[
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE DECISION BELOW COMPORTS, NOT CONFLICTS, WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nA. Jennings Distinguished \"Clear\" Sections 1225 and 1226 From \"Ambiguous\" Section 1231(a)(6)\nB. The Third Circuit's Construction of Section 1231(a)(6) Avoids Serious Due Process Concerns\nIII. THIS CASE IS A PREMATURE AND POOR VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW\nA. Granting Review Would Be Premature At Best\nB. The Petition Should Be Denied Regardless Of The Guzman Chavez Petition's Disposition",
        "reference": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THAT OF ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THAT OF ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Jennings Distinguished \"Clear\" Sections 1225 and 1226 From \"Ambiguous\" Section 1231(a)(6)\nB. The Third Circuit's Construction of Section 1231(a)(6) Avoids Serious Due Process Concerns\nIII. THIS CASE IS A PREMATURE AND POOR VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW\nA. Granting Review Would Be Premature At Best\nB. The Petition Should Be Denied Regardless Of The Guzman Chavez Petition's Disposition",
        "reference": "II. THE DECISION BELOW COMPORTS, NOT CONFLICTS, WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THAT OF ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS\nII. THE DECISION BELOW COMPORTS, NOT CONFLICTS, WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Third Circuit's Construction of Section 1231(a)(6) Avoids Serious Due Process Concerns\nIII. THIS CASE IS A PREMATURE AND POOR VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW\nA. Granting Review Would Be Premature At Best\nB. The Petition Should Be Denied Regardless Of The Guzman Chavez Petition's Disposition",
        "reference": "A. Jennings Distinguished \"Clear\" Sections 1225 and 1226 From \"Ambiguous\" Section 1231(a)(6)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THAT OF ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS\nII. THE DECISION BELOW COMPORTS, NOT CONFLICTS, WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nA. Jennings Distinguished \"Clear\" Sections 1225 and 1226 From \"Ambiguous\" Section 1231(a)(6)\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS CASE IS A PREMATURE AND POOR VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW\nA. Granting Review Would Be Premature At Best\nB. The Petition Should Be Denied Regardless Of The Guzman Chavez Petition's Disposition",
        "reference": "B. The Third Circuit's Construction of Section 1231(a)(6) Avoids Serious Due Process Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THAT OF ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS\nII. THE DECISION BELOW COMPORTS, NOT CONFLICTS, WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nA. Jennings Distinguished \"Clear\" Sections 1225 and 1226 From \"Ambiguous\" Section 1231(a)(6)\nB. The Third Circuit's Construction of Section 1231(a)(6) Avoids Serious Due Process Concerns\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Granting Review Would Be Premature At Best\nB. The Petition Should Be Denied Regardless Of The Guzman Chavez Petition's Disposition",
        "reference": "III. THIS CASE IS A PREMATURE AND POOR VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THAT OF ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS\nII. THE DECISION BELOW COMPORTS, NOT CONFLICTS, WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nA. Jennings Distinguished \"Clear\" Sections 1225 and 1226 From \"Ambiguous\" Section 1231(a)(6)\nB. The Third Circuit's Construction of Section 1231(a)(6) Avoids Serious Due Process Concerns\nIII. THIS CASE IS A PREMATURE AND POOR VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Petition Should Be Denied Regardless Of The Guzman Chavez Petition's Disposition",
        "reference": "A. Granting Review Would Be Premature At Best",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THAT OF ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS\nII. THE DECISION BELOW COMPORTS, NOT CONFLICTS, WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nA. Jennings Distinguished \"Clear\" Sections 1225 and 1226 From \"Ambiguous\" Section 1231(a)(6)\nB. The Third Circuit's Construction of Section 1231(a)(6) Avoids Serious Due Process Concerns\nIII. THIS CASE IS A PREMATURE AND POOR VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT'S REVIEW\nA. Granting Review Would Be Premature At Best\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Petition Should Be Denied Regardless Of The Guzman Chavez Petition's Disposition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Err In Holding That Board Members Are Federal Officers Subject To The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Must Comply With Separation-Of-Powers Principles Even When Acting Pursuant To Article IV Of The U.S. Constitution\nD. The Oversight Board Members Are Officers Of The United States\nE. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
        "reference": "A. The Insular Cases Are Unconstitutional And Should Not Be The Foundation To Reverse The Court Of Appeals' Ruling",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Insular Cases Are Unconstitutional And Should Not Be The Foundation To Reverse The Court Of Appeals' Ruling\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress Must Comply With Separation-Of-Powers Principles Even When Acting Pursuant To Article IV Of The U.S. Constitution\nD. The Oversight Board Members Are Officers Of The United States\nE. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
        "reference": "B. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Err In Holding That Board Members Are Federal Officers Subject To The Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Insular Cases Are Unconstitutional And Should Not Be The Foundation To Reverse The Court Of Appeals' Ruling\nB. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Err In Holding That Board Members Are Federal Officers Subject To The Appointments Clause\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Oversight Board Members Are Officers Of The United States\nE. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
        "reference": "C. Congress Must Comply With Separation-Of-Powers Principles Even When Acting Pursuant To Article IV Of The U.S. Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Insular Cases Are Unconstitutional And Should Not Be The Foundation To Reverse The Court Of Appeals' Ruling\nB. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Err In Holding That Board Members Are Federal Officers Subject To The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Must Comply With Separation-Of-Powers Principles Even When Acting Pursuant To Article IV Of The U.S. Constitution\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
        "reference": "D. The Oversight Board Members Are Officers Of The United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Insular Cases Are Unconstitutional And Should Not Be The Foundation To Reverse The Court Of Appeals' Ruling\nB. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Err In Holding That Board Members Are Federal Officers Subject To The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Must Comply With Separation-Of-Powers Principles Even When Acting Pursuant To Article IV Of The U.S. Constitution\nD. The Oversight Board Members Are Officers Of The United States\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. The Mootness Doctrine Precludes Judicial Review In This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "This [MISSING]\nA. A substantial jurisdictional question exists\nB. Class-action settlements relying on cy pres require careful scrutiny and should be approved only when certain limitations are met\n1. The history and logic of cy pres do not support its use in class-action settlements\n2. Use of cy pres in class-action settlements raises serious concerns that warrant additional analysis\n3. In conducting scrutiny of cy pres settlements, courts should enforce several limitations\na. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if they redress plaintiffs' injuries\nb. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if there is not a non-arbitrary way to distribute the settlement funds to class members\nc. Cy pres distributions should be discounted in awarding attorney's fees",
        "reference": "This Court should vacate the decision below and remand for the lower courts to address standing or conduct further review of the cy pres relief in the settlement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "This Court should vacate the decision below and remand for the lower courts to address standing or conduct further review of the cy pres relief in the settlement\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Class-action settlements relying on cy pres require careful scrutiny and should be approved only when certain limitations are met\n1. The history and logic of cy pres do not support its use in class-action settlements\n2. Use of cy pres in class-action settlements raises serious concerns that warrant additional analysis\n3. In conducting scrutiny of cy pres settlements, courts should enforce several limitations\na. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if they redress plaintiffs' injuries\nb. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if there is not a non-arbitrary way to distribute the settlement funds to class members\nc. Cy pres distributions should be discounted in awarding attorney's fees",
        "reference": "A. A substantial jurisdictional question exists",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "This Court should vacate the decision below and remand for the lower courts to address standing or conduct further review of the cy pres relief in the settlement\nA. A substantial jurisdictional question exists\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The history and logic of cy pres do not support its use in class-action settlements\n2. Use of cy pres in class-action settlements raises serious concerns that warrant additional analysis\n3. In conducting scrutiny of cy pres settlements, courts should enforce several limitations\na. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if they redress plaintiffs' injuries\nb. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if there is not a non-arbitrary way to distribute the settlement funds to class members\nc. Cy pres distributions should be discounted in awarding attorney's fees",
        "reference": "B. Class-action settlements relying on cy pres require careful scrutiny and should be approved only when certain limitations are met",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "This Court should vacate the decision below and remand for the lower courts to address standing or conduct further review of the cy pres relief in the settlement\nA. A substantial jurisdictional question exists\nB. Class-action settlements relying on cy pres require careful scrutiny and should be approved only when certain limitations are met\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Use of cy pres in class-action settlements raises serious concerns that warrant additional analysis\n3. In conducting scrutiny of cy pres settlements, courts should enforce several limitations\na. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if they redress plaintiffs' injuries\nb. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if there is not a non-arbitrary way to distribute the settlement funds to class members\nc. Cy pres distributions should be discounted in awarding attorney's fees",
        "reference": "1. The history and logic of cy pres do not support its use in class-action settlements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "This Court should vacate the decision below and remand for the lower courts to address standing or conduct further review of the cy pres relief in the settlement\nA. A substantial jurisdictional question exists\nB. Class-action settlements relying on cy pres require careful scrutiny and should be approved only when certain limitations are met\n1. The history and logic of cy pres do not support its use in class-action settlements\n2. [MISSING]\n3. In conducting scrutiny of cy pres settlements, courts should enforce several limitations\na. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if they redress plaintiffs' injuries\nb. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if there is not a non-arbitrary way to distribute the settlement funds to class members\nc. Cy pres distributions should be discounted in awarding attorney's fees",
        "reference": "2. Use of cy pres in class-action settlements raises serious concerns that warrant additional analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "This Court should vacate the decision below and remand for the lower courts to address standing or conduct further review of the cy pres relief in the settlement\nA. A substantial jurisdictional question exists\nB. Class-action settlements relying on cy pres require careful scrutiny and should be approved only when certain limitations are met\n1. The history and logic of cy pres do not support its use in class-action settlements\n2. Use of cy pres in class-action settlements raises serious concerns that warrant additional analysis\n3. [MISSING]\na. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if they redress plaintiffs' injuries\nb. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if there is not a non-arbitrary way to distribute the settlement funds to class members\nc. Cy pres distributions should be discounted in awarding attorney's fees",
        "reference": "3. In conducting scrutiny of cy pres settlements, courts should enforce several limitations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "This Court should vacate the decision below and remand for the lower courts to address standing or conduct further review of the cy pres relief in the settlement\nA. A substantial jurisdictional question exists\nB. Class-action settlements relying on cy pres require careful scrutiny and should be approved only when certain limitations are met\n1. The history and logic of cy pres do not support its use in class-action settlements\n2. Use of cy pres in class-action settlements raises serious concerns that warrant additional analysis\n3. In conducting scrutiny of cy pres settlements, courts should enforce several limitations\na. [MISSING]\nb. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if there is not a non-arbitrary way to distribute the settlement funds to class members\nc. Cy pres distributions should be discounted in awarding attorney's fees",
        "reference": "a. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if they redress plaintiffs' injuries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "This Court should vacate the decision below and remand for the lower courts to address standing or conduct further review of the cy pres relief in the settlement\nA. A substantial jurisdictional question exists\nB. Class-action settlements relying on cy pres require careful scrutiny and should be approved only when certain limitations are met\n1. The history and logic of cy pres do not support its use in class-action settlements\n2. Use of cy pres in class-action settlements raises serious concerns that warrant additional analysis\n3. In conducting scrutiny of cy pres settlements, courts should enforce several limitations\na. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if they redress plaintiffs' injuries\nb. [MISSING]\nc. Cy pres distributions should be discounted in awarding attorney's fees",
        "reference": "b. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if there is not a non-arbitrary way to distribute the settlement funds to class members",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "This Court should vacate the decision below and remand for the lower courts to address standing or conduct further review of the cy pres relief in the settlement\nA. A substantial jurisdictional question exists\nB. Class-action settlements relying on cy pres require careful scrutiny and should be approved only when certain limitations are met\n1. The history and logic of cy pres do not support its use in class-action settlements\n2. Use of cy pres in class-action settlements raises serious concerns that warrant additional analysis\n3. In conducting scrutiny of cy pres settlements, courts should enforce several limitations\na. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if they redress plaintiffs' injuries\nb. Cy pres distributions are permissible only if there is not a non-arbitrary way to distribute the settlement funds to class members\nc. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "c. Cy pres distributions should be discounted in awarding attorney's fees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Foreign nationals are not \"Inhabitants\" and Cannot be Included in a State's Population for Apportionment Purposes\nIII. Counting Foreign Nationals, legally or illegally present in the US, for Apportionment Purposes Violates the \"One Person, One Vote\" and Equal Protection Principles",
        "reference": "I. The Constitution's Original Meaning in the Apportionment Context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution's Original Meaning in the Apportionment Context\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Counting Foreign Nationals, legally or illegally present in the US, for Apportionment Purposes Violates the \"One Person, One Vote\" and Equal Protection Principles",
        "reference": "II. Foreign nationals are not \"Inhabitants\" and Cannot be Included in a State's Population for Apportionment Purposes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution's Original Meaning in the Apportionment Context\nII. Foreign nationals are not \"Inhabitants\" and Cannot be Included in a State's Population for Apportionment Purposes\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Counting Foreign Nationals, legally or illegally present in the US, for Apportionment Purposes Violates the \"One Person, One Vote\" and Equal Protection Principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "A. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "B. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "C. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. [MISSING]\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "II. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "A. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. [MISSING]\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "B. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. [MISSING]\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "reference": "C. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Services Failed to Carry Their Burden of Demonstrating Their Entitlement to Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Under Exemption 5\nA. The Record Establishes That the Services' Jeopardy Determination Caused EPA to Amend Its Rule\nB. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure\nC. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority\nII. The Services May Not Withhold the Jeopardy Opinions Merely Because They Preceded the Final Biological Opinions\nA. FOIA Does Not Permit Withholding of Consequential Intermediate Decisions Within Multi-Step Regulatory Processes\nB. Exemption 5 Does Not Turn on Signature or Official Issuance\n1. FOIA's Disclosure Provisions Preclude Interpreting Exemption 5 to Encompass Consequential Interim Decisions\n2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions\n3. The Services' Interpretation Ignores Both FOIA's Core Function and the Deliberative Process Privilege's Purpose\nC. The Services' Regulations Do Not Prevent the Services from Addressing Jeopardy in a Draft Opinion\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. FOIA's Text and Function Require a Fact-Specific Approach to Exemption 5",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Dilution Ruling Is Wrong",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Infringement Ruling Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Infringement Ruling Is Wrong\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit's Dilution Ruling Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The BioPharma Industry Benefits from Access to the Important Historical Data Provided by BioSci's FOIA Requests\nA. The FOIA Process As Presently Administered by the SEC Advances the Securities Laws Goals of Disclosure, and Operates as an Important Check on False Press Releases\nB. Where FOIA Access is Weakened, BioPharma Industry Actors Will Increase Reliance on Alternative Confidential Information Providers Including Lawyers and Investment Bankers\nIII. Existing Exemption 4 Practice Operates a Reasonable Balance for Competing Interests",
        "reference": "I. BioSci Relies Upon Current FOIA Jurisprudence and Practice in Conducting Its Business",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BioSci Relies Upon Current FOIA Jurisprudence and Practice in Conducting Its Business\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The FOIA Process As Presently Administered by the SEC Advances the Securities Laws Goals of Disclosure, and Operates as an Important Check on False Press Releases\nB. Where FOIA Access is Weakened, BioPharma Industry Actors Will Increase Reliance on Alternative Confidential Information Providers Including Lawyers and Investment Bankers\nIII. Existing Exemption 4 Practice Operates a Reasonable Balance for Competing Interests",
        "reference": "II. The BioPharma Industry Benefits from Access to the Important Historical Data Provided by BioSci's FOIA Requests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BioSci Relies Upon Current FOIA Jurisprudence and Practice in Conducting Its Business\nII. The BioPharma Industry Benefits from Access to the Important Historical Data Provided by BioSci's FOIA Requests\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Where FOIA Access is Weakened, BioPharma Industry Actors Will Increase Reliance on Alternative Confidential Information Providers Including Lawyers and Investment Bankers\nIII. Existing Exemption 4 Practice Operates a Reasonable Balance for Competing Interests",
        "reference": "A. The FOIA Process As Presently Administered by the SEC Advances the Securities Laws Goals of Disclosure, and Operates as an Important Check on False Press Releases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BioSci Relies Upon Current FOIA Jurisprudence and Practice in Conducting Its Business\nII. The BioPharma Industry Benefits from Access to the Important Historical Data Provided by BioSci's FOIA Requests\nA. The FOIA Process As Presently Administered by the SEC Advances the Securities Laws Goals of Disclosure, and Operates as an Important Check on False Press Releases\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Existing Exemption 4 Practice Operates a Reasonable Balance for Competing Interests",
        "reference": "B. Where FOIA Access is Weakened, BioPharma Industry Actors Will Increase Reliance on Alternative Confidential Information Providers Including Lawyers and Investment Bankers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BioSci Relies Upon Current FOIA Jurisprudence and Practice in Conducting Its Business\nII. The BioPharma Industry Benefits from Access to the Important Historical Data Provided by BioSci's FOIA Requests\nA. The FOIA Process As Presently Administered by the SEC Advances the Securities Laws Goals of Disclosure, and Operates as an Important Check on False Press Releases\nB. Where FOIA Access is Weakened, BioPharma Industry Actors Will Increase Reliance on Alternative Confidential Information Providers Including Lawyers and Investment Bankers\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Existing Exemption 4 Practice Operates a Reasonable Balance for Competing Interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Grids Are Not Fully Interconnected\nB. The Grids Serve Varying Markets With Complex Capacity And Reliability Requirements Set By The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission\nC. The Grids Cannot Support Rapid Integration Of Renewable Energy\nII. The Circuit Court Erroneously Assumed That Growing Demand for Renewable Generation Supports EPA-Mandated Generation Shifting As The Best System Of Emission Reduction Under Section 111(d)",
        "reference": "I. The Circuit Court Erroneously Assumed That The Nation's Electrical Grids Could Support Widespread Mandatory Generation Shifting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Circuit Court Erroneously Assumed That The Nation's Electrical Grids Could Support Widespread Mandatory Generation Shifting\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Grids Serve Varying Markets With Complex Capacity And Reliability Requirements Set By The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission\nC. The Grids Cannot Support Rapid Integration Of Renewable Energy\nII. The Circuit Court Erroneously Assumed That Growing Demand for Renewable Generation Supports EPA-Mandated Generation Shifting As The Best System Of Emission Reduction Under Section 111(d)",
