if \"b < a\" yields true. The comparison \"a >= b\" yields true if and only if \"b < a\" yields true or \"a == b\" yields true. 3.5.5.2.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-7d9058e90f3b9fb0fd42ac1dc488dd4b1e54163d8cd0bf8c04d1e9cc773cd08e","text":"session-level attributes. The process here is identical to that indicated in the Initial Offers section above. The next step is to generate lip sync groups as defined in RFC5888, Section 7. For each MediaStream with more than one MediaStreamTrack, a group of type \"LS\" MUST be added that contains the mid values for each MediaStreamTrack in that MediaStream. In some cases this may result in adding a mid to a given LS group that was not in that LS group in the associated offer. Although this is not allowed by RFC5888, it is allowed when implementing this specification. The next step is to generate m= sections for each m= section that is present in the remote offer, as specified in RFC3264, Section 6. For the purposes of this discussion, any session-level attributes in the"}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-7dbc83df082edcd6594ac11844ffd0fbf492c1b8c938de1a8b1d8b00701ba345","text":"multipath negotiation is ambiguous, they MUST be interpreted as acknowledging packets sent on path 0. Endpoints negotiate the use of one packet number space for all paths or separate packet number spaces per path during the connection handshake nego. While separate packet number spaces allow for more efficient ACK encoding, especially when paths have highly different latencies, this approach requires the use of a connection ID. Therefore use of a single number space can be beneficial when endpoints use zero-length connection ID for less overhead. 7.1. If the multipath option is negotiated to use one packet number space"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-7dc4125d3239db49948b7912a0d35448f2d9b06023acc2d1ea4c0751f3987b74","text":"Update the \"Reference\" to also refer to this document. Add the following notes: Experts are to verify that there is in fact a publicly available standard. An Internet Draft that is posted and never published or a standard in another standards body, industry consortium, university site, etc. suffices. As specified in RFC8126, assignments made in the Private Use space are not generally useful for broad interoperability. It is the responsibility of those making use of the Private Use range to ensure that no conflicts occur (within the intended scope of use). For widespread experiments, temporary reservations are available. See expert-pool for additional information about the designated expert pool."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-7dc4c5373ca6758d1b095a05032ad116878f0f252106ba3ecd0d79203279bc56","text":"invoking packet included in the ICMP packet and only forward the ICMP packet to the client whose scoping matches the invoking packet. Since there are known risks with some IPv6 extension headers (e.g., ROUTING-HDR), implementers need to follow the latest guidance regarding handling of IPv6 extension headers. 11. 11.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-7dd413bda47e50f6061b42021a8f393bf4d9f814eaa616122841927eff560476","text":"where a flight is very large and the receiver is forced to elide acknowledgements for records which have already been ACKed. As noted above, the receipt of any record responding to a given flight MUST be taken as an implicit acknowledgement for the entire flight. taken as an implicit acknowledgement for the entire flight to which it is responding. 7.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-7e4861ae2a2b7f07d3e16395eed60429f159d386c20efbb4853461fe395f9a5d","text":"Imported PSKs do not collide with future protocol versions and KDFs. There is no known interference between the process for computing Imported PSKs from an external PSK and the processing of existing external PSKs used in (D)TLS 1.2 and below. However, only limited analysis has been done, which is an additional reason why applications SHOULD provision separate PSKs for (D)TLS 1.3 and prior versions, even when the importer interface is used in (D)TLS 1.3. There are no known related outputs or security issues caused from the process for computing Imported PSKs from an external PSK and the processing of existing external PSKs used in (D)TLS 1.2 and below, as noted in rollout. However, only limited analysis has been done, which is an additional reason why applications SHOULD provision separate PSKs for (D)TLS 1.3 and prior versions, even when the importer interface is used in (D)TLS 1.3. The PSK Importer does not prevent applications from constructing non- importer PSK identities that collide with imported PSK identities."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-7e5fc648bbb83dafefc1371436305ecba3a1eb079433445b44bd0857e67912b3","text":"Determining which entries are too close to eviction to reference is an encoder preference. One heuristic is to target a fixed amount of available space in the dynamic table: either unused space or space that can be reclaimed by evicting unreferenced entries. To achieve that can be reclaimed by evicting non-blocking entries. To achieve this, the encoder can maintain a draining index, which is the smallest absolute index in the dynamic table that it will emit a reference for. As new entries are inserted, the encoder increases"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-7e74d68cd8caab85b1d19bdcee9fd2f61e69e8bdb6c7758eae259843aca6711d","text":"from the \"path_secret[n]\" value assigned to the root node. If the \"path\" value is not populated: Define \"commit_secret\" as the all-zero vector of the same length as a \"path_secret\" value would be. the all-zero vector of length \"KDF.Nh\" (the same length as a \"path_secret\" value would be). Update the confirmed and interim transcript hashes using the new Commit, and generate the new GroupContext."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-7ee4147b587a5618ea1a893ff0d1073c78e233dfa8ad920ed8a4384b964aed21","text":"At the time this is published, the response types are works in progress. The only known response type is \"application/dns- udpwireformat\", but it is likely that at least one JSON-based udpwireformat\", but it is possible that at least one JSON-based response format will be defined in the future. The DNS response for \"application/dns-udpwireformat\" in dnswire MAY"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-7ef889952c339dfe6caa2e8041411dcd1faa9dcc46725c7d3b6f8fbecc952b0d","text":"the public key from the configuration, \"pkR\", and a selected combination of KDF, identified by \"kdf_id\", and AEAD, identified by \"aead_id\". a combination of KDF, identified by \"kdf_id\", and AEAD, identified by \"aead_id\", that the selects from those in the . The then constructs an , \"enc_request\", from a binary encoded HTTP request BINARY, \"request\", as follows:"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-7fca4960f7fec018ebbf5057fa865514fea63e5ea98f1dd8280cf6f8bb5731ae","text":"setting Connection and Message Properties in Pre-Establishment) or have been omitted for brevity and simplicity. In this diagram, the lifetime of a Connection object is broken into three phases: Pre-Establishment, the Established state, and Termination. Pre-Establishment is based around a Preconnection object, that contains various sub-objects that describe the properties and parameters of desired Connections (Local and Remote Endpoints, Transport Properties, and Security Parameters). A Preconnection can be used to start listening for inbound connections, in which case a Listener object is created, or can be used to establish a new connection directly using Initiate() (for outbound connections) or Rendezvous() (for peer-to-peer connections). Once a Connection is in the Established state, an application can send and receive Message objects, and receive state updates. Closing or aborting a connection, either locally or from the peer, can terminate a connection. 4.1.1. Endpoint: An endpoint represents an identifier for one side of a"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-80286c5408d822aa7d0ab43cd8a6d2bbc9d8509f80864ad137253dadedbe52ff","text":"A signature algorithm MLS uses draft-07 of HPKE I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke for public-key MLS uses draft-08 of HPKE I-D.irtf-cfrg-hpke for public-key encryption. The \"DeriveKeyPair\" function associated to the KEM for the ciphersuite maps octet strings to HPKE key pairs."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-8035cb02e8a1d5c9b0422044323e5df2d4eb7abe6e566ea737a992b017194afe","text":"A Preconnection Object holds properties reflecting the application's requirements and preferences for the transport. These include Selection Properties for selecting protocol stacks and paths, as well as Connection Properties for configuration of the detailed operation of the selected Protocol Stacks. as Connection Properties and Message Properties for configuration of the detailed operation of the selected Protocol Stacks on a per- Connection and Message level. The protocol(s) and path(s) selected as candidates during establishment are determined and configured using these properties."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-80e63b5cc266762da0df3960e3a708b58e0e2b7a8d50b1846a4f8abe949f1899","text":"Number by one. Compute the AEAD nonce from the Sender ID, Common IV, and Partial IV. Add the following step after step 5: B. If the message is an Observe notification, store it in memory for use with re-registrations (see replay-protection), and delete from memory any older one previously stored. 8.4. A client receiving a response containing the OSCORE option SHALL"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-80ff43f310ac62c1321f99ae90156650c2ea390aa4a443c5cafe0cc56a207567","text":"single underlying transport connection where possible. This is not a strict requirement. The default is to not have this option. 5.2.6. 5.2.7. Type: Boolean"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-8262ff57f973fb07e51a2a0fae85c21d5bd783e66c7412a95355da39080eb7ce","text":"14. I-D.draft-ietf-quic-datagram specifies a QUIC extension to enable sending and receiving unreliable datagrams over QUIC. Unlike operating directly over UDP, applications that use the QUIC datagram service do not need to implement their own congestion control, per RFC8085, as QUIC datagrams are congestion controlled. I-D.ietf-quic-datagram specifies a QUIC extension to enable sending and receiving unreliable datagrams over QUIC. Unlike operating directly over UDP, applications that use the QUIC datagram service do not need to implement their own congestion control, per RFC8085, as QUIC datagrams are congestion controlled. QUIC datagrams are not flow-controlled, and as such data chunks may be dropped if the receiver is overloaded. While the reliable"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-83030c83eac00099f00a5d68dd66e6110c22c4eba14f5a18b2a4ffe3f918b206","text":"Calling \"Close\" on a UDP Multicast Receive Connection (ABORT.UDP(- Lite)) releases the local port reservation and leaves the group. The Connection then issues a \"Closed\" Event. Calling \"Abort\" on a UDP Multicast Receive Connection (ABORT.UDP(- Lite)) is identical to calling \"Close\". Lite)) is identical to calling \"Close\", except that the Connection will send a \"ConnectionError\" Event rather than a \"Closed\" Event. Calling \"CloseGroup\" on a UDP Multicast Receive Connection (ABORT.UDP(-Lite)) is identical to calling \"Close\" on this"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-832e3d3aa3b5f4b82449c35294164449c0919773710726a7f283318e2302f904","text":"Knowledge that a header block with references to the dynamic table has been processed permits the encoder to evict entries to which no unacknowledged references remain, regardless of whether those references were potentially blocking (see blocked-insertion). When a unacknowledged references remain (see blocked-insertion). When a stream is reset or abandoned, the indication that these header blocks will never be processed serves a similar function; see stream- cancellation. will never be processed serves a similar function (see stream- cancellation). The decoder chooses when to emit Insert Count Increment instructions (see insert-count-increment). Emitting an instruction after adding"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-rrc-83d485ff650e25235baafdde212c27af9d8ff43ba6778d952a93daf2c142c88e","text":"I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13. The presentation language used in this document is described in Section 4 of RFC8446. This document reuses the definition of \"anti-amplification limit\" from RFC9000 to mean three times the amount of data received from an unvalidated address. This includes all DTLS records originating from that source address, excluding discarded ones. 3. The use of RRC is negotiated via the \"rrc\" DTLS-only extension. On"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-8424f39ca64dc188d8a076f5a5443ddea07684c84a16d3964e4ff7ef813ce3c8","text":"have a route for the destination address, or if it is configured to reject a destination prefix by policy, or if the MTU of the outgoing link is lower than the size of the packet to be forwarded. In such scenarios, CONNECT-IP endpoints SHOULD use ICMP ICMP to signal the forwarding error to its peer. scenarios, CONNECT-IP endpoints SHOULD use ICMP ICMP ICMPV6 to signal the forwarding error to its peer. Endpoints are free to select the most appropriate ICMP errors to send. Some examples that are relevant for CONNECT-IP include: For invalid source addresses, send Destination Unreachable ICMPV6 with code 5, \"Source address failed ingress/egress policy\". For unroutable destination addresses, send Destination Unreachable ICMPV6 with a code 0, \"No route to destination\", or code 1, \"Communication with destination administratively prohibited\". For packets that cannot fit within the MTU of the outgoing link, send Packet Too Big ICMPV6. In order to receive these errors, endpoints need to be prepared to receive ICMP packets. If an endpoint sends ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsules, its routes SHOULD include an allowance for receiving ICMP messages. If an endpoint does not send ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsules, such as a client opening an IP flow through a proxy, it SHOULD process proxied ICMP packets from its peer in order to receive these errors. Note that ICMP messages can originate from a source address different from that of the CONNECT-IP peer. 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-842c4e4f694d32572c3fed0abffca3aad0c14fb4bd8e5ddce624af9868887456","text":"6. Clients MUST ignore any received Version Negotiation packets that contain the version that they initially attempted. Once a client has reacted to a Version Negotiation packet, it MUST drop all subsequent Version Negotiation packets on that connection. contain the version that they initially attempted. A client that makes a connection attempt based on information received from a Version Negotiation packet MUST ignore any Version Negotiation packets it receives in response to that connection attempt. Both endpoints MUST parse their peer's Version Information during the handshake. If parsing the Version Information failed (for example,"}
{"_id":"q-en-groupcomm-bis-845ed6222245ef6a3f10492885e1171c73078e3c5046760e8443bc50d5658cc1","text":"This section defines how proxies operate in a group communication scenario. In particular, sec-proxy-forward defines operations of forward-proxies, while sec-proxy-reverse defines operations of reverse-proxies. reverse-proxies. Security operations for a proxy are discussed later in chap-proxy-security. 3.5.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-8466fff8c1ec988b10223297fc4b8e0a3a45a6cbac7f381236688a42894f23ad","text":"The rsabssa_blind_sign function is defined in BLINDRSA, Section 5.1.2.. The Issuer generates an HTTP response with status code 200 whose body consists of TokenResponse, with the content type set as \"message/token-response\". set as \"application/private-token-response\". 6.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-84946ba121693329ad3040627bfceb1310a15fd274efa852c001667663087cf9","text":"content. Before being encrypted, the sender data is encoded as an object of the following form: MLSSenderData.sender is assumed to be a \"member\" sender type. When constructing an MLSSenderData from a Sender object, the sender MUST verify Sender.sender_type is \"member\" and use Sender.sender for MLSSenderData.sender. When constructing an MLSSenderData from a Sender object, the sender MUST verify Sender.sender_type is \"member\" and use Sender.leaf_index for MLSSenderData.leaf_index. The \"reuse_guard\" field contains a fresh random value used to avoid nonce reuse in the case of state loss or corruption, as described in"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-homenet-hna-849923a10d01180bff08af59616d2e8a3e626fc2181f0b73a3f97d33156f069b","text":"7. The Homenet Zone provides information about the home network. Some users may be tempted to have provide responses dependent on the origin of the DNS query. More specifically, some users may be tempted to provide a different view for DNS queries originating from the home network and for DNS queries coming from the Internet. Each view could then be associated with a dedicated Homenet Zone. Note that this document does not specify how DNS queries originating from the home network are addressed to the Homenet Zone. This could be done via hosting the DNS resolver on the HNA for example. This section is not normative. sec-reasons details why some nodes may only be reachable from the home network and not from the global Internet. sec-consequences briefly describes the consequences of having distinct views such as a \"home network view\" and an \"Internet view\". Finally, sec-guidance provides guidance on how to resolve names that are only significant in the home network, without creating different views. 7.1. The motivation for supporting different views is to provide different answers dependent on the origin of the DNS query, for reasons such as: 1: An end user may want to have services not published on the Internet. Services like the HNA administration interface that provides the GUI to administer your HNA might not seem advisable to publish on the Internet. Similarly, services like the mapper that registers the devices of your home network may also not be desirable to be published on the Internet. In both cases, these services should only be known or used by the network administrator. To restrict the access of such services, the home network administrator may choose to publish these pieces of information only within the home network, where it might be assumed that the users are more trusted than on the Internet. Even though this assumption may not be valid, at least this may reduce the surface of any attack. 2: Services within the home network may be reachable using non global IP addresses. IPv4 and NAT may be one reason. On the other hand IPv6 may favor link-local or site-local IP addresses. These IP addresses are not significant outside the boundaries of the home network. As a result, they MAY be published in the home network view, and SHOULD NOT be published in the Public Homenet Zone. 7.2. Enabling different views leads to a non-coherent naming system. Depending on where resolution is performed, some services will not be available. This may be especially inconvenient with devices with multiple interfaces that are attached both to the Internet via a 3G/4G interface and to the home network via a WLAN interface. Devices may also cache the results of name resolution, and these cached entries may no longer be valid if a mobile device moves between a homenet connection and an internet connection e.g. a device temporarily loses wifi signal and switches to 3G. Regarding local-scope IP addresses, such devices may end up with poor connectivity. Suppose, for example, that DNS resolution is performed via the WLAN interface attached to the HNA, and the response provides local-scope IP addresses, but the communication is initiated on the 3G/4G interface. Communications with local-scope addresses will be unreachable on the Internet, thus aborting the communication. The same situation occurs if a device is flip / flopping between various WLAN networks. Regarding DNSSEC, if the HNA does not sign the Homenet Zone and outsources the signing process, the two views are different, because one is protected with DNSSEC whereas the other is not. Devices with multiple interfaces will have difficulty securing the naming resolution, as responses originating from the home network may not be signed. For devices with all its interfaces attached to a single administrative domain, that is to say the home network, or the Internet. Incoherence between DNS responses may still also occur if the device is able to perform DNS resolutions both using the DNS resolving server of the home network, or one of the ISP. DNS resolution performed via the HNA or the ISP resolver may be different than those performed over the Internet. 7.3. As documented in sec-consequences, it is RECOMMENDED to avoid different views. If network administrators choose to implement multiple views, impacts on devices' resolution SHOULD be evaluated. As a consequence, the Homenet Zone is expected to be an exact copy of the Public Homenet Zone. As a result, services that are not expected to be published on the Internet SHOULD NOT be part of the Homenet Zone, local-scope addresses SHOULD NOT be part of the Homenet Zone, and when possible, the HNA SHOULD sign the Homenet Zone. The Homenet Zone is expected to host public information only. It is not the scope of the DNS service to define local home network boundaries. Instead, local scope information is expected to be provided to the home network using local scope naming services. mDNS RFC6762 DNS-SD RFC6763 are two examples of these services. Currently mDNS is limited to a single link network. However, future protocols are expected to leverage this constraint as pointed out in RFC7558. 7.4. This section is focused on the Homenet Reverse Zone. Firstly, all considerations for the Homenet Zone apply to the Homenet"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-84b8d0490f82dfe7b380f83547cd7c4dd3a50d6f45d619a9b0a735f3c9955fc0","text":"RD registration URI (mandatory). This is the location of the RD, as obtained from discovery. Endpoint name (mandatory). The endpoint name is an identifier that MUST be unique within a domain. The maximum length of this parameter is 63 bytes. Endpoint name (mostly mandatory). The endpoint name is an identifier that MUST be unique within a domain. The maximum length of this parameter is 63 bytes. If the RD is configured to recognize the endpoint (eg. based on its security context), the endpoint can elide the endpoint name, and assign one based on the configuration. Domain (optional). The domain to which this endpoint belongs. The maximum length of this parameter is 63 bytes. When this"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-84f5577352a10e24c4cf6e61f7d021887e4e9bf444c7a7fffb16f41313659fb7","text":"verification) or make sure there is common context for the server to verify the address using a service-generated token. The service must also communicate the source connection ID of the Retry packet to the server so that it can include it in a transport parameter for client verification. There are two different mechanisms to allow offload of DoS mitigation to a trusted network service. One requires no shared state; the server need only be configured to trust a retry service, though this"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-84f590bbd6fa0c70a633e97c9e9aec30de68d48757b8d462b877e5a8bd63854b","text":"to \"cid_spare\", then either existing or new CID MAY be used. Endpoints SHOULD use receiver-provided CIDs in the order they were provided. Endpoints MUST NOT have more than one NewConnectionId message outstanding. provided. Implementations which receive more spare CIDs than they wish to maintain MAY simply discard any extra CIDs. Endpoints MUST NOT have more than one NewConnectionId message outstanding. Implementations which either did not negotiate the \"connection_id\" extension or which have negotiated receiving an empty CID MUST NOT"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-8504d4db954a9aaf4563c567177fcf1d059d8fbfb6375ea6dadf143249a3a412","text":"request that is made to the target. This means that only the gateway or target are in a position to identify abuse. A gateway MAY send signals toward the relay to provide feedback about specific requests. A relay that acts on this feedback could - either inadvertently or by design - lead to clients being deanonymized. For example, a gateway could respond differently to requests it cannot decapsulate, as mentioned in errors. A relay that acts on this feedback could - either inadvertently or by design - lead to client deanonymization. 7.2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-datagram-854b4b93a6d7467c90569bdd1938b375e9ff0cb09412fca026b5e02539c06c5d","text":"This document defines two new DATAGRAM QUIC frame types, which carry application data without requiring retransmissions. Note that DATAGRAM frames are only meant for unreliable transmissions. Reliable transmission is already supported by QUIC via STREAM frames. Discussion of this work is encouraged to happen on the QUIC IETF mailing list quic@ietf.org [3] or on the GitHub repository which contains the draft: https://github.com/quicwg/datagram [4]."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-8564423caebde6aa808db065d9af500baa1cd1810e99331a552be85c57c5b725","text":"This specification defines the following protocol messages, along with their corresponding media types: TokenRequest: \"message/token-request\" TokenRequest: \"application/private-token-request\" TokenResponse: \"message/token-response\" TokenResponse: \"application/private-token-response\" The definition for each media type is in the following subsections. 8.2.1. message application token-request private-token-request N/A"}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-8594abdaf51913976fa01cb503760a0ce817c738a18c235019542c2c2b9a8aea","text":"4. This section describes a typical RTCWeb session and shows how the This section describes a typical WebRTC session and shows how the various security elements interact and what guarantees are provided to the user. The example in this section is a \"best case\" scenario in which we provide the maximal amount of user authentication and"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-85aebb3a0a4979077199b3cae9525728a17891de0ad55511a598b34abf83692e","text":"An intermediary can reencode HTTP Datagrams as it forwards them. In other words, an intermediary MAY send a DATAGRAM capsule to forward an HTTP Datagram which was received in a QUIC DATAGRAM frame, and vice versa. an HTTP Datagram that was received in a QUIC DATAGRAM frame, and vice versa. Intermediaries MUST NOT perform this reencoding unless they have identified the use of the Capsule Protocol on the corresponding request stream; see capsule-protocol. Note that while DATAGRAM capsules that are sent on a stream are reliably delivered in order, intermediaries can reencode DATAGRAM"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-85e96c6e606cd95a94c4b1fc561bc6e2a14fffd8bf8f288ffdae3350c18c1b9b","text":"conditions that irrevocably lead to the termination of the Connection are signaled using ConnectionError instead (see termination). The ReceiveError event passes an optional associated messageContext. The ReceiveError event passes an optional associated MessageContext. This may indicate that a Message that was being partially received previously, but had not completed, encountered an error and will not be completed."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-8642a0f3996f9e10d0a6b9fcf99b741374ee13f1e1f170113e0f50a122401251","text":"a POST request with an empty update. That is, it should send a JWS whose payload is an empty object ({}). 7.3.1. 7.3.4. As described above, a client can indicate its agreement with the CA's terms of service by setting the \"terms-of-service-agreed\" field in"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-86c4705d8d4187984f53f0daf85748982860df2c0fe1775ba67bb9f1b462ae48","text":"The value for hpke_init_key MUST be a public key for the asymmetric encryption scheme defined by cipher_suite. The whole structure is signed using the client's signature key. A KeyPackage object with an invalid signature field MUST be considered malformed. The input to the signature computation comprises all of the fields except for the signature field. invalid signature field MUST be considered malformed. The signature is computed by the function \"SignWithLabel\" with a label \"KeyPackage\" and a content comprising of all of the fields except for the signature field. KeyPackage objects MUST contain at least two extensions, one of type \"capabilities\", and one of type \"lifetime\". The \"capabilities\""}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-86d37d266cf2a5985bfe34677e19dbf6d79215e41c8154cf2f7da1f6a092ef4b","text":"Clients encapsulate a request \"request\" using values from a key configuration: the key identifier from the configuration, \"keyID\", the key identifier from the configuration, \"keyID\", with the corresponding KEM identified by \"kemID\", the public key from the configuration, \"pkR\", and"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-875979fa721eaab1f1c24fac88b6f4124b37d90e3814be1ba4bcff35f58758ef","text":"2. Flows are bidirectional exchanges of datagrams within a single QUIC connection. These are conceptually similar to streams in the sense that they allow multiplexing of application data. Flows are identified within a connection by a numeric value, referred to as the flow ID. A flow ID is a 62-bit integer (0 to 2^62-1). In order to allow multiple exchanges of datagrams to coexist on a given QUIC connection, HTTP datagrams contain two layers of multiplexing. First, the QUIC DATAGRAM frame payload starts with an encoded stream identifier that associates the datagram with a given QUIC stream. Second, datagrams carry a context identifier (see datagram-contexts) that allows multiplexing multiple datagram contexts related to a given HTTP request. Conceptually, the first layer of multiplexing is per-hop, while the second is end-to-end. Flows lack any of the ordering or reliability guarantees of streams. Beyond this, a sender SHOULD ensure that DATAGRAM frames within a single flow are transmitted in order relative to one another. 2.1. 3. Within the scope of a given HTTP request, contexts provide an additional demultiplexing layer. Contexts determine the encoding of datagrams, and can be used to implicitly convey metadata. For example, contexts can be used for compression to elide some parts of the datagram: the context identifier then maps to a compression context that the receiver can use to reconstruct the elided data. Contexts are identified within the scope of a given request by a numeric value, referred to as the context ID. A context ID is a 62-bit integer (0 to 2^62-1). While stream IDs are a per-hop concept, context IDs are an end-to-end concept. In other words, if a datagram travels through one or more intermediaries on its way from client to server, the stream ID will most likely change from hop to hop, but the context ID will remain the same. Context IDs are opaque to intermediaries. 2.2. Implementations of HTTP/3 that support the DATAGRAM extension MUST provide a flow ID allocation service. That service will allow applications co-located with HTTP/3 to request a unique flow ID that they can subsequently use for their own purposes. The HTTP/3 implementation will then parse the flow ID of incoming DATAGRAM provide a context ID allocation service. That service will allow applications co-located with HTTP/3 to request a unique context ID that they can subsequently use for their own purposes. The HTTP/3 implementation will then parse the context ID of incoming DATAGRAM frames and use it to deliver the frame to the appropriate application context. Even-numbered flow IDs are client-initiated, while odd-numbered flow IDs are server-initiated. This means that an HTTP/3 client implementation of the flow ID allocation service MUST only provide Even-numbered context IDs are client-initiated, while odd-numbered context IDs are server-initiated. This means that an HTTP/3 client implementation of the context ID allocation service MUST only provide even-numbered IDs, while a server implementation MUST only provide odd-numbered IDs. Note that, once allocated, any flow ID can be used by both client and server - only allocation carries separate namespaces to avoid requiring synchronization. odd-numbered IDs. Note that, once allocated, any context ID can be used by both client and server - only allocation carries separate namespaces to avoid requiring synchronization. Additionally, note that the context ID namespace is tied to a given HTTP request: it is possible for the same numeral context ID to be used simultaneously in distinct requests. 4. 3. When used with HTTP/3, the Datagram Data field of QUIC DATAGRAM frames uses the following format (using the notation from the \"Notational Conventions\" section of QUIC): A variable-length integer indicating the Flow ID of the datagram (see datagram-flows). A variable-length integer that contains the value of the client- initiated bidirectional stream that this datagram is associated with, divided by four. (The division by four stems from the fact that HTTP requests are sent on client-initiated bidirectional streams, and those have stream IDs that are divisible by four.) A variable-length integer indicating the context ID of the datagram (see datagram-contexts). The payload of the datagram, whose semantics are defined by individual applications. Note that this field can be empty. Intermediaries parse the Quarter Stream ID field in order to associate the QUIC DATAGRAM frame with a stream. If an intermediary receives a QUIC DATAGRAM frame whose payload is too short to allow parsing the Quarter Stream ID field, the intermediary MUST treat it as an HTTP/3 connection error of type H3_GENERAL_PROTOCOL_ERROR. Intermediaries MUST ignore any HTTP/3 Datagram fields after the Quarter Stream ID. Endpoints parse both the Quarter Stream ID field and the Context ID field in order to associate the QUIC DATAGRAM frame with a stream and context within that stream. If an endpoint receives a QUIC DATAGRAM frame whose payload is too short to allow parsing the Quarter Stream ID field, the endpoint MUST treat it as an HTTP/3 connection error of type H3_GENERAL_PROTOCOL_ERROR. If an endpoint receives a QUIC DATAGRAM frame whose payload is long enough to allow parsing the Quarter Stream ID field but too short to allow parsing the Context ID field, the endpoint MUST abruptly terminate the corresponding stream with a stream error of type H3_GENERAL_PROTOCOL_ERROR. If a DATAGRAM frame is received and its Quarter Stream ID maps to a stream that has already been closed, the receiver MUST silently drop that frame. If a DATAGRAM frame is received and its Quarter Stream ID maps to a stream that has not yet been created, the receiver SHALL either drop that frame silently or buffer it temporarily while awaiting the creation of the corresponding stream. 4. CAPSULE allows reliably sending request-related information end-to- end, even in the presence of HTTP intermediaries. CAPSULE is an HTTP/3 Frame (as opposed to a QUIC frame) which SHALL only be sent in client-initiated bidirectional streams. Intermediaries MUST forward all received CAPSULE frames in their unmodified entirety on the same stream where it would forward DATA frames. Intermediaries MUST NOT send any CAPSULE frames other than the ones it is forwarding. This specification of CAPSULE currently uses HTTP/3 frame type 0xffcab5. If this document is approved, a lower number will be requested from IANA. The Type and Length fields follows the definition of HTTP/3 frames from H3. The payload consists of: The type of this capsule. Data whose semantics depends on the Capsule Type. Endpoints which receive a Capsule with an unknown Capsule Type MUST silently drop that Capsule. Intermediaries MUST forward Capsules, even if they do not know the Capsule Type or cannot parse the Capsule Data. 4.1. The REGISTER_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsule (type=0x00) allows an endpoint to inform its peer of the encoding and semantics of datagrams associated with a given context ID. Its Capsule Data field consists of: The context ID to register. A string of comma-separated key-value pairs to enable extensibility. Keys are registered with IANA, see iana-keys. The ABNF for the Extension String field is as follows (using syntax from Section 3.2.6 of RFC7230): Note that these registrations are unilateral and bidirectional: the sender of the frame unilaterally defines the semantics it will apply to the datagrams it sends and receives using this context ID. Once a context ID is registered, it can be used in both directions. Endpoints MUST NOT send DATAGRAM frames using a Context ID until they have either sent or received a REGISTER_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT Capsule with the same Context ID. However, due to reordering, an endpoint that receives a DATAGRAM frame with an unknown Context ID MUST NOT treat it as an error, it SHALL instead drop the DATAGRAM frame silently, or buffer it temporarily while awaiting the corresponding REGISTER_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT Capsule. Endpoints MUST NOT register the same Context ID twice on the same stream. This also applies to Context IDs that have been closed using a CLOSE_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsule. Clients MUST NOT register server- initiated Context IDs and servers MUST NOT register client-initiated Context IDs. If an endpoint receives a REGISTER_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsule that violates one or more of these requirements, the endpoint MUST abruptly terminate the corresponding stream with a stream error of type H3_GENERAL_PROTOCOL_ERROR. 4.2. The CLOSE_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsule (type=0x01) allows an endpoint to inform its peer that it will no longer send or parse received datagrams associated with a given context ID. Its Capsule Data field consists of: The context ID to close. A string of comma-separated key-value pairs to enable extensibility, see the definition of the same field in register- capsule for details. Note that this close is unilateral and bidirectional: the sender of the frame unilaterally informs its peer of the closure. Endpoints can use CLOSE_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsules to close a context that was initially registered by either themselves, or by their peer. Endpoints MAY use the CLOSE_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsule to immediately reject a context that was just registered using a REGISTER_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsule if they find its Extension String to be unacceptable. After an endpoint has either sent or received a CLOSE_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT frame, it MUST NOT send any DATAGRAM frames with that Context ID. However, due to reordering, an endpoint that receives a DATAGRAM frame with a closed Context ID MUST NOT treat it as an error, it SHALL instead drop the DATAGRAM frame silently. Endpoints MUST NOT close a Context ID that was not previously registered. Endpoints MUST NOT close a Context ID that has already been closed. If an endpoint receives a CLOSE_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsule that violates one or more of these requirements, the endpoint MUST abruptly terminate the corresponding stream with a stream error of type H3_GENERAL_PROTOCOL_ERROR. 4.3. The DATAGRAM capsule (type=0x02) allows an endpoint to send a datagram frame over an HTTP stream. This is particularly useful when using a version of HTTP that does not support QUIC DATAGRAM frames. Its Capsule Data field consists of: A variable-length integer indicating the context ID of the datagram (see datagram-contexts). The payload of the datagram, whose semantics are defined by individual applications. Note that this field can be empty. Endpoints MUST treat receipt of a DATAGRAM frame whose payload is too short to parse the flow ID as an HTTP/3 connection error of type H3_GENERAL_PROTOCOL_ERROR. Datagrams sent using the DATAGRAM Capsule have the exact same semantics as datagrams sent in QUIC DATAGRAM frames. 5."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-8779c8f9f406c86afab125cc5451f09addb093083931a3f1a69ac7788d028f6b","text":"A TCP connection error is signaled with QUIC RESET_STREAM frame. A proxy treats any error in the TCP connection, which includes receiving a TCP segment with the RST bit set, as a stream error of type HTTP_CONNECT_ERROR (http-error-codes). Correspondingly, a proxy MUST send a TCP segment with the RST bit set if it detects an error with the stream or the QUIC connection. type HTTP_CONNECT_ERROR (http-error-codes). Correspondingly, if a proxy detects an error with the stream or the QUIC connection, it MUST close the TCP connection. If the underlying TCP implementation permits it, the proxy SHOULD send a TCP segment with the RST bit set. 4.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-87fa8ab52c776bcf529deb5d644f004abf4ba6e1e1fbda9254c23fe68a3834b3","text":"9. 9.1. M00TODO: Put in generalities about sigature algorithms and parameters. 9.2. 9.1. ECDSA DSS defines a signature algorithm using ECC."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-8804883e4b77d4cdb15aec4e6cb1a76fee05690a49c345532e119e6ebd4a18f9","text":"The \"path\" field of a Commit message MUST be populated if the Commit covers at least one Update or Remove proposal, i.e., if the length of the \"updates\" or \"removes vectors is greater than zero. The \"path\"field MUST also be populated if the Commit covers no proposals at all (i.e., if all three proposal vectors are empty). The \"path\"field MAY be omitted if the Commit covers only Add proposals. In pseudocode, the logic for whether the \"path` field is required is as follows: the \"updates\" or \"removes\" vectors is greater than zero. The \"path\" field MUST also be populated if the Commit covers no proposals at all (i.e., if all three proposal vectors are empty). The \"path\" field MAY be omitted if the Commit covers only Add proposals. In pseudocode, the logic for whether the \"path\" field is required is as follows: To summarize, a Commit can have three different configurations, with different uses:"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-882fa5d8ba59b246e39a2b50d8305f78634ac80d1c343800b2994e516fe3f407","text":"12.3.21. Protocol Property (Generic) Integer Connection This Property is a non-negative integer representing the relative inverse priority of this Connection relative to other Connections in the same Connection Group. It has no effect on Connections not part of a Connection Group. As noted in groups, this property is not entangled when Connections are cloned. Integer Connection Property - see 12.3.22. [TODO: Discuss: should we remove this? Whether we need this or the other depends on how we want to implement multi-streaming. We don't need both, so we should make a decision.] need both, so we should make a decision. @mwelzl - These are really two different things @philsbln] Integer Message Property - see msg-niceness."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-885579f4577f791980c2f741a53c63cda5459f6a2aad11289d511fff99524648","text":"5.6. In addition to measurements media players use to guide their segment- by-segment adaptive streaming requests, streaming media providers may also rely on measurements collected from media players to provide analytics that can be used for decisions such as whether the adaptive encoding bitrates in use are the best ones to provide to media players, or whether current media content caching is providing the best experience for viewers. To that effect, the Consumer Technology Association (CTA) who owns the Web Application Video Ecosystem (WAVE) project has published two important specifications. 5.6.1. Media players use measurements to guide their segment-by-segment adaptive streaming requests, but may also provide measurements to streaming media providers. In turn, providers may base analytics on these measurements, to guide decisions such as whether adaptive encoding bitrates in use are the best ones to provide to media players, or whether current media content caching is providing the best experience for viewers. To that effect, the Consumer Technology Association (CTA) who owns the Web Application Video Ecosystem (WAVE) project has published two important specifications. CTA-2066: Streaming Quality of Experience Events, Properties and Metrics CTA-2066 specifies a set of media player events, properties, quality of experience (QoE) metrics and associated terminology for"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-889c0dcd6f69eb349637a30e21baa54243226f9fc2662fcd248e9b046b865b0e","text":"Prior to receiving an ACK_FREQUENCY frame, endpoints send acknowledgements as specified in Section 13.2.1 of QUIC-TRANSPORT. On receiving an ACK_FREQUENCY frame and updating its recorded \"max_ack_delay\" and \"Ack-Eliciting Threshold\" values (ack-frequency- frame), the endpoint MUST send an acknowledgement when one of the following conditions are met: On receiving an ACK_FREQUENCY frame and updating its \"max_ack_delay\" and \"Ack-Eliciting Threshold\" values (ack-frequency-frame), the endpoint sends an acknowledgement when one of the following conditions are met: Since the last acknowledgement was sent, the number of received ack-eliciting packets is greater than or equal to the recorded \"Ack-Eliciting Threshold\". ack-eliciting packets is greater than the \"Ack-Eliciting Threshold\". Since the last acknowledgement was sent, \"max_ack_delay\" amount of time has passed."}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-88d6b8428aae431033222f4b05a5cb674530c3dfead30ef4147463705bd57294","text":"This document provides usage guidance for external Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs) in Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 as defined in RFC 8446. This document lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under certain assumptions, and then demonstrates how violations of these assumptions lead to attacks. This document discusses PSK use cases and provisioning processes. This document provides advice for applications to help meet these assumptions. This document also lists the privacy and security properties that are not provided by TLS 1.3 when external PSKs are used. It lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under certain assumptions, and then demonstrates how violations of these assumptions lead to attacks. Advice for applications to help meet these assumptions is provided. It also discusses PSK use cases and provisioning processes. Finally, it lists the privacy and security properties that are not provided by TLS 1.3 when external PSKs are used. 1."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-890d0e7788edb0978f72a0f35c1c26aedfed62d48899ffb83a68b757a9404512","text":"4.2. TCP conflates transmission order at the sender with delivery order at the receiver, which results in retransmissions of the same data carrying the same sequence number, and consequently leads to \"retransmission ambiguity\". QUIC separates the two. QUIC uses a packet number to indicate transmission order. Application data is sent in one or more streams and delivery order is determined by stream offsets encoded within STREAM frames. the receiver, resulting in the retransmission ambiguity problem (RETRANSMISSION). QUIC separates transmission order from delivery order: packet numbers indicate transmission order, and delivery order is determined by the stream offsets in STREAM frames. QUIC's packet number is strictly increasing within a packet number space, and directly encodes transmission order. A higher packet"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-890e13a03f136342b404601b0d9e55a8bdc7182c0a266b91c9fad7face18d8c5","text":"2. The design goal is to be able to send simple sensor measurements in small packets on mesh networks from large numbers of constrained devices. Keeping the total size of payload under 80 bytes makes this easy to use on a wireless mesh network. It is always difficult to define what small code is, but there is a desire to be able to implement this in roughly 1 KB of flash on a 8 bit microprocessor. Experience with power meters and other large scale deployments has indicated that the solution needs to support allowing multiple measurements to be batched into a single HTTP or CoAP request. This \"batch\" upload capability allows the server side to efficiently support a large number of devices. It also conveniently supports batch transfers from proxies and storage devices, even in situations where the sensor itself sends just a single data item at a time. The multiple measurements could be from multiple related sensors or from the same sensor but at different times. small packets from large numbers of constrained devices. Keeping the total size of payload small makes it easy to use SenML also in constrained networks, e.g., in a 6LoWPAN RFC4944. It is always difficult to define what small code is, but there is a desire to be able to implement this in roughly 1 KB of flash on a 8 bit microprocessor. Experience with power meters and other large scale deployments has indicated that the solution needs to support allowing multiple measurements to be batched into a single HTTP or CoAP request. This \"batch\" upload capability allows the server side to efficiently support a large number of devices. It also conveniently supports batch transfers from proxies and storage devices, even in situations where the sensor itself sends just a single data item at a time. The multiple measurements could be from multiple related sensors or from the same sensor but at different times. The basic design is an array with a series of measurements. The following example shows two measurements made at different times."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-891526db026660e7ea3592e1903a46c81f4c1f61617a77439e88e094bc681755","text":"If the nodelist is empty, the conversion result is \"LogicalFalse\". Extraction of a value from a nodelist can be performed in several ways, so an implicit conversion from \"NodesType\" to \"ValueType\" may be surprising and has therefore not been defined. A function expression with a declared type of \"NodesType\" can indirectly be used as an argument for a parameter of declared type \"ValueType\" by wrapping the expression in a call to a function extension such as \"value\" (see value). Notes: Extraction of a value from a nodelist can be performed in several ways, so an implicit conversion from \"NodesType\" to \"ValueType\" may be surprising and has therefore not been defined. A function expression with a declared type of \"NodesType\" can indirectly be used as an argument for a parameter of declared type \"ValueType\" by wrapping the expression in a call to a function extension, such as \"value()\" (see value), that takes a parameter of type \"NodesType\" and returns a result of type \"ValueType\". The well-typedness of function expressions can now be defined in terms of this type system."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-89519d27c88b5e08a4fa6bc63e437ff43db94586d98684650e863ebd6545a4fd","text":"Section 8.2 of I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns describes a second downgrade attack where an attacker can block connections to the encrypted DNS server, and recommends that clients prevent it by switching to SVCB- reliant behavior once SVCB resolution does succeed. For DDR, this means that once a client discovers a compatible Designated Resolver, it SHOULD NOT use unencrypted DNS until the SVCB record expires, unless verification of the resolver fails. server. For DDR, clients need to validate a Designated Resolver using a connection to the server before trusting it, so attackers that can block these connections can prevent clients from switching to use encrypted DNS. DoH resolvers that allow discovery using DNS SVCB answers over unencrypted DNS MUST NOT provide differentiated behavior based on the"}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-8988846c21a79a3356f55d6a8352b08bb4165d139840a20834c8d8fbc8797ea6","text":"param_value_definition : If for any one of the endpoints the parameter is absent or set to 0, or if the two endpoints select incompatible values, one proposing 0x1 and the other proposing 0x2, the endpoints MUST fallback to QUIC- TRANSPORT with single path and MUST NOT use any frame or mechanism defined in this document. If an endpoint proposes the value 0x3, the value proposed by the other is accepted. If both endpoints propose the value 0x3, the value 0x2 is negotiated. the endpoints MUST fallback to QUIC-TRANSPORT with single active path and MUST NOT use any frame or mechanism defined in this document. If endpoint receives unexpected value for the transport parameter \"enable_multipath\", it MUST treat this as a connection error of type"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-89a8bbfc543d08ec4504d0d18f941e849965a63a3eaa6e128a0f8b3bf0a396bf","text":"The helper handles well-formed requests as follows. (As usual, malformed requests are handled as described in pa-error-common- aborts.) It first looks for the PDA parameters \"PDAParam\" for which \"PDAAggregateReq.task_id\" is equal to the task id derived from \"PDAAggregateReq.task_id\" is equal to the task ID derived from \"PDAParam\". The response consists of the helper's updated state and a sequence of"}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-8a08b6bfbd3721c647e50b21f09729b2956f91371434fda8bb25f9616e5ede4b","text":"handshake even though the Retry itself was sent using the original version. 6.2. 7.2. QUIC version 1 uses TLS 1.3, which supports session resumption by sending session tickets in one connection that can be used in a later"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-8a40c246ab9e94b517e69237d66b8806b408e86c1b89be2ee8fc5e51093e8b3f","text":"for other control processes, and a short header that may be used for data transmission in an established connection. While the long header always exposes some information (such as the version and Connection IDs), the short header only optionally exposes a single Connection ID. Given that exposing this information may make it possible to associate multiple addresses with a single client during rebinding, which has privacy implications, an application may indicate to not support exposure of certain information after the handshake. Specifically, an application that has additional information that the client is not behind a NAT and the server is not behind a load balancer, and therefore it is unlikely that the addresses will be re- bound, may indicate to the transport that is wishes to not expose a Connection IDs), the short header exposes at most only a single Connection ID. 6.1. QUIC supports a server-generated Connection ID, transmitted to the client during connection establishment (see Section 6.1 of QUIC). Servers behind load balancers should propose a Connection ID during the handshake, encoding the identity of the server or information about its load balancing pool, in order to support stateless load balancing. Once the server generates a Connection ID that encodes its identity, every CDN load balancer would be able to forward the packets to that server without needing information about every specific flow it is forwarding. Server-generated Connection IDs must not encode any information other that that needed to route packets to the appropriate backend server(s): typically the identity of the backend server or pool of servers, if the data-center's load balancing system keeps \"local\" state of all flows itself. Care must be exercised to ensure that the information encoded in the Connection ID is not sufficient to identify unique end users. Note that by encoding routing information in the Connection ID, load balancers open up a new attack vector that allows bad actors to direct traffic at a specific backend server or pool. It is therefore recommended that Server-Generated Connection ID includes a cryptographic MAC that the load balancer pool server is able to identify and discard packets featuring an invalid MAC. Servers behind load balancers may need to propose a Connection ID during the handshake, encoding the identity of the server or information about its load balancing pool, in order to support stateless load balancing. Once the server generates a Connection ID that encodes its identity, every CDN load balancer would be able to forward the packets to that server without retaining connection state. Server-generated connection IDs should seek to obscure any encoding, of routing identities or any other information. Exposing the server mapping would allow linkage of multiple IP addresses to the same host if the server also supports migration. Furthermore, this opens an attack vector on specific servers or pools. The best way to obscure an encoding is to appear random to observers, which is most rigorously achieved with encryption. 6.2. While sufficiently robust connection ID generation schemes will mitigate linkability issues, they do not provide full protection. Analysis of the lifetimes of six-tuples (source and destination addresses as well as the migrated CID) may expose these links anyway. In the limit where connection migration in a server pool is rare, it is trivial for an observer to associate two connection IDs. Conversely, in the opposite limit where every server handles multiple simultaneous migrations, even an exposed server mapping may be insufficient information. The most efficient mitigation for these attacks is operational, either by using a load balancing architecture that loads more flows onto a single server-side address, by coordinating the timing of migrations to attempt to increase the number of simultaneous migrations at a given time, or through other means. 6.3. QUIC provides a Server Retry packet that can be sent by a server in response to the Client Initial packet. The server may choose a new Connection ID in that packet and the client will retry by sending"}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-8abbca47c48547a16c9d274ae237830b3576282e5e64cb2c4e402808d25d6046","text":"Compute a COSE_Encrypt0 as defined in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of I- D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct, with the EDHOC AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher suite, using the encryption key K_4, the initialization vector IV_4, the plaintext P, and the following parameters as input (see COSE): initialization vector IV_4, the plaintext PLAINTEXT_4, and the following parameters as input (see COSE): protected = h''"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-8abc64dd3a9d0bb545378a7da2aa0b1162db573f4cf4774bf24595e78730bba0","text":"To avoid excessively small idle timeout periods, endpoints MUST increase the idle timeout period to be at least three times the current Probe Timeout (PTO). current Probe Timeout (PTO). This allows for multiple PTOs to expire prior to idle timeout, ensuring the idle timeout does not expire as a result of a single packet loss. 10.1.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-8afbe6d6449d6d791e159784b63ada130ea5dd97930e6cc0f63d026a8a00ba7d","text":"4.2.2. The ADDRESS_REQUEST capsule allows an endpoint to request assignment of an IP address from its peer. This capsule is not required for simple client/proxy communication where the client only expects to receive one address from the proxy. The capsule allows the endpoint to optionally indicate a preference for which address it would get assigned. This capsule uses a Capsule Type of 0xfff101. Its value uses the following format: The ADDRESS_REQUEST capsule (see iana-types for the value of the capsule type) allows an endpoint to request assignment of an IP address from its peer. This capsule is not required for simple client/proxy communication where the client only expects to receive one address from the proxy. The capsule allows the endpoint to optionally indicate a preference for which address it would get assigned. IP Version of this address request. MUST be either 4 or 6."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-8b017caffdd4c765c4ce14cdadabe8196db7b9f0e54bea58efa4aa728571946b","text":"must instead match what was supplied in the offer, as described above. Unless codec preferences have been set for the associated transceiver, the media formats on the m= line MUST be generated in the same order as in the current local description. Each \"a=ice-ufrag\" and \"a=ice-pwd\" line MUST stay the same, unless the m= section is restarting, in which case new ICE credentials must be created as specified in RFC5245, Section 9.2.1.1. If the"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-8b0a9c29c82ca883645ca74f33c1cc4c57e40379f7001c7673b98676172dac29","text":"following restriction: The fields of the \"o=\" line MUST stay the same except for the field, which MUST increment if the session description changes in any way, including the addition of ICE candidates. field, which MUST increment by one on each call to createOffer if the offer might differ from the output of the previous call to createOffer; implementations MAY opt to increment on every call. The value of the generated is independent of the of the current local description; in particular, in the case where the current version is N, an offer is created with version N+1, and then that offer is rolled back so that the current version is again N, the next generated offer will still have version N+2. Note that if the application creates an offer by reading currentLocalDescription instead of calling createOffer, the returned SDP may be different than when setLocalDescription was originally called, due to the addition of gathered ICE candidates, but the will not have changed. There are no known scenarios in which this causes problems, but if this is a concern, the solution is simply to use createOffer to ensure a unique . If the initial offer was applied using setLocalDescription, but an answer from the remote side has not yet been applied, meaning the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-8b9a55d4cc9d97a13fe136fa57e2f4bb0d6351661cc3c806088bafb4470f8fd2","text":"provide a signature on a signature allowing for a proof that a signature existed at a given time (i.e., a timestamp). A CoSWID SHOULD be signed, using the above mechanism, to protect the integrity of the CoSWID tag. See the security considerations (in sec-sec) for more information on why a signed CoSWID is valuable in most cases. 8. This specification allows for tagged and untagged CBOR data items"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-8be5f77c8ef321245879d535f6e7b84ecbf02163f4c1351feecaa73b9c9ec41d","text":"Before the client can upload its report to the leader, it must know the public key of each of the aggregators. These are retrieved from each aggregator by sending a request to \"[aggregator]/hpke_config\", where \"[aggregator]\" is the aggregator's endpoint URL, obtained from the task parameters. The aggregator responds to well-formed requests with status 200 and an \"HpkeConfig\" value: each aggregator by sending a request to \"[aggregator]/hpke_config?task_id=[task-id]\", where \"[aggregator]\" is the aggregator's endpoint URL, obtained from the task parameters, and \"[task-id]\" is the task ID obtained from the task parameters, encoded in Base 64 with URL and filename safe alphabet with no padding, as specified in sections 5 and 3.2 of RFC4648. If the aggregator does not recognize the task ID, then it responds with HTTP error status 404 Not Found and an error of type \"unrecognizedTask\". The aggregator responds to well-formed requests with status 200 and an \"HpkeConfig\" value: [TODO: Allow aggregators to return HTTP 403 Forbidden in deployments that use authentication to avoid leaking information about which tasks exist.] [OPEN ISSUE: Decide whether to expand the width of the id, or support multiple cipher suites (a la OHTTP/ECH).]"}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-8bff13ac4c951b092c00397ee8bfa41f9d4dcac0f609e3da6225348566e3a8b0","text":"Time-Sensitive Network. 2.3. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\", \"SHOULD\", \"SHOULD NOT\", \"RECOMMENDED\", \"NOT RECOMMENDED\", \"MAY\", and \"OPTIONAL\" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 RFC2119 RFC8174 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. The basic approach defined in I-D.ietf-detnet-mpls supports the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-8c067dd136a31a97b312127f3a7d8fc28eaeae5401d07655de7953d61a536f52","text":"match a value provided in the corresponding \"ECHConfig.cipher_suites\" list. A cryptographic hash of the \"ECHConfig\" structure from which the ECH key was obtained, i.e., from the first byte of \"version\" to the end of the structure. This hash is computed using the hash function associated with \"cipher_suite\", i.e., the corresponding HPKE KDF algorithm hash. Equal to \"Expand(Extract(\"\", config), \"ech_config_digest\", Nh)\", where \"config\" is the \"ECHConfig\" structure and \"Extract\", \"Expand\", and \"Nh\" are as specified by the cipher suite KDF. (Passing the literal \"\"\"\" as the salt is interpreted by \"Extract\" as no salt being provided.) The HPKE encapsulated key, used by servers to decrypt the corresponding \"encrypted_ch\" field."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-8c11bfe1e65c9a1421412355433d21785cee9ee08cd2bf528afacc07ab0bca48","text":"CertificateEntry. If the corresponding certificate type extension (\"server_certificate_type\" or \"client_certificate_type\") was not used or the X.509 certificate type was negotiated, then each CertificateEntry contains an X.509 certificate. The sender's certificate MUST come in the first CertificateEntry in the list. Each following certificate SHOULD directly certify one preceding it. Because certificate validation requires that trust anchors be distributed independently, a certificate that specifies a trust anchor MAY be omitted from the chain, provided that supported peers are known to possess any omitted certificates. (\"server_certificate_type\" or \"client_certificate_type\") was not negotiated in Encrypted Extensions, or the X.509 certificate type was negotiated, then each CertificateEntry contains an X.509 certificate. The sender's certificate MUST come in the first CertificateEntry in the list. Each following certificate SHOULD directly certify one preceding it. Because certificate validation requires that trust anchors be distributed independently, a certificate that specifies a trust anchor MAY be omitted from the chain, provided that supported peers are known to possess any omitted certificates. Note: Prior to TLS 1.3, \"certificate_list\" ordering required each certificate to certify the one immediately preceding it; however,"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-8c783d11e42db7caaa6c5284014124153870e5d25e7c284b6bb8142a0ba3c216","text":"That the client controls the identifier in question. This process may be repeated to associate multiple identifiers to a key pair (e.g., to request certificates with multiple identifiers) or to associate multiple accounts with an identifier (e.g., to allow This process may be repeated to associate multiple identifiers with an account (e.g., to request certificates with multiple identifiers) or to associate multiple accounts with an identifier (e.g., to allow multiple entities to manage certificates). Authorization resources are created by the server in response to certificate orders or authorization requests submitted by an account key holder; their URLs are provided to the client in the responses to newOrder or newAuthorization requests submitted by an account key holder; their URLs are provided to the client in the responses to these requests. The authorization object is implicitly tied to the account key used to sign the request. When a client receives an order from the server in reply to a new order request, it downloads the authorization resources by sending When a client receives an order from the server in reply to a newOrder request, it downloads the authorization resources by sending POST-as-GET requests to the indicated URLs. If the client initiates authorization using a request to the newAuthz resource, it will have already received the pending authorization object in the response to"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-taps-transport-security-8ca8b253588518dcb83411bb1c448efa4b0a81b5379af8e9ea11bd7006d28d7d","text":"involves sending a cookie exchange to avoid DoS attacks. Protocols: QUIC + TLS, DTLS, WireGuard 5.3. Connection Termination The security protocol may be instructed to tear down its connection and session information. This is needed by some protocols to prevent application data truncation attacks. Protocols: TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT, tcpcrypt, IKEv2 Key Update The handshake protocol may be instructed to update its keying material, either by the application directly or by the record protocol sending a key expiration event. Protocols: TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT, tcpcrypt, IKEv2 Pre-Shared Key Export The handshake protocol will generate one or more keys to be used for record encryption/decryption and authentication. These may be explicitly exportable to the application, traditionally limited to direct export to the record protocol, or inherently non-exportable because the keys must be used directly in conjunction with the record protocol. Pre-Shared Key Export The handshake protocol will generate one or more keys to be used for record encryption/decryption and authentication. These may be explicitly exportable to the application, traditionally limited to direct export to the record protocol, or inherently non-exportable because the keys must be used directly in conjunction with the record protocol. Explict export: TLS (for QUIC), tcpcrypt, IKEv2, DTLS (for SRTP)"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-8cb2c4ccf4f1c9519b4f3b1b7ea34bd43680f6d62b1a02411a088aec24d15e0d","text":"Steps: Run \"(cfg, update) = PP_Server_Setup(id)\". Run \"(cfg, update) = ServerSetup(id)\". Construct a \"config_update\" message."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-8cd0975ff6944f83493777ee2e8fe4eb3b3ff86d81d69d4cd9bfe90af28d4291","text":"Priority handling of retransmissions can be implemented by the sender in the transport layer. QUIC recommends retransmitting lost data before new data, unless indicated differently by the application. Currently, QUIC only provides fully reliable stream transmission, which means that prioritization of retransmissions will be beneficial in most cases, by filling in gaps and freeing up the flow control window. For partially reliable or unreliable streams, priority scheduling of retransmissions over data of higher-priority streams might not be desirable. For such streams, QUIC could either provide an explicit interface to control prioritization, or derive the prioritization decision from the reliability level of the stream. When a QUIC endpoint uses fully reliable streams for transmission, prioritization of retransmissions will be beneficial in most cases, filling in gaps and freeing up the flow control window. For partially reliable or unreliable streams, priority scheduling of retransmissions over data of higher-priority streams might not be desirable. For such streams, QUIC could either provide an explicit interface to control prioritization, or derive the prioritization decision from the reliability level of the stream. 4.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-8cd34460fc96bed1c9c39694c430fb9d183319be1d88033d68f266818a751074","text":"ClientHello message in their first Initial packet. The TLS implementation does not need to ensure that the ClientHello is sufficiently large. QUIC PADDING frames are added to increase the size of the packet as necessary. is large enough to meet the requirements for QUIC packets. QUIC PADDING frames are added to increase the size of the packet as necessary; see Section 14.1 of QUIC-TRANSPORT. 4.4."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-8d5e700d1e2a77fb7d450970636d7f3960efca2996db795889a3d92b960e19ba","text":"Clients using Opportunistic Discovery (opportunistic) MUST be limited to cases where the Unencrypted DNS Resolver and Designated Resolver have the same IP address. Clients which do not follow Opportunistic Discovery (opportunistic) and instead try to connect without first checking for a designation run the possible risk of being intercepted by an attacker hosting an Encrypted DNS Resolver on an IP address of an Unencrypted DNS Resolver where the attacker has failed to gain have the same IP address, which SHOULD be a private or local IP address. Clients which do not follow Opportunistic Discovery (opportunistic) and instead try to connect without first checking for a designation run the possible risk of being intercepted by an attacker hosting an Encrypted DNS Resolver on an IP address of an Unencrypted DNS Resolver where the attacker has failed to gain control of the Unencrypted DNS Resolver. The constraints on the use of Designated Resolvers specified here"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-8e48f48381ed85defb2ae8889b1875d4917b45533bb6e8b89325891a22a30699","text":"batch IDs. Thus the Aggregator needs to check that the query is associated with a known batch ID: For a CollectReq containing a query of type \"by_batch_id\", the For a CollectionReq containing a query of type \"by_batch_id\", the Leader checks that the provided batch ID corresponds to a batch ID it returned in a previous CollectResp for the task. it returned in a previous Collection for the task. For an AggregateShareReq, the Helper checks that the batch ID provided by the Leader corresponds to a batch ID used in a"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-8e4e7bc132318ac1e80db46acded7a94807b39cf70198cf93fc8d7afff93ce98","text":"For example, an If-Match Outer option is discarded, Uri-Host Outer option is not discarded, Observe is not discarded. Replace step 3 in ver-req with: B. If Observe is present in the received message, and has value 0, check if the Token, Kid and Partial IV are identical to a previously received Observe registration. In this case, replay verification is postponed until step C. Otherwise verify the 'Partial IV' parameter using the Replay Window, as described in replay-protection. Insert the following steps between step 6 and 7 of ver-req: B. If Observe was present in the received message (in step 1): C. If Observe was present in the received message (in step 1): If the value of Observe in the Outer message is 0: If Observe is present and has value 0 in the decrypted options, discard the Outer Observe; discard the Outer Observe. If the Token, Kid and Partial IV are identical to a previously received Observe registration, respond with a notification as described in observe-replay- processing; Otherwise, discard both the Outer and Inner (if present) Observe options. Observe options and verify the 'Partial IV' parameter using the Replay Window, as described in replay-protection. If the value of Observe in the Outer message is not 0, discard If the value of Observe in the Outer message is not 0, discard the decrypted Observe option if present. Insert the following steps between step 6 and 7 of ver-req: C. If the message is an Observe registration, store it in memory for later comparison with re-registrations (see replay-protection). D. If the message is an Observe cancellation, delete from memory the previously stored registration related to that observation (see replay-protection). 8.3. If a CoAP response is generated in response to an OSCORE request, the"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-8e6ca378b456b534433f202c020c7dfcd9b98ead85944a20c6a2b8ddae358add","text":"8.5. A new address is considered valid when a PATH_RESPONSE frame is received that contains the data that was sent in a previous PATH_CHALLENGE frame. Receipt of an acknowledgment for a packet containing a PATH_CHALLENGE frame is not adequate validation, since the acknowledgment can be spoofed by a malicious peer. Path validation succeeds when a PATH_RESPONSE frame is received that contains the data that was sent in a previous PATH_CHALLENGE frame. This validates the path on which the PATH_CHALLENGE was sent. Receipt of an acknowledgment for a packet containing a PATH_CHALLENGE frame is not adequate validation, since the acknowledgment can be spoofed by a malicious peer. 8.6."}