        "reference": "A. The Grids Are Not Fully Interconnected",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Circuit Court Erroneously Assumed That The Nation's Electrical Grids Could Support Widespread Mandatory Generation Shifting\nA. The Grids Are Not Fully Interconnected\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Grids Cannot Support Rapid Integration Of Renewable Energy\nII. The Circuit Court Erroneously Assumed That Growing Demand for Renewable Generation Supports EPA-Mandated Generation Shifting As The Best System Of Emission Reduction Under Section 111(d)",
        "reference": "B. The Grids Serve Varying Markets With Complex Capacity And Reliability Requirements Set By The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Circuit Court Erroneously Assumed That The Nation's Electrical Grids Could Support Widespread Mandatory Generation Shifting\nA. The Grids Are Not Fully Interconnected\nB. The Grids Serve Varying Markets With Complex Capacity And Reliability Requirements Set By The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Circuit Court Erroneously Assumed That Growing Demand for Renewable Generation Supports EPA-Mandated Generation Shifting As The Best System Of Emission Reduction Under Section 111(d)",
        "reference": "C. The Grids Cannot Support Rapid Integration Of Renewable Energy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Circuit Court Erroneously Assumed That The Nation's Electrical Grids Could Support Widespread Mandatory Generation Shifting\nA. The Grids Are Not Fully Interconnected\nB. The Grids Serve Varying Markets With Complex Capacity And Reliability Requirements Set By The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission\nC. The Grids Cannot Support Rapid Integration Of Renewable Energy\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Circuit Court Erroneously Assumed That Growing Demand for Renewable Generation Supports EPA-Mandated Generation Shifting As The Best System Of Emission Reduction Under Section 111(d)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1059_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Government Proved Baroni Had Authority to Realign the Lanes\nB. The Government Proved Baroni Ordered a Traffic Study",
        "reference": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S CONCESSIONS ABOUT AUTHORITY RESOLVE THIS CASE IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1059_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S CONCESSIONS ABOUT AUTHORITY RESOLVE THIS CASE IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Government Proved Baroni Ordered a Traffic Study",
        "reference": "A. The Government Proved Baroni Had Authority to Realign the Lanes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1059_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S CONCESSIONS ABOUT AUTHORITY RESOLVE THIS CASE IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR\nA. The Government Proved Baroni Had Authority to Realign the Lanes\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Government Proved Baroni Ordered a Traffic Study",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Exclusive Representation Threatens Individual Liberties\nB. Exclusive Representation Lives in Tension with Title VII\nC. The Union Favored Majoritarian Interests at Groff's Expense\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD EMPOWER INDIVIDUALS AND EMPLOYERS TO PURSUE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN A UNIONIZED WORKPLACE BY ABANDONING HARDISON",
        "reference": "I. EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION HURT GROFF'S ABILITY TO SECURE A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION CONSISTENT WITH TITLE VII",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION HURT GROFF'S ABILITY TO SECURE A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION CONSISTENT WITH TITLE VII\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Exclusive Representation Lives in Tension with Title VII\nC. The Union Favored Majoritarian Interests at Groff's Expense\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD EMPOWER INDIVIDUALS AND EMPLOYERS TO PURSUE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN A UNIONIZED WORKPLACE BY ABANDONING HARDISON",
        "reference": "A. Exclusive Representation Threatens Individual Liberties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION HURT GROFF'S ABILITY TO SECURE A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION CONSISTENT WITH TITLE VII\nA. Exclusive Representation Threatens Individual Liberties\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Union Favored Majoritarian Interests at Groff's Expense\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD EMPOWER INDIVIDUALS AND EMPLOYERS TO PURSUE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN A UNIONIZED WORKPLACE BY ABANDONING HARDISON",
        "reference": "B. Exclusive Representation Lives in Tension with Title VII",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION HURT GROFF'S ABILITY TO SECURE A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION CONSISTENT WITH TITLE VII\nA. Exclusive Representation Threatens Individual Liberties\nB. Exclusive Representation Lives in Tension with Title VII\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD EMPOWER INDIVIDUALS AND EMPLOYERS TO PURSUE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN A UNIONIZED WORKPLACE BY ABANDONING HARDISON",
        "reference": "C. The Union Favored Majoritarian Interests at Groff's Expense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION HURT GROFF'S ABILITY TO SECURE A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION CONSISTENT WITH TITLE VII\nA. Exclusive Representation Threatens Individual Liberties\nB. Exclusive Representation Lives in Tension with Title VII\nC. The Union Favored Majoritarian Interests at Groff's Expense\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THIS COURT SHOULD EMPOWER INDIVIDUALS AND EMPLOYERS TO PURSUE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS IN A UNIONIZED WORKPLACE BY ABANDONING HARDISON",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-515_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT\nIII. THIS CASE IS THE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS",
        "reference": "I. THE DECISION BELOW CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH TACKETT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-515_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH TACKETT\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS CASE IS THE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS",
        "reference": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-515_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH TACKETT\nII. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES BOTH AN INTERCIRCUIT AND AN INTRACIRCUIT CONFLICT\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THIS CASE IS THE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Court should add the question of whether the ATS imposes aiding-and-abetting liability.\nC. The question whether respondents' claims are impermissibly extraterritorial warrants review.\nD. The petition in Cargill is a suitable vehicle for review of all three questions.",
        "reference": "A. The question whether the ATS authorizes liability for domestic corporations warrants review.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron Deference Violates the Separation of Powers and Threatens Individual Liberty\nA. The Separation of Powers and Our Constitution's Promise of an Independent Judiciary Protect Individual Liberty\nB. Chevron Deference Threatens Individual Liberty By Transferring Legislative and Judicial Powers to the Executive\n1. Chevron Stacks the Deck Against the American People\n2. Chevron Transfers Legislative Powers to Unelected Executive Officials\n3. Chevron Transfers Judicial Authority to Unelected Executive Officials\n4. Chevron and Its Constitutionally Challenged Companion, Brand X, Are At Odds with Due Process\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Chevron Violates the APA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Prohibiting Coaches from Engaging in Visible, Private Prayer at Public Schools Will Discourage Faithful Coaches and Teachers from Mentoring and Guiding At-Risk Youth with Disastrous Consequences",
        "reference": "I. Visible Expressions of Faith in Sports Cannot Be Unconstitutional When Overt Expressions of Faith in Sports are a \"Longstanding\" American Practice Whose Historical Lineage Shows No Establishment Clause Violation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. Visible Expressions of Faith in Sports Cannot Be Unconstitutional When Overt Expressions of Faith in Sports are a \"Longstanding\" American Practice Whose Historical Lineage Shows No Establishment Clause Violation\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Prohibiting Coaches from Engaging in Visible, Private Prayer at Public Schools Will Discourage Faithful Coaches and Teachers from Mentoring and Guiding At-Risk Youth with Disastrous Consequences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Sixth Amendment Clearly Forecloses The Use Of Judicial Factfinding To Support An ACCA Enhancement\nB. ACCA Enhancements Are Routinely Imposed Based On Improper Judicial Factfinding\nII. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD STATE UNEQUIVOCALLY \u2014 YET AGAIN \u2014 THAT ACCA ENHANCEMENTS CANNOT BE BASED ON JUDGE-FOUND FACTS",
        "reference": "I. LOWER COURTS UNIFORMLY APPLY THE OCCASIONS REQUIREMENT IN A MANNER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. LOWER COURTS UNIFORMLY APPLY THE OCCASIONS REQUIREMENT IN A MANNER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. ACCA Enhancements Are Routinely Imposed Based On Improper Judicial Factfinding\nII. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD STATE UNEQUIVOCALLY \u2014 YET AGAIN \u2014 THAT ACCA ENHANCEMENTS CANNOT BE BASED ON JUDGE-FOUND FACTS",
        "reference": "A. The Sixth Amendment Clearly Forecloses The Use Of Judicial Factfinding To Support An ACCA Enhancement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. LOWER COURTS UNIFORMLY APPLY THE OCCASIONS REQUIREMENT IN A MANNER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITS\nA. The Sixth Amendment Clearly Forecloses The Use Of Judicial Factfinding To Support An ACCA Enhancement\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD STATE UNEQUIVOCALLY \u2014 YET AGAIN \u2014 THAT ACCA ENHANCEMENTS CANNOT BE BASED ON JUDGE-FOUND FACTS",
        "reference": "B. ACCA Enhancements Are Routinely Imposed Based On Improper Judicial Factfinding",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. LOWER COURTS UNIFORMLY APPLY THE OCCASIONS REQUIREMENT IN A MANNER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITS\nA. The Sixth Amendment Clearly Forecloses The Use Of Judicial Factfinding To Support An ACCA Enhancement\nB. ACCA Enhancements Are Routinely Imposed Based On Improper Judicial Factfinding\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD STATE UNEQUIVOCALLY \u2014 YET AGAIN \u2014 THAT ACCA ENHANCEMENTS CANNOT BE BASED ON JUDGE-FOUND FACTS",
        "reference": "II. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. LOWER COURTS UNIFORMLY APPLY THE OCCASIONS REQUIREMENT IN A MANNER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITS\nA. The Sixth Amendment Clearly Forecloses The Use Of Judicial Factfinding To Support An ACCA Enhancement\nB. ACCA Enhancements Are Routinely Imposed Based On Improper Judicial Factfinding\nII. THE SIMULTANEITY TEST DOES NOT REDUCE THE CENTRAL ROLE OF IMPERMISSIBLE FACTFINDING IN THE OCCASIONS ANALYSIS\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE COURT SHOULD STATE UNEQUIVOCALLY \u2014 YET AGAIN \u2014 THAT ACCA ENHANCEMENTS CANNOT BE BASED ON JUDGE-FOUND FACTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. MARKS REQUIRED THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE\nA. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis\nB. Under Marks, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in McDonald controls here\nIII. THE COURT CAN INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE WITHOUT OVERRULING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE\nIV. THE COURT MUST OVERRULE CRUIKSHANK TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE, AND SHOULD DO SO\nV. A FRACTURED COURT WOULD SERVE THE LAW BETTER THAN INCORPORATION THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS",
        "reference": "I. THE INDIANA COURT WAS REQUIRED TO RULE ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT QUESTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INDIANA COURT WAS REQUIRED TO RULE ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT QUESTION\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis\nB. Under Marks, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in McDonald controls here\nIII. THE COURT CAN INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE WITHOUT OVERRULING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE\nIV. THE COURT MUST OVERRULE CRUIKSHANK TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE, AND SHOULD DO SO\nV. A FRACTURED COURT WOULD SERVE THE LAW BETTER THAN INCORPORATION THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS",
        "reference": "II. MARKS REQUIRED THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INDIANA COURT WAS REQUIRED TO RULE ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT QUESTION\nII. MARKS REQUIRED THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Under Marks, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in McDonald controls here\nIII. THE COURT CAN INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE WITHOUT OVERRULING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE\nIV. THE COURT MUST OVERRULE CRUIKSHANK TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE, AND SHOULD DO SO\nV. A FRACTURED COURT WOULD SERVE THE LAW BETTER THAN INCORPORATION THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS",
        "reference": "A. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INDIANA COURT WAS REQUIRED TO RULE ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT QUESTION\nII. MARKS REQUIRED THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE\nA. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THE COURT CAN INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE WITHOUT OVERRULING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE\nIV. THE COURT MUST OVERRULE CRUIKSHANK TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE, AND SHOULD DO SO\nV. A FRACTURED COURT WOULD SERVE THE LAW BETTER THAN INCORPORATION THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS",
        "reference": "B. Under Marks, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in McDonald controls here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INDIANA COURT WAS REQUIRED TO RULE ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT QUESTION\nII. MARKS REQUIRED THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE\nA. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis\nB. Under Marks, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in McDonald controls here\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THE COURT MUST OVERRULE CRUIKSHANK TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE, AND SHOULD DO SO\nV. A FRACTURED COURT WOULD SERVE THE LAW BETTER THAN INCORPORATION THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS",
        "reference": "III. THE COURT CAN INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE WITHOUT OVERRULING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INDIANA COURT WAS REQUIRED TO RULE ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT QUESTION\nII. MARKS REQUIRED THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE\nA. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis\nB. Under Marks, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in McDonald controls here\nIII. THE COURT CAN INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE WITHOUT OVERRULING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. A FRACTURED COURT WOULD SERVE THE LAW BETTER THAN INCORPORATION THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS",
        "reference": "IV. THE COURT MUST OVERRULE CRUIKSHANK TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE, AND SHOULD DO SO",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INDIANA COURT WAS REQUIRED TO RULE ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT QUESTION\nII. MARKS REQUIRED THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE\nA. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis\nB. Under Marks, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in McDonald controls here\nIII. THE COURT CAN INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE WITHOUT OVERRULING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE\nIV. THE COURT MUST OVERRULE CRUIKSHANK TO INCORPORATE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE, AND SHOULD DO SO\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. A FRACTURED COURT WOULD SERVE THE LAW BETTER THAN INCORPORATION THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "II. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "A. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. [MISSING]\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "1. Lynch v. Donnelly",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. [MISSING]\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "B. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "C. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. [MISSING]\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. [MISSING]\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "D. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "III. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "A. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S FREQUENT CRITICISM OF, OCCASIONAL DEPARTURE FROM, AND OCCASIONAL RELIANCE ON, THE LEMON TEST FOR PASSIVE GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS DEMONSTRATE WHY IT MUST BE ABANDONED AS UNWORKABLE\nII. WHOLLY INCONSISTENT RULINGS IN PASSIVE RELIGIOUS DISPLAY CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE LEMON TEST HAS CONFUSED INSTEAD OF CLARIFIED THE QUESTION OF WHEN A GOVERNMENT DISPLAY VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. Fractured Rulings In Holiday Display Cases Show How The Lemon Test Is Unworkable As An Analytical Tool\n1. Lynch v. Donnelly\n2. County of Allegheny v. ACLU\nB. Conflicts Regarding The Constitutionality Of Historic Document Displays Featuring The Ten Commandments Illustrate How The Lemon Test Leads To Unprincipled Results\nC. Whether and How Lemon Should Be Applied Has Also Left Analyses of Decalogue Monuments Hopelessly Confused\n1. Tenth Circuit: Lemon applies and the monument is unconstitutional\n2. Ninth Circuit: Van Orden, not Lemon, applies and the monument is constitutional\n3. Eighth Circuit: Lemon does not apply and the monuments are constitutional\nD. Contradictory Analyses Of Passive Monuments Containing Crosses And A Statue Further Illustrate Why Lemon Must Be Abandoned\n1. Ninth Circuit: Mt. Soledad cross unconstitutional, Christ statue constitutional\n2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD\nA. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Objectively Non-Coercive Historical Practices Do Not Offend the Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE SPLIT AMONG FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS ON THE PREJUDICE REQUIREMENT HAS ONGOING REAL-WORLD CONSEQUENCES.\nIII. THE PREJUDICE ELEMENT WAS DISPOSITIVE BELOW, AND GIVEN CIRCUIT PRECEDENT, MORGAN HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ARGUE PREJUDICE.",
        "reference": "I. SUNDANCE ENGAGED IN VOLUNTARY CONDUCT THAT WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED WAIVER IN OTHER CONTRACTUAL CONTEXTS.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. SUNDANCE ENGAGED IN VOLUNTARY CONDUCT THAT WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED WAIVER IN OTHER CONTRACTUAL CONTEXTS.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE PREJUDICE ELEMENT WAS DISPOSITIVE BELOW, AND GIVEN CIRCUIT PRECEDENT, MORGAN HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ARGUE PREJUDICE.",
        "reference": "II. THE SPLIT AMONG FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS ON THE PREJUDICE REQUIREMENT HAS ONGOING REAL-WORLD CONSEQUENCES.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. SUNDANCE ENGAGED IN VOLUNTARY CONDUCT THAT WOULD HAVE CONSTITUTED WAIVER IN OTHER CONTRACTUAL CONTEXTS.\nII. THE SPLIT AMONG FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS ON THE PREJUDICE REQUIREMENT HAS ONGOING REAL-WORLD CONSEQUENCES.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE PREJUDICE ELEMENT WAS DISPOSITIVE BELOW, AND GIVEN CIRCUIT PRECEDENT, MORGAN HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ARGUE PREJUDICE.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Amicus substantially overreads Santana\nB. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would contradict the Fourth Amendment's original meaning\nIII. Fourth Amendment balancing precludes a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule is not necessary to serve law-enforcement interests\nB. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would severely infringe upon privacy",
        "reference": "I. This Court's precedent does not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's precedent does not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would contradict the Fourth Amendment's original meaning\nIII. Fourth Amendment balancing precludes a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule is not necessary to serve law-enforcement interests\nB. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would severely infringe upon privacy",
        "reference": "A. Amicus substantially overreads Santana",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's precedent does not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. Amicus substantially overreads Santana\nB. [MISSING]\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would contradict the Fourth Amendment's original meaning\nIII. Fourth Amendment balancing precludes a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule is not necessary to serve law-enforcement interests\nB. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would severely infringe upon privacy",
        "reference": "B. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's precedent does not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. Amicus substantially overreads Santana\nB. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Fourth Amendment balancing precludes a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule is not necessary to serve law-enforcement interests\nB. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would severely infringe upon privacy",
        "reference": "II. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would contradict the Fourth Amendment's original meaning",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's precedent does not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. Amicus substantially overreads Santana\nB. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would contradict the Fourth Amendment's original meaning\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule is not necessary to serve law-enforcement interests\nB. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would severely infringe upon privacy",
        "reference": "III. Fourth Amendment balancing precludes a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's precedent does not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. Amicus substantially overreads Santana\nB. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would contradict the Fourth Amendment's original meaning\nIII. Fourth Amendment balancing precludes a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would severely infringe upon privacy",
        "reference": "A. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule is not necessary to serve law-enforcement interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's precedent does not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. Amicus substantially overreads Santana\nB. The Court's broader exigent-circumstances case law bars a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would contradict the Fourth Amendment's original meaning\nIII. Fourth Amendment balancing precludes a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule\nA. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule is not necessary to serve law-enforcement interests\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule would severely infringe upon privacy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "A. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "2. Mob Violence And Riots",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. [MISSING]\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "3. Conflicts With Indians",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "B. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "C. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "D. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "II. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "A. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "reference": "B. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In A Nation Whose Veneer Of Civilization Is Thin, Americans Have Been Their Own First Responders To Violent Situations Since The Founding\nA. Colonists Faced A Variety Of Threats That Necessitated Carrying Firearms\n1. Day-To-Day Violence From Fellow Colonists\n2. Mob Violence And Riots\n3. Conflicts With Indians\nB. Criminal Law Enforcement In The Founding Era Did Little To Prevent Or Deter Crime\nC. Surrounded By This Violence, The Founders Understood The Fragility Of Civilization\nD. Americans Have Remained Their Own First Responders Despite The Evolution Of Policing Over The Past 200 Years\nII. The Need For Armed Self-Defense Remains Especially Acute Today\nA. The Events And Aftermath Of 2020 Reinforce That The Veneer Of Civilization Remains Thin, And Violence Can Surge At A Moment's Notice\nB. Violence Is Also Increasing In Natural Response To Political Movements Aimed At Dismantling Traditional Law Enforcement Systems\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The People Are Responding To These Conditions By Exercising Their Second Amendment Rights To Keep And Bear Arms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 7-1.\nB. The Majority Rule Is Wrong.\nC. The BIO Confirms This Is A Clean Vehicle To Resolve The Split.\nD. This Issue Is Important.\nII. The Second Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 3-4.\nB. The Decision Below Is Wrong.\nC. This Issue Is Important.\nD. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
        "reference": "I. The First Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Majority Rule Is Wrong.\nC. The BIO Confirms This Is A Clean Vehicle To Resolve The Split.\nD. This Issue Is Important.\nII. The Second Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 3-4.\nB. The Decision Below Is Wrong.\nC. This Issue Is Important.\nD. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
        "reference": "A. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 7-1.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 7-1.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The BIO Confirms This Is A Clean Vehicle To Resolve The Split.\nD. This Issue Is Important.\nII. The Second Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 3-4.\nB. The Decision Below Is Wrong.\nC. This Issue Is Important.\nD. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
        "reference": "B. The Majority Rule Is Wrong.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 7-1.\nB. The Majority Rule Is Wrong.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. This Issue Is Important.\nII. The Second Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 3-4.\nB. The Decision Below Is Wrong.\nC. This Issue Is Important.\nD. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
        "reference": "C. The BIO Confirms This Is A Clean Vehicle To Resolve The Split.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 7-1.\nB. The Majority Rule Is Wrong.\nC. The BIO Confirms This Is A Clean Vehicle To Resolve The Split.\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Second Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 3-4.\nB. The Decision Below Is Wrong.\nC. This Issue Is Important.\nD. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
        "reference": "D. This Issue Is Important.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 7-1.\nB. The Majority Rule Is Wrong.\nC. The BIO Confirms This Is A Clean Vehicle To Resolve The Split.\nD. This Issue Is Important.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 3-4.\nB. The Decision Below Is Wrong.\nC. This Issue Is Important.\nD. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
        "reference": "II. The Second Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 7-1.\nB. The Majority Rule Is Wrong.\nC. The BIO Confirms This Is A Clean Vehicle To Resolve The Split.\nD. This Issue Is Important.\nII. The Second Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Decision Below Is Wrong.\nC. This Issue Is Important.\nD. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
        "reference": "A. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 3-4.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 7-1.\nB. The Majority Rule Is Wrong.\nC. The BIO Confirms This Is A Clean Vehicle To Resolve The Split.\nD. This Issue Is Important.\nII. The Second Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 3-4.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Issue Is Important.\nD. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Is Wrong.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 7-1.\nB. The Majority Rule Is Wrong.\nC. The BIO Confirms This Is A Clean Vehicle To Resolve The Split.\nD. This Issue Is Important.\nII. The Second Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 3-4.\nB. The Decision Below Is Wrong.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
        "reference": "C. This Issue Is Important.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 7-1.\nB. The Majority Rule Is Wrong.\nC. The BIO Confirms This Is A Clean Vehicle To Resolve The Split.\nD. This Issue Is Important.\nII. The Second Question Satisfies The Court's Certiorari Criteria.\nA. Respondents Concede The Circuits Are Split 3-4.\nB. The Decision Below Is Wrong.\nC. This Issue Is Important.\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. MOUNT HEALTHY MUST BE APPLIED IN RETALIATORY ARREST CASES TO PERMIT VINDICATION OF CRITICAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS\nA. The First Amendment Does Not Permit Courts to Decide Retaliation Claims By Skirting The Essential Inquiry of Whether The Government Targeted Protected Speech Based on its Communicative Impact\n1. The Mount Healthy Framework Allows Courts to Determine Whether State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\n2. Focusing Only on The Existence of Probable Cause Does Not Allow Courts to Consider Whether a State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\nB. Granting Police Officers Unfettered Discretion to Punish Via Arrest Speech of Which They Do Not Approve Impermissibly Chills Speech\nC. No Other Government Power Can Be Deployed in Retaliation For Speech While Maintaining Immunity From a section 1983 Claim",
        "reference": "I. SIGNIFICANT DEPRIVATIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WILL OCCUR IF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST BARS ALL RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIMS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SIGNIFICANT DEPRIVATIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WILL OCCUR IF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST BARS ALL RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIMS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The First Amendment Does Not Permit Courts to Decide Retaliation Claims By Skirting The Essential Inquiry of Whether The Government Targeted Protected Speech Based on its Communicative Impact\n1. The Mount Healthy Framework Allows Courts to Determine Whether State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\n2. Focusing Only on The Existence of Probable Cause Does Not Allow Courts to Consider Whether a State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\nB. Granting Police Officers Unfettered Discretion to Punish Via Arrest Speech of Which They Do Not Approve Impermissibly Chills Speech\nC. No Other Government Power Can Be Deployed in Retaliation For Speech While Maintaining Immunity From a section 1983 Claim",
        "reference": "II. MOUNT HEALTHY MUST BE APPLIED IN RETALIATORY ARREST CASES TO PERMIT VINDICATION OF CRITICAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SIGNIFICANT DEPRIVATIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WILL OCCUR IF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST BARS ALL RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIMS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES\nII. MOUNT HEALTHY MUST BE APPLIED IN RETALIATORY ARREST CASES TO PERMIT VINDICATION OF CRITICAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The Mount Healthy Framework Allows Courts to Determine Whether State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\n2. Focusing Only on The Existence of Probable Cause Does Not Allow Courts to Consider Whether a State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\nB. Granting Police Officers Unfettered Discretion to Punish Via Arrest Speech of Which They Do Not Approve Impermissibly Chills Speech\nC. No Other Government Power Can Be Deployed in Retaliation For Speech While Maintaining Immunity From a section 1983 Claim",
        "reference": "A. The First Amendment Does Not Permit Courts to Decide Retaliation Claims By Skirting The Essential Inquiry of Whether The Government Targeted Protected Speech Based on its Communicative Impact",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SIGNIFICANT DEPRIVATIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WILL OCCUR IF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST BARS ALL RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIMS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES\nII. MOUNT HEALTHY MUST BE APPLIED IN RETALIATORY ARREST CASES TO PERMIT VINDICATION OF CRITICAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS\nA. The First Amendment Does Not Permit Courts to Decide Retaliation Claims By Skirting The Essential Inquiry of Whether The Government Targeted Protected Speech Based on its Communicative Impact\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Focusing Only on The Existence of Probable Cause Does Not Allow Courts to Consider Whether a State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\nB. Granting Police Officers Unfettered Discretion to Punish Via Arrest Speech of Which They Do Not Approve Impermissibly Chills Speech\nC. No Other Government Power Can Be Deployed in Retaliation For Speech While Maintaining Immunity From a section 1983 Claim",
        "reference": "1. The Mount Healthy Framework Allows Courts to Determine Whether State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SIGNIFICANT DEPRIVATIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WILL OCCUR IF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST BARS ALL RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIMS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES\nII. MOUNT HEALTHY MUST BE APPLIED IN RETALIATORY ARREST CASES TO PERMIT VINDICATION OF CRITICAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS\nA. The First Amendment Does Not Permit Courts to Decide Retaliation Claims By Skirting The Essential Inquiry of Whether The Government Targeted Protected Speech Based on its Communicative Impact\n1. The Mount Healthy Framework Allows Courts to Determine Whether State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\n2. [MISSING]\nB. Granting Police Officers Unfettered Discretion to Punish Via Arrest Speech of Which They Do Not Approve Impermissibly Chills Speech\nC. No Other Government Power Can Be Deployed in Retaliation For Speech While Maintaining Immunity From a section 1983 Claim",
        "reference": "2. Focusing Only on The Existence of Probable Cause Does Not Allow Courts to Consider Whether a State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SIGNIFICANT DEPRIVATIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WILL OCCUR IF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST BARS ALL RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIMS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES\nII. MOUNT HEALTHY MUST BE APPLIED IN RETALIATORY ARREST CASES TO PERMIT VINDICATION OF CRITICAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS\nA. The First Amendment Does Not Permit Courts to Decide Retaliation Claims By Skirting The Essential Inquiry of Whether The Government Targeted Protected Speech Based on its Communicative Impact\n1. The Mount Healthy Framework Allows Courts to Determine Whether State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\n2. Focusing Only on The Existence of Probable Cause Does Not Allow Courts to Consider Whether a State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\nB. [MISSING]\nC. No Other Government Power Can Be Deployed in Retaliation For Speech While Maintaining Immunity From a section 1983 Claim",
        "reference": "B. Granting Police Officers Unfettered Discretion to Punish Via Arrest Speech of Which They Do Not Approve Impermissibly Chills Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SIGNIFICANT DEPRIVATIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WILL OCCUR IF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST BARS ALL RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIMS UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES\nII. MOUNT HEALTHY MUST BE APPLIED IN RETALIATORY ARREST CASES TO PERMIT VINDICATION OF CRITICAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS\nA. The First Amendment Does Not Permit Courts to Decide Retaliation Claims By Skirting The Essential Inquiry of Whether The Government Targeted Protected Speech Based on its Communicative Impact\n1. The Mount Healthy Framework Allows Courts to Determine Whether State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\n2. Focusing Only on The Existence of Probable Cause Does Not Allow Courts to Consider Whether a State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of its Communicative Impact\nB. Granting Police Officers Unfettered Discretion to Punish Via Arrest Speech of Which They Do Not Approve Impermissibly Chills Speech\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. No Other Government Power Can Be Deployed in Retaliation For Speech While Maintaining Immunity From a section 1983 Claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. California's Regime and the Ninth Circuit's Approach Are Inadequate to Protect Against the Range of Reprisals that Donors Can Suffer",
        "reference": "I. Disclosure May Subject Donors to Reprisals Not Only by the Public, but Also by Domestic and Foreign Governments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. Disclosure May Subject Donors to Reprisals Not Only by the Public, but Also by Domestic and Foreign Governments\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. California's Regime and the Ninth Circuit's Approach Are Inadequate to Protect Against the Range of Reprisals that Donors Can Suffer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Unanimous Decision Below Reflects A Proper Application Of Sovereign Immunity Law And Statutory Interpretation Rules.\nA. The Constitution Does Not Allow Private Parties To Sue The States Under The NGA\ni. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.\nii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.\nB. The NGA Does Not Empower Private Parties To Sue The States With Sufficient Clarity.\nIII. The Consequences Of The Third Circuit's Decision Are Overstated.\nA. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On NGA Cases.\nB. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On This Case.",
        "reference": "I. There Is No Split That Warrants Review.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split That Warrants Review.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Constitution Does Not Allow Private Parties To Sue The States Under The NGA\ni. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.\nii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.\nB. The NGA Does Not Empower Private Parties To Sue The States With Sufficient Clarity.\nIII. The Consequences Of The Third Circuit's Decision Are Overstated.\nA. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On NGA Cases.\nB. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On This Case.",
        "reference": "II. The Unanimous Decision Below Reflects A Proper Application Of Sovereign Immunity Law And Statutory Interpretation Rules.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split That Warrants Review.\nII. The Unanimous Decision Below Reflects A Proper Application Of Sovereign Immunity Law And Statutory Interpretation Rules.\nA. [MISSING]\ni. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.\nii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.\nB. The NGA Does Not Empower Private Parties To Sue The States With Sufficient Clarity.\nIII. The Consequences Of The Third Circuit's Decision Are Overstated.\nA. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On NGA Cases.\nB. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On This Case.",
        "reference": "A. The Constitution Does Not Allow Private Parties To Sue The States Under The NGA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split That Warrants Review.\nII. The Unanimous Decision Below Reflects A Proper Application Of Sovereign Immunity Law And Statutory Interpretation Rules.\nA. The Constitution Does Not Allow Private Parties To Sue The States Under The NGA\ni. [MISSING]\nii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.\nB. The NGA Does Not Empower Private Parties To Sue The States With Sufficient Clarity.\nIII. The Consequences Of The Third Circuit's Decision Are Overstated.\nA. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On NGA Cases.\nB. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On This Case.",
        "reference": "i. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split That Warrants Review.\nII. The Unanimous Decision Below Reflects A Proper Application Of Sovereign Immunity Law And Statutory Interpretation Rules.\nA. The Constitution Does Not Allow Private Parties To Sue The States Under The NGA\ni. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.\nii. [MISSING]\nB. The NGA Does Not Empower Private Parties To Sue The States With Sufficient Clarity.\nIII. The Consequences Of The Third Circuit's Decision Are Overstated.\nA. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On NGA Cases.\nB. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On This Case.",
        "reference": "ii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split That Warrants Review.\nII. The Unanimous Decision Below Reflects A Proper Application Of Sovereign Immunity Law And Statutory Interpretation Rules.\nA. The Constitution Does Not Allow Private Parties To Sue The States Under The NGA\ni. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.\nii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Consequences Of The Third Circuit's Decision Are Overstated.\nA. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On NGA Cases.\nB. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On This Case.",
        "reference": "B. The NGA Does Not Empower Private Parties To Sue The States With Sufficient Clarity.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split That Warrants Review.\nII. The Unanimous Decision Below Reflects A Proper Application Of Sovereign Immunity Law And Statutory Interpretation Rules.\nA. The Constitution Does Not Allow Private Parties To Sue The States Under The NGA\ni. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.\nii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.\nB. The NGA Does Not Empower Private Parties To Sue The States With Sufficient Clarity.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On NGA Cases.\nB. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On This Case.",
        "reference": "III. The Consequences Of The Third Circuit's Decision Are Overstated.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split That Warrants Review.\nII. The Unanimous Decision Below Reflects A Proper Application Of Sovereign Immunity Law And Statutory Interpretation Rules.\nA. The Constitution Does Not Allow Private Parties To Sue The States Under The NGA\ni. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.\nii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.\nB. The NGA Does Not Empower Private Parties To Sue The States With Sufficient Clarity.\nIII. The Consequences Of The Third Circuit's Decision Are Overstated.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On This Case.",
        "reference": "A. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On NGA Cases.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split That Warrants Review.\nII. The Unanimous Decision Below Reflects A Proper Application Of Sovereign Immunity Law And Statutory Interpretation Rules.\nA. The Constitution Does Not Allow Private Parties To Sue The States Under The NGA\ni. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.\nii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.\nB. The NGA Does Not Empower Private Parties To Sue The States With Sufficient Clarity.\nIII. The Consequences Of The Third Circuit's Decision Are Overstated.\nA. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On NGA Cases.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. PennEast Overstates The Impacts Of The Third Circuit's Decision On This Case.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Court has recognized in every other context that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination\nB. Higher-education admissions is the only context where a party accused of discrimination may determine whether discrimination is necessary\nII. Experience Demonstrates That the Grutter Standard Is Unworkable\nA. Texas's experiences with affirmative action demonstrate that Grutter is unworkable\nB. The experience of petitioner's members further demonstrates the theoretical problems behind Grutter\nIII. This Court Has Undermined Grutter in Subsequent Case Law\nIV. Purported Reliance Interests Are No Basis To Retain Grutter",
        "reference": "I. Grutter Was an Unprincipled Departure from This Court's Rule That Racial Preferences Are Unacceptable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter Was an Unprincipled Departure from This Court's Rule That Racial Preferences Are Unacceptable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Higher-education admissions is the only context where a party accused of discrimination may determine whether discrimination is necessary\nII. Experience Demonstrates That the Grutter Standard Is Unworkable\nA. Texas's experiences with affirmative action demonstrate that Grutter is unworkable\nB. The experience of petitioner's members further demonstrates the theoretical problems behind Grutter\nIII. This Court Has Undermined Grutter in Subsequent Case Law\nIV. Purported Reliance Interests Are No Basis To Retain Grutter",
        "reference": "A. This Court has recognized in every other context that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter Was an Unprincipled Departure from This Court's Rule That Racial Preferences Are Unacceptable\nA. This Court has recognized in every other context that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Experience Demonstrates That the Grutter Standard Is Unworkable\nA. Texas's experiences with affirmative action demonstrate that Grutter is unworkable\nB. The experience of petitioner's members further demonstrates the theoretical problems behind Grutter\nIII. This Court Has Undermined Grutter in Subsequent Case Law\nIV. Purported Reliance Interests Are No Basis To Retain Grutter",
        "reference": "B. Higher-education admissions is the only context where a party accused of discrimination may determine whether discrimination is necessary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter Was an Unprincipled Departure from This Court's Rule That Racial Preferences Are Unacceptable\nA. This Court has recognized in every other context that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination\nB. Higher-education admissions is the only context where a party accused of discrimination may determine whether discrimination is necessary\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Texas's experiences with affirmative action demonstrate that Grutter is unworkable\nB. The experience of petitioner's members further demonstrates the theoretical problems behind Grutter\nIII. This Court Has Undermined Grutter in Subsequent Case Law\nIV. Purported Reliance Interests Are No Basis To Retain Grutter",