{"_id":"q-en-rtcweb-transport-8e9a727586f9308b2adec572787f583b6e569a29ec22fc87241b5c3071625f52","text":"This specification does not assume that the implementation will have access to ICMP or raw IP. The following protocols may be used, but can be implemented by a WebRTC endpoint, and are therefore not defined as \"system-provided interfaces\": TURN - Traversal Using Relays Around NAT, STUN - Session Traversal Utilities for NAT, ICE - Interactive Connectivity Establishment, RFC5245 TLS - Trasnsport Layer Security, DTLS - Datagram Transport Layer Security, RFC6347. 3.2. Web applications running in a WebRTC browser MUST be able to utilize"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-8ea2fabe68758256c0680e135a326b4074d3372ec72df1543b3d75dcf91ced1a","text":"An \"a=rtcp-mux\" line, as specified in RFC5761, Section 5.1.3. If the RTP/RTCP multiplexing policy is \"require\", an \"a=rtcp-mux- only\" line, as specified in I-D.ietf-mmusic-mux-exclusive, Section 4. An \"a=rtcp-rsize\" line, as specified in RFC5506, Section 5. Lastly, if a data channel has been created, a m= section MUST be"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-8ea48d3fe599744993536877c58dd221ac922d297ba919a5cd8a3ef8888e2dd2","text":"9.2. In addition to the SenML Fragment Identifiers described above, with the XML and EXI SenML formats also the syntax defined in the XML and EXI SenML formats also the syntax defined in the XPointer element() Scheme XPointerElement of the XPointer Framework XPointerFramework can be used. (This is required by RFC7303 for media types using the \"+xml\" structured syntax suffix. SenML allows this for the EXI formats as well for consistency.)"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-8ec4abdd4f34f0fa64f1eacb279545382f94e8436eceeaadb9f4e689910dc08d","text":"replay protection data. The operation of validating the Partial IV and updating the replay protection data MUST be atomic. 7.4.1.2. In order to allow intermediaries to re-register their interest in a resource (see 3.3.1 of RFC7641), a server receiving an Observe registration with Token, Kid and Partial IV identical to a previously received registration, and which decrypts without error SHALL not treat it as a replay and SHALL respond with a notification. The notification may be a cached copy of the latest sent notification (with the same Token, Kid and Partial IV) or it may be a newly generated notification with a fresh Partial IV. 7.5. To prevent reuse of an AEAD nonce with the same key, or from"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-8ed33d3dc480bbed337808be2ae7c7121aac0ceafe0ee2d886b1c19feb2efec0","text":"the client has accomplished the challenge. Once the validation process is complete and the server is satisfied that the client has met its requirements, the server can either proactively issue the requested certificate or wait for the client to request that the application be \"finalized\", at which point the certificate will be issued and provided to the client. that the client has met its requirements, the server will issue the requested certificate and make it available to the client. To revoke a certificate, the client simply sends a revocation request indicating the certificate to be revoked, signed with an authorized"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-8ed68ec4f47e8f466198be284068f6bef59666f91ae3b91f1378c14fa6f6dc04","text":"The hash function used for HKDF RFC5869 is that which is associated with the EPSK. It is not the hash function associated with ImportedIdentity.target_kdf. If no hash function is specified, SHA-256 SHA2 MUST be used. Diversifying EPSK by SHA-256 SHA2 SHOULD be used. Diversifying EPSK by ImportedIdentity.target_kdf ensures that an IPSK is only used as input keying material to at most one KDF, thus satisfying the requirements in RFC8446. See security-considerations for more"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-8ef1c35641b446e8e32ba75f816ea01e5e25552d9a79075a075853349448dffd","text":"12. Each Commit message is premised on a given starting state, indicated in its \"prior_epoch\" field. If the changes implied by a Commit messages are made starting from a different state, the results will be incorrect. by the \"epoch\" field of the enclosing MLSPlaintext message. If the changes implied by a Commit messages are made starting from a different state, the results will be incorrect. This need for sequencing is not a problem as long as each time a group member sends a Commit message, it is based on the most current"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-8f4c9aa1636b8be8314a4294c08a4295207e6ecd806febe1e4fea957d01b406c","text":"Minor editorial fixes in response to Gen-ART review. Random EP names: Point that multiple collisions are possible but unlikely. (For background, in the first round of attempts there's a good chance that one of the random IDs will collide due to the birthday paradox; the likelyhood for a second (or even third) collision in a row is way below that because only the colliding node(s) will retry). changes from -24 to -25 Large rework of section 7 (Security policies)"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-8f5b05c7fa31ee96bea57b15258ae6d7479bdbcc665be991f26ace7846bf963a","text":"as well as providing a public key that others can use for key agreement. The client's signature key can be updated throughout the lifetime of the group by sending a new KeyPackage with a new signature key; the new signature key MUST be validated by the Credential. However, the identity MUST be the same in both Credentials and the new Credential MUST be validated by the authentication service. When used as InitKeys, KeyPackages are intended to be used only once"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-8fdc467c7a728293e43c1f2201df477c766ca4b4719a8e53a99727a7ec6e7d2c","text":"a Preconnection allows applications to override this for more detailed control. Transport Properties MUST always be specified while security parameters are OPTIONAL. If Message Framers are used (see framing), they MUST be added to the Preconnection during pre-establishment."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-909fe41445749624a3ccba24a3cc63cdb61cad68cfd7197401dd3fb1afe1409e","text":"4.2.3. The Transport Services architecture defines a mechanism that allows applications to easily make use of various network paths and Protocol Stacks without requiring major changes in application logic. In some cases, changing which Protocol Stacks or network paths are used will require updating the preferences expressed by the application that uses the Transport Services system. For example, an application can enable the use of a multipath or multistreaming transport protocol by modifying the properties in its Pre-Connection configuration. In some cases, however, the Transport Services system will be able to automatically change Protocol Stacks without an update to the application, either by selecting a new stack entirely, or by racing multiple candidate Protocol Stacks during connection establishment. This functionality in the API can be a powerful driver of new protocol adoption, but needs to be constrained carefully to avoid unexpected behavior that can lead to functional or security problems. If two different Protocol Stacks can be safely swapped, or raced in parallel (see racing), then they are considered to be \"equivalent\". Equivalent Protocol Stacks need to meet the following criteria: Both stacks MUST offer the interface requested by the application for connection establishment and data transmission. For example, if an application requires preservation of message boundaries, a Protocol Stack that runs UDP as the top-level interface to the application is not equivalent to a Protocol Stack that runs TCP as the top-level interface. A UDP stack would allow an application to read out message boundaries based on datagrams sent from the remote system, whereas TCP does not preserve message boundaries on its own, but needs a framing protocol on top to determine message boundaries. Both stacks MUST offer the transport services that are requested by the application. For example, if an application specifies that it requires reliable transmission of data, then a Protocol Stack using UDP without any reliability layer on top would not be allowed to replace a Protocol Stack using TCP. However, if the application does not require reliability, then a Protocol Stack that adds reliability could be regarded as an equivalent Protocol Stack as long as providing this would not conflict with any other application-requested properties. Both stacks MUST offer security protocols and parameters as requested by the application I-D.ietf-taps-transport-security. Security features and properties, such as cryptographic algorithms, peer authentication, and identity privacy vary across security protocols, and across versions of security protocols. Protocol equivalence ought not to be assumed for different protocols or protocol versions, even if they offer similar application configuration options. To ensure that security protocols are not incorrectly swapped, Transport Services systems SHOULD only automatically generate equivalent Protocol Stacks when the transport security protocols within the stacks are identical. Specifically, a Transport Services system would consider protocols identical only if they are of the same type and version. For example, the same version of TLS running over two different transport Protocol Stacks are considered equivalent, whereas TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 RFC8446 are not considered equivalent. However, Transport Services systems MAY allow applications to indicate that they consider two different transport protocols equivalent, e.g., to allow fallback to TLS 1.2 if TLS 1.3 is not available. 4.2.4. By default, stored properties of the implementation, such as cached protocol state, cached path state, and heuristics, may be shared (e.g. across multiple connections in an application). This provides"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-90ec8d3e20525ef26c48aa3b704937e1aa563219cf06525bec5672469243e84d","text":"Partial IV MUST always be compared with the Notification Number, which thus MUST NOT be forgotten after 128 seconds. Further details of replay protection of notifications are specified in replay- protection. The client MAY ignore the Observe option value. protection. Clients can re-register observations to ensure that the observation is still active and establish freshness again (RFC7641 Section 3.3.1). When an OSCORE observation is refreshed, not only the ETags, but also the partial IV (and thus the payload and OSCORE option) change. The server uses the new request's Partial IV as the 'request_piv' of new responses. Section 3.3.1). When an OSCORE protected observation is refreshed, not only the ETags, but also the partial IV (and thus the payload and OSCORE option) change. The server uses the new request's Partial IV as the 'request_piv' of new responses. 4.1.3.5."}
{"_id":"q-en-webrtc-http-ingest-protocol-912dbf9f14e24806404606b1a9a828babf9bffe807d8723fd8dd15f5c80770de","text":"its adoption in the broadcasting/streaming industry is lagging behind. Currently, there is no standard protocol designed for ingesting media into a streaming service using WebRTC and so content providers still rely heavily on protocols like RTMP for doing so. These protocols are much older than WebRTC and by default lack some important security and resilience features provided by WebRTC with minimal overhead and additional latency. The media codecs used for ingestion in older protocols tend to be limited and not negotiated. WebRTC includes support for negotiation of codecs, potentially alleviating transcoding on the ingest node (which can introduce delay and degrade media quality). Server side transcoding that has traditionally been done to present multiple renditions in Adaptive Bit Rate Streaming (ABR) implementations can be replaced with Simulcast RFC8853 and SVC codecs that are well supported by WebRTC clients. In addition, WebRTC clients can adjust client-side encoding parameters based on RTCP feedback to maximize encoding quality. Encryption is mandatory in WebRTC, therefore secure transport of media is implicit. The IETF RTCWEB working group standardized JSEP (RFC8829), a mechanism used to control the setup, management, and teardown of a multimedia session. It also describes how to negotiate media flows"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-914c745c9afabe6be67b689ea5a3594034453c96b7a0e4b73283e7c7a185b70d","text":"This information is aggregated in a \"PublicGroupState\" object as follows: \"struct { CipherSuite cipher_suite; opaque group_id<0..255>; uint64 epoch; opaque tree_hash<0..255>; opaque interim_transcript_hash<0..255>; Extension extensions<0..2^32-1>; HPKEPublicKey external_pub; } PublicGroupState; \" Note that the \"tree_hash\" field is used the same way as in the Welcome message. The full tree can be included via the \"ratchet_tree\" extension ratchet-tree-extension. The information above are not deemed public data in general, but applications can choose to make them available to new members in order to allow External Commits. The signature MUST verify using the public key taken from the credential in the leaf node at position \"signer_index\". The signature covers the following structure, comprising all the fields in the PublicGroupState above \"signer_index\": This signature authenticates the HPKE public key, so that the joiner knows that the public key was provided by a member of the group. The fields that are not signed are included in the key schedule via the GroupContext object. If the joiner is provided an inaccurate data for these fields, then its external Commit will have an incorrect \"confirmation_tag\" and thus be rejected. The information in a PublicGroupState is not deemed public in general, but applications can choose to make it available to new members in order to allow External Commits. External Commits work like regular Commits, with a few differences:"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-918dbf8f4773d9146dcc460181084bf2d252612a75faaefe38b9782b3d8c72ec","text":"the server is not overly constrained by the amplification restriction. Packet loss, in particular loss of a Handshake packet from the server, can cause a situation in which the server cannot send when the client has no data to send and the anti-amplification limit is reached. In order to avoid this causing a handshake deadlock, clients MUST send a packet upon a probe timeout, as described in QUIC-RECOVERY. If the client has no data to retransmit and does not have Handshake keys, it MUST send an Initial packet in a UDP datagram of at least 1200 bytes. If the client has Handshake keys, it SHOULD send a Handshake packet. Loss of an Initial or Handshake packet from the server can cause a deadlock if the client does not send additional Initial or Handshake packets. A deadlock could occur when the server reaches its anti- amplification limit and the client has received acknowledgements for all the data it has sent. In this case, when the client has no reason to send additional packets, the server will be unable to send more data because it has not validated the client's address. To prevent this deadlock, clients MUST send a packet on a probe timeout (PTO, see Section 5.3 of QUIC-RECOVERY). Specifically, the client MUST send an Initial packet in a UDP datagram of at least 1200 bytes if it does not have Handshake keys, and otherwise send a Handshake packet. A server might wish to validate the client address before starting the cryptographic handshake. QUIC uses a token in the Initial packet"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-91dc795aa79eba959b3b1fc806d992c21fc42376529a290fe169a371530d19ed","text":"then the server SHOULD change the status of the order to \"invalid\" and MAY delete the order resource. The server MUST issue the requested certificate and update the order resource with a URL for the certificate shortly after the client has fulfilled the server's requirements. If the client has already satisfied the server's requirements at the time of this request (e.g., by obtaining authorization for all of the identifiers in the certificate in previous transactions), then the server MUST proactively issue the requested certificate and provide a URL for it in the \"certificate\" field of the order. The server MUST, however, still list the completed authorizations in the \"authorizations\" array. The server MUST begin the issuance process for the requested certificate and update the order resource with a URL for the certificate once the client has fulfilled the server's requirements. If the client has already satisfied the server's requirements at the time of this request (e.g., by obtaining authorization for all of the identifiers in the certificate in previous transactions), then the server MUST proactively issue the requested certificate and provide a URL for it in the \"certificate\" field of the order. The server MUST, however, still list the completed authorizations in the \"authorizations\" array. Once the client believes it has fulfilled the server's requirements, it should send a GET request to the order resource to obtain its"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-9208fd828069a86575a6e7144e0d719e261980117a91408a4f8f781122572541","text":"2.4.7. The \"search\" function extension provides a way to check whether a The \"search()\" function extension provides a way to check whether a given string contains a substring that matches a given regular expression, which is in I-D.draft-ietf-jsonpath-iregexp form."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-922a8ca97b32e3b743d50fa816d684b59a7a46c720643d75fe1fd98d17435490","text":"AggregateShare collect-flow: \"application/dap-aggregate-share\" CollectReq collect-flow: \"application/dap-collect-req\" CollectionReq collect-flow: \"application/dap-collect-req\" Collection collect-flow: \"application/dap-collection\""}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-92546c4c9f804cb26e5368f83a80b5d3f327270f622724245f133de3312620ef","text":"for key exchange, AES-128-GCM for HPKE, HKDF over SHA2-256, and Ed25519 for signatures. Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use. New ciphersuite values are assigned by IANA as described in iana- considerations."}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-925ab0ac7aa0cb688c485f45ab48c806708ae57fdf87f4b95239e3e317b8b4d7","text":"PSK into the devices, or using a Trust On First Use (TOFU) approach with a device completely unprotected before the first login did take place. Many devices have very limited UI. For example, they may only have a numeric keypad or even less number of buttons. When the TOFU approach is not suitable, entering the key would require typing it on a constrained UI. example, they may only have a numeric keypad or even fewer buttons. When the TOFU approach is not suitable, entering the key would require typing it on a constrained UI. Some devices provision PSKs via an out-of-band, cloud-based syncing protocol. Some secrets may be baked into or hardware or software device Some secrets may be baked into hardware or software device components. Moreover, when this is done at manufacturing time, secrets may be printed on labels or included in a Bill of Materials for ease of scanning or import."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-92ac9dba84bb9d10726b79e9d66d1bdf879cb4772fb814e786b6392d54e06740","text":"that the load balancer will redirect the next Client Initial packet to a different server in that pool. 7. 8. Versioning in QUIC may change the protocol's behavior completely, except for the meaning of a few header fields that have been declared"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-92df464175e8f6b1e58ba049ab2614b75f96b647056d036619a7d71cfa5c4c4a","text":"Internet Transport Protocols\" describes the impact of increased encryption of transport headers in general terms. It is also worth noting that considerations for heavily-encrypted transport protocols also come into play when streaming media is carried over IP-level VPNs and tunnels, with the additional consideration that an intermediary that does not possess credentials allowing decryption will not have visibility to the source and destination IP addresses of the packets being carried inside the tunnel. 7.2. Although the IETF has put considerable emphasis on end-to-end"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-92f64eae66d08e3548f501c7bdae4eb81dc18f33c44305458c02edf092b39943","text":"is not present or does not validate, the server MUST abort the handshake. Servers SHOULD NOT attempt to validate multiple binders; rather they SHOULD select a single PSK and validate solely the binder that corresponds to that PSK. See [client-hello-recording] for the security rationale for this requirement. In order to accept PSK key establishment, the server sends a \"pre_shared_key\" extension indicating the selected identity. that corresponds to that PSK. See [client-hello-recording] and [psk- identity-exposure] for the security rationale for this requirement. In order to accept PSK key establishment, the server sends a \"pre_shared_key\" extension indicating the selected identity. Clients MUST verify that the server's selected_identity is within the range supplied by the client, that the server selected a cipher suite"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-92f95fb903cfee0f6206687b6aaa0369409468011f7d73996156478fb9681ceb","text":"recognition of the handshake, as illustrated in handshake. It can also be inferred during the flow's lifetime, if the endpoints use the spin bit facility described below and in Section 17.3.1 of QUIC- TRANSPORT. TRANSPORT. RTT measurement is available to unidirectional observers when the spin bit is enabled. 3.8.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-9317fa1f0c8526ef5bc1042ca034c06f4cac4e3ebfbf27effbc6f7aa16bdf018","text":"Delimiter-separated formats, such as HTTP/1.1. Common Message Framers can be provided by the Transport Services implementation, but an implemention ought to allow custom Message implementation, but an implementation ought to allow custom Message Framers to be defined by the application or some other piece of software. This section describes one possible interface for defining Message Framers as an example."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-93552cd360cffd36f28531e2a6c1f753463420624ce8f8d233f0afb3b388a322","text":"Each POST request to an aggregator contains a \"PDATaskID\". If the aggregator does not recognize the task, i.e., it can't find a \"PDAParam\" for which the derived task id matches the \"PDATaskID\", \"PDAParam\" for which the derived task ID matches the \"PDATaskID\", then it aborts and alerts the peer with \"unrecognized task\". 4."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-939ebc28cc65e3da05d0c07aae2c77dd651b8faa86e35bf1fc907ee114a0d333","text":"exchange-summary shows the multiple packets that form a single \"flight\" of messages being processed individually, to show what incoming messages trigger different actions. New handshake messages are requested after incoming packets have been processed. This process varies based on the structure of endpoint implementations and the order in which packets arrive; this is intended to illustrate the steps involved in a single handshake exchange. incoming messages trigger different actions. This shows multiple \"Get Handshake\" invocations to retrieve handshake messages at different encryption levels. New handshake messages are requested after incoming packets have been processed. exchange-summary shows one possible structure for a simple handshake exchange. The exact process varies based on the structure of endpoint implementations and the order in which packets arrive. Implementations could use a different number of operations or execute them in other orders. 4.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-93ab3ba9ec23e7a9661f4bc8950f61e352cb733f5627712fe54ceb8acafb38b7","text":"used to fine-tune the eventually established connection. These Connection Properties can also be used to monitor and fine-tune established connections. The behavior of the selected protocol stack(s) when sending Messages is controlled by Message Context Properties message-props. Collectively, Selection, Connection, and Message Context Properties can be referred to as Transport Properties. All Transport Properties, regardless of the phase in which they are used, are organized within a single namespace. This enables setting them as defaults in earlier stages and querying them in later stages: - Connection Properties can be set on Preconnections - Message Properties can be set on Preconnections and Connections - The effect of Selection Properties can be queried on Connections and Messages stack(s) when sending Messages is controlled by Message Properties message-props. Collectively, Selection, Connection, and Message Properties can be referred to as Transport Properties. All Transport Properties, regardless of the phase in which they are used, are organized within a single namespace. This enables setting them as defaults in earlier stages and querying them in later stages: - Connection Properties can be set on Preconnections - Message Properties can be set on Preconnections and Connections - The effect of Selection Properties can be queried on Connections and Messages Transport Properties can have one of a set of data types:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mptcp-rfc6824bis-93fb968f7cc3668c56b026ffe9f4a7f317320ea54e64268d2d50318c69b78179","text":"performing subflows or subflows that regularly fail during use, in order to temporarily choose not to use these paths. 3.11. TCP Fast Open, described in RFC7413, has been introduced with the objective of gaining one RTT before transmitting data. This is considered a valuable gain as very short connections are very common, especially for HTTP request/response schemes. It achieves this by sending the SYN-segment together with data and allowing the server to reply immediately with data after the SYN/ACK. RFC7413 secures this mechanism, by using a new TCP option that includes a cookie which is negotiated in a preceding connection. When using TCP Fast Open in conjunction with MPTCP, there are two key points to take into account, detailed hereafter. 3.11.1. When a TFO client first connects to a server, it cannot immediately include data in the SYN for security reasons RFC7413. Instead, it requests a cookie that will be used in subsequent connections. This is done with the TCP cookie request/response options, of resp. 2 bytes and 6-18 bytes (depending on the chosen cookie length). TFO and MPTCP can be combined provided that the total length of their options does not exceed the maximum 40 bytes possible in TCP: In the SYN: MPTCP uses a 4-bytes long MP_CAPABLE option. The MPTCP and TFO options sum up to 6 bytes. With typical TCP-options using up to 19 bytes in the SYN (24 bytes if options are padded at a word boundary), there is enough space to combine the MP_CAPABLE with the TFO Cookie Request. In the SYN+ACK: MPTCP uses a 12-bytes long MP_CAPABLE option, but now TFO can be as long as 18 bytes. Since the maximum option length may be exceeded, it is up to the server to solve this by using a shorter cookie. As an example, if we consider that 19 bytes are used for classical TCP options, the maximum possible cookie length would be of 7 bytes. Note that the same limitation applies to subsequent connections, for the SYN packet (because the client then echoes back the cookie to the server). Finally, if the security impact of reducing the cookie size is not deemed acceptable, the server can reduce the amount of other TCP-options by omitting the TCP timestamps (as outlined in app_options). 3.11.2. MPTCP uses, in the TCP establishment phase, a key exchange that is used to generate the Initial Data Sequence Numbers (IDSNs). In particular, the SYN with MP_CAPABLE occupies the first octet of the data sequence space. With TFO, one way to handle the data sent together with the SYN would be to consider an implicit DSS mapping that covers that SYN segment (since there is not enough space in the SYN to include a DSS option). The problem with that approach is that if a middlebox modifies the TFO data, this will not be noticed by MPTCP because of the absence of a DSS-checksum. For example, a TCP (but not MPTCP)-aware middlebox could insert bytes at the beginning of the stream and adapt the TCP checksum and sequence numbers accordingly. With an implicit mapping, this would give to client and server a different view on the DSS-mapping, with no way to detect this inconsistency as the DSS checksum is not present. To solve this, the TFO data should not be considered part of the Data Sequence Number space: the SYN with MP_CAPABLE still occupies the first octet of data sequence space, but then the first non-TFO data byte occupies the second octet. This guarantees that, if the use of DSS-checksum is negotiated, all data in the data sequence number space is checksummed. We also note that this does not entail a loss of functionality, because TFO-data is always sent when only one path is active. 3.11.3. The following shows a few examples of possible TFO+MPTCP establishment scenarios. Before a client can send data together with the SYN, it must request a cookie to the server, as shown in Figure fig_tfocookie. This is done by simply combining the TFO and MPTCP options. Once this is done, the received cookie can be used for TFO, as shown in Figure fig_tfodata. In this example, the client first sends 20 bytes in the SYN. The server immediately replies with 100 bytes following the SYN-ACK upon which the client replies with 20 more bytes. Note that the last segment in the figure has a TCP sequence number of 21, while the DSS subflow sequence number is 1 (because the TFO data is not part of the data sequence number space, as explained in Section tfodata. In Figure fig_tfofallback, the server does not support TFO. The client detects that no state is created in the server (as no data is acked), and now sends the MP_CAPABLE in the third ack, in order for the server to build its MPTCP context at then end of the establishment. Now, the tfo data, retransmitted, becomes part of the data sequence mapping because it is effectively sent (in fact re- sent) after the establishment. It is also possible that the server acknowledges only part of the TFO data, as illustrated in Figure fig_tfopartial. The client will simply retransmit the missing data together with a DSS-mapping. 4. In order to support multipath operation, the semantics of some TCP"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-9402a287dae138f0b9f5c2a48267fdfd4fcde493def2dc97826b4fa89d43f906","text":"server, can cause a situation in which the server cannot send when the client has no data to send and the anti-amplification limit is reached. In order to avoid this causing a handshake deadlock, clients SHOULD send a packet upon a probe timeout, as described in clients MUST send a packet upon a probe timeout, as described in QUIC-RECOVERY. If the client has no data to retransmit and does not have Handshake keys, it SHOULD send an Initial packet in a UDP datagram of at least 1200 bytes. If the client has Handshake keys, it SHOULD send a Handshake packet. have Handshake keys, it MUST send an Initial packet in a UDP datagram of at least 1200 bytes. If the client has Handshake keys, it SHOULD send a Handshake packet. A server might wish to validate the client address before starting the cryptographic handshake. QUIC uses a token in the Initial packet"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-9416d61252fec6f74a41640528da78a66b504bb15ae09993146e714640dbd0b0","text":"ACK-Eliciting Threshold, an endpoint can expect that the peer will not need to wait for its \"max_ack_delay\" period before sending an acknowledgement. In such cases, the endpoint MAY therefore exclude the peer's 'max_ack_delay' from its PTO calculation. Note that this optimization requires some care in implementation, since it can cause premature PTOs under packet loss when \"ignore_order\" is enabled. the peer's 'max_ack_delay' from its PTO calculation. When Ignore Order is enabled and loss causes the peer to not receive enough packets to trigger an immediate acknowledgement, the receiver will wait 'max_ack_delay', increasing the chances of a premature PTO. Therefore, if Ignore Order is enabled, the PTO MUST be larger than the peer's 'max_ack_delay'. 9."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-94302b41bde1f0bbfbef8f1e83c0f6b83e8a7aa7deafb49e7a2823be0c7fb7a0","text":"There are two primary use cases for this protocol. The primary one is to prevent on-path network devices from The primary use case is to prevent on-path network devices from interfering with native DNS operations. This interference includes, but is not limited to, spoofing DNS responses, blocking DNS requests, and tracking. HTTP authentication and proxy friendliness are"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-94ca5cbbaa220ec7c15ee58618e4e7bcd5cfcaec3d68c0f97d9f8bc023f8b71f","text":"ClientEncryptedCH.encrypted_ch. This matching procedure should be done using one of the following two checks: Compare ClientEncryptedCH.config_digest against cryptographic hashes of known ECHConfig and choose the one that matches. Compare ClientEncryptedCH.config_digest against digests of known ECHConfig and choose the one that matches. Use trial decryption of ClientEncryptedCH.encrypted_ch with known ECHConfig and choose the one that succeeds."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-9546fb4cadf7a7ae444ef4fe80b4040348bba9bced523fef876755c198d5e96d","text":"(OK) status code and the current contents of the account object. Once an account is deactivated, the server MUST NOT accept further requests authorized by that account's key. A server may take a variety of actions in response to an account deactivation, e.g., deleting data related to that account or sending mail to the account's contacts. Servers SHOULD NOT revoke certificates issued by the deactivated account, since this could cause operational disruption for servers using these certificates. ACME does not provide a way to reactivate a deactivated account. requests authorized by that account's key. The server SHOULD cancel any pending operations authorized by the account's key, such as certificate orders. A server may take a variety of actions in response to an account deactivation, e.g., deleting data related to that account or sending mail to the account's contacts. Servers SHOULD NOT revoke certificates issued by the deactivated account, since this could cause operational disruption for servers using these certificates. ACME does not provide a way to reactivate a deactivated account. 7.4."}
{"_id":"q-en-mdns-ice-candidates-95489f83247f944a538c5f57e6230c36a5c76934eec182fb1e9e7ac2cad30ca3","text":"explanation for the overall connection rate drop is that hairpinning failed in some cases. One potential mitigation, as discussed in privacy, is to not conceal candidates created from RFC4941 IPv6 addresses. This permits connectivity even in large internal networks or where mDNS is disabled. Future versions of this document will include experimental data regarding this option. 5.2. As noted in description, ICE agents using the mDNS technique are"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-96561c971ea3b424a17c98a71aa1bec9bd4ad18e4003e6c7249d9cd97f999b54","text":"could send more data to an unwilling target than a CONNECT proxy. However, in practice denial of service attacks target open TCP ports so the TCP SYN-ACK does not offer much protection in real scenarios. While a proxy could potentially limit the number of UDP packets it is willing to forward until it has observed a response from the target, that is unlikely to provide any protection against denial of service attacks because such attacks target open UDP ports where the protocol running over UDP would respond, and that would be interpreted as willingness to accept UDP by the proxy. UDP sockets for UDP proxying have a different lifetime than TCP sockets for CONNECT, therefore implementors would be well served to follow the advice in handling if they base their UDP proxying implementation on a preexisting implementation of CONNECT. The security considerations described in HTTP-DGRAM also apply here."}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-975a330d2103add798bda441fab8460e502f556857ac12145a78a52e5dc1cf0a","text":"encrypted-nonce) Pass 2: The load balancer decrypts the nonce octets using 128-bit AES Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode, much like QUIC header protection, using the server-id intermediate as \"nonce\" for this AES ECB mode, using the server-id intermediate as \"nonce\" for this pass. The server-id intermediate octets are zero-padded to 16 octets. AES-ECB encrypts this padded server-id intermediate using its key to generate a mask which it applies to the encrypted"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-97798394efe0406e4cb343f5e4e46622232c7b83af6a7ef847a7b4b69fb7682e","text":"Secret is called with four distinct transcripts; in a 1-RTT-only exchange with three distinct transcripts. The complete transcript passed to Derive-Secret is always taken from the following sequence of handshake messages, starting at the first ClientHello and including only those messages that were sent: ClientHello, HelloRetryRequest, ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, Server CertificateRequest, Server Certificate, Server CertificateVerify, Server Finished, EndOfEarlyData, Client Certificate, Client CertificateVerify, Client Finished. If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value consisting of a string of Hash.length zero bytes is used. Note that this does not mean skipping rounds, so if PSK is not in use Early Secret will still"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-97b1e42a6ba52f5d053717ebbda8d520ab35b78c112b0e72f8d214249b48d78b","text":"then accepts B as trustworthy, it can choose to accept B as a Verifier for other Attesters. As another example, the Relying Party can establish trust in the Verifier by out of band establishment of key material, combined with a protocol like TLS to communicate. There is an assumption that between the establishment of the trusted key material and the creation of the Evidence, that the Verifier has not been compromised. Similarly, the Relying Party also needs to trust the Relying Party Owner for providing its Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results, and in some scenarios the Relying Party might even require that the"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-97dbd320b14456224a897c6f41c60bfedeb8dd0696f3bb28a09c9bc56f28a1be","text":"5. This section defines how to use the COSE format I-D.ietf-cose-msg to wrap and protect data in the unprotected CoAP message. OSCOAP uses the COSE_Encrypt0 structure with an Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) algorithm. This section defines how to use COSE I-D.ietf-cose-msg to wrap and protect data in the unprotected CoAP message. OSCOAP uses the untagged COSE_Encrypt0 structure with an Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) algorithm. The key lengths, IV lengths, and maximum sequence number are algorithm dependent. The maximum sequence number SHALL be 2^(nonce length in bits - 1) - 1. The AEAD algorithm AES-CCM-64-64-128 defined in Section 10.2 of I- D.ietf-cose-msg is mandatory to implement. For AES-CCM-64-64-128 the length of Sender Key and Recipient Key SHALL be 128 bits, the length of nonce, Sender IV, and Recipient IV SHALL be 7 bytes, and the maximum Sequence Number SHALL be 2^56-1. The nonce is constructed as described in Section 3.1 of I-D.ietf-cose-msg, i.e. by padding the Partial IV (Sequence Number in network byte order) with zeroes and XORing it with the context IV (Sender IV or Recipient IV). Since OSCOAP only makes use of a single COSE structure, there is no need to explicitly specify the structure, and OSCOAP uses the untagged version of the COSE_Encrypt0 structure (Section 2. of I- D.ietf-cose-msg). If the COSE object has a different structure, the recipient MUST reject the message, treating it as malformed. length of Sender Key and Recipient Key is 128 bits, the length of nonce, Sender IV, and Recipient IV is 7 bytes, and the maximum Sequence Number is 2^55 - 1. The nonce is constructed as described in Section 3.1 of I-D.ietf- cose-msg, i.e. by padding the partial IV (Sequence Number in network byte order) with zeroes and XORing it with the context IV (Sender IV or Recipient IV). The first bit in the Sender IV or Recipient IV SHALL be flipped in responses. We denote by Plaintext the data that is encrypted and integrity protected, and by Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) the data that is integrity protected only, in the COSE object. The fields of COSE_Encrypt0 structure are defined as follows (see example in sem-auth-enc). is integrity protected only. The \"Headers\" field is formed by: The COSE Object SHALL be a COSE_Encrypt0 object with fields defined as follows The \"protected\" field, which SHALL include: The \"protected\" field includes: The \"Partial IV\" parameter. The value is set to the Sender Sequence Number. The Partial IV is a byte string (type: bstr), and SHOULD be of minimum length needed to encode the sequence number. The \"Partial IV\" parameter. The value is set to the Sender Sequence Number. The Partial IV SHALL be of minimum length needed to encode the sequence number. This parameter SHALL be present in requests, and MAY be present in responses. The \"kid\" parameter. The value is set to the Sender ID (see sec-context-section). The \"kid\" parameter. The value is set to the Sender ID (see sec-context-section). This parameter SHALL be present in requests. The \"unprotected\" field, which SHALL be empty. The \"unprotected\" field is empty. The \"ciphertext\" field is computed from the Plaintext (see plaintext) and the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) (see AAD) and encoded as a byte string (type: bstr), following Section 5.2 of I-D.ietf-cose-msg. following Section 5.2 of I-D.ietf-cose-msg. The encryption process is described in Section 5.3 of I-D.ietf-cose- msg. 5.1. The Plaintext is formatted as a CoAP message without Header (see plaintext-figure) consisting of: all CoAP Options present in the unprotected message which are encrypted (see coap-headers-and-options), in the order as given by the Option number (each Option with Option Header including delta to previous included encrypted option); and all CoAP Options present in the unprotected message that are encrypted (see coap-headers-and-options). The options are encoded as described in Section 3.1 of RFC7252, where the delta is the difference to the previously included encrypted option); and the CoAP Payload, if present, and in that case prefixed by the one-byte Payload Marker (0xFF). the Payload of unprotected CoAP message, if present, and in that case prefixed by the one-byte Payload Marker (0xFF). 5.2. The Additional Authenticated Data (\"Enc_structure\") as described is Section 5.3 of I-D.ietf-cose-msg includes: the \"context\" parameter, which has value \"Encrypted\" The external_aad SHALL be a CBOR array as defined below: the \"protected\" parameter, which includes the \"protected\" part of the \"Headers\" field; the \"external_aad\" is a serialized CBOR array aad where the exact content is different in requests (external_aad_req) and responses (external_aad_resp). It contains: ver: uint, contains the CoAP version number, as defined in Section 3 of code: uint, contains is the CoAP Code of the unprotected CoAP message, as defined in Section 3 of RFC7252. where: alg: int, contains the Algorithm from the security context used for the exchange (see sec-context-def-section); ver: uint, contains the CoAP version number, as defined in Section 3 of RFC7252. id : bstr, is the identifier for the endpoint sending the request and verifying the response; which means that for the endpoint sending the response, the id has value Recipient ID, while for the endpoint receiving the response, id has the value Sender ID. code: uint, contains is the CoAP Code of the unprotected CoAP message, as defined in Section 3 of RFC7252. seq : bstr, is the value of the \"Partial IV\" in the COSE object of the request (see Section 5). alg: int, contains the Algorithm from the security context used for the exchange (see sec-context-def-section). tag-previous-block: bstr, contains the AEAD Tag of the message containing the previous block in the sequence, as enumerated by Block1 in the case of a request and Block2 in the case of a response, if the message is fragmented using a block option RFC7959. request_id : bstr, contains the identifier for the endpoint sending the request and verifying the response; which means that for the endpoint sending the response, the id has value Recipient ID, while for the endpoint receiving the response, id has the value Sender ID. The encryption process is described in Section 5.3 of I-D.ietf-cose- msg. request_seq : bstr, contains the value of the \"Partial IV\" in the COSE object of the request (see Section 5). 6."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-taps-transport-security-98c7f0096377f9ff87c913454fda8fd2ded73289b01601cea4635212993764e2","text":"key exchange, signatures, and ciphersuites. Protocols: TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT, tcpcrypt, IKEv2, SRTP Session Cache The application provides the ability to save and retrieve session state (such as tickets, keying material, and server parameters) that may be used to resume the security session. Session Cache Management The application provides the ability to save and retrieve session state (such as tickets, keying material, and server parameters) that may be used to resume the security session. Protocols: TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT Authentication Delegation"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-990da7f1144f73d676439c3f1b7c011b47c8dfdd13049a982b678e61ea6d63cb","text":"track documents need to be marked as recommended. If an item is marked as not recommended it does not necessarily mean that it is flawed, rather, it indicates that either the item has not that it is flawed; rather, it indicates that either the item has not been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-991c5d7c83160b06eb59c1db7e037255294caa2742d237e1cf1c2005b73b9165","text":"The final size is the amount of flow control credit that is consumed by a stream. Assuming that every contiguous byte on the stream was sent once, the final size is the number of bytes sent. More generally, this is one higher than the largest byte offset sent on the stream. generally, this is one higher than the offset of the byte with the largest offset sent on the stream, or zero if no bytes were sent. For a stream that is reset, the final size is carried explicitly in a RESET_STREAM frame. Otherwise, the final size is the offset plus the"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-9953eaecb7a521e2b5a49eebf53e3ad75c87bcf74b59be4ed334fef1179f6554","text":"Note that, as a PSK may have a different lifetime than an update, it does not necessarily provide the same Forward Secrecy (FS) or Post- Compromise Security (PCS) guarantees than a Commit message. Compromise Security (PCS) guarantees as a Commit message. 7.10."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-9957bc25394ada7169dd4191f8196c43e2106a2558025b7f3c41fbfb5dce15f8","text":"The server MUST ignore any updates to the \"key\", or \"order\" fields or any other fields it does not recognize. The server MUST verify that the request is signed with the private key corresponding to the \"key\" field of the request before updating the registration. field of the request before updating the account object. For example, to update the contact information in the above account, the client could send the following request:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-996cb5dd2b4e6387d06265431bef55888f84646a1624d6b70f4f4120dcb1ec5e","text":"meet these requirements, it MUST abort the IP proxying request stream. Since setting the IP protocol to zero indicates all protocols are allowed, the requirements above make it possible for two routes to overlap when one has IP protocol set to zero and the other set to non-zero. Endpoints MUST not send a ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule with routes that overlap in such a way. Validating this requirement is OPTIONAL, but if an endpoint detects the violation, it MUST abort the IP proxying request stream. 5. The mechanism for proxying IP in HTTP defined in this document allows"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-9996c02fe41f9324e301d0927b5f33ce895c61bc922b69f811376118fe98a65e","text":"header, is integrity protected. Further, information that was sent and exposed in handshake packets sent before the cryptographic context was established are validated later during the cryptographic handshake. Therefore, devices on path MUST NOT change any information or bits in QUIC packet headers, since alteration of header information will lead to a failed integrity check at the receiver, and can even lead to connection termination. handshake. Therefore, devices on path cannot alter any information or bits in QUIC packet headers, since alteration of header information will lead to a failed integrity check at the receiver, and can even lead to connection termination. 2.6."}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-99ab0ef9b75e4b0edf58b546cd3f322a493b9367f7ae2299add5c355157ad00e","text":"requests at the requesting server's default discovery URI to obtain the link-format payload to register. The endpoint MUST include the endpoint name and MAY include the registration parameters d, lt and extra-attrs, in the POST request as per registration. The context of the registration is taken from the requesting server's URI. The endpoint includes the same registration parameters in the POST request as it would per registration. The context of the registration is taken from the requesting server's URI. The endpoints MUST be deleted after the expiration of their lifetime. Additional operations cannot be executed because no registration"}
{"_id":"q-en-capport-wg-architecture-9acca9ec986a299811a829161ef37653667d68a5d8f68ec1c79d607ba6fac4c6","text":"Abstract This document describes a captive portal architecture. DHCP or Router Advertisements, an optional signaling protocol, and an HTTP API are used to provide the solution. The role of Provisioning Router Advertisements (RAs), an optional signaling protocol, and an HTTP API are used to provide the solution. The role of Provisioning Domains (PvDs) is described. 1."}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-9b25b7653f54695c9fad22bff1a5806a8838e1ee2c03d36244024d7d45b26941","text":"With multi-homing, an adversary is able to correlate the communication interaction over the two paths, which adds further privacy concerns. privacy concerns. The lack of a CID update mechanism makes this extension unsuitable for mobility scenarios where correlation must be considered. Importantly, the sequence number makes it possible for a passive attacker to correlate packets across CID changes. Thus, even if a"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-9b67bd07d461aedd6ee8d7bf026167df8bee81ad6938e90053adef384734cc89","text":"The CA verifies that the client controls the requested domain name(s) by having the ACME client perform some action(s) that can only be done with control of the domain name(s). For example, the CA might require a client requesting example.com to provision DNS record under example.com or an HTTP resource under CA might require a client requesting example.com to provision a DNS record under example.com or an HTTP resource under http://example.com. Once the CA is satisfied, it issues the certificate and the ACME"}
{"_id":"q-en-eap-aka-pfs-9b712de12d6dd2c74b9f8809e83e0b4bff43bb9d06edc81b8182731e877e23b3","text":"7.4. The Initiator and the Responder must make sure that unprotected data and metadata do not reveal any sensitive information. In particular, this applies to AT_KDF, AT_KDF_FS, AT_PUB_ECDHE, and AT_KDF_INPUT. AT_KDF, AT_KDF_FS, and AT_PUB_ECDHE reveals the used cryptographic Unprotected data and metadata can reveal sensitive information and need to be selected with care. In particular, this applies to AT_KDF, AT_KDF_FS, AT_PUB_ECDHE, and AT_KDF_INPUT. AT_KDF, AT_KDF_FS, and AT_PUB_ECDHE reveals the used cryptographic algorithms, if these depend on the peer identity they leak information about the peer. AT_KDF_INPUT reveals the network name. An attacker observing network traffic may use such information for traffic flow analysis or to track an endpoint. information about the peer. AT_KDF_INPUT reveals the network name, although that is done on purpose to bind the authentication to a particular context. An attacker observing network traffic may use the above types of information for traffic flow analysis or to track an endpoint. 7.5."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-9bc1a9a5971d7719c17ec7163d8eb845f354fb07031b51a25316d8f526bfdc82","text":"A client that is unable to retry requests loses all requests that are in flight when the server closes the connection. An endpoint MAY send multiple GOAWAY frames indicating different identifiers, but MUST NOT increase the identifier value they send, since clients might already have retried unprocessed requests on another connection. Receiving a GOAWAY containing a larger identifier than previously received MUST be treated as a connection error of type H3_ID_ERROR. send multiple GOAWAY frames indicating different identifiers, but the identifier in each frame MUST NOT be greater than the identifier in any previous frame, since clients might already have retried unprocessed requests on another connection. Receiving a GOAWAY containing a larger identifier than previously received MUST be treated as a connection error of type H3_ID_ERROR. An endpoint that is attempting to gracefully shut down a connection can send a GOAWAY frame with a value set to the maximum possible"}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-9be24231f734044555a83945dc6fa72d934caf8bd16471ed274020601578ea82","text":"identity on a site they do trust (such as a social network.) Recently, a number of Web-based identity technologies (OAuth, BrowserID, Facebook Connect), etc. have been developed. While the BrowserID, Facebook Connect etc.) have been developed. While the details vary, what these technologies share is that they have a Web- based (i.e., HTTP/HTTPS) identity provider which attests to your identity. For instance, if I have an account at example.org, I could"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-9c1ce15371e7395cc74d14d05bd9bb1e47cc28cfdcaba6e9f607d87bf839bd96","text":"upper layer protocol MUST NOT write any record that exceeds the maximum record size of 2^14 bytes. The DTLS record layer SHOULD also allow the upper layer protocol to discover the amount of record expansion expected by the DTLS processing; alternately it MAY report PMTU estimates minus the estimated expansion from the transport layer and DTLS record framing. Note that DTLS does not defend against spoofed ICMP messages; implementations SHOULD ignore any such messages that indicate PMTUs below the IPv4 and IPv6 minimums of 576 and 1280 bytes respectively The DTLS record layer SHOULD allow the upper layer protocol to discover the amount of record expansion expected by the DTLS processing. If there is a transport protocol indication (either via ICMP or via a refusal to send the datagram as in Section 14 of RFC4340), then the DTLS record layer MUST inform the upper layer protocol of the error. If there is a transport protocol indication that the PMTU was exceeded (either via ICMP or via a refusal to send the datagram as in Section 14 of RFC4340), then the DTLS record layer MUST inform the upper layer protocol of the error. The DTLS record layer SHOULD NOT interfere with upper layer protocols performing PMTU discovery, whether via RFC1191 or RFC4821 mechanisms."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-9c284c1a69b9f811f0ee4b28171c9d334c2aad7697fc09f33aa7593f913ba21b","text":"extension. It MUST NOT save the \"retry_config\" value in EncryptedExtensions. [[OPEN ISSUE: Depending on what we do for issue#450, it may be appropriate to change the client behavior if the HRR extension is present.]] Offering a GREASE extension is not considered offering an encrypted ClientHello for purposes of requirements in real-ech. In particular, the client MAY offer to resume sessions established without ECH."}
{"_id":"q-en-7710bis-9c30073732e8cbf88db7c52540848d10eb3dd2a4e08ad3033ac3400f5df161f7","text":"clients that they are behind a captive-portal enforcement device and how to contact an API for more information. This document replaces RFC 7710 RFC7710. 1.1. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-9cbce1fbdf15d831f78dc77787798a5ffb07b3644a25f09a57a635b6e35c71f1","text":"renders 5-tuple based filtering insufficient and requires more state to be maintained by DDoS defense systems. For the common case of NAT rebinding, DDoS defense systems can detect a change in the client's endpoint address by linking flows based on the first 8 bytes of the server's connection IDs, provided the server is using at least 8- bytes-long connection IDs. QUIC's linkability resistance ensures that a deliberate connection migration is accompanied by a change in the connection ID and necessitates that connection ID-aware DDoS defense system must have the same information about connection IDs as the load balancer I-D.ietf-quic-load-balancers. This may be complicated where mitigation and load balancing environments are logically separate. endpoint address by linking flows based on the server's connection IDs. QUIC's linkability resistance ensures that a deliberate connection migration is accompanied by a change in the connection ID. It is questionable whether connection migrations must be supported during a DDoS attack. If the connection migration is not visible to"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-9cd7c4198fcf99850c76674a869bf27cbbf7dab55b4a2b29e6a5246d97b96ac7","text":"is represented as an encoded UncompressedPointRepresentation struct, as defined in RFC8446. 5.1.2. The signature algorithm specified in the ciphersuite is the mandatory algorithm to be used for signatures in FramedContentAuthData and the tree signatures. It MUST be the same as the signature algorithm specified in the credentials in the leaves of the tree (including the leaf node information in KeyPackages used to add new members). The signatures used in this document are encoded as specified in RFC8446. In particular, ECDSA signatures are DER-encoded and EdDSA signatures are defined as the concatenation of \"r\" and \"s\" as"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-9ce7d8150e61d256beb19db9c288d88df32422cbe62ee6ad53b2202f9026556e","text":"implementation should store the properties in storage common to all protocols, and notify all protocol instances in the Protocol Stack whenever the properties have been modified by the application. For protocol-specfic properties, such as the User Timeout that applies to TCP, the Transport Services implementation only needs to update the relevant protocol instance. Protocol-specific Properties, such as the User Timeout that applies to TCP, the Transport Services implementation only needs to update the relevant protocol instance. If an error is encountered in setting a property (for example, if the application tries to set a TCP-specific property on a Connection that"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-9d11cd99a785d5fb47836cadf83a45d336acdfd7f3e96893ac73079567357904","text":"Endpoints MUST NOT send this extension in a TLS connection that does not use QUIC (such as the use of TLS with TCP defined in TLS13). A fatal unsupported_extension alert MUST be sent if this extension is received when the transport is not QUIC. fatal unsupported_extension alert MUST be sent by an implementation that supports this extension if the extension is received when the transport is not QUIC. 8.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-9d88c1d65880177c1ee1069a0527db8e0ec1601d1d049cf1744640b05c401cf7","text":"Signature = I2OSP(R, n) | I2OSP(S, n) where n = ceiling(key_length / 8) 9.2.1. 9.1.1. On of the issues that needs to be discussed is substitution attacks. There are two different things that can potentially be substituted in"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-9dc51f6ab17baf048898660b8af516c7a58aa5759b9efc71e767f8ea6cb974de","text":"\"key_share\", \"pre_shared_key\", \"psk_key_exchange_modes\", \"early_data\", \"cookie\", \"supported_versions\", \"certificate_authorities\", \"oid_filters\", \"post_handshake_auth\", and \"signature_algorithms_certs\", extensions with the values and \"signature_algorithms_cert\", extensions with the values defined in this document and the Recommended value of \"Yes\". IANA [SHALL update/has updated] this registry to include a \"TLS"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-9de3e3ceccdaa00a244410583b92581a2d98546576cc853517577018c1246fb1","text":"and might be required to be a quoted-string if the base64url string includes \"=\" characters. This challenge value MUST be unique for every 401 HTTP response to prevent replay attacks. This attribute is required for all challenges. This parameter is required for all challenges. \"token-key\", which contains a base64url encoding of the public key for use with the issuance protocol indicated by the challenge."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-9e1d95e9309d2d2decbda05730ff22a5642be0b99a9549c63072c8a876cfeb3b","text":"The sending endpoint SHALL write the Code of the original CoAP message into the plaintext of the COSE object (see plaintext). After that, the sending endpoint writes an Outer Code to the OSCORE message. The Outer Code SHALL be set to 0.02 (POST) or 0.05 (FETCH) for requests. For non-Observe requests the client SHALL set the Outer Code to 0.02 (POST). For responses, the sending endpoint SHALL respond with Outer Code 2.04 (Changed) to 0.02 (POST) requests, and with Outer Code 2.05 (Content) to 0.05 (FETCH) requests. Using FETCH with Observe allows OSCORE to be compliant with the Observe processing in OSCORE-unaware intermediaries. The choice of POST and FETCH RFC8132 allows all OSCORE messages to have payload. The receiving endpoint SHALL discard the Outer Code in the OSCORE message and write the Code of the COSE object plaintext (plaintext) into the decrypted CoAP message. message. With one exeception (see observe-option-processing) the Outer Code SHALL by default be set to 0.02 (POST) for requests and to 2.04 (Changed) for responses. The receiving endpoint SHALL discard the Outer Code in the OSCORE message and write the Code of the COSE object plaintext (plaintext) into the decrypted CoAP message. The other currently defined CoAP Header fields are Unprotected (Class U). The sending endpoint SHALL write all other header fields of the"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-9e302eca20749acbe278151dbbcaa9c632aae100dec0f4d217fb9263c17c180a","text":"has received this parameter SHOULD NOT send an HTTP message header that exceeds the indicated size, as the peer will likely refuse to process it. However, an HTTP message can traverse one or more intermediaries (see Section 3.7 of SEMANTICS) before reaching the origin server. Because this limit is applied separately by each intermediaries before reaching the origin server; see Section 3.7 of SEMANTICS. Because this limit is applied separately by each implementation which processes the message, messages below this limit are not guaranteed to be accepted."}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-9efa99a537e1b7baddfb77061e16ad0eaa8aaa74a634e0d7c42dcbea8e01de18","text":"provisional value 0xff020000, which might change with each edition of this document. The salt used to derive Initial keys in Sec 5.2 of RFC9001 changes to The salt used to derive Initial keys in Section 5.2 of QUIC-TLS changes to: The labels used in RFC9001 to derive packet protection keys (Sec 5.1), header protection keys (Sec 5.4), Retry Integrity Tag keys (Sec 5.8), and key updates (Sec 6.1) change from \"quic key\" to The labels used in QUIC-TLS to derive packet protection keys (Section Section 5.1 of QUIC-TLS), header protection keys (Section Section 5.4 of QUIC-TLS), Retry Integrity Tag keys (Section Section 5.8 of QUIC-TLS), and key updates (Section Section 6.1 of QUIC-TLS) change from \"quic key\" to \"quicv2 key\", from \"quic iv\" to \"quicv2 iv\", from \"quic hp\" to \"quicv2 hp\", and from \"quic ku\" to \"quicv2 ku\", to meet the guidance for new versions in Section 9.6 of that document. guidance for new versions in Section Section 9.6 of QUIC-TLS of that document. The key and nonce used for the Retry Integrity Tag (Sec 5.8 of RFC9001) change to: The key and nonce used for the Retry Integrity Tag (Section 5.8 of QUIC-TLS) change to: 4."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-9f22eeedf7f4f56362165b50dc27bf3924bda0b5a06222599d14097286d74a05","text":"Regular expression tests can be applied to \"string\" values only. The value of the first operand (\"containable\") of a \"contain-expr\" is compared to every single element of the RHS \"container\". In case of a match a selection occurs. Containment tests -- like comparisons -- are restricted to primitive values. So even if a structured \"containable\" value is equal to a certain structured value in \"container\", no selection is done. The value of the second operand (\"container\") of a \"contain-expr\" needs to be resolved to an array. Otherwise nothing is selected. The following table lists filter expression operators in order of precedence from highest (binds most tightly) to lowest (binds least tightly)."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-9f375630ed7ad6dada4aaddf2791935648086a2293c14609a0a89496507374ea","text":"Each endpoint advertises its own idle timeout to its peer. An endpoint restarts any timer it maintains when a packet from its peer is received and processed successfully. The timer is also restarted when sending a packet containing frames other than ACK or PADDING (an ack-eliciting packet; see QUIC-RECOVERY), but only if no other ack- eliciting packets have been sent since last receiving a packet. Restarting when sending packets ensures that connections do not prematurely time out when initiating new activity. when sending an ack-eliciting packet (see QUIC-RECOVERY), but only if no other ack-eliciting packets have been sent since last receiving a packet. Restarting when sending packets ensures that connections do not prematurely time out when initiating new activity. The value for an idle timeout can be asymmetric. The value advertised by an endpoint is only used to determine whether the"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-9f5ced198f07374ac48f430fdf55db60bf8bf2c35b25001f0362c1a31cf75f2c","text":"migrates away from a local address SHOULD retire all connection IDs used on that address once it no longer plans to use that address. An endpoint can request that its peer retire connection IDs by sending a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame with an increased Retire Prior To field. Upon receipt, the peer SHOULD retire the corresponding connection IDs and send the corresponding RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames in a timely manner. Failing to do so can cause packets to be delayed, lost, or cause the original endpoint to send a stateless reset in response to a connection ID it can no longer route An endpoint can cause its peer to retire connection IDs by sending a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame with an increased Retire Prior To field. Upon receipt, the peer MUST retire the corresponding connection IDs and send corresponding RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames. Failing to retire the connection IDs within approximately one PTO can cause packets to be delayed, lost, or cause the original endpoint to send a stateless reset in response to a connection ID it can no longer route correctly. An endpoint MAY discard a connection ID for which retirement has been requested once an interval of no less than 3 PTO has elapsed since an acknowledgement is received for the NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame requesting that retirement. Subsequent incoming packets using that requesting that retirement. Until then, the endpoint SHOULD be prepared to receive packets that contain the connection ID that it has requested be retired. Subsequent incoming packets using that connection ID could elicit a response with the corresponding stateless reset token."}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-9f9ba337714ea992c305ba0f1260ef306312566166c2a077c7badb98841023f2","text":"5.1. TODO - Add example with string, data, boolean, and base value 5.1.1. The following shows a temperature reading taken approximately \"now\""}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-9fbbb745c8339da86136db972619bbe7554c3a35ec50ec10baee178771fd2b5a","text":"8. We can provide DATAGRAM support in HTTP/2 by defining the CAPSULE frame in HTTP/2. We can provide DATAGRAM support in HTTP/1.x by defining its data stream format to a sequence of length-value capsules. TODO: Refactor this document and add definitions for HTTP/1.x and HTTP/2. 9. Since this feature requires sending an HTTP/3 Settings parameter, it \"sticks out\". In other words, probing clients can learn whether a server supports this feature. Implementations that support this"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-9fefc9c04d62c967802dd4c4ce43769348ad30aff8aa6a307ba2706918ae3dcf","text":"that the load balancer will redirect the next Client Initial packet to a different server in that pool. 6.3. QUIC provides for multiple Server and Client Connection IDs to be used simultaneously by a given connection, which allows seamless connection migration when one of the endpoints changes IP address and/or UDP port. Section 6.11.5 of QUIC describes how to use this facility to reduce the risk of exposing a link among these addresses to observers on the network. However, analysis of the lifetimes of six-tuples (source and destination addresses as well as the migrated CID) may expose these links anyway. In practice, a finite set of flows will be undergoing migration within any one time window as seen from any given observation point in the network, and any migration must keep at least one endpoint address constant during the migration. Because of this, a key insight here is that this finite set of flows represents the anonymity set for any one flow undergoing migration within it. For endpoints with low volume, this anonymity set will be necessarily small, so there remains a significant risk of linkage exposure through timing-based analysis. The most efficient mitigation for these attacks is operational, by increasing the size of the anonymity set as seen from a passive observer in the Internet, either by using a load balancing architecture that loads more flows onto a single server-side address, by coordinating the timing of migrations to attempt to increase the number of simultaneous migrations at a given time, or through other means. 7. Versioning in QUIC may change the protocol's behavior completely,"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-a00279b26361ffc521e6887d4b4a7c3d9a70c261b1254237045dde3c7eb4a945","text":"Ciphersuites are represented with the CipherSuite type. HPKE public keys are opaque values in a format defined by the underlying Diffie- Hellman protocol (see the Ciphersuites section of the HPKE specification for more information): 6.1.1. This ciphersuite uses the following primitives: specification for more information). Hash function: SHA-256 The signature algorithm specified in the ciphersuite is the mandatory algorithm to be used for the signatutes in MLSPlaintext and the tree signatures. It can be different from the signature algorithm specified in credential fielf of ClientInitKeys. AEAD: AES-128-GCM The ciphersuites are defined in section mls-ciphersuites. When HPKE is used with this ciphersuite, it uses the following algorithms: KEM: 0x0002 = DHKEM(Curve25519) 6.1.1. KDF: 0x0001 = HKDF-SHA256 Depending on the Diffie-Hellman group of the ciphersuite, different rules apply to private key derivation and public key verification. AEAD: 0x0001 = AES-GCM-128 6.1.1.1. Given an octet string X, the private key produced by the Derive-Key- Pair operation is SHA-256(X). (Recall that any 32-octet string is a valid Curve25519 private key.) The corresponding public key is Pair operation is SHA-256(X) (Recall that any 32-octet string is a valid X25519 private key). The corresponding public key is X25519(SHA-256(X), 9). Implementations SHOULD use the approach specified in RFC7748 to"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-a05868a9ae511a4ab78510f49f7e683372623b99630298868a453fedcde96d5d","text":"3.7. JSEP supports simulcast of a MediaStreamTrack, where multiple encodings of the source media can be transmitted within the context of a single m= section. The current JSEP API is designed to allow applications to send simulcasted media but only to receive a single encoding. This allows for multi-user scenarios where each sending client sends multiple encodings to a server, which then, for each receiving client, chooses the appropriate encoding to forward. JSEP supports simulcast transmission of a MediaStreamTrack, where multiple encodings of the source media can be transmitted within the context of a single m= section. The current JSEP API is designed to allow applications to send simulcasted media but only to receive a single encoding. This allows for multi-user scenarios where each sending client sends multiple encodings to a server, which then, for each receiving client, chooses the appropriate encoding to forward. Applications request support for simulcast by configuring multiple encodings on an RTPSender, which, upon generation of an offer or"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-a086fef1ef048beff550ec4a7e19f200c772f9edc90105e754c22982268d1ed0","text":"If the \"path_secret\" value is set in the GroupSecrets object: Identify the lowest common ancestor of the leaf node \"my_leaf\" and of the node of the member with LeafNodeRef and of the node of the member with leaf index \"GroupInfo.signer\". Set the private key for this node to the private key derived from the \"path_secret\"."}