        "reference": "II. Experience Demonstrates That the Grutter Standard Is Unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter Was an Unprincipled Departure from This Court's Rule That Racial Preferences Are Unacceptable\nA. This Court has recognized in every other context that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination\nB. Higher-education admissions is the only context where a party accused of discrimination may determine whether discrimination is necessary\nII. Experience Demonstrates That the Grutter Standard Is Unworkable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The experience of petitioner's members further demonstrates the theoretical problems behind Grutter\nIII. This Court Has Undermined Grutter in Subsequent Case Law\nIV. Purported Reliance Interests Are No Basis To Retain Grutter",
        "reference": "A. Texas's experiences with affirmative action demonstrate that Grutter is unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter Was an Unprincipled Departure from This Court's Rule That Racial Preferences Are Unacceptable\nA. This Court has recognized in every other context that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination\nB. Higher-education admissions is the only context where a party accused of discrimination may determine whether discrimination is necessary\nII. Experience Demonstrates That the Grutter Standard Is Unworkable\nA. Texas's experiences with affirmative action demonstrate that Grutter is unworkable\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. This Court Has Undermined Grutter in Subsequent Case Law\nIV. Purported Reliance Interests Are No Basis To Retain Grutter",
        "reference": "B. The experience of petitioner's members further demonstrates the theoretical problems behind Grutter",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter Was an Unprincipled Departure from This Court's Rule That Racial Preferences Are Unacceptable\nA. This Court has recognized in every other context that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination\nB. Higher-education admissions is the only context where a party accused of discrimination may determine whether discrimination is necessary\nII. Experience Demonstrates That the Grutter Standard Is Unworkable\nA. Texas's experiences with affirmative action demonstrate that Grutter is unworkable\nB. The experience of petitioner's members further demonstrates the theoretical problems behind Grutter\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Purported Reliance Interests Are No Basis To Retain Grutter",
        "reference": "III. This Court Has Undermined Grutter in Subsequent Case Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter Was an Unprincipled Departure from This Court's Rule That Racial Preferences Are Unacceptable\nA. This Court has recognized in every other context that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination\nB. Higher-education admissions is the only context where a party accused of discrimination may determine whether discrimination is necessary\nII. Experience Demonstrates That the Grutter Standard Is Unworkable\nA. Texas's experiences with affirmative action demonstrate that Grutter is unworkable\nB. The experience of petitioner's members further demonstrates the theoretical problems behind Grutter\nIII. This Court Has Undermined Grutter in Subsequent Case Law\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Purported Reliance Interests Are No Basis To Retain Grutter",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-364_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Protecting Historical and Architectural Heritage \u2014both Secular and Religious \u2014is a Legitimate Government Interest for Cultural, Aesthetic, and Economic Reasons\nB. Governments Have a Legitimate Interest in Promoting the Historical, Architectural, and Cultural Heritage of Religious Structures\nC. Federal, State, and Local Governments Regularly Fund the Preservation of Historic Religious Structures to Advance Secular Public Benefits\nII. STATE COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER HISTORIC PRESERVATION GRANTS ARE A PUBLIC BENEFIT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF TRINITY LUTHERAN",
        "reference": "I. PRESERVING HISTORIC RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES IS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-364_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. PRESERVING HISTORIC RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES IS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Governments Have a Legitimate Interest in Promoting the Historical, Architectural, and Cultural Heritage of Religious Structures\nC. Federal, State, and Local Governments Regularly Fund the Preservation of Historic Religious Structures to Advance Secular Public Benefits\nII. STATE COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER HISTORIC PRESERVATION GRANTS ARE A PUBLIC BENEFIT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF TRINITY LUTHERAN",
        "reference": "A. Protecting Historical and Architectural Heritage \u2014both Secular and Religious \u2014is a Legitimate Government Interest for Cultural, Aesthetic, and Economic Reasons",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-364_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. PRESERVING HISTORIC RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES IS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE\nA. Protecting Historical and Architectural Heritage \u2014both Secular and Religious \u2014is a Legitimate Government Interest for Cultural, Aesthetic, and Economic Reasons\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Federal, State, and Local Governments Regularly Fund the Preservation of Historic Religious Structures to Advance Secular Public Benefits\nII. STATE COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER HISTORIC PRESERVATION GRANTS ARE A PUBLIC BENEFIT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF TRINITY LUTHERAN",
        "reference": "B. Governments Have a Legitimate Interest in Promoting the Historical, Architectural, and Cultural Heritage of Religious Structures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-364_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. PRESERVING HISTORIC RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES IS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE\nA. Protecting Historical and Architectural Heritage \u2014both Secular and Religious \u2014is a Legitimate Government Interest for Cultural, Aesthetic, and Economic Reasons\nB. Governments Have a Legitimate Interest in Promoting the Historical, Architectural, and Cultural Heritage of Religious Structures\nC. [MISSING]\nII. STATE COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER HISTORIC PRESERVATION GRANTS ARE A PUBLIC BENEFIT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF TRINITY LUTHERAN",
        "reference": "C. Federal, State, and Local Governments Regularly Fund the Preservation of Historic Religious Structures to Advance Secular Public Benefits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-364_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. PRESERVING HISTORIC RELIGIOUS STRUCTURES IS AN ISSUE OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE\nA. Protecting Historical and Architectural Heritage \u2014both Secular and Religious \u2014is a Legitimate Government Interest for Cultural, Aesthetic, and Economic Reasons\nB. Governments Have a Legitimate Interest in Promoting the Historical, Architectural, and Cultural Heritage of Religious Structures\nC. Federal, State, and Local Governments Regularly Fund the Preservation of Historic Religious Structures to Advance Secular Public Benefits\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. STATE COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER HISTORIC PRESERVATION GRANTS ARE A PUBLIC BENEFIT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF TRINITY LUTHERAN",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT'S REFUSAL TO REVIEW PATENT CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR UNDERMINES THE RULE OF LAW",
        "reference": "I. AS PART OF THE DIRECT REVIEW PROCESS, THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT'S INDEPENDENT REVIEW SHOULD HAVE INCORPORATED THE ESTABLISHED RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AT THE TIME",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS PART OF THE DIRECT REVIEW PROCESS, THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT'S INDEPENDENT REVIEW SHOULD HAVE INCORPORATED THE ESTABLISHED RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AT THE TIME\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT'S REFUSAL TO REVIEW PATENT CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR UNDERMINES THE RULE OF LAW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner's illegitimate presence in Avis's car cannot support a Fourth Amendment claim\nB. Neither property rights nor societal expectations support petitioner's assertion of a Fourth Amendment interest in Avis's car\n1. Petitioner had no enforceable property rights in a car he was not allowed to drive\n2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car\nC. Petitioner's \"possession and control\" test is unsound",
        "reference": "Petitioner had no Fourth Amendment interest in a rental car that he was prohibited from driving",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner had no Fourth Amendment interest in a rental car that he was prohibited from driving\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Neither property rights nor societal expectations support petitioner's assertion of a Fourth Amendment interest in Avis's car\n1. Petitioner had no enforceable property rights in a car he was not allowed to drive\n2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car\nC. Petitioner's \"possession and control\" test is unsound",
        "reference": "A. Petitioner's illegitimate presence in Avis's car cannot support a Fourth Amendment claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner had no Fourth Amendment interest in a rental car that he was prohibited from driving\nA. Petitioner's illegitimate presence in Avis's car cannot support a Fourth Amendment claim\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Petitioner had no enforceable property rights in a car he was not allowed to drive\n2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car\nC. Petitioner's \"possession and control\" test is unsound",
        "reference": "B. Neither property rights nor societal expectations support petitioner's assertion of a Fourth Amendment interest in Avis's car",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner had no Fourth Amendment interest in a rental car that he was prohibited from driving\nA. Petitioner's illegitimate presence in Avis's car cannot support a Fourth Amendment claim\nB. Neither property rights nor societal expectations support petitioner's assertion of a Fourth Amendment interest in Avis's car\n1. [MISSING]\n2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car\nC. Petitioner's \"possession and control\" test is unsound",
        "reference": "1. Petitioner had no enforceable property rights in a car he was not allowed to drive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner had no Fourth Amendment interest in a rental car that he was prohibited from driving\nA. Petitioner's illegitimate presence in Avis's car cannot support a Fourth Amendment claim\nB. Neither property rights nor societal expectations support petitioner's assertion of a Fourth Amendment interest in Avis's car\n1. Petitioner had no enforceable property rights in a car he was not allowed to drive\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner's \"possession and control\" test is unsound",
        "reference": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner had no Fourth Amendment interest in a rental car that he was prohibited from driving\nA. Petitioner's illegitimate presence in Avis's car cannot support a Fourth Amendment claim\nB. Neither property rights nor societal expectations support petitioner's assertion of a Fourth Amendment interest in Avis's car\n1. Petitioner had no enforceable property rights in a car he was not allowed to drive\n2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner's \"possession and control\" test is unsound",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected\nB. RJR Nabisco established the domestic-injury requirement to limit claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not to deny RICO standing to foreign plaintiffs\nC. Considering the conduct and the location of the property injured is consistent with this Court's precedent. . 16\nII. This Case Involves A Permissible Domestic Application Of Section 1964(c)\nIII. Petitioners' Novel Textual Approach To Section 1964(c) Is Flawed And Leads To Absurd Results That Contradict The Statute And This Court's Domestic-Injury Requirement\nA. A plaintiff's domestic injury in property centers on where the injury arose and where the property is located, not on the legal fiction of where the owner of that property may \"feel\" the harm\nB. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)\nIV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit\nV. Petitioners' Parade Of Horribles Does Not Require A Bright-Line Rule That Conflicts With Section 1964(c)",
        "reference": "I. Congress Did Not Bar Foreign Plaintiffs From Asserting RICO Claims; RJR Nabisco's Domestic-Injury Requirement Focuses On Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Did Not Bar Foreign Plaintiffs From Asserting RICO Claims; RJR Nabisco's Domestic-Injury Requirement Focuses On Conduct\nA. [MISSING]\nB. RJR Nabisco established the domestic-injury requirement to limit claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not to deny RICO standing to foreign plaintiffs\nC. Considering the conduct and the location of the property injured is consistent with this Court's precedent. . 16\nII. This Case Involves A Permissible Domestic Application Of Section 1964(c)\nIII. Petitioners' Novel Textual Approach To Section 1964(c) Is Flawed And Leads To Absurd Results That Contradict The Statute And This Court's Domestic-Injury Requirement\nA. A plaintiff's domestic injury in property centers on where the injury arose and where the property is located, not on the legal fiction of where the owner of that property may \"feel\" the harm\nB. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)\nIV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit\nV. Petitioners' Parade Of Horribles Does Not Require A Bright-Line Rule That Conflicts With Section 1964(c)",
        "reference": "A. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Did Not Bar Foreign Plaintiffs From Asserting RICO Claims; RJR Nabisco's Domestic-Injury Requirement Focuses On Conduct\nA. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Considering the conduct and the location of the property injured is consistent with this Court's precedent. . 16\nII. This Case Involves A Permissible Domestic Application Of Section 1964(c)\nIII. Petitioners' Novel Textual Approach To Section 1964(c) Is Flawed And Leads To Absurd Results That Contradict The Statute And This Court's Domestic-Injury Requirement\nA. A plaintiff's domestic injury in property centers on where the injury arose and where the property is located, not on the legal fiction of where the owner of that property may \"feel\" the harm\nB. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)\nIV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit\nV. Petitioners' Parade Of Horribles Does Not Require A Bright-Line Rule That Conflicts With Section 1964(c)",
        "reference": "B. RJR Nabisco established the domestic-injury requirement to limit claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not to deny RICO standing to foreign plaintiffs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Did Not Bar Foreign Plaintiffs From Asserting RICO Claims; RJR Nabisco's Domestic-Injury Requirement Focuses On Conduct\nA. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected\nB. RJR Nabisco established the domestic-injury requirement to limit claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not to deny RICO standing to foreign plaintiffs\nC. [MISSING]\nII. This Case Involves A Permissible Domestic Application Of Section 1964(c)\nIII. Petitioners' Novel Textual Approach To Section 1964(c) Is Flawed And Leads To Absurd Results That Contradict The Statute And This Court's Domestic-Injury Requirement\nA. A plaintiff's domestic injury in property centers on where the injury arose and where the property is located, not on the legal fiction of where the owner of that property may \"feel\" the harm\nB. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)\nIV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit\nV. Petitioners' Parade Of Horribles Does Not Require A Bright-Line Rule That Conflicts With Section 1964(c)",
        "reference": "C. Considering the conduct and the location of the property injured is consistent with this Court's precedent. . 16",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Did Not Bar Foreign Plaintiffs From Asserting RICO Claims; RJR Nabisco's Domestic-Injury Requirement Focuses On Conduct\nA. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected\nB. RJR Nabisco established the domestic-injury requirement to limit claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not to deny RICO standing to foreign plaintiffs\nC. Considering the conduct and the location of the property injured is consistent with this Court's precedent. . 16\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Petitioners' Novel Textual Approach To Section 1964(c) Is Flawed And Leads To Absurd Results That Contradict The Statute And This Court's Domestic-Injury Requirement\nA. A plaintiff's domestic injury in property centers on where the injury arose and where the property is located, not on the legal fiction of where the owner of that property may \"feel\" the harm\nB. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)\nIV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit\nV. Petitioners' Parade Of Horribles Does Not Require A Bright-Line Rule That Conflicts With Section 1964(c)",
        "reference": "II. This Case Involves A Permissible Domestic Application Of Section 1964(c)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Did Not Bar Foreign Plaintiffs From Asserting RICO Claims; RJR Nabisco's Domestic-Injury Requirement Focuses On Conduct\nA. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected\nB. RJR Nabisco established the domestic-injury requirement to limit claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not to deny RICO standing to foreign plaintiffs\nC. Considering the conduct and the location of the property injured is consistent with this Court's precedent. . 16\nII. This Case Involves A Permissible Domestic Application Of Section 1964(c)\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. A plaintiff's domestic injury in property centers on where the injury arose and where the property is located, not on the legal fiction of where the owner of that property may \"feel\" the harm\nB. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)\nIV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit\nV. Petitioners' Parade Of Horribles Does Not Require A Bright-Line Rule That Conflicts With Section 1964(c)",
        "reference": "III. Petitioners' Novel Textual Approach To Section 1964(c) Is Flawed And Leads To Absurd Results That Contradict The Statute And This Court's Domestic-Injury Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Did Not Bar Foreign Plaintiffs From Asserting RICO Claims; RJR Nabisco's Domestic-Injury Requirement Focuses On Conduct\nA. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected\nB. RJR Nabisco established the domestic-injury requirement to limit claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not to deny RICO standing to foreign plaintiffs\nC. Considering the conduct and the location of the property injured is consistent with this Court's precedent. . 16\nII. This Case Involves A Permissible Domestic Application Of Section 1964(c)\nIII. Petitioners' Novel Textual Approach To Section 1964(c) Is Flawed And Leads To Absurd Results That Contradict The Statute And This Court's Domestic-Injury Requirement\nA. [MISSING]\nB. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)\nIV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit\nV. Petitioners' Parade Of Horribles Does Not Require A Bright-Line Rule That Conflicts With Section 1964(c)",
        "reference": "A. A plaintiff's domestic injury in property centers on where the injury arose and where the property is located, not on the legal fiction of where the owner of that property may \"feel\" the harm",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Did Not Bar Foreign Plaintiffs From Asserting RICO Claims; RJR Nabisco's Domestic-Injury Requirement Focuses On Conduct\nA. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected\nB. RJR Nabisco established the domestic-injury requirement to limit claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not to deny RICO standing to foreign plaintiffs\nC. Considering the conduct and the location of the property injured is consistent with this Court's precedent. . 16\nII. This Case Involves A Permissible Domestic Application Of Section 1964(c)\nIII. Petitioners' Novel Textual Approach To Section 1964(c) Is Flawed And Leads To Absurd Results That Contradict The Statute And This Court's Domestic-Injury Requirement\nA. A plaintiff's domestic injury in property centers on where the injury arose and where the property is located, not on the legal fiction of where the owner of that property may \"feel\" the harm\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit\nV. Petitioners' Parade Of Horribles Does Not Require A Bright-Line Rule That Conflicts With Section 1964(c)",
        "reference": "B. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Did Not Bar Foreign Plaintiffs From Asserting RICO Claims; RJR Nabisco's Domestic-Injury Requirement Focuses On Conduct\nA. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected\nB. RJR Nabisco established the domestic-injury requirement to limit claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not to deny RICO standing to foreign plaintiffs\nC. Considering the conduct and the location of the property injured is consistent with this Court's precedent. . 16\nII. This Case Involves A Permissible Domestic Application Of Section 1964(c)\nIII. Petitioners' Novel Textual Approach To Section 1964(c) Is Flawed And Leads To Absurd Results That Contradict The Statute And This Court's Domestic-Injury Requirement\nA. A plaintiff's domestic injury in property centers on where the injury arose and where the property is located, not on the legal fiction of where the owner of that property may \"feel\" the harm\nB. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. Petitioners' Parade Of Horribles Does Not Require A Bright-Line Rule That Conflicts With Section 1964(c)",
        "reference": "IV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Did Not Bar Foreign Plaintiffs From Asserting RICO Claims; RJR Nabisco's Domestic-Injury Requirement Focuses On Conduct\nA. Congress drafted Section 1964(c) to allow \"any person\" to bring a civil RICO claim; that choice must be respected\nB. RJR Nabisco established the domestic-injury requirement to limit claims based on extraterritorial conduct, not to deny RICO standing to foreign plaintiffs\nC. Considering the conduct and the location of the property injured is consistent with this Court's precedent. . 16\nII. This Case Involves A Permissible Domestic Application Of Section 1964(c)\nIII. Petitioners' Novel Textual Approach To Section 1964(c) Is Flawed And Leads To Absurd Results That Contradict The Statute And This Court's Domestic-Injury Requirement\nA. A plaintiff's domestic injury in property centers on where the injury arose and where the property is located, not on the legal fiction of where the owner of that property may \"feel\" the harm\nB. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)\nIV. Petitioners' Intangible-Property Arguments Lack Merit\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. Petitioners' Parade Of Horribles Does Not Require A Bright-Line Rule That Conflicts With Section 1964(c)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Courts have made up ad hoc tests to determine whether \"intangible injuries\" are concrete, and they ultimately fall back on a limited set of traditional injuries\nB. Courts disagree about the scope and applicability of historical and common law analysis under Spokeo\nC. Courts applying Spokeo focus on legislative intent to the detriment of plain text, leading to absurd results\nD. There is substantial confusion about whether the imminence standard in Clapper limits standing in data breach cases\nE. Convergence of the various confusions over Spokeo has led to conflicting and absurd results\nII. Individuals who sue to vindicate their private rights necessarily satisfy the requirements of Article III standing because they suffer concrete injuries when their legal rights are violated",
        "reference": "I. The Spokeo decision has led to incoherent, conflicting, and unpredictable outcomes as lower courts have struggled to apply the concreteness test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Spokeo decision has led to incoherent, conflicting, and unpredictable outcomes as lower courts have struggled to apply the concreteness test\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Courts disagree about the scope and applicability of historical and common law analysis under Spokeo\nC. Courts applying Spokeo focus on legislative intent to the detriment of plain text, leading to absurd results\nD. There is substantial confusion about whether the imminence standard in Clapper limits standing in data breach cases\nE. Convergence of the various confusions over Spokeo has led to conflicting and absurd results\nII. Individuals who sue to vindicate their private rights necessarily satisfy the requirements of Article III standing because they suffer concrete injuries when their legal rights are violated",
        "reference": "A. Courts have made up ad hoc tests to determine whether \"intangible injuries\" are concrete, and they ultimately fall back on a limited set of traditional injuries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Spokeo decision has led to incoherent, conflicting, and unpredictable outcomes as lower courts have struggled to apply the concreteness test\nA. Courts have made up ad hoc tests to determine whether \"intangible injuries\" are concrete, and they ultimately fall back on a limited set of traditional injuries\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Courts applying Spokeo focus on legislative intent to the detriment of plain text, leading to absurd results\nD. There is substantial confusion about whether the imminence standard in Clapper limits standing in data breach cases\nE. Convergence of the various confusions over Spokeo has led to conflicting and absurd results\nII. Individuals who sue to vindicate their private rights necessarily satisfy the requirements of Article III standing because they suffer concrete injuries when their legal rights are violated",
        "reference": "B. Courts disagree about the scope and applicability of historical and common law analysis under Spokeo",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Spokeo decision has led to incoherent, conflicting, and unpredictable outcomes as lower courts have struggled to apply the concreteness test\nA. Courts have made up ad hoc tests to determine whether \"intangible injuries\" are concrete, and they ultimately fall back on a limited set of traditional injuries\nB. Courts disagree about the scope and applicability of historical and common law analysis under Spokeo\nC. [MISSING]\nD. There is substantial confusion about whether the imminence standard in Clapper limits standing in data breach cases\nE. Convergence of the various confusions over Spokeo has led to conflicting and absurd results\nII. Individuals who sue to vindicate their private rights necessarily satisfy the requirements of Article III standing because they suffer concrete injuries when their legal rights are violated",
        "reference": "C. Courts applying Spokeo focus on legislative intent to the detriment of plain text, leading to absurd results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Spokeo decision has led to incoherent, conflicting, and unpredictable outcomes as lower courts have struggled to apply the concreteness test\nA. Courts have made up ad hoc tests to determine whether \"intangible injuries\" are concrete, and they ultimately fall back on a limited set of traditional injuries\nB. Courts disagree about the scope and applicability of historical and common law analysis under Spokeo\nC. Courts applying Spokeo focus on legislative intent to the detriment of plain text, leading to absurd results\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Convergence of the various confusions over Spokeo has led to conflicting and absurd results\nII. Individuals who sue to vindicate their private rights necessarily satisfy the requirements of Article III standing because they suffer concrete injuries when their legal rights are violated",
        "reference": "D. There is substantial confusion about whether the imminence standard in Clapper limits standing in data breach cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Spokeo decision has led to incoherent, conflicting, and unpredictable outcomes as lower courts have struggled to apply the concreteness test\nA. Courts have made up ad hoc tests to determine whether \"intangible injuries\" are concrete, and they ultimately fall back on a limited set of traditional injuries\nB. Courts disagree about the scope and applicability of historical and common law analysis under Spokeo\nC. Courts applying Spokeo focus on legislative intent to the detriment of plain text, leading to absurd results\nD. There is substantial confusion about whether the imminence standard in Clapper limits standing in data breach cases\nE. [MISSING]\nII. Individuals who sue to vindicate their private rights necessarily satisfy the requirements of Article III standing because they suffer concrete injuries when their legal rights are violated",
        "reference": "E. Convergence of the various confusions over Spokeo has led to conflicting and absurd results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Spokeo decision has led to incoherent, conflicting, and unpredictable outcomes as lower courts have struggled to apply the concreteness test\nA. Courts have made up ad hoc tests to determine whether \"intangible injuries\" are concrete, and they ultimately fall back on a limited set of traditional injuries\nB. Courts disagree about the scope and applicability of historical and common law analysis under Spokeo\nC. Courts applying Spokeo focus on legislative intent to the detriment of plain text, leading to absurd results\nD. There is substantial confusion about whether the imminence standard in Clapper limits standing in data breach cases\nE. Convergence of the various confusions over Spokeo has led to conflicting and absurd results\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Individuals who sue to vindicate their private rights necessarily satisfy the requirements of Article III standing because they suffer concrete injuries when their legal rights are violated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is the natural kind of human being that includes unborn human beings\nA. Key developments in originalist theory: original meaning and natural kind meaning\nB. The original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses was the natural kind of human being\nC. The natural kind original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses included unborn human beings",
        "reference": "I. The conventional wisdom regarding the constitutional personhood of unborn human beings in jurisprudence and scholarship",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. The conventional wisdom regarding the constitutional personhood of unborn human beings in jurisprudence and scholarship\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Key developments in originalist theory: original meaning and natural kind meaning\nB. The original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses was the natural kind of human being\nC. The natural kind original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses included unborn human beings",
        "reference": "II. The original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is the natural kind of human being that includes unborn human beings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. The conventional wisdom regarding the constitutional personhood of unborn human beings in jurisprudence and scholarship\nII. The original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is the natural kind of human being that includes unborn human beings\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses was the natural kind of human being\nC. The natural kind original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses included unborn human beings",
        "reference": "A. Key developments in originalist theory: original meaning and natural kind meaning",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. The conventional wisdom regarding the constitutional personhood of unborn human beings in jurisprudence and scholarship\nII. The original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is the natural kind of human being that includes unborn human beings\nA. Key developments in originalist theory: original meaning and natural kind meaning\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The natural kind original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses included unborn human beings",
        "reference": "B. The original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses was the natural kind of human being",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. The conventional wisdom regarding the constitutional personhood of unborn human beings in jurisprudence and scholarship\nII. The original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is the natural kind of human being that includes unborn human beings\nA. Key developments in originalist theory: original meaning and natural kind meaning\nB. The original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses was the natural kind of human being\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The natural kind original meaning of \"person\" in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses included unborn human beings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Stevens Treaties Creates No Conflict in Lower Court Authority\nB. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict with Fishing Vessel\nC. The Court of Appeals' Decision Conflicts with No Other Decision of This Court\nD. No Occasion Exists for Revisiting the Careful, Factbound Examination of the Historical Record Conducted by the Courts Below\nE. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review\nII. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT IN REJECTING THE STATE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF WAIVER\nIII. THE STATE'S RECORD-BOUND ATTACKS ON THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION REST ON PREMISES THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED BELOW\nIV. THE STATE'S ATTEMPT TO SOW FEARS ABOUT FUTURE DECISIONS DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE NARROW HOLDING BELOW INTO ONE DESERVING OF REVIEW BY THIS COURT",
        "reference": "I. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT, BUT INSTEAD HEWED CLOSELY TO THE TREATY LANGUAGE AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, IN HOLDING THAT WASHINGTON DOES NOT HAVE LICENSE TO DESTROY THE TREATY FISHERIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT, BUT INSTEAD HEWED CLOSELY TO THE TREATY LANGUAGE AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, IN HOLDING THAT WASHINGTON DOES NOT HAVE LICENSE TO DESTROY THE TREATY FISHERIES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict with Fishing Vessel\nC. The Court of Appeals' Decision Conflicts with No Other Decision of This Court\nD. No Occasion Exists for Revisiting the Careful, Factbound Examination of the Historical Record Conducted by the Courts Below\nE. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review\nII. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT IN REJECTING THE STATE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF WAIVER\nIII. THE STATE'S RECORD-BOUND ATTACKS ON THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION REST ON PREMISES THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED BELOW\nIV. THE STATE'S ATTEMPT TO SOW FEARS ABOUT FUTURE DECISIONS DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE NARROW HOLDING BELOW INTO ONE DESERVING OF REVIEW BY THIS COURT",
        "reference": "A. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Stevens Treaties Creates No Conflict in Lower Court Authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT, BUT INSTEAD HEWED CLOSELY TO THE TREATY LANGUAGE AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, IN HOLDING THAT WASHINGTON DOES NOT HAVE LICENSE TO DESTROY THE TREATY FISHERIES\nA. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Stevens Treaties Creates No Conflict in Lower Court Authority\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court of Appeals' Decision Conflicts with No Other Decision of This Court\nD. No Occasion Exists for Revisiting the Careful, Factbound Examination of the Historical Record Conducted by the Courts Below\nE. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review\nII. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT IN REJECTING THE STATE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF WAIVER\nIII. THE STATE'S RECORD-BOUND ATTACKS ON THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION REST ON PREMISES THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED BELOW\nIV. THE STATE'S ATTEMPT TO SOW FEARS ABOUT FUTURE DECISIONS DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE NARROW HOLDING BELOW INTO ONE DESERVING OF REVIEW BY THIS COURT",
        "reference": "B. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict with Fishing Vessel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT, BUT INSTEAD HEWED CLOSELY TO THE TREATY LANGUAGE AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, IN HOLDING THAT WASHINGTON DOES NOT HAVE LICENSE TO DESTROY THE TREATY FISHERIES\nA. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Stevens Treaties Creates No Conflict in Lower Court Authority\nB. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict with Fishing Vessel\nC. [MISSING]\nD. No Occasion Exists for Revisiting the Careful, Factbound Examination of the Historical Record Conducted by the Courts Below\nE. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review\nII. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT IN REJECTING THE STATE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF WAIVER\nIII. THE STATE'S RECORD-BOUND ATTACKS ON THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION REST ON PREMISES THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED BELOW\nIV. THE STATE'S ATTEMPT TO SOW FEARS ABOUT FUTURE DECISIONS DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE NARROW HOLDING BELOW INTO ONE DESERVING OF REVIEW BY THIS COURT",
        "reference": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Conflicts with No Other Decision of This Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT, BUT INSTEAD HEWED CLOSELY TO THE TREATY LANGUAGE AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, IN HOLDING THAT WASHINGTON DOES NOT HAVE LICENSE TO DESTROY THE TREATY FISHERIES\nA. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Stevens Treaties Creates No Conflict in Lower Court Authority\nB. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict with Fishing Vessel\nC. The Court of Appeals' Decision Conflicts with No Other Decision of This Court\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review\nII. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT IN REJECTING THE STATE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF WAIVER\nIII. THE STATE'S RECORD-BOUND ATTACKS ON THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION REST ON PREMISES THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED BELOW\nIV. THE STATE'S ATTEMPT TO SOW FEARS ABOUT FUTURE DECISIONS DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE NARROW HOLDING BELOW INTO ONE DESERVING OF REVIEW BY THIS COURT",
        "reference": "D. No Occasion Exists for Revisiting the Careful, Factbound Examination of the Historical Record Conducted by the Courts Below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT, BUT INSTEAD HEWED CLOSELY TO THE TREATY LANGUAGE AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, IN HOLDING THAT WASHINGTON DOES NOT HAVE LICENSE TO DESTROY THE TREATY FISHERIES\nA. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Stevens Treaties Creates No Conflict in Lower Court Authority\nB. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict with Fishing Vessel\nC. The Court of Appeals' Decision Conflicts with No Other Decision of This Court\nD. No Occasion Exists for Revisiting the Careful, Factbound Examination of the Historical Record Conducted by the Courts Below\nE. [MISSING]\nII. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT IN REJECTING THE STATE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF WAIVER\nIII. THE STATE'S RECORD-BOUND ATTACKS ON THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION REST ON PREMISES THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED BELOW\nIV. THE STATE'S ATTEMPT TO SOW FEARS ABOUT FUTURE DECISIONS DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE NARROW HOLDING BELOW INTO ONE DESERVING OF REVIEW BY THIS COURT",
        "reference": "E. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT, BUT INSTEAD HEWED CLOSELY TO THE TREATY LANGUAGE AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, IN HOLDING THAT WASHINGTON DOES NOT HAVE LICENSE TO DESTROY THE TREATY FISHERIES\nA. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Stevens Treaties Creates No Conflict in Lower Court Authority\nB. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict with Fishing Vessel\nC. The Court of Appeals' Decision Conflicts with No Other Decision of This Court\nD. No Occasion Exists for Revisiting the Careful, Factbound Examination of the Historical Record Conducted by the Courts Below\nE. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE STATE'S RECORD-BOUND ATTACKS ON THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION REST ON PREMISES THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED BELOW\nIV. THE STATE'S ATTEMPT TO SOW FEARS ABOUT FUTURE DECISIONS DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE NARROW HOLDING BELOW INTO ONE DESERVING OF REVIEW BY THIS COURT",
        "reference": "II. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT IN REJECTING THE STATE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF WAIVER",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT, BUT INSTEAD HEWED CLOSELY TO THE TREATY LANGUAGE AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, IN HOLDING THAT WASHINGTON DOES NOT HAVE LICENSE TO DESTROY THE TREATY FISHERIES\nA. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Stevens Treaties Creates No Conflict in Lower Court Authority\nB. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict with Fishing Vessel\nC. The Court of Appeals' Decision Conflicts with No Other Decision of This Court\nD. No Occasion Exists for Revisiting the Careful, Factbound Examination of the Historical Record Conducted by the Courts Below\nE. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review\nII. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT IN REJECTING THE STATE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF WAIVER\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THE STATE'S ATTEMPT TO SOW FEARS ABOUT FUTURE DECISIONS DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE NARROW HOLDING BELOW INTO ONE DESERVING OF REVIEW BY THIS COURT",
        "reference": "III. THE STATE'S RECORD-BOUND ATTACKS ON THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION REST ON PREMISES THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED BELOW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT, BUT INSTEAD HEWED CLOSELY TO THE TREATY LANGUAGE AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, IN HOLDING THAT WASHINGTON DOES NOT HAVE LICENSE TO DESTROY THE TREATY FISHERIES\nA. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation of the Stevens Treaties Creates No Conflict in Lower Court Authority\nB. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict with Fishing Vessel\nC. The Court of Appeals' Decision Conflicts with No Other Decision of This Court\nD. No Occasion Exists for Revisiting the Careful, Factbound Examination of the Historical Record Conducted by the Courts Below\nE. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review\nII. THE COURTS BELOW CREATED NO CONFLICT IN REJECTING THE STATE'S EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF WAIVER\nIII. THE STATE'S RECORD-BOUND ATTACKS ON THE DISTRICT COURT'S INJUNCTION REST ON PREMISES THOROUGHLY DISCREDITED BELOW\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. THE STATE'S ATTEMPT TO SOW FEARS ABOUT FUTURE DECISIONS DOES NOT TRANSFORM THE NARROW HOLDING BELOW INTO ONE DESERVING OF REVIEW BY THIS COURT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, in loco parentis did not cover all off-campus speech that \"disrupted\" the school\nIII. The school's decision to punish B.L. for posting vague profanities while under her parents' custody exceeded the traditional bounds of in loco parentis",
        "reference": "I. Under the common law, schools had no authority to act in loco parentis when students were under their parent's custody",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the common law, schools had no authority to act in loco parentis when students were under their parent's custody\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The school's decision to punish B.L. for posting vague profanities while under her parents' custody exceeded the traditional bounds of in loco parentis",
        "reference": "II. When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, in loco parentis did not cover all off-campus speech that \"disrupted\" the school",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the common law, schools had no authority to act in loco parentis when students were under their parent's custody\nII. When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, in loco parentis did not cover all off-campus speech that \"disrupted\" the school\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The school's decision to punish B.L. for posting vague profanities while under her parents' custody exceeded the traditional bounds of in loco parentis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "A. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. [MISSING]\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "B. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "II. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "A. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "B. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. [MISSING]\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "III. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "A. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "B. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "reference": "C. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES HAVE STANDING\nA. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury\nB. Common Cause Appellees Proved Associational Injury\nII. COMMON CAUSE APPELLEES' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. The Elections Clause Is Not A \"Textually Demonstrable Commitment\" That Precludes Judicial Review\nB. This Case Does Not Lack \"Manageable Standards\" For Resolution\n1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard\n2. Appellants' \"Line-Drawing\" Argument Is A Red Herring\n3. The Legal Principles Governing This Case Are Well-Settled And Within The Judiciary's Competence To Apply\n4. The Evidence That Common Cause Appellees Adduced To Satisfy These Legal Principles Was Familiar And Compelling\nIII. THE 2016 PLAN AND ITS INDIVIDUAL DISTRICTS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The First Amendment\nB. The Plan And Its Districts Violate The Equal Protection Clause\nC. The Plan And Its Districts Violate Article I\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner's federal claim is properly presented\nB. The introduction of Morris's allocution was not harmless\nII. The admission of Morris's allocution violated the Confrontation Clause\nA. Morris's allocution was admitted simply because petitioner's defense rendered it relevant\nB. The Confrontation Clause does not allow the admission of testimonial hearsay simply because it becomes relevant\n1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture\n2. Case law regarding prophylactic rules\n3. \"Integrity of the adversarial factfinding process.\"",