{"_id":"q-en-webrtc-http-ingest-protocol-a0b2ea3088b2c3465a258a6f576dc8fe65fbcc33814bc01f2a95abfeb4eab44e","text":"based on RTP and may be the closest in terms of features to WebRTC, is not compatible with the SDP offer/answer model RFC3264. In the specific case of media ingestion into a streaming service, some assumptions can be made about the server-side which simplifies the WebRTC compliance burden, as detailed in WebRTC-gateway document draft-ietf-rtcweb-gateways. So, currently, there is no standard protocol designed for ingesting media into a streaming service using WebRTC and so content providers still rely heavily on protocols like RTMP for doing so. Most of those protocols are not RTP based, requiring media protocol translation when doing egress via WebRTC. Avoiding this media protocol translation is desirable as there is no functional parity between those protocols and WebRTC and it increases the implementation complexity at the media server side. Also, the media codecs used in those protocols tend to be limited and not negotiated, not always matching the mediac codes supported in WebRTC. This requires to perform transcoding on the ingest node, which introduces delay, degrades media quality and increases the processing workload required on the server side. Server side transcoding that has traditionally been done to present multiple renditions in Adaptive Bit Rate Streaming (ABR) implementations can be replaced with Simulcast RFC8853 and SVC codecs that are well supported by WebRTC clients. In addition, WebRTC clients can adjust client-side encoding parameters based on RTCP feedback to maximize encoding quality. This document proposes a simple protocol for supporting WebRTC as media ingestion method which:"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-homenet-hna-a0eb1c771e4ba88d397d5865c774098ccfd7e022d35fc56c993f5dc9cda914fa","text":"lookup would provide DNS as opposed to DNSSEC responses provided by the Public Authoritative Server(s). 3) Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to guarantee coherence between DNS responses. Using a unique zone is one way to guarantee uniqueness of the responses among servers and places. Issues generated by different views are discussed in more details in sec-views. 4) Privacy and Integrity of the DNSSEC Homenet Zone are better guaranteed. When the Zone is signed by the HNA, it makes modification of the DNS data -- for example for flow redirection -- impossible. As a result, signing the Homenet Zone by the HNA provides better protection for end user privacy. Privacy and Integrity of the DNSSEC Homenet Zone are better guaranteed. When the Zone is signed by the HNA, it makes modification of the DNS data -- for example for flow redirection -- impossible. As a result, signing the Homenet Zone by the HNA provides better protection for end user privacy. Reasons for signing the zone by the Outsourcing Infrastructure are:"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-a0f06c8351806854e83f24b8a006806ec9ad39d4f8fc37b52a55394dda3b65fb","text":"Fulfill the server's requirements for issuance Finalize the application and request issuance Await issuance and download the issued certificate The client's application for a certificate describes the desired certificate using a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) plus a"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-a0fac9efdb6ad9077928e0a609909549200c6a4adf58a6ac554cf017cc8f7bb6","text":"access control mechanisms SHOULD be used to protect it such as file system controls, physical security or hardware security modules. 6.2. 6.3. Delegated credentials do not provide any additional form of early revocation. Since it is short lived, the expiry of the delegated"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-a13fd312290922139c9c48ead1697ed5c1ffd750ca68f293e42bab2ed29796c3","text":"implementation to communicate control data to the remote endpoint that can be used to parse Messages. Similarly, when a Message Framer generates a \"Stop\" event, the framer implementation has the opportunity to write some final data or clear up its local state before the \"Closed\" event is delivered to the Application. The framer implementation can indicate that it has finished with this. At any time if the implementation encounters a fatal error, it can also cause the Connection to fail and provide an error. Should the framer implementation deem the candidate selected during racing unsuitable it can signal this by failing the Connection prior to marking it as ready. If there are no other candidates available, the Connection will fail. Otherwise, the Connection will select a different candidate and the Message Framer will generate a new \"Start\" event. Before an implementation marks a Message Framer as ready, it can also dynamically add a protocol or framer above it in the stack. This allows protocols like STARTTLS, that need to add TLS conditionally,"}
{"_id":"q-en-multipart-ct-a157b7fa3212423b1b92993e12caaf60d1824d2d433d819508db7c108ad88011","text":"on multiple already existing media types. Applications using the application/multipart-core Content-Format define the internal structure of the application/multipart-core representation. define the semantics as well as the internal structure of the application/multipart-core representation according to the syntax described by the CDDL in mct-cddl. For example, one way to structure the sub-types specific to an application/multipart-core container is to always include them at the"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-a17d842135beb1f8267bd9f0be16aa240cb6814d30e00d52dc42f9463ecd19ef","text":"Transport Properties MUST always be specified while security parameters are OPTIONAL. Message Framers (see framing), if required, should be added to the If Message Framers are used (see framing), they MUST be added to the Preconnection during pre-establishment. 5.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-a18c80a6c7f17b34f6d1f2634737781f456e7df08329ecf33a0caf1880dc13d4","text":"3.5.5.2.2. The comparison operators \"==\", \"<\", and \">\" are defined first and then these are used to define \"!=\", \"<=\", and \">=\". The comparison operators \"==\" and \"<\" are defined first and then these are used to define \"!=\", \"<=\", \">\", and \">=\". When a path resulting in an empty nodelist appears on either side of a comparison:"}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-a199f778f48d0afa4f13a2d59993c5a46d0ee27700606c325e05b8b47c39181e","text":"widely deployed, this section discusses considerations for future versions to help with compatibility with QUIC version 1. 6.1. 7.1. QUIC version 1 features Retry packets, which the server can send to validate the client's IP address before parsing the client's first"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-a1af2e6e828dad3f32fe4e2645489dbb17513295435b30196805edb3152cf776","text":"4.2. This document defines multiple new capsule types that allow endpoints to exchange IP configuration information. Both endpoints MAY send any number of these new capsules. 4.2.1. The ADDRESS_ASSIGN capsule allows an endpoint to inform its peer that"}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-a1ef24fd6d106cb44a42c361f77ba5cea47d4657812fb31ca5c57a1a56379352","text":"Security considerations for DetNet are described in detail in I- D.ietf-detnet-security. General security considerations are described in RFC8655. DetNet IP data plane specific considerations are summarized in I-D.ietf-detnet-ip. This section considers exclusively security considerations which are specific to the DetNet IP over TSN sub-network scenario. are summarized in RFC8939. This section considers exclusively security considerations which are specific to the DetNet IP over TSN sub-network scenario. The sub-network between DetNet nodes needs to be subject to appropriate confidentiality. Additionally, knowledge of what DetNet/"}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-a2087a803eac366b9cbc8332743f855be802e5c1510c79b1a7c97ae4dcb8e016","text":"This proposal supports the negotiation of either the use of one packet number space for all paths or the use of separate packet number spaces per path. While separate packet number spaces allow for more efficient ACK encoding, especially when paths have highly different latencies, this approach requires the use of a connection ID. Therefore use of a single number space can be beneficial in highly constrained networks that do not benefit from exposing the connection ID in the header. While both approaches are supported by the specification in this version of the document, the intention for the final publication of a multipath extension for QUIC is to choose one option in order to avoid incompatibility. More evaluation and number spaces per path. While both approaches are supported by the specification in this version of the document, the intention for the final publication of a multipath extension for QUIC is to choose one option in order to avoid incompatibility. More evaluation and implementation experience is needed to select one approach before final publication. Some discussion about pros and cons can be found here: https://github.com/mirjak/draft-lmbdhk-quic-"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-a269468fab807589fe6ffd79b60584e7db595e64cf29d8b28f615878c476d267","text":"first record is at position 1. A range of records can be selected by giving the first and the last record number separated by a '-' character. Instead of the second number, the '*' character can be used to indicate the last Senml Record in the Pack. A set of records used to indicate the last SenML Record in the Pack. A set of records can also be selected using a comma separated list of record positions or ranges. (We use the term \"selecting a record\" for identifying it as part of the fragment, not in the sense of isolating it from the Pack -- the record still needs to be interpreted as part of the Pack, e.g., using the base values defined in record 1.) the base values defined in earlier records) 9.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-a26d7e0937df1ed17fc7dfd4e2a1bbc2482ce3002a7725127a9c638871338630","text":"1.2. draft-07 - Integration of semi-ephemeral DH proposal. draft-08 Remove support for weak and lesser used named curves. Remove support for MD5 and SHA-224 hashes with signatures. draft-07 Integration of semi-ephemeral DH proposal. Add initial 0-RTT support"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-a28c834449e2308c09b25f21f31d0db04e29ed1ede1896e3b012555a83790b0f","text":"The Rendezvous() Action causes the Preconnection to listen on the Local Endpoint for an incoming Connection from the Remote Endpoint, while simultaneously trying to establish a Connection from the Local Endpoint to the Remote Endpoint. This corresponds to a TCP simultaneous open, for example. while also simultaneously trying to establish a Connection from the Local Endpoint to the Remote Endpoint. If there are multiple Local Endpoints or Remote Endpoints configured, then initiating a rendezvous action will systematically probe the reachability of those endpoints following an approach such as that used in Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) RFC5245. If the endpoints are suspected to be behind a NAT, Rendezvous() can be initiated using Local and Remote Endpoints that support a method of discovering NAT bindings such as Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) RFC8489 or Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) RFC5766. In this case, the Local Endpoint will resolve to a mixture of local and server reflexive addresses. The Resolve() action on the Preconnection can be used to discover these bindings: The Resolve() call returns a list of Preconnection Objects, that represent the concrete addresses, local and server reflexive, on which a Rendezvous() for the Preconnection will listen for incoming Connections. These resolved Preconnections will share all other Properties with the Preconnection from which they are derived, though some Properties may be made more-specific by the resolution process. An application that uses Rendezvous() to establish a peer-to-peer connection in the presence of NATs will configure the Preconnection object with a Local Endpoint that supports NAT binding discovery. It will then Resolve() on that endpoint, and pass the resulting list of candidate local addresses to the peer via a signalling protocol, for example as part of an ICE RFC5245 exchange within SIP RFC3261 or WebRTC RFC7478. The peer will, via the same signalling channel, return the remote endpoint candidates. These remote endpoint candidates are then configured on the Preconnection, allowing the Rendezvous() Action to be initiated. The Rendezvous() Action returns a Connection object. Once Rendezvous() has been called, any changes to the Preconnection MUST"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-a2bcf7b6ed62735054f873dbe66e5eef772901cf9537535e3022d91e92285aaa","text":"digital signatures. The \"extension_data\" field of this extension contains a \"supported_signature_algorithms\" value. %%% Signature Algorithm Extension enum { none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), sha512(6), (255) } HashAlgorithm; %%% Signature Algorithm Extension enum { none(0), md5_RESERVED(1), sha1(2), sha224_RESERVED(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), sha512(6), (255) } HashAlgorithm; Each SignatureAndHashAlgorithm value lists a single hash/signature pair that the client is willing to verify. The values are indicated"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-a2c749c26d4c1114dff015fecacb944789189c950ca23bd01703391489a88e7c","text":"If the packet is from a new encryption level, it is saved for later processing by TLS. Once TLS moves to receiving from this encryption level, saved data can be provided to TLS. When providing data from any new encryption level to TLS, if there is data from a previous encryption level that TLS has not consumed, this MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. encryption level, saved data can be provided to TLS. When TLS provides keys for a higher encryption level, if there is data from a previous encryption level that TLS has not consumed, this MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. Each time that TLS is provided with new data, new handshake bytes are requested from TLS. TLS might not provide any bytes if the handshake"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mptcp-rfc6824bis-a2d233b1da9e4232905edac80853210f0625ffefe23515c9a0351ce0853595e8","text":"is running out of resources. In these cases, MPTCP should send the MP_FASTCLOSE. This option is illustrated in tcpm_fastclose. If Host A wants to force the closure of an MPTCP connection, the MPTCP Fast Close procedure is as follows: If Host A wants to force the closure of an MPTCP connection, it has two different options: Host A sends an ACK containing the MP_FASTCLOSE option on one subflow, containing the key of Host B as declared in the initial connection handshake. On all the other subflows, Host A sends a regular TCP RST to close these subflows, and tears them down. Host A now enters FASTCLOSE_WAIT state. Option A (ACK) : Host A sends an ACK containing the MP_FASTCLOSE option on one subflow, containing the key of Host B as declared in the initial connection handshake. On all the other subflows, Host A sends a regular TCP RST to close these subflows, and tears them down. Host A now enters FASTCLOSE_WAIT state. Upon receipt of an MP_FASTCLOSE, containing the valid key, Host B answers on the same subflow with a TCP RST and tears down all subflows. Host B can now close the whole MPTCP connection (it transitions directly to CLOSED state). Option R (RST) : Host A sends a RST containing the MP_FASTCLOSE option on all subflows, containing the key of Host B as declared in the initial connection handshake. Host A can tear the subflows and the connection down immediately. If a host receives a packet with a valid MP_FASTCLOSE option, it shall process it as follows : Upon receipt of an ACK with MP_FASTCLOSE, containing the valid key, Host B answers on the same subflow with a TCP RST and tears down all subflows. Host B can now close the whole MPTCP connection (it transitions directly to CLOSED state). As soon as Host A has received the TCP RST on the remaining subflow, it can close this subflow and tear down the whole"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-a2da134ff6ccd86eb16dc5c6f8affc7ca538aa94980eefaf2a5e0e91d079efdf","text":"which type of header is present. The purpose of this bit is invariant across QUIC versions. The long header exposes more information. In version 1 of QUIC, it is used during connection establishment, including version negotiation, retry, and 0-RTT data. It contains a version number, as well as source and destination connection IDs for grouping packets belonging to the same flow. The definition and location of these fields in the QUIC long header are invariant for future versions of QUIC, although future versions of QUIC may provide additional fields in the long header QUIC-INVARIANTS. The long header exposes more information. It contains a version number, as well as source and destination connection IDs for associating packets with a QUIC connection. The definition and location of these fields in the QUIC long header are invariant for future versions of QUIC, although future versions of QUIC may provide additional fields in the long header QUIC-INVARIANTS. In version 1 of QUIC, the long header is used during connection establishment to transmit crypto handshake data, perform version negotiation, retry, and send 0-RTT data. Short headers contain only an optional destination connection ID and the spin bit for RTT measurement. In version 1 of QUIC, they are"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-a3002cb236972f704cc0c4a115fd62e9bacc0eaba2e1b8ea8d385fc1433805c0","text":"12.3.11. Control Property [TODO: Discuss] Boolean Preconnection, Connection This property specifies whether an application considers it useful to be informed in case sent data was retransmitted more often than a certain threshold. When set to true, the effect is twofold: The application may receive events in case excessive retransmissions. In addition, the transport system considers this as a preference to use transports stacks that can provide this notification. This is not a strict requirement. If set to false, no notification of excessive retransmissions will be sent and this transport feature is ignored for protocol selection. The default is to have this option. Boolean Connection Property - see conn-retrans-notify. 12.3.12. Control Property [TODO: Discuss] Integer Preconnection, Connection This property specifies after how many retransmissions to inform the application about \"Excessive Retransmissions\". Integer Connection Property - see 12.3.13. Control Property [TODO: Discuss] Boolean Preconnection, Connection This property specifies whether an application considers it useful to be informed when an ICMP error message arrives that does not force termination of a connection. When set to true, received ICMP errors will be available as SoftErrors. Note that even if a protocol supporting this property is selected, not all ICMP errors will necessarily be delivered, so applications cannot rely on receiving them. Setting this option also implies a preference to prefer transports stacks that can provide this notification. If not set, no events will be sent for ICMP soft error message and this transport feature is ignored for protocol selection. This property applies to Connections and Connection Groups. The default is not to have this option. Boolean Connection Property - see 12.3.14."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-a30beccb4b2b387472f93d8de0d2b6fbb05127fb69a4806331d9cb7410a108ea","text":"SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 SHS, respectively. The \"none\" value is provided for future extensibility, in case of a signature algorithm which does not require hashing before signing. The usage of MD5 and SHA-224 are deprecated. The md5_RESERVED and sha224_RESERVED values MUST NOT be offered or negotiated by any implementation. This field indicates the signature algorithm that may be used."}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-a321824a9c981a9cdb43015f4bc4cd0509564d0fe7466e3544a37d4dc3af06b6","text":"REQUIRED. A unique access token for continuing the request, in the format specified in response-token-single. This access token MUST be bound to the client instance's key used in the request and MUST NOT be a \"bearer\" token. As a consequence, the \"bound\" field of this access token is always the boolean value \"true\" and the MUST NOT be a \"bearer\" token. As a consequence, the \"flags\" array of this access token MUST NOT contain the string \"bearer\" and the \"key\" field MUST be omitted. This access token MUST NOT be usable at resources outside of the AS. The client instance MUST present the access token in all requests to the continuation URI as"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-dnssd-srp-a323baa39d5eb364cfae942c52ca239ac9256ac32324f1d3e66953acec4a4365","text":"Service Registration Protocol for DNS-Based Service Discovery draft-ietf-dnssd-srp-13 draft-ietf-dnssd-srp-14 Abstract"}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-a33db2e1f0499d121f426384854b2d6730908a252c2eb584235cab1e8a94122f","text":"If endpoint receives an unexpected value for the transport parameter \"enable_multipath\", it MUST treat this as a connection error of type MP_CONNECTION_ERROR and close the connection. TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR (specified in Section 20.1 of QUIC- TRANSPORT) and close the connection. This extension does not change the definition of any transport parameter defined in Section 18.2. of QUIC-TRANSPORT."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-a38319418cafcb24b2ea5c2608d0453462da8e1585c560de229de6df1e7b99bc","text":"Therefore it needs to respond to the request without waiting for a packet from the target. However, if the target_host is a DNS name, the UDP proxy MUST perform DNS resolution before replying to the HTTP request. If errors occur during this process (for example, a DNS resolution failure), the UDP proxy MUST fail the request and SHOULD send details using an appropriate \"Proxy-Status\" header field PROXY- STATUS. request. If errors occur during this process, the UDP proxy MUST fail the request and SHOULD send details using an appropriate \"Proxy- Status\" header field PROXY-STATUS (for example, if DNS resolution returns an error, the proxy can use the dns_error Proxy Error Type from PROXY-STATUS). UDP proxies can use connected UDP sockets if their operating system supports them, as that allows the UDP proxy to rely on the kernel to"}
{"_id":"q-en-using-github-a3b8f7509cb49307cde0d2e1de830d37e34fe943427c8dfe0cc0a8c0e3e6b79c","text":"[4] https://about.gitlab.com/ [5] https://trustee.ietf.org/license-for-open-source- repositories.html [6] https://github.com/dontcallmedom/github-notify-ml [5] https://github.com/dontcallmedom/github-notify-ml "}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-a3ca92467c49c47a1079df7bdd7515a6dbc0d28944e4ef6ef1dab75fba9e4537","text":"prioritization. Note that this property is not a per-message override of the connection Priority - see conn-priority. The Priority properties may Connection Priority - see conn-priority. The Priority properties may interact, but can be used independently and be realized by different mechanisms; see priority-in-taps."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-a43a7fd6b50fc395ec981fd5621e0187ea34adc073605a93c51b87869a54b2db","text":"an HTTP Datagram. This prevents infinite loops in the presence of routing loops, and matches the choices in IPsec IPSEC. IPv6 requires that every link have an MTU of at least 1280 bytes IPv6. Since CONNECT-IP conveys IP packets in HTTP Datagrams and those can in turn be sent in QUIC DATAGRAM frames which cannot be fragmented DGRAM, the MTU of a CONNECT-IP link can be limited by the MTU of the QUIC connection that CONNECT-IP is operating over. This can lead to situations where the IPv6 minimum link MTU is violated. CONNECT-IP endpoints that support IPv6 MUST ensure that the CONNECT- IP tunnel link MTU is at least 1280 (i.e., that they can send HTTP Datagrams with payloads of at least 1280 bytes). This can be accomplished using various techniques: if HTTP intermediaries are not in use, both CONNECT-IP endpoints can pad the QUIC INITIAL packets of the underlying QUIC connection that CONNECT-IP is running over. if HTTP intermediaries are in use, CONNECT-IP endpoints can enter in an out of band agreement with the intermediaries to ensure that endpoints and intermediaries pad QUIC INITIAL packets. CONNECT-IP endpoints can also send ICMPv6 echo requests with 1232 bytes of data to ascertain the link MTU and tear down the tunnel if they do not receive a response. Unless endpoints have an out of band means of guaranteeing that one of the two previous techniques is sufficient, they MUST use this method. Endpoints MAY implement additional filtering policies on the IP packets they forward."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-a44f3f9f395bbf4b1e08e782486911e52865b66a24a8dc83bd0d2253b76076f5","text":"The ACK frame uses the least significant bit of the type value (that is, type 0x03) to indicate ECN feedback and report receipt of QUIC packets with associated ECN codepoints of ECT(0), ECT(1), or ECN-CE in the packet's IP header. ECN Counts are only present when the ACK in the packet's IP header. ECN counts are only present when the ACK frame type is 0x03. When present, there are three ECN counts, as shown in ecn-count- format. The three ECN Counts are: The ECN count fields are: A variable-length integer representing the total number of packets received with the ECT(0) codepoint in the packet number space of"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-a480037366b635dc55770cc3a4c06609343230bccfa40983a7f0745e1c511e6f","text":"Verifier Owner may need to trust the Verifier before giving the Endorsement, Reference Values, or Appraisal Policy to it. This can be done similarly to how a Relying Party might establish trust in a Verifier as discussed above, and in such a case, mutual attestation might even be needed as discussed in rpowner-trust. Verifier as discussed above, and in such a case, mutual authentication or attestation might even be needed as discussed in rpowner-trust. 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-a4c1f9e5f19ee7cf2978d1d317173980edbb11310c6e47fc37f4674f437902b9","text":"Local Endpoint is specified, the implementation should either use an ephemeral port or generate an error. If the Path Selection Properties do not require a single network interface or path, but allow the use of multiple paths, the Listener object should register for incoming traffic on all of the network interfaces or paths that conform to the Path Selection Properties. The set of available paths can change over time, so the implementation should monitor network path changes and register and de-register the Listener across all usable paths. When using multiple paths, the Listener is generally expected to use the same port for listening on each. If the Protocol Selection Properties allow multiple protocols to be used for listening, and the implementation supports it, the Listener object should register across the eligble protocols for each path. This means that inbound Connections delivered by the implementation may have heterogeneous protocol stacks. If the Selection Properties do not require a single network interface or path, but allow the use of multiple paths, the Listener object should register for incoming traffic on all of the network interfaces or paths that conform to the Properties. The set of available paths can change over time, so the implementation should monitor network path changes and register and de-register the Listener across all usable paths. When using multiple paths, the Listener is generally expected to use the same port for listening on each. If the Selection Properties allow multiple protocols to be used for listening, and the implementation supports it, the Listener object should register across the eligble protocols for each path. This means that inbound Connections delivered by the implementation may have heterogeneous protocol stacks. 4.8.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-a4cf9bb4c37308264d71696cbd24a559588d961b4e09cb707b2c272872b2c419","text":"Server Initial datagram as shown in fig-server-initial typically containing three packets: an Initial packet with the beginning of the server's side of the TLS handshake, a Handshake packet with the rest of the server's side of the TLS handshake, and initial 1-RTT data, if of the server's side of the TLS handshake, and 1-RTT data, if present. The Client Completion datagram contains at least one Handshake packet"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-a543ce9edaf586defa47f9cb5868f943b0a2f15fb8d2d916019bd06ea5d6f652","text":"6.1. When applicable for non-interactive tokens, all Origins SHOULD implement a robust storage-query mechanism for checking that tokens sent by clients have not been spent before. Such tokens only need to be checked for each Origin individually. But all Origins must perform global double-spend checks to avoid clients from exploiting the possibility of spending tokens more than once against distributed token checking systems. For the same reason, the global data storage must have quick update times. While an update is occurring it may be possible for a malicious client to spend a token more than once. 6.2. When a Client holds tokens for an Issuer, it is possible for any verifier to invoke that client to redeem tokens for that Issuer. This can lead to an attack where a malicious verifier can force a"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-a5483d70f90fc64029ed42ff9cfaed6caa43c5d107e314087c199e9a89fe133d","text":"IANA are requested to create a new entry in the \"HTTP Problem Type\" registry established by PROBLEM. 9.5. IANA are requested to create a new entry in the \"HTTP Problem Type\" registry established by PROBLEM. 10. References 10.1. URIs [1] https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types [1] https://iana.org/assignments/media-types [2] https://iana.org/assignments/http-problem-types Index"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-a5c507685ba46945f20bc6e5c7abdb9ee3e9a948dc21856d20f5a32f01764f5a","text":"The entries in iana-setting-table are registered by this document. Additionally, each code of the format \"0x1f * N + 0x21\" for non- negative integer values of N (that is, 0x21, 0x40, ..., through 0x3ffffffffffffffe) MUST NOT be assigned by IANA. Each code of the format \"0x1f * N + 0x21\" for non-negative integer values of N (that is, 0x21, 0x40, ..., through 0x3ffffffffffffffe) MUST NOT be assigned by IANA and MUST NOT appear in the listing of assigned values. 11.2.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-coap-tcp-tls-a689bf5437c74c448ddf15ba09013d859c5e07396404b56844ed2f3d92acde0c","text":"RFC6455. All requests for which the CoAP client has not received a response yet are cancelled when the connection is closed. If the client observes one or more resources over the WebSocket connection, then the CoAP server (or intermediary in the role of the CoAP server) MUST remove all entries associated with the client from the lists of observers when the connection is closed. yet are cancelled when the connection is closed. 4."}
{"_id":"q-en-rtcweb-overview-a6af68bcabc8ed037519c343adb9ebd4a8925bbb0454d7d710bf1eec0d6aa59d","text":"gateway to convert between the signaling on the web side to the SIP signaling may be needed. When a new codec is specified, and the SDP for the new codec is specified in the MMUSIC WG, no other standardization should be required for it to be possible to use that in the web browsers. Adding new codecs which might have new SDP parameters should not change the APIs between the browser and Javascript application. As soon as the browsers support the new codecs, old applications written before the codecs were specified should automatically be able to use the new codecs where appropriate with no changes to the JS applications. When an SDP for a new codec is specified, no other standardization should be required for it to be possible to use that in the web browsers. Adding new codecs which might have new SDP parameters should not change the APIs between the browser and Javascript application. As soon as the browsers support the new codecs, old applications written before the codecs were specified should automatically be able to use the new codecs where appropriate with no changes to the JS applications. The particular choices made for WebRTC, and their implications for the API offered by a browser implementing WebRTC, are described in I-"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-a6d979b00850620a80a14def69f49df6221f16ea25f79a126bb0c3a7e32a3dad","text":"9.6. The main MLS key schedule provides a \"resumption_secret\" that is used as a PSK to inject entropy from one epoch into another. This The main MLS key schedule provides a \"resumption_psk\" that is used as a PSK to inject entropy from one epoch into another. This functionality is used in the reinitialization and branching processes described in reinitialization and sub-group-branching, but may be used by applications for other purposes. Some uses of resumption PSKs might call for the use of PSKs from historical epochs. The application SHOULD specify an upper limit on the number of past epochs for which the \"resumption_secret\" may be the number of past epochs for which the \"resumption_psk\" may be stored. 9.7. The main MLS key schedule provides a per-epoch \"authentication_secret\". If one of the parties is being actively impersonated by an attacker, their \"authentication_secret\" will differ from that of the other group members. Thus, members of a group MAY use their \"authentication_secrets\" within an out-of-band authentication protocol to ensure that they share the same view of the group. The main MLS key schedule provides a per-epoch \"authentication_code\". If one of the parties is being actively impersonated by an attacker, their \"authentication_code\" will differ from that of the other group members. Thus, members of a group MAY verify out of band that their \"authentication_code\" values are all the same, in order to ensure that they share the same view of the group. 10."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-a6e5a67335f38af363b784184d3aef8efcf4929ac80c29ccb5243c73551b72f1","text":"A GroupContextExtensions proposal is used to update the list of extensions in the GroupContext for the group. \"struct { Extension extensions<0..2^32-1>; } GroupContextExtensions; \" \"struct { Extension extensions; } GroupContextExtensions; \" A member of the group applies a GroupContextExtensions proposal with the following steps:"}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-a707b65e57030223edd34f4967fe8a720227d0b7e21df52cf1e6d1d87c9206ee","text":"Entropy properties of external PSKs may also affect TLS security properties. For example, if a high entropy PSK is used, then PSK- only key establishment modes provide expected security properties for TLS, including, for example, including establishing the same session keys between peers, secrecy of session keys, peer authentication, and downgrade protection. See RFC8446, Section E.1 for an explanation of these properties. However, these modes lack forward security. Forward security may be achieved by using a PSK-DH mode, or, alternatively, by using PSKs with short lifetimes. TLS, including establishing the same session keys between peers, secrecy of session keys, peer authentication, and downgrade protection. See RFC8446, Section E.1 for an explanation of these properties. However, these modes lack forward security. Forward security may be achieved by using a PSK-DH mode, or, alternatively, by using PSKs with short lifetimes. In contrast, if a low entropy PSK is used, then PSK-only key establishment modes are subject to passive exhaustive search attacks"}
{"_id":"q-en-t2trg-rest-iot-a72fc97d00d44214624f4126575eb471fa32a342aa71e794e35998829cbf3ddc","text":"a RESTful API. Different protocols can be used with RESTful systems, but at the time of writing the most common protocols are HTTP RFC7230 and CoAP of writing the most common protocols are HTTP RFC9110 and CoAP RFC7252. Since RESTful APIs are often lightweight and enable loose coupling of system components, they are a good fit for various Internet of Things (IoT) applications, which in general aim at"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-a742b61a20bd027e83f82608658e9e5637922418fe953d97327695a6c6d54887","text":"4.2. This document leaves when and how many bytes to advertise in a MAX_STREAM_DATA or MAX_DATA frame to implementations, but offers a few considerations. These frames contribute to connection overhead. Therefore frequently sending frames with small changes is undesirable. At the same time, larger increments to limits are necessary to avoid blocking if updates are less frequent, requiring larger resource commitments at the receiver. Thus there is a trade- off between resource commitment and overhead when determining how large a limit is advertised. Implementations decide when and how much credit to advertise in MAX_STREAM_DATA and MAX_DATA frames, but this section offers a few considerations. To avoid blocking a sender, a receiver can send a MAX_STREAM_DATA or MAX_DATA frame multiple times within a round trip or send it early enough to allow for recovery from loss of the frame. Control frames contribute to connection overhead. Therefore, frequently sending MAX_STREAM_DATA and MAX_DATA frames with small changes is undesirable. On the other hand, if updates are less frequent, larger increments to limits are necessary to avoid blocking a sender, requiring larger resource commitments at the receiver. There is a trade-off between resource commitment and overhead when determining how large a limit is advertised. A receiver can use an autotuning mechanism to tune the frequency and amount of advertised additional credit based on a round-trip time estimate and the rate at which the receiving application consumes data, similar to common TCP implementations. As an optimization, sending frames related to flow control only when there are other frames to send or when a peer is blocked ensures that flow control doesn't cause extra packets to be sent. If a sender runs out of flow control credit, it will be unable to send new data and is considered blocked. It is generally considered best to not let the sender become blocked. To avoid blocking a sender, and to reasonably account for the possibility of loss, a receiver should send a MAX_DATA or MAX_STREAM_DATA frame at least two round trips before it expects the sender to get blocked. A receiver MUST NOT wait for a STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED or DATA_BLOCKED frame before sending MAX_STREAM_DATA or MAX_DATA, since doing so will mean that a sender will be blocked for at least an entire round trip, and potentially for longer if the peer chooses to not send STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED or DATA_BLOCKED frames. data, similar to common TCP implementations. As an optimization, an endpoint could send frames related to flow control only when there are other frames to send or when a peer is blocked, ensuring that flow control does not cause extra packets to be sent. A blocked sender is not required to send STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED or DATA_BLOCKED frames. Therefore, a receiver MUST NOT wait for a STREAM_DATA_BLOCKED or DATA_BLOCKED frame before sending a MAX_STREAM_DATA or MAX_DATA frame; doing so could result in the sender being blocked for the rest of the connection. Even if the sender sends these frames, waiting for them will result in the sender being blocked for at least an entire round trip. When a sender receives credit after being blocked, it might be able to send a large amount of data in response, resulting in short-term congestion; see Section 6.9 in QUIC-RECOVERY for a discussion of how a sender can avoid this congestion. 4.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-a79efe89015b7016e78129a8f649445e4cdccf04324ad0468e26c29dd942efec","text":"policy or user input. Details of such policy are out of scope of this document. Clients MUST NOT automatically use a Designated Resolver without some sort of validation, such as the two methods defined in this document or a future mechanism. defined in this document or a future mechanism. Use without validation can allow an attacker to direct traffic to an Encrypted Resolver that is unrelated to the original Unencrypted DNS Resolver, as described in security. A client MUST NOT re-use a designation discovered using the IP address of one Unencrypted DNS Resolver in place of any other"}
{"_id":"q-en-capport-wg-architecture-a7ab21a80e4fdcc11b2927aa5cb0eb141def762c8d37e847ccf66dfb2d9ff573","text":"Captive Portal API Server: Also known as API Server. A server hosting the Captive Portal API. Captive Portal Signal: A notification from the network used to inform the User Equipment that the state of its captivity could have Captive Portal Signal: A notification from the network used to signal to the User Equipment that the state of its captivity could have changed. Captive Portal Signaling Protocol: Also known as Signaling Protocol."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-a7bde9cf1317e857b70cf1a11975e59b7eda5bc0366391cefc1045bf7578cc57","text":"Many of the use cases for delegated credentials can also be addressed using purely server-side mechanisms that do not require changes to client behavior (e.g., LURK I-D.mglt-lurk-tls-requirements). These mechanisms, however, incur per-transaction latency, since the front- end server has to interact with a back-end server that holds a private key. The mechanism proposed in this document allows the delegation to be done off-line, with no per-transaction latency. The figure below compares the message flows for these two mechanisms with TLS 1.3 I-D.ietf-tls-tls13. client behavior (e.g., a PKCS#11 interface or a remote signing mechanism KEYLESS). These mechanisms, however, incur per-transaction latency, since the front-end server has to interact with a back-end server that holds a private key. The mechanism proposed in this document allows the delegation to be done off-line, with no per- transaction latency. The figure below compares the message flows for these two mechanisms with TLS 1.3 RFC8446. These two mechanisms can be complementary. A server could use credentials for clients that support them, while using LURK to support legacy clients. It is possible to address the short-lived certificate concerns above by automating certificate issuance, e.g., with ACME I-D.ietf-acme- acme. In addition to requiring frequent operationally-critical interactions with an external party, this makes the server operator dependent on the CA's willingness to issue certificates with sufficiently short lifetimes. It also fails to address the issues with algorithm support. Nonetheless, existing automated issuance APIs like ACME may be useful for provisioning credentials within an operator network. by automating certificate issuance, e.g., with ACME RFC8555. In addition to requiring frequent operationally-critical interactions with an external party, this makes the server operator dependent on the CA's willingness to issue certificates with sufficiently short lifetimes. It also fails to address the issues with algorithm support. Nonetheless, existing automated issuance APIs like ACME may be useful for provisioning credentials within an operator network. 3. While X.509 forbids end-entity certificates from being used as issuers for other certificates, it is perfectly fine to use them to issue other signed objects as long as the certificate contains the digitalSignature KeyUsage (RFC5280 section 4.2.1.3). We define a new signed object format that would encode only the semantics that are needed for this application. The credential has the following digitalSignature KeyUsage (RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3). We define a new signed object format that would encode only the semantics that are needed for this application. The credential has the following structure: Relative time in seconds from the beginning of the delegation"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-a844beab10882dab3f6ab38a581b387a87519a32c79789a3d29b364fe345d29b","text":"Each \"m=\" and c=\" line MUST be filled in with the port, protocol, and address of the default candidate for the m= section, as described in RFC5245, Section 4.3. Each \"a=rtcp\" attribute line MUST also be filled in with the port and address of the appropriate default candidate, either the default RTP or RTCP candidate, depending on whether RTCP multiplexing is currently active or not. Note that if RTCP multiplexing is being offered, but not yet active, the default RTCP candidate MUST be used, as indicated in RFC5761, section 5.1.3. In each case, if no candidates of the desired type have yet been gathered, dummy values MUST be used, as described above. described in RFC5245, Section 4.3. If ICE checking has already completed for one or more candidate pairs and a candidate pair is in active use, then that pair MUST be used, even if ICE has not yet completed. Note that this differs from the guidance in RFC5245, Section 9.1.2.2, which only refers to offers created when ICE has completed. Each \"a=rtcp\" attribute line MUST also be filled in with the port and address of the appropriate default candidate, either the default RTP or RTCP candidate, depending on whether RTCP multiplexing is currently active or not. Note that if RTCP multiplexing is being offered, but not yet active, the default RTCP candidate MUST be used, as indicated in RFC5761, section 5.1.3. In each case, if no candidates of the desired type have yet been gathered, dummy values MUST be used, as described above. Each \"a=mid\" line MUST stay the same."}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-a8641382d7dc8b77bd793b4d488fb448a9370e88c012cbaef42d344893a24f34","text":"1. This document provides usage guidance for external Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs) in TLS. It lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under certain assumptions and demonstrates how violations of these assumptions lead to attacks. This document also discusses PSK use cases, provisioning processes, and TLS stack implementation support in the context of these assumptions. It provides advice for applications in various use cases to help meet these assumptions. There are many resources that provide guidance for password generation and verification aimed towards improving security. However, there is no such equivalent for external Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs) in TLS. This document aims to reduce that gap. It lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under certain assumptions and demonstrates how violations of these assumptions lead to attacks. This document also discusses PSK use cases, provisioning processes, and TLS stack implementation support in the context of these assumptions. It provides advice for applications in various use cases to help meet these assumptions. The guidance provided in this document is applicable across TLS RFC8446, DTLS I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13, and Constrained TLS I-D.ietf-tls-"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-rrc-a87a098b17a7024d6b6ea92d8e419d07f6904554ccbaf04a2073d41a578cd12f","text":"However, the server wants to test the reachability of the client at his new IP address. 6. 7. Note that the return routability checks do not protect against flooding of third-parties if the attacker is on-path, as the attacker"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-a87fbb6cbf0f0a46a0348d00dbf574dd815e45d05fa42e04395a0b6e8f24ba0f","text":"retry tokens marked as being a few seconds in the future, due to possible clock synchronization issues. A server MUST NOT send a Retry packet in response to an Initial packet that contains a retry token. After decrypting the token, the server uses the corresponding fields to populate the original_destination_connection_id transport parameter, with a length equal to ODCIL, and the retry_source_connection_id transport parameter, with length equal to RSCIL. As discussed in QUIC-TRANSPORT, a server MUST NOT send a Retry packet in response to an Initial packet that contains a retry token. 7."}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-a8c01eed4d5a21923edbe54d27810896b6741fab361e34014e55b24700c8c78a","text":"from TSN (L2) to PW (MPLS) encapsulation. However, such interworking is out-of-scope in this document and left for further study. A MPLS DetNet flow is configured to carry any number of TSN flows. The DetNet flow specific bandwidth profile SHOULD match the required bandwidth of the App-flow aggregate. 5.3. In the design of I-D.ietf-detnet-mpls an MPLS service label (the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-a8c49119d642c5ab421095b7583d5ab4c43e27f63680a2759fa1efba320d2148","text":"first string compares less than the remainder of the second string. Note that comparisons using either of the operators \"<\" or \">\" yield false if either value being compared is an object, array, boolean, or \"null\". Note that comparisons using the operator \"<\" yield false if either value being compared is an object, array, boolean, or \"null\". \"!=\", \"<=\" and \">=\" are defined in terms of the other comparison operators. For any \"a\" and \"b\": \"!=\", \"<=\", \">\", and \">=\" are defined in terms of the other comparison operators. For any \"a\" and \"b\": The comparison \"a != b\" yields true if and only if \"a == b\" yields false."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-a9c0a98eb5569b5e7e3ea770373fde95f9ae47fa5eacfc87234ab94842e61319","text":"14. This document requests the creation of the following new IANA registries: MLS Ciphersuites All of these registries should be under a heading of \"Message Layer Security\", and administered under a Specification Required policy RFC8126. registries: MLS Ciphersuites (mls-ciphersuites). All of these registries should be under a heading of \"Message Layer Security\", and assignments are made via the Specification Required policy RFC8126. See de for additional information about the MLS Designated Experts (DEs). 14.1. The \"MLS Ciphersuites\" registry lists identifiers for suites of cryptographic algorithms defined for use with MLS. These are two- byte values, so the maximum possible value is 0xFFFF = 65535. Values in the range 0xF000 - 0xFFFF are reserved for vendor-internal usage. Template: Value: The two-byte identifier for the ciphersuite Name: The name of the ciphersuite Reference: Where this algorithm is defined The initial contents for this registry are as follows: [[ Note to RFC Editor: Please replace \"XXXX\" above with the number assigned to this RFC. ]] A ciphersuite is a combination of a protocol version and the set of cryptographic algorithms that should be used. Ciphersuite names follow the naming convention: Where VALUE is represented as two 8bit octets: This specification defines the following ciphersuites for use with MLS 1.0. The KEM/DEM constructions used for HPKE are defined by HPKE. The corresponding AEAD algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM, are defined in RFC5116. AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is defined in RFC7539. The corresponding hash algorithms are defined in SHS. It is advisable to keep the number of ciphersuites low to increase the chances clients can interoperate in a federated environment, therefore the ciphersuites only inlcude modern, yet well-established algorithms. Depending on their requirements, clients can choose between two security levels (roughly 128-bit and 256-bit). Within the security levels clients can choose between faster X25519/X448 curves and FIPS 140-2 compliant curves for Diffie-Hellman key negotiations. Additionally clients that run predominantly on mobile processors can choose ChaCha20Poly1305 over AES-GCM for performance reasons. Since ChaCha20Poly1305 is not listed by FIPS 140-2 it is not paired with FIPS 140-2 compliant curves. The security level of symmetric encryption algorithms and hash functions is paired with the security level of the curves. The mandatory-to-implement ciphersuite for MLS 1.0 is \"MLS10_128_HPKE25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519\" which uses Curve25519, HKDF over SHA2-256 and AES-128-GCM for HPKE, and AES- 128-GCM with Ed25519 for symmetric encryption and signatures. Values with the first byte 255 (decimal) are reserved for Private Use. New ciphersuite values are assigned by IANA as described in iana- considerations. 14.2. [[ OPEN ISSUE: pick DE mailing address. Maybe mls-des@ or mls-de- pool. ]] Specification Required RFC8126 registry requests are registered after a three-week review period on the MLS DEs' mailing list: TBD@ietf.org [1], on the advice of one or more of the MLS DEs. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the MLS DEs may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published. Registration requests sent to the MLS DEs mailing list for review SHOULD use an appropriate subject (e.g., \"Request to register value in MLS Bar registry\"). Within the review period, the MLS DEs will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the MLS DEs mailing list and IANA. Denials SHOULD include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention for resolution using the iesg@ietf.org [2] mailing list. Criteria that SHOULD be applied by the MLS DEs includes determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or useful only for a single application, and whether the registration description is clear. For example, the MLS DEs will apply the ciphersuite-related advisory found in ciphersuites. IANA MUST only accept registry updates from the MLS DEs and SHOULD direct all requests for registration to the MLS DEs' mailing list. It is suggested that multiple MLS DEs be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular MLS DE, that MLS DE SHOULD defer to the judgment of the other MLS DEs. 15. References 15.1. URIs [1] mailto:TBD@ietf.org [2] mailto:iesg@ietf.org "}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-a9c7fffb53b116692f4736b70a05ee3dfd531081ba024a437ebbfd39b69f5042","text":"a comparison using the operator \"<\" yields false. When any path or function expression on either side of a comparison When any query or function expression on either side of a comparison results in a nodelist consisting of a single node, that side is replaced by the value of its node and then:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-a9d0dabc682b53c2031a9d8216ff1a912379bc5aae14a9027b97418376e17449","text":"the hash values with a bitwise-XOR operation. Then, for each Aggregator endpoint \"{aggregator}\" in the parameters associated with \"CollectReq.task_id\" (see collect-flow) except its associated with \"CollectionReq.task_id\" (see collect-flow) except its own, the Leader sends a POST request to \"{aggregator}/tasks/{task- id}/aggregate_shares\" with the following message:"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-a9d9b201fe28dadeed890e649919b97e1649fa7be11f696e24b3eb22194fc66c","text":"sections as one BUNDLE group. However, whether the m= sections are bundle-only or not depends on the BUNDLE policy. The next step is to generate session-level lip sync groups as defined in RFC5888, Section 7. For each MediaStream with more than one MediaStreamTrack, a group of type \"LS\" MUST be added that contains the mid values for each MediaStreamTrack in that MediaStream. Attributes which SDP permits to either be at the session level or the media level SHOULD generally be at the media level even if they are identical. This promotes readability, especially if one of a set of"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-aa0f046f8448f24fbe63d3531ca239e6cd70c1a8ae6b3cbadc70cb2a04a6a32e","text":"Aligned excerpt examples in I-D text with full CDDL Fixed titels where title was referring to group instead of map Fixed titles where title was referring to group instead of map Added missig date in SEMVER Added missing date in SEMVER Fixed root cardinality for file and directory, etc."}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-aa7a75a196dc0926f85428688872c4dbccdac53352ce0a49e4724cdb0ba153e1","text":"protect against DOS attacks, excess traffic due to malicious or malfunctioning devices is prevented or mitigated through the use of existing mechanisms, for example by policing and shaping incoming traffic. To prevent DetNet packets from being delayed by an entity external to a DetNet domain, DetNet technology definition can allow for the mitigation of on-path attackers, for example through use of authentication and authorization of devices within the DetNet domain. traffic. To prevent DetNet packets having their delay manipulated by an external entity, precautions need to be taken to ensure that all devices on an LSP are those intended to be there by the network operator and that they are well behaved. In addition to physical security, technical methods such as authentication and authorization of network equipment and the instrumentation and monitoring of the LSP packet delay may be used. If a delay attack is suspected, traffic may be moved to an alternate path, for example through changing the LSP or management of the PREOF configuration. 7."}
{"_id":"q-en-capport-wg-architecture-aa9609869e6683d3cbe942716ef8d2cbb15b6b2ee4f99e810b00b3f279621f54","text":"such cases, it is possible for the components to still uniquely identify the device if they are aware of the port mapping. In some situations, the User Equipment may have multiple IP addresses, while still satisfying all of the recommended properties. This raises some challenges to the components of the network. For example, if the User Equipment tries to access the network with multiple IP addresses, should the Enforcement Device and API Server treat each IP address as a unique User Equipment, or should it tie the multiple addresses together into one view of the subscriber? An In some situations, the User Equipment may have multiple IP addresses (either IPv4, IPv6 or a dual-stack RFC4213 combination), while still satisfying all of the recommended properties. This raises some challenges to the components of the network. For example, if the User Equipment tries to access the network with multiple IP addresses, should the Enforcement Device and API Server treat each IP address as a unique User Equipment, or should it tie the multiple addresses together into one view of the subscriber? An implementation MAY do either. Attention should be paid to IPv6 and the fact that it is expected for a device to have multiple IPv6 addresses on a single link. In such cases, identification could be"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-aabce84c2ee56184b1b421d21a12d0d27ab99ed2e0f2b9d682f7f35c131bee0f","text":"client MUST abruptly terminate the corresponding stream with a stream error of type H3_GENERAL_PROTOCOL_ERROR. 4.2. 4.4.2. The REGISTER_DATAGRAM_NO_CONTEXT capsule (see iana-types for the value of the capsule type) allows a client to inform the server that"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-aad2c6de16422570b5b86395261c327a3528403e04be009e6318bebfc1a73697","text":"Depending on the status of the connection, the queried Connection Properties will include different information: [TODO: turn this list into actual properties or move up into the explaining text] The status of the connection, which can be one of the following: Establishing, Established, Closing, or Closed."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-ab05c1889006b6559f572a582d7d4c3a02e14207d1a5ef3e881d9bfc1a9aca19","text":"construction, using a distinct label. To avoid collisions in these labels, an IANA registry is defined in mls-signature-labels. The ciphersuites are defined in section mls-ciphersuites. 5.1.3. As with signing, MLS includes a label and context in encryption operations to avoid confusion between ciphertexts produced for different purposes. Encryption and decryption including this label and context are done as follows: Where EncryptContext is specified as: And its fields set to: Here, the functions \"SealBase\" and \"OpenBase\" are defined RFC9180, using the HPKE algorithms specified by the group's ciphersuite. If MLS extensions require HPKE encryption operations, they should re-use the EncryptWithLabel construction, using a distinct label. To avoid collisions in these labels, an IANA registry is defined in mls- public-key-encryption-labels. 5.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-aba067ec9574e53fcf23b131c9bd39d4a396124042f66bb017c03d9b33d35a1b","text":"excluded by subsequent calls to createOffer and createAnswer, in which case the corresponding media formats in the associated m= section will be excluded. The codec preferences cannot add media formats that would otherwise not be present. This includes codecs that were not negotiated in a previous offer/answer exchange that included the transceiver. formats that would otherwise not be present. The codec preferences of an RtpTransceiver can also determine the order of codecs in subsequent calls to createOffer and createAnswer,"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-abb2577ce70f5ffb2a539a65dced4b2960cc33e3bb6b0080083a1b883b545cce","text":"A function expression is correctly typed if all the following are true: If it occurs as a \"filter-path\" in an existence test, the function If it occurs as a \"filter-path\" in a test expression, the function is defined to have result type \"OptionalNodes\" or one of its subtypes, or to have result type \"OptionalBoolean\" or one of its subtypes."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-abd760229f952a05ff5e20bfd1c40d5a8abb3bf794990088f60512ab1916ecea","text":"Receiving acknowledgments for data sent on the new path serves as proof of the peer's reachability from the new address. Note that since acknowledgments may be received on any path, return reachability on the new path is not established. To establish return reachability on the new path is not established. No method is provided to establish return reachability, as endpoints independently determine reachability on each direction of a path. To establish reachability on the new path, an endpoint MAY concurrently initiate path validation migrate-validate on the new path or it MAY choose to wait for the peer to send the next non-probing frame to its new address. path validation migrate-validate on the new path. An endpoint MAY defer path validation until after a peer sends the next non-probing frame to its new address. 9.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-ac0834d4119410fabcc6b68986ec13d6af3e840f09e33092eccef00f3f689851","text":"If this is the only Connection object that is assigned to the SCTP association or stream mapping has not been negotiated, CONNECT.SCTP is called. Else, a new stream is used: if there are enough streams available, \"Initiate\" is just a local operation that assigns a new stream number to the Connection object. The number of streams is negotiated as a parameter of the prior CONNECT.SCTP call, and it represents a trade-off between local resource usage and the number of Connection objects that can be mapped without requiring a reconfiguration signal. When running out of streams, ADD_STREAM.SCTP must be called. CONNECT.SCTP is called. Else, unless the Selection Property \"activeReadBeforeSend\" is Preferred or Required, a new stream is used: if there are enough streams available, \"Initiate\" is just a local operation that assigns a new stream number to the Connection object. The number of streams is negotiated as a parameter of the prior CONNECT.SCTP call, and it represents a trade-off between local resource usage and the number of Connection objects that can be mapped without requiring a reconfiguration signal. When running out of streams, ADD_STREAM.SCTP must be called. If this is the only Connection object that is assigned to the SCTP association or stream mapping has not been negotiated,"}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-ac2ab8885f39bf1c6884e023f6d9296719c3085c1027d7f207c5f0905d8f9dc5","text":"latency. To collect ACK delays on all the paths, hosts should rely on time stamps as described in QUIC-Timestamp. 7.1.4. ECN feedback in QUIC is provided based on counters in the ACK frame (see Section 19.3.2. of QUIC-TRANSPORT). That means if an ACK frame acknowledges multiple packets, the ECN feedback cannot be accounted to a specific packet. There are separate counters for each packet number space. However, sending to zero-length CID receivers, the same number space is used for multiple paths. Respectively, if an ACK frames acknowledges multiple packets from different paths, the ECN feedback cannot unambiguously be assigned to a path. If the sender marks its packets with the ECN capable flags, the network will expect standard reactions to ECN marks, such as slowing down transmission on the sending path. If zero-length CID is used, the sending path is however ambiguous. Therefore, the sender MUST treat a CE marking as a congestion signal on all sending paths that have been by a packet that was acknowledged in the ACK frame signaling the CE counter increase. A host that is sending over multiple paths to a zero-length CID receiver MAY disable ECN marking and send all subsequent packets as Not-ECN capable. 7.1.5. Hosts that are designed to support multipath using multiple number spaces MAY adopt a conservative posture after negotiating multipath support with a peer using zero-length CID. The simplest posture is to only send data on one path at a time, while accepting packets on all acceptable paths. In that case: the attribution of packets to path discussed in zero-length-cid- loss-and-congestion are easy to solve because packets are sent on a single path, the ACK Delays are correct, the vast majority of ECN marks relate to the current sending path. Of course, the hosts will only take limited advantage from the multipath capability in these scenarios. Support for \"make before break\" migrations will improve, but load sharing between multiple paths will not work. 7.2. If the multipath option is enabled with a value of 2, each path has its own packet number space for transmitting 1-RTT packets and a new ACK frame format is used as specified in ack-mp-frame. Compared to the QUIC version 1 ACK frame, the ACK_MP frames additionally contains a Packet Number Space Identifier (PN Space ID). The PN Space ID used to distinguish packet number spaces for different paths and is simply If packets contain a non-zero CID, each path has its own packet number space for transmitting 1-RTT packets and a new ACK frame format is used as specified in ack-mp-frame. Compared to the QUIC version 1 ACK frame, the ACK_MP frames additionally contains a Packet Number Space Identifier (PN Space ID). The PN Space ID used to distinguish packet number spaces for different paths and is simply derived from the sequence number of Destination Connection ID. Therefore, the packet number space for 1-RTT packets can be identified based on the Destination Connection ID in each packets."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-ac75eca0c0a0c1a11a2da80bff37fd5240a87b7f2d0ad7691df23342fe54f1a1","text":"Given these inputs, the derivation of secrets for an epoch proceeds as shown in the following diagram: A number of secrets are derived from the epoch secret for different A number of values are derived from the epoch secret for different purposes: The \"external secret\" is used to derive an HPKE key pair whose (In general, we use \"secret\" to refer to a value that is used derive further secret values, and \"key\" to refer to a value that is used with an algorithm such as HMAC or an AEAD algorithm.) The \"external_secret\" is used to derive an HPKE key pair whose private key is held by the entire group: The public key \"external_pub\" can be published as part of the"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-ac779f40290a256843cad00bfaddab32ffc3404be5c9fadcd567ad25436ebe52","text":"The \"signature\" field in an MLSPlaintext object is computed using the signing private key corresponding to the public key, which was authenticated by the credential at the leaf of the tree indicated by the sender field. The signature covers the plaintext metadata and message content, which is all of MLSPlaintext except for the \"signature\", the \"confirmation_tag\" and \"membership_tag\" fields. If the sender is a member of the group, the signature also covers the GroupContext for the current epoch, so that signatures are specific to a given group and epoch. the sender field. The signature is computed using \"SignWithLabel\" with label \"\"MLSPlaintextTBS\"\" and with a content that covers the plaintext metadata and message content, which is all of MLSPlaintext except for the \"signature\", the \"confirmation_tag\" and \"membership_tag\" fields. If the sender is a member of the group, the content also covers the GroupContext for the current epoch, so that signatures are specific to a given group and epoch. The \"membership_tag\" field in the MLSPlaintext object authenticates the sender's membership in the group. For an MLSPlaintext with a"}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-acb6baf0fa4ed28f6721bb51e743305f1f0f610778c44a9689059a011db37c9e","text":"encapsulations for consistency but there is no hard requirement in this regard. Implementation details of PREOF functions is out of scope for this document. IEEE802.1CB-2017 specifies replication and elimination specific aspects, which can be applied to PRF and PEF. 4.2.2.1. The Packet Replication Function (PRF) function MAY be supported by an"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-edhoc-ad2f59b9e098e29a028ffa49df9c6624d6cfb191619e1bca1141ea5d068156b9","text":"EDHOC data and the OSCORE ciphertext, using the newly defined EDHOC option for signalling. 4. The approach defined in this specification consists of sending EDHOC message_3 inside an OSCORE protected CoAP message. The resulting EDHOC + OSCORE request is in practice the OSCORE Request from fig-non-combined, sent to a protected resource and with the correct CoAP method and options, with the addition that it also transports EDHOC message_3. Since EDHOC message_3 may be too large to be included in a CoAP Option, e.g. if containing a large public key certificate chain, it has to be transported through the CoAP payload. The use of this approach is explicitly signalled by including an EDHOC Option (see signalling) in the EDHOC + OSCORE request. 4.1. 5.2. The Client prepares an EDHOC + OSCORE request as follows."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-ad3979f845cbca6a51d83b5458983e529fb3214aceb1944c20a645e143076a57","text":"The \"a=rtcp-mux\" line MUST only be added if present in the most recent answer. The \"a=rtcp-mux-only\" line MUST only be added if present in the most recent answer. The \"a=rtcp-rsize\" line MUST only be added if present in the most recent answer."}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-ad3f05a5d5113d900d1c9d90fefbe69d9706245371b9086a11667ff99faaec8d","text":"When the multipath option is negotiated, clients that want to use an additional path MUST first initiate the Address Validation procedure with PATH_CHALLENGE and PATH_RESPONSE frames described in Section 8 of QUIC-TRANSPORT. After receiving packets from the client on the new paths, the servers MAY in turn attempt to validate these paths using the same mechanisms. with PATH_CHALLENGE and PATH_RESPONSE frames described in Section 8.2 of QUIC-TRANSPORT. After receiving packets from the client on a new path, if the server decides to use the new path, the server MUST perform path validation Section 8.2 of QUIC-TRANSPORT unless it has previously validated that address. If validation succeed, the client can send non-probing, 1-RTT packets on the new paths. In contrast with the specification in Section 9 of"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-ad7a30b051bad5052b28c8af703f605c3ee492441ed5c1b77eb317c650e24f8b","text":"4.2. The Obfuscated CID Algorithm makes an attempt to obscure the mapping of connections to servers to reduce linkability, while not requiring true encryption and decryption. The format is depicted in the figure The Stream Cipher CID algorithm provides cryptographic protection at the cost of additional per-packet processing at the load balancer to decrypt every incoming connection ID. The CID format is depicted below. 4.2.1. The configuration agent selects an arbitrary set of bits of the server connection ID that it will use to route to a given server, called the \"routing bits\". The number of bits MUST have enough entropy to have a different code point for each server, and SHOULD have enough entropy so that there are many codepoints for each server. The configuration agent MUST NOT select a routing mask with more than 136 routing bits set to 1, which allows for the first octet and up to 2 octets for server purposes in a maximum-length connection ID. The configuration agent selects a divisor that MUST be larger than the number of servers. It SHOULD be large enough to accommodate reasonable increases in the number of servers. The divisor MUST be an odd integer so certain addition operations do not always produce an even number. The configuration agent also assigns each server a \"modulus\", an integer between 0 and the divisor minus 1. These MUST be unique for each server, and SHOULD be distributed across the entire number space between zero and the divisor. 4.2.2. Upon receipt of a QUIC packet, the load balancer extracts the selected bits of the Server CID and expresses them as an unsigned integer of that length. The load balancer then divides the result by the chosen divisor. The modulus of this operation maps to the modulus for the destination server. Note that any Server CID that contains a server's modulus, plus an arbitrary integer multiple of the divisor, in the routing bits is routable to that server regardless of the contents of the non-routing bits. Outside observers that do not know the divisor or the routing bits will therefore have difficulty identifying that two Server CIDs route to the same server. Note also that not all Connection IDs are necessarily routable, as the computed modulus may not match one assigned to any server. These DCIDs are non-compliant as described above. 4.2.3. The server chooses a connection ID length. This MUST contain all of the routing bits and MUST be at least 9 octets to provide adequate entropy. When a server needs a new connection ID, it adds an arbitrary nonnegative integer multiple of the divisor to its modulus, without exceeding the maximum integer value implied by the number of routing bits. The choice of multiple should appear random within these constraints. The server encodes the result in the routing bits. It MAY put any other value into bits that used neither for routing nor config rotation. These bits SHOULD appear random to observers. 4.3. The Stream Cipher CID algorithm provides true cryptographic protection, rather than mere obfuscation, at the cost of additional per-packet processing at the load balancer to decrypt every incoming connection ID. The CID format is depicted below. 4.3.1. The configuration agent assigns a server ID to every server in its pool, and determines a server ID length (in octets) sufficiently large to encode all server IDs, including potential future servers."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-ae1a6124802c73949820cf9a5cec2d507dafb2d51989c507540ef1afae8e7ba2","text":"the ICE candidate event. If the pool becomes depleted, either because a larger-than-expected number of ICE components is used, or because the pool has not had enough time to gather candidates, the remaining candidates are gathered as usual. remaining candidates are gathered as usual. This only occurs for the first offer/answer exchange, after which the candidate pool is emptied and no longer used. One example of where this concept is useful is an application that expects an incoming call at some point in the future, and wants to"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-ae4aa2ea54ef8a248627a8e4ec4c426fc94be3c766cfc569ca6e5d7552da339b","text":"4.1.2. Branch types must occur in a specific order relative to one another to avoid creating leaf nodes with invalid or incompatible settings. In the example above, it would be invalid to branch for derived endpoints (the DNS results for www.example.com) before branching between interface paths, since there are situations when the results will be different across networks due to private names or different supported IP versions. Implementations must be careful to branch in an order that results in usable leaf nodes whenever there are multiple branch types that could be used from a single node. The order of operations for branching should be: Alternate Paths Branch types ought to occur in a specific order relative to one another to avoid creating leaf nodes with invalid or incompatible settings. In the example above, it would be invalid to branch for derived endpoints (the DNS results for www.example.com) before branching between interface paths, since there are situations when the results will be different across networks due to private names or different supported IP versions. Implementations need to be careful to branch in a consistent order that results in usable leaf nodes whenever there are multiple branch types that could be used from a single node. This document recommends the following order of operations for branching: Network Paths Protocol Options"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-ae7273aefec2e3d6fa23a10b8c571fec37904f0ceaefc0ad96d847a86dae826a","text":"to use smaller packets, so that the limited reassembly capacity is not exceeded. For TCP, MSS clamping (Section 3.2 of {?RFC4459}}) is often used to For TCP, MSS clamping (Section 3.2 of RFC4459) is often used to change the sender's maximum TCP segment size, but QUIC requires a different approach. Section 14 of QUIC-TRANSPORT advises senders to probe larger sizes using Datagram Packetization Layer PMTU Discovery"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-ae7cd011cd509c32badc1c5f4d132abc418413525590ca0caddb049b230e287b","text":"be acknowledged, an endpoint MAY wait until an ack-eliciting packet has been received to include an ACK frame with outgoing frames. A receiver MUST NOT send an ack-eliciting frame in all packets that would otherwise be non-ack-eliciting, to avoid an infinite feedback loop of acknowledgements. 13.2.2. A receiver determines how frequently to send acknowledgements in"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-aea0b7b65521665fa1cac419ff9898f82338ebe3dda963945354900670342fa2","text":"3.2. The properties specified during pre-establishment has a close The properties specified during pre-establishment have a close connection to system policy. The implementation is responsible for combining and reconciling several different sources of preferences when establishing Connections. These include, but are not limited to: Application preferences, i.e., preferences specified during the pre-establishment such as Local Endpoint, Remote Endpoint, Path Selection Properties, and Protocol Selection Properties. pre-establishment via Selection Properties. Dynamic system policy, i.e., policy compiled from internally and externally acquired information about available network"}
{"_id":"q-en-capport-wg-architecture-aee96a54fbd153b1287f123be968f59b1c03dea6cd058555f9c03ad8c11a431f","text":"addresses on a single link. In such cases, identification could be performed by subnet, such as the /64 to which the IP belongs. 3.4.3. The URIs provided in the API SHOULD contain all the information necessary to render the resources requested: the resources should not depend on ambient information, such as remote address on the connection. This is to ensure that the content served from these URIs is correct and meaningful to the User Equipment, even when accessed from a network other than the one that contains the captive portal. One consequence of this is that URIs provided in the API are expected to be resolved using public global DNS (as defined in Section 2 of RFC8499). 3.5. A Captive Portal API needs to present information to clients that is unique to that client. To do this, some systems use information from the context of a request, such as the source address, to identify the UE. Using information from context rather than information from the URI allows the same URI to be used for different clients. However, it also means that the resource is unable to provide relevant information if the UE makes a request using a different network path. This might happen when UE has multiple network interfaces. It might also happen if the address of the API provided by DNS depends on where the query originates (as in split DNS RFC8499). Accessing the API MAY depend on contextual information. However, the URIs provided in the API SHOULD be unique to the UE and not dependent on contextual information to function correctly. Though a URI might still correctly resolve when the UE makes the request from a different network, it is possible that some functions"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-af06117084c267087b1b73b1d5ab4120cef32481971795d5db809b6e6c1780e9","text":"Section 4.4 of IANA-POLICY) where two registrations MUST NOT have the same Key. This registry is initially empty. 10. References 9. References 10.1. URIs 9.1. URIs [1] mailto:masque@ietf.org"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-af283bba575794c05d39d7e82a7314db472ae278209ae2721ee840e8595e4a8d","text":"Datagram. This prevents infinite loops in the presence of routing loops, and matches the choices in IPsec IPSEC. Implementers need to ensure that they do not forward any link-local traffic onto a different interface than the one it was received on. IP proxies also need to properly reply to packets destined to link- local multicast addresses. IPv6 requires that every link have an MTU of at least 1280 bytes IPv6. Since IP proxying in HTTP conveys IP packets in HTTP Datagrams and those can in turn be sent in QUIC DATAGRAM frames which cannot be"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-af59ac7c168491d101f2b971dfacb4d7a9b2473ec27c0f0020da24fe34866031","text":"the fact that there are applications using HTTP/3 datagrams enabled on this endpoint. 9. 8. 8.1. This document will request IANA to register the following entry in the \"HTTP/3 Frames\" registry: 9.1. 8.2. This document will request IANA to register the following entry in the \"HTTP/3 Settings\" registry: 9.2. 8.3. This document will request IANA to register the \"Datagram-Flow-Id\" header field in the \"Permanent Message Header Field Names\" registry maintained at <>. This document establishes a registry for HTTP/3 frame type codes. The \"HTTP Capsule Types\" registry governs a 62-bit space. Registrations in this registry MUST include the following fields: Type: A name or label for the capsule type. The value of the Capsule Type field (see capsule-frame) is a 62bit integer. An optional reference to a specification for the type. This field MAY be empty. Registrations follow the \"First Come First Served\" policy (see Section 4.4 of IANA-POLICY) where two registrations MUST NOT have the same Type. 9.3. This registry initially contains the following entries: This document will request IANA to create an \"HTTP Datagram Flow Parameters\" registry. Registrations in this registry MUST include the following fields: 8.4. The key of a parameter that is associated with a datagram flow list member (see header). Keys MUST be valid structured field parameter keys (see Section 3.1.2 of STRUCT-FIELD). REGISTER_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsules carry key-value pairs, see register-capsule. This document will request IANA to create an \"HTTP Datagram Context Extension Keys\" registry. Registrations in this registry MUST include the following fields: A brief description of the parameter semantics, which MAY be a summary if a specification reference is provided. The key (see register-capsule). Keys MUST be valid tokens as defined in Section 3.2.6 of RFC7230. This field MUST be either Yes or No. Yes indicates that this parameter is the name of a named element (see header). No indicates that it is a parameter that is not a name. A brief description of the key semantics, which MAY be a summary if a specification reference is provided. An optional reference to a specification for the parameter. This field MAY be empty."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-afc2755514b8de622c009f5e98f3a80ca78bab8915d0b49838f0dae69c403634","text":"to the member name from any JSON object in its input nodelist. It selects no nodes from any other JSON value. Note that the \"dot-selector\" follows the philosophy of JSON strings and is allowed to contain bit sequences that cannot encode Unicode characters (a single unpaired UTF-16 surrogate, for example). The behaviour of an implementation is undefined for member names which do not encode Unicode characters. 3.5.3. 3.5.3.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-b012575e4a0375a8be980b224cd9d9132ea1ba49701ce2fc797e5f16bfbb53fc","text":"ConnectionError<> occurs when a Connection transitions to Closed state due to an error in all other circumstances. The following diagram shows the possible states of a Connection and the events that occur upon a transition from one state to another. The interface provides the following guarantees about the ordering of operations:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-b02f7eb94ec3fce700da883f51bc2e1742cc37f91d8fd00f4a266d9278f91535","text":"There are significant risks in allowing arbitrary clients to establish a tunnel to arbitrary targets, as that could allow bad actors to send traffic and have it attributed to the proxy. Proxies that support UDP proxying SHOULD restrict its use to authenticated that support UDP proxying ought to restrict its use to authenticated users. Because the CONNECT method creates a TCP connection to the target,"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ctls-b0e0512bc252a66dc15ab48297030076da4b9449dfe89b228de6ca4cbef0aa32","text":"Omitting the fields and handshake messages required for preserving backwards-compatibility with earlier TLS versions. More compact encodings, for example point compression. More compact encodings. A template-based specialization mechanism that allows pre- populating information at both endpoints without the need for negotiation. Alternative cryptographic techniques, such as semi-static Diffie- Hellman. OPEN ISSUE: Semi-static and point compression are never mentioned again. Alternative cryptographic techniques, such as nonce truncation. For the common (EC)DHE handshake with pre-established certificates, Stream cTLS achieves an overhead of 53 bytes over the minimum"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-b0e11d064d9dc9edd18cc8c24a1b4e5044154888b5291ab1e92d6de2176466cf","text":"operators to limit the exposure of keys in cases that they do not realize a compromise has occurred. The risk inherent in cross- organizational transactions makes it operationally infeasible to rely on an external CA for such short-lived credentials. In OCSP stapling, if an operator chooses to talk frequently to the CA to obtain stapled responses, then failure to fetch an OCSP stapled on an external CA for such short-lived credentials. In OCSP stapling (i.e., using the Certificate Status extension types ocsp RFC6066 or ocsp_multi RFC6961), if an operator chooses to talk frequently to the CA to obtain stapled responses, then failure to fetch an OCSP stapled response results only in degraded performance. On the other hand, failure to fetch a potentially large number of short lived certificates would result in the service not being available, which"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-b14f2adfe1e5c645893080a78fdcb15fbb963b19a1cfc485fef7bdce4803279f","text":"Session cache management: Used to tune session cache capacity, lifetime, and other policies. Connections that use Transport Services SHOULD use security in general. However, for compatibility with endpoints that do not support transport security protocols (such as a TCP endpoint that does not support TLS), applications can initialize their security parameters to indicate that security can be disabled, or can be opportunistic. If security is disabled, the Transport Services system will not attempt to add transport security automatically. If security is opportunistic, it will allow Connections without transport security, but will still attempt to use security if available. Representation of Security Parameters in implementations should parallel that chosen for Transport Property names as recommended in scope-of-interface-defn."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-b1a36dc568dd431d1ae97c28e881cb20dd73ea6654fb0ff258a6a2a3b7d7cc1c","text":"When set to true, this property will initiate new Connections using as little cached information (such as session tickets or cookies) as possible from previous connections that are not entangled with it. Any state generated by this Connection will only be shared with entangled connections. Cloned Connections will use saved state from within the Connection Group. This is used for separating Connection Contexts as specified in I-D.ietf-taps-arch. possible from previous connections that are not in the same Connection Group. Any state generated by this Connection will only be shared with Connections in the same Connection Group. Cloned Connections will use saved state from within the Connection Group. This is used for separating Connection Contexts as specified in I- D.ietf-taps-arch. Note that this does not guarantee no leakage of information, as implementations may not be able to fully isolate all caches (e.g."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-b1bcbcd9bf5c6bde5ff0a0289d5531140bdd2f29c20c2eee96f1ecc9ae1320e6","text":"MUST verify the JWS before processing the request. Encapsulating request bodies in JWS provides authentication of requests. JWS objects sent in ACME requests MUST meet the following additional criteria: A JWS object sent as the body of an ACME request MUST meet the following additional criteria: The JWS MUST be in the Flattened JSON Serialization"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-b1bff4c6e7cc8c40ffcc425dd02db8eeca9742d77cc8b1516e4db898b0848a6d","text":"The semantics of regular expressions are as defined in I-D.draft- bormann-jsonpath-iregexp. The logical AND, OR, and NOT operators have the normal semantics of Boolean algebra and consequently obey these laws (where \"P\", \"Q\", and \"R\" are any expressions with syntax \"logical-and-expr\", \"T\" is any true expression, such as \"1 == 1\", and \"F\" is any false expression, such as \"1 == 0\"): 3.5.8.3. JSON document:"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-b1d424a13a5fa623054f51aa33cf05e3503ca7635b374bc034375c3c6d5e5014","text":"configuration details for transport security protocols, as discussed in security-parameters. It does not recommend use (or disuse) of specific algorithms or protocols. Any API-compatible transport security protocol should work in a TAPS system. security protocol should work in a TAPS system. Security consideration for these protocols should be discussed in the respective specifications. The desribed API is used to exchange information between an application and the transport system. While it is not necessarily expected that both systems are implemented by the same authority, it is expected that the transport system implementation is either provided as a library that is selected by the application from a trusted party, or that it is part of the operating system that the application also relies on for other tasks. In either case, the TAPS API is an internal interface that is used to change information locally between two systems. However, as the transport system is responsible for network communication, it is in the position to potentially share any information provided by the application with the network or another communication peer. Most of the information provided over the TAPS API are useful to configure and select protocols and paths and are not necessarily privacy sensitive. Still, there is some information that could be privacy sensitve because this might reveal usage characteristics and habits of the user of an application. Of course any communication over a network reveals usage characteristics, as all packets as well as their timing and size are part of the network-visible wire image RFC8546. However, the selection of a protocol and its configuration also impacts which information is visible, potentially in clear text, and which other enties can access it. In most cases information that is provided for protocol and path selection should not directly translate to information that is can be observed by network devices on the path. But there might be specific configuration information that are intended for path exposure, such as e.g. a DiffServ codepoint setting, that is either povided directly by the application or indirectly configured over a traffic profile. Further, applications should be aware that communication attempts can lead to more than one connection establishment. This is for example the case when the transport system also excecutes name resolution; or when support mechanisms such as TURN or ICE are used to establish connectivity; or if protocols or paths are raised; or if a path fails and fallback or re-establishment is supported in the transport system. These communication activities are not different from what is used today, however, the goal of a TAPS transport system is to support such mechanisms as a generic service within the transport layer. This enables applications to more dynamically benefit from innovations and new protocols in the transport system but at the same time may reduce transparency of the underlying communication actions to the application itself. The TAPS API is designed such that protocol and path selection can be limited to a small and controlled set if required by the application for functional or security purposes. Further, TAPS implementations should provide an interface to poll information about which protocol and path is currently in use as well as provide logging about the communication events of each connection. "}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-b246e15aa050549ea7edbdc26e668ce643427e3c41d7c4b5c717796ff8d920d9","text":"expiration, as TCP does with Tail Loss Probes (RACK) and a Retransmission Timeout (RFC5681). Larger values of kPersistentCongestionThreshold cause the sender to become less responsive to persistent congestion in the network, which can result in aggressive sending into a congested network. Too small a value can result in a sender declaring persistent congestion unnecessarily, resulting in reduced throughput for the sender. The RECOMMENDED value for kPersistentCongestionThreshold is 3, which is approximately equivalent to two TLPs before an RTO in TCP. results in behavior that is approximately equivalent to a TCP sender declaring an RTO after two TLPs. This design does not use consecutive PTO events to establish persistent congestion, since application patterns impact PTO"}
{"_id":"q-en-qlog-b249fa4f3dbf8556c07a2813b76704f77d05c5b5364b035008fa34e437cc6c1c","text":"1. This document describes the values of the qlog name (\"category\" + \"event\") and \"data\" fields and their semantics for the HTTP/3 and QPACK protocols. This document is based on draft-34 of the HTTP/3 I-D QUIC-HTTP and draft-21 of the QPACK I-D QUIC-QPACK. QUIC events are defined in a separate document QLOG-QUIC. \"event\") and \"data\" fields and their semantics for HTTP/3 RFC9114 and QPACK QPACK. Feedback and discussion are welcome at https://github.com/quicwg/qlog [1]. Readers are advised to refer to the \"editor's draft\" at that"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-b254eea71cc5e2616245e03f0ee3dac5236c4289e44ad60a60df04871c9ddcbd","text":"systems and use cases, this identity may become a persistent tracking identifier. Note also that ImportedIdentity.context is visible in cleartext on the wire as part of the PSK identity. Unless otherwise protected by a mechanism such as TLS Encrypted ClientHello ECH, applications SHOULD not put sensitive information in this field. 9. This specification introduces a new registry for TLS KDF identifiers,"}
{"_id":"q-en-certificate-compression-b2666dfb1bc9fa7f986876410fe80e1d502acba8ce8f1c8f86833a232b75d15e","text":"brotli, the Certificate message MUST be compressed with the Brotli compression algorithm as defined in RFC7932. It is possible to define a certificate compression algorithm that uses a pre-shared dictionary to achieve higher compression ratio. This document does not define any such algorithms. If the received CompressedCertificate message cannot be decompressed, the connection MUST be torn down with the \"bad_certificate\" alert."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-b267153702e7c25c7bb00370c1091470356171a978c53d864a2cb7b2eb8a038c","text":"a host which only functions as an ACME server could place the directory under the path \"/\". If the ACME server does not implement pre-authorization (Section 7.4.1) it MUST omit the \"newAuthz\" field of the directory. The object MAY additionally contain a field \"meta\". If present, it MUST be a JSON object; each field in the object is an item of metadata relating to the service provided by the ACME server."}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-b278b5910d319494038f065f0775bba0ead2588d5c0085c77d6204663757a330","text":"value and the receiving member's known identity. See Selfie for details. To illustrate the rerouting attack, consider the group of peers who know the PSK be \"A\", \"B\", and \"C\". The attack proceeds as follows: To illustrate the rerouting attack, consider three peers, \"A\", \"B\", and \"C\", who all know the PSK. The attack proceeds as follows: \"A\" sends a \"ClientHello\" to \"B\"."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-b2ab4c1c1836d8ea1eb71c32e7bc9ff391eb286a5f7897f526666489639774c9","text":"problem. The \"type\" and \"detail\" fields MUST be populated. To facilitate automatic response to errors, this document defines the following standard tokens for use in the \"type\" field (within the \"urn:acme:\" namespace): \"urn:ietf:params:acme:error:\" namespace): This list is not exhaustive. The server MAY return errors whose \"type\" field is set to a URI other than those defined above. Servers MUST NOT use the ACME URN namespace for errors other than the standard types. Clients SHOULD display the \"detail\" field of such errors. Authorization and challenge objects can also contain error information to indicate why the server was unable to validate"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-b2b24a93ca2a85f656f256c6d02936608c1b1a60844d3ff083c59163313222c6","text":"cause long timeout-based delays before this problem is detected by the endpoints and the connection can potentially be re-established. QUIC endpoints support address migration and a QUIC connection can survive a change of the IP address or ports by mapping the connection ID, if present, to an existing connection. Ideally a new connection ID is used at the same time when the address/port changes to avoid linkability. As new connection IDs belonging to the same connection are not known to on-path devices, network devices are not able to map QUIC connections after a 4-tuple change. As such, when the 4-tuple changes, stateful devices lose their state and break connectivity if state is required for forwarding, while the endpoints would otherwise survive such a change. Use of connection IDs is specifically discouraged for NAT applications. If a NAT hits an operational limit, it is recommended to rather drop the initial packets of a flow (see also sec-"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-b35f42f66ba02d257c11d0dd33f438ffb297c2255f40477c7ab110fbd482649e","text":"unoccupied leaf, or appended to the right edge of the tree if all leaves are occupied. Create an initial, partial GroupInfo object reflecting the following values: Group ID: The group ID for the group Epoch: The epoch ID for the next epoch Tree: The group's ratchet tree after the commit has been applied Prior confirmed transcript hash: The confirmed transcript hash for the current state of the group (not the provisional state) Create a DirectPath using the new tree (which includes any new members). The GroupContext for this operation uses the \"group_id\", \"epoch\", \"tree\", and \"prior_confirmed_transcript_hash\""}
{"_id":"q-en-mediatypes-b46ced5ff9cab34ee67a08e2f3fb5aa2fdde9e268bac4cb4c46d453db79bcd27","text":"Change controller: n/a 4. References 3. Security requirements for both media type and media type suffix registrations are discussed in Section 4.6 of MEDIATYPE. 4.1. URIs 4. This specification defines the following new Internet media types MEDIATYPE. IANA has updated the \"Media Types\" registry at https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types [3] with the registration information provided below. 5. References 5.1. URIs [1] https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/httpapi/ [2] https://github.com/ioggstream/draft-polli-rest-api-mediatypes [3] https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types "}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-b46e36fbc295d80db7fe1b25e13311ab3b0784560daecaf8b59bf7e685cf6c80","text":"Upon receipt of a HelloRetryRequest, the client MUST verify that the extensions block is not empty and otherwise MUST abort the handshake with a \"decode_error\" alert. Clients SHOULD abort the handshake with an \"unexpected message\" if the HelloRetryRequest would not result in any change in the ClientHello or in response to any second HelloRetryRequest which was sent in the same connection (i.e., where the ClientHello was itself in response to a HelloRetryRequest). with a \"decode_error\" alert. Clients MUST abort the handshake with an \"illegal_parameter\" alert if the HelloRetryRequest would not result in any change in the ClientHello. If a client receives a second HelloRetryRequest in the same connection (i.e., where the ClientHello was itself in response to a HelloRetryRequest), it MUST abort the handshake with an \"unexpected_message\" alert. Otherwise, the client MUST process all extensions in the HelloRetryRequest and send a second updated ClientHello. The"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-b5507b6cbc0d0b949b69f5d2fab57c36c370cd062f422a9f0166d41f66f346d5","text":"constructing and processing an . The Nenc parameter corresponding to the KEM used in HPKE can be found in HPKE. Nenc refers to the size of the encapsulated KEM shared secret, in bytes. in HPKE or the HPKE KEM IANA registry [1]. Nenc refers to the size of the encapsulated KEM shared secret, in bytes. 4.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-b57a5a0b9c38604ae13fce8e68d85638974c48fe4f809b2c1202f66029d287c7","text":"A specialized feature could be required by an application only when using a specific protocol, and not when using others. For example, if an application is using UDP, it could require control over the checksum or fragmentation behavior for UDP; if it used a protocol to frame its data over a byte stream like TCP, it would not need these options. In such cases, the API ought to expose the features in such a way that they take effect when a particular protocol is selected, but do not imply that only that protocol could be used. For example, if the API allows an application to specify a preference to use a partial checksum, communication would not fail when a protocol such as TCP is selected, which uses a checksum covering the entire payload. if an application is using TCP, it could require control over the User Timeout Option for TCP; these options would not take effect for other transport protocols. In such cases, the API ought to expose the features in such a way that they take effect when a particular protocol is selected, but do not imply that only that protocol could be used. For example, if the API allows an application to specify a preference to use the User Timeout Option, communication would not fail when a protocol such as QUIC is selected. Other specialized features, however, could be strictly required by an application and thus constrain the set of protocols that can be used."}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-b5e597bfc132e8ff6720351c0b02bdd94573e4577b76e4678ff931bb23f842fd","text":"The attacker intercepts the message and redirects it to \"C\". \"C\" responds with to \"A\". \"C\" responds with a \"ServerHello\" to \"A\". \"A\" sends a \"Finished\" message to \"B\". \"A\" has completed the handshake, ostensibly with \"B\"."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-b603c9851bc2ab5fc9b26edca305f590c5a507e191d46f421632a15792d5a297","text":"The entries in the following table are registered by this document. Additionally, each code of the format \"0x1f * N + 0x21\" for non- negative integer values of N (that is, 0x21, 0x40, ..., through 0x3ffffffffffffffe) MUST NOT be assigned by IANA. Each code of the format \"0x1f * N + 0x21\" for non-negative integer values of N (that is, 0x21, 0x40, ..., through 0x3ffffffffffffffe) MUST NOT be assigned by IANA and MUST NOT appear in the listing of assigned values. "}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-b636087010b097c19e81fa49b3e658744de4f18a581f3cf7887cc028826f580f","text":"If a stream is canceled after receiving a complete response, the client MAY ignore the cancellation and use the response. However, if a stream is cancelled after receiving a partial response, the response SHOULD NOT be used. Only idempotent actions (such as GET, PUT, or DELETE) can be safely retried; a client SHOULD NOT response SHOULD NOT be used. Only idempotent actions such as GET, PUT, or DELETE can be safely retried; a client SHOULD NOT automatically retry a request with a non-idempotent method unless it has some means to know that the request semantics are actually idempotent, regardless of the method, or some means to detect that the original request was never applied. See Section 8.2.2 of SEMANTICS for more details. has some means to know that the request semantics are idempotent independent of the method or some means to detect that the original request was never applied. See Section 8.2.2 of SEMANTICS for more details. 4.1.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-b6412bade29c9d100de9d464068367c095e88864fa66134f3143cc9c422153b9","text":"is just a new stream of an already active multi-streaming protocol instance. Changing one of the Connection Properties on one Connection in the group changes it for all others. Message Properties, however, are not entangled. For example, changing \"Timeout for aborting Connection\" (see conn-timeout) on one Connection in a group will automatically change this Connection Property for all Connections in the group in the same way. However, changing \"Lifetime\" (see msg- lifetime) of a Message will only affect a single Message on a single Connection, entangled or not. If the underlying protocol supports multi-streaming, it is natural to use this functionality to implement Clone. In that case, entangled Connections are multiplexed together, giving them similar treatment not only inside endpoints, but also across the end-to-end Internet path. use this functionality to implement Clone. In that case, Connections in a Connection Group are multiplexed together, giving them similar treatment not only inside endpoints, but also across the end-to-end Internet path. Note that calling Clone() can result in on-the-wire signaling, e.g., to open a new connection, depending on the underlying Protocol Stack. When Clone() leads to multiple connections being opened instead of multi-streaming, the Transport Services system will ensure consistency of Connection Properties by uniformly applying them to all underlying connections in a group. Even in such a case, there are possibilities for a Transport Services system to implement prioritization within a Connection Group TCP-COUPLING RFC8699. to open a new transport connection, depending on the underlying Protocol Stack. When Clone() leads to the opening of multiple such connections, the Transport Services system will ensure consistency of Connection Properties by uniformly applying them to all underlying connections in a group. Even in such a case, there are possibilities for a Transport Services system to implement prioritization within a Connection Group TCP-COUPLING RFC8699. Attempts to clone a Connection can result in a CloneError: The Connection Priority Connection Property operates on entangled Connections using the same approach as in msg-priority: when allocating available network capacity among Connections in a The \"Connection Priority\" Connection Property operates on Connections in a Connection Group using the same approach as in msg-priority: when allocating available network capacity among Connections in a Connection Group, sends on Connections with lower Priority values will be prioritized over sends on Connections with higher Priority values. Capacity will be shared among these Connections according to"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-b64422e5a1209a7af1136a68776e5214160f2641640b7855354cbe47c864cd27","text":"previous variant in two important ways: The output tokens are publicly verifiable by anyone with the Issuer public key; and Issuer public key. The issuance protocol does not admit public or private metadata to bind additional context to tokens. Otherwise, this variant is nearly identical. In particular, Issuers provide a Private and Public Key, denoted skI and pkI, respectively, used to produce tokens as input to the protocol. See public-issuer- configuration for how this key pair is generated. The first property means that any Origin can select a given Issuer to produce tokens, as long as the Origin has the Issuer public key, without explicit coordination or permission from the Issuer. This is because the Issuer does not learn the Origin that requested the token during the issuance protocol. Beyond these differences, the publicly verifiable issuance protocol variant is nearly identical to the privately verifiable issuance protocol variant. In particular, Issuers provide a Private and Public Key, denoted skI and pkI, respectively, used to produce tokens as input to the protocol. See public-issuer-configuration for how this key pair is generated. Clients provide the following as input to the issuance protocol:"}
{"_id":"q-en-rfc-censorship-tech-b67e11d9e2a2f05fd79a23771a61d69205fffd0da4c534f914d6626d3b565a15","text":"Internet Backbone: If a censor controls the gateways into a region, they can filter undesirable traffic that is traveling into and out of the region by sniffing and mirroring at the relevant exchange points. Censorship at this point-of-control is most exchange points. Censorship at this point of control is most effective at controlling the flow of information between a region and the rest of the Internet, but is ineffective at identifying content traveling between the users within a region. Internet Service Providers: Internet Service Providers are perhaps the most natural point-of-control. They have a benefit of being the most natural point of control. They have a benefit of being easily enumerable by a censor paired with the ability to identify the regional and international traffic of all their users. The censor's filtration mechanisms can be placed on an ISP via"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-b68e61f102323af1a80bebfe700e245f478176ba16c493dfb27256bab1d080d9","text":"example, the Unicode PLACE OF INTEREST SIGN (U+2318) would be defined in ABNF as \"%x2318\". Functions are referred to using the function name followed by a pair of parentheses, as in \"fname()\". The terminology of RFC8259 applies except where clarified below. The terms \"Primitive\" and \"Structured\" are used to group different kinds of values as in RFC8259; JSON Objects and Arrays are structured, all"}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-b69635c9084afa4d8d9da8577c1c2eb516e4f7c92af9d411a2d91b113f155022","text":"With static Diffie-Hellman key authentication, the authenticating endpoint can deny having participated in the protocol. Two earlier versions of EDHOC have been formally analyzed Norrman20 Bruni18 and the specification has been updated based on the analysis. Three earlier versions of EDHOC have been formally analyzed Jacomme23 Norrman20 Bruni18 and the specification has been updated based on the analysis. 8.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-b6b038aef9793d395cc92609bb6da5743fa6c50dfd6a1aa9cc97f6039387e6f8","text":"7.2.5. The frame (type=0x05) is used to carry a promised request header section from server to client on a , as in HTTP/2. section from server to client on a . The payload consists of:"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-b6bb7fa9b8a76e1bbc2c82ce2bf47a409d57ace8111ddaf6fff9597498d18a5a","text":"6.5.1. The Replay-Nonce header field includes a server-generated value that the server can use to detect unauthorized replay in future client requests. The server MUST generate the value provided in Replay- Nonce in such a way that they are unique to each message, with high probability, and unpredictable to anyone besides the server. For instance, it is acceptable to generate Replay-Nonces randomly. The Replay-Nonce HTTP header field includes a server-generated value that the server can use to detect unauthorized replay in future client requests. The server MUST generate the values provided in Replay-Nonce header fields in such a way that they are unique to each message, with high probability, and unpredictable to anyone besides the server. For instance, it is acceptable to generate Replay-Nonces randomly. The value of the Replay-Nonce field MUST be an octet string encoded according to the base64url encoding described in Section 2 of The value of the Replay-Nonce header field MUST be an octet string encoded according to the base64url encoding described in Section 2 of RFC7515. Clients MUST ignore invalid Replay-Nonce values. The ABNF RFC5234 for the Replay-Nonce header field follows:"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-b6d73634c7c756d2a73e314c84a20cba7a31c86332c9775b437eed6b25080560","text":"The tree hash of a tree is the tree hash of its root node, which we define recursively, starting with the leaves. As some nodes may be blank while others contain data we use the following struct to include data if present. The tree hash of a leaf node is the hash of leaf's \"LeafNodeHashInput\" object which might include a \"LeafNode\" object depending on whether or not it is blank."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-b74339620ea58247e32f19b334bc6f32bdba9ae59dfa68b6f136e69ff17782b9","text":"5. Implementations of HTTP/3 that support HTTP Datagrams can indicate that to their peer by sending the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with a value of 1. The value of the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter MUST be either 0 or 1. A value of 0 indicates that HTTP Datagrams are not supported. An endpoint that receives the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with a value that is neither 0 or 1 MUST terminate the connection with error H3_SETTINGS_ERROR. Endpoints MUST NOT send QUIC DATAGRAM frames until they have both sent and received the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with a value of 1. When clients use 0-RTT, they MAY store the value of the server's H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter. Doing so allows the client to send QUIC DATAGRAM frames in 0-RTT packets. When servers decide to accept 0-RTT data, they MUST send a H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter greater than or equal to the value they sent to the client in the connection where they sent them the NewSessionTicket message. If a client stores the value of the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with their 0-RTT state, they MUST validate that the new value of the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter sent by the server in the handshake is greater than or equal to the stored value; if not, the client MUST terminate the connection with error H3_SETTINGS_ERROR. In all cases, the maximum permitted value of the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter is 1. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations that support receiving HTTP Datagrams using QUIC always send the H3_DATAGRAM SETTINGS parameter with a value of 1, even if the application does not intend to use HTTP Datagrams. This helps to avoid \"sticking out\"; see security. 5.1. [[RFC editor: please remove this section before publication.]] Some revisions of this draft specification use a different value (the Identifier field of a Setting in the HTTP/3 SETTINGS frame) for the H3_DATAGRAM Settings Parameter. This allows new draft revisions to make incompatible changes. Multiple draft versions MAY be supported by either endpoint in a connection. Such endpoints MUST send multiple values for H3_DATAGRAM. Once an endpoint has sent and received SETTINGS, it MUST compute the intersection of the values it has sent and received, and then it MUST select and use the most recent draft version from the intersection set. This ensures that both endpoints negotiate the same draft version. 6. Data streams (see capsule-protocol) can be prioritized using any means suited to stream or request prioritization. For example, see Section 11 of PRIORITY."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-b745a8f35d5abfb438ae585f5bc6e1ef73e1047071376bbeb27dde552fd8121d","text":"permitted; receipt of a second stream which claims to be a control stream MUST be treated as a connection error of type HTTP_WRONG_STREAM_COUNT. The sender MUST NOT close the control stream. If the control stream is closed at any point, this MUST be treated as a connection error of type HTTP_CLOSED_CRITICAL_STREAM. stream, and the receiver MUST NOT request that the sender close the control stream. If either control stream is closed at any point, this MUST be treated as a connection error of type HTTP_CLOSED_CRITICAL_STREAM. A pair of unidirectional streams is used rather than a single bidirectional stream. This allows either peer to send data as soon"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-b78a7767df12959a33a4e5ec45c1dc1e293776365d18c8713ea44d6ff4d133eb","text":"to an inbound SYN with a SYN-ACK. Calling \"Clone\" on a TCP Connection creates a new Connection with equivalent parameters. The two Connections are otherwise independent. equivalent parameters. These Connections, and Connections generated via later calls to \"Clone\" on one of them, form a Connection Group. To realize \"entanglement\" for these Connections, with the exception of \"Connection Priority\", changing a Connection Property on one of them must affect the Connection Properties of the others too. No guarantees of honoring the Connection Property \"Connection Priority\" are given, and thus it is safe for an implementation of a transport system to ignore this property. When it is reasonable to assume that Connections traverse the same path (e.g., when they share the same encapsulation), support for it can also experimentally be implemented using a congestion control coupling mechanism (see for example TCP-COUPLING or RFC3124). SEND.TCP. TCP does not on its own preserve Message boundaries. Calling \"Send\" on a TCP connection lays out the bytes on the TCP"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-b797040c5cc64db200e666ba8fbc4c60e65d9f7b0b6f5a8caba7e73a5c892f58","text":"Stapling RFC6961 to provide the client with certificate revocation information that does not require contacting a third party. A DNS API client may face a similar bootstrapping problem when the HTTP request needs to resolve the hostname portion of the DNS URI. Just as the address of a traditional DNS nameserver cannot be originally determined from that same server, a DOH client cannot use its DOH server to initially resolve the server's host name into an address. Alternative strategies a client might employ include making the initial resolution part of the configuration, IP based URIs and corresponding IP based certificates for HTTPS, or resolving the DNS API Server's hostname via traditional DNS or another DOH server while still authenticating the resulting connection via HTTPS. 11. Joe Hildebrand contributed lots of material for a different iteration"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-b7e1e34fd24ac8d4de111463f5d3471fd16c45168ff26c2fa777dfc2bcc9dd1d","text":"constraints on the selection and configuration of paths and protocols to establish a Connection with a remote endpoint. A Connection represents a transport Protocol Stack on which data can be sent to and received from a remote endpoint. Connections can be created from Preconnections in three ways: by initiating the Preconnection (i.e., actively opening, as in a client), through listening on the Preconnection (i.e., passively opening, as in a server), or rendezvousing on the Preconnection (i.e. peer to peer establishment). and/or received from a remote endpoint (i.e., depending on the kind of transport, connections can be bi-directional or unidirectional). Connections can be created from Preconnections in three ways: by initiating the Preconnection (i.e., actively opening, as in a client), through listening on the Preconnection (i.e., passively opening, as in a server), or rendezvousing on the Preconnection (i.e. peer to peer establishment). Once a Connection is established, data can be sent on it in the form of Messages. The interface supports the preservation of message"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-b80425cecbf5c15a7104e48ebe07cc1bcfcbf3e7b5287dfa96586064eb6a3165","text":"As noted in trustmodel, Verifiers and Relying Parties have trust anchor stores that must be secured. RFC6024 contains more discussion of trust anchor store requirements. Specifically, a trust anchor store must resist modification against unauthorized insertion, deletion, and modification. of trust anchor store requirements for protecting public keys. Section 6 of NIST-800-57-p1 contains a comprehensive treatment of the topic, including the protection of symmetric key material. Specifically, a trust anchor store must resist modification against unauthorized insertion, deletion, and modification. Additionally, if the trust anchor is a symmetric key, the trust anchor store must not allow unauthorized read. If certificates are used as trust anchors, Verifiers and Relying Parties are also responsible for validating the entire certificate"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-b89511c92fcd1f44e541c10ea0e4d7ed7993bb6f94446e4b57f08c5840bb7b43","text":"UDP datagram. Multiple QUIC packets can be encapsulated in a single UDP datagram. A QUIC packet that contains frames other than ACK and PADDING. These cause a recipient to send an acknowledgment (see sending- acknowledgements). A QUIC packet that contains frames other than ACK, PADDING, and CONNECTION_CLOSE. These cause a recipient to send an acknowledgment (see sending-acknowledgements). An entity that can participate in a QUIC connection by generating, receiving, and processing QUIC packets. There are only two types"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-b8ab0a1e6c91a0bf41fef03b1082505df45ef5f2ad2f3e7baa7537149f5c1bde","text":"distrustful entities control requests or responses that are placed onto a single HTTP/3 connection. If the shared QPACK compressor permits one entity to add entries to the dynamic table, and the other to access those entries, then the state of the table can be learned. to access those entries to encode chosen field lines, then the attacker can learn the state of the table by observing the length of the encoded output. Having requests or responses from mutually distrustful entities occurs when an intermediary either:"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-b8e40f31c74b16331ae81f94e107aa9f03720536b512e0d8367c8e84c03f7e7f","text":"\"psk\" \"app_ack\" \"reinit\" New proposal types MUST state whether they require a path. If any"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-b904d173224aae1097c982b8221f1817f41f8be4e1a1baefcdd3c793f84e6674","text":"The default is full checksum coverage without being able to change it, and requiring a checksum when receiving. 5.2.9. 5.2.10. Type: Tuple (Enumeration, Preference)"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-b952cff5d667adb84667f819a8d0053948e0e5ba8381644d92176e549739a75a","text":"3. This document defines the \"masque-udp\" HTTP Upgrade Token. \"masque- This document defines the \"connect-udp\" HTTP Upgrade Token. \"connect- udp\" uses the Capsule Protocol as defined in HTTP-DGRAM. A \"masque-udp\" request requests that the recipient establish a tunnel over a single HTTP stream to the destination target server identified by the \"target_host\" and \"target_port\" variables of the URI template (see client-config). If the request is successful, the proxy commits to converting received HTTP Datagrams into UDP packets and vice versa until the tunnel is closed. Tunnels are commonly used to create an end-to-end virtual connection, which can then be secured using QUIC QUIC or another protocol running over UDP. A \"connect-udp\" request requests that the recipient establish a tunnel over a single HTTP stream to the destination target server identified by the \"target_host\" and \"target_port\" variables of the URI template (see client-config). If the request is successful, the proxy commits to converting received HTTP Datagrams into UDP packets and vice versa until the tunnel is closed. Tunnels are commonly used to create an end-to-end virtual connection, which can then be secured using QUIC QUIC or another protocol running over UDP. When sending its UDP proxying request, the client SHALL perform URI template expansion to determine the path and query of its request."}
{"_id":"q-en-webpush-protocol-b97151069025b15fb92418a218e4e65438499f309d34b216aaa2dd15e60f03c7","text":"A device and software that is the recipient of push messages. Examples in this document use the RFC7230. Many of the exchanges can be completed using HTTP/1.1. Where HTTP/2 is necessary, the more verbose frame format from RFC7540 is used. be completed using HTTP/1.1: message_subscription send replace acknowledge_message When an example depends on HTTP/2 server push, the more verbose frame format from RFC7540 is used: monitor-subscription monitor-set receive_receipt Examples do not include specific methods for push message encryption or application server authentication because the protocol does not"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-b97f5ee986cdf272858001f66fc9bf7f826c2f036ed08be93172486c562370d5","text":"IANA is requested to create an entry, echo_required(121) in the existing registry for Alerts (defined in RFC8446), with the \"DTLS-OK\" column being set to \"Y\". 12. Any future information or hints that influence the outer ClientHello SHOULD be specified as ECHOConfig extensions, or in an entirely new version of ECHOConfig. This is primarily because the outer ClientHello exists only in support of ECHO. Namely, it is both an envelope for the encrypted inner ClientHello and enabler for authenticated key mismatch signals (see server-behavior). In contrast, the inner ClientHello is the true ClientHello used upon ECHO negotiation. "}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-b998da4e5f6043e2a778072bf77e95d738df1fae3afdc00e9a6cfea2c92d5fa7","text":"and imported PSKs are distinct since their identities are different on the wire. See rollout for more details. Endpoints which import external keys MUST NOT use either the external keys or the derived keys for any other purpose. Moreover, each external PSK MUST be associated with at most one hash function, as per the rules in Section 4.2.11 from RFC8446. See security- considerations for more discussion. Endpoints which import external keys MUST NOT use the keys that are input to the import process for any purpose other than the importer, and MUST NOT use the derived keys for any purpose other than TLS PSKs. Moreover, each external PSK fed to the importer process MUST be associated with at most one hash function. This is analogous to the rules in Section 4.2.11 of RFC8446. See security-considerations for more discussion. 3.1. The following terms are used throughout this document: External PSK (EPSK): A PSK established or provisioned out-of-band, i.e., not from a TLS connection, which is a tuple of (Base Key, External Identity, Hash)."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-iana-registry-updates-b9d12e5c491698ee317795fb4fe46411c965f05ab919edc6ccf0a2789552ee4b","text":"represents a security trade-off that may not be appropriate for general environments. If an item is not marked as recommended it does not necessarily mean that it is flawed; rather, it indicates that either the item has not been through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, or is intended only for specific use cases. IANA [SHALL add/has added] the following notes for additional information:"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-b9df25a3825b7845761a214308a833871a62bdf54b4c618fd8f60a69c51bf6d6","text":"send a PING or other small ack-eliciting frame occasionally, such as once per round trip, to elicit an ACK from the peer. A receiver MUST NOT send an ack-eliciting frame in all packets that would otherwise be non-ack-eliciting, to avoid an infinite feedback loop of acknowledgements. In cases without ACK frame loss, this algorithm allows for a minimum of 1 RTT of reordering. In cases with ACK frame loss and reordering, this approach does not guarantee that every acknowledgement is seen by the sender before it is no longer included in the ACK frame. Packets could be received out of order and all subsequent ACK frames containing them could be lost. In this case, the loss recovery algorithm could cause spurious retransmissions, but the sender will continue making forward progress. 13.2.6. 13.2.5. An endpoint measures the delays intentionally introduced between the time the packet with the largest packet number is received and the"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-b9f845eef73832885ddf89677206ab75b2ce18e5a6305074469442aefc15a6c3","text":"discard a header once the content has been parsed). To deliver a Message to the application, the framer implementation can either directly deliever data that it has allocated, or deliver a can either directly deliver data that it has allocated, or deliver a range of data directly from the underlying transport and simulatenously advance the receive cursor. simultaneously advance the receive cursor. Note that \"MessageFramer.DeliverAndAdvanceReceiveCursor\" allows the framer implementation to earmark bytes as part of a Message even"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-ba19cb2a898519e71853277cf3e2e68abd578821ea658b16334344cf64680191","text":" Privacy Pass: Architectural Framework draft-davidson-pp-architecture-latest Privacy Pass Architectural Framework draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture-latest Abstract"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-ba9e927c6fa400f55b8203dc0b9dc52b94ecc9f3896f4656e58fe8257bb2afd0","text":"the request (see cose-object). request_piv: contains the value of the 'Partial IV' in the COSE object of the request (see cose-object), with one exception: in case of protection or verification of Observe cancellations, the request_piv contains the value of the 'Partial IV' in the COSE object of the corresponding registration (see observe- registration). object of the request (see cose-object). options: contains the Class I options (see outer-options) present in the original CoAP message encoded as described in Section 3.1"}
{"_id":"q-en-rfc7807bis-bb0e7f6d669d5f844fedf6e8e737d30802a1ece2e17aa7cef010c4c01f4322d0","text":"possible, and that when relative URIs are used, they include the full path (e.g., \"/types/123\"). The type URI can also be a non-resolvable URI. For example, the tag URI scheme RFC4151 can be used to uniquely identify problem types: Non-resolvable URIs ought not be used when there is some future possibility that it might become desireable to do so. For example, if the URI above were used in an API and later a tool was adopted that resolves type URIs to discover information about the error, taking advantage of that capability would require switching to a resolvable URI, thereby creating a new identity for the problem type and thus introducing a breaking change. 3.1.2. The \"status\" member is a JSON number indicating the HTTP status code"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-bb12b124f6d9094ec8afda3c1304b8c7c3f1c18ce5835823c96e9add639e7499","text":"1. QUIC is a new multiplexed and secure transport protocol atop UDP, specified in QUIC-TRANSPORT. This document describes congestion control and loss recovery for QUIC. Mechanisms described in this document follow the spirit of existing TCP congestion control and loss recovery mechanisms, described in RFCs, various Internet-drafts, or academic papers, and also those prevalent in TCP implementations. QUIC is a secure general-purpose transport protocol, described in QUIC-TRANSPORT). This document describes loss detection and congestion control mechanisms for QUIC. 2."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-bc08c2b7375d69eb04de7f3dc83b0a5562e2aa15f9cc749125248f7c1560dbb7","text":"example, if reliable delivery was requested for a Message handed over before calling Close, the Closed Event will signify that this Message has indeed been delivered. This action does not affect any other Connection that is entangled with this one in a Connection Group. Connection in the same Connection Group. The Closed Event informs the application that the Remote Endpoint has closed the Connection. There is no guarantee that a remote Close will indeed be signaled. Abort terminates a Connection without delivering any remaining Messages. This action does not affect any other Connection that is entangled with this one in a Connection Group. Messages. This action does not affect any other Connection that in the same Connection Group. CloseGroup gracefully terminates a Connection and any other Connections that are entangled with this one in a Connection Group. For example, all of the Connections in a group might be streams of a single session for a multistreaming protocol; closing the entire group will close the underlying session. See also groups. As with Close, any Messages remaining to be processed on a Connection will be handled prior to closing. AbortGroup terminates a Connection and any other Connections that are entangled with this one in a Connection Group without delivering any remaining Messages. Connections in the same Connection Group. For example, all of the Connections in a group might be streams of a single session for a multistreaming protocol; closing the entire group will close the underlying session. See also groups. As with Close, any Messages remaining to be processed on a Connection will be handled prior to closing. AbortGroup terminates a Connection and any other Connections in the same Connection Group without delivering any remaining Messages. A ConnectionError informs the application that: 1) data could not be delivered to the peer after a timeout, or 2) the Connection has been"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-bc16348d28e5c0fbb9d7117a59a6e85300197f7e00e779b3354bab22270c769b","text":"ACK-FREQUENCY frames have a type of 0xXX, and contain the following fields: An optional variable-length integer representing the maximum number of ack-eliciting packets after which the receiver sends an acknowledgement. A variable-length integer representing the maximum number of ack- eliciting packets after which the receiver sends an acknowledgement. A value of 1 will result in an acknowledgement being sent for every ack-eliciting packet received. A value of 0 is invalid. A variable-length integer representing an update to the peer's \"max_ack_delay\" transport parameter (Section 18.2 in QUIC- TRANSPORT). The value of this field is in microseconds. Any value smaller than the min_ack_delay advertised by this endpoint is invalid. An optional variable-length integer representing the maximum amount of time, in microseconds, after which the receiver sends an acknowledgement. The value of the Time Tolerance field is scaled by multiplying the encoded value by 2 to the power of the value of the \"ack_delay_exponent\" transport parameter set by the sender of the ACK-FREQUENCY frame (see Section XX in QUIC-TRANSPORT). Scaling in this fashion allows for a larger range of values with a shorter encoding at the cost of lower resolution. Receipt of invalid values in an ACK-FREQUENCY frame MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. ACK-FREQUENCY frames are ack-eliciting. However, their loss does not require retransmission."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-bc50b2717f9421381bb0e0acfa120a696e76165859d2c8c2b655c5d5abb745e0","text":"Changing one of these Protocol Properties on one Connection in the group changes it for all others. Per-Message Protocol Properties, however, are not entangled. For example, changing \"Timeout for aborting Connection\" (see timeout) on one Connection in a group will automatically change this Protocol Property for all Connections in the group in the same way. However, changing \"Lifetime\" (see msg- aborting Connection\" (see conn-timeout) on one Connection in a group will automatically change this Protocol Property for all Connections in the group in the same way. However, changing \"Lifetime\" (see msg- lifetime) of a Message will only affect a single Message on a single Connection, entangled or not."}
{"_id":"q-en-rfc-censorship-tech-bc59fe08b51d9868c425f5c76eaa26a395cb7d13511b4435fd57463137f4e476","text":"domain all other DNS servers will be unable to properly forward and cache the site. Domain name registration is only really a risk where undesirable content is hosted on TLD controlled by the censoring country, such as .cn or .ru Anderson-2011. country, such as .cn or .ru Anderson-2011 or where legal processes in countries like the United States result in domain name seizures and/ or DNS redirection by the government Kopel-2013. 6.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-bc76e30d787db221fc5aabb93f3cd2250ca11611ffed60b348805765025d5ffb","text":"\"proto\": The PDA protocol, e.g., Prio or Hits. The rest of the structure contains the protocol specific parameters. Each task has a unique _task id_ derived from the PDA parameters: Each task has a unique _task ID_ derived from the PDA parameters: The task ID of a \"PDAParam\" `is derived using the following procedure: The task id is derived using the following procedure. [TODO: Specify derivation of the task ID.] Where \"SHA-256\" is as specified in FIPS180-4. 3.1.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-bcd9e9cb63666b99e453d38e25d31426932ee8094c0eda08622567cd84c91a31","text":"options. An Outer Max-Age message field is used to avoid unnecessary caching of OSCORE error responses at OSCORE-unaware intermediary nodes. A server MAY set a Class U Max-Age message field with value zero to OSCORE error responses, which are described in Sections replay- protection, ver-req, and ver-res. Such a message field is then processed according to outer-options. of error responses caused by OSCORE processing at OSCORE-unaware intermediary nodes. A server MAY set a Class U Max-Age message field with value zero to such error responses, described in Sections replay-protection, ver-req, and ver-res, since these error responses are cacheable, but subsequent OSCORE requests would never create a hit in the intermediary caching it. Setting the Outer Max-Age to zero relieves the intermediary from uselessly caching responses. Successful OSCORE responses do not need to include an Outer Max-Age option since the responses are non-cacheable by construction (see coap-header). option since the responses appear to the OSCORE-unaware intermediary as 2.04 Changed responses, which are non-cacheable (see coap-header). The Outer Max-Age message field is processed according to outer- options. 4.1.3.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-edhoc-bcf6ac1b3561e5a325950c593f5b12a72a5d104f222507f5ed1d6c6245e197d1","text":" Combining EDHOC and OSCORE Using EDHOC for OSCORE with CoAP Transport draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc-latest Abstract This document defines an optimization approach for combining the lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol EDHOC run over CoAP with the first subsequent OSCORE transaction. This combination reduces the number of round trips required to set up an OSCORE Security Context and to complete an OSCORE transaction using that Security Context. This document defines how the lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol EDHOC is used for establishing an OSCORE Security Context, using CoAP for message transferring. Furthermore, this document defines an optimization approach for combining EDHOC run over CoAP with the first subsequent OSCORE transaction. This reduces the number of round trips required to set up an OSCORE Security Context and to complete an OSCORE transaction using that Security Context. 1. This document defines an optimization approach to combine the lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol EDHOC I-D.ietf-lake- edhoc, when running over CoAP RFC7252, with the first subsequent OSCORE RFC8613 transaction. Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC) I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc is a lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol, especially intended for use in constrained scenarios. As defined in Section 7.2 of I- D.ietf-lake-edhoc, EDHOC messages can be transported over the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) RFC7252. This allows for a minimum number of round trips necessary to setup the OSCORE Security Context and complete an OSCORE transaction, for example when an IoT device gets configured in a network for the first time. This document builds on the EDHOC specification I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc and defines how EDHOC run over CoAP is used for establishing a Security Context for Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) RFC8613. In addition, this document defines an optimization approach that combines EDHOC run over CoAP with the first subsequent OSCORE transaction. This allows for a minimum number of round trips necessary to setup the OSCORE Security Context and complete an OSCORE transaction, for example, when an IoT device gets configured in a network for the first time. This optimization is desirable, since the number of protocol round trips impacts the minimum number of flights, which in turn can have a"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-bd09e810ab2d681e1803f88f834b8ff13fc78c20e9325d2c2f6a300af4306909","text":"certificate when the certificate permits the usage of delegated credentials. Conforming CAs MUST mark this extension as non-critical. This allows the certificate to be used by service owners for clients that do not support certificate delegation as well and not need to obtain two certificates. The client MUST NOT accept a delegated credential unless the server's end-entity certificate satisfies the following criteria:"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-bd585c38954009dafa673937d66951966312fcc2f551b787de78548789e5f1a8","text":"more. connection-props provides a list of Connection Properties, while Selection Properties are listed in the subsections below. Many properties are only considered during establishment, and can not be changed after a Connection is established; however, they can still be queried. The return type of a queried Selection Property is Boolean, where \"true\" means that the Selection Property has been applied and \"false\" means that the Selection Property has not been applied. Note that \"true\" does not mean that a request has been honored. For example, if \"Congestion control\" was requested with preference level \"Prefer\", but congestion control could not be supported, querying the \"congestionControl\" property yields the value \"false\". If the preference level \"Avoid\" was used for \"Congestion control\", and, as requested, the Connection is not congestion controlled, querying the \"congestionControl\" property also yields the value \"false\". Selection Properties are listed in the subsections below. Selection Properties are only considered during establishment, and can not be changed after a Connection is established. After a Connection is established, Selection Properties can only be read to check the properties used by the Connection. Upon reading, the Preference type of a Selection Property changes into Boolean, where \"true\" means that the selected Protocol Stack supports the feature or uses the path associated with the Selection Property, and \"false\" means that the Protocol Stack does not support the feature or use the path. Implementations of Transport Services systems may alternatively use the two Preference values \"Require\" and \"Prohibit\" to represent \"true\" and \"false\", respectively. An implementation of the Transport Services API must provide sensible defaults for Selection Properties. The default values for each"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-be3bc9ac41b9f914fb0d3d04f7296654fb3ed6e003d0d18fe62082fc793200b4","text":"then the server SHOULD change the status of the application to \"invalid\" and MAY delete the application resource. The server SHOULD issue the requested certificate and update the The server MUST issue the requested certificate and update the application resource with a URL for the certificate as soon as the client has fulfilled the server's requirements. If the client has already satisfied the server's requirements at the time of this request (e.g., by obtaining authorization for all of the identifiers in the certificate in previous transactions), then the server MAY in the certificate in previous transactions), then the server MUST proactively issue the requested certificate and provide a URL for it in the \"certificate\" field of the application. The server MUST, however, still list the satisfied requirements in the \"requirements\""}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-beef8b57682bd84270e2a2d685ff5e26a63bd79bed64b48f6a38a0ff43c42a7e","text":"still being transmitted to the cache, and while the cache does not yet know the size of the object. Some of the popular caching systems were designed around cache footprint and had deeply ingrained assumptions about knowing the size of objects being stored, so the change in design requirements in long-established systems caused some errors in production. Incidents occurred where a transmission error in the connection from the upstream source to the cache could result in the cache holding a truncated segment and transmitting it to the end user's device. In this case, players rendering the stream often had the video freeze until the player was reset. In some cases the truncated object was even cached that way and served later to other players, causing continued stalls at the same spot in the video for all players playing the segment delivered from that cache node. assumptions about knowing the size of objects that are being stored, so the change in design requirements in long-established systems caused some errors in production. Incidents occurred where a transmission error in the connection from the upstream source to the cache could result in the cache holding a truncated segment and transmitting it to the end user's device. In this case, players rendering the stream often had the video freeze until the player was reset. In some cases the truncated object was even cached that way and served later to other players as well, causing continued stalls at the same spot in the video for all players playing the segment delivered from that cache node. 3.5."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-bf066c364c8a574589be53d14405d188dbbb1a663c64c04df5da8928b81a06a8","text":"Outer Observe value, it stops processing the message, as specified in ver-res. It the server accepts the Observe registration, a Partial IV must be In order to support Observe processing in OSCORE-unaware intermediaries, for messages with the Observe option the Outer Code SHALL be set to 0.05 (FETCH) for requests and to 2.05 (Content) for responses. 4.1.3.4.2. It the server accepts an Observe registration, a Partial IV must be included in all notifications (both successful and error). To secure the order of notifications, the client SHALL maintain a Notification Number for each Observation it registers. The Notification Number is"}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-bf200aa305220aa60adea70151774062d1b08dec7035df3280b7e0ffcde0f2c2","text":"of a codepoint in the 0-63 range to replace the provisional codepoint described above. 9.2. 10.2. This document registers a new value in the \"QUIC Transport Error Codes\" registry maintained at < Verify that the value of \"leaf_node.public_key\" is different from the value of the \"init_key\" field. 11.2. Within MLS, a KeyPackage is identified by its hash (see, e.g.,"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-bf8584dfe9945a9c9357b2519215d6c5484378dad737661a51c0c122da781101","text":"Protocol-specific Properties MUST use the protocol acronym as the Namespace (e.g., a \"tcp\" Connection could support a TCP-specific Transport Property, such as the user timeout value, in a protocol- specific property called \"tcp.userTimeoutValue\" (see tcp-uto). Transport Property, such as the user timeout value, in a Protocol- specific Property called \"tcp.userTimeoutValue\" (see tcp-uto). Vendor or implementation specific properties MUST use a string identifying the vendor or implementation as the Namespace."}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-bfad92b00a8ee9d64918dbbe325aa9350f204b5c6f644aa667e10141fdc31d6c","text":"not want an account to be created if one does not already exist, then it SHOULD do so by sending a POST request to the new-account URL with a JWS whose payload has an \"only-return-existing\" field set to \"true\" ({\"only-return-existing\": true}). ({\"only-return-existing\": true}). If a client sends such a request and an account does not exist, then the server MUST return an error response with status code 400 (Bad Request) and type \"urn:ietf:params:acme:error:accountDoesNotExist\". 7.3.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-bfeb9a76d537d7e285dc313b265378943f3eecb373dd64a37dffdbe7b85e58d7","text":"Fields and variables may be assigned a fixed value using \"=\", as in: 3.7.1. 3.8. Defined structures may have variants based on some knowledge that is available within the environment. The selector must be an enumerated"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-bfec1b7d92579ffff33eee80ee21df35bf69bf7413ce485d0c7a41636f27eb83","text":"find out the plaintext by correlation between the question and the length. The content and length of the \"padding\" field in \"MLSCiphertextContent\" can be chosen at the time of message encryption by the sender. It is recommended that padding data is comprised of zero-valued bytes and follows an established deterministic padding scheme. The length of the \"padding\" field in \"MLSCiphertextContent\" can be chosen at the time of message encryption by the sender. Senders may use padding to reduce the ability of attackers outside the group to infer the size of the encrypted content. 16.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-c00474ef0ac8efb627c5619c9199c38a7dc87dab32922cc74e842ee166e3dd32","text":"without accompanying evidence about its validity - used as proof of identity. The Attester is issued with a credential by the Endorser that is randomised and then used to anonymously confirm the validity of their evidence. The evidence is verified using the Endorser's public key. _mandatory_ A statement representing an identifier list that MUST be"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-c0494011db1261cc0aa9f7f29284e43eed419fc7573cee17485c5104d9d328e9","text":"3. Endpoints advertise their support of the extension described in this document by sending the following transport parameter: A variable-length integer representing the minimum amount of time in microseconds by which the endpoint can delay an acknowledgement. Values of 0 and 2^14 or greater are invalid, and receipt of these values MUST be treated as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. An endpoint's min_ack_delay MUST NOT be greater than the its max_ack_delay. Endpoints that support this extension MUST treat receipt of a min_ack_delay that is greater than the received max_ack_delay as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. Note that while the endpoint's max_ack_delay transport parameter is in milliseconds (Section 18.2 in QUIC-TRANSPORT), min_ack_delay is specified in microseconds. 4. Delaying acknowledgements as much as possible reduces both work done by the endpoints and network load. An endpoint's loss detection and congestion control mechanisms however need to be tolerant of this"}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-c0496342cb6cac0f1b19e535992cd355db5e959be0c0d634439d28d84bda2c37","text":"identifiers have privacy implications; see endpoint-privacy. Each endpoint SHOULD know the identifier of the other endpoint with which its wants to connect and SHOULD compare it with the other which it wants to connect and SHOULD compare it with the other endpoint's identifier used in ImportedIdentity.context. It is however important to remember that endpoints sharing the same group PSK can always impersonate each other."}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-c051b62d8ca848c19dafa98bdd12110379b23a36539aaccf97536ffd43b99b6b","text":"the calling service via HTTPS and so know the origin with some level of confidence. They also have accounts with some identity provider. This sort of identity service is becoming increasingly common in the Web environment in technologies such (BrowserID, Federated Google Login, Facebook Connect, OAuth, OpenID, WebFinger), and is often provided as a side effect service of a user's ordinary accounts with some service. In this example, we show Alice and Bob using a Web environment (with technologies such as BrowserID, Federated Google Login, Facebook Connect, OAuth, OpenID, WebFinger), and is often provided as a side effect service of a user's ordinary accounts with some service. In this example, we show Alice and Bob using a separate identity service, though the identity service may be the same entity as the calling service or there may be no identity service at all."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-c05350fcbda0004b29f21e45d54a9cbf92ef98dff312a2c774168381404f1807","text":"\"struct { Extension extensions<0..2^32-1>; } GroupContextExtensions; \" A member of the group applies a GroupContextExtensions proposal by removing all of the existing extensions from the GroupContext object for the group and replacing them with the list of extensions in the proposal. (This is a wholesale replacement, not a merge. An extension is only carried over if the sender of the proposal includes it in the new list.) Note that once the GroupContext is updated, its inclusion in the confirmation_tag by way of the key schedule will confirm that all members of the group agree on the extensions in use. A member of the group applies a GroupContextExtensions proposal with the following steps: If the new extensions include a \"required_capabilities\" extension, verify that all members of the group support the required capabilities (including those added in the same commit, and excluding those removed). Remove all of the existing extensions from the GroupContext object for the group and replacing them with the list of extensions in the proposal. (This is a wholesale replacement, not a merge. An extension is only carried over if the sender of the proposal includes it in the new list.) Note that once the GroupContext is updated, its inclusion in the confirmation_tag by way of the key schedule will confirm that all members of the group agree on the extensions in use. 11.1.9."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-c0753a7aed720d71db53e95b39222460b0a8800709d216dd9eee69d389eda4e7","text":"\"signer\". If the node is blank or if signature verification fails, return an error. Verify that the \"group_id\" is unique among the groups that the client is currently participating in. Verify the integrity of the ratchet tree. Verify that the tree hash of the ratchet tree matches the"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-c1802c6a05ba33b9c41c1b7d73dbd91c92ef6923e1afbd5549a42a1743ff7f4e","text":"GroupSecrets object with the \"psks\" field set, the receiving Client includes them in the key schedule in the order listed in the Commit, or in the \"psks\" field respectively. For resumption PSKs, the PSK is defined as the \"resumption_secret\" of the group and epoch specified in the \"PreSharedKeyID\" object. Specifically, \"psk_secret\" is computed as follows: defined as the \"resumption_psk\" of the group and epoch specified in the \"PreSharedKeyID\" object. Specifically, \"psk_secret\" is computed as follows: Here \"0\" represents the all-zero vector of length \"KDF.Nh\". The \"index\" field in \"PSKLabel\" corresponds to the index of the PSK in"}