        "reference": "I. The State's arguments for avoiding the question presented lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State's arguments for avoiding the question presented lack merit\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The introduction of Morris's allocution was not harmless\nII. The admission of Morris's allocution violated the Confrontation Clause\nA. Morris's allocution was admitted simply because petitioner's defense rendered it relevant\nB. The Confrontation Clause does not allow the admission of testimonial hearsay simply because it becomes relevant\n1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture\n2. Case law regarding prophylactic rules\n3. \"Integrity of the adversarial factfinding process.\"",
        "reference": "A. Petitioner's federal claim is properly presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State's arguments for avoiding the question presented lack merit\nA. Petitioner's federal claim is properly presented\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The admission of Morris's allocution violated the Confrontation Clause\nA. Morris's allocution was admitted simply because petitioner's defense rendered it relevant\nB. The Confrontation Clause does not allow the admission of testimonial hearsay simply because it becomes relevant\n1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture\n2. Case law regarding prophylactic rules\n3. \"Integrity of the adversarial factfinding process.\"",
        "reference": "B. The introduction of Morris's allocution was not harmless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State's arguments for avoiding the question presented lack merit\nA. Petitioner's federal claim is properly presented\nB. The introduction of Morris's allocution was not harmless\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Morris's allocution was admitted simply because petitioner's defense rendered it relevant\nB. The Confrontation Clause does not allow the admission of testimonial hearsay simply because it becomes relevant\n1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture\n2. Case law regarding prophylactic rules\n3. \"Integrity of the adversarial factfinding process.\"",
        "reference": "II. The admission of Morris's allocution violated the Confrontation Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State's arguments for avoiding the question presented lack merit\nA. Petitioner's federal claim is properly presented\nB. The introduction of Morris's allocution was not harmless\nII. The admission of Morris's allocution violated the Confrontation Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Confrontation Clause does not allow the admission of testimonial hearsay simply because it becomes relevant\n1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture\n2. Case law regarding prophylactic rules\n3. \"Integrity of the adversarial factfinding process.\"",
        "reference": "A. Morris's allocution was admitted simply because petitioner's defense rendered it relevant",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State's arguments for avoiding the question presented lack merit\nA. Petitioner's federal claim is properly presented\nB. The introduction of Morris's allocution was not harmless\nII. The admission of Morris's allocution violated the Confrontation Clause\nA. Morris's allocution was admitted simply because petitioner's defense rendered it relevant\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture\n2. Case law regarding prophylactic rules\n3. \"Integrity of the adversarial factfinding process.\"",
        "reference": "B. The Confrontation Clause does not allow the admission of testimonial hearsay simply because it becomes relevant",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State's arguments for avoiding the question presented lack merit\nA. Petitioner's federal claim is properly presented\nB. The introduction of Morris's allocution was not harmless\nII. The admission of Morris's allocution violated the Confrontation Clause\nA. Morris's allocution was admitted simply because petitioner's defense rendered it relevant\nB. The Confrontation Clause does not allow the admission of testimonial hearsay simply because it becomes relevant\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Case law regarding prophylactic rules\n3. \"Integrity of the adversarial factfinding process.\"",
        "reference": "1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State's arguments for avoiding the question presented lack merit\nA. Petitioner's federal claim is properly presented\nB. The introduction of Morris's allocution was not harmless\nII. The admission of Morris's allocution violated the Confrontation Clause\nA. Morris's allocution was admitted simply because petitioner's defense rendered it relevant\nB. The Confrontation Clause does not allow the admission of testimonial hearsay simply because it becomes relevant\n1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture\n2. [MISSING]\n3. \"Integrity of the adversarial factfinding process.\"",
        "reference": "2. Case law regarding prophylactic rules",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State's arguments for avoiding the question presented lack merit\nA. Petitioner's federal claim is properly presented\nB. The introduction of Morris's allocution was not harmless\nII. The admission of Morris's allocution violated the Confrontation Clause\nA. Morris's allocution was admitted simply because petitioner's defense rendered it relevant\nB. The Confrontation Clause does not allow the admission of testimonial hearsay simply because it becomes relevant\n1. Waiver / equitable forfeiture\n2. Case law regarding prophylactic rules\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. \"Integrity of the adversarial factfinding process.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges\nB. Legislative or administrative motivation must be directed at a challenger's religious beliefs in as-applied, religion cases, and it was not here\nII. ARTICLE X, SECTION 6 OF THE 1972 MONTANA CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EMBODY ANTI-CATHOLIC ANIMUS\nA. The 1889 Montana predecessor amendment was not enacted with improper purpose\nB. Any purported improper purpose was cleansed with the 1972 re-enactment of the Montana constitution",
        "reference": "I. PETITIONERS ASK THIS COURT TO DEVIATE FROM PRECEDENT TO INVALIDATE MONTANA LAW BASED ON NONEXISTENT MOTIVATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS ASK THIS COURT TO DEVIATE FROM PRECEDENT TO INVALIDATE MONTANA LAW BASED ON NONEXISTENT MOTIVATION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Legislative or administrative motivation must be directed at a challenger's religious beliefs in as-applied, religion cases, and it was not here\nII. ARTICLE X, SECTION 6 OF THE 1972 MONTANA CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EMBODY ANTI-CATHOLIC ANIMUS\nA. The 1889 Montana predecessor amendment was not enacted with improper purpose\nB. Any purported improper purpose was cleansed with the 1972 re-enactment of the Montana constitution",
        "reference": "A. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS ASK THIS COURT TO DEVIATE FROM PRECEDENT TO INVALIDATE MONTANA LAW BASED ON NONEXISTENT MOTIVATION\nA. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges\nB. [MISSING]\nII. ARTICLE X, SECTION 6 OF THE 1972 MONTANA CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EMBODY ANTI-CATHOLIC ANIMUS\nA. The 1889 Montana predecessor amendment was not enacted with improper purpose\nB. Any purported improper purpose was cleansed with the 1972 re-enactment of the Montana constitution",
        "reference": "B. Legislative or administrative motivation must be directed at a challenger's religious beliefs in as-applied, religion cases, and it was not here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS ASK THIS COURT TO DEVIATE FROM PRECEDENT TO INVALIDATE MONTANA LAW BASED ON NONEXISTENT MOTIVATION\nA. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges\nB. Legislative or administrative motivation must be directed at a challenger's religious beliefs in as-applied, religion cases, and it was not here\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The 1889 Montana predecessor amendment was not enacted with improper purpose\nB. Any purported improper purpose was cleansed with the 1972 re-enactment of the Montana constitution",
        "reference": "II. ARTICLE X, SECTION 6 OF THE 1972 MONTANA CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EMBODY ANTI-CATHOLIC ANIMUS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS ASK THIS COURT TO DEVIATE FROM PRECEDENT TO INVALIDATE MONTANA LAW BASED ON NONEXISTENT MOTIVATION\nA. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges\nB. Legislative or administrative motivation must be directed at a challenger's religious beliefs in as-applied, religion cases, and it was not here\nII. ARTICLE X, SECTION 6 OF THE 1972 MONTANA CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EMBODY ANTI-CATHOLIC ANIMUS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Any purported improper purpose was cleansed with the 1972 re-enactment of the Montana constitution",
        "reference": "A. The 1889 Montana predecessor amendment was not enacted with improper purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS ASK THIS COURT TO DEVIATE FROM PRECEDENT TO INVALIDATE MONTANA LAW BASED ON NONEXISTENT MOTIVATION\nA. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges\nB. Legislative or administrative motivation must be directed at a challenger's religious beliefs in as-applied, religion cases, and it was not here\nII. ARTICLE X, SECTION 6 OF THE 1972 MONTANA CONSTITUTION DOES NOT EMBODY ANTI-CATHOLIC ANIMUS\nA. The 1889 Montana predecessor amendment was not enacted with improper purpose\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Any purported improper purpose was cleansed with the 1972 re-enactment of the Montana constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Under Pegram, ESOP Fiduciaries Need Not Use Corporate Inside Information or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms to Benefit Plan Participants\nB. Obliging ESOP Fiduciaries to Use Corporate Inside Information Creates Tension Between ERISA and the Securities Laws and Other Anomalies\nII. Respondents' Complaint Fails Because A Prudent Fiduciary Could Have Concluded That Disclosure Would Do More Harm Than Good To The Fund\nA. Respondents Concede That the \"Could Not Have\" Standard Governs\nB. Respondents' Generalized Allegations Fail to Plausibly Allege a Duty of Prudence Breach\nIII. The Government Correctly Recognizes That ERISA Does Not Impose Independent Disclosure Obligations, But Its Proposed Hybrid ERISA Suits For Securities-Law Violations Would Skirt Sensible Limitations On Securities Litigation",
        "reference": "I. ESOP Fiduciaries Generally Have No ERISA Obligation To Use Corporate Inside Information Or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms In Making Fiduciary Decisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. ESOP Fiduciaries Generally Have No ERISA Obligation To Use Corporate Inside Information Or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms In Making Fiduciary Decisions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Obliging ESOP Fiduciaries to Use Corporate Inside Information Creates Tension Between ERISA and the Securities Laws and Other Anomalies\nII. Respondents' Complaint Fails Because A Prudent Fiduciary Could Have Concluded That Disclosure Would Do More Harm Than Good To The Fund\nA. Respondents Concede That the \"Could Not Have\" Standard Governs\nB. Respondents' Generalized Allegations Fail to Plausibly Allege a Duty of Prudence Breach\nIII. The Government Correctly Recognizes That ERISA Does Not Impose Independent Disclosure Obligations, But Its Proposed Hybrid ERISA Suits For Securities-Law Violations Would Skirt Sensible Limitations On Securities Litigation",
        "reference": "A. Under Pegram, ESOP Fiduciaries Need Not Use Corporate Inside Information or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms to Benefit Plan Participants",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. ESOP Fiduciaries Generally Have No ERISA Obligation To Use Corporate Inside Information Or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms In Making Fiduciary Decisions\nA. Under Pegram, ESOP Fiduciaries Need Not Use Corporate Inside Information or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms to Benefit Plan Participants\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Respondents' Complaint Fails Because A Prudent Fiduciary Could Have Concluded That Disclosure Would Do More Harm Than Good To The Fund\nA. Respondents Concede That the \"Could Not Have\" Standard Governs\nB. Respondents' Generalized Allegations Fail to Plausibly Allege a Duty of Prudence Breach\nIII. The Government Correctly Recognizes That ERISA Does Not Impose Independent Disclosure Obligations, But Its Proposed Hybrid ERISA Suits For Securities-Law Violations Would Skirt Sensible Limitations On Securities Litigation",
        "reference": "B. Obliging ESOP Fiduciaries to Use Corporate Inside Information Creates Tension Between ERISA and the Securities Laws and Other Anomalies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. ESOP Fiduciaries Generally Have No ERISA Obligation To Use Corporate Inside Information Or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms In Making Fiduciary Decisions\nA. Under Pegram, ESOP Fiduciaries Need Not Use Corporate Inside Information or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms to Benefit Plan Participants\nB. Obliging ESOP Fiduciaries to Use Corporate Inside Information Creates Tension Between ERISA and the Securities Laws and Other Anomalies\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Respondents Concede That the \"Could Not Have\" Standard Governs\nB. Respondents' Generalized Allegations Fail to Plausibly Allege a Duty of Prudence Breach\nIII. The Government Correctly Recognizes That ERISA Does Not Impose Independent Disclosure Obligations, But Its Proposed Hybrid ERISA Suits For Securities-Law Violations Would Skirt Sensible Limitations On Securities Litigation",
        "reference": "II. Respondents' Complaint Fails Because A Prudent Fiduciary Could Have Concluded That Disclosure Would Do More Harm Than Good To The Fund",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. ESOP Fiduciaries Generally Have No ERISA Obligation To Use Corporate Inside Information Or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms In Making Fiduciary Decisions\nA. Under Pegram, ESOP Fiduciaries Need Not Use Corporate Inside Information or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms to Benefit Plan Participants\nB. Obliging ESOP Fiduciaries to Use Corporate Inside Information Creates Tension Between ERISA and the Securities Laws and Other Anomalies\nII. Respondents' Complaint Fails Because A Prudent Fiduciary Could Have Concluded That Disclosure Would Do More Harm Than Good To The Fund\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Respondents' Generalized Allegations Fail to Plausibly Allege a Duty of Prudence Breach\nIII. The Government Correctly Recognizes That ERISA Does Not Impose Independent Disclosure Obligations, But Its Proposed Hybrid ERISA Suits For Securities-Law Violations Would Skirt Sensible Limitations On Securities Litigation",
        "reference": "A. Respondents Concede That the \"Could Not Have\" Standard Governs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. ESOP Fiduciaries Generally Have No ERISA Obligation To Use Corporate Inside Information Or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms In Making Fiduciary Decisions\nA. Under Pegram, ESOP Fiduciaries Need Not Use Corporate Inside Information or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms to Benefit Plan Participants\nB. Obliging ESOP Fiduciaries to Use Corporate Inside Information Creates Tension Between ERISA and the Securities Laws and Other Anomalies\nII. Respondents' Complaint Fails Because A Prudent Fiduciary Could Have Concluded That Disclosure Would Do More Harm Than Good To The Fund\nA. Respondents Concede That the \"Could Not Have\" Standard Governs\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Government Correctly Recognizes That ERISA Does Not Impose Independent Disclosure Obligations, But Its Proposed Hybrid ERISA Suits For Securities-Law Violations Would Skirt Sensible Limitations On Securities Litigation",
        "reference": "B. Respondents' Generalized Allegations Fail to Plausibly Allege a Duty of Prudence Breach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. ESOP Fiduciaries Generally Have No ERISA Obligation To Use Corporate Inside Information Or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms In Making Fiduciary Decisions\nA. Under Pegram, ESOP Fiduciaries Need Not Use Corporate Inside Information or Corporate Disclosure Mechanisms to Benefit Plan Participants\nB. Obliging ESOP Fiduciaries to Use Corporate Inside Information Creates Tension Between ERISA and the Securities Laws and Other Anomalies\nII. Respondents' Complaint Fails Because A Prudent Fiduciary Could Have Concluded That Disclosure Would Do More Harm Than Good To The Fund\nA. Respondents Concede That the \"Could Not Have\" Standard Governs\nB. Respondents' Generalized Allegations Fail to Plausibly Allege a Duty of Prudence Breach\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Government Correctly Recognizes That ERISA Does Not Impose Independent Disclosure Obligations, But Its Proposed Hybrid ERISA Suits For Securities-Law Violations Would Skirt Sensible Limitations On Securities Litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Historical Division Between State and Federal Crime Has Almost Entirely Eroded Over the Past Sixty Years\nB. The Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Become Practically Unknowable and Substantially Overlaps with State Criminal Law\nC. The Expanding Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Vitiated Federalism Protections Formerly Inherent In the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nD. The Federalization of Crime Undermines the Practical Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nII. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Complicates Legislators' Task When Fixing Criminal Punishments",
        "reference": "I. The Extensive Federalization of Criminal Law Has Undermined the Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Extensive Federalization of Criminal Law Has Undermined the Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Become Practically Unknowable and Substantially Overlaps with State Criminal Law\nC. The Expanding Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Vitiated Federalism Protections Formerly Inherent In the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nD. The Federalization of Crime Undermines the Practical Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nII. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Complicates Legislators' Task When Fixing Criminal Punishments",
        "reference": "A. The Historical Division Between State and Federal Crime Has Almost Entirely Eroded Over the Past Sixty Years",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Extensive Federalization of Criminal Law Has Undermined the Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nA. The Historical Division Between State and Federal Crime Has Almost Entirely Eroded Over the Past Sixty Years\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Expanding Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Vitiated Federalism Protections Formerly Inherent In the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nD. The Federalization of Crime Undermines the Practical Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nII. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Complicates Legislators' Task When Fixing Criminal Punishments",
        "reference": "B. The Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Become Practically Unknowable and Substantially Overlaps with State Criminal Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Extensive Federalization of Criminal Law Has Undermined the Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nA. The Historical Division Between State and Federal Crime Has Almost Entirely Eroded Over the Past Sixty Years\nB. The Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Become Practically Unknowable and Substantially Overlaps with State Criminal Law\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Federalization of Crime Undermines the Practical Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nII. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Complicates Legislators' Task When Fixing Criminal Punishments",
        "reference": "C. The Expanding Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Vitiated Federalism Protections Formerly Inherent In the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Extensive Federalization of Criminal Law Has Undermined the Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nA. The Historical Division Between State and Federal Crime Has Almost Entirely Eroded Over the Past Sixty Years\nB. The Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Become Practically Unknowable and Substantially Overlaps with State Criminal Law\nC. The Expanding Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Vitiated Federalism Protections Formerly Inherent In the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Complicates Legislators' Task When Fixing Criminal Punishments",
        "reference": "D. The Federalization of Crime Undermines the Practical Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Extensive Federalization of Criminal Law Has Undermined the Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nA. The Historical Division Between State and Federal Crime Has Almost Entirely Eroded Over the Past Sixty Years\nB. The Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Become Practically Unknowable and Substantially Overlaps with State Criminal Law\nC. The Expanding Scope of Federal Criminal Law Has Vitiated Federalism Protections Formerly Inherent In the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nD. The Federalization of Crime Undermines the Practical Rationale for the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Complicates Legislators' Task When Fixing Criminal Punishments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The term \"Confidential\" in Exemption 4 should be narrowly construed\nIII. Whether information is categorized confidential should depend on statutes and regulations, not contractor discretion",
        "reference": "I. The National Parks standard ignores FOIA's plain text and has proven unworkable in practice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority\nA. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity\n2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate\n2. [MISSING]\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect\nA. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale\nB. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual\nC. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "reference": "2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority\nA. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity\n2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate\n2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale\nB. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual\nC. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "reference": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority\nA. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity\n2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate\n2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual\nC. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "reference": "A. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority\nA. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity\n2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate\n2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect\nA. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "reference": "B. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority\nA. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity\n2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate\n2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect\nA. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale\nB. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 2333(d) Requires That A Defendant Substantially Assist The \"Act Of International Terrorism\" That Gave Rise To The Claim\nB. Common Law Principles Confirm That Aiding And Abetting Requires Assisting The Principal Tort\nC. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Construed Section 2333(d)\nII. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES, AT A MINIMUM, THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY ASSISTED THE REINA ATTACK AND THAT NOT BLOCKING THOSE ACCOUNTS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST SUCH AN ATTACK\nA. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance\nB. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued The Statutory Knowledge Requirement\nC. Decisions From Other Courts Of Appeals Confirm The Ninth Circuit's Error\nIII. REVERSAL IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FAR-REACHING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES",