{"_id":"q-en-using-github-c1c75f44d27fd153aa5aac668b51d8df3ea134086a58818b7925b58504117fc8","text":"An alternative is to rely on periodic email summaries of activity, such as those produced by a notification tool like github-notify-ml [6]. This tool has been used effectively in several working groups, [5]. This tool has been used effectively in several working groups, though it requires server infrastructure. A working group that uses GitHub MAY provide either facility at the"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-c1cf3a85c10ddead4cebdfbb441de3e94f7a640f496dcec721737e0d4b5150b0","text":"\"signature_algorithms\" is REQUIRED for certificate authentication. \"supported_groups\" and \"key_share\" are REQUIRED for DHE or ECDHE key exchange. \"supported_groups\" is REQUIRED for ClientHello messages using DHE or ECDHE key exchange. \"key_share\" is REQUIRED for DHE or ECDHE key exchange. \"pre_shared_key\" is REQUIRED for PSK key agreement."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-c201cc0eb97e9494bb7795b962a2d5c1b98eb21b789c840ca64bfc15a17b3b71","text":"Data whose semantics depends on the Capsule Type. Unless otherwise specified, all Capsule Types are defined as opaque to intermediaries. Intermediaries MUST forward all received opaque CAPSULE frames in their unmodified entirety. Intermediaries MUST NOT send any opaque CAPSULE frames other than the ones it is forwarding. All Capsule Types defined in this document are opaque, with the exception of the DATAGRAM Capsule, see datagram-capsule. Definitions of new Capsule Types MAY specify that the newly introduced type is transparent. Intermediaries MUST treat unknown Capsule Types as opaque. Intermediaries respect the order of opaque CAPSULE frames: if an intermediary receives two opaque CAPSULE frames in a given order, it MUST forward them in the same order. Endpoints which receive a Capsule with an unknown Capsule Type MUST silently drop that Capsule. Intermediaries MUST forward Capsules, even if they do not know the Capsule Type or cannot parse the Capsule Data. silently drop that Capsule. Receipt of a CAPSULE HTTP/3 Frame on a stream that is not a client- initiated bidirectional stream MUST be treated as a connection error of type H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED. 4.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-c2368769d0deacd91d6a9fc7b12156c06d6bccd960ba4bfb238a32af051e971a","text":"be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular MLS DE, that MLS DE SHOULD defer to the judgment of the other MLS DEs. 18.6. This document registers the \"message/mls\" MIME media type in order to allow other protocols (ex: HTTP RFC7540) to convey MLS messages. 19. References 19.1. URIs"}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-c39ddf1eea2176dbd6640cd8c6004344963c3040ee0dff0881267eebde97de9e","text":"mpls and I-D.ietf-detnet-ip. This draft does not have additional security considerations. 5. 7. This document makes no IANA requests."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-c3a5f0fd33568257cd69159c5ca7c4a0990118c1d404cf9986fc19f0db34fd8f","text":"1. The Internet does not always provide end to end reachability for native DNS. On-path network devices may spoof DNS responses, block DNS requests, or just redirect DNS queries to different DNS servers that give less-than-honest answers. These are also sometimes delivered with poor performance or reduced feature sets. Over time, there have been many proposals for using HTTP and HTTPS as a substrate for DNS queries and responses. To date, none of those proposals have made it beyond early discussion, partially due to disagreement about what the appropriate formatting should be and partially because they did not follow HTTP best practices. This document defines a specific protocol for sending DNS RFC1035 queries and getting DNS responses over HTTP RFC7540 using https:// (and therefore TLS RFC5246 security for integrity and"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-c3fe408282ad76e3fd03fa6e661bac228aa276cfa171abf1b65cd71cc73db624","text":"Many application programming interfaces (APIs) to perform transport networking have been deployed, perhaps the most widely known and imitated being the BSD socket() POSIX interface. The naming of objects and functions across these APIs is not consistent, and varies imitated being the BSD Socket POSIX interface. The naming of objects and functions across these APIs is not consistent, and varies depending on the protocol being used. For example, sending and receiving streams of data is conceptually the same for both an unencrypted Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) stream and operating on an encrypted Transport Layer Security (TLS) RFC8446 stream over TCP, but applications cannot use the same socket send() and recv() calls on top of both kinds of connections. Similarly, terminology for the implementation of transport protocols varies based on the context of the protocols themselves: terms such as \"flow\", \"stream\", \"message\", and \"connection\" can take on many different meanings. This variety can lead to confusion when trying to understand the similarities and differences between protocols, and how applications can use them effectively. TCP, but applications cannot use the same socket \"send()\" and \"recv()\" calls on top of both kinds of connections. Similarly, terminology for the implementation of transport protocols varies based on the context of the protocols themselves: terms such as \"flow\", \"stream\", \"message\", and \"connection\" can take on many different meanings. This variety can lead to confusion when trying to understand the similarities and differences between protocols, and how applications can use them effectively. The goal of the Transport Services architecture is to provide a common, flexible, and reusable interface for transport protocols. As"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-homenet-hna-c3ffdbd6c6a8a9d61a9a5d73a4394789675d7150794e749a76fa005694375842","text":"Reasons for signing the zone by the HNA are: 1) Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to Keeping the Homenet Zone and the Public Homenet Zone equal to securely optimize DNS resolution. As the Public Zone is signed with DNSSEC, RRsets are authenticated, and thus DNS responses can be validated even though they are not provided by the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-svcb-dns-c40d0f4c84086a501a71bc5459f9e56eb7c36e5f4d25775f6de0cc5880b5bbcd","text":"This key is automatically mandatory if present. (See Section 7 of SVCB for the definition of \"automatically mandatory\".) Support for the \"port\" key can be unsafe if the client has implicit elevated access to some network service (e.g. a local service that is inaccessible to remote parties) and that service uses a TCP-based protocol other than TLS. A hostile DNS server might be able to manipulate this service by causing the client to send a specially crafted TLS SNI or session ticket that can be misparsed as a command or exploit. To avoid such attacks, clients SHOULD NOT support the \"port\" key unless one of the following conditions applies: The client is being used with a DNS server that it trusts not attempt this attack. The client is being used in a context where implicit elevated access cannot apply. The client restricts the set of allowed TCP port values to exclude any ports where a confusion attack is likely to be possible (e.g. the \"bad ports\" list from the \"Port blocking\" section of FETCH). 4.3. These SvcParamKeys from SVCB apply to the \"dns\" scheme without"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-c4146c315b180d278168e89521ea7894c9538de0cfb9f26e59987a23c9cb5654","text":"the result is \"LogicalTrue\"; if the function's declared result type is \"NodesType\", it tests whether the result is non-empty. If the function's declared result type is \"ValueType\", its use in a test expression is not well-typed. expression is not well typed. Comparison expressions are available for comparisons between primitive values (that is, numbers, strings, \"true\", \"false\", and"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-irtf-nwcrg-network-coding-satellites-c426f8be3837c91763b6aa5a6a23291c95b4e34327aa0e5c57bb88bc181fc6d2","text":"the radio resource has been in the core design of SATellite COMmunication (SATCOM) systems. The trade-off often resided in how much redundancy a system adds to cope from link impairments, without reducing the good-put when the channel quality is high. There is reducing the good-put when the channel quality is good. There is usually enough redundancy to guarantee a Quasi-Error Free transmission. However, physical layer reliability mechanisms may not recover transmission losses (e.g. with a mobile user) and layer 2 (or above) re-transmissions induce 500 ms one-way delay with a geostationary satellite. Further exploiting coding schemes at higher OSI-layers is an opportunity for releasing constraints on the physical layer in such cases and improving the performance of SATCOM systems. transmission. The recovery time depends on the encoding block size. Considering for instance geostationary satellite system (GEO), physical or link layers erasure coding mechanisms recover transmission losses within a negligible delay compared to link delay. However, when retransmissions are triggered, this leads to an non- negligible additional delay in particular over GEO link. Further exploiting coding schemes at application or transport layers is an opportunity for releasing constraints on the physical layer and improving the performance of SATCOM systems. We have noticed an active research activity on coding and SATCOM in the past. That being said, not much has actually made it to"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-c470486f219901910f2765df5fca9cca08043e2842ba22185eb29d3cdc8a2c9b","text":"expected to be relevant for a closed connection. Retransmitting the final packet requires less state. New packets from unverified addresses could be used to create an amplification attack; see address-validation. To avoid this, endpoints MUST either limit transmission of CONNECTION_CLOSE frames to validated addresses or drop packets without response if the response would be more than three times larger than the received packet. After receiving a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, endpoints enter the draining state. An endpoint that receives a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame MAY send a single packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame before entering the draining state, using a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame and a NO_ERROR code if appropriate. An endpoint MUST NOT send further packets, which could result in a constant exchange of CONNECTION_CLOSE frames until the closing period on either peer ended. While in the closing state, an endpoint could receive packets from a new source address, possibly indicating a connection migration; see migration. An endpoint in the closing state MUST either discard packets received from an unvalidated address or limit the cumulative size of packets it sends to an unvalidated address to three times the size of packets it receives from that address. An immediate close can be used after an application protocol has arranged to close a connection. This might be after the application protocols negotiates a graceful shutdown. The application protocol exchanges whatever messages that are needed to cause both endpoints to agree to close the connection, after which the application requests that the connection be closed. When the application closes the connection, a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with an appropriate error code will be used to signal closure. 10.2.1. An endpoint is not expected to handle key updates when it is closing (Section 6 of QUIC-TLS). A key update might prevent the endpoint from moving from the closing state to the draining state, as the endpoint will not be able to process subsequently received packets, but it otherwise has no impact. 10.2.2. The draining state is entered once an endpoint receives a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, which indicates that its peer is closing or draining. While otherwise identical to the closing state, an endpoint in the draining state MUST NOT send any packets. Retaining packet protection keys is unnecessary once a connection is in the draining state. An endpoint that receives a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame MAY send a single packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame before entering the draining state, using a NO_ERROR code if appropriate. An endpoint MUST NOT send further packets. Doing so could result in a constant exchange of CONNECTION_CLOSE frames until one of the endpoints exits the closing state. An endpoint MAY enter the draining state from the closing state if it receives a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, which indicates that the peer is also closing or draining. In this case, the draining state SHOULD end when the closing state would have ended. In other words, the endpoint uses the same end time, but ceases transmission of any packets on this connection. 10.2.3. When sending CONNECTION_CLOSE, the goal is to ensure that the peer will process the frame. Generally, this means sending the frame in a"}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-c58c3d915b72dfa951646f1bbfd25912a5de197e682c0b38080dbdd085c7fd73","text":"different online protocol. Intra-data-center communication. Machine-to-machine communication within a single data center or PoP may use externally provisioned PSKs, primarily for the purposes of supporting TLS connections with early data; see security-con for considerations when using early data with external PSKs. within a single data center or point-of-presence (PoP) may use externally provisioned PSKs, primarily for the purposes of supporting TLS connections with early data; see security-con for considerations when using early data with external PSKs. Certificateless server-to-server communication. Machine-to- machine communication may use externally provisioned PSKs,"}
{"_id":"q-en-webpush-protocol-c616a98236f5910e7403913c88c8a01efcef5152ba4a80f50b3345b6ad478dc4","text":"topic is used to correlate push messages sent to the same subscription and does not convey any other semantics. The grammar for the Topic header field uses the \"token\" and \"quoted- string\" rules defined in RFC7230. Any double quotes from the \"quoted-string\" form are removed before comparing topics for equality. The grammar for the Topic header field uses the \"token\" rule defined in RFC7230. For use with this protocol, the Topic header field MUST be restricted to no more than 32 characters from the URL and filename safe Base 64"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-c63abac2a0bf249401ef51e7829e28ca85adb49afafd7d72d30fd8de01fdd55a","text":"As a domain may resolve to multiple IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, the server will connect to at least one of the hosts found in A and AAAA records, at its discretion. The HTTP server may be made available over either HTTPS or unencrypted HTTP; the client tells the server in its response which to check. records, at its discretion. Because many webservers allocate a default HTTPS virtual host to a particular low-privilege tenant user in a subtle and non-intuitive manner, the challenge must be completed over HTTP, not HTTPS. The string \"simpleHttp\""}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-c640ed145e0038ede56b4c887bf4eff0f03841f4a6697e4f0da400972b098292","text":"9. The application can set per-connection Protocol Properties (see protocol-props). Certain Procotol Properties may be read-only, on a protocol- and property-specific basis. ~~~ Connection.SetProperty(property, value) ~~~ 9.1. The application can set per-connection Properties. Certain Connection Properties may be read-only, on a protocol- and property- specific basis. ~~~ Connection.SetProperty(property, value) ~~~ At any point, the application can query Connection Properties. ~~~ ConnectionProperties := Connection.GetProperties() ~~~"}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-c648bcfc13fb57c5632c10e9420d03cd08335e25939f169b9b054ee110f63098","text":"This parameter holds a part of the IV value. When using the COSE_Encrypted structure, frequently a portion of the IV is part of the context associated with the key value. This field is used to carry the portion of the IV that changes for each message. As the IV is authenticated by the encryption process, this value can be placed in the unprotected header bucket. The 'Initialization Vector' and 'Partial Initialization Vector' parameters MUST NOT be present in the same security layer. The final IV is generated by concatenating the fixed portion of the IV, a zero string and the changing portion of the IV. The length of the zero string is computed by taking the required IV length and subtracting the lengths of the fixed and changing IV portions. to carry a value that causes the IV to be changed for each message. As the IV is authenticated by the encryption process, this value can be placed in the unprotected header bucket. The 'Initialization Vector' and 'Partial Initialization Vector' parameters MUST NOT be present in the same security layer. The message IV is generated by the following steps: Left pad the partial IV with zeros to the length of IV. XOR the padded partial IV with the context IV. This parameter holds a counter signature value. Counter signatures provide a method of having a second party sign some"}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-c65281c4d003357724fcfb469ab3825572f4ba1c08d93b5aeec33c386f07b66f","text":"This section lists some example use-cases where pair-wise external PSKs, i.e., external PSKs that are shared between only one server and one client, have been used for authentication in TLS. one client, have been used for authentication in TLS. There was no attempt to prioritize the examples in any particular order. Device-to-device communication with out-of-band synchronized keys. PSKs provisioned out-of-band for communicating with known"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-c67132b072bac94a8eebed04c298086e5b6d45fced7f765fa81cb31de486ed36","text":"transitively via an Endorser (e.g., the Verifier puts the Endorser's public key into its trust anchor store). In layered attestation, a root of trust is the initial Attesting Environment. Claims can be collected from or about each layer. The corresponding claims can be collected from or about each layer. The corresponding Claims can be structured in a nested fashion that reflects the nesting of the Attester's layers. Attester's layers. Normally, Claims are not self-asserted, rather a previous layer acts as the Attesting Environment for the next layer. Claims about a root of trust typically are asserted by Endorsers. The device illustrated in layered includes (A) a BIOS stored in read- only memory, (B) an updatable bootloader, and (C) an operating system"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-c69a2bb5dfa9abb79ec5028c1b55f3f31959a8f5b6600f25357a2ea2ef566598","text":"fields; this document uses \"fields\" for generality. A name-value pair sent as part of an HTTP field section. See Sections 6.3 and 6.5 of SEMANTICS. Sections 6.3 and 6.5 of RFC9110. Data associated with a field name, composed from all field line values with that field name in that section, concatenated together"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-c6c243603189072620a7730992ba02423989135cab6f02e1b2475cf384771d81","text":"Relying Party or for a Verifier, then integrity of the process is compromised. The security of conveyed information may be applied at different layers, whether by a conveyance protocol, or an information encoding format. This architecture expects attestation messages (i.e., Evidence, Attestation Results, Endorsements, Reference Values, and Policies) are end-to-end protected based on the role interaction The security protecting conveyed information may be applied at different layers, whether by a conveyance protocol, or an information encoding format. This architecture expects attestation messages (i.e., Evidence, Attestation Results, Endorsements, Reference Values, and Policies) are end-to-end protected based on the role interaction context. For example, if an Attester produces Evidence that is relayed through some other entity that doesn't implement the Attester or the intended Verifier roles, then the relaying entity should not"}
{"_id":"q-en-bundled-responses-c740f569776e68f3e31d4fdb4dfe83a081c138434e0dfcc81a02186c797a6f41","text":"\"\"index\"\" (index-section) \"\"manifest\"\" (manifest-section) \"\"critical\"\" (critical-section) \"\"responses\"\" (responses-section)"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-c751fc7d7ef15b55a739e307a2878775cd31b506ee1357acf0292a8fa59b51e5","text":"If the Protocol Stack includes a transport protocol that supports multipath connectivity, an update to the available paths should inform the Protocol Instance of the new set of paths that are permissible based on the Path Selection Properties passed by the permissible based on the Selection Properties passed by the application. A multipath protocol can establish new subflows over new paths, and should tear down subflows over paths that are no longer available. If the Protocol Stack includes a transport"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-c78e72e3b3db807ce4de3b6e8d35cc6004363d3e993022697844c13a9e295562","text":"defined. The protocol must use a secure transport that meets the requirements for modern https://. requirements for modern HTTPS. 4.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-c7a7392be78e3a1c3f9607c9634869e8d24d009a3fcf266b8cc75807c66e5005","text":"Additionally to the previous section, the following applies when Observe is supported. Observe allows re-registration of observations (see 3.3.1 of RFC7641). A server receiving an Observe registration identical to a previously stored one (including Partial IV and Token) SHALL treat it as valid and reply with the last notification sent. 7.4.1.1. A client receiving a notification SHALL compare the Partial IV of a received notification with the Notification Number associated to that Observe registration. Observe reordering MUST be linked to OSCORE's ordering of notifications. The client MAY do so by copying the least significant bytes of the Partial IV into the Observe option, before passing it to CoAP processing. If the verification of the response succeeds, and the received Partial IV was greater than the Observe registration. The ordering of notifications after OSCORE processing MUST be aligned with the Partial IV. The client MAY do so by copying the least significant bytes of the Partial IV into the Observe option, before passing it to CoAP processing. The client MAY ignore an Outer Observe option value. If the verification of the response succeeds, and the received Partial IV was greater than the Notification Number, then the client SHALL update the corresponding Notification Number with the received Partial IV. The client MUST stop processing notifications with a Partial IV which has been"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-c7b3275154872caebf03e59c89c75f8c2fa9c164fd1c4c6766233bf6eea4ae63","text":"one way; all other characters are unescaped. Note: Normalized Paths are Singular Queries, but not all Singular Queries are Normalized Paths. For example, \"$[-3]\" is a Singular Query, but is not a Normalized Path. The Normalized Path equivalent Queries are Normalized Paths. For example, \"$[-3]\" is a singular query, but is not a Normalized Path. The Normalized Path equivalent to \"$[-3]\" would have an index equal to the array length minus \"3\". (The array length must be at least \"3\" if \"$[-3]\" is to identify a node.)"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-c814a558b9c70c4c84af3b9a6cb8d795301ec7836b67feea488fe92e1c5ab36e","text":"obtains a token at time T2, a colluding issuer and origin can link this to the same client if T2 is unique to the client. This linkability is less feasible as the number of issuance events at time T2 increases. Depending on the \"max-age\" token challenge attribute, T2 increases. Depending on the \"max-age\" token challenge parameter, clients MAY try to augment the time between getting challenged then redeeming a token so as to make this sort of linkability more difficult. For more discussion on correlation risks between token"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-c81d7d0ca466479ad401a9a1b3e5a01e80de394aef2cccfc3c8c9c48d8375677","text":"Defaults are 0x01 for the endpoint initially being client, and 0x00 for the endpoint initially being server Master Salt Default is the empty string Key Derivation Function (KDF) Default is HKDF SHA-256"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-c833a776df9e978b8e28a7208fc3baa2eaa2be35d0bbb96942a95461d43fd143","text":"ODCIL: The original destination connection ID length. Tokens in NEW_TOKEN frames MUST set this field to zero. Original Destination Connection ID: This is copied from the field in the client Initial packet. RSCIL: The retry source connection ID length. Tokens in NEW_TOKEN frames MUST set this field to zero. Original Destination Connection ID: The server or Retry Service copies this from the field in the client Initial packet. Retry Source Connection ID: The server or Retry service copies this from the Source Connection ID of the Retry packet. Client IP Address: The source IP address from the triggering Initial packet. The client IP address is 16 octets. If an IPv4 address, the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-c8840953e2e5ace7eaa77d96d6bcda6d41d9ce16c5e7609b968dd4815b93ed49","text":"3.8. A Normalized Path is a JSONPath with restricted syntax that identifies a node by providing a query that results in exactly that node. For example, the JSONPath expression \"$.book[?(@.price<10)]\" could select two values with Normalized Paths \"$['book'][3]\" and \"$['book'][5]\". For a given JSON value, there is a one to one correspondence between the value's nodes and the Normalized Paths that identify these nodes. Note that there is precisely one Normalized Path that identifies each node. A JSONPath implementation may output Normalized Paths instead of, or in addition to, the values identified by these paths. Since bracket notation is more general than dot notation, it is used to construct Normalized Paths. Single quotes are used to delimit string member names. This reduces the number of characters that need escaping when Normalized Paths appear as strings (which are delimited with double quotes) in JSON texts. A Normalized Path is a canonical representation of the identity of a node in a value. Specifically, a Normalized Path is a JSONPath query with restricted syntax (defined below), e.g., \"$['book'][3]\", which when applied to the value results in a nodelist consisting of just the node identified by the Normalized Path. Note that a Normalized Path represents the identity of a node . There is precisely one Normalized Path identifying any particular node in a value. A canonical representation of a nodelist is as a JSON arrays of strings, where the strings are Normalized Paths. Normalized Paths provide a predictable format that simplifies testing and post-processing of nodelists, e.g., to remove duplicate nodes. Normalized Paths are used in this document as result paths in examples. Normalized Paths use the canonical bracket notation, rather than dot notation. Single quotes are used to delimit string member names. This reduces the number of characters that need escaping when Normalized Paths appear in double quote delimited strings, e.g., in JSON texts. Certain characters are escaped, in one and only one way; all other characters are unescaped. Normalized Paths are Singular Paths. Not all Singular Paths are Normalized Paths: \"$[-3]\", for example, is a Singular Path, but not a Normalized Path. The Normalized Path equivalent to \"$[-3]\" would have an index equal to the array length minus \"3\". (The array length must be at least \"3\" if \"$[-3]\" is to identify a node.) Note: Normalized Paths are Singular Paths, but not all Singular Paths are Normalized Paths. For example, \"$[-3]\" is a Singular Path, but is not a Normalized Path. The Normalized Path equivalent to \"$[-3]\" would have an index equal to the array length minus \"3\". (The array length must be at least \"3\" if \"$[-3]\" is to identify a node.) Since there can only be one Normalized Path identifying a given node, the syntax stipulates which characters are escaped and which are not. So the definition of \"normal-hexchar\" is designed for hex escaping of characters which are not straightforwardly-printable, for example U+000B LINE TABULATION, but for which no standard JSON escape such as \"n\" is available. U+000B LINE TABULATION, but for which no standard JSON escape, such as \"n\", is available. 3.8.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-c89433adba23b61b9f70fc81f83747d07919478ea2236724b91bbf8dcff1cace","text":"type in RFC5280), but has the keyEncipherment and dataEncipherment usages are disabled. The extension MAY be marked crititcal. (See Section 4.2 of RFC5280.) If the strict boolean is set to true, then the server MUST use delegated credential in the handshake; if no delegated credential is offered, then the client MUST abort the handshake with an \"illegal_parameter\" alert. 5. TBD"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-c8b80d02f235d2e6612e67b0bf70bea5e9b96dd779572129debe09641cfe218f","text":"security implications of HTTP caching for other protocols that use HTTP. In the absence of information about the authenticity of responses, such as DNSSEC, a DNS API server can give a client invalid data in In the absence of DNSSEC information about the authenticity of responses a DNS API server can give a client invalid data in responses. A client MUST NOT use arbitrary DNS API servers. Instead, a client MUST only use DNS API servers specified using mechanisms such as explicit configuration. This does not guarantee"}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-c8e6049f74901447cb397057b3365f1ae5e44292a161ca86706c7ee189cacb8c","text":"provides several general-purpose packet schedulers depending on the application goals. Note that the receiver could use a different scheduling strategy to send ACK(_MP) frames. The recommended default behaviour consists in sending ACK(_MP) frames on the path they acknowledge packets. Other scheduling strategies, such as sending ACK(_MP) frames on the lowest latency path, might be considered, but they could impact the sender with side effects on, e.g., the RTT estimation or the congestion control scheme. When adopting such asymetrical acknowledgment scheduling, the receiver should at least ensure that the sender negotiated one-way delay calculation mechanism (e.g., QUIC- Timestamp). 8. Simultaneous use of multiple paths enables different retransmission"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-c91133b583f984876a666b5ef85e6050a5d51268d4871ae993da2f0f1810e176","text":"information through an identity API. The definition of such an identity API is out of scope for this specification. The AS MUST return the \"subject\" field only in cases where the AS is sure that the RO and the end-user are the same party. This can be accomplished through some forms of authorization. Subject identifiers returned by the AS SHOULD uniquely identify the RO at the AS. Some forms of subject identifier are opaque to the client instance (such as the subject of an issuer and subject pair),"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-c91140bda80a1e07fbc0f80bd38cec80991bb20678313f3ee4f2e454ecc80aab","text":"asymmetry of request/response message sizes. Additionally, an attacker able to observe the data traffic exchanged between two DTLS peers is able to replay datagrams with modified IP address/port numbers. between two DTLS peers is able to modify IP address/port numbers. When the optional DTLS replay detection is not in use, such an attacker can also replay the observed packets, and the multiple copies of each packet can have different IP address/port numbers as well. The topic of peer address updates is discussed in peer-address- update."}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-c9299fa4572b207eff085b0d6a4a6b88301bbd61dddb6435f507699079bb2979","text":"bounded end-to-end delivery latency. General background and concepts of DetNet can be found in the DetNet Architecture RFC8655. The DetNet Architecture models the DetNet related data plane functions decomposed into two sub-layers: a service sub-layer and a forwarding sub-layer. The service sub-layer is used to provide DetNet service functions such as protection and reordering. The The purpose of this document is to describe the use of the MPLS data plane to establish and support DetNet flows. The DetNet Architecture models the DetNet related data plane functions decomposed into two sub-layers: a service sub-layer and a forwarding sub-layer. The service sub-layer is used to provide DetNet service functions such as protection and reordering. At the DetNet data plane a new set of functions (PREOF) provide the service sub-layer specific tasks. The forwarding sub-layer is used to provide forwarding assurance (low loss, assured latency, and limited out-of-order delivery). loss, assured latency, and limited out-of-order delivery) via already existing Traffic Engineering and queuing tools. The use of the functionalities of the DetNet service sub-layer and the DetNet forwarding sub-layer require careful design and control by the controller plane in addition to the DetNet specific use of MPLS encapsulation as specified by this document. This document specifies the DetNet data plane operation and the on- wire encapsulation of DetNet flows over an MPLS-based Packet Switched"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-c9526b2045dfad29d2c51de5ba22f2846ff0366e2c35c441ca8a102fe7319516","text":"record is found in DTLSInnerPlaintext.real_type after decryption. The CID value, cid_length bytes long, as agreed at the time the extension has been negotiated. extension has been negotiated. Recall that (as discussed previously) each peer chooses the CID value it will receive and use to identify the connection, so an implementation can choose to always recieve CIDs of a fixed length. If, however, an implementation chooses to receive different lengths of CID, the assigned CID values must be self-delineating since there is no other mechanism available to determine what connection (and thus, what CID length) is in use. The encrypted form of the serialized DTLSInnerPlaintext structure."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-c953285e8d4470f9f0613946778c70c6dbafd1e8d6019b38b9d195e908bc7110","text":"Target KDF: The KDF for which a PSK is imported for use. Imported PSK (IPSK): A PSK derived from an EPSK, External Identity, optional context string, target protocol, and target KDF. Imported PSK (IPSK): A PSK derived from an EPSK, optional context string, target protocol, and target KDF. Imported Identity: A sequence of bytes used to identify an IPSK. This document uses presentation language from RFC8446, Section 3. 4. This section describes the PSK Importer interface and its underlying"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-c9c46b8c9a020ef28528a7bf594fc4188d58614d4ade69fe62a9254556ca6581","text":"for responses in request-response. Due to reordering, data on a push stream can arrive before the corresponding PUSH_PROMISE, in which case both the associated client request and the pushed request headers are unknown. Clients which receive a new push stream with an headers are unknown. Clients that receive a new push stream with an as-yet-unknown Push ID can buffer the stream data in expectation of the matching PUSH_PROMISE. A client can use stream flow control (see section 4.1 of QUIC-TRANSPORT) to limit the amount of data a server"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-edhoc-c9d58f678bd2186a11609ce94a9f27bc0f9f0b4a91e6f3de3acaa0d601d63ee3","text":"unassigned in the \"CoAP Option Numbers\" registry, as first available and consistent option numbers for the EDHOC option. This document suggests 21 (TBD21) as option number to be assigned to the new EDHOC option, since both 13 and 21 are consistent for the use case in question, but different use cases or protocols may make better use of the option number 13. ] 7.2. IANA is asked to enter the following entries to the \"EDHOC Exporter Label\" registry defined in I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc. "}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-c9ff335ec21764bd54bff176e80bb0afd4fb621cc3767427162a1f930ceeaede","text":"TokenChallenge message, along with information about what keys to use when requesting a token from the issuer. Origins that support this authentication scheme need to handle the following tasks: Select which issuer to use, and configure the issuer name and token-key to include in WWW-Authenticate challenges. Determine a redemption context construction to include in the TokenChallenge, as discussed in context-construction. Select the origin information to include in the TokenChallenge. This can be empty to allow fully cross-origin tokens, a single origin name that matches the origin itself, or a list of origin names containing the origin. The TokenChallenge message has the following structure: The structure fields are defined as follows:"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-ca075660c848c65b9cb91cc4ad5054ffb38fe97507b00d39ad64a92d21bdcaa7","text":"opening of either the send or receive side causes the stream to open in both directions. An endpoint MUST open streams of the same type in increasing order of stream ID. These states are largely informative. This document uses stream states to describe rules for when and how different types of frames can be sent and the reactions that are expected when"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-ca277abdfe4faa0645119f2917b67f34ff2d1595d524b52758a94d5f1885f0af","text":"Evidence as well as all accompanying Event Logs back to the Verifier. While it is crucial that Claims, the Handle, and the Attester Identity information MUST be cryptographically bound to the signature of Evidence, they MAY be presented obfuscated, encrypted, or cryptographically blinded. For further reference see section security-and-privacy-considerations. Identity information (i.e., the Authentication Secret) MUST be cryptographically bound to the signature of Evidence, they MAY be presented obfuscated, encrypted, or cryptographically blinded. For further reference see section security-and-privacy-considerations. As soon as the Verifier receives the signed Evidence and Event Logs, it appraises the Evidence. For this purpose, it validates the As soon as the Verifier receives the Evidence and the Event Logs, it appraises the Evidence. For this purpose, it validates the signature, the Attester Identity, and the Handle, and then appraises the Claims. Appraisal procedures are application-specific and can be conducted via comparison of the Claims with corresponding Reference"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-ca2ae72414b422ecab14f55f2b04add7d27008699e114a24ff3ffd8572a4f2d7","text":"EndOfEarlyData is not necessary to determine when the early data is complete, and because DTLS is lossy, attackers can trivially mount the deletion attacks that EndOfEarlyData prevents in TLS. Servers SHOULD aggressively age out the epoch 1 keys upon receiving the first epoch 2 record and SHOULD NOT accept epoch 1 data after the first epoch 3 record is received. (See dtls-epoch for the definitions of each epoch.) SHOULD NOT accept records from epoch 1 indefinitely once they are able to process records from epoch 3. Though reordering of IP packets can result in records from epoch 1 arriving after records from epoch 3, this is not likely to persist for very long relative to the round trip time. Servers could discard epoch 1 keys after the first epoch 3 data arrives, or retain keys for processing epoch 1 data for a short period. is received. (See dtls-epoch for the definitions of each epoch.) 5.6."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-ca43ab85e00d6b3058d8a3d2650ac9985a65c8d5a1765a2cf4f99f468b81c514","text":"the new state is the \"prior_confirmed_transcript_hash\" in the GroupInfo object. Process the \"path\" field in the GroupInfo to update the new group state: Update the leaf at index \"index\" with the private key corresponding to the public key in the node. Apply the DirectPath to the tree, as described in synchronizing-views-of-the-tree. Identify the lowest common ancestor of the leaves at \"index\" and at \"GroupInfo.signer_index\". Set the private key for this node to the private key derived from the \"path_secret\" in the KeyPackage object. Define \"commit_secret\" as the value \"path_secret[n+1]\" derived from the \"path_secret[n]\" value assigned to the root node. For each parent of the common ancestor, up to the root of the tree, derive a new path secret and set the private key for the node to the private key derived from the path secret. The private key MUST be the private key that correspondns to the public key in the node. Use the \"epoch_secret\" from the KeyPackage object to generate the epoch secret and other derived secrets for the current epoch."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-ca47e871218c94327cb994f2a92cb5ee992f5e02779c3015d93bcffbcf0126db","text":"Consequently, a Version Negotiation packet consumes an entire UDP datagram. A server MUST NOT send more than one Version Negotiation packet in response to a single UDP datagram. See version-negotiation for a description of the version negotiation process."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-ca80cf29dcda7e017e5007469fdc8734aabace202d1f34467e396226a9bbade9","text":"Since clients can receive DNS SVCB answers over unencrypted DNS, on- path attackers can prevent successful discovery by dropping SVCB queries or answers. Clients should be aware that it might not be possible to distinguish between resolvers that do not have any Designated Resolver and such an active attack. To limit the impact of discovery queries being dropped either maliciously or unintentionally, clients can re-send their SVCB queries periodically. queries or answers, and thus prevent clients from switching to use encrypted DNS. Clients should be aware that it might not be possible to distinguish between resolvers that do not have any Designated Resolver and such an active attack. To limit the impact of discovery queries being dropped either maliciously or unintentionally, clients can re-send their SVCB queries periodically. Section 8.2 of I-D.ietf-add-svcb-dns describes a second downgrade attack where an attacker can block connections to the encrypted DNS server, and recommends that clients prevent it by switching to SVCB- reliant behavior once SVCB resolution does succeed. For DDR, this means that once a client discovers a compatible Designated Resolver, it SHOULD NOT use unencrypted DNS until the SVCB record expires, unless verification of the resolver fails. DoH resolvers that allow discovery using DNS SVCB answers over unencrypted DNS MUST NOT provide differentiated behavior based on the"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-ca8d7b610fe8621cfe14e8a11c80cd8c0a63d9e9d7ac76047f7cb2a03696548f","text":"of the connection. An endpoint that completes a graceful shutdown SHOULD use the HTTP_NO_ERROR code when closing the connection. If a client has consumed all available bidirectional stream IDs with requests, the server need not send a GOAWAY frame, since the client is unable to make further requests. 6.3. An HTTP/3 implementation can immediately close the QUIC connection at"}
{"_id":"q-en-webpush-protocol-caa419bc60588bfdb2f72c236f06520e59d1edf843766e0e2a409a75cb42b672","text":"Generic Event Delivery Using HTTP Push draft-thomson-webpush-protocol-latest draft-ietf-webpush-protocol-latest Abstract"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-cab787cbf1ced84af7620f0bd574ea536fbe4b1bc5be1e9723cdf77854040f83","text":"expansion) the server MAY abort the connection with an \"illegal_parameter\" alert without attempting to decrypt. Assuming that these checks succeed, the server then computes K_sni and decrypts the ServerName value. If decryption fails, the server MUST abort the connection with a \"decrypt_error\" alert. Assuming these checks succeed, the server then computes K_sni and decrypts the ServerName value. If decryption fails, the server MUST abort the connection with a \"decrypt_error\" alert. If the decrypted value's length is different from the advertised padding_length or the padding consists of any value other than 0,"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-cb7c1cd6964b389f972862e64d9de25917c8a973acd97b6d08d628945e9aeac5","text":"Even though transport parameters transmitted in the client's Initial packet are observable by the network, they cannot be modified by the network without risking connection failure. Further, the reply from network without causing connection failure. Further, the reply from the server cannot be observed, so observers on the network cannot know which parameters are actually in use."}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-cb9c97b62e4c04c7466941a1c7af0cb9546be1eb9c9ab915f79d89fa00a65daa","text":"multipath negotiation is ambiguous, they MUST be interpreted as acknowledging packets sent on path 0. Endpoints negotiate the use of one packet number space for all paths or separate packet number spaces per path during the connection handshake nego. While separate packet number spaces allow for more efficient ACK encoding, especially when paths have highly different latencies, this approach requires the use of a connection ID. Therefore use of a single number space can be beneficial when endpoints use zero-length connection ID for less overhead. 7.1. If the multipath option is negotiated to use one packet number space for all paths, the packet sequence numbers are allocated from the common number space, so that, for example, packet number N could be sent on one path and packet number N+1 on another. ACK frames report the numbers of packets that have been received so far, regardless of the path on which they have been received. That means the senders needs to maintain an association between sent packet numbers and the path over which these packets were sent. This is necessary to implement per path congestion control. When a packet is acknowledged, the state of the congestion control MUST be updated for the path where the acknowledged packet was originally sent. The RTT is calculated based on the delay between the transmission of that packet and its first acknowledgement (see compute-rtt) and is used to update the RTT statistics for the sending path. Also loss detection MUST be adapted to allow for different RTTs on different paths. For example, timer computations should take into account the RTT of the path on which a packet was sent. Detections based on packet numbers shall compare a given packet number to the highest packet number received for that path. If a zero-length connection ID is used, one packet number space for all paths. That means the packet sequence numbers are allocated from the common number space, so that, for example, packet number N could be sent on one path and packet number N+1 on another. In this case, ACK frames report the numbers of packets that have been received so far, regardless of the path on which they have been received. That means the senders needs to maintain an association between sent packet numbers and the path over which these packets were sent. This is necessary to implement per path congestion control, as explained in zero-length-cid-loss-and-congestion. Further, the receiver of packets with zero-length connection IDs should implement handling of acknowledgements as defined in sending- acknowledgements-and-handling-ranges. ECN handing is specified in ecn-handling, and mitigation of the RTT measurement is further explained in ack-delay-and-zero-length-cid- considerations. If a node does not want to implement this logic, it MAY instead limit its use of multiple paths as explained in restricted-sending-to-zero- length-cid-peer. 7.1.1. If zero-length CID and therefore also a single packet number space is used by the sender, the receiver MAY send ACK frames instead of ACK_MP frames to reduce overhead as the additional path ID field will anyway always carry the same value. If senders decide to send packets on paths with different transmission delays, some packets will very likely be received out of order. This will cause the ACK frames to carry multiple ranges of"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-cbe0d03d44c133e20d9b9fac63247550638fb0052a3772082d59d6011ea1efbf","text":"The endpoint accepting incoming QUIC connections. When used without qualification, the tuple of IP version, IP address, UDP protocol, and UDP port number that represents one end of a network path. An opaque identifier that is used to identify a QUIC connection at an endpoint. Each endpoint sets a value for its peer to include in packets sent towards the endpoint."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-cbe82276937335e483eddc66d5e284fc3183c97e4a87432e5b96bb3de939176c","text":"VPNs from residential users as they stopped commuting and switched to work-at-home. Again, it will be helpful for streaming operators to monitor traffic as described in measure-coll, watching for sudden changes in performance. 4. Streaming media latency refers to the \"glass-to-glass\" time duration,"}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-cc0956c563a27ae7239d506ba7d189725c842ecdf5d4f1ee673b62e3bfe90353","text":"1. QUIC RFC9000 has numerous extension points, including the version number that occupies the second through fifth octets of every long header (see RFC8999). If experimental versions are rare, and QUIC version 1 constitutes the vast majority of QUIC traffic, there is the potential for middleboxes to ossify on the version octets always being 0x00000001. QUIC QUIC has numerous extension points, including the version number that occupies the second through fifth octets of every long header (see RFC8999). If experimental versions are rare, and QUIC version 1 constitutes the vast majority of QUIC traffic, there is the potential for middleboxes to ossify on the version octets always being 0x00000001. Furthermore, version 1 Initial packets are encrypted with keys derived from a universally known salt, which allow observers to"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-cc2213778a2493220cadf44eb3279bc236513b8fedb11b2646303a5cc3a16b17","text":"4.1. (To the editor: check this repository URL after the draft is adopted. The working group may create its own repository) This document is in the Github repository at: This document is in the Github repository at https://github.com/GrumpyOldTroll/ietf-mops-drafts. Readers are welcome to open issues and send pull requests for this document. https://github.com/ietf-wg-mops/draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons Readers are welcome to open issues and send pull requests for this document. Substantial discussion of this document should take place on the MOPS working group mailing list (mops@ietf.org). Join: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mops Search: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mops/ 4.2. Presentations: IETF 105 BOF: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4G3YBVmn9Eo&t=47m21s IETF 106 Mops meeting: https://www.youtube.com/ IETF 106 meeting: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=4_k340xT2jM&t=7m23s List archive search for doc mentions: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mops/?q=draft-ietf-mops- streaming-opcons 5. This document requires no actions from IANA."}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-cc876371c75900f83a6112e234ad20e4ae17e7c9a7e922237b262a8d67257e48","text":"4.5.2. If the Record has no Unit, the Base Unit is used as the Unit. Having no Unit and no Base Unit is allowed. no Unit and no Base Unit is allowed; any information that may be required about units applicable to the value then needs to be provided by the application context. 4.5.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-cc9d6b7bff7470b37edc077ba8be6dec9bb6dea93903b691a842fd9dfc62d44c","text":"defined in Section 6 of TLS13. A TLS alert is converted into a QUIC connection error. The AlertDescription value is added to 0x100 to produce a QUIC error code from the range reserved for CRYPTO_ERROR. The resulting value is sent in a QUIC CONNECTION_CLOSE frame of type 0x1c. AlertDescription value is added to 0x0100 to produce a QUIC error code from the range reserved for CRYPTO_ERROR. The resulting value is sent in a QUIC CONNECTION_CLOSE frame of type 0x1c. QUIC is only able to convey an alert level of \"fatal\". In TLS 1.3, the only existing uses for the \"warning\" level are to signal"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-cca1b2a3c4a9ea8b16c3bdc586c98ed08812fd38138e3342cb48768de0500a45","text":"private key. The mechanism proposed in this document allows the delegation to be done off-line, with no per-transaction latency. The figure below compares the message flows for these two mechanisms with TLS 1.3 I-D.ietf-tls-tls13. TLS 1.3 I-D.ietf-tls-tls13, where DC is delegated credentials. These two mechanisms can be complementary. A server could use credentials for clients that support them, while using LURK to"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-cd51ef27efc7a92dc12d51e454bb347b295d11c5e2160987d3a3239b1d729661","text":"The public key of the account key pair, encoded as a JSON Web Key object RFC7517. \"valid\" or \"deactivated\" The status of this registration. Possible values are: \"valid\", \"deactivated\", and \"revoked\". \"deactivated\" should be used to indicate user initiated deactivation whereas \"revoked\" should be used to indicate administratively initiated deactivation. An array of URIs that the server can use to contact the client for issues related to this authorization. For example, the server may"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-cd5e6581b38e970d2813c72230d612cd0e0b83ad6c029c0c69cd3aca394f7b53","text":"The DTLSCiphertext structure omits the superfluous version number and type fields. DTLS adds an explicit epoch and sequence number to the TLS record header. This sequence number allows the recipient to correctly verify the DTLS MAC. However, the number of bits used for the epoch and sequence number fields in the DTLSCiphertext structure have been reduced. DTLS adds an epoch and sequence number to the TLS record header. This sequence number allows the recipient to correctly verify the DTLS MAC. However, the number of bits used for the epoch and sequence number fields in the DTLSCiphertext structure have been reduced. The DTLSCiphertext structure has a variable length header."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-cd84fda70208c5aabbddefc965fc2e6aabb117e53858bb3664c9f337b4b51be9","text":"clearer. Session Information (\"i=\"), URI (\"u=\"), Email Address (\"e=\"), Phone Number (\"p=\"), Bandwidth (\"b=\"), Repeat Times (\"r=\"), and Time Zones (\"z=\") lines are not useful in this context and SHOULD NOT be included. Phone Number (\"p=\"), Repeat Times (\"r=\"), and Time Zones (\"z=\") lines are not useful in this context and SHOULD NOT be included. Encryption Keys (\"k=\") lines do not provide sufficient security and MUST NOT be included."}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-cdd3ca116392168160aee8ada07f72317d294612d25c0def90ef7f306661c77e","text":"who have not implemented WebRTC at all, WebRTC implementations need to be more careful. Consider the case of a call center which accepts calls via RTCWeb. Consider the case of a call center which accepts calls via WebRTC. An attacker proxies the call center's front-end and arranges for multiple clients to initiate calls to the call center. Note that this requires user consent in many cases but because the data channel"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-ce674057738fe76f0726baa9898d1ffbb14340ec98fb39acec613b802a8ef908","text":"messages received. The 3-tuple (Cid, Sender ID, Partial IV) is called Transaction Identifier (Tid), and SHALL be unique for each Base Key. The Tid is used as a unique challenge in the COSE object of the protected CoAP request. The Tid is part of the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD, see sec-obj-cose) of the protected CoAP response message, which is how responses are bound to requests. Identifier (Tid), and SHALL be unique for each Master Secret. The Tid is used as a unique challenge in the COSE object of the protected CoAP request. The Tid is part of the Additional Authenticated Data (AAD, see sec-obj-cose) of the protected CoAP response message, which is how responses are bound to requests. 3.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-cea332d1bb90bda58715e0ce0130f24b73eba5127a7660cf9a5f389ea6927074","text":"performance and functional characteristics; and it can communicate with different remote systems to optimize performance, robustness to failure, or some other metric. Beyond these, if the API for the system remains the same over time, new protocols and features could be added to the system's implementation without requiring changes in system remains the same over time, new protocols and features can be added to the system's implementation without requiring changes in applications for adoption. 3.1. The normative requirements described here allow Transport Services APIs and Implementations to provide this functionlity without causing incompatibility or introducing security vulnerabilities. The rest of this document describes the architecture non-normatively. Functionality that is common across multiple transport protocols ought to be accessible through a unified set of API calls. An application using a Transport Services API can implement logic for its basic use of transport networking (establishing the transport, and sending and receiving data) once, and expect that implementation to continue to function as the transports change. 3.1. As a baseline, any Transport Services API needs to allow access to the distilled minimal set of features offered by transport protocols Any functionality that is common across multiple transport protocols SHOULD be made accessible through a unified set of Transport Services API calls. As a baseline, any Transport Services API MUST allow access to the minimal set of features offered by transport protocols I-D.ietf-taps-minset. An application can specify constraints and preferences for the protocols, features, and network interfaces it will use via Properties. A Transport Services API SHOULD offer Properties that are common to multiple transport protocols, in order to enable the system to appropriately select between protocols that offer equivalent features. Similarly, a Transport Services API SHOULD offer Properties that are applicable to a variety of network layer interfaces and paths, in order to permit racing of different network paths without affecting the applications using the system. Each Property is expected to have a default value. The default values for Properties SHOULD be selected to ensure correctness for the widest set of applications, while providing the widest set of options for selection. For example, since both applications that require reliability and those that do not require reliability can function correctly when a protocol provides reliability, reliability ought to be enabled by default. As another example, the default value for a Property regarding the selection of network interfaces ought to permit as many interfaces as possible. Applications using a Transport Services system interface are REQUIRED to be robust to the automated selection provided by the system, where the automated selection is constrained by the requirements and preferences expressed by the application. 3.2. There are applications that will need to control fine-grained details of transport protocols to optimize their behavior and ensure compatibility with remote systems. A Transport Services system therefore ought to also permit more specialized protocol features to be used. The interface for these specialized options ought to be exposed differently from the common options to ensure flexibility. therefore SHOULD permit more specialized protocol features to be used. A specialized feature could be required by an application only when using a specific protocol, and not when using others. For example,"}
{"_id":"q-en-lxnm-ceadcde2cb643743df0391fef7009cef48a7b127ff1bdae071beffde2a0091a3","text":"6.3.2.1. This sub-tree defines the L2VPN service type, according to the several signalling options to exchange membership information between several signaling options to exchange membership information between PEs of an L2VPN. The following signaling options are supported: Refers to the BGP control plane as described in RFC4761 and RFC6624. Refers to the BGP control plane as described in RFC7432 and RFC7209. The service is a Multipoint VPLSs that use a BGP control plane as described in RFC4761 and RFC6624. For this L2VPN service, the model allows configuring the Route Distinguisher, the Route Targets, the PWE encapsulation type and the MTU configurations to allow MTU mismatch. The service is a Multipoint VPLSs that use also a BGP control plane but also includes the additional features and related parameters RFC7432 and RFC7209. The model allows the configuration of the EVPN service interface type, the local and remote VPWS Service Instance (VSI) RFC8214, the EVPN policies for handling MAC addresses and the Ethernet Segment Identifier (ESI) information. Refers to LDP-signaled pseudowires RFC6074. A Multipoint VPLSs that use a mesh of LDP-signaled Pseudowires RFC6074. The model allows configuring the T-LDP PWE type, MTU mismatch and the list of AC and PW bindings. Refers to L2TP-signaled pseudowires RFC6074. The L2 VPN uses L2TP-signaled Pseudowires as described in RFC6074. The model allows configuring TBC. 6.3.2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-cef3dfc2256bac7167c64f745ef14aa09941bbc8aac37c3f74b53a8feb73f289","text":"6.1.2. Note that this API has multiple ways to constrain and prioritize endpoint candidates based on the network interface: Specifying an interface on a RemoteEndpoint qualifies the scope of the remote endpoint, e.g., for link-local addresses. Specifying an interface on a LocalEndpoint explicitly binds all candidates derived from this endpoint to use the specified interface. Specifying an interface using the \"interface\" Selection Property (prop-interface) or indirectly via the \"pvd\" Selection Property (prop-pvd) influences the selection among the available candidates. While specifying an interface on an endpoint restricts the candidates available for connection establishment in the Pre-Establishment Phase, the Selection Properties prioritize and constrain the connection establishment. 6.1.3. An Endpoint can have an alternative definition when using different protocols. For example, a server that supports both TLS/TCP and QUIC may be accessible on two different port numbers depending on which"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-cf11380e3081f7f72ae9dde9dbd35de2795a24f5cf00f6501f00e0d964bbfcda","text":"different algorithms such as loss-based CUBIC RFC8312, delay-based COPA or BBR, or even something completely different. We do have experience with deploying new congestion controllers without melting the Internet (CUBIC is one example), but the point mentioned in tcp-behavior about TCP being implemented in operating system kernels is also different with QUIC. Although QUIC can be implemented in operating system kernels, one of the design goals when this work was chartered was \"QUIC is expected to support rapid, distributed development and testing of features\", and to meet this expectation, many implementers have chosen to implement QUIC in user space, outside the operating system kernel, and to even distribute QUIC libraries with their own applications. The decision to deploy a new version of QUIC is relatively uncontrolled, compared to other widely used transport protocols, and this can include new transport behaviors that appear without much notice except to the QUIC endpoints. At IETF 105, Christian Huitema and Brian Trammell presented a talk on \"Congestion Defense in Depth\" CDiD, that explored potential concerns about new QUIC congestion controllers being broadly deployed without the testing and instrumentation that current major content providers routinely include. The sense of the room at IETF 105 was that the current major content providers understood what is at stake when they deploy new congestion controllers, but this presentation, and the related discussion in TSVAREA minutes from IETF 105 (tsvarea-105, are still worth a look for new and rapidly growing content providers. The Internet community does have experience with deploying new congestion controllers without melting the Internet. As noted in RFC8312, both the CUBIC congestion controller and its predecessor BIC have significantly different behavior from Reno-style congestion controllers such as TCP NewReno RFC6582, but both CUBIC and BIC were added to the Linux kernel in order to allow experimentation and analysis, and both were then selected as the default TCP congestion controllers in Linux, and both were deployed globally. The point mentioned in tcp-behavior about TCP congestion controllers being implemented in operating system kernels is different with QUIC. Although QUIC can be implemented in operating system kernels, one of the design goals when this work was chartered was \"QUIC is expected to support rapid, distributed development and testing of features\", and to meet this expectation, many implementers have chosen to implement QUIC in user space, outside the operating system kernel, and to even distribute QUIC libraries with their own applications. It is worth noting that streaming operators using HTTP/3, carried over QUIC, can expect more frequent deployment of new congestion controller behavior than has been the case with HTTP/1 and HTTP/2, carried over TCP. It is worth considering that if TCP-based HTTP traffic and UDP-based HTTP/3 traffic are allowed to enter operator networks on roughly"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-cf442c70d9b106af442e086e1ba38c81d5cb6301ea9439a702508fb54275fdc9","text":"Endpoints which receive a Capsule with an unknown Capsule Type MUST silently drop that Capsule. Receipt of a CAPSULE HTTP/3 Frame on a stream that is not a client- initiated bidirectional stream MUST be treated as a connection error of type H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED. CAPSULE frames MUST NOT be sent on a stream before at least one HEADERS frame has been sent on that stream. This removes the need to buffer capsules when the endpoint needs information from headers to determine how to react to the capsule. If a CAPSULE frame is received on a stream before a HEADERS frame, the receiver MUST treat this as a connection error of type H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED. 4.4. 4.1. 4.4.1. The REGISTER_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsule (see iana-types for the value of the capsule type) allows an endpoint to inform its peer of the"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-cf77d3e6353d2e0c7d0d0399706ba2c347fae9a0c73dbf471b7dd6230cb8d51a","text":"Transmit the Welcome message to the other new members Group IDs SHOULD be constructed in such a way that there's an overwhelmingly low probability of honest group creators generating the same group ID, even without assistance from the Delivery Service. For example, by making the group ID a freshly generated random value of size \"KDF.Nh\". The Delivery Service MAY attempt to ensure that group IDs are globally unique by rejecting the creation of new groups with a previously used ID. The recipient of a Welcome message processes it as described in joining-via-welcome-message. If application context informs the recipient that the Welcome should reflect the creation of a new group"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-cf8e5c4eede6e3533aef61d4d1550e22d48e39dfaba1a741dc2c7f61eb9c686e","text":"In pseudocode, this procedure is as follows: decrypt an by reversing this process. That is, they first parse decrypt an by reversing this process. That is, first parse \"enc_response\" into \"response_nonce\" and \"ct\". They then follow the same process to derive values for \"aead_key\" and \"aead_nonce\". same process to derive values for \"aead_key\" and \"aead_nonce\", using their sending HPKE context, \"sctxt\", as the HPKE context, \"context\". The uses these values to decrypt \"ct\" using the Open function provided by the AEAD. Decrypting might produce an error, as follows:"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-d0123abb4828d372d4b663dbd858339735ab10d303ff9ab8dd0dd4f277648cd1","text":"The inner JWS MUST have the same \"url\" header parameter as the outer JWS. The inner JWS MAY omit the \"nonce\" header parameter. The server MUST ignore any value provided for the \"nonce\" header parameter. The inner JWS MUST omit the \"nonce\" header parameter. This transaction has signatures from both the old and new keys so that the server can verify that the holders of the two keys both"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-d05fc86a126f34113b416b7ae81f39af591a099b97c510640913f5ccfe0f07a7","text":"to cases where the Unencrypted Resolver and Designated Resolver have the same IP address. The constraints on validation of Designated Resolvers specified here apply specifically to the automatic discovery mechanisms defined in this document, which are referred to as Authenticated Discovery and Opportunistic Discovery. Clients MAY use some other mechanism to validate and use Designated Resolvers discovered using the DNS SVCB record. However, use of such an alternate mechanism needs to take into account the attack scenarios detailed here. 8. 8.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-d095117445958a16a081044f422496b345da866568aa1b4f34009ada54925186","text":"actually allowed to evict other members; groups can enforce access control policies on top of these basic mechanism. 4.3. A group comprises a single linear sequence of epochs and groups are generally independent of one-another. However, it can sometimes be useful to link epochs cryptographically, either within a group or across groups. MLS derives a resumption pre-shared key (PSK) from each epoch to allow entropy extracted from one epoch to be injected into a future epoch. This link guarantees that members entering the new epoch agree on a key if and only if were members of the group during the epoch from which the resumption key was extracted. MLS supports two ways to tie a new group to an existing group. Re- initialization closes one group and creates a new group comprising the same members with different parameters. Branching starts a new group with a subset of the original group's participants (with no effect on the original group). In both cases, the new group is linked to the old group via a resumption PSK. Applications may also choose to use resumption PSKs to link epochs in other ways. For example, the following figure shows a case where a resumption PSK from epoch \"n\" is injected into epoch \"n+k\". This demonstrates that the members of the group at epoch \"n+k\" were also members at epoch \"n\", irrespective of any changes to these members' keys due to Updates or Commits. 