        "reference": "I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST A SPECIFIC \"ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,\" NOT A GENERAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST A SPECIFIC \"ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,\" NOT A GENERAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Common Law Principles Confirm That Aiding And Abetting Requires Assisting The Principal Tort\nC. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Construed Section 2333(d)\nII. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES, AT A MINIMUM, THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY ASSISTED THE REINA ATTACK AND THAT NOT BLOCKING THOSE ACCOUNTS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST SUCH AN ATTACK\nA. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance\nB. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued The Statutory Knowledge Requirement\nC. Decisions From Other Courts Of Appeals Confirm The Ninth Circuit's Error\nIII. REVERSAL IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FAR-REACHING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES",
        "reference": "A. Section 2333(d) Requires That A Defendant Substantially Assist The \"Act Of International Terrorism\" That Gave Rise To The Claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST A SPECIFIC \"ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,\" NOT A GENERAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN\nA. Section 2333(d) Requires That A Defendant Substantially Assist The \"Act Of International Terrorism\" That Gave Rise To The Claim\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Construed Section 2333(d)\nII. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES, AT A MINIMUM, THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY ASSISTED THE REINA ATTACK AND THAT NOT BLOCKING THOSE ACCOUNTS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST SUCH AN ATTACK\nA. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance\nB. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued The Statutory Knowledge Requirement\nC. Decisions From Other Courts Of Appeals Confirm The Ninth Circuit's Error\nIII. REVERSAL IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FAR-REACHING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES",
        "reference": "B. Common Law Principles Confirm That Aiding And Abetting Requires Assisting The Principal Tort",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST A SPECIFIC \"ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,\" NOT A GENERAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN\nA. Section 2333(d) Requires That A Defendant Substantially Assist The \"Act Of International Terrorism\" That Gave Rise To The Claim\nB. Common Law Principles Confirm That Aiding And Abetting Requires Assisting The Principal Tort\nC. [MISSING]\nII. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES, AT A MINIMUM, THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY ASSISTED THE REINA ATTACK AND THAT NOT BLOCKING THOSE ACCOUNTS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST SUCH AN ATTACK\nA. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance\nB. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued The Statutory Knowledge Requirement\nC. Decisions From Other Courts Of Appeals Confirm The Ninth Circuit's Error\nIII. REVERSAL IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FAR-REACHING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES",
        "reference": "C. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Construed Section 2333(d)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST A SPECIFIC \"ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,\" NOT A GENERAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN\nA. Section 2333(d) Requires That A Defendant Substantially Assist The \"Act Of International Terrorism\" That Gave Rise To The Claim\nB. Common Law Principles Confirm That Aiding And Abetting Requires Assisting The Principal Tort\nC. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Construed Section 2333(d)\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance\nB. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued The Statutory Knowledge Requirement\nC. Decisions From Other Courts Of Appeals Confirm The Ninth Circuit's Error\nIII. REVERSAL IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FAR-REACHING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES",
        "reference": "II. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES, AT A MINIMUM, THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY ASSISTED THE REINA ATTACK AND THAT NOT BLOCKING THOSE ACCOUNTS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST SUCH AN ATTACK",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST A SPECIFIC \"ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,\" NOT A GENERAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN\nA. Section 2333(d) Requires That A Defendant Substantially Assist The \"Act Of International Terrorism\" That Gave Rise To The Claim\nB. Common Law Principles Confirm That Aiding And Abetting Requires Assisting The Principal Tort\nC. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Construed Section 2333(d)\nII. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES, AT A MINIMUM, THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY ASSISTED THE REINA ATTACK AND THAT NOT BLOCKING THOSE ACCOUNTS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST SUCH AN ATTACK\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued The Statutory Knowledge Requirement\nC. Decisions From Other Courts Of Appeals Confirm The Ninth Circuit's Error\nIII. REVERSAL IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FAR-REACHING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES",
        "reference": "A. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST A SPECIFIC \"ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,\" NOT A GENERAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN\nA. Section 2333(d) Requires That A Defendant Substantially Assist The \"Act Of International Terrorism\" That Gave Rise To The Claim\nB. Common Law Principles Confirm That Aiding And Abetting Requires Assisting The Principal Tort\nC. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Construed Section 2333(d)\nII. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES, AT A MINIMUM, THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY ASSISTED THE REINA ATTACK AND THAT NOT BLOCKING THOSE ACCOUNTS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST SUCH AN ATTACK\nA. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Decisions From Other Courts Of Appeals Confirm The Ninth Circuit's Error\nIII. REVERSAL IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FAR-REACHING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued The Statutory Knowledge Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST A SPECIFIC \"ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,\" NOT A GENERAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN\nA. Section 2333(d) Requires That A Defendant Substantially Assist The \"Act Of International Terrorism\" That Gave Rise To The Claim\nB. Common Law Principles Confirm That Aiding And Abetting Requires Assisting The Principal Tort\nC. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Construed Section 2333(d)\nII. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES, AT A MINIMUM, THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY ASSISTED THE REINA ATTACK AND THAT NOT BLOCKING THOSE ACCOUNTS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST SUCH AN ATTACK\nA. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance\nB. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued The Statutory Knowledge Requirement\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. REVERSAL IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FAR-REACHING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES",
        "reference": "C. Decisions From Other Courts Of Appeals Confirm The Ninth Circuit's Error",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES A DEFENDANT TO SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST A SPECIFIC \"ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,\" NOT A GENERAL TERRORISM CAMPAIGN\nA. Section 2333(d) Requires That A Defendant Substantially Assist The \"Act Of International Terrorism\" That Gave Rise To The Claim\nB. Common Law Principles Confirm That Aiding And Abetting Requires Assisting The Principal Tort\nC. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Construed Section 2333(d)\nII. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES, AT A MINIMUM, THAT DEFENDANTS KNEW OF SPECIFIC ACCOUNTS THAT SUBSTANTIALLY ASSISTED THE REINA ATTACK AND THAT NOT BLOCKING THOSE ACCOUNTS WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY ASSIST SUCH AN ATTACK\nA. Statutory Text, Halberstam, And Common Law Principles Require Specific Knowledge Of The Alleged Substantial Assistance\nB. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued The Statutory Knowledge Requirement\nC. Decisions From Other Courts Of Appeals Confirm The Ninth Circuit's Error\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. REVERSAL IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT FAR-REACHING HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. [MISSING]\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "A. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. [MISSING]\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "B. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. [MISSING]\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "C. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. [MISSING]\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "D. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "II. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. [MISSING]\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "A. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. [MISSING]\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. [MISSING]\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "reference": "B. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's mandate poses grave risks to donors to human-rights groups like ChinaAid, which is facing extreme repression by China\nA. On an unprecedented scale, China is surveilling, harassing, and intimidating critics globally, including in the United States\nB. China has acted to harass and intimidate ChinaAid and its supporters, even using proxies to make public death threats against ChinaAid's president\nC. One of China's primary means of attacking critics outside of China is highly sophisticated hacking, including into federal agencies\nD. China's hackers are among the world's most elite; they have hacked the \"Holy Grail of cyber-espionage\": the iPhone\nII. China's sophisticated hackers will inevitably exploit California's porous registry to find donors to organizations that China views as critics\nA. The decision below inadvertently highlights the ruinous defects in California's registry\n1. California still uploads the entire contents of its registry\u201460,000 donor lists\u2014to the Internet every year\n2. The \"tedious\" task of uploading 60,000 donor lists is still left to \"temporary\" and \"student\" workers, whose errors the State does not count as public disclosures\n3. Donor lists are still \"inadvertently misclassified as public\" and left public on the Internet for up to six days\n4. The State still relies on charities themselves to catch its errors and demand they be fixed \"immediately.\"\n5. It is no answer to say, as does the decision below, that \"nothing is perfectly secure on the [I]nternet,\" especially as the State stores hard copies of donor lists with unmonitored outside vendors\nB. California will not be able to stop China if it could not stop petitioner's expert after he notified the State of a major flaw in the registry. 23\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Given the speed and ferocity of China's extraterritorial repression, an as-applied challenge would be useless to groups like ChinaAid",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Public-Accommodation Laws Under the Common Law\nB. \"Good Reason\" in the Anglo-American Tradition\nC. Nineteenth Century Views of Accommodations Before the Reconstruction Amendments\nD. Conclusion: The Common Law Background of the First Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments\nII. The Recent Trend in Expanding Public Accommodation Laws Can Cause Constitutional Problems\nA. Freedom of Speech\nB. Free Exercise of Religion\nC. Freedom from Involuntary Servitude",
        "reference": "I. As the First and Thirteenth Amendments Were Being Framed, Public-Accommodation Laws Applied Only to Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining Goods or Services",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. As the First and Thirteenth Amendments Were Being Framed, Public-Accommodation Laws Applied Only to Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining Goods or Services\nA. [MISSING]\nB. \"Good Reason\" in the Anglo-American Tradition\nC. Nineteenth Century Views of Accommodations Before the Reconstruction Amendments\nD. Conclusion: The Common Law Background of the First Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments\nII. The Recent Trend in Expanding Public Accommodation Laws Can Cause Constitutional Problems\nA. Freedom of Speech\nB. Free Exercise of Religion\nC. Freedom from Involuntary Servitude",
        "reference": "A. Public-Accommodation Laws Under the Common Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. As the First and Thirteenth Amendments Were Being Framed, Public-Accommodation Laws Applied Only to Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining Goods or Services\nA. Public-Accommodation Laws Under the Common Law\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Nineteenth Century Views of Accommodations Before the Reconstruction Amendments\nD. Conclusion: The Common Law Background of the First Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments\nII. The Recent Trend in Expanding Public Accommodation Laws Can Cause Constitutional Problems\nA. Freedom of Speech\nB. Free Exercise of Religion\nC. Freedom from Involuntary Servitude",
        "reference": "B. \"Good Reason\" in the Anglo-American Tradition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. As the First and Thirteenth Amendments Were Being Framed, Public-Accommodation Laws Applied Only to Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining Goods or Services\nA. Public-Accommodation Laws Under the Common Law\nB. \"Good Reason\" in the Anglo-American Tradition\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Conclusion: The Common Law Background of the First Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments\nII. The Recent Trend in Expanding Public Accommodation Laws Can Cause Constitutional Problems\nA. Freedom of Speech\nB. Free Exercise of Religion\nC. Freedom from Involuntary Servitude",
        "reference": "C. Nineteenth Century Views of Accommodations Before the Reconstruction Amendments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. As the First and Thirteenth Amendments Were Being Framed, Public-Accommodation Laws Applied Only to Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining Goods or Services\nA. Public-Accommodation Laws Under the Common Law\nB. \"Good Reason\" in the Anglo-American Tradition\nC. Nineteenth Century Views of Accommodations Before the Reconstruction Amendments\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Recent Trend in Expanding Public Accommodation Laws Can Cause Constitutional Problems\nA. Freedom of Speech\nB. Free Exercise of Religion\nC. Freedom from Involuntary Servitude",
        "reference": "D. Conclusion: The Common Law Background of the First Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. As the First and Thirteenth Amendments Were Being Framed, Public-Accommodation Laws Applied Only to Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining Goods or Services\nA. Public-Accommodation Laws Under the Common Law\nB. \"Good Reason\" in the Anglo-American Tradition\nC. Nineteenth Century Views of Accommodations Before the Reconstruction Amendments\nD. Conclusion: The Common Law Background of the First Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Freedom of Speech\nB. Free Exercise of Religion\nC. Freedom from Involuntary Servitude",
        "reference": "II. The Recent Trend in Expanding Public Accommodation Laws Can Cause Constitutional Problems",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. As the First and Thirteenth Amendments Were Being Framed, Public-Accommodation Laws Applied Only to Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining Goods or Services\nA. Public-Accommodation Laws Under the Common Law\nB. \"Good Reason\" in the Anglo-American Tradition\nC. Nineteenth Century Views of Accommodations Before the Reconstruction Amendments\nD. Conclusion: The Common Law Background of the First Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments\nII. The Recent Trend in Expanding Public Accommodation Laws Can Cause Constitutional Problems\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Free Exercise of Religion\nC. Freedom from Involuntary Servitude",
        "reference": "A. Freedom of Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. As the First and Thirteenth Amendments Were Being Framed, Public-Accommodation Laws Applied Only to Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining Goods or Services\nA. Public-Accommodation Laws Under the Common Law\nB. \"Good Reason\" in the Anglo-American Tradition\nC. Nineteenth Century Views of Accommodations Before the Reconstruction Amendments\nD. Conclusion: The Common Law Background of the First Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments\nII. The Recent Trend in Expanding Public Accommodation Laws Can Cause Constitutional Problems\nA. Freedom of Speech\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Freedom from Involuntary Servitude",
        "reference": "B. Free Exercise of Religion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. As the First and Thirteenth Amendments Were Being Framed, Public-Accommodation Laws Applied Only to Businesses That Provided Life-Sustaining Goods or Services\nA. Public-Accommodation Laws Under the Common Law\nB. \"Good Reason\" in the Anglo-American Tradition\nC. Nineteenth Century Views of Accommodations Before the Reconstruction Amendments\nD. Conclusion: The Common Law Background of the First Amendment and the Reconstruction Amendments\nII. The Recent Trend in Expanding Public Accommodation Laws Can Cause Constitutional Problems\nA. Freedom of Speech\nB. Free Exercise of Religion\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Freedom from Involuntary Servitude",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The FTC Act Does Not Strip The District Court Of Jurisdiction To Hear Axon's Constitutional Challenges To the FTC's Structure, Procedures, And Existence\nA. Axon's Constitutional Claims Are a Misfit for the FTC Act's Administrative Review Scheme\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Contrary Conclusion Cannot Be Reconciled With the Statute's Text or This Court's Cases\nIII. Timely Judicial Resolution Of Claims Like Axon's Is Critical To Preserving the Separation Of Powers And Preventing Agency Overreach",
        "reference": "I. District Courts May Hear Constitutional Challenges To An Agency's Structure, Procedures, Or Existence Absent Clear Statutory Language To the Contrary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. District Courts May Hear Constitutional Challenges To An Agency's Structure, Procedures, Or Existence Absent Clear Statutory Language To the Contrary\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Axon's Constitutional Claims Are a Misfit for the FTC Act's Administrative Review Scheme\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Contrary Conclusion Cannot Be Reconciled With the Statute's Text or This Court's Cases\nIII. Timely Judicial Resolution Of Claims Like Axon's Is Critical To Preserving the Separation Of Powers And Preventing Agency Overreach",
        "reference": "II. The FTC Act Does Not Strip The District Court Of Jurisdiction To Hear Axon's Constitutional Challenges To the FTC's Structure, Procedures, And Existence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. District Courts May Hear Constitutional Challenges To An Agency's Structure, Procedures, Or Existence Absent Clear Statutory Language To the Contrary\nII. The FTC Act Does Not Strip The District Court Of Jurisdiction To Hear Axon's Constitutional Challenges To the FTC's Structure, Procedures, And Existence\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Contrary Conclusion Cannot Be Reconciled With the Statute's Text or This Court's Cases\nIII. Timely Judicial Resolution Of Claims Like Axon's Is Critical To Preserving the Separation Of Powers And Preventing Agency Overreach",
        "reference": "A. Axon's Constitutional Claims Are a Misfit for the FTC Act's Administrative Review Scheme",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. District Courts May Hear Constitutional Challenges To An Agency's Structure, Procedures, Or Existence Absent Clear Statutory Language To the Contrary\nII. The FTC Act Does Not Strip The District Court Of Jurisdiction To Hear Axon's Constitutional Challenges To the FTC's Structure, Procedures, And Existence\nA. Axon's Constitutional Claims Are a Misfit for the FTC Act's Administrative Review Scheme\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Timely Judicial Resolution Of Claims Like Axon's Is Critical To Preserving the Separation Of Powers And Preventing Agency Overreach",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Contrary Conclusion Cannot Be Reconciled With the Statute's Text or This Court's Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. District Courts May Hear Constitutional Challenges To An Agency's Structure, Procedures, Or Existence Absent Clear Statutory Language To the Contrary\nII. The FTC Act Does Not Strip The District Court Of Jurisdiction To Hear Axon's Constitutional Challenges To the FTC's Structure, Procedures, And Existence\nA. Axon's Constitutional Claims Are a Misfit for the FTC Act's Administrative Review Scheme\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Contrary Conclusion Cannot Be Reconciled With the Statute's Text or This Court's Cases\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Timely Judicial Resolution Of Claims Like Axon's Is Critical To Preserving the Separation Of Powers And Preventing Agency Overreach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Since Our Nation's Founding, Private Citizens Have Taken Active Roles in Enforcing Laws Promoting the Public Welfare Without Constitutional Objection",