5. The protocol uses \"ratchet trees\" for deriving shared secrets among a"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-d0bcbcb591bcfdfb1f050656a30770b5683131301878f005af518794606f6a83","text":"mean skipping rounds, so if PSK is not in use Early Secret will still be HKDF-Extract(0, 0). For the computation of the binder_secret, the label is \"external psk binder key\" for external PSKs (those provisioned outside of TLS) and \"resumption psk binder key\" for resumption PSKs (those provisioned as the resumption master secret of a previous handshake). The different labels prevent the substitution of one type of PSK for the other. provisioned outside of TLS) and \"res binder\" for resumption PSKs (those provisioned as the resumption master secret of a previous handshake). The different labels prevent the substitution of one type of PSK for the other. There are multiple potential Early Secret values depending on which PSK the server ultimately selects. The client will need to compute"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-d0dc74ebc8b642a10cd632c19880fdd7e7aae1d2aeeb42fa0df78245417fd256","text":"filter expression: Its only argument is an instance of \"ValueType\" (possibly taken from a singular path as in the example above). The result also is an a singular query as in the example above). The result also is an instance of \"ValueType\": an unsigned integer or \"Nothing\". If the argument value is a string, the result is the number of"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-d10be697b26bb506936e3a69126f9823cdcc046ff13600d08304ef2de8a3e971","text":"as a result of racing multiple transports or as part of TCP Fast Open. Final: when this is true, it means that a transport connection can be closed immediately after its transmission. Corruption Protection Length: when this is set to any value other than -1, it limits the required checksum in protocols that allow limiting the checksum length (e.g. UDP-Lite). Immediate Acknowledgement: this informs the implementation that the sender intends to execute tight control over the send buffer, and therefore wants to avoid delayed acknowledgements. In case of SCTP, a request to immediately send acknowledgements can be implemented using the \"sack-immediately flag\" described in Section 4.2 of RFC8303 for the SEND.SCTP primitive. Instantaneous Capacity Profile: when this is set to \"Interactive/ Low Latency\", the Message should be sent immediately, even when this comes at the cost of using the network capacity less efficiently. For example, small messages can sometimes be bundled to fit into a single data packet for the sake of reducing header overhead; such bundling should not be used. For example, in case of TCP, the Nagle algorithm should be disabled when Interactive/ Low Latency is selected as the capacity profile. Scavenger/Bulk can translate into usage of a congestion control mechanism such as LEDBAT, and/or the capacity profile can lead to a choice of a DSCP value as described in I-D.ietf-taps-minset). [Note: See also send-params-non-consensus for additional Send Parameters under discussion.] Transmission Profile: TBD - because it's not final in the API yet. Old text follows: when this is set to \"Interactive/Low Latency\", the Message should be sent immediately, even when this comes at the cost of using the network capacity less efficiently. For example, small messages can sometimes be bundled to fit into a single data packet for the sake of reducing header overhead; such bundling should not be used. For example, in case of TCP, the Nagle algorithm should be disabled when Interactive/Low Latency is selected as the capacity profile. Scavenger/Bulk can translate into usage of a congestion control mechanism such as LEDBAT, and/ or the capacity profile can lead to a choice of a DSCP value as described in I-D.ietf-taps-minset). Singular Transmission: when this is true, the application requests to avoid transport-layer segmentation or network-layer fragmentation. Some transports implement network-layer fragmentation avoidance (Path MTU Discovery) without exposing this functionality to the application; in this case, only transport- layer segmentation should be avoided, by fitting the message into a single transport-layer segment or otherwise failing. Otherwise, network-layer fragmentation should be avoided--e.g. by requesting the IP Don't Fragment bit to be set in case of UDP(-Lite) and IPv4 (SET_DF in RFC8304). 5.1.1.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-d1f1cbac9731a48d6cfc64f1b26b32fbb0ab1d15f9993720b5aa81f0eb2c97ad","text":"characteristics as input for the switching decision or the congestion controller on the new path. Only the client can actively migrate. However, servers can indicate during the handshake that they prefer to transfer the connection to a different address after the handshake, e.g. to move from an address that is shared by multiple servers to an address that is unique to the server instance. The server can provide an IPv4 and an IPv6 address in a transport parameter during the TLS handshake and the client can select between the two if both are provided. See also Section 9.6 of QUIC. 8. QUIC connections are closed either by expiration of an idle timeout,"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-d26c3d7be8da431e4256071586a11a929690b0b26d1759c02e0fb6f00428d47e","text":"From the client's perspective, a WebTransport session is established when the client receives a 200 response. From the server's perspective, a session is established once it sends a 200 response. Both endpoints MUST NOT open any streams or send any datagrams on a given session before that session is established. WebTransport over HTTP/3 does not support 0-RTT. WebTransport over HTTP/3 does not support 0-RTT. 3.4."}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-d26c46ded7bf43ee13895a4b5ffadc8686fea24f8cb8c494cd9b3eff0acf6079","text":"codepoint in the IP header SHOULD be acknowledged immediately, to reduce the peer's response time to congestion events. 4.2. 5.2. For performance reasons, an endpoint can receive incoming packets from the underlying platform in a batch of multiple packets. This"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-edhoc-d2ad043a1caabfdf23610d6a5d1614482e8fcb5cea69785f155fc4926967f8f7","text":"derivation, as per Section 5.4.3 and Section 7.2.1 of I-D.ietf- lake-edhoc, respectively. If the applicability statement used in the EDHOC session specifies that EDHOC message_4 shall be sent, the Server MUST stop the EDHOC processing and consider it failed, as due to a client error. Extract the OSCORE ciphertext from the payload of the EDHOC + OSCORE request, as the value of the second CBOR byte string in the CBOR sequence."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-d2d3dd562073ff6d095af647329825e31e6e638d084f0309291b9c4c18a618cb","text":"4.2.4. The direction method returns the last value passed into setDirection. If setDirection has never been called, it returns the direction the transceiver was initialized with. 4.2.5. The currentDirection method returns the last negotiated direction for the transceiver's associated m= section. More specifically, it returns the RFC3264 directional attribute of the associated m= section in the last applied answer, with \"send\" and \"recv\" directions reversed if it was a remote answer. For example, if the directional attribute for the associated m= section in a remote answer is \"recvonly\", currentDirection returns \"sendonly\". If an answer that references this transceiver has not yet been applied, or if the transceiver is stopped, currentDirection returns null. 4.2.6. The setCodecPreferences method sets the codec preferences of a transceiver, which in turn affect the presence and order of codecs of the associated m= section on future calls to createOffer and"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-d2f50250f8c8496d5f324b4a6f00feaf833d2ff80321064a301782ddf9a0f906","text":"When generating a routable connection ID, the server writes arbitrary bits into its nonce octets, and its provided server ID into the server ID octets. Servers MAY opt to have a longer connection ID beyond the nonce and server ID. The nonce and additional bits MAY encode additional information, but SHOULD appear essentially random to observers. beyond the nonce and server ID. The additional bits MAY encode additional information, but SHOULD appear essentially random to observers. If the decrypted nonce bits increase monotonically, that guarantees that nonces are not reused between connection IDs from the same server. The server encrypts the server ID using exactly the algorithm as described in triple-stream-cipher-load-balancer-actions, performing"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-d30d999fc1e18f48423eaa10be1a625d6e4bce9c4d4a92fcbfa39a1a27b21124","text":"The certificate and signing key to be used. A Handshake Context based on the hash of the handshake messages A Handshake Context based on the transcript of the handshake messages A base key to be used to compute a MAC key."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-d34f5950ca6c7a9202b1d0626a3cc3f80a424b4452248dfd6ee98c5fea1fa648","text":"both were then selected as the default TCP congestion controllers in Linux, and both were deployed globally. The point mentioned in tcp-behavior about TCP congestion controllers being implemented in operating system kernels is different with QUIC. Although QUIC can be implemented in operating system kernels, one of the design goals when this work was chartered was \"QUIC is expected to support rapid, distributed development and testing of features,\" and to meet this expectation, many implementers have chosen to implement QUIC in user space, outside the operating system kernel, and to even distribute QUIC libraries with their own applications. It is worth noting that streaming operators using HTTP/3, carried over QUIC, can expect more frequent deployment of new congestion controller behavior than has been the case with HTTP/1 and HTTP/2, carried over TCP. The point mentioned in reliable-behavior about TCP congestion controllers being implemented in operating system kernels is different with QUIC. Although QUIC can be implemented in operating system kernels, one of the design goals when this work was chartered was \"QUIC is expected to support rapid, distributed development and testing of features,\" and to meet this expectation, many implementers have chosen to implement QUIC in user space, outside the operating system kernel, and to even distribute QUIC libraries with their own applications. It is worth noting that streaming operators using HTTP/3, carried over QUIC, can expect more frequent deployment of new congestion controller behavior than has been the case with HTTP/1 and HTTP/2, carried over TCP. It is worth considering that if TCP-based HTTP traffic and UDP-based HTTP/3 traffic are allowed to enter operator networks on roughly"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-d357bb5da2600caf6e073e931ad5ea3dde46d1ef8bfcc679bbdaf836d15a2750","text":"\"Upgrade\". the response SHALL include a single \"Upgrade\" header with value \"masque-udp\". \"connect-udp\". the response SHALL NOT include any Transfer-Encoding or Content- Length header fields."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-d37bbfb5b4a0f49002efce37ef94d7314b46d05e6cd0cc892129bab6d775b78c","text":"and header protection, as a connection error of type PROTOCOL_VIOLATION. Discarding such a packet after only removing header protection can expose the endpoint to attacks; see Section 9.3 of QUIC-TLS. Section 9.5 of QUIC-TLS. The next bit (0x04) of byte 0 indicates the key phase, which allows a recipient of a packet to identify the packet protection"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-d38048f89f512f6dc60bb725a12a0dc5b9064657d0d01cc5bd3681484fb7c355","text":"constrain the types of information for which the trust anchor is authoritative.\" The trust anchor may be a certificate or it may be a raw public key along with additional data if necessary such as its public key algorithm and parameters. public key algorithm and parameters. In the context of this document, a trust anchor may also be a symmetric key, as in TCG-DICE- SIBDA or the symmetric mode described in I-D.tschofenig-rats-psa- token. Thus, trusting a Verifier might be expressed by having the Relying Party store the Verifier's public key or certificate in its trust anchor store, or might be expressed by storing the public key or certificate of an entity (e.g., a Certificate Authority) that is in the Verifier's certificate path. For example, the Relying Party can Party store the Verifier's key or certificate in its trust anchor store, or might be expressed by storing the public key or certificate of an entity (e.g., a Certificate Authority) that is in the Verifier's certificate path. For example, the Relying Party can verify that the Verifier is an expected one by out of band establishment of key material, combined with a protocol like TLS to communicate. There is an assumption that between the establishment"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-d38cc7af6961c2892341b00490b301fe5609ec4cb98538d619689c2a90262830","text":"The output of the decryption is the server ID that the load balancer uses for routing. 4.3.3. 4.2.3. When generating a routable connection ID, the server writes arbitrary bits into its nonce octets, and its provided server ID into the"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-d3e99729fc4d69325cf813b1aa524908d3858da5f25d38d67c6022d303faa70d","text":"5. Several types of ciphers have been defined for use with TLS and DTLS and the MAC calculation for those ciphers differs slightly. and the MAC calculations for those ciphers differ slightly. This specification modifies the MAC calculation defined in RFC6347 and RFC7366 as well as the definition of the additional data used with AEAD ciphers provided in RFC6347 for records with content type This specification modifies the MAC calculation as defined in RFC6347 and RFC7366, as well as the definition of the additional data used with AEAD ciphers provided in RFC6347, for records with content type tls12_cid. The modified algorithm MUST NOT be applied to records that do not carry a CID, i.e., records with content type other than tls12_cid."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-d3f03c1a44c95500179ef1a20aa7a2faa55557eb3e512b6fb3a2eafa95d5bf6c","text":"3.2. This document focuses on QUIC version 1, and this section applies only to packets belonging to QUIC version 1 flows; for purposes of on-path observation, it assumes that these packets have been identified as such through the observation of a version number exchange as described above. This document focuses on QUIC version 1, and this Connection Confirmation section applies only to packets belonging to QUIC version 1 flows; for purposes of on-path observation, it assumes that these packets have been identified as such through the observation of a version number exchange as described above. Connection establishment uses Initial and Handshake packets containing a TLS handshake, and Retry packets that do not contain"}
{"_id":"q-en-multipath-d42864adfb06518142e5794f57d0f8b762437b09db4a654c2a17e93c2f268726","text":"7.1.2. When sending to a zero-length CID receiver, senders may receive acknowledgements that combine packet numbers received over multiple paths. However, even if one packet number space is used on multiple path the sender MUST maintain separate congestion control state for each path. Therefore, senders MUST be able to infer the sending path from the acknowledged packet numbers, for example by remembering which packet was sent on what path. The senders MUST use that information to perform congestion control on the relevant paths, and to correctly estimate the transmission delays on each path. (See ack-delay-and-zero-length-cid-considerations for specific considerations about using the ACK Delay field of ACK frames, and ecn-handling for issues on using ECN marks.) Loss detection as specified in QUIC-RECOVERY uses algorithms based on timers and on sequence numbers. When packets are sent over multiple paths, loss detection must be adapted to allow for different RTTs on different paths. When sending to zero-length CID receivers, packets sent on different paths may be received out of order. Therefore senders cannot directly use the packet sequence numbers to compute the Packet Thresholds defined in Section 6.1.1 of QUIC-RECOVERY. Relying only on Time Thresholds produces correct results, but is somewhat suboptimal. Some implementations have been getting good results by not just remembering the path over which a packet was sent, but also maintaining an order list of packets sent on each path. That ordered list can then be used to compute acknowledgement gaps per path in Packet Threshold tests. 7.1.3. The ACK Delay field of the ACK frame is relative to the largest acknowledged packet number (see Section 13.2.5 of QUIC-TRANSPORT). When using paths with different transmission delays, the reported"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-d42a61591b2e6863395fa0327c46e6b883222f6abed65edea895608fc6754e23","text":"A URL for the certificate that has been issued in response to this application. [[ Open issue: There are two possible behaviors for the CA here. Either (a) the CA automatically issues once all the requirements are fulfilled, or (b) the CA waits for confirmation from the client that it should issue. If we allow both, we will need a signal in the application object of whether confirmation is required. I would prefer that auto-issue be the default, which would imply a syntax like \"confirm\": true ]] [[ Open issue: Should this syntax allow multiple certificates? That would support reissuance / renewal in a straightforward way, especially if the CSR / notBefore / notAfter could be updated. ]] The elements of the \"requirements\" array are immutable once set, except for their \"status\" fields. If any other part of the object changes after the object is created, the client MUST consider the"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-d480355c277de05699ff80fb057bfa907eede34a82e7a0b38f7dd7d7f97155a0","text":"7.3.4. This method is indicated by \"jws\" in the \"proof\" field. A JWS RFC7515 object is created as follows: This method is indicated by the method value \"jws\". This method defines no additional parameters. A JWS RFC7515 object is created as follows: To protect the request, the JWS header contains the following claims."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-d4c32c04386d53b43e9de8ebfa362d45b83e86dedebb2a4a8d9a133c157c49fc","text":"An endpoint that receives a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame with a sequence number smaller than the Retire Prior To field of a previously received NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame MUST immediately send a corresponding RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame that retires the newly received connection ID. received NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame MUST send a corresponding RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame that retires the newly received connection ID, unless it has already done so for that sequence number. 19.16."}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-d58195160dd6fc41f596b99d966ea5cae49622e35035d94f8489b346f78ed6ce","text":"MUST be able to dereference or process the key information in order to be able to sign the request. OPTIONAL. A set of flags that represent attributes or behaviors of the access token issued by the AS. The values of the \"flags\" field defined by this specification are as follows: This flag indicates whether the token is bound to the client instance's key. If the \"bearer\" flag is present, the access token is a bearer token, and the \"key\" field in this response MUST be omitted. If the \"bearer\" flag is omitted and the \"key\" field in this response is omitted, the token is bound the request-client in its request for access. If the \"bearer\" flag is omitted, and the \"key\" field is present, the token is bound to the key and proofing mechanism indicated in the \"key\" field. OPTIONAL. Flag indicating a hint of AS behavior on token rotation. If this flag is set to the value \"true\", then the client instance can expect a previously-issued access token to continue to work after it has been rotate-access-token or the underlying grant request has been continue-modify, resulting in the issuance of new access tokens. If this flag is set to the boolean value \"false\" or is omitted, the client instance can rotation. If this flag is present, then the client instance can expect a previously-issued access token to continue to work after it has been rotate-access-token or the underlying grant request has been continue-modify, resulting in the issuance of new access tokens. If this flag is omitted, the client instance can anticipate a given access token will stop working after token rotation or grant request modification. Note that a token flagged as \"durable\" can still expire or be revoked through any normal"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-d591c5c8abbb8e47bbe981de33e7d630e4ce8164ce4eed4c88d7e95e93eea477","text":"8. This document makes multiple registrations in the registries defined by HTTP3. The allocations created by this document are all assigned permanent status and list a change controller of the IETF and a contact of the HTTP working group (ietf-http-wg@w3.org). by RFC9114. The allocations created by this document are all assigned permanent status and list a change controller of the IETF and a contact of the HTTP working group (ietf-http-wg@w3.org). 8.1. This document specifies two settings. The entries in the following table are registered in the \"HTTP/3 Settings\" registry established in HTTP3. RFC9114. For formatting reasons, the setting names here are abbreviated by removing the 'SETTINGS_' prefix."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-d5b76ae6befc5fb0aa5ac2785b44f56e14ca0bfe36915b8c4c6d27c0774f7b58","text":"address on multiple different networks, a Designated Resolver that has been discovered on one network SHOULD NOT be reused on any of the other networks without repeating the discovery process for each network. However, if a given Unencrypted DNS Resolver designates a Designated Resolver that does not use a private or local IP address and can be verified using the mechanism described in verified, it MAY be used on different network connections so long as the subsequent connections over other networks can also be successfully verified using the mechanism described in verified. This is a tradeoff between performance (by having no delay in establishing an encrypted DNS connection on the new network) and functionality (if the Unencrypted DNS Resolver intends to designate different Designated Resolvers based on the network from which clients connect). network, since the same IP address may be used for different servers on the different networks. 4.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-d5d0c31da427bbecd0f71f3209a6c7945295bc57cb485baa4dbb8b80e89483ab","text":"A key package that is prepublished by a client, which other clients can use to introduce the client to a new group. A long-lived signing key pair used to authenticate the sender of a message. A signing key pair used to authenticate the sender of a message. Terminology specific to tree computations is described in ratchet- trees."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-d5dc603e4308efc2c80d89623f8392582ab03f21ceb998e89fdd8d5e756f49e0","text":"2.5.5.2.1. A query by itself in a Logical context is an existence test which A query by itself in a logical context is an existence test which yields true if the query selects at least one node and yields false if the query does not select any nodes."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-d6156a85043014728e77db27d71bcce83f5985d8ad1fddc2591e6a6a729f7890","text":"9.2. A more serious problem is MITM proxies which do not support this extension. RFC8446; Section 9.3 requires that such proxies remove extension. RFC8446, Section 9.3 requires that such proxies remove any extensions they do not understand. The handshake will then present a certificate based on the public name, without echoing the \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension to the client."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-d63cf0d305ef4d794ea1f3e79ab28152324d3355da9040eed6cdf454655489de","text":"curves, they SHOULD perform the additional checks specified in Section 7 of 6.1.2. This ciphersuite uses the following primitives: 6.1.1.2. Hash function: SHA-256 AEAD: AES-128-GCM When HPKE is used with this ciphersuite, it uses the following algorithms: KEM: 0x0001 = DHKEM(P-256) Given an octet string X, the private key produced by the Derive-Key- Pair operation is SHA-512(X) truncated to 448 bits (Recall that any 56-octet string is a valid X448 private key). The corresponding public key is X448(SHA-512(X), 5). KDF: 0x0001 = HKDF-SHA256 Implementations SHOULD use the approach specified in RFC7748 to calculate the Diffie-Hellman shared secret. Implementations MUST check whether the computed Diffie-Hellman shared secret is the all- zero value and abort if so, as described in Section 6 of RFC7748. If implementers use an alternative implementation of these elliptic curves, they SHOULD perform the additional checks specified in Section 7 of AEAD: 0x0001 = AES-GCM-128 6.1.1.3. Given an octet string X, the private key produced by the Derive-Key- Pair operation is SHA-256(X), interpreted as a big-endian integer."}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-d6658ab05df56830c012fe6d10029addef2f2f56047add42158a840b3803ab52","text":"attempt prior to receiving the Version Negotiation packet is distinct from the connection with the incompatible version that follows. Note that this separation across two connections is conceptual: it applies to normative requirements on QUIC connections, but does not require implementations to internally use two distinct connection objects. 2.5. When the client picks its original version, it will try to avoid"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-d69f4376eb5e635ffa14f2bd3a18a6aa4f4404dad8a14d2e42702469fdce850d","text":"receives an Initial Packet with the first bit to '0', it is a Retry token and the server MUST NOT attempt to validate it. Instead, it MUST assume the address is validated and MUST extract the Original Destination Connection ID, assuming the format described in nss- service-requirements. Destination Connection ID and Retry Source Connection ID, assuming the format described in nss-service-requirements. 6.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-d6ab907c9381fab98bef6031c885c0ad6ab8316919820bb757507e591b115336","text":"D.ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis.) The _direct path_ of a root is the empty list, and of any other node is the concatenation of that node with the direct path of its parent. The _copath_ of a node is the list of siblings of nodes in its direct is the concatenation of that node's parent along with the parent's direct path. The _copath_ of a node is the node's sibling concatenated with the list of siblings of all the nodes in its direct path. The _frontier_ of a tree is the list of heads of the maximal full subtrees of the tree, ordered from left to right. For example, in the below tree: The direct path of C is (C, CD, ABCD) The direct path of C is (CD, ABCD, ABCDEFG) The copath of C is (D, AB, EFG)"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-d6ed0388ebc2af6a7a76ff7ac7238237cb70a40e46e34018be496935aa8bce91","text":"Servers decrypt an Encapsulated Request by reversing this process. Given an Encapsulated Request \"enc_request\", a server: Parses \"enc_request\" into \"keyID\", \"kdfID\", \"aeadID\", \"enc\", and \"ct\" (indicated using the function \"parse()\" in pseudocode). The server is then able to find the HPKE private key, \"skR\", corresponding to \"keyID\". Parses \"enc_request\" into \"keyID\", \"kemID\", \"kdfID\", \"aeadID\", \"enc\", and \"ct\" (indicated using the function \"parse()\" in pseudocode). The server is then able to find the HPKE private key, \"skR\", corresponding to \"keyID\". a. If \"keyID\" does not identify a key, the server returns an error. a. If \"keyID\" does not identify a key matching the type of \"kemID\", the server returns an error. b. If \"kdfID\" and \"aeadID\" identify a combination of KDF and AEAD that the server is unwilling to use with \"skR\", the server returns"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-d6fda0b5be913d1ab6013d945cc90335a1c6da79ab2991ebb8fd631e8c8ed444","text":"measures appropriate for its value. The degree of protection afforded to this key material can vary by device, based upon considerations as to a cost/benefit evaluation of the intended function of the device. The confidentiality protection is fundamentally based upon some amount of physical protection: while the intended function of the device and the specific practices of the device manufacturer or integrator. The confidentiality protection is fundamentally based upon some amount of physical protection: while encryption is often used to provide confidentiality when a key is conveyed across a factory, where the attestation key is created or applied, it must be available in an unencrypted form. The physical"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-d707621ff61fd0744887d60c1a822b6b88b468f9dced795074f1e74c99ca9f52","text":"public key for the credential in the \"leaf_key_package\" of the \"path\" field. An external commit MUST reference no more than one ExternalInit proposal, and the ExternalInit proposal MUST be supplied by value, not by reference. When processing a Commit, both existing and new members MUST use the external init secret as described in external-initialization. When processing a Commit, both existing and new members MUST use the external init secret as described in external-initialization. The sender type for the MLSPlaintext encapsulating the External Commit MUST be \"new_member\" If the Add Proposal is also issued by the new member, its member SenderType MUST be \"new_member\" In other words, External Commits come in two \"flavors\" - a \"join\" commit that adds the sender to the group or a \"resync\" commit that replaces a member's prior appearance with a new one. Note that the \"resync\" operation allows an attacker that has compromised a member's signature private key to introduce themselves into the group and remove the prior, legitimate member in a single Commit. Without resync, this can still be done, but requires two operations, the external Commit to join and a second Commit to remove the old appearance. Applications for whom this distinction is salient can choose to disallow external commits that contain a Remove, or to allow such resync commits only if they contain a \"reinit\" PSK proposal that demonstrates the joining member's presence in a prior epoch of the group. With the latter approach, the attacke would need to compromise the PSK as well as the signing key, but the application will need to ensure that continuing, non-resync'ing members have the required PSK. 11.2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-d76e7d9085cfa715da174c2a230569a95f0d7211969bc7e6f397c14f07420188","text":"cryptographic key, we use the term \"label\" for this usage of either an integer or a string to identify map keys and choice data items. 1.5. One of the standard issues that is specified in IETF cryptographic algorithms is a requirement that a standard specify a set of minimal algorithms that are required to be implemented. This is done to promote interoperability as it provides a minimal set of algorithms that all devices can be sure will exist at both ends. However, we have elected not to specify a set of mandatory algorithms in this document. It is expected that COSE is going to be used in a wide variety of applications and on a wide variety of devices. Many of the constrained devices are going to be setup to used a small fixed set of algorithms, and this set of algorithms may not match those available on a device. We therefore have deferred to the application protocols the decision of what to specify for mandatory algorithms. Since the set of algorithms in an environment of constrained devices may depend on what the set of devices are and how long they have been in operation, we want to highlight that application protocols will need to specify some type of discovery method of algorithm capabilities. The discovery method may be as simple as requiring preconfiguration of the set of algorithms to providing a discovery method built into the protocol. S/MIME provided a number of different ways to approach the problem: Advertising in the message (S/MIME capabilities) Advertising in the certificate (capabilities extension) Minimum requirements for the S/MIME which have been updated over time 2. The COSE_MSG structure is a top level CBOR object that corresponds to"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-d7759443c22bd8caae22790c0573aae3d75a14cccd2c7abb05f414e309411fba","text":"In both cases, the new members need information to bootstrap their local group state. New members MUST verify the \"signature\" using the public key taken from the credential in the leaf node of the ratchet tree with leaf index \"signer\". The signature covers the following structure, comprising all the fields in the GroupInfo above \"signature\": New members MUST verify that \"group_id\" is unique among the groups they're currently participating in. New members also MUST verify the \"signature\" using the public key taken from the leaf node of the ratchet tree with leaf index \"signer\". The signature covers the following structure, comprising all the fields in the GroupInfo above \"signature\": 13.2.3.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-d77b31627ed8772fe87ca49519de34ac975bc3441262af2840344b334affdaea","text":"much later - in that scenario one endpoint might be aware of the compatibility document while the other may not. When a client creates a QUIC connection, its goal is to use an application layer protocol. Therefore, when considering which versions are compatible, clients will only consider versions that support one of the intended application layer protocols. For example, if the client's first flight advertises multiple Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) ALPN tokens and multiple compatible versions, the server needs to ensure that the ALPN token that it selects can run over the QUIC version that it selects. 2.3. When the server can parse the client's first flight using the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ticketrequest-d7a4169a6ae46f2337b879f787b62d8a9022554b25a0856a2f4ff68066476d55","text":"send more than 255 tickets to clients. Servers that support ticket requests MUST NOT echo \"ticket_request\" in the EncryptedExtensions. in the EncryptedExtensions message. A client MUST abort the connection with an \"illegal_parameter\" alert if the \"ticket_request\" extension is present in the EncryptedExtensions message. Clients MUST NOT change the value of TicketRequestContents.count in second ClientHello messages sent in response to a HelloRetryRequest. 4."}
{"_id":"q-en-bundled-responses-d7cbc67cb854b198df07ee60094f564693723dbb18b6745dd3b525ae1a36dd44","text":"4.2.2. The \"manifest\" section records a single URL identifying the manifest of the bundle. The URL MUST refer to a resource with representations contained in the bundle itself. The bundle can contain multiple representations at this URL, and the client is expected to content-negotiate for the best one. For example, a client might select the one matching an \"accept\" header of \"application/manifest+json\" (appmanifest) and an \"accept-language\" header of \"es-419\". 4.2.3. The \"critical\" section consists of the names of sections of the bundle that the client needs to understand in order to load the bundle correctly. Other sections are assumed to be optional."}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-d882c08ff01a15277443f2989d1a0bfc42553810950cf2b274c7e66d9195a96a","text":"references) and are matched against a resolved link target. Queries for endpoints SHOULD be expressed in path-absolute form if possible and MUST be expressed in URI form otherwise; the RD SHOULD recognize either. either. The \"anchor\" attribute is usable for resource lookups, and, if queried, MUST be for in URI form as well. Endpoints that are interested in a lookup result repeatedly or continuously can use mechanisms like ETag caching, resource"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-d8998e713ba5f11e27c0c8165399ed81c444a40e9901d948553cc43a556a11af","text":"example, the default port for HTTP/3 QUIC-HTTP is UDP port 443, analogous to HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 over TLS over TCP. Applications SHOULD define an alternate endpoint discovery mechanism Applications should define an alternate endpoint discovery mechanism to allow the usage of ports other than the default. For example, HTTP/3 (QUIC-HTTP sections 3.2 and 3.3) specifies the use of ALPN RFC7301 for service discovery which allows the server to use and"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-d9155fb004b47151ad288b84c06c72cc1a387a945c9d622e942f623541c24afd","text":"5.2.4. Type: Enum This property specifies whether an application wants to use the connection for sending and/or receiving data. Possible values are: The connection must support sending and receiving data The connection must support sending data. The connection must support receiving data In case a unidirectional connection is requested, but the system should fall back to bidirectional transport if unidirectional connections are not supported by the transport protocol. 5.2.5. Type: Preference This property specifies whether an application would like to supply a"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-d93e9f03e69c2cbe16afb4ab0700fb895dda31b4ffc6b5cb496e8b881a751c84","text":"SHA-256 MUST be used. Diversifying EPSK by ImportedIdentity.target_kdf ensures that an IPSK is only used as input keying material to at most one KDF, thus satisfying the requirements in RFC8446. Endpoints generate a compatible ipskx for each target ciphersuite they offer. For example, importing a key for TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 would yield two PSKs, one for HKDF-SHA256 and another for HKDF-SHA384. In contrast, if TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 are supported, only one derived key is necessary. The resulting IPSK base key 'ipskx' is then used as the binder key in TLS 1.3 with identity ImportedIdentity. With knowledge of the supported KDFs, one may import PSKs before the start of a connection. EPSKs may be imported for early data use if they are bound to protocol settings and configurations that would otherwise be required for early data with normal (ticket-based PSK) resumption. Minimally, that means ALPN, QUIC transport settings, etc., must be provisioned alongside these EPSKs. requirements in RFC8446. See security-considerations for more details. Endpoints SHOULD generate a compatible \"ipskx\" for each target ciphersuite they offer. For example, importing a key for TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 would yield two PSKs, one for HKDF-SHA256 and another for HKDF-SHA384. In contrast, if TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 are supported, only one derived key is necessary. EPSKs may be imported before the start of a connection if the target KDFs, protocols, and context string(s) are known a priori. EPSKs may also be imported for early data use if they are bound to protocol settings and configurations that would otherwise be required for early data with normal (ticket-based PSK) resumption. Minimally, that means ALPN, QUIC transport parameters (if used for QUIC), etc., must be provisioned alongside these EPSKs. 4.2. To prevent PSK Importers from being confused with standard out-of- band PSKs, imported PSKs change the PSK binder key derivation label. In particular, the standard TLS 1.3 PSK binder key computation is defined as follows: To prevent confusion between imported and non-imported PSKs, imported PSKs change the PSK binder key derivation label. In particular, the standard TLS 1.3 PSK binder key computation is defined as follows: Imported PSKs replace the string \"ext binder\" with \"imp binder\" when deriving \"binder_key\". This means the binder key is now computed as deriving \"binder_key\". This means the binder key is computed as follows: This new label differentiates non-imported and imported external PSKs. Specifically, a client and server will negotiate use of an This new label ensures a client and server will negotiate use of an external PSK if and only if (a) both endpoints import the PSK or (b) neither endpoint imports the PSK. As \"binder_key\" is a leaf key, changing its computation does not affect any other key."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-d96c4254dd6dd12adc307dd98bfed8a2016a49dc053ba3c174bd0474a59e351c","text":"A client which supports this document SHALL send an empty \"delegated_credential\" extension in its ClientHello. If the client receives a delegated credential without indicating support, then the client SHOULD abort with an \"unexpected_message\" alert. client MUST abort with an \"unexpected_message\" alert. If the extension is present, the server MAY send a delegated credential extension. If the extension is not present, the server MUST NOT send a credential. A credential MUST NOT be provided unless a Certificate message is also sent. The server MUST ignore the extension unless TLS 1.2 or later is negotiated. When negotiating TLS 1.3, and using delegated credentials, the server MUST send the delegated credential as an extension in the CertificateEntry of its end-entity certificate; the client SHOULD ignore delegated credentials sent as extensions with any other certificate. When negotiating TLS 1.2, the delegated credential MUST be sent as an extension in the ServerHello. credential extension; if the extension is not present, the server MUST NOT send a delegated credential. A delegated credential MUST NOT be provided unless a Certificate message is also sent. The server MUST ignore the extension unless TLS 1.2 or later is negotiated. When negotiating TLS 1.3, the server MUST send the delegated credential as an extension in the CertificateEntry of its end-entity certificate; the client SHOULD ignore delegated credentials sent as extensions to any other certificate. When negotiating TLS 1.2, the delegated credential MUST be sent as an extension in the ServerHello. The delegated credential contains a signature from the public key in the end-entity certificate using a signature algorithm advertised by"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-d9a52211fb2d44330ecdc876c67de169b0f5171b48428c9fd7c8d1af944afdf8","text":"1. Server operators often deploy TLS termination services in locations such as remote data centers or Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) where it may be difficult to detect key compromises. Short-lived certificates may be used to limit the exposure of keys in these cases. However, short-lived certificates need to be renewed more frequently than long-lived certificates. If an external CA is unable to issue a certificate in time to replace a deployed certificate, the server would no longer be able to present a valid certificate to clients. With short-lived certificates, there is a smaller window of time to renew a certificates and therefore a higher risk that an outage at a CA will negatively affect the uptime of the service. Typically, a TLS server uses a certificate provided by some entity other than the operator of the server (a \"Certification Authority\" or CA) RFC8446 RFC5280. This organizational separation makes the TLS"}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-d9a732a30f2c68ec731e625fa3408dac0d258a0a1d471444e85ff52da602b062","text":"Keys (PSKs) in Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 RFC8446. This guidance also applies to Datagram TLS (DTLS) 1.3 I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13 and Compact TLS 1.3 I-D.ietf-tls-ctls. For readability, this document uses the term TLS to refer to all such versions. External PSKs are symmetric secret keys provided to the TLS protocol document uses the term TLS to refer to all such versions. External PSKs are symmetric secret keys provided to the TLS protocol implementation as external inputs. External PSKs are provisioned out-of-band. This document lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under certain assumptions and demonstrates how violations of these assumptions lead to attacks. This document discusses PSK use cases, provisioning processes, and TLS stack implementation support in the context of these assumptions. This document also provides advice for applications in various use cases to help meet these assumptions. out-of-band. This document lists TLS security properties provided by PSKs under certain assumptions and demonstrates how violations of these assumptions lead to attacks. This document discusses PSK use cases, provisioning processes, and TLS stack implementation support in the context of these assumptions. This document also provides advice for applications in various use cases to help meet these assumptions. There are many resources that provide guidance for password generation and verification aimed towards improving security."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-d9c9967778b7a7bc1d744c22ba83fb4992fd6c0e8088f96bc73a3ffa3ca69b5f","text":"createOffer to generate new ICE credentials, for the purpose of forcing an ICE restart and kicking off a new gathering phase, in which the new servers will be used. If the ICE candidate pool has a nonzero size, any existing candidates will be discarded, and new candidates will be gathered from the new servers. a nonzero size, and a local description has not yet been applied, any existing candidates will be discarded, and new candidates will be gathered from the new servers. Any change to the ICE candidate policy affects the next gathering phase. If an ICE gathering phase has already started or"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-da40f1eee0107562d700b421f050f34011a2e398c48f2c0e544dc32fd035d190","text":"associated with an existing connection, or - for servers - potentially create a new connection. Hosts try to associate a packet with an existing connection. If the packet has a non-zero-length Destination Connection ID corresponding to an existing connection, QUIC processes that packet accordingly. Note that more than one connection ID can be associated with a connection; see connection-id. Endpoints try to associate a packet with an existing connection. If the packet has a non-zero-length Destination Connection ID corresponding to an existing connection, QUIC processes that packet accordingly. Note that more than one connection ID can be associated with a connection; see connection-id. If the Destination Connection ID is zero length and the packet matches the local address and port of a connection where the host matches the local address and port of a connection where the endpoint used zero-length connection IDs, QUIC processes the packet as part of that connection."}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-da4cf8d5e6d5f29f6111c02f5e3a2d09ab63ef249b59b463546b8282cc538871","text":"The Initiator SHALL compose message_3 as follows: Compute the transcript hash TH_3 = H(TH_2, CIPHERTEXT_2) where H() Compute the transcript hash TH_3 = H(TH_2, PLAINTEXT_2) where H() is the EDHOC hash algorithm of the selected cipher suite. The transcript hash TH_3 is a CBOR encoded bstr and the input to the hash function is a CBOR Sequence. Note that H(TH_2, CIPHERTEXT_2) hash function is a CBOR Sequence. Note that H(TH_2, PLAINTEXT_2) can be computed and cached already in the processing of message_2. Compute MAC_3 = EDHOC-KDF( PRK_4x3m, TH_3, \"MAC_3\", << ID_CRED_I,"}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-da5596f02f9a002c73f49290f53dd9fc27f24f34c437695c8f35fe174b4f3c88","text":"member impersonate another group member, but a malicious non-member can reroute handshakes between honest group members to connect them in unintended ways. A naive sharing of PSKs, even assuming only honest but curious participants know the key, does not enforce any of these properties, bar one. Endpoint Identity Protection holds vacuously, because the client and server do not use certificates in PSK mode. (This is not true with use of the \"tls_cert_with_extern_psk\" extension I-D.ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with- extern-psk.) honest but curious participants know the key, can violate all these properties, bar one. Endpoint Identity Protection holds vacuously, because the client and server do not use certificates in PSK mode. (This is not true with use of the \"tls_cert_with_extern_psk\" extension I-D.ietf-tls-tls13-cert-with-extern-psk.) In the following sub-sections, we list attacks that demonstrate violations of these properties when the fundamental PSK assumption does not hold. This list is not exhaustive, but merely highlights a number of potential pitfalls. does not hold. 3.1.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-rtcweb-transport-da8a9600cee61cf998a13ab7bc4cb03e793f65e6b23b480cc53bc2a20c7acb6c","text":"elements described. TCP RFC0793. This is used for HTTP/WebSockets, as well as for TURN/SSL and ICE-TCP. TURN/TLS and ICE-TCP. For both protocols, IPv4 and IPv6 support is assumed."}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-dab4c6a39fb258f04a3b603dabf3c5f193c2968db4c26fbc882b684eddc91a5c","text":"an endpoint to use a globally constant length for such connection identifiers. This can in turn ease parsing and connection lookup, for example by having the length in question be a compile-time constant. Implementations, which want to use variable-length CIDs, are responsible for constructing the CID in such a way that its length can be determined on reception. Such implementations must still be able to send CIDs of different length to other parties. Note that there is no CID length information included in the record itself. constant. Such implementations MUST still be able to send CIDs of different length to other parties. Implementations that want to use variable-length CIDs are responsible for constructing the CID in such a way that its length can be determined on reception. Note that there is no CID length information included in the record itself. In DTLS 1.2, CIDs are exchanged at the beginning of the DTLS session only. There is no dedicated \"CID update\" message that allows new"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-dab680c128275d16fc0599691a79fc1d0ec5a6aa0e1165297d27c67c36806742","text":"does not lose any information from the JSON value. EXI uses the XML types. New entries can be added to the registration by Expert Review as defined in RFC8126. Experts should exercise their own good judgment but need to consider that shorter labels should have more strict review. New entries can be added to the registration by either Expert Review or IESG Approval as defined in RFC8126. Experts should exercise their own good judgment but need to consider that shorter labels should have more strict review. New entries should not be made that counteract the advice at the end of considerations. All new SenML labels that have \"base\" semantics (see senml-base) MUST start with character 'b'. Regular labels MUST NOT start with that"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-dadf5a2bcc177f9d18081544456bada8230dff6a7cf2590d27ad1d05d8e49a2e","text":"for each of those names, the values associated with the name by the objects are equal. a comparison using either of the operators \"<\" or \">\" yields true if and only if the comparison is between values of the same type which are both numbers or both strings and which satisfy the comparison: a comparison using the operator \"<\" yields true if and only if the comparison is between values of the same type which are both numbers or both strings and which satisfy the comparison: numbers expected to interoperate as per RFC7493 MUST compare using the normal mathematical ordering; numbers not expected to"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-dae6c47298caf71d4c9d20fe81cac50880cdf6f6f60d332847ae29ba86e65a13","text":"in the tree, for the second Add, the next empty leaf to the right, etc. Validate the KeyPackage: Verify that the signature on the KeyPackage is valid using the public key in the KeyPackage's credential Verify that the following fields in the KeyPackage are unique among the members of the group (including any other members added in the same Commit): \"(credential.identity, endpoint_id)\" tuple \"credential.signature_key\" \"hpke_init_key\" Verify that the KeyPackage is compatible with the group's parameters. The ciphersuite and protocol version of the KeyPackage must match those in use in the group. If the GroupContext has a \"required_capabilities\" extension, then the required extensions and proposals MUST be listed in the KeyPackage's \"capabilities\" extension. If necessary, extend the tree to the right until it has at least index + 1 leaves"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-daeafb62589239a340a937134f8ba5192c4bedb85ca74022f3b5712d18813f55","text":"existing registry for Alerts (defined in RFC8446), with the \"DTLS-OK\" column being set to \"Y\". 8.3. IANA is requested to create an entry, ESNI(0xff9f), in the existing registry for Resource Record (RR) TYPEs (defined in RFC6895) with \"Meaning\" column value being set to \"Encrypted SNI\". 9. When operating in Split Mode, backend servers will not have access to PaddedServerNameList.sni or ClientESNIInner.nonce without access to the ESNI keys or a way to decrypt ClientEncryptedSNI.encrypted_sni. One way to address this for a single connection, at the cost of having communication not be unmodified TLS 1.3, is as follows. Assume there is a shared (symmetric) key between the client-facing server and the backend server and use it to AEAD-encrypt Z and send the encrypted blob at the beginning of the connection before the ClientHello. The backend server can then decrypt ESNI to recover the true SNI and nonce. 10. Alternative approaches to encrypted SNI may be implemented at the TLS or application layer. In this section we describe several alternatives and discuss drawbacks in comparison to the design in this document. 10.1. 10.1.1. In this variant, TLS Client Hellos are tunneled within early data payloads belonging to outer TLS connections established with the client-facing server. This requires clients to have established a previous session --- and obtained PSKs --- with the server. The client-facing server decrypts early data payloads to uncover Client Hellos destined for the backend server, and forwards them onwards as necessary. Afterwards, all records to and from backend servers are forwarded by the client-facing server - unmodified. This avoids double encryption of TLS records. Problems with this approach are: (1) servers may not always be able to distinguish inner Client Hellos from legitimate application data, (2) nested 0-RTT data may not function correctly, (3) 0-RTT data may not be supported - especially under DoS - leading to availability concerns, and (4) clients must bootstrap tunnels (sessions), costing an additional round trip and potentially revealing the SNI during the initial connection. In contrast, encrypted SNI protects the SNI in a distinct Client Hello extension and neither abuses early data nor requires a bootstrapping connection. 10.1.2. In this variant, client-facing and backend servers coordinate to produce \"combined tickets\" that are consumable by both. Clients offer combined tickets to client-facing servers. The latter parse them to determine the correct backend server to which the Client Hello should be forwarded. This approach is problematic due to non- trivial coordination between client-facing and backend servers for ticket construction and consumption. Moreover, it requires a bootstrapping step similar to that of the previous variant. In contrast, encrypted SNI requires no such coordination. 10.2. 10.2.1. In this variant, clients request secondary certificates with CERTIFICATE_REQUEST HTTP/2 frames after TLS connection completion. In response, servers supply certificates via TLS exported authenticators I-D.ietf-tls-exported-authenticator in CERTIFICATE frames. Clients use a generic SNI for the underlying client-facing server TLS connection. Problems with this approach include: (1) one additional round trip before peer authentication, (2) non-trivial application-layer dependencies and interaction, and (3) obtaining the generic SNI to bootstrap the connection. In contrast, encrypted SNI induces no additional round trip and operates below the application layer. 11. The design described here only provides encryption for the SNI, but not for other extensions, such as ALPN. Another potential design would be to encrypt all of the extensions using the same basic structure as we use here for ESNI. That design has the following advantages: It protects all the extensions from ordinary eavesdroppers If the encrypted block has its own KeyShare, it does not necessarily require the client to use a single KeyShare, because the client's share is bound to the SNI by the AEAD (analysis needed). It also has the following disadvantages: The client-facing server can still see the other extensions. By contrast we could introduce another EncryptedExtensions block that was encrypted to the backend server and not the client-facing server. It requires a mechanism for the client-facing server to provide the extension-encryption key to the backend server (as in communicating-sni and thus cannot be used with an unmodified backend server. A conformant middlebox will strip every extension, which might result in a ClientHello which is just unacceptable to the server (more analysis needed). "}
{"_id":"q-en-capport-wg-architecture-db52915e9c2d1599e3c4f034cdfecd1dabc1ea634a5390f7ff79acbd02c68b76","text":"the equipment. At minimum, the API MUST provide: (1) the state of captivity and (2) a URI for the Captive Portal Server. The API SHOULD provide evidence to the caller that it supports the present architecture. a URI for the Captive Portal Server. A caller to the API needs to be presented with evidence that the content it is receiving is for a version of the API that it supports. For an HTTP-based interaction, such as in I-D.ietf-capport-api this might be achieved by using a content type that is unique to the protocol. When User Equipment receives Captive Portal Signals, the User Equipment MAY query the API to check the state. The User Equipment"}
{"_id":"q-en-7710bis-db981e116b7030a7360b1c7cb862f74bedb63c656e95cb2720f858fec3072ac7","text":"Networks with no captive portals MAY explicitly indicate this condition by using this option with the IANA-assigned URI for this purpose (see ietf_params_capport-unrestricted). Clients observing the URI value \"urn:ietf:params:capport-unrestricted\" MAY forego time- consuming forms of captive portal detection. purpose (see iana-urn). Clients observing the URI value \"urn:ietf:params:capport-unrestricted\" MAY forego time-consuming forms of captive portal detection. 2.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-t2trg-rest-iot-dba8edac2accdade7144283756af84aedb7e6037144d0a9492890dc20575f46f","text":"3.6. Section 6 of RFC7231 defines a set of Status Codes in HTTP that are Section 15 of RFC9110 defines a set of Status Codes in HTTP that are assigned by the server to indicate whether a request was understood and satisfied, and how to interpret the answer. Similarly, Section 5.9 of RFC7252 defines the set of Response Codes in CoAP. The status codes consist of three digits (e.g., \"404\" with HTTP or \"4.04\" with CoAP) where the first digit expresses the class of the code. Implementations do not need to understand all status codes, but the class of the code must be understood. Codes starting with 1 are informational; the request was received and being processed (not The codes consist of three digits (e.g., \"404\" with HTTP or \"4.04\" with CoAP) where the first digit expresses the class of the code. Implementations do not need to understand all codes, but the class of the code must be understood. Codes starting with 1 are informational; the request was received and being processed (not available in CoAP). Codes starting with 2 indicate a successful request. Codes starting with 3 indicate redirection; further action is needed to complete the request (not available in CoAP). Codes"}
{"_id":"q-en-dnssec-chain-extension-dbc2aa2ac493b5fc923a50cda5cdf4707893f96f20a7c2af72f468afc71f6a2b","text":"This sequence of native DNS wire format records enables easier generation of the data structure on the server and easier verification of the data on client by means of existing DNS library functions. However this document describes the data structure in sufficient detail that implementers if they desire can write their own code to do this. functions. Each RRset in the chain is composed of a sequence of wire format DNS resource records. The format of the resource record is described in RFC1035, Section 3.2.1. The resource records that make up a RRset all have the same owner, type and class, but different RDATA as specified RFC2181, Section 5. Each RRset in the sequence is followed by its associated RRsig record set. The RRsig record wire format is described in RFC4034, Section 3.1. The signature portion of the RDATA, as described in the same section, is the following: set. This RRset has the same owner and class as the preceding RRset, but has type RRSIG. The Type Covered field in the RDATA of the RRsigs identifies the type of the preceding RRset as described in RFC4034, Section 3. The RRsig record wire format is described in RFC4034, Section 3.1. The signature portion of the RDATA, as described in the same section, is the following: where RRSIG_RDATA is the wire format of the RRSIG RDATA fields with the Signer's Name field in canonical form and the signature field"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-dbe9be57be09c3fbac8efae94f6c263bc234df5e592e39f4c5555673015896e2","text":"Because the integrity check indirectly depends on a sequence number, if record N is not received, then the integrity check on record N+1 will be based on the wrong sequence number and thus will fail. DTLS solves this problem by adding explicit sequence numbers. will fail. DTLS solves this problem by adding sequence numbers. The TLS handshake is a lock-step cryptographic handshake. Messages must be transmitted and received in a defined order; any"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-dc09dc9659d729d9a48def8221d1d5997562a1a525a7225f612fb297ec393149","text":" Privacy Pass: HTTP API draft-svaldez-pp-http-api-latest Privacy Pass HTTP API draft-ietf-privacypass-http-api-latest Abstract"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-dc2bf953176bc90708b3d0ba3abb55abecbb73c9c208d3212b74d72d7e556338","text":"An application that implements fallback needs to consider the security consequences. A fallback to TCP and TLS exposes control information to modification and manipulation in the network. Further downgrades to older TLS versions than used in QUIC, which is 1.3, might result in significantly weaker cryptographic protection. For example, the results of protocol negotiation RFC7301 only have confidentiality protection if TLS 1.3 is used. downgrades to older TLS versions than 1.3, which is used in QUIC version 1, might result in significantly weaker cryptographic protection. For example, the results of protocol negotiation RFC7301 only have confidentiality protection if TLS 1.3 is used. These applications must operate, perhaps with impaired functionality, in the absence of features provided by QUIC not present in the"}
{"_id":"q-en-manifest-spec-dc714cbcc56b1cf80567c3de73e6d1e15ea1c26ba6fe5b07e8724e3c39575ac8","text":"of the element and to ensure correct serialization for integrity and authenticity checks. All CBOR maps in the Manifest and manifest envelope MUST be encoded with the canonical CBOR ordering as defined in RFC8949. 8.2. The Envelope contains each of the other primary constituent parts of"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-dc840e4b9efc24dcc185ba942debe6a2809da68075ab9101e0c303f2126f69cc","text":"in that order. The load balancer uses the server ID octets for routing. 4.4.3. 4.3.3. When generating a routable connection ID, the server MUST choose a connection ID length between 17 and 20 octets. The server writes its"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-dca290bd7dbfcbb673914930aa687e30e9229a92302483d41fd4f503edc3e0a4","text":"6.1. Appendix A.1 of I-D.ietf-taps-minset explains, using primitives that are described in RFC8303 and RFC8304, how to implement changing the following protocol properties of an established connection with TCP and UDP. Below, we amend this description for other protocols (if applicable): Appendix A.1 of I-D.ietf-taps-minset explains, using primitives from RFC8303 and RFC8304, how to implement changing some of the following protocol properties of an established connection with TCP and UDP. Below, we amend this description for other protocols (if applicable) and extend it with Connection Properties that are not contained in I- D.ietf-taps-minset. Relative niceness: for SCTP, this can be done using the primitive CONFIGURE_STREAM_SCHEDULER.SCTP described in section 4 of RFC8303. Timeout for aborting Connection: for SCTP, this can be done using the primitive CHANGE_TIMEOUT.SCTP described in section 4 of RFC8303. Abort timeout to suggest to the Remote Endpoint: for TCP, this can be done using the primitive CHANGE_TIMEOUT.TCP described in section 4 of RFC8303. Notification of excessive retransmissions: TODO Retransmission threshold before excessive retransmission notification: for TCP, this can be done using ERROR.TCP described in section 4 of RFC8303. notification: TODO; for TCP, this can be done using ERROR.TCP described in section 4 of RFC8303. Notification of ICMP soft error message arrival: TODO Required minimum coverage of the checksum for receiving: for UDP- Lite, this can be done using the primitive SET_MIN_CHECKSUM_COVERAGE.UDP-Lite described in section 4 of RFC8303. Priority (Connection): TODO; for SCTP, this can be done using the primitive CONFIGURE_STREAM_SCHEDULER.SCTP described in section 4 of RFC8303. Timeout for aborting Connection: for SCTP, this can be done using the primitive CHANGE_TIMEOUT.SCTP described in section 4 of RFC8303. Connection group transmission scheduler: for SCTP, this can be done using the primitive SET_STREAM_SCHEDULER.SCTP described in section 4 of RFC8303. Maximum message size concurrent with Connection establishment: TODO Maximum Message size before fragmentation or segmentation: TODO Maximum Message size on send: TODO Maximum Message size on receive: TODO Capacity Profile: TODO Bounds on Send or Receive Rate: TODO TCP-specific Property: User Timeout: for TCP, this can be configured using the primitive CHANGE_TIMEOUT.TCP described in section 4 of RFC8303. It may happen that the application attempts to set a Protocol Property which does not apply to the actually chosen protocol. In this case, the implementation should fail gracefully, i.e., it may"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-dcad91569c36673cac8883fb890b618e973a07452623261d0a37010c5b0a54ff","text":"defining a common terminology as well as how each metric should be computed for consistent reporting. 5.6.2. CTA-5004: Common Media Client Data (CMCD) Many assume that the CDNs have a holistic view into the health and performance of the streaming clients. However, this is not the case."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-dcb1dd402277d9fd53b2f1acdf8b9acb5bc4df7213d4c1156977cc8f966d3944","text":"encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo (SPKI) object carrying pkI. The SPKI object MUST use the RSASSA-PSS OID RFC5756, which specifies the hash algorithm and salt size. The salt size MUST match the output size of the hash function associated with the public key and token type. the hash function associated with the public key and token type. The parameters field for the digest used in the mask generation function and the digest being signed MUST be omitted. An example sequence of the SPKI object (in ASN.1 format) for a 2048-bit key is below: \"$ cat spki.bin | xxd -r -p | openssl asn1parse -dump -inform DER 0:d=0 hl=4 l= 338 cons: SEQUENCE 4:d=1 hl=2 l= 61 cons: SEQUENCE 6:d=2 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :rsassaPss 17:d=2 hl=2 l= 48 cons: SEQUENCE 19:d=3 hl=2 l= 13 cons: cont [ 0 ] 21:d=4 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE 23:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha384 34:d=3 hl=2 l= 26 cons: cont [ 1 ] 36:d=4 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE 38:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :mgf1 49:d=5 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE 51:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT :sha384 62:d=3 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 2 ] 64:d=4 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :30 67:d=1 hl=4 l= 271 prim: BIT STRING \" Since Clients truncate \"token_key_id\" in each \"TokenRequest\", Issuers should ensure that the truncated form of new key IDs do not collide"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-dd3451293017b2e4aa03d851f0663548d186cf273b41cbd4cf53ae0f5e63dc07","text":"structure, which specify the protocol used to verify and aggregate the clients' measurements: \"nonce\": A unique sequence of bytes used to ensure that two otherwise identical \"PDAParam\" instances will have distinct \"PDATaskID\"s. It is RECOMMENDED that this be set to a random 16-byte string derived from a cryptographically secure pseurandom number generator. \"leader_url\": The leader's endpoint URL. \"helper_url\": The helper's endpoint URL."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-dd7a4d4f42671642f91ff49a7d773c2d44306d349d0dbd46d07e001c05e80444","text":"given that establishing a new connection using 0-RTT support is cheap and fast. QoS mechanisms in the network MAY also use the connection ID for QoS mechanisms in the network could also use the connection ID for service differentiation, as a change of connection ID is bound to a change of address which anyway is likely to lead to a re-route on a different path with different network characteristics."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-ddbf020790c93c02345bdb3644d33fe82079f6442301974efda19c6d17e56d93","text":"Abstract This document describes an interface for importing external PSK (Pre- Shared Key) into TLS 1.3. This document describes an interface for importing external Pre- Shared Keys (PSKs) into TLS 1.3. 1. TLS 1.3 RFC8446 supports pre-shared key (PSK) authentication, wherein TLS 1.3 RFC8446 supports Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication, wherein PSKs can be established via session tickets from prior connections or externally via some out-of-band mechanism. The protocol mandates that each PSK only be used with a single hash function. This was"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-de2bfd6745d2f4a111c2ce8bc2c896855788e1aa7bf55665a0d7fa37db4551c1","text":"routing bytes. The Server ID is unique to each server, and the routing bytes are global. For Obfuscated CID Routing, this consists of the Routing Bits, Divisor, and Modulus. The Modulus is unique to each server, but the others MUST be global. For Stream Cipher CID Routing, this consists of the Server ID, Server ID Length, Key, and Nonce Length. The Server ID is unique to each server, but the others MUST be global. The authentication token MUST"}
{"_id":"q-en-version-negotiation-de67f39041113a22fbf872055740058d0e5bff16bb75b70bf0e00557ffcdc12f","text":"possibility of cross-protocol attacks, but more analysis is still needed here. 9. 10. 9.1. 10.1. This document registers a new value in the \"QUIC Transport Parameters\" registry maintained at"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-decf3c360c600011ec77696416533b2ea49863678f4dc0427825731120af242b","text":"6.1. Within sec-trans, the term \"Media Transport Protocol\" is used to describe to describe the protocol of interest. This is easier to understand if the reader assumes a protocol stack that looks something like this: where \"Media Format\" would be something like an RTP payload format RFC2736 or ISOBMFF ISOBMFF, \"Media Transport Protocol\" would be something like RTP or HTTP, and \"Transport Protocol\" would be something like TCP or UDP. Not all possible streaming media applications follow this model, but for the ones that do, it seems useful to have names for the protocol layers between Media Format and Transport Layer It is worth noting explicitly that the Media Transport Protocol and Transport Protocol layers might each include more than one protocol. For example, a Media Transport Protocol might run over HTTP, or over WebTransport, which in turn runs over HTTP. It is worth noting explicitly that more complex network protocol stacks are certainly possible - for instance, packets with this protocol stack may be carried in a tunnel, or in a VPN. If these environments are present, streaming media operators may need to analyze their effects on applications as well. 6.2. For most of the history of the Internet, we have trusted UDP-based applications to limit their impact on other users. One of the strategies used was to use UDP for simple query-response application"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-df1c78a8f9b76fd118ce73953c070a9589c0156da7f308d83c9c05244840f5c0","text":"specification QUIC-TLS. This split is performed to enable light- weight versioning with different cryptographic handshakes. 8. 9. This document has no actions for IANA. 9. 10. See the security considerations in QUIC and QUIC-TLS; the security considerations for the underlying transport protocol are relevant for"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-df4f06c4defc3f6b51ca83ab7c91c49a4d60175cbba6aa615a726a4a3a8ff292","text":"Issuer completes the issuance flow by computing a blinded response as follows: This is encoded and transmitted to the client in the following TokenResponse structure: The rsabssa_blind_sign function is defined in BLINDRSA, Section 5.1.2.. The Issuer generates an HTTP response with status code 200 whose body consists of \"blind_sig\", with the content type code 200 whose body consists of TokenResponse, with the content type set as \"message/token-response\". 6.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-dfaaad8b5d75e753bbd86568886252b14877adfde3828be880376e50c68db58b","text":"4.1.3.4. Observe RFC7641 is an optional feature. An implementation MAY support RFC7252 and the OSCORE option without supporting RFC7641. support RFC7252 and the OSCORE option without supporting RFC7641, in which case the Observe related processing specified in this section, sequence-numbers and processing can be omitted. The Observe option as used here targets the requirements on forwarding of I-D.hartke-core-e2e-security-reqs (Section 2.2.1). To support proxy operations, OSCORE MUST set Outer Observe. If Observe was only sent encrypted end-to-end, an OSCORE-unaware proxy would not expect several responses to a request and notifications would not reach the endpoint. Moreover, intermediaries are allowed to cancel observations at any time; forbidding this behavior would also result in notifications being dropped. An intermediary that supports Observe MUST copy the OSCORE option in the next hop request unchanged. It is worth noting that although intermediaries are allowed to re-send notifications to other clients, when using OSCORE this does not happen, since requests from different clients will have different cache keys. This section specifies Observe processing associated to the Partial IV (observe-partial-iv) and Observe processing in the presence of RFC7641-compliant intermediaries (observe-option-processing). In contrast to e.g. block-wise, the Inner and Outer Observe option are not processed independently. Outer Observe is required to support Observe operations in intermediaries, but the additional use of Inner Observe is needed to protect Observe registrations end-to- end (see observe-option-processing). observe-without-intermed specifies a simplified Observe processing which is applicable in the absence of intermediaries. Note that OSCORE is compliant with the requirement that a client must not register more than once for the same target resource (see Section 3.1 of RFC7641) since the target resource for Observe registration is identified by all options in the request that are part of the Cache-Key, including OSCORE. 4.1.3.4.1. To support proxy operations, the CoAP client using Observe with OSCORE MUST set Outer Observe. If Observe was only sent encrypted end-to-end, an OSCORE-unaware proxy would not expect several responses to a non-Observe request and notifications would not reach the client. Moreover, intermediaries are allowed to cancel observations and inform the server; forbidding this may result in processing and transmission of notifications on the server side which do not reach the client. In case of registrations or re-registrations, the CoAP client using Observe with OSCORE MUST set both Inner and Outer Observe to the same value (0). This allows the server to verify that the observation was requested by the client, thereby avoiding unnecessary overhead (processing and transmission of notifications) on the server, since such notifications would not benefit the client. Note that, as defined in Section 3.1 of RFC7641, the target resource for Observe registration is identified by all options in the request that are part of the Cache-Key, including OSCORE. This means that several clients registering to the same protected resource via an intermediary, when using OSCORE, will be effectively registering to different target resources. The intermediary may then register to the protected resource (different target resources) once per each client. The processing of the CoAP Code for Observe messages is described in coap-header. requested by the client, thereby avoiding unnecessary processing and transmission of notifications, since such notifications would not benefit the client. An intermediary that supports Observe MUST copy the OSCORE option in the next hop request unchanged. Although intermediaries are allowed to re-send notifications to other clients, when using OSCORE this does not happen, since requests from different clients will have different cache keys. The Outer Observe option in the CoAP request may be legitimately removed by a proxy or ignored by the server. In these cases, the removed by a proxy or ignored by a server. In these cases, the server processes the request as a non-Observe request and produce a non-Observe response. If the OSCORE client receives a response to an Observe request without an Outer Observe value, then it verifies the"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-e0f4bc9fa017ce787eb9dec80ba2e77aa27406bdf3aa61dc59331521fdadf599","text":"L corresponds to the KDF output length of ImportedIdentity.target_kdf as defined in IANA. For hash-based KDFs, such as HKDF_SHA256(0x0001), this is the length of the hash function output, i.e., 32 octets. This is required for the IPSK to be of length suitable for supported ciphersuites. e.g., 32 octets for SHA256. This is required for the IPSK to be of length suitable for supported ciphersuites. Internally, HKDF-Expand- Label uses a label corresponding to ImportedIdentity.target_protocol, e.g., \"tls13\" for TLS 1.3, as per RFC8446, Section 7.1, or \"dtls13\" for DTLS 1.3, as per I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13, Section 5.10. The identity of \"ipskx\" as sent on the wire is ImportedIdentity, i.e., the serialized content of ImportedIdentity is used as the content of PskIdentity.identity in the PSK extension. The corresponding TLS 1.3 binder key is \"ipskx\". corresponding PSK input for the TLS 1.3 key schedule is 'ipskx'. As the maximum size of the PSK extension is 2^16 - 1 octets, an Imported Identity that exceeds this size is likely to cause a"}
{"_id":"q-en-groupcomm-bis-e13891184edfbb93c7054f33435c4ce50536cd0abfecd3ed3cad32479df60780","text":"groupcomm, and it is RECOMMENDED to perform them according to the approach described in I-D.ietf-ace-key-groupcomm-oscore. 5.3. Different solutions may be selected for secure group communication via a proxy depending on proxy type, use case and deployment requirements. In this section the options based on Group OSCORE are listed. For a client performing a group communication request via a forward- proxy, end-to-end security should be implemented. The client then creates a group request protected with Group OSCORE and unicasts this to the proxy. The proxy adapts the request from a forward-proxy request to a regular request and multicasts this adapted request to the indicated CoAP group. During the adaptation, the security provided by Group OSCORE persists, in either case of using the group mode or using the pairwise mode. The first leg of communication from client to proxy can optionally be further protected, e.g., by using (D)TLS and/or OSCORE. For a client performing a group communication request via a reverse- proxy, either end-to-end-security or hop-by-hop security can be implemented. The case of end-to-end security is the same as for the forward-proxy case. The case of hop-by-hop security is only possible if the proxy can be completely trusted and it is configured as a member of the OSCORE security group(s) that it needs to access, on behalf of clients. The first leg of communication between client and proxy is then protected with a security method for CoAP unicast, such as (D)TLS, OSCORE or a combination of such methods. The second leg between proxy and servers is protected using Group OSCORE. This can be useful in applications where for example the origin client does not implement Group OSCORE, or the group management operations are confined to a particular network domain and the client is outside this domain. For all the above cases, more details on using Group OSCORE are defined in I-D.tiloca-core-groupcomm-proxy. 6. This section provides security considerations for CoAP group"}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-e14ff1f183a53e4cb1998767b26b41e4543afa27f7fe5fd75f3fe5534ce281ff","text":"The precise information from the signaling message that must be cryptographically bound to the user's identity and a mechanism for carrying assertions in JSEP messages. sec.jsep-binding carrying assertions in JSEP messages. This is specified in sec.jsep-binding. The interface to the IdP. sec.protocol-details specifies a specific protocol mechanism which allows the use of any identity"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-e159956bc9189b1cc5d01c41f7460e4d535c5b925595c4ee08cebaa088161d50","text":"When this message will be sent: If this message is sent, it MUST be sent immediately after the The EncryptedExtensions message MUST be sent immediately after the ServerHello message. This is the first message that is encrypted under keys derived from ES."}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-e17c87c080a4dc98ead9a2df273705bae11ef61c6672b212cac7df88fb14eedb","text":"Some devices have accurate time while others do not so SenML supports absolute and relative times. Time is represented in floating point as seconds. Values greater than zero represent an absolute time relative to the Unix epoch (1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time) and the time is counted same way as the Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX) \"seconds since the epoch\" TIME_T. Values of 0 or less represent a relative time in the past from the current time. A simple sensor with no absolute wall clock time might take a as seconds. Values greater than or equal to 2*28 represent an absolute time relative to the Unix epoch. Values less than 2*28 represent time relative to the current time. A simple sensor with no absolute wall clock time might take a measurement every second, batch up 60 of them, and then send the batch to a server. It would include the relative time each measurement was made compared to the time the batch was sent in each"}
{"_id":"q-en-perc-wg-e19327d115690afe23ca93830fada7c45a2857ac6bb9ce411dbadc3321b47e1e","text":"been changed, then the original value will already be in the OHB, so no update to the OHB is required. A Media Distributor that decrypts, modifies, and re-encrypts packets in this way MUST use an independent key for each recipient, SHOULD use an independent salt for each recipient, and MUST NOT re-encrypt the packet using the sender's keys. If the Media Distributor decrypts and re-encrypts with the same key and salt, it will result in the reuse of a (key, nonce) pair, undermining the security of GCM. 5.3. To decrypt a packet, the endpoint first decrypts and verifies using"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-e1bc2fae0f493720fb0cfce017cb3ebc309cd16191db3efc2ca05ba7b133488e","text":"The configuration agent also selects an 16-octet AES-ECB key to use for connection ID decryption. 4.4.2. 4.3.2. Upon receipt of a QUIC packet, the load balancer reads the first octet to obtain the config rotation bits. It then decrypts the"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-e21680197ec67eea083013bd9dcab4c2a519b32c74ecf31db0dbc335298558fb","text":"This property applies to Connections and Connection Groups. The default is not to have this option. 5.2.8. 5.2.9. Type: Preference"}
{"_id":"q-en-data-plane-drafts-e237898ce799fe48cbdcf47995bf2adafff9bcbd5c0fce5062ee4d62b96ac1c9","text":"(DetNet) Edge node terminates all related information elements encoded in the MPLS labels. The LSP used to forward the DetNet packet may be of any type (MPLS- LDP, MPLS-TE, MPLS-TP RFC5921, or MPLS-SR RFC8660). The LSP (F-Label) label and/or the S-Label may be used to indicate the queue processing as well as the forwarding parameters. When a PE receives a packet from the Service Proxy function it MUST add to the packet the DetNet flow-ID specific S-label and create a d-CW. The PE MUST forward the packet according to the configured DetNet Service and Forwarding sub-layer rules to other PE nodes. handle the packet as defined in I-D.ietf-detnet-mpls. When a PE receives an MPLS packet from a remote PE, then, after processing the MPLS label stack, if the top MPLS label ends up being"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-e23d89f6e3172caf2b7c7d9a2f8c875c0b503aff2f8982c45df5f28bd7bd4579","text":"human user to visit in order for instructions on how to agree to the terms. 7.3.2. 7.3.5. The server MAY require a value to be present for the \"external- account-binding\" field. This can be used to an ACME account with an"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-e2446efef23b1370f45b6ad27e3c6c46f34c73d8fb82c50907915edf665626e4","text":"6.1. Marking the delegation certificate's DelegationUsage extension non- critical allows the certificate to be used for clients that do not support delegated credentials. However, it may be desirable to ensure that the delegation certificate is only used in handshakes in which a delegated credential negotiated. It suffices to mark the extension crticial and set the strict boolean to true: if the client does not support delegated credentials, then it will abort the handshake if the certificate has the DelegationUsage extension (as per Section 4.2 of RFC5280); if the client indicates support, but the server does not offer a delegated credential, then the client will abort the handshake (as per certificate-requirements). 6.2. Delegated credentials limit the exposure of the TLS private key by limiting its validity. An attacker who compromises the private key of a delegated credential can act as a man in the middle until the"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-e287432c146f8f59c4a50445a1780206dbc5263780697bfc0a6a84b0d92df94f","text":"Zero or more encrypted copies of the path secret corresponding to the node A signature over the node content The path secret value for a given node is encrypted for the subtree corresponding to the parent's non-updated child, i.e., the child on the copath of the leaf node. There is one encrypted path secret for"}
{"_id":"q-en-coap-tcp-tls-e2dd599af1a6063c46183f84e0fba29e8b2c9371cea9c79a4ce5c44e041898b5","text":"distinction between Confirmable or Non-Confirmable messages, and does not provide Acknowledgement or Reset messages. Since the WebSocket protocol provides ordered delivery of messages, the mechanism for reordering detection when RFC7641 is not needed. The value of the Observe Option in notifications MAY be empty on transmission and MUST be ignored on reception. 3.4. When a client does not receive any response for some time after"}
{"_id":"q-en-bundled-responses-e2f11ec6c1f32f002fa4c780b4ae80e64989ac3f6011d4564a9478d22e3ec90c","text":"Do all of: If the bundle's contained URLs (e.g. in the manifest and index) are derived from the request for the bundle, percent-encode [1] (URL) any bytes that are greater than 0x7E or are not URL code points [2] (URL) in these URLs. It is particularly important to make sure no unescaped nulls (0x00) or angle brackets (0x3C and 0x3E) appear. If the bundle's contained URLs (e.g. in the index) are derived from the request for the bundle, percent-encode [1] (URL) any bytes that are greater than 0x7E or are not URL code points [2] (URL) in these URLs. It is particularly important to make sure no unescaped nulls (0x00) or angle brackets (0x3C and 0x3E) appear. Similarly, if the request headers for any contained resource are based on the headers sent while requesting the bundle, only"}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-e312ad707e6e218cab9e1f6ab9ed8c4bf2b57c973e2e90c15e0e6e8f427fdc12","text":"RECOMMENDED to not trust a single source of randomness and to not put unaugmented random numbers on the wire. Implementations might consider deriving secret and non-secret randomness from different PNRG/PRF/KDF instances to limit the damage if the PNRG/PRF/KDF turns out to be fundamentally broken. NIST generally forbids deriving secret and non-secret randomness from the same KDF instance, but this decision has been criticized by Krawczyk HKDFpaper and doing so is common practice. In addition to IVs, other examples are the challenge in EAP-TTLS, the RAND in 3GPP AKAs, and the Session-Id in EAP-TLS 1.3. Note that part of KEYSTREAM_2 is also non-secret randomness as it is known or predictable to an attacker. As explained by Krawczyk, if any attack is mitigated by the NIST requirement it would mean that the KDF is fully broken and would have to be replaced anyway. If ECDSA is supported, \"deterministic ECDSA\" as specified in RFC6979 MAY be used. Pure deterministic elliptic-curve signatures such as deterministic ECDSA and EdDSA have gained popularity over randomized"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-e3364f2def4b7920d3511c4d95d4033154febb6dea55a8f4520c76fb139a7602","text":"outdated frame, such as a MAX_DATA frame carrying a smaller maximum data than one found in an older packet. A sender SHOULD avoid retransmitting information from packets once they are acknowledged. This includes packets that are acknowledged after being declared lost, which can happen in the presence of network reordering. Doing so requires senders to retain information about packets after they are declared lost. A sender can discard this information after a period of time elapses that adequately allows for reordering, such as a PTO (Section 6.2 of QUIC-RECOVERY), or on other events, such as reaching a memory limit. Upon detecting losses, a sender MUST take appropriate congestion control action. The details of loss detection and congestion control are described in QUIC-RECOVERY."}
{"_id":"q-en-ratelimit-headers-e34ac7cfd59c0424664dbe747da2b9ed61ace3e1dacc72dd5ae359d009d94566","text":"extension parameters: To avoid clashes, implementers SHOULD prefix unregistered parameters with an \"x-\" identifier, e.g. \"x-acme-policy\", \"x-acme- burst\". While it is useful to define a clear syntax and semantics even for custom parameters, it is important to note that user agents are not required to process quota policy information. with a vendor identifier, e.g. \"acme-policy\", \"acme-burst\". While it is useful to define a clear syntax and semantics even for custom parameters, it is important to note that user agents are not required to process quota policy information. 2.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-e39df697bb02acee83ddf4fd1bdd19d760f1291544507b067642c9c484d41c04","text":"alternatively be absent (\"Nothing\"). \"OptionalNodes\" is an abstraction of a \"filter-path\" (which appears in an existence test or as a function argument). appears in a test expression or as a function argument). The abstract instances above can be obtained from the concrete representations in tbl-typerep."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-e3dd23db756c48780deb8f39fe3ddfa4bde85197cad430c93b45c21c804b523c","text":"Existence tests differ from comparisons in that: they work with arbitrary relative or absolute queries (not just Singular Queries). singular queries). they work with queries that select structured values."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-e41efb5775f469a2ba2fda324c1d39bff39b102e99c7e745e39751ce0942d69c","text":"When using ALPN, endpoints MUST immediately close a connection (see Section 10.2 of QUIC-TRANSPORT) with a no_application_protocol TLS alert (QUIC error code 0x178; see tls-errors) if an application alert (QUIC error code 0x0178; see tls-errors) if an application protocol is not negotiated. While ALPN only specifies that servers use this alert, QUIC clients MUST use error 0x178 to terminate a use this alert, QUIC clients MUST use error 0x0178 to terminate a connection when ALPN negotiation fails. An application protocol MAY restrict the QUIC versions that it can operate over. Servers MUST select an application protocol compatible with the QUIC version that the client has selected. The server MUST treat the inability to select a compatible application protocol as a connection error of type 0x178 (no_application_protocol). Similarly, a client MUST treat the selection of an incompatible application protocol by a server as a connection error of type 0x178. connection error of type 0x0178 (no_application_protocol). Similarly, a client MUST treat the selection of an incompatible application protocol by a server as a connection error of type 0x0178. 8.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-e4a159d51221306ce631d950c21bf20607e5240a88ec29927075726e261ae513","text":"The server operator can only use TLS signature schemes for which the CA will issue credentials. These dependencies cause problems in practice. Server operators often deploy TLS termination services in locations such as remote data centers or Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) where it may be difficult to detect key compromises. Short-lived certificates may be used to limit the exposure of keys in these cases. However, short-lived certificates need to be renewed more frequently than long-lived certificates. If an external CA is unable to issue a certificate in time to replace a deployed certificate, the server would no longer be able to present a valid certificate to clients. With short-lived certificates, there is a smaller window of time to renew a certificates and therefore a higher risk that an outage at a CA will negatively affect the uptime of the service. To reduce the dependency on external CAs, this document proposes a limited delegation mechanism that allows a TLS peer to issue its own credentials within the scope of a certificate issued by an external"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-e4d8acffd502736df804816de000a5e4315389e0c784a07a0d7f84a2ea9b5ad9","text":"PSKs for TLS 1.3 and non-imported PSKs for earlier versions co-exist for incremental deployment. ImportedIdentity.context MUST include the context used to derive the EPSK, if any exists. For example, ImportedIdentity.context may ImportedIdentity.context MUST include the context used to determine the EPSK, if any exists. For example, ImportedIdentity.context may include information about peer roles or identities to mitigate Selfie-style reflection attacks Selfie. See mitigate-selfie for more details. If the EPSK is a key derived from some other protocol or"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-e4e7d21cf1ec83000adae93bfb7713c3170e75623315c03d21ca669b61e1b371","text":"likely the receiver will be able to process all the packets in a single pass. A packet with a short header does not include a length, so it can only be the last packet included in a UDP datagram. An endpoint SHOULD NOT coalesce multiple packets at the same encryption level. endpoint SHOULD include multiple frames in a single packet if they are to be sent at the same encryption level, instead of coalescing multiple packets at the same encryption level. Receivers MAY route based on the information in the first packet contained in a UDP datagram. Senders MUST NOT coalesce QUIC packets"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-e4f188d460964138bec08e04a4dd6982aaca5ee40aeaeda08693e79bca3b62ef","text":"Context Identifier (Cid) Base Key (master_secret) Master Secret The following input parameters MAY be pre-established. In case any of these parameters is not pre-established, the default value"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-e4fcafb5c4d52912ff1f7512ba4525c514b4bd0504f64d074a1ee768644ac471","text":"parameter is elided, the RD MAY associate the endpoint with a configured default domain. Endpoint Type (optional). The semantic type of the endpoint. This parameter SHOULD be less than 63 bytes. Lifetime (optional). Lifetime of the registration in seconds. Range of 60-4294967295. If no lifetime is included in the initial registration, a default value of 86400 (24 hours)"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-e54749e957b4bf8a0c5daea8a72649bcce2e340f071f54d4aa0d47a0e366c14d","text":"described in stream-cipher-load-balancer-actions, performing the three passes in reverse order. 4.4. 4.3. The Block Cipher CID Algorithm, by using a full 16 octets of plaintext and a 128-bit cipher, provides higher cryptographic"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-e575a8965f4741afc4eee87a5f07c1492cd8a1a7f6cf2a114bd4df41745e53e0","text":"names for which current connection is not authoritative (according to the TLS certificate). Note that it is possible for the WWW-Authenticate header to include multiple challenges, in order to allow the client to fetch a batch of multiple tokens for future use. For example, the WWW-Authenticate header could look like this: Caching and pre-fetching of tokens is discussed in caching. If a client fetches a batch of multiple tokens for future use that are bound to a specific redemption context (the redemption_context in the TokenChallenge was not empty), clients SHOULD discard these tokens upon flushing state such as HTTP cookies COOKIES, or changing networks. Using these tokens in a context that otherwise would not be linkable to the original context could allow the origin to recognize a client. Note that it is possible for the WWW-Authenticate header to include multiple challenges. This allows the origin to indicate support for different token types, issuers, or to include multiple redemption contexts. For example, the WWW-Authenticate header could look like this: 2.1.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-e584ce69aa107765f38bdd823f3327ee7502773b47e492bcf829945531438048","text":"of the destinations included in the scope, then the IP proxy can immediately fail the request. Note that IP protocol numbers represent both upper layers (as defined in IPv6, examples include TCP and UDP) and IPv6 extension headers (as defined in IPv6, examples include Fragment and Options headers). IP proxies MAY reject requests to scope to protocol numbers that are used for extension headers. Upon receiving packets, implementations that support scoping by IP protocol number MUST walk the chain of extensions to find the matching IP protocol number. 4.7. This document defines multiple new capsule types that allow endpoints"}
{"_id":"q-en-acme-e5a6a213eff5ae5492787beb919f2cf9ac4460af4dcd9891dde8083302a8256b","text":"\"alg\" \"jwk\" (only for requests to new-reg and revoke-cert resources) \"jwk\" (only for requests to new-account and revoke-cert resources) \"kid\" (for all other requests)."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-e5b3c6373009d0a3c64d3ceb4567e87d5f85af4e1a0220a24c65eaa1e49be033","text":"invoke Receive again. Multiple invocations of ReceivedPartial deliver data for the same Message by passing the same messageContext, until the endOfMessage Message by passing the same MessageContext, until the endOfMessage flag is delivered or a ReceiveError occurs. All partial blocks of a single Message are delivered in order without gaps. This event does not support delivering discontiguous partial Messages."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-e5f9ad52b664f1160936a616f573ac044a63d8f99f96b83259f0c86339d9ea54","text":"Certain characters are escaped, in one and only one way; all other characters are unescaped. Note: Normalized Paths are Singular Paths, but not all Singular Paths are Normalized Paths. For example, \"$[-3]\" is a Singular Path, but is not a Normalized Path. The Normalized Path equivalent to \"$[-3]\" would have an index equal to the array length minus \"3\". (The array length must be at least \"3\" if \"$[-3]\" is to identify a node.) Note: Normalized Paths are Singular Queries, but not all Singular Queries are Normalized Paths. For example, \"$[-3]\" is a Singular Query, but is not a Normalized Path. The Normalized Path equivalent to \"$[-3]\" would have an index equal to the array length minus \"3\". (The array length must be at least \"3\" if \"$[-3]\" is to identify a node.) Since there can only be one Normalized Path identifying a given node, the syntax stipulates which characters are escaped and which are not."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-e63cf65346529c5d98e9b6ece3862bb1428f96ad79cc6af2d96f9d8a39442d56","text":"encoded using the QUIC variable length integer scheme described in RFC9000. If at any point a session ID is received that cannot a valid ID for a client-initiated bidirectional stream, the recepient MUST close the connection with an H3_ID_ERROR error code. 4.1. Once established, both endpoints can open unidirectional streams."}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-rats-wg-architecture-e650a6f4e692bea7d58e073ecf0e62eff9dc5c6f587d58ea0a6378cabe791da1","text":"Relying Party(s). In some cases where Evidence contains sensitive information, an Attester might even require that a Verifier first go through a remote attestation procedure with it before the Attester will send the sensitive Evidence. This can be done by having the Attester first act as a Verifier/Relying Party, and the Verifier act as its own Attester, as discussed above. Attester might even require that a Verifier first go through a TLS authentication or a remote attestation procedure with it before the Attester will send the sensitive Evidence. This can be done by having the Attester first act as a Verifier/Relying Party, and the Verifier act as its own Attester, as discussed above. 7.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-e65513ef02ddab9f14df6605a6d7045edbf3ba441db07d8aea8a99aa0c65fbd3","text":"packets, the ACK Delay field in acknowledgements for those packet types SHOULD be set to 0. 13.2.7. 13.2.6. ACK frames MUST only be carried in a packet that has the same packet number space as the packet being acknowledged; see packet-protected."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-e670bd35d70be6e34e011aa0626151c72ea542891612d669b4b3354ad0612206","text":"with higher rankings represent connection attempts that will be raced first. Implementations should order the branches to reflect the preferences expressed by the application for its new connection, including Protocol and Path Selection Properties, which are specified in I-D.ietf-taps-interface. including Selection Properties, which are specified in I-D.ietf-taps- interface. In addition to the properties provided by the application, an implementation may include additional criteria such as cached performance estimates, see performance-caches, or system policy, see role-of-system-policy, in the ranking. Two examples of how the Protocol and Path Selection Properties may be used to sort branches are provided below: role-of-system-policy, in the ranking. Two examples of how Selection and Connection Properties may be used to sort branches are provided below: Interface Type: If the application specifies an interface type to be preferred or avoided, implementations should rank paths accordingly. If the application specifies an interface type to be required or prohibited, we expect an implementation to not include the non-conforming paths into the three. \"Interface Instance or Type\": If the application specifies an interface type to be preferred or avoided, implementations should rank paths accordingly. If the application specifies an interface type to be required or prohibited, we expect an implementation to not include the non-conforming paths into the three. Capacity Profile: An implementation may use the Capacity Profile \"Capacity Profile\": An implementation may use the Capacity Profile to prefer paths optimized for the application's expected traffic pattern according to cached performance estimates, see performance-caches: Interactive/Low Latency: Prefer paths with the lowest expected Round Trip Time Constant Rate: Prefer paths that can satisfy the requested Stream Send or Stream Receive Bitrate, based on observed maximum throughput Scavenger: Prefer paths with the highest expected available bandwidth, based on observed maximum throughput Scavenger/Bulk: Prefer paths with the highest expected available bandwidth, based on observed maximum throughput Low Latency/Interactive: Prefer paths with the lowest expected Round Trip Time [Note: See branch-sorting-non-consensus for additional examples related to Properties under discussion.] Constant-Rate Streaming: Prefer paths that can satisfy the requested Stream Send or Stream Receive Bitrate, based on observed maximum throughput Implementations should process properties in the following order: Prohibit, Require, Prefer, Avoid. If Protocol or Path Selection Properties contain any prohibited properties, the implementation should first purge branches containing nodes with these properties. For required properties, it should only keep branches that satisfy these requirements. Finally, it should order branches according to Prohibit, Require, Prefer, Avoid. If Selection Properties contain any prohibited properties, the implementation should first purge branches containing nodes with these properties. For required properties, it should only keep branches that satisfy these requirements. Finally, it should order branches according to preferred properties, and finally use avoided properties as a tiebreaker. For Require and Avoid, Path Selection Properties take precedence over Protocol Selection Properties. For example, if the application has indicated both a preference for WiFi over LTE and for a feature only available in SCTP, branches will be first sorted accord to the Path Selection Property, with WiFi at the top. Then, branches with SCTP will be sorted to the top within their subtree according to the Protocol Selection Property. However, if the implementation has cached the information that SCTP is not available on the path over WiFi, there is no SCTP node in the WiFi subtree. Here, the path over WiFi will be tried first, and, if connection establishment succeeds, TCP will be used. So the Path Selection Property of preferring WiFi takes precedence over the Protocol Selection Property of preferring SCTP. 4.4. The primary goal of the Candidate Racing process is to successfully"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-e671933f51a0efb65d66aa449420c1abf17c519f75ed605b69d65ad9b7dd5247","text":"Initiate. An InitiateError occurs either when the set of transport properties and cryptographic parameters cannot be fulfilled on a Connection for and security parameters cannot be fulfilled on a Connection for initiation (e.g. the set of available Paths and/or Protocol Stacks meeting the constraints is empty) or reconciled with the local and/or remote endpoints; when the remote specifier cannot be resolved; or"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-e6be3f9767191384bc485c7a20bab66249b6ba02ebc23ca1c6f6017a2c1f48bf","text":"2.4.8. The \"value\" function extension provides a way to convert an instance of \"NodesType\" to a value and make that available for further processing in the filter expression: The \"value()\" function extension provides a way to convert an instance of \"NodesType\" to a value and make that available for further processing in the filter expression: Its only argument is an instance of \"NodesType\" (possibly taken from a \"filter-query\", as in the example above). The result is an"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-taps-transport-security-e6f71a8f85cec8ee8c672821e62666f8073d992896b678a79f6885869514e445","text":"provide authentication, using EAP for example. Protocols: IKEv2, SRTP 5.2. Pre-Shared Key Import Either the handshake protocol or the application directly can supply pre-shared keys for the record protocol use for encryption/ decryption and authentication. If the application can supply keys directly, this is considered explicit import; if the handshake protocol traditionally provides the keys directly, it is considered direct import; if the keys can only be shared by the handshake, they are considered non-importable. Handshake interfaces are the points of interaction between a handshake protocol and the application, record protocol, and transport once the handshake is active. Explict import: QUIC, ESP Direct import: TLS, DTLS, MinimalT, tcpcrypt, WireGuard Send Handshake Messages The handshake protocol needs to be able to send messages over a transport to the remote peer to establish trust and to negotiate keys. Protocols: All (TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT, CurveCP, IKEv2, WireGuard, SRTP (DTLS)) Non-importable: CurveCP Receive Handshake Messages The handshake protocol needs to be able to receive messages from the remote peer over a transport to establish trust and to negotiate keys. Protocols: All (TLS, DTLS, QUIC + TLS, MinimalT, CurveCP, IKEv2, WireGuard, SRTP (DTLS)) 5.2. Identity Validation During a handshake, the security protocol will conduct identity"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-e70c89c73ea8b0f4449f89baa771c867136fe09fe3749153ebb3fcff2c2d0ecc","text":"9.1. [[ OPEN ISSUE: Direct initialization is currently undefined. A client can create a group by initializing its own state to reflect a group including only itself, then adding the initial members. This has computation and communication complexity O(N log N) instead of the O(N) complexity of direct initialization. ]] A group can always be created by initializing a one-member group and using adding members individually. For cases where the initial list of members is known, the Init message allows a group to be created more efficiently. The creator of the group constructs an Init message as follows: Fetch a UserInitKey for each member (including the creator) Identify a protocol version and cipher suite that is supported by all proposed members. Construct a ratchet tree with its leaves populated with the public keys and credentials from the UserInitKeys of the members, and all other nodes blank. Generate a fresh leaf key pair for the first leaf Compute its direct path in this ratchet tree Each member of the newly-created group initializes its state from the Init message as follows: Note the group ID, protocol version, and cipher suite in use Construct a ratchet tree as above Update the cached ratchet tree by replacing nodes in the direct path from the first leaf using the direct path Update the cached ratchet tree by replacing nodes in the direct path from the first leaf using the information contained in the \"path\" attribute The update secret for this interaction, used with an all-zero init secret to generate the first epoch secret, is the \"path_secret[i+1]\" derived from the \"path_secret[i]\" associated to the root node. The members learn the relevant path secrets by decrypting one of the encrypted path secrets in the DirectPath and working back to the root (as in normal DirectPath processing). [[ OPEN ISSUE: This approach leaks the initial contents of the tree to the Delivery Service, unlike the sequential-Add case. ]] [[ OPEN ISSUE: It might be desireable for the group creator to be able to \"pre-warm\" the tree, by providing values for some nodes not on its direct path. This would violate the tree invariant, so we would need to figure out what mitigations would be necessary. ]] 9.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-e71df0a524e1f6f400a954f98bf143bc23d3006701fced48322cd1193b9bdcaa","text":"in MLSPlaintext. The \"new_member\" SenderType is used for clients proposing that they themselves be added. For this ID type the sender value MUST be zero. Proposals with types other than Add MUST NOT be sent with this sender type. In such cases, the MLSPlaintext MUST be signed with the private key corresponding to the KeyPackage in the Add message. Recipients MUST verify that the MLSPlaintext carrying the Proposal message is validly signed with this key. themselves be added. For this ID type the sender value MUST be zero and the Proposal type MUST be Add. The MLSPlaintext MUST be signed with the private key corresponding to the KeyPackage in the Add message. Recipients MUST verify that the MLSPlaintext carrying the Proposal message is validly signed with this key. The \"preconfigured\" SenderType is reserved for signers that are pre- provisioned to the clients within a group. If proposals with these"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-e71fe2a3bb006073ef4e8366634de84e44e7b234042cc8e6a1bc6d65174967e4","text":"\"encrypted_client_hello\" extension and proceeds with the handshake as usual, per RFC8446, Section 4.1.2. If it supports ECH but cannot decrypt it, then it ignores the extension and proceeds with the handshake as usual. This is If it supports ECH but does not recognize the configuration specified by the client, then it ignores the extension and terminates the handshake using the ClientHelloOuter. This is referred to as \"ECH rejection\". When ECH is rejected, the server sends an acceptable ECH configuration in its EncryptedExtensions message. If it supports ECH and can decrypt it, then it forwards the ClientHelloInner to the backend, who terminates the connection. This is referred to as \"ECH acceptance\". If it supports ECH and recognizes the configuration, then it attempts to decrypt the ClientHelloInner. It aborts the handshake if decryption fails; otherwise it forwards the ClientHelloInner to the backend, who terminates the connection. This is referred to as \"ECH acceptance\". Upon receiving the server's response, the client determines whether ECH was accepted or rejected and proceeds with the handshake"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-e75977ac2ce5e01b666c959af9c7e643d0d6fde6e9b55a8b6ad00b0b24626c47","text":"If a data channel m= section has been offered, a m= section MUST also be generated for data. The field MUST be set to \"application\" and the and \"fmt\" fields MUST be set to exactly match the fields in the offer. match the fields in the offer. Note that if media m= sections are bundled into a data m= section, then certain TRANSPORT and IDENTICAL attributes may appear in the data m= section even if they would otherwise only be appropriate for a media m= section (e.g., \"a=rtcp- mux\"). Within the data m= section, an \"a=mid\" line MUST be generated and included as described above, along with an \"a=sctp-port\" line"}
{"_id":"q-en-webpush-protocol-e774aca5a4fc4a5e13970cdc9f3c4ee82e235d14a74d2986f7a9b423e9c7f548","text":"Examples in this document use the RFC7230. Many of the exchanges can be completed using HTTP/1.1, where HTTP/2 is necessary, the more verbose frame format from I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2 is used. verbose frame format from RFC7540 is used. 2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-e774d76bcef4d8122af505d04ef7f059acdc5ec79c9553ad1c78d2eaa1a5375c","text":"HTTP_WG; HTTP working group; ietf-http-wg@w3.org 8.3. 7.3. This document will request IANA to register the following entry in the \"HTTP Field Name\" registry:"}
{"_id":"q-en-cose-spec-e779cef45c5047619dd03864458f426e00d8ca0171a4a8e644e2b4698a4ae517","text":"[CREF20] JLS: Do we create a registry for curves? Is is the same registry for both EC1 and EC2? [CREF21] JLS: Should we use the integer encoding for x, y and d instead of bstr? [CREF21] JLS: Should we use the integer encoding for x and d instead of bstr? [CREF22] JLS: Should we use the integer encoding for x, y and d instead of bstr?"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-e786d83591cf9960aecb7d30455b773d67151bf389f20e63e070d80c46254afe","text":"the comparison is between two paths each of which result in an empty nodelist. a comparison using either of the operators \"<\" or \">\" yields false. a comparison using the operator \"<\" yields false. When any path on either side of a comparison results in a nodelist consisting of a single node, each such path is replaced by the value"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-e7ef03f93b2fe368ac56d86784fcdbaedc7c92c7a06f89c8fef556edf4c40005","text":"MUST send the quic_transport_parameters extension; endpoints that receive ClientHello or EncryptedExtensions messages without the quic_transport_parameters extension MUST close the connection with an error of type 0x16d (equivalent to a fatal TLS missing_extension error of type 0x016d (equivalent to a fatal TLS missing_extension alert, see tls-errors). Transport parameters become available prior to the completion of the"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-e828e125d988eb6f86f1f17a21f389c0b5c49abc0d26162de3c398e1a6c314a0","text":"DeriveSecret takes its Secret argument from the incoming arrow \"0\" represents an all-zero byte string of length \"KDF.Nh\". When processing a handshake message, a client combines the following information to derive new epoch secrets:"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-e8345bbe2cfb7805ff66a7a471487f7cce17652ca8bab2bc0d61ce2617293d90","text":"in the \"PreSharedKeyID\" object. Specifically, \"psk_secret\" is computed as follows: Here \"0\" represents the all-zero vector of length KDF.Nh. The Here \"0\" represents the all-zero vector of length \"KDF.Nh\". The \"index\" field in \"PSKLabel\" corresponds to the index of the PSK in the \"psk\" array, while the \"count\" field contains the total number of PSKs. In other words, the PSKs are chained together with KDF.Extract"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-e8391012b03affa722fad9f4ee84fa6ee0ec34fcbd1c7f1f812aabcae69a2878","text":"attribute MUST NOT be specified. If the RTP/RTCP multiplexing policy is \"require\", each m= section MUST contain an \"a=rtcp-mux\" attribute. MUST contain an \"a=rtcp-mux\" attribute. If an \"m=\" section contains an \"a=rtcp-mux-only\" attribute then that section MUST also contain an \"a=rtcp-mux\" attribute. If this session description is of type \"pranswer\" or \"answer\", the following additional checks are applied:"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-e874a8473134de191acb7b5e2bd6614a98551ced3debd8ad014306d7b772a321","text":"The TLS handshake establishes one or more input secrets which are combined to create the actual working keying material, as detailed below. The key derivation process makes use of the following functions, based on HKDF RFC5869: below. The key derivation process makes use of the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand functions as defined for HKDF RFC5869, as well as the functions defined below: Given a set of n InputSecrets, the final \"master secret\" is computed by iteratively invoking HKDF-Extract with InputSecret_1, InputSecret_2, etc. The initial secret is simply a string of 0s as long as the size of the Hash that is the basis for the HKDF. InputSecret_2, etc. The initial secret is simply a string of zeroes as long as the size of the Hash that is the basis for the HKDF. Concretely, for the present version of TLS 1.3, secrets are added in the following order:"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-e8c2dc16087dc0de5cf4020e9617f22299da2c01c2e5a77d2d3fef8d733abd6f","text":"single QUIC packet. If it does not, then older ranges (those with the smallest packet numbers) are omitted. ack-tracking and ack-limiting describe an exemplary approach for determining what packets to acknowledge in each ACK frame. Though the goal of these algorithms is to generate an acknowledgment for every packet that is processed, it is still possible for acknowledgments to be lost. A sender cannot expect to receive an acknowledgment for every packet that the receiver processes. 13.2.4. When a packet containing an ACK frame is sent, the largest acknowledged in that frame may be saved. When a packet containing an ACK frame is acknowledged, the receiver can stop acknowledging packets less than or equal to the largest acknowledged in the sent ACK frame. In cases without ACK frame loss, this algorithm allows for a minimum of 1 RTT of reordering. In cases with ACK frame loss and reordering, this approach does not guarantee that every acknowledgement is seen by the sender before it is no longer included in the ACK frame. Packets could be received out of order and all subsequent ACK frames containing them could be lost. In this case, the loss recovery algorithm could cause spurious retransmissions, but the sender will continue making forward progress. 13.2.5. A receiver limits the number of ACK Ranges (ack-ranges) it remembers and sends in ACK frames, both to limit the size of ACK frames and to avoid resource exhaustion. After receiving acknowledgments for an ACK frame, the receiver SHOULD stop tracking those acknowledged ACK Ranges. Ranges. Senders can expect acknowledgements for most packets, but QUIC does not guarantee receipt of an acknowledgment for every packet that the receiver processes. It is possible that retaining many ACK Ranges could cause an ACK frame to become too large. A receiver can discard unacknowledged ACK"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-e8c7c8429486c962e328679e88b6db0ef9a48d90dabc2928dd3efa853234bcd9","text":"how to process them from format also apply to HTTP/3 datagrams sent and received using the DATAGRAM capsule. The DATAGRAM Capsule is transparent to intermediaries, meaning that intermediaries MAY parse it and send DATAGRAM Capsules that they did not receive. This allows an intermediary to reencode HTTP/3 Datagrams as it forwards them: in other words, an intermediary MAY send a DATAGRAM Capsule to forward an HTTP/3 Datagram which was received in a QUIC DATAGRAM frame, and vice versa. Note that while DATAGRAM capsules are sent on a stream, intermediaries can reencode HTTP/3 datagrams into QUIC DATAGRAM frames over the next hop, and those could be dropped. Because of this, applications have to always consider HTTP/3 datagrams to be unreliable, even if they were initially sent in a capsule. 5. In order to facilitate extensibility of contexts, the"}
{"_id":"q-en-sframe-e8e1efd6d0b409050bdbb8642875a3b412148da0eda42baf66087e9851bdd4ae","text":"encryption IV. The frame counter must be unique and monodically increasing to avoid IV reuse. The frame counter itself can be encoded in a variable length format to decrease the overhead, the following encoding schema is used The first byte in the header is fixed and contains the header metadata S 1 bit Signature flag, indicates the payload contains a signature of set. Reserved (4 bits) Reserved bits LEN (3 bits) The length of the CTR fields in bytes. CTR (Variable length) Frame counter up to 8 bytes long As each sender will use their own key for encryption, so the SFrame header will include the key id to allow the receiver to identify the key that needs to be used for decrypting. Both the frame counter and the key id are encoded in a variable length format to decrease the overhead, so the first byte in the Sframe header is fixed and contains the header metadata with the following format: Signature flag (S): 1 bit This field indicates the payload contains a signature of set. Counter Length (LEN): 3 bits This field indicates the length of the CTR fields in bytes. Extended Key Id Flag (X): 1 bit Indicates if the key field contains the key id or the key length. Key or Key Length: 3 bits This field containts the key id (KID) if the X flag is set to 0, or the key length (KLEN) if set to 1. If X flag is 0 then the KID is in the range of 0-7 and the frame counter (CTR) is found in the next LEN bytes: Key id (KID): 3 bits The key id (0-7). Frame counter (CTR): (Variable length) Frame counter value up to 8 bytes long. if X flag is 1 then KLEN is the length of the key (KID), that is found after the SFrame header metadata byte. After the key id (KID), the frame counter (CTR) will be found in the next LEN bytes: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+----------------------+------------- ---------+ |S|LEN |1|KLEN | KID... (length=KLEN) | CTR... (length=LEN) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+----------------------+----------------------+ Key length (KLEN): 3 bits The key length in bytes. Key id (KID): (Variable length) The key id value up to 8 bytes long. Frame counter (CTR): (Variable length) Frame counter value up to 8 bytes long. 3.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-e970a55d4da67d8089d6da6491ee0aaa56756a2b3732e2982137db86456c1c94","text":"respectively. In order to achieve the privacy and security goals of the protocol a also needs to observe the guidance in client-responsibilities. also needs to observe the guidance in sec-client. The interacts with the as an HTTP client by constructing a request using the same restrictions as the request, except that the target"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-e979f742965dc9a22acb14936a871f207c290fedbde53b26cd022d1191a856f3","text":"3.3. The Transport Services API is envisioned as the abstract model for a family of APIs that share a common way to expose transport features and encourage flexibility. The abstract API definition I-D.ietf- taps-interface describes this interface and how it can be exposed to application developers. Implementations that provide the Transport Services API I-D.ietf- taps-impl will vary due to system-specific support and the needs of the deployment scenario. It is expected that all implementations of Transport Services will offer the entire mandatory API. All implementations are expected to offer an API that is sufficient to use the distilled minimal set of features offered by transport protocols I-D.ietf-taps-minset, including API support for TCP and UDP transport. However, some features provided by this API will not be functional in certain implementations. For example, it is possible that some very constrained devices might not have a full TCP implementation beneath the API. To preserve flexibility and compatibility with future protocols, top- level features in the Transport Services API ought to avoid referencing particular transport protocols. The mappings of these API features to specific implementations of each feature is explained in the I-D.ietf-taps-impl along with the implications of the feature on existing protocols. It is expected that I-D.ietf-taps-interface will be updated and supplemented as new protocols and protocol features are developed. A Transport Services implementation can select Protocol Stacks based on the Properties communicated by the application. If two different Protocol Stacks can be safely swapped, or raced in parallel (see racing), then they are considered to be \"equivalent\". Equivalent Protocol Stacks are defined as stacks that can provide the same transport properties and interface expectations as requested by the application. The following two examples show non-equivalent Protocol Stacks: If the application requires preservation of message boundaries, a Protocol Stack that runs UDP as the top-level interface to the application is not equivalent to a Protocol Stack that runs TCP as the top-level interface. A UDP stack would allow an application to read out message boundaries based on datagrams sent from the remote system, whereas TCP does not preserve message boundaries on its own, but needs a framing protocol on top to determine message boundaries. If the application specifies that it requires reliable transmission of data, then a Protocol Stack using UDP without any reliability layer on top would not be allowed to replace a Protocol Stack using TCP. The following example shows equivalent Protocol Stacks: If the application does not require reliable transmission of data, then a Protocol Stack that adds reliability could be regarded as an equivalent Protocol Stack as long as providing this would not conflict with any other application-requested properties. To ensure that security protocols are not incorrectly swapped, Transport Services systems MUST only select Protocol Stacks that meet application requirements (I-D.ietf-taps-transport-security). Systems SHOULD only race Protocol Stacks where the transport security protocols within the stacks are identical. Transport Services systems MUST NOT automatically fall back from secure protocols to insecure protocols, or to weaker versions of secure protocols. A Transport Services system MAY allow applications to explicitly specify that fallback to a specific other version of a protocol is allowed, e.g., to allow fallback to TLS 1.2 if TLS 1.3 is not available. 3.4. It is important to note that neither the Transport Services API I- D.ietf-taps-interface nor the Implementation document I-D.ietf-taps- impl define new protocols or protocol capabilities that affect what is communicated across the network. Use of a Transport Services system does not require that a peer on the other side of a connection system MUST NOT require that a peer on the other side of a connection uses the same API or implementation. A Transport Services system acting as a connection initiator can communicate with any existing system that implements the transport protocol(s) selected by the Transport Services system. Similarly, a Transport Services system acting as a listener can receive connections for any protocol that is supported by the system from existing initiators that implement the protocol, independent of whether the initiator uses Transport Services as well or not. acting as a connection initiator is able to communicate with any existing system that implements the transport protocol(s) and all the required properties selected by the Transport Services system. Similarly, a Transport Services system acting as a listener can receive connections for any protocol that is supported by the system from existing initiators that implement the protocol, independent of whether the initiator uses a Transport Services system or not. In normal use, a Transport Services system SHOULD result in consistent protocol and interface selection decisions for the same network conditions given the same set of Properties. This is intended to provide predictable outcomes to the application using the API. 4."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-e9ac09e4d31d0bb1b8d67da1339f1dc021979f1e649ce263cd6c228ed6cbe1bb","text":"A TLSCiphertext record was received that had a length more than 2^14+256 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSPlaintext record 2^14 + 256 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSPlaintext record with more than 2^14 bytes. This alert is always fatal and should never be observed in communication between proper implementations (except when messages were corrupted in the network)."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-e9dc10f9fdc7bc6af9e71df5edd73b036cdf2cf556d851a5e44e86ba3c8b0b39","text":"process the Commit (i.e., not including any members being added or removed by the Commit). The sender of a Commit SHOULD NOT include any Update proposals that the sender themselves generated. If sender generated one or more Update proposals during an epoch, then it SHOULD instead update its leaf and direct path by sending \"path\" field in the Commit. If there are multiple proposals that apply to the same leaf, the committer chooses one and includes only that one in the Commit, considering the rest invalid. The committer MUST prefer any Remove"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-e9ea17be71c06679f5a32f3d09cf8ff7f4d10fccc17242fc9d73552b392f952c","text":"protocols and paths without requiring major changes to the application. design explains the design principles behind the Transport requirements explains the fundamental requirements for a Transport Services API. These principles are intended to make sure that transport protocols can continue to be enhanced and evolve without requiring too many changes by application developers. requiring significant changes by application developers. concepts presents the Transport Services architecture diagram and defines the concepts that are used by both the API and"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-homenet-hna-ea2d7dc8baf8cf65e18b95064d0e24dd4a748c9d62049136882ccddd66118f35","text":"Server. On the other hand, if the HNA signs the Homenet Zone itself, the zone would be collected by the Synchronization Server and directly transferred to the Public Authoritative Server(s). These policies are discussed and detailed in sec-dnssec-deplyment and sec- views. policies are discussed and detailed in sec-dnssec-deplyment. 4.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-ea5f90c627ca1259f46673d52a8cd7a8ca4aa4bf6ef3c4cf7061f9f3e4ceded8","text":"Unlike CONNECT-UDP requests, which require specifying a target host, CONNECT-IP requests can allow endpoints to send arbitrary IP packets to any host. The client can choose to restrict a given request to a specific host or IP protocol by adding parameters to its request. When the server knows that a request is scoped to a target host or specific prefix or IP protocol by adding parameters to its request. When the server knows that a request is scoped to a target prefix or protocol, it can leverage this information to optimize its resource allocation; for example, the server can assign the same public IP address to two CONNECT-IP requests that are scoped to different hosts and/or different protocols. address to two CONNECT-IP requests that are scoped to different prefixes and/or different protocols. CONNECT-IP uses URI template variables (client-config) to determine the scope of the request for packet proxying. All variables defined"}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-ea8e6ffa25f33a035dc8ae248650b1f9f3489005b52c524fe9803ba5f9e09031","text":"If the server sends a Retry packet, it MUST use the original version. The client ignores Retry packets using other versions. The client MUST NOT use a different version in the subsequent Initial that contains the Retry token. The server MAY encode the QUIC version in its Retry token to validate that the client did not switch versions, and drop the packet if it switched. MUST NOT use a different version in the subsequent Initial packet that contains the Retry token. The server MAY encode the QUIC version in its Retry token to validate that the client did not switch versions, and drop the packet if it switched. QUIC version 2 uses the same transport parameters to authenticate the Retry as QUIC version 1. After switching to a negotiated version"}
{"_id":"q-en-coap-tcp-tls-eaffc03735232215629dc2a4d1632d8ddfccf9b15702d5d908823b322e4d00f4","text":"4.3.1. An endpoint can use the critical Default-Uri-Host Option to indicate the default value for the Uri-Host Options in the messages that it sends to the other endpoint. Its value MUST be a valid value for the Uri-Host Option (Section 5.10.1 of RFC7252). For TLS, the base value for the Default-Uri-Host Option in the direction from the Connection Initiator to the Connection Acceptor is given by the SNI value. For WebSockets, the base value for the Default-Uri-Host Option in the direction from the Connection Initiator to the Connection Acceptor is given by the HTTP Host header field. The active value of the Default-Uri-Host Option is replaced each time the option is sent with a modified value. Its starting value is its base value (if available). 4.3.2. The sender can use the elective Max-Message-Size Option to indicate the maximum message size in bytes that it can receive."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-webtrans-http3-eb018f7d27059b3f7b44c1c31a668d69839ab60c6f02e8610d3f0722644cf83e","text":"This document Both 7.5. The following entry is added to the \"HTTP/3 Error Code\" registry established by HTTP3: H3_WEBTRANSPORT_BUFFERED_STREAM_REJECTED 0x3994bd84 WebTransport data stream rejected due to lack of associated session. This document. "}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-eb23ee51ce8769c164c4523b4dc1c449308668dbbf4f7e000cd1cec9671c5bc6","text":"for the \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension. Clients MUST ignore any \"ECHConfig\" structure with a version they do not support. The length, in bytes, of the next field. The length, in bytes, of the next field. This length field allows implementations to skip over the elements in such a list where they cannot parse the specific version of ECHConfig. An opaque byte string whose contents depend on the version. For this specification, the contents are an \"ECHConfigContents\""}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-eb67944012077c2ef7d4aba66d9b4774f26e9de34bc8f9ca9c0e5ea81fe37b90","text":"7.3.3. This method is indicated by \"jwsd\" in the \"proof\" field. A JWS RFC7515 object is created as follows: This method is indicated by the method value \"jwsd\". This method defines no additional parameters. A JWS RFC7515 object is created as follows: To protect the request, the JOSE header of the signature contains the following claims:"}
{"_id":"q-en-rtcweb-transport-ec10a4ea01c6de9039ac46ca6c3c087e85ae41b9dd856224a26a8a77b9b117a4","text":"The WebRTC implementation MAY support accessing the Internet through an HTTP proxy. If it does so, it MUST support the \"connect\" header as specified in I-D.ietf-httpbis-tunnel-protocol. as specified in I-D.ietf-httpbis-tunnel-protocol, and proxy authentication as described in Section 4.3.6 of RFC7231 and RFC7235 MUST also be supported. 3.5."}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-ec2132e3b3a4b32c3094a62671beebdec091e0672e762090a599b274b8bfc0a5","text":"To avoid additional delays to connection migration confirmation when using this extension, a client can bundle an IMMEDIATE_ACK frame with the first non-probing frame (Section 9.2 of QUIC-TRANSPORT) it sends or it can simply send an IMMEDIATE_ACK frame, which is a non-probing or it can send only an IMMEDIATE_ACK frame, which is a non-probing frame. An endpoint's congestion controller and RTT estimator are reset upon"}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-ec5259c577ef224db6e8674908b4ad9ac78fc6744ac52ca211a40734983226c9","text":"ASCII characters to facilitate transmission over HTTP headers within other protocols without requiring additional encoding. RECOMMENDED. Flag indicating if the token is bound to the client instance's key. If the boolean value is \"true\" or the field is omitted, and the \"key\" field is omitted, the token is bound to the request-client in its request for access. If the boolean value is \"true\" or the field is omitted, and the \"key\" field is present, the token is bound to the key and proofing mechanism indicated in the \"key\" field. If the boolean value is \"false\", the token is a bearer token with no key bound to it and the \"key\" field MUST be omitted. REQUIRED for multiple access tokens, OPTIONAL for single access token. The value of the \"label\" the client instance provided in the associated request-token, if present. If the token has been"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-ec8f5b272826fa949c4ba899cda29245c5813dae2931d10caac434a2a6d53368","text":"information about a client that any existing member can use to add this client to the group asynchronously. A ClientInitKey object specifies what ciphersuites a client supports, as well as providing public keys that the client can use for key derivation and signing. The client's identity key is intended to be stable throughout the lifetime of the group; there is no mechanism to change it. Init keys are intended to be used a very limited number of times, potentially once. (see init-key-reuse). ClientInitKeys also contain an identifier chosen by the client, which the client MUST assure uniquely identifies a given ClientInitKey object among the set of ClientInitKeys created by this client. The init_keys array MUST have the same length as the cipher_suites array, and each entry in the init_keys array MUST be a public key for the asymmetric encryption scheme defined in the cipher_suites array and used in the HPKE construction for TreeKEM. The whole structure is signed using the client's identity key. A ClientInitKey object with an invalid signature field MUST be considered malformed. The input to the signature computation comprises all of the fields except for the signature field. A ClientInitKey object specifies a ciphersuite that the client supports, as well as providing a public key that others can use for key agreement. The client's identity key is intended to be stable throughout the lifetime of the group; there is no mechanism to change it. Init keys are intended to be used a very limited number of times, ideally only once. (See init-key-reuse). Clients MAY generate and publish multiple ClientInitKey objects to support multiple ciphersuites, or to reduce the likelihood of init key reuse. ClientInitKeys contain an identifier chosen by the client, which the client MUST assure uniquely identifies a given ClientInitKey object among the set of ClientInitKeys created by this client. The value for init_key MUST be a public key for the asymmetric encryption scheme defined by cipher_suite. The whole structure is signed using the client's identity key. A ClientInitKey object with an invalid signature field MUST be considered malformed. The input to the signature computation comprises all of the fields except for the signature field. 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-ecc3dac6ec3668fa8dba10a77bbbf4a7afce71d78266d37f35943765d0f99e03","text":"additional information. The format of the encoded identity is defined by the application. For an X.509 credential, each entry in the chain represents a single DER-encoded X.509 certificate. The chain is ordered such that the first entry (chain[0]) is the end-entity certificate and each subsequent certificate in the chain MUST be the issuer of the previous certificate. The public key encoded in the \"subjectPublicKeyInfo\" of the end-entity certificate MUST be identical to the \"signature_key\" in the LeafNode containing this credential. For an X.509 credential, each entry in the \"certificates\" field represents a single DER-encoded X.509 certificate. The chain is ordered such that the first entry (chain[0]) is the end-entity certificate. The public key encoded in the \"subjectPublicKeyInfo\" of the end-entity certificate MUST be identical to the \"signature_key\" in the LeafNode containing this credential. A chain MAY omit any non-leaf certificates that supported peers are known to already possess. 5.3.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-ecc7b5ff8d32e77db8ea2bba6d1747a305dc1964a6017d442e1d2ee2b2998e1a","text":"intensive, and reducing acknowledgement frequency reduces this cost at a data sender. Severely asymmetric link technologies, such as DOCSIS, LTE, and satellite links, connection throughput in the data direction becomes constrained when the reverse bandwidth is filled by For severely asymmetric link technologies, such as DOCSIS, LTE, and satellite links, connection throughput in the forward path can become constrained when the reverse path is filled by acknowledgment packets. When traversing such links, reducing the number of acknowledgments allows connection throughput to scale much further. number of acknowledgments can achieve higher connection throughput. The rate of acknowledgment packets can impact link efficiency, including transmission opportunities or battery life. As discussed in implementation however, there can be undesirable consequences to congestion control and loss recovery if a receiver"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-ed4ee8b9c54399095f56acf184e880c248692fd59f56a07831aae24a639215b9","text":"layer. By providing reliability at the stream level and congestion control across the entire connection, it has the capability to improve the performance of HTTP compared to a TCP mapping. QUIC also incorporates TLS 1.3 at the transport layer, offering comparable security to running TLS over TCP, with the improved connection setup latency of TCP Fast Open RFC7413. incorporates TLS 1.3 TLS13 at the transport layer, offering comparable security to running TLS over TCP, with the improved connection setup latency of TCP Fast Open TFO. This document defines a mapping of HTTP semantics over the QUIC transport protocol, drawing heavily on the design of HTTP/2. While"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-ed74f8092af886de69382864079dfc6fa44895539c434cbeaa4470e4e408dc15","text":"Sending a Message with Message Properties inconsistent with the Selection Properties of the Connection yields an error. Connection Properties describe the default behavior for all Messages on a Connection. If a Message Property contradicts a Connection Property, and if this per-Message behavior can be supported, it overrides the Connection Property for the specific Message. For example, if \"Reliable Data Transfer (Connection)\" is set to \"Require\" and a protocol with configurable per-Message reliability is used, setting \"Reliable Data Transfer (Message)\" to \"false\" for a particular Message will allow this Message to be sent without any reliability guarantees. Changing the Reliable Data Transfer property on Messages is only possible for Connections that were established enabling the Selection Property \"Configure Per-Message Reliability\". If a Message Property contradicts a Connection Property, and if this per-Message behavior can be supported, it overrides the Connection Property for the specific Message. For example, if \"Reliable Data Transfer (Connection)\" is set to \"Require\" and a protocol with configurable per-Message reliability is used, setting \"Reliable Data Transfer (Message)\" to \"false\" for a particular Message will allow this Message to be sent without any reliability guarantees. Changing the Reliable Data Transfer property on Messages is only possible for Connections that were established enabling the Selection Property \"Configure Per-Message Reliability\". The following Message Properties are supported:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-ee26328427d3b3b7d16bcde2795d3489329226bccee02b280cbf12160af07ab3","text":"When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3, the EAP-TLS peers and EAP- TLS servers MUST comply with the compliance requirements (mandatory- to-implement cipher suites, signature algorithms, key exchange algorithms, extensions, etc.) for the TLS version used. For TLS 1.3 the compliance requirements are defined in Section 9 of RFC8446. In algorithms, extensions, etc.) defined in Section 9 of RFC8446. In EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3, only cipher suites with confidentiality SHALL be supported."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-ee2e814e54b332e263412c671d421df8b7120cf1025a62c1addc141b353008d7","text":"This property applies to Connections and Connection Groups. The default is to have this option. 5.2.7. 5.2.8. Type: Boolean"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-ee48b4fa86c5ac8f6c0125535ad8ecd3e0407dcf9e5a1f0ca9c32ec613bdf0ad","text":"7. In order to satisfy the security requirements of DNS over HTTPS, this protocol MUST use HTTP/2 RFC7540 or its successors. HTTP/2 enforces a modern TLS profile necessary for achieving the security requirements of this protocol. This protocol MUST be used with https scheme URI RFC7230. The messages in classic UDP based DNS RFC1035 are inherently unordered and have low overhead. A competitive HTTP transport needs to support reordering, priority, parallelism, and header compression. For this additional reason, this protocol MUST use HTTP/2 RFC7540 or its successors. This protocol MUST use HTTP/2 RFC7540 or its successors in order to satisfy the security requirements of DNS over HTTPS. Further, the messages in classic UDP based DNS RFC1035 are inherently unordered and have low overhead. A competitive HTTP transport needs to support reordering, priority, parallelism, and header compression, all of which are supported by HTTP/2 RFC7540 or its successors. 8."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ctls-ee7d4d0e5a042143b31daccd8821b73e43689b8dd6cae3ca4cf03cef8974970f","text":"more on this, as well as https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/ TugB5ddJu3nYg7chcyeIyUqWSbA.]] contains keys that are not required to be understood by the client. Server operators MUST NOT place a key in this section unless the server is able to determine whether the key is in use based on the client data it receives. A key MUST NOT appear in both the main template and the optional section. 2.1.1. To be compatible with the specializations described in this section,"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-edhoc-ee81abb0fb2f6e871f754c5914526eb50b9d64a1ba7843a00be68119219d6a38","text":"is not applicable to the approach defined in this specification. If step 4 (EDHOC processing) fails, the server discontinues the protocol as per Section 5.4.3 of I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc and sends an EDHOC error message, formatted as defined in Section 6.1 of I-D.ietf- lake-edhoc. In particular, the CoAP response conveying the EDHOC error message: MUST have Content-Format set to application/edhoc defined in Section 9.5 of I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc. MUST specify a CoAP error response code, i.e. 4.00 (Bad Request) in case of client error (e.g. due to a malformed EDHOC message_3), or 5.00 (Internal Server Error) in case of server error (e.g. due to failure in deriving EDHOC key material). protocol as per Section 5.4.3 of I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc and responds with an EDHOC error message, formatted as defined in Section 6.1 of I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc. In particular, the CoAP response conveying the EDHOC error message MUST have Content-Format set to application/edhoc defined in Section 9.5 of I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc. If step 4 (EDHOC processing) is successfully completed but step 7 (OSCORE processing) fails, the same OSCORE error handling applies as defined in Section 8.2 of RFC8613. 5. 5.4. An example based on the OSCORE test vector from Appendix C.4 of RFC8613 and the EDHOC test vector from Appendix B.2 of I-D.ietf-lake- edhoc is given in fig-edhoc-opt-2. In particular, the example assumes that: fig-edhoc-opt-2 shows an example of EDHOC + OSCORE Request, based on the OSCORE test vector from Appendix C.4 of RFC8613 and the EDHOC test vector from Appendix B.2 of I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc. In particular, the example assumes that: The used OSCORE Partial IV is 0, consistently with the first request protected with the new OSCORE Security Context. The OSCORE Sender ID of the Client is 0x20. This corresponds to The OSCORE Sender ID of the Client is 0x00. This corresponds to the EDHOC Connection Identifier C_R, which is encoded as the bstr_identifier 0x08 in EDHOC message_3. bstr_identifier 0x37 in EDHOC message_3. The EDHOC option is registered with CoAP option number 13. The EDHOC option is registered with CoAP option number 21. 6."}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-eec4d267f28962d6cae5d9c9c2e0d8fccff6ce37b9785b1ebcf89d943d50072f","text":"If PSK is not combined with fresh ephemeral key exchange, then compromise of any group member allows the attacker to passively read (and actively modify) all traffic. read (and actively modify) all traffic, including past traffic. Additionally, a malicious non-member can reroute handshakes between honest group members to connect them in unintended ways, as described"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-eec630ca2f26110d3f091655f5ae1caa78c03f0d0349198ed541e3b79276c032","text":"will never show up when queuing the value of a preference - the effective preference must be returned instead. Internally, the transport system will first exclude all protocols and paths that match a Prohibit, then exclude all protocols and paths that do not match a Require, then sort candidates according to The implementation MUST ensure a consistent outcome given the same Selection Properties. Internally, it MUST exclude all protocols and paths that match a Prohibit and exclude all protocols and paths that do not match a Require. It MUST then sort candidates according to Preferred properties, and then use Avoided properties as a tiebreaker. Selection Properties that select paths take preference over those that select protocols. For example, if an application indicates a preference for a specific path by specifying an interface, but also a preference for a protocol not available on this path, the transport system will try the path first, ignoring the protocol preference. tiebreaker. Note that the protocols and paths which are available on a specific system may vary, such that application preferences may conflict with each other. For example, if an application indicates a preference for a specific path by specifying an interface, but also a preference for a protocol, a situation might occur in which the preferred protocol is not available on the preferred path. In such cases, implementations MUST ensure a deterministic outcome by prioritizing Selection Properties that select paths over those that select protocols. Therefore, the transport system MUST try the path first, ignoring the protocol preference if the protocol does not work on the path. Selection and Connection Properties, as well as defaults for Message Properties, can be added to a Preconnection to configure the"}
{"_id":"q-en-webpush-protocol-ef15a6cd24303f0ceaf43d8f83f12b7a68d5006784ab2cf8395674665e0e79d9","text":"A user agent requests the delivery of new push messages by making a GET request to a push message subscription resource. The push service does not respond to this request, it instead uses I-D.ietf- httpbis-http2 to send the contents of push messages as they are sent by application servers. service does not respond to this request, it instead uses RFC7540 to send the contents of push messages as they are sent by application servers. Each push message is pushed in response to a synthesized GET request. The GET request is made to the push message resource that was created"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-ef52f3074b0fabd0706c5407cebacbe896a970fab8cfa261a3e5d5cf8aac9629","text":"5.4. If a client decides to cache the certificate chain an re-validate it when resuming a connection, the client SHOULD also cache the associated delegated credential and re-validate it. 5.5. Delegated credentials can be valid for 7 days and it is much easier for a service to create delegated credential than a certificate signed by a CA. A service could determine the client time and clock"}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-ef59f2809e6dc694de2fa19ecc4b564e716028e1f09942ea7ddf67e02b0ecb7d","text":"freshness\", i.e., allowing Alice to verify that Bob is still prepared to receive her communications so that Alice does not continue to send large traffic volumes to entities which went abruptly offline. ICE specifies periodic STUN keepalizes but only if media is not flowing. Because the consent issue is more difficult here, we require RTCWeb specifies periodic STUN keepalives but only if media is not flowing. Because the consent issue is more difficult here, we require WebRTC implementations to periodically send keepalives. As described in Section 5.3, these keepalives MUST be based on the consent freshness mechanism specified in I-D.muthu-behave-consent-freshness. If a"}
{"_id":"q-en-ack-frequency-efed8aa2d9303f17ba7eae971936e549b2c4e193c07509a7bb522610af16c87a","text":"A variable-length integer that indicates how many out of order packets can arrive before eliciting an immediate ACK. If no ACK_FREQUENCY frames have been received, this value defaults to 3, which is the recommended packet threhold for loss detection in (Section 18.2 of QUIC-RECOVERY). A value of 0 indicates immediate ACKs SHOULD never be sent due to receiving an out-of-order packet. ACK_FREQUENCY frames have been received, the endpoint immediately acknowledges any subsequent packets that are received out of order, as specified in Section 13.2 of QUIC-TRANSPORT, as such the default value is 1. A value of 0 indicates immediate ACKs SHOULD never be sent due to receiving an out-of-order packet. ACK_FREQUENCY frames are ack-eliciting. However, their loss does not require retransmission if an ACK_FREQUENCY frame with a larger"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-architecture-f03849269c876b30f1bedb4afca3d91f46d5ea570b457ae04ed0b2e1cdc79d26","text":"Finally, Clients should not be able to perform DoS attacks denial-of- service. 5. This document makes no requests of IANA. "}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-f0b197a12d54c053b1c038bed772c769eb02efcb120b68ccdefd72d8bea30024","text":"External Commits work like regular Commits, with a few differences: External Commits MUST reference an Add Proposal that adds the issuing new member to the group The proposals included by value in an External Commit MUST meet the following conditions: There MUST be a single Add proposal that adds the new issuing new member to the group There MUST be a single ExternalInit proposal There MUST NOT be any Update proposals If a Remove proposal is present, then the \"credential\" and \"endpoint_id\" of the removed leaf MUST be the same as the corresponding values in the Add KeyPackage. The proposals included by reference in an External Commit MUST meet the following conditions: There MUST NOT be any ExternalInit proposals External Commits MUST contain a \"path\" field (and is therefore a \"full\" Commit)"}
{"_id":"q-en-webrtc-http-ingest-protocol-f0fe19293774f22be8a17f9bd0e310cbac3b50fcdbcb5e89a3c8d363063d7d3e","text":"The initial offer by the WHIP client MAY be sent after the full ICE gathering is complete with the full list of ICE candidates, or it MAY only contain local candidates (or even an empty list of candidates). only contain local candidates (or even an empty list of candidates) as per RFC8863. In order to simplify the protocol, there is no support for exchanging gathered trickle candidates from Media Server ICE candidates once the"}
{"_id":"q-en-senml-spec-f100310b4dbd3d45f29781fac41a5a7bce7590fbb003c3b7e1c942478558819d","text":"The compressed form, using the byte alignment option of EXI, for the above XML is the following: A small temperature sensor devices that only generates this one EXI A small temperature sensor device that only generates this one EXI file does not really need an full EXI implementation. It can simply hard code the output replacing the 1-wire device ID starting at byte 0x20 and going to byte 0x2F with it's device ID, and replacing the"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-f104f330ebd98f87c7e0de8b289961ed851292089ec17c5377bddd9ada280655","text":"This document specifies two stream types. The entries in the following table are registered in the \"HTTP/3 Stream Types\" registry established in HTTP3. established in RFC9114. 8.3. This document specifies three error codes. The entries in the following table are registered in the \"HTTP/3 Error Codes\" registry established in HTTP3. established in RFC9114. "}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-f215299e749b9c1cd6603a44e88eee774783ee4313e56cc3eac9e29ee7c4f5a9","text":"the GroupContext. This extension lists the extensions and proposal types that must be supported by all members of the group. For new members, it is enforced by existing members during the application of Add commits. Existing members should of course be in compliance already. In order to ensure this continues to be the case even as the group's extensions can be updated, a GroupContextExtensions proposal is invalid if it contains a \"required_capabilities\" extension that requires capabilities not supported by all current members. supported by all members of the group. The \"default\" proposal and extension types defined in this document are assumed to be implemented by all clients, and need not be listed in RequiredCapabilities in order to be safely used. For new members, support for required capabilities is enforced by existing members during the application of Add commits. Existing members should of course be in compliance already. In order to ensure this continues to be the case even as the group's extensions can be updated, a GroupContextExtensions proposal is invalid if it contains a \"required_capabilities\" extension that requires non- default capabilities not supported by all current members. 10.2."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-f25dc5fc3576b0eb1e31ee93861b3a73ab0982dd7d5c5d5738c3fa8a84898d4c","text":"Group. As noted in groups, this property is not entangled when Connections are cloned, i.e., changing the Priority on one Connection in a Connection Group does not change it on the other Connections in the same Connection Group. the same Connection Group. See priority-in-taps. 7.1.4."}
{"_id":"q-en-suit-firmware-encryption-f27362bc5d6ccb3c2b2b2a27e196817ee0bddb26bed66fb6da707d6b91211691","text":"4. This specification introduces two extensions to the SUIT envelope and the manifest structure, as motivated in arch. The SUIT envelope is enhanced with a key exchange payload, which is carried inside the suit-protection-wrappers parameter, see envelope- fig. One or multiple SUIT_Encryption_Info payload(s) are carried within the suit-protection-wrappers parameter. The content of the SUIT_Encryption_Info payload is explained in AES-KW (for AES-KW) and in HPKE (for HPKE). When the encryption capability is used, the suit-protection-wrappers parameter MUST be included in the envelope. The manifest is extended with a CEK verification parameter (called suit-cek-verification), see manifest-fig. This parameter is optional and is utilized in environments where battery exhaustion attacks are a concern. Details about the CEK verification can be found in cek- verification. This specification introduces two extensions to the SUIT_Parameters, as motivated in arch. The SUIT manifest is enhanced with a key exchange payload, which is carried within the suit-directive-override-parameters or suit- directive-set-parameters for each encrypted payload. One SUIT_Encryption_Info is carried with suit-parameter-encryption-info, see parameter-fig. The content of the SUIT_Encryption_Info is explained in AES-KW (for AES-KW) and in HPKE (for HPKE). When the encryption capability is used, the SUIT_Encryption_Info parameter MUST be included in the SUIT_Directive. A CEK verification parameter (called suit-parameter-cek- verification), see parameter-fig, also extends the manifest. This parameter is optional and is utilized in environments where battery exhaustion attacks are a concern. Details about the CEK verification can be found in cek-verification. 5."}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-f29c28ca86558689d7b067d369a6e1818605b60daa9cf02c7eb75cfa3da44eab","text":"MUST be at least 8 octets and no more than 16 octets. The nonce length and server ID length MUST sum to 19 or fewer octets. 4.3.2. 4.2.2. Upon receipt of a QUIC packet, the load balancer extracts as many of the earliest octets from the destination connection ID as necessary"}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-f2a86fd00fe0373a23abc4dabfa955f2c8122a23f8a5e6c649fe00ae5ea0dddf","text":"identifiers from EDHOC SHOULD provide mechanisms to update the connection identifier and MAY provide mechanisms to issue several simultaneously active connection identifiers. See RFC9000 for a non- constrained example of such mechanisms. Connection identifiers SHOULD be unpredictable. Using the same identifier several times is not a problem as long as it is chosen randomly. Connection identity privacy mechanisms are only useful when there are not fixed identifiers such as IP address or MAC address in the lower layers. constrained example of such mechanisms. Connection identifiers can e.g., be chosen randomly among the set of unused 1-byte connection identifiers. Connection identity privacy mechanisms are only useful when there are not fixed identifiers such as IP address or MAC address in the lower layers. 8.6."}
{"_id":"q-en-gnap-core-protocol-f2aa93e1320277cadcc402fe2b7fa2929ccffd418c8def8769fdfd0f4a0ba841","text":"sends the \"split\" flag as described in request-token-single. If the AS has split the access token response, the response MUST include the \"split\" flag set to \"true\". include the \"split\" flag. [[ See issue #69 [17] ]]"}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-f2aff402cef140675ee52ade2591e3a0d6a5e0a4a91c8a26acce05aed48bae49","text":"properties outlined above. The attack violates the same session keys property, as \"A\" and \"B\" have each completed a session, ostensibly with each other, and yet do not agree on the session key. If \"A\" does not send a key share, then the attacker can have a session with \"A\" and a separate session with \"B\", where both sessions have the same key. This violates the uniqueness of session keys property. In the case of KCI resistance, where we assume the attacker has compromised \"A\", the attacker can successfully impersonate \"B\" to \"A\" using this pattern. does not send a key share extension, then the attacker can have a session with \"A\" and a separate session with \"B\", where both sessions have the same key. Since the attacker has knowledge of all of the messages and their content, the nonce in the handshake does not prevent the attacker from computing the full key schedule. This violates the uniqueness of session keys property. In the case of KCI resistance, where we assume the attacker has compromised \"A\", the attacker can successfully impersonate \"B\" to \"A\" using this pattern. 4. Given the desired security goals from sec-properties, applications which make use of external PSKs MUST adhere to the following requirements: To achieve the security goals from sec-properties when the external PSK will not be combined with a pairwise secret value, applications MUST use external PSKs that adhere to the following requirements: Each PSK MUST NOT be shared between with more than two logical nodes. As a result, an agent that acts as both a client and a"}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-f2cfcd7f43ed4cf70cf6ba304f616a3d14f5a0fd42a323d69b70b6b67848e1ed","text":"TLS session tickets and NEW_TOKEN tokens are specific to the QUIC version of the connection that provided them. Clients SHOULD NOT use a session ticket or token from a QUICv1 connection to initiate a QUICv2 connection, or vice versa. a session ticket or token from a QUIC version 1 connection to initiate a QUIC version 2 connection, or vice versa. Servers MUST validate the originating version of any session ticket or token and not accept one issued from a different version. A"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-f325486f24417b000fa2fe1ae0185fa4c7dd26b1c3a6301935b03f3051915175","text":"interaction models in general, the following set of prerequisites MUST be in place to support the implementation of interaction models: A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser without accompanying evidence about its validity, used as proof of identity. An Authentication Secret MUST be available exclusively to an Attesting Environment of an Attester. The Attester MUST protect Claims with that Authentication Secret, thereby proving the authenticity of the Claims included in Evidence. The Authentication Secret MUST be established before RATS can take place. A statement about a distinguishable Attester made by an Endorser. The provenance of Evidence with respect to a distinguishable Attesting Environment MUST be correct and unambiguous. An Attester Identity MAY be a unique identity, MAY be included in a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), MAY be part of a group signature, or it MAY be a randomized DAA credential DAA. An Attester Identity MAY be an Authentication Secret which is available exclusively to one of the Attesting Environments of an Attester. It MAY be a unique identity, MAY be included in a zero- knowledge proof (ZKP), MAY be part of a group signature, or it MAY be a randomized DAA credential DAA. Attestation Evidence MUST be authentic. In order to provide proofs of authenticity, Attestation Evidence SHOULD be cryptographically associated with an identity document (e.g. an PKIX certificate or trusted key material, or a randomized DAA credential DAA), or SHOULD include a correct and unambiguous and stable reference to an accessible identity document. An Authentication Secret MUST be available exclusively to an Attester's Attesting Environment. The Attester MUST protect Claims with that Authentication Secret, thereby proving the authenticity of the Claims included in Evidence. The Authentication Secret MUST be established before RATS can take place. (e.g., a PKIX certificate or trusted key material, or a randomized DAA credential DAA), or SHOULD include a correct, unambiguous and stable reference to an accessible identity document. Evidence MUST include an indicator about its freshness that can be understood by a Verifier. Analogously, interaction models MUST"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-f3267e3448192b1c4579455fc5bf855ea453366769b6cf3b337bca7a45156945","text":"17.6. This document registers the \"message/mls\" MIME media type in order to allow other protocols (ex: HTTP RFC7540) to convey MLS messages. allow other protocols (e.g., HTTP RFC7540) to convey MLS messages. message"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-conn-id-f415d80e476a46290746c5d10c9745faaaadb8de44461bc826cf061c5bf66e20","text":"The above is necessary to protect against attacks that use datagrams with spoofed addresses or replayed datagrams to trigger attacks. Note that there is no requirement to use of the anti-replay window Note that there is no requirement for use of the anti-replay window mechanism defined in Section 4.1.2.6 of DTLS 1.2. Both solutions, the \"anti-replay window\" or \"newer algorithm\" will prevent address the \"anti-replay window\" or \"newer\" algorithm, will prevent address updates from replay attacks while the latter will only apply to peer address updates and the former applies to any application layer traffic. Note that datagrams that pass the DTLS cryptographic verification procedures but do not trigger a change of peer address are still valid DTLS records and are still to be passed to the application. Application protocols that implement protection against these attacks depend on being aware of changes in peer addresses so that they can engage the necessary mechanisms. When delivered such an event, an application layer-specific address validation mechanism can be triggered, for example one that is based on successful exchange of triggered, for example one that is based on successful exchange of a minimal amount of ping-pong traffic with the peer. Alternatively, an DTLS-specific mechanism may be used, as described in I-D.tschofenig- tls-dtls-rrc."}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-f428b0ec255a09e8eb2ef8a5a67ceb80dbfe89b6b6df607da8864b558758ec27","text":"the complete LwM2M model to a summary of how RD is used in there, with a reference to the current specification. impl-info: Add note about the type being WIP changes from -24 to -25 Large rework of section 7 (Security policies)"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-f4457a43ac9fb94a51bcb115a90fc5e6a489840ef4ee2188327a5640af42c0de","text":"perform this process as part of packet processing, but this creates a timing signal that can be used by an attacker to learn when key updates happen and thus the value of the Key Phase bit in certain packets. Endpoints SHOULD instead defer the creation of the next set of receive packet protection keys until some time after a key update packets. Endpoints MAY instead defer the creation of the next set of receive packet protection keys until some time after a key update completes, up to three times the PTO; see old-keys-recv. Once generated, the next set of packet protection keys SHOULD be"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-f49d4257e1a7f5ad4c183ada9ef61d3aac48a4e977459dfebe0bcbbe853e91ca","text":"processing in the filter expression: Its only argument is an instance of \"NodesType\" (possibly taken from a \"filter-path\" as in the example above). The result is an instance a \"filter-query\" as in the example above). The result is an instance of \"ValueType\". If the argument contains a single node, the result is the value of"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-f4e85dc66a1d5b8851d31507c584a9e720b36d0b52e927dab5121607b96a5574","text":"Remove renegotiation. Update format of signatures with context. Remove point format negotiation. draft-03"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mptcp-rfc6824bis-f4f1acfddecb788b1cc127cd1c2e932bd22c8f226cc5109eb1c99da503399826","text":"receiver of the TCP packet (which can be either host). The initial SYN, containing just the MP_CAPABLE header, is used to define the version of MPTCP beign requested, as well as exchanging define the version of MPTCP being requested, as well as exchanging flags to negotiate connection features, described later. This option is used to declare the 64-bit keys that the end hosts"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-f5416c47974a1cab3f186a49249256f4ed53520ab2937f075402af63756fd8ed","text":"integrity measurements for files. The ISO-19770-2:2015 XML schema uses XML DSIG to support cryptographic signatures. Signing CoSWID tags follows the procedues defined in CBOR Object Signing and Encryption RFC8152. A CoSWID tg MUST be wrapped in a Signing CoSWID tags follows the procedures defined in CBOR Object Signing and Encryption RFC8152. A CoSWID tag MUST be wrapped in a COSE Single Signer Data Object (COSE_Sign1) that contains a single signature and MUST be signed by the tag creator. The following CDDL specification defines a restrictive subset of COSE header parameters"}
{"_id":"q-en-oscore-edhoc-f543a8c69f99559779956d40694496ffe1c4fdd6010bd64f2e360cee6b9e1e0a","text":"2. EDHOC is a 3-message key exchange protocol. Section 7.2 of I-D.ietf- lake-edhoc specifies how to transport EDHOC over CoAP: the EDHOC data (referred to as \"EDHOC messages\") are transported in the payload of CoAP requests and responses. The EDHOC protocol allows two peers to agree on a cryptographic secret, in a mutually-authenticated way and by using Diffie-Hellman ephemeral keys to achieve perfect forward secrecy. The two peers are denoted as Initiator and Responder, as the one sending or receiving the initial EDHOC message_1, respectively. After successful processing of EDHOC message_3, both peers agree on a cryptographic secret that can be used to derive further security material, and especially to establish an OSCORE Security Context RFC8613. The Responder can also send an optional EDHOC message_4 to achieve key confirmation, e.g. in deployments where no protected application message is sent from the Responder to the Initiator. Section 7.2 of I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc specifies how to transport EDHOC over CoAP. That is, the EDHOC data (referred to as \"EDHOC messages\") are transported in the payload of CoAP requests and responses. The default message flow consists in the CoAP Client acting as Initiator and the CoAP Server acting as Responder. Alternatively, the two roles can be reversed. In the rest of this document, EDHOC messages are considered to be transported over CoAP. fig-non-combined shows a Client and Server running EDHOC as Initiator and Responder, respectively. That is, the Client sends a POST request with payload EDHOC message_1 to a reserved resource at the CoAP Server, by default at Uri-Path \"/.well-known/edhoc\". This triggers the EDHOC exchange at the Server, which replies with a 2.04 (Changed) Response with payload EDHOC message_2. Finally, the Client sends a CoAP POST request to the same resource used for EDHOC message_1, with payload EDHOC message_3. The Content-Format of these CoAP messages may be set to \"application/edhoc\". After this exchange takes place, and after successful verifications as specified in the EDHOC protocol, the Client and Server can derive an OSCORE Security Context, as defined in oscore-ctx of this document. After that, they can use OSCORE to protect their communications. This draft deals with the case of the Initiator acting as CoAP Client and the Responder acting as CoAP Server; instead, the case of the Initiator acting as CoAP Server cannot be optimized by using this approach. As shown in fig-non-combined, this purely-sequential way of first running EDHOC and then using OSCORE takes three round trips to complete. That is, the CoAP Client sends a POST request containing EDHOC message_1 to a reserved resource at the CoAP Server. This triggers the EDHOC exchange on the CoAP Server, which replies with a 2.04 (Changed) Response containing EDHOC message_2. Finally, the CoAP Client sends EDHOC message_3, as a CoAP POST request to the same resource used for EDHOC message_1. The Content-Format of these CoAP messages may be set to \"application/edhoc\". edhoc-in-oscore defines an optimization for combining EDHOC with the first subsequent OSCORE transaction. This reduces the number of round trips required to set up an OSCORE Security Context and to complete an OSCORE transaction using that Security Context. After this exchange takes place, and after successful verifications specified in the EDHOC protocol, the Client and Server derive the OSCORE Security Context, as specified in Section 7.2.1 of I-D.ietf- lake-edhoc. Then, they are ready to use OSCORE. 3. This sequential way of running EDHOC and then OSCORE is specified in fig-non-combined. As shown in the figure, this mechanism takes 3 round trips to complete. When using EDHOC over CoAP for establishing an OSCORE Security Context, EDHOC messages are exchanged as defined in Section 7.2 of I- D.ietf-lake-edhoc, with the following addition. The number of roundtrips can be minimized as follows. Already after receiving EDHOC message_2 and before sending EDHOC message_3, the CoAP Client has all the information needed to derive the OSCORE Security Context. EDHOC error messages sent as CoAP responses MUST be error responses, i.e. they MUST specify a CoAP error response code. In particular, it is RECOMMENDED that such error responses have response code either 4.00 (Bad Request) in case of client error (e.g. due to a malformed EDHOC message), or 5.00 (Internal Server Error) in case of server error (e.g. due to failure in deriving EDHOC key material). This means that the Client can potentially send at the same time both EDHOC message_3 and the subsequent OSCORE Request. On a semantic level, this approach practically requires to send two separate REST requests at the same time. 4. The high level message flow of running EDHOC and OSCORE combined is shown in fig-combined. After successful processing of EDHOC message_3 (see Section 5.5 of I- D.ietf-lake-edhoc), the Client and Server derive Security Context parameters for OSCORE (see Section 3.2 of RFC8613) as follows. The Master Secret and Master Salt are derived by using the EDHOC- Exporter interface defined in Section 4.1 of I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc. The EDHOC Exporter Labels to use are \"OSCORE Master Secret\" and \"OSCORE Master Salt\", for deriving the OSCORE Master Secret and the OSCORE Master Salt, respectively. By default, key_length is the key length (in bytes) of the application AEAD Algorithm of the selected cipher suite for the EDHOC session. Also by default, salt_length has value 8. The Initiator and Responder MAY agree out-of-band on a longer key_length than the default and on a different salt_length. The AEAD Algorithm is the application AEAD algorithm of the selected cipher suite for the EDHOC session. The HKDF Algorithm is the HKDF algorithm of the selected cipher suite for the EDHOC session. In case the Client is the Initiator and the Server is the Responder, the Client's OSCORE Sender ID and the Server's OSCORE Sender ID are the byte string EDHOC connection identifier C_R and C_I for the EDHOC session, respectively. The reverse applies in case the Client is the Responder and the Server is the Initiator. Numeric connection identifiers are converted to (naturally byte- string shaped) Sender IDs by using their CBOR encoded form. For example, a C_R of 10 corresponds to a (typically server) Sender ID of hexadecimal '0a', -12 to hexadecimal '2b', whereas a byte- string valued C_R of h'ff' corresponds to a Sender ID of hexadecimal 'ff'. Before deriving an OSCORE Security Context, the two peers MUST ensure that the EDHOC connection identifiers are different. that is, the two peers MUST NOT derive an OSCORE Security Context from an EDHOC session, if C_R is equal to C_I for that session. If the Responder runs EDHOC with the intention of deriving an OSCORE Security Context, the Responder MUST NOT include in EDHOC message_2 a connection identifier C_R equivalent (under conversion to a Sender ID) to the connection identifier C_I received in EDHOC message_1. If the Initiator runs EDHOC with the intention of deriving an OSCORE Security Context, the initiator MUST discontinue the protocol and reply with an EDHOC error message when receiving an EDHOC message_2 that includes a connection identifier C_R equal to C_I. The Client and Server use the parameters above to establish an OSCORE Security Context, as per Section 3.2.1 of RFC8613. From then on, the Client and Server MUST be able to retrieve the OSCORE protocol state using its chosen connection identifier, and optionally other information such as the 5-tuple, i.e., the tuple (source IP address, source port, destination IP address, destination port, transport protocol). Defining the specific details of how to transport the data and of their processing order is the goal of this specification, as defined in edhoc-in-oscore. 5. 3. This section defines an optimization for combining the EDHOC exchange with the first subsequent OSCORE transaction, thus minimizing the number of round trips between the two peers. This approach can be used only if the default EDHOC message flow is used, i.e., when the Client acts as Initiator and the Server acts as Responder, while it cannot be used in the case with reversed roles. When running the purely-sequential flow of overview, the Client has all the information to derive the OSCORE Security Context already after receiving EDHOC message_2 and before sending EDHOC message_3. Hence, the Client can potentially send both EDHOC message_3 and the subsequent OSCORE Request at the same time. On a semantic level, this requires sending two REST requests at once, as in fig-combined. To this end, the specific approach defined in this section consists of sending EDHOC message_3 inside an OSCORE protected CoAP message. The resulting EDHOC + OSCORE request is in practice the OSCORE Request from fig-non-combined, as still sent to a protected resource and with the correct CoAP method and options, but with the addition that it also transports EDHOC message_3. As EDHOC message_3 may be too large to be included in a CoAP Option, e.g., if containing a large public key certificate chain, it has to be transported in the CoAP payload of the EDHOC + OSCORE request. The rest of this section specifies how to transport the data in the EDHOC + OSCORE request and their processing order. In particular, the use of this approach is explicitly signalled by including an EDHOC Option (see edhoc-option) in the EDHOC + OSCORE request. The processing of the EDHOC + OSCORE request is specified in client- processing for the Client side and in server-processing for the Server side. This section defines the EDHOC Option, used in a CoAP request to signal that the request combines EDHOC message_3 and OSCORE protected data. 5.1. This section defines the EDHOC Option. The option is used in a CoAP request, to signal that the request payload conveys both an EDHOC message_3 and OSCORE protected data, combined together. The EDHOC Option has the properties summarized in fig-edhoc-option, which extends Table 4 of RFC7252. The option is Critical, Safe-to-"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-f5d972b21d981cfde84819f3c65b259008fb802d30ffe1c2732b82fac14c7a31","text":"HTTP/3 endpoint is authoritative for other origins without an explicit signal. Prior to making requests for an origin whose scheme is not \"https,\" the client MUST ensure the server is willing to serve that scheme. If the client intends to make requests for an origin whose scheme is \"http\", this means that it MUST obtain a valid \"http-opportunistic\" response for the origin as described in RFC8164 prior to making any such requests. Other schemes might define other mechanisms. A server that does not wish clients to reuse connections for a particular origin can indicate that it is not authoritative for a request by sending a 421 (Misdirected Request) status code in"}
{"_id":"q-en-sframe-f61fcb10326750d9369562f3e44cb8301455855306e72c8a16a65cb61f098682","text":"5.1.2. The sender of a simulcast stream may use the same SRC for all the simulcast streams from the same media source or use a different SRC for each of them, in any case it is transparent to the SFU which will be able to perform the simulcast layer switching normally. The senders are already able to receive different SRCs from different participants due to LastN and RTP Stream reuse, so supporting simulcast uses same mechanisms. When using simulcast, the same input image will produce N different encoded frames (one per simulcat layer) which would be processed inpependently by the frame encryptor and assigned an unique counter for each. 5.1.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-f66596c4d0d5ed1fadf2a3b09e81fb2a4d6fba5f502b55cf68cb16732bc228f6","text":"The \"extension_data\" field of this extension SHALL contain a \"NamedGroupList\" value: %%% Named Group Extension enum { // Elliptic Curve Groups. sect163k1 (1), sect163r1 (2), sect163r2 (3), sect193r1 (4), sect193r2 (5), sect233k1 (6), sect233r1 (7), sect239k1 (8), sect283k1 (9), sect283r1 (10), sect409k1 (11), sect409r1 (12), sect571k1 (13), sect571r1 (14), secp160k1 (15), secp160r1 (16), secp160r2 (17), secp192k1 (18), secp192r1 (19), secp224k1 (20), secp224r1 (21), secp256k1 (22), secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), %%% Named Group Extension enum { // Elliptic Curve Groups. obsolete_RESERVED (1..13), sect571r1 (14), obsolete_RESERVED (15..22), secp256r1 (23), secp384r1 (24), secp521r1 (25), Indicates support of the corresponding named curve The named curves defined here are those specified in SEC 2 [13]. Note that many of these curves are also recommended in ANSI X9.62 X962 and FIPS 186-2 DSS. Values 0xFE00 through 0xFEFF are reserved for private use. Values 0xFF01 and 0xFF02 were used in previous versions of TLS but MUST NOT be offered by TLS 1.3 implementations. [[OPEN ISSUE: Triage curve list.]] Indicates support of the corresponding named curve. Note that some curves are also recommended in ANSI X9.62 X962 and FIPS 186-2 DSS. Values 0xFE00 through 0xFEFF are reserved for private use. Indicates support of the corresponding finite field group, defined in in I-D.ietf-tls-negotiated-ff-dhe. Values 0x01FC through 0x01FF are reserved for private use. Values within \"obsolete_RESERVED\" ranges were used in previous versions of TLS and MUST NOT be offered or negotiated by TLS 1.3 implementations. Items in named_curve_list are ordered according to the client's preferences (favorite choice first). As an example, a client that only supports secp192r1 (aka NIST P-192; value 19 = 0x0013) and secp224r1 (aka NIST P-224; value 21 = 0x0015) and prefers to use secp192r1 would include a TLS extension consisting As an example, a client that only supports secp256r1 (aka NIST P-256; value 23 = 0x0017) and secp384r1 (aka NIST P-384; value 24 = 0x0018) and prefers to use secp256r1 would include a TLS extension consisting of the following octets. Note that the first two octets indicate the extension type (Supported Group Extension):"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-f6b00bcb50d831a0493b72ce4342455368e64a9a81c0f631dd862c76115ac2ea","text":"for the corresponding m= line in the offer. If codec preferences have been set for the associated transceiver, media formats MUST be generated in the corresponding order, and MUST exclude any codecs not present in the codec preferences or not present in the offer. Note that non-JSEP endpoints are not subject to this restriction, and might add media formats in the answer that are not present in the offer, as specified in RFC3264, Section 6.1. Therefore, JSEP implementations MUST be prepared to receive such answers. Unless excluded by the above restrictions, the media formats MUST include the mandatory audio/video codecs as specified in RFC7874, Section 3, and RFC7742, Section 5. media formats MUST be generated in the corresponding order, regardless of what was offered, and MUST exclude any codecs not present in the codec preferences. Otherwise, the media formats on the m= line MUST be generated in the same order as those offered in the current remote description, excluding any currently unsupported formats. Any currently available media formats that are not present in the current remote description MUST be added after all existing formats. In either case, the media formats in the answer MUST include at least one format that is present in the offer, but MAY include formats that are locally supported but not present in the offer, as mentioned in RFC3264, Section 6.1. If no common format exists, the m= section is rejected as described above. The m= line MUST be followed immediately by a \"c=\" line, as specified in RFC4566, Section 5.7. Again, as no candidates are available yet,"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-f6bd1d66b127e0826d079f5f0c16a88c380deb478c133ace8e36cc94ffaa75e3","text":"configuration. This does not guarantee protection against invalid data but reduces the risk. A client can use DNS over HTTPS as one of multiple mechanisms to obtain DNS data. If a client of this protocol encounters an HTTP error after sending a DNS query, and then falls back to a different DNS retrieval mechanism, doing so can weaken the privacy and authenticity expected by the user of the client. 10. Local policy considerations and similar factors mean different DNS"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-f6e33f5eb4675a7f13e59d6a8f83d51380c9bdd0238fd845e3f0723c4e5d3e32","text":"its own name as one of the names in the list. When used in an authentication challenge, the \"PrivateToken\" scheme uses the following attributes: uses the following parameters: \"challenge\", which contains a base64url-encoded RFC4648 TokenChallenge value. Since the length of the challenge is not"}
{"_id":"q-en-7710bis-f6ed93e31d658241cde9796898be11a6cea5f54e75d789be804f5bb0728f36dc","text":"authenticating to, and interacting with the captive portal is out of scope of this document. RFC7710 used DHCP code point 160. Due to a conflict, this document specifies TBD. This document replaces RFC 7710. RFC 7710 used DHCP code point 160. Due to a conflict, this document specifies TBD. [ This document is being collaborated on in Github at: https://github.com/capport-wg/7710bis. The most recent version of"}
{"_id":"q-en-load-balancers-f702d3da28d53373f73c74a0e349671c059c5f7484aa43db8f8377a9621af75b","text":"it also requires connection IDs of at least 17 octets, increasing overhead of client-to-server packets. 4.4.1. 4.3.1. The configuration agent assigns a server ID to every server in its pool, and determines a server ID length (in octets) sufficiently"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-f75038d783b37de375a8c32ae749f31c29aaac283b73dc07b42a7a77589f9d41","text":"implementation level only -- they do not influence the result of the evaluation.) Any function expressions in a query must be well-formed (by conforming to the above ABNF) and well-typed, otherwise the JSONPath Any function expressions in a query must be well formed (by conforming to the above ABNF) and well typed, otherwise the JSONPath implementation MUST raise an error (see synsem-overview). To define which function expressions are well-typed, a type system is first which function expressions are well typed, a type system is first introduced. 2.6.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-f76c2ceafd37f83ac6c385b0724349512cdf9490dd82ec3861ef5db401dfc2f3","text":"For any specified \"TIAS\" bandwidth value, set this value as a constraint on the maximum RTP bitrate to be used when sending media as specified in RFC3890. If a \"TIAS\" value is not media, as specified in RFC3890. If a \"TIAS\" value is not present, but an \"AS\" value is specified, generate a \"TIAS\" value using this formula:"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls-rrc-f76e1ff09a7b96378100e35673637c6529e679e0295266a6eb43295b07c6305e","text":"confidence to the receiving peer that the sending peer is reachable at the indicated address and port. Note however that, irrespective of CID, if RRC has been successfully negotiated by the peers, path validation can be used at any time by either endpoint. For instance, an endpoint might use RRC to check that a peer is still in possession of its address after a period of quiescence. 2. The key words \"MUST\", \"MUST NOT\", \"REQUIRED\", \"SHALL\", \"SHALL NOT\","}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-udp-f78af393dca914ef624419d6d4102cb132d97f6894336c3c7777148745e16bce","text":"servers that support UDP proxying ought to restrict its use to authenticated users. There exist software and network deployments that perform access control checks based on the source IP address of incoming requests. For example, some software allows unauthenticated configuration changes if they originated from 127.0.0.1. Such software could be running on the same host as the UDP proxy, or in the same broadcast domain. Proxied UDP traffic would then be received with a source IP address belonging to the UDP proxy. If this source address is used for access control, UDP proxying clients could use the UDP proxy to escalate their access privileges beyond those they might otherwise have. This could lead to unauthorized access by UDP proxying clients unless the UDP proxy disallows UDP proxying requests to vulnerable targets, such as localhost names and addresses, link-local addresses, the UDP proxy's own addresses, multicast and broadcast addresses. UDP proxies can use the destination_ip_prohibited Proxy Error Type from PROXY-STATUS when rejecting such requests. UDP proxies share many similarities to TCP CONNECT proxies when considering them as infrastructure for abuse to enable denial of service attacks. Both can obfuscate the attacker's source address"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-f794ada3ed65765e7bee148fe265c444a9c56d2a19aa2175aeb68d3c2bddcb3f","text":"algorithm and PSK. Thus, an EPSK may be used with the same KDF (and underlying HMAC hash algorithm) as TLS 1.3 with importers. However, critically, the derived PSK will not be the same since the importer differentiates the PSK via the identity, target protocol, and target KDF. Thus, PSKs imported for TLS 1.3 are distinct from those used in TLS 1.2, and thereby avoid cross-protocol collisions. Note that this differentiates the PSK via the identity and target KDF and protocol. Thus, PSKs imported for TLS 1.3 are distinct from those used in TLS 1.2, and thereby avoid cross-protocol collisions. Note that this does not preclude endpoints from using non-imported PSKs for TLS 1.2. Indeed, this is necessary for incremental deployment. 7. The Key Importer security goals can be roughly stated as follows: The PSK Importer security goals can be roughly stated as follows: avoid PSK re-use across KDFs while properly authenticating endpoints. When modeled as computational extractors, KDFs assume that input keying material (IKM) is sampled from some \"source\" probability"}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-f7b39d6ee4df37651afc2bf39030b86a014be0d0a8bf31cd8b51fa34a4eac9e4","text":"handshake packets sent before the cryptographic context was established are validated later during the cryptographic handshake. Therefore, devices on path cannot alter any information or bits in QUIC packet headers, since alteration of header information will lead to a failed integrity check at the receiver, and can even lead to connection termination. QUIC packet headers, except specific parts of Initial packets, since alteration of header information will lead to a failed integrity check at the receiver, and can even lead to connection termination. 2.6."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-f7f61f36a2f8e485f0565148d2bcd41096702220dd754c0d15e11a670081a3a5","text":"Revise list of currently available AEAD cipher suites. Reduce maximum permitted record expansion for AEAD from 2048 to 256 octets. draft-07 Integration of semi-ephemeral DH proposal."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-f8102ddb436ea5b6b8fea00d1da068dd6cdebc4990e5e32776627555af77e540","text":"If sending a second ClientHello in response to a HelloRetryRequest, the client copies the entire \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension from the first ClientHello. the first ClientHello. The identical value will reveal to an observer that the value of \"encrypted_client_hello\" was fake, but this only occurs if there is a HelloRetryRequest. If the server sends an \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension in either HelloRetryRequest or EncryptedExtensions, the client MUST check the"}
{"_id":"q-en-ietf-wg-privacypass-base-drafts-f81a6b4077c5843e96b0cbff4f4979c0132e15f2cd8d15ecc71d001d95ac8233","text":"Server functionality: \"PP_Server_Setup\": Generates server configuration and keys \"ServerSetup\": Generates server configuration and keys \"PP_Issue\": Run on the contents of the client message in the \"Issue\": Run on the contents of the client message in the issuance phase. \"PP_Verify\": Run on the contents of the client message in the \"Verify\": Run on the contents of the client message in the redemption phase. Client functionality: \"PP_Client_Setup\": Generates the client configuration based on the configuration used by a given server. \"ClientSetup\": Generates the client configuration based on the configuration used by a given server. \"PP_Generate\": Generates public and private data associated with the contents of the client message in the issuance phase. \"Generate\": Generates public and private data associated with the contents of the client message in the issuance phase. \"PP_Process\": Processes the contents of the server response in the issuance phase. \"Process\": Processes the contents of the server response in the issuance phase. \"PP_Redeem\": Generates the data that forms the client message in the redemption phase. \"Redeem\": Generates the data that forms the client message in the redemption phase. We will use each of the functions internally in the description of the interfaces that follows."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-mops-streaming-opcons-f86860b713be2b5e406ebab9ae87ad7e994d9013b41d553d5f0dc672b123e7dd","text":"to predict usage and provision bandwidth, caching, and other mechanisms to meet the needs of users. In some cases (sec-predict), this is relatively routine, but in other cases, it is more difficult (sec-unpredict, sec-extreme). (sec-unpredict). And as with other parts of the ecosystem, new technology brings new challenges. For example, with the emergence of ultra-low-latency"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-f891e56346cd6c59361ab95f8db3039c6249f0d10aa063a8163181b4082fbea6","text":"endpoint is allowed to send packets from any source address that falls within the prefix. If an endpoint receives multiple ADDRESS_ASSIGN capsules, all of the assigned addresses or prefixes can be used. For example, multiple ADDRESS_ASSIGN capsules are necessary to assign both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. 4.2.2. The ADDRESS_REQUEST capsule allows an endpoint to request assignment"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-add-ddr-f8cb5a077008b0e0ade211bd66f1d69fb8911a85becce19985155de8da0ff461","text":"client or network. If the IP address of a Designated Resolver differs from that of an Unencrypted DNS Resolver, clients applying Verified Discovery (verified) MUST validate that the IP address of the Unencrypted DNS Resolver is covered by the SubjectAlternativeName of the Designated"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-f8eb3ad5c101cd74ce1b68b2486c9d0409c8cd0da2861d4124b7b63c2eb583ac","text":"associate an SNI value with the ticket. Clients, however, SHOULD store the SNI with the PSK to fulfill the requirements of NSTMessage. Implementor's note: the most straightforward way to implement the PSK/cipher suite matching requirements is to negotiate the cipher suite first and then exclude any incompatible PSKs. Any unknown PSKs (e.g., they are not in the PSK database or are encrypted with an unknown key) SHOULD simply be ignored. If no acceptable PSKs are found, the server SHOULD perform a non-PSK handshake if possible. Implementor's note: when session resumption is the primary use case of PSKs the most straightforward way to implement the PSK/cipher suite matching requirements is to negotiate the cipher suite first and then exclude any incompatible PSKs. Any unknown PSKs (e.g., they are not in the PSK database or are encrypted with an unknown key) SHOULD simply be ignored. If no acceptable PSKs are found, the server SHOULD perform a non-PSK handshake if possible. If backwards compatibility is important, client provided, externally established PSKs SHOULD influence cipher suite selection. Prior to accepting PSK key establishment, the server MUST validate the corresponding binder value (see psk-binder below). If this value"}
{"_id":"q-en-tls13-spec-f9380419c65e917483abb40456f0e5b1ced42806f460366406a1785201210eec","text":"appropriate rules. If the client supports only the default hash and signature algorithms (listed in this section), it MAY omit the signature_algorithms (listed in this section), it MAY omit the \"signature_algorithms\" extension. If the client does not support the default algorithms, or supports other hash and signature algorithms (and it is willing to use them for verifying messages sent by the server, i.e., server certificates and server key share), it MUST send the signature_algorithms extension, listing the algorithms it is willing to accept. \"signature_algorithms\" extension, listing the algorithms it is willing to accept. If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the If the client does not send the \"signature_algorithms\" extension, the server MUST do the following: If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_RSA,"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-f95f55bd99b4a10036145c18566179c8cb73e0b97256f52fe132eec7e55b9702","text":"Including a \"Date\" header field in the response allows the to correct clock errors by retrying the same request using the value of the \"Date\" field provided by the . The value of the \"Date\" field can be copied if the request is fresh, with an adjustment based on the \"Age\" field otherwise. When retrying a request, the MUST create a fresh encryption of the modified request, using a new HPKE context. copied if the response is fresh, with an adjustment based on the \"Age\" field otherwise; see HTTP-CACHING. When retrying a request, the MUST create a fresh encryption of the modified request, using a new HPKE context. Retrying immediately allows the to measure the round trip time to the . The observed delay might reveal something about the location of the . could delay retries to add some uncertainty to any observed delay. Intermediaries can sometimes rewrite the \"Date\" field when forwarding responses. This might cause problems if the and intermediary clocks"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-f9947b7d38dc9766252ae35fb942ceb6cc08e29199de520c181f9d8f4743efa4","text":"3. During pre-establishment the application specifies the Endpoints to be used for communication as well as its preferences regarding Protocol and Path Selection. The implementation stores these objects and properties as part of the Preconnection object for use during connection establishment. For Protocol and Path Selection Properties that are not provided by the application, the implementation must use the default values specified in the Transport Services API (I-D.ietf- taps-interface). be used for communication as well as its preferences via Selection Properties and, if desired, also Connection Properties. Generally, Connection Properties should be configured as early as possible, as they may serve as input to decisions that are made by the implementation (the Capacity Profile may guide usage of a protocol offering scavenger-type congestion control, for example). In the remainder of this document, we only refer to Selection Properties because they are the more typical case and have to be handled by all implementations. The implementation stores these objects and properties as part of the Preconnection object for use during connection establishment. For Selection Properties that are not provided by the application, the implementation must use the default values specified in the Transport Services API (I-D.ietf-taps-interface). 3.1."}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-f9ab5c9362af3f13729cc1a2e6a4751f6d5887133c61dc181e503118c183a65e","text":"delay SHOULD NOT be considered an RTT sample. Until the server has validated the client's address on the path, the amount of data it can send is limited, as specified in Section 8.1 of QUIC-TRANSPORT. Data at Initial encryption MUST be retransmitted before Handshake data and data at Handshake encryption MUST be retransmitted before any ApplicationData data. If no data can be sent, then the PTO alarm MUST NOT be armed until data has been received from the client. amount of data it can send is limited to three times the amount of data received, as specified in Section 8.1 of QUIC-TRANSPORT. If no data can be sent, then the PTO alarm MUST NOT be armed. Since the server could be blocked until more packets are received from the client, it is the client's responsibility to send packets to"}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-fa141e4d910089a8891e7c7e57aa7172a18acba6d159304f8e69e0361128c1e8","text":"implementation to communicate control data to the Remote Endpoint that can be used to parse Messages. Once the framer implementation has completed its setup or handshake, it can indicate to the application that it is ready to handling data with this call. Similarly, when a Message Framer generates a \"Stop\" event, the framer implementation has the opportunity to write some final data or clear up its local state before the \"Closed\" event is delivered to the Application. The framer implementation can indicate that it has finished with this. finished with this call. At any time if the implementation encounters a fatal error, it can also cause the Connection to fail and provide an error."}
{"_id":"q-en-tls-subcerts-fa23d10373b564cf31d2d4fcba1dfc2e0f9f10ae33896ddb67253e9c41b95f1a","text":"associated signature algorithm). The signature on the credential indicates a delegation from the certificate that is issued to the TLS server operator. The secret key used to sign a credential corresponds to the public key of the X.509 end-entity certificate. corresponds to the public key of the TLS server's X.509 end-entity certificate. A TLS handshake that uses delegated credentials differs from a normal handshake in a few important ways:"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-fa27efe44a51191f81672664c314a792609f16242f09beb205dfa11df1598b8e","text":"A credential (only for leaf nodes) A signature over the content of the node The conditions under which each of these values must or must not be present are laid out in views."}
{"_id":"q-en-t2trg-rest-iot-fa5ff7f0498362d77602772d3178b8fbd16e907ea20550987dfad05e2382e053","text":"3.5. Section 4.3 of RFC7231 defines the set of methods in HTTP; Section 9.3 of RFC9110 defines the set of methods in HTTP; Section 5.8 of RFC7252 defines the set of methods in CoAP. As part of the Uniform Interface constraint, each method can have certain properties that give guarantees to clients."}
{"_id":"q-en-edhoc-fa6052c9f4ec49338b48ff99af94103195512d85f063fa0fd3a307676c646c4c","text":"iv_length - length of the initialization vector of the EDHOC AEAD algorithm P = ( ? PAD, ID_CRED_I / bstr / -24..23, Signature_or_MAC_3, ? EAD_3 ) PLAINTEXT_3 = ( ? PAD, ID_CRED_I / bstr / -24..23, Signature_or_MAC_3, ? EAD_3 ) If ID_CRED_I contains a single 'kid' parameter, i.e., ID_CRED_I = { 4 : kid_I }, then only the byte string kid_I"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-fabd9fc63d04bffbd63b426d89222666a50f27dbd7b49dfef777281a7d071cc7","text":"Records are signed via a server private key, ESNIKeys have no authenticity or provenance information. This means that any attacker which can inject DNS responses or poison DNS caches, which is a common scenario in client access netowrks, can supply clients with common scenario in client access networks, can supply clients with fake ESNIKeys (so that the client encrypts SNI to them) or strip the ESNIKeys from the response. However, in the face of an attacker that controls DNS, no SNI encryption scheme can work because the attacker"}
{"_id":"q-en-quic-v2-fb1e8df3726de486f5f45f167dcab5dda9bcd570a19081a5305bf99da717f787","text":"3. QUIC version 2 endpoints MUST implement the QUIC version 1 specification as described in RFC9000, RFC9001, and RFC9002, with the specification as described in QUIC, QUIC-TLS, and RFC9002, with the following changes: The version field of long headers is TBD. Note: Unless this"}
{"_id":"q-en-security-arch-fb3e0bd2deecbcf32c6175aefb05239dd65b68a87d31c7f76f2bcfc78d0df678","text":"5.6. In a number of cases, it is desirable for the endpoint (i.e., the browser) to be able to directly identity the endpoint on the other side without trusting only the signaling service to which they are browser) to be able to directly identify the endpoint on the other side without trusting the signaling service to which they are connected. For instance, users may be making a call via a federated system where they wish to get direct authentication of the other side. Alternately, they may be making a call on a site which they"}
{"_id":"q-en-dtls13-spec-fb6629df350ba4c91186a9883d0347858fa44769f6961809808ca8bb2af25e7a","text":"DTLS implementations SHOULD follow the following rules: If the DTLS record layer informs the DTLS handshake layer that a message is too big, it SHOULD immediately attempt to fragment it, using any existing information about the PMTU. message is too big, the handshake layer SHOULD immediately attempt to fragment the message, using any existing information about the PMTU. If repeated retransmissions do not result in a response, and the PMTU is unknown, subsequent retransmissions SHOULD back off to a"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-fb95d37e10ab332d1db951d01b83091289f134740e5bd9f192b9daccb62c6309","text":"the same properties for operations on the registration resource. Registrants that are prepared to pick a different identifier when their initial attempt at registration is unauthorized should pick an their initial attempt (or attempts, in the unlikely case of two subsequent collisions) at registration is unauthorized should pick an identifier at least twice as long as the expected number of registrants; registrants without such a recovery options should pick significantly longer endpoint names (e.g. using UUID URNs RFC4122)."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-fbb47b2bf96383e5ece11e6749613305dc1de8ccbdb9ee8d72f7be94ee441775","text":"authentication protocols, wherein at least one is uncompromised, jointly authenticates all protocols. Authenticating with an externally provisioned PSK, therefore, should ideally authenticate both the TLS connection and the external provision process. both the TLS connection and the external provisioning process. Typically, the external provision process produces a PSK and corresponding context from which the PSK was derived and in which it should be used. We refer to an external PSK without such context as \"context free\". should be used. If available, this is used as the ImportedIdentity.context value. We refer to an external PSK without such context as \"context-free\". Thus, in considering the source-independence and compound authentication requirements, the Key Import API described in this document aims to achieve the following goals: authentication requirements, the PSK Import interface described in this document aims to achieve the following goals: Externally provisioned PSKs imported into TLS achieve compound authentication of the provision step(s) and connection. Externally provisioned PSKs imported into a TLS connection achieve compound authentication of the provisioning process and connection. Context-free PSKs only achieve authentication within the context of a single connection. Imported PSKs are used as IKM for two different KDFs. Imported PSKs are not used as IKM for two different KDFs. Imported PSKs do not collide with existing PSKs used for TLS 1.2 and below."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-fbf2d046ef2e4f90fa695a93c04117fa691a0c24d5fbf4e583d24c62fa7bec28","text":"impacted by QUIC. QUIC is an end-to-end transport protocol. No information in the protocol header, even that which can be inspected, is meant to be mutable by the network. This is achieved through integrity protection of the wire image WIRE-IMAGE. Encryption of most control signaling means that less information is visible to the network than is the case with TCP. protocol header, even that which can be inspected, is mutable by the network. This is achieved through integrity protection of the wire image WIRE-IMAGE. Encryption of most control signaling means that less information is visible to the network than is the case with TCP. Integrity protection can also simplify troubleshooting, because none of the nodes on the network path can modify transport layer information. However, it does imply that in-network operations that depend on modification of data are not possible without the cooperation of a QUIC endpoint. This might be possible with the introduction of a proxy which authenticates as an endpoint. Proxy operations are not in scope for this document. information. However, it means in-network operations that depend on modification of data are not possible without the cooperation of an QUIC endpoint. This might be possible with the introduction of a proxy which authenticates as an endpoint. Proxy operations are not in scope for this document. Network management is not a one-size-fits-all endeavour: practices considered necessary or even mandatory within enterprise networks"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-irtf-nwcrg-network-coding-satellites-fc85bc2a1838db52574f93ced3e2db3a835baadf344d706de842b87bcb1f6074","text":"5. This document discuses some opportunities to introduce these This document discuses some opportunities to introduce coding techniques at a wider scale in satellite telecommunications systems. Even though this document focuses on satellite systems, it is worth"}
{"_id":"q-en-external-psk-design-team-fc87c767967cbcc08a2b3ffd6b5214a557fc85ebaae9f5fe1285f0f863fc9e0c","text":"limited UI. For example, they may only have a numeric keypad or even less number of buttons. When the TOFU approach is not suitable, entering the key would require typing it on a constrained UI. Moreover, PSK production lacks guidance unlike user passwords. constrained UI. Some devices provision PSKs via an out-of-band, cloud-based syncing protocol."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-fcfc53845dd957fe1271305cdab7c28e4d20557379c9ecff80f3e0c02952a2ec","text":"preference to use the User Timeout Option, communication would not fail when a protocol such as QUIC is selected. Other specialized features, however, could be strictly required by an Other specialized features, however, can be strictly required by an application and thus constrain the set of protocols that can be used. For example, if an application requires support for automatic handover or failover for a connection, only protocol stacks that"}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-fd6f0d89c2939fe817402abb20f3c907b0a8cdf40c6cc084260288fa8a6e5559","text":"POST {+rd}{?ep,d,et,lt,con,extra-attrs*} {+rd}{?ep,d,lt,con,extra-attrs*} "}
{"_id":"q-en-resource-directory-fdb2c2224e66b70f333d024b14e528832b6e3968a76fcfbf5c2f02a5d620f8d7","text":"the link-format payload to register. The endpoint MUST include the endpoint name and MAY include the registration parameters d, lt, et and extra-attrs, in the POST request as per registration. The context of the registration is taken from the requesting server's URI. registration parameters d, lt and extra-attrs, in the POST request as per registration. The context of the registration is taken from the requesting server's URI. The endpoints MUST be deleted after the expiration of their lifetime. Additional operations cannot be executed because no registration"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-masque-h3-datagram-fdb929593c0ac3522d1e52ced9615b27fb25b724931be67b4f08ad305fbd4807","text":"of contexts, and they MAY do so in a way which is opaque to intermediaries. 4.3. 4.4.3. The CLOSE_DATAGRAM_CONTEXT capsule (see iana-types for the value of the capsule type) allows an endpoint to inform its peer that it will"}
{"_id":"q-en-capport-wg-architecture-fdc2b8f4aba3a6fcf63bea58dff9287f2ebaa667335a95ebef63dda9bffa0c21","text":"7.5. The Captive Portal Signal could inform the User Equipment that it is being held captive. There is no requirement that the User Equipment do something about this. Devices MAY permit users to disable automatic reaction to Captive Portal Signals indications for privacy reasons. However, there would be the trade-off that the user doesn't get notified when network access is restricted. Hence, end-user devices MAY allow users to manually control captive portal The Captive Portal Signal could signal to the User Equipment that it is being held captive. There is no requirement that the User Equipment do something about this. Devices MAY permit users to disable automatic reaction to Captive Portal Signals indications for privacy reasons. However, there would be the trade-off that the user doesn't get notified when network access is restricted. Hence, end- user devices MAY allow users to manually control captive portal interactions, possibly on the granularity of Provisioning Domains."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-fdca8281fa5d264ee308df5329234a031d8206d9d99daa96fb0eb8d6fc2d8382","text":"length connection ID is also strongly recommended when migration is supported. Currently QUIC only supports the use of a single network path at a time, which enables failover use cases. Path validation is required so that endpoints validate paths before use to avoid address spoofing attacks. Path validation takes at least one RTT and congestion control will also be reset after path migration. Therefore migration usually has a performance impact. The base specification of QUIC version 1 only supports the use of a single network path at a time, which enables failover use cases. Path validation is required so that endpoints validate paths before use to avoid address spoofing attacks. Path validation takes at least one RTT and congestion control will also be reset after path migration. Therefore migration usually has a performance impact. QUIC probing packets, which can be sent on multiple paths at once, are used to perform address validation as well as measure path"}
{"_id":"q-en-quicwg-base-drafts-fded1e8ba3f87c52f08f66851fa176123d253626a84332d580c9c2068919304b","text":"Before a new entry is added to the dynamic table, entries are evicted from the end of the dynamic table until the size of the dynamic table is less than or equal to (table capacity - size of new entry) or until the table is empty. The encoder MUST NOT evict a dynamic table entry unless it has first been acknowledged by the decoder. until the table is empty. The encoder MUST NOT evict a blocking dynamic table entry (see blocked-insertion). If the size of the new entry is less than or equal to the dynamic table capacity, then that entry is added to the table. It is an"}
{"_id":"q-en-oblivious-http-fe6ea47c7d371bfca7e37bd4fe7a008d99043f3d033ca2cfc1666207c919a610","text":"constructing and processing an . The Nn and Nk values correspond to parameters of the AEAD used in HPKE, which is defined in HPKE. Nn and Nk refer to the size of the AEAD nonce and key respectively, in bytes. The nonce length is set to the larger of these two lengths, i.e., max(Nn, Nk). HPKE, which is defined in HPKE or the HPKE AEAD IANA registry [2]. Nn and Nk refer to the size of the AEAD nonce and key respectively, in bytes. The nonce length is set to the larger of these two lengths, i.e., max(Nn, Nk). 4.3."}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-taps-transport-security-fe7bc5a1e9b4d1cfd061cd2582b39cca267809c3045afc5de56d6c1e395d4cc3","text":"This interaction is often limited to signaling between the record layer and the handshake layer. ESP IPsec Mobility Events (ME): The record protocol can be signaled that it is being migrated to another transport or interface due to"}
{"_id":"q-en-mls-protocol-feb3351f426d0248d49083302b5dca097c42beb370db752c2a7410847a773079","text":"above), then it MUST be populated. Otherwise, the sender MAY omit the \"path\" field at its discretion. If populating the \"path\" field: Create a DirectPath using the new If populating the \"path\" field: Create a UpdatePath using the new tree (which includes any new members). The GroupContext for this operation uses the \"group_id\", \"epoch\", \"tree_hash\", and \"confirmed_transcript_hash\" values in the initial GroupContext object. Assign this DirectPath to the \"path\" field in the Commit. Assign this UpdatePath to the \"path\" field in the Commit. Apply the DirectPath to the tree, as described in Apply the UpdatePath to the tree, as described in synchronizing-views-of-the-tree. Define \"commit_secret\" as the value \"path_secret[n+1]\" derived from the \"path_secret[n]\" value assigned to the root node."}
{"_id":"q-en-ops-drafts-fedaab82ed2527f62f2226e71d2143866819480cb0e3615d202e220983e580b7","text":"network elements such as firewalls that use the port number for application identification. Applications could define an alternate endpoint discovery mechanism to allow the usage of ports other than the default. For example, HTTP/3 (Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of QUIC-HTTP) specifies the use of HTTP Alternative Services RFC7838 for an HTTP origin to advertise the availability of an equivalent HTTP/3 endpoint on a certain UDP port by using the \"h3\" Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) RFC7301 token. ALPN permits the client and server to negotiate which of several protocols will be used on a given connection. Therefore, multiple applications might be supported on a single UDP port based on the ALPN token offered. Applications using QUIC are required to register an ALPN token for use in the TLS handshake. As QUIC version 1 deferred defining a complete version negotiation mechanism, HTTP/3 requires QUIC version 1 and defines the ALPN token (\"h3\") to only apply to that version. So far no single approach has been selected for managing the use of different QUIC versions, neither in HTTP/3 nor in general. Application protocols that use QUIC need to consider how the protocol will manage different QUIC versions. Decisions for those protocols might be informed by choices made by other protocols, like HTTP/3. 9. QUIC supports connection migration by the client. If an IP address"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-feed8bad9ff149a97a505b5b0e0d31dbd60180c002d24d8eb4e6ca7d6b85bae7","text":"The last input comprises the randomness consumed by the sharding algorithm. The sharding randomness is a random byte string of length specified by the VDAF. The Client MUST generate this using a cryptographicallly secure random number generator. cryptographically secure random number generator. The Client then wraps each input share in the following structure:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-esni-ff38f334213b10460cfcc1ba5f591efc5dad0fbbeedf301f0547bf2098e26277","text":"When a client wants to establish a TLS session with the backend server, it constructs its ClientHello as usual (we will refer to this as the ClientHelloInner message) and then encrypts this message using the ECH public key. It then constructs a new ClientHello (ClientHelloOuter) with innocuous values for sensitive extensions, e.g., SNI, ALPN, etc., and with the encrypted ClientHelloInner in an the public key of the ECH configuration. It then constructs a new ClientHello (ClientHelloOuter) with innocuous values for sensitive extensions, e.g., SNI, ALPN, etc., and with an \"encrypted_client_hello\" extension, which this document defines (encrypted-client-hello). Finally, it sends ClientHelloOuter to the server. (encrypted-client-hello). The extension's payload carries the encrypted ClientHelloInner and specifies the ECH configuration used for encryption. Finally, it sends ClientHelloOuter to the server. Upon receiving the ClientHelloOuter, the client-facing server takes one of the following actions:"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-ppm-dap-ff43695cc20930af0e2cbcc686dd83ad401702ecc38dc23ca3709b88da3ff2e5","text":"4.5.6. Before an Aggregator responds to a CollectReq or AggregateShareReq, it must first check that the request does not violate the parameters associated with the DAP task. It does so as described here. Before an Aggregator responds to a CollectionReq or AggregateShareReq, it must first check that the request does not violate the parameters associated with the DAP task. It does so as described here. First the Aggregator checks that the batch respects any \"boundaries\" determined by the query type. These are described in the subsections"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-tls-ctls-ff7f541151f2861abb3046b173d16d421d5919ba39dc7736f4a6850f57164f9e","text":"value to distinguish cTLS plaintext records from encrypted records, TLS/DTLS records, and other protocols using the same 5-tuple. The \"profile_id\" field MUST identify the profile that is in use. A zero-length ID corresponds to the cTLS default protocol. The server's reply does not include the \"profile_id\", because the server must be using the same profile indicated by the client. Encrypted records use DTLS 1.3 RFC9147 record framing, comprising a configuration octet followed by optional connection ID, sequence number, and length fields. The encryption process and additional"}
{"_id":"q-en-draft-ietf-jsonpath-base-ff8f87187bec524b229fc21c5b8f9453a09691908acbb34d7638314810d21128","text":"2.5.5.2.1. A path by itself in a Logical context is an existence test which yields true if the path selects at least one node and yields false if the path does not select any nodes. A query by itself in a Logical context is an existence test which yields true if the query selects at least one node and yields false if the query does not select any nodes. Existence tests differ from comparisons in that: they work with arbitrary relative or absolute paths (not just Singular Paths). they work with arbitrary relative or absolute queries (not just Singular Queries). they work with paths that select structured values. they work with queries that select structured values. To examine the value of a node selected by a path, an explicit To examine the value of a node selected by a query, an explicit comparison is necessary. For example, to test whether the node selected by the path \"@.foo\" has the value \"null\", use \"@.foo == selected by the query \"@.foo\" has the value \"null\", use \"@.foo == null\" (see null-semantics) rather than the negated existence test \"!@.foo\" (which yields false if \"@.foo\" selects a node, regardless of the node's value)."}
{"_id":"q-en-api-drafts-ffd154e25436dfd17e82f93f85c50bbdd6d971dbade26152c99eb9f4e98d466d","text":"the main Connection implementation that delivers events to the custom framer implementation whenever data is ready to be parsed or framed. The Transport Services implementation needs to ensure that all of the events and actions taken on a Message Framer are synchronized to ensure consistent behavior. For example, some of the actions defined below (such as PrependFramer and StartPassthrough) modify how data flows in a protocol stack, and require synchronization with sending and parsing data in the Message Framer. When a Connection establishment attempt begins, an event can be delivered to notify the framer implementation that a new Connection is being created. Similarly, a stop event can be delivered when a"}
{"_id":"q-en-jsep-ffd5deeba92108f608c4a5265ca338c57bd258942c5fedb90c7aaa281d2a87a5","text":"JSEP's handling of session descriptions is simple and straightforward. Whenever an offer/answer exchange is needed, the initiating side creates an offer by calling a createOffer() API. The application optionally modifies that offer, and then uses it to set up its local config via the setLocalDescription() API. The offer is then sent off to the remote side over its preferred signaling mechanism (e.g., WebSockets); upon receipt of that offer, the remote party installs it using the setRemoteDescription() API. application then uses that offer to set up its local config via the setLocalDescription() API. The offer is finally sent off to the remote side over its preferred signaling mechanism (e.g., WebSockets); upon receipt of that offer, the remote party installs it using the setRemoteDescription() API. To complete the offer/answer exchange, the remote party uses the createAnswer() API to generate an appropriate answer, applies it"}