        "reference": "I. Laufer's Asserted Harm Is Closely Analogous to the Humiliation and Sense of Exclusion that Formed the Basis for Common-Law Suits for Breach of the Innkeeper's Duty to Entertain",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Laufer's Asserted Harm Is Closely Analogous to the Humiliation and Sense of Exclusion that Formed the Basis for Common-Law Suits for Breach of the Innkeeper's Duty to Entertain\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Since Our Nation's Founding, Private Citizens Have Taken Active Roles in Enforcing Laws Promoting the Public Welfare Without Constitutional Objection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Continue to Defer to Congress to Define the Extent and Limits of Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. The Political Branches, Not the Courts, Have Determined Whether to Except Immovable Property from Foreign Sovereign Immunity\nB. Any Narrowing of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Should Come from Congress.\nIII. An Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity Would Be Inconsistent with this Court's Settled Precedents and the Unique Nature of Tribes as Domestic Dependent Nations\nA. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nB. The Lundgrens' Analogies to States and Foreign Nations Ignore Basic Differences Bearing on the \"Special Brand of Sovereignty the Tribes Retain.\"\nIV. Having Sought to Adjudicate the Tribe's Interest in the Property, the Lundgrens' Suit Should Have Been Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Decline to Consider the Lundgrens' New Argument for an Immovable Property Exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Decline to Consider the Lundgrens' New Argument for an Immovable Property Exception\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Political Branches, Not the Courts, Have Determined Whether to Except Immovable Property from Foreign Sovereign Immunity\nB. Any Narrowing of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Should Come from Congress.\nIII. An Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity Would Be Inconsistent with this Court's Settled Precedents and the Unique Nature of Tribes as Domestic Dependent Nations\nA. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nB. The Lundgrens' Analogies to States and Foreign Nations Ignore Basic Differences Bearing on the \"Special Brand of Sovereignty the Tribes Retain.\"\nIV. Having Sought to Adjudicate the Tribe's Interest in the Property, the Lundgrens' Suit Should Have Been Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Continue to Defer to Congress to Define the Extent and Limits of Tribal Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Decline to Consider the Lundgrens' New Argument for an Immovable Property Exception\nII. The Court Should Continue to Defer to Congress to Define the Extent and Limits of Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Any Narrowing of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Should Come from Congress.\nIII. An Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity Would Be Inconsistent with this Court's Settled Precedents and the Unique Nature of Tribes as Domestic Dependent Nations\nA. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nB. The Lundgrens' Analogies to States and Foreign Nations Ignore Basic Differences Bearing on the \"Special Brand of Sovereignty the Tribes Retain.\"\nIV. Having Sought to Adjudicate the Tribe's Interest in the Property, the Lundgrens' Suit Should Have Been Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "A. The Political Branches, Not the Courts, Have Determined Whether to Except Immovable Property from Foreign Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Decline to Consider the Lundgrens' New Argument for an Immovable Property Exception\nII. The Court Should Continue to Defer to Congress to Define the Extent and Limits of Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. The Political Branches, Not the Courts, Have Determined Whether to Except Immovable Property from Foreign Sovereign Immunity\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. An Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity Would Be Inconsistent with this Court's Settled Precedents and the Unique Nature of Tribes as Domestic Dependent Nations\nA. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nB. The Lundgrens' Analogies to States and Foreign Nations Ignore Basic Differences Bearing on the \"Special Brand of Sovereignty the Tribes Retain.\"\nIV. Having Sought to Adjudicate the Tribe's Interest in the Property, the Lundgrens' Suit Should Have Been Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "B. Any Narrowing of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Should Come from Congress.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Decline to Consider the Lundgrens' New Argument for an Immovable Property Exception\nII. The Court Should Continue to Defer to Congress to Define the Extent and Limits of Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. The Political Branches, Not the Courts, Have Determined Whether to Except Immovable Property from Foreign Sovereign Immunity\nB. Any Narrowing of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Should Come from Congress.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nB. The Lundgrens' Analogies to States and Foreign Nations Ignore Basic Differences Bearing on the \"Special Brand of Sovereignty the Tribes Retain.\"\nIV. Having Sought to Adjudicate the Tribe's Interest in the Property, the Lundgrens' Suit Should Have Been Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "III. An Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity Would Be Inconsistent with this Court's Settled Precedents and the Unique Nature of Tribes as Domestic Dependent Nations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Decline to Consider the Lundgrens' New Argument for an Immovable Property Exception\nII. The Court Should Continue to Defer to Congress to Define the Extent and Limits of Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. The Political Branches, Not the Courts, Have Determined Whether to Except Immovable Property from Foreign Sovereign Immunity\nB. Any Narrowing of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Should Come from Congress.\nIII. An Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity Would Be Inconsistent with this Court's Settled Precedents and the Unique Nature of Tribes as Domestic Dependent Nations\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Lundgrens' Analogies to States and Foreign Nations Ignore Basic Differences Bearing on the \"Special Brand of Sovereignty the Tribes Retain.\"\nIV. Having Sought to Adjudicate the Tribe's Interest in the Property, the Lundgrens' Suit Should Have Been Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "A. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Decline to Consider the Lundgrens' New Argument for an Immovable Property Exception\nII. The Court Should Continue to Defer to Congress to Define the Extent and Limits of Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. The Political Branches, Not the Courts, Have Determined Whether to Except Immovable Property from Foreign Sovereign Immunity\nB. Any Narrowing of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Should Come from Congress.\nIII. An Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity Would Be Inconsistent with this Court's Settled Precedents and the Unique Nature of Tribes as Domestic Dependent Nations\nA. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. Having Sought to Adjudicate the Tribe's Interest in the Property, the Lundgrens' Suit Should Have Been Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "B. The Lundgrens' Analogies to States and Foreign Nations Ignore Basic Differences Bearing on the \"Special Brand of Sovereignty the Tribes Retain.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Decline to Consider the Lundgrens' New Argument for an Immovable Property Exception\nII. The Court Should Continue to Defer to Congress to Define the Extent and Limits of Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. The Political Branches, Not the Courts, Have Determined Whether to Except Immovable Property from Foreign Sovereign Immunity\nB. Any Narrowing of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Should Come from Congress.\nIII. An Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity Would Be Inconsistent with this Court's Settled Precedents and the Unique Nature of Tribes as Domestic Dependent Nations\nA. This Court's Precedents Foreclose an Immovable Property Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nB. The Lundgrens' Analogies to States and Foreign Nations Ignore Basic Differences Bearing on the \"Special Brand of Sovereignty the Tribes Retain.\"\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Having Sought to Adjudicate the Tribe's Interest in the Property, the Lundgrens' Suit Should Have Been Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-364_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The decision below conflicts with Trinity Lutheran\nIII. No legitimate antiestablishment interest justifies barring churches from historic preservation programs",
        "reference": "I. The decision below deepens the conflicts over Trinity Lutheran's application to historic preservation programs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-364_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decision below deepens the conflicts over Trinity Lutheran's application to historic preservation programs\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. No legitimate antiestablishment interest justifies barring churches from historic preservation programs",
        "reference": "II. The decision below conflicts with Trinity Lutheran",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-364_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decision below deepens the conflicts over Trinity Lutheran's application to historic preservation programs\nII. The decision below conflicts with Trinity Lutheran\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. No legitimate antiestablishment interest justifies barring churches from historic preservation programs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Individual Mandate Cannot Be Severed From the Guaranteed Issue and Community Rating Provisions",
        "reference": "I. The Individual Mandate No Longer Functions As a Tax and Cannot Be Sustained As a Constitutional Exercise of Congress's Power to Tax",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Individual Mandate No Longer Functions As a Tax and Cannot Be Sustained As a Constitutional Exercise of Congress's Power to Tax\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Individual Mandate Cannot Be Severed From the Guaranteed Issue and Community Rating Provisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The State of Mississippi provides assistance for mothers and families from conception onward\nB. The State of Mississippi provides support for children starting at birth\nII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting unborn life\nIII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting women from the health risks associated with abortions after 15 weeks' gestational age\nIV. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession\nV. The Mississippi Legislature did not impose an undue burden on women",
        "reference": "I. The Mississippi Legislature values life",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Mississippi Legislature values life\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The State of Mississippi provides support for children starting at birth\nII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting unborn life\nIII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting women from the health risks associated with abortions after 15 weeks' gestational age\nIV. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession\nV. The Mississippi Legislature did not impose an undue burden on women",
        "reference": "A. The State of Mississippi provides assistance for mothers and families from conception onward",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Mississippi Legislature values life\nA. The State of Mississippi provides assistance for mothers and families from conception onward\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting unborn life\nIII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting women from the health risks associated with abortions after 15 weeks' gestational age\nIV. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession\nV. The Mississippi Legislature did not impose an undue burden on women",
        "reference": "B. The State of Mississippi provides support for children starting at birth",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The National Parks standard ignores FOIA's plain text and has proven unworkable in practice\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Whether information is categorized confidential should depend on statutes and regulations, not contractor discretion",
        "reference": "II. The term \"Confidential\" in Exemption 4 should be narrowly construed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The National Parks standard ignores FOIA's plain text and has proven unworkable in practice\nII. The term \"Confidential\" in Exemption 4 should be narrowly construed\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Whether information is categorized confidential should depend on statutes and regulations, not contractor discretion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Arizona Has Steadily Made It Easier to Vote\nIII. Arizona's Precinct-Voting and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act\nIV. Arizona's Anti-Ballot Harvesting Law and Section 2",
        "reference": "I. Arizona's Steady Expansion of Voter Registration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Arizona's Steady Expansion of Voter Registration\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Arizona's Precinct-Voting and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act\nIV. Arizona's Anti-Ballot Harvesting Law and Section 2",
        "reference": "II. Arizona Has Steadily Made It Easier to Vote",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Arizona's Steady Expansion of Voter Registration\nII. Arizona Has Steadily Made It Easier to Vote\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Arizona's Anti-Ballot Harvesting Law and Section 2",
        "reference": "III. Arizona's Precinct-Voting and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Arizona's Steady Expansion of Voter Registration\nII. Arizona Has Steadily Made It Easier to Vote\nIII. Arizona's Precinct-Voting and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Arizona's Anti-Ballot Harvesting Law and Section 2",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.\nB. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.\nC. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.\nD. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.\n1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\n2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.\nE. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.\nF. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"\nII. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.\nIII. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "reference": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.\nC. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.\nD. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.\n1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\n2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.\nE. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.\nF. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"\nII. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.\nIII. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "reference": "A. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\nA. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.\nD. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.\n1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\n2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.\nE. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.\nF. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"\nII. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.\nIII. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "reference": "B. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\nA. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.\nB. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.\n1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\n2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.\nE. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.\nF. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"\nII. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.\nIII. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "reference": "C. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\nA. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.\nB. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.\nC. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.\nD. [MISSING]\n1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\n2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.\nE. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.\nF. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"\nII. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.\nIII. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "reference": "D. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\nA. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.\nB. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.\nC. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.\nD. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.\nE. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.\nF. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"\nII. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.\nIII. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "reference": "1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\nA. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.\nB. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.\nC. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.\nD. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.\n1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\n2. [MISSING]\nE. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.\nF. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"\nII. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.\nIII. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "reference": "2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\nA. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.\nB. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.\nC. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.\nD. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.\n1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\n2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.\nE. [MISSING]\nF. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"\nII. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.\nIII. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "reference": "E. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\nA. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.\nB. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.\nC. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.\nD. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.\n1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\n2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.\nE. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.\nF. [MISSING]\nII. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.\nIII. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "reference": "F. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\nA. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.\nB. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.\nC. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.\nD. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.\n1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\n2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.\nE. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.\nF. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "reference": "II. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Because It Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech Well Beyond Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\nA. The Statute's Plain Meaning Reaches Any Speech That Persuades or Encourages a Noncitizen to Remain In Violation of Law, and Therefore Prohibits a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech.\nB. Speech Encouraging Violations of Law is Protected by the First Amendment Except in Very Narrow Circumstances.\nC. The Statute Criminalizes a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech as Compared to Its Legitimate Scope.\nD. The Encouragement Provision Cannot Be Narrowly Construed as a Criminal Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Law.\n1. The Statute's Text, History, and Context Confirm that It Cannot be Read Narrowly As a Prohibition on Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.\n2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.\nE. The Sentencing Enhancement Does Not Save The Encouragement Provision.\nF. Holding that the Encouragement Provision is Overbroad Will Not Threaten Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statutes Simply Because They Also Include the Terms \"Encourage\" or \"Induce.\"\nII. The Encouragement Provision is Also Overbroad Because It Criminalizes Speech Encouraging Civil Immigration Violations.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. If the Court Upholds the Encouragement Provision Under the Narrow Construction the Government Now Proposes, Respondent's Conviction Should Still be Vacated Because The Jury Did Not Find that Respondent Engaged in Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. There is a historical religious practice of audible clergy prayer at the time of execution\nB. There is a historical religious practice of clergy touch at the time of execution\nC. TDCJ's prohibition of historical religious practices triggers strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause\nII. Denying audible clergy prayer and clergy touch also triggers strict scrutiny under RLUIPA\nIII. TDCJ cannot make out a successful strict scrutiny affirmative defense under either the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA\nIV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
        "reference": "I. The Free Exercise Clause protects the right of condemned prisoners to engage in historical religious practices like audible clergy prayer and clergy touch at the time of execution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Free Exercise Clause protects the right of condemned prisoners to engage in historical religious practices like audible clergy prayer and clergy touch at the time of execution\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There is a historical religious practice of clergy touch at the time of execution\nC. TDCJ's prohibition of historical religious practices triggers strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause\nII. Denying audible clergy prayer and clergy touch also triggers strict scrutiny under RLUIPA\nIII. TDCJ cannot make out a successful strict scrutiny affirmative defense under either the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA\nIV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
        "reference": "A. There is a historical religious practice of audible clergy prayer at the time of execution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Free Exercise Clause protects the right of condemned prisoners to engage in historical religious practices like audible clergy prayer and clergy touch at the time of execution\nA. There is a historical religious practice of audible clergy prayer at the time of execution\nB. [MISSING]\nC. TDCJ's prohibition of historical religious practices triggers strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause\nII. Denying audible clergy prayer and clergy touch also triggers strict scrutiny under RLUIPA\nIII. TDCJ cannot make out a successful strict scrutiny affirmative defense under either the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA\nIV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
        "reference": "B. There is a historical religious practice of clergy touch at the time of execution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Free Exercise Clause protects the right of condemned prisoners to engage in historical religious practices like audible clergy prayer and clergy touch at the time of execution\nA. There is a historical religious practice of audible clergy prayer at the time of execution\nB. There is a historical religious practice of clergy touch at the time of execution\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Denying audible clergy prayer and clergy touch also triggers strict scrutiny under RLUIPA\nIII. TDCJ cannot make out a successful strict scrutiny affirmative defense under either the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA\nIV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
        "reference": "C. TDCJ's prohibition of historical religious practices triggers strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Free Exercise Clause protects the right of condemned prisoners to engage in historical religious practices like audible clergy prayer and clergy touch at the time of execution\nA. There is a historical religious practice of audible clergy prayer at the time of execution\nB. There is a historical religious practice of clergy touch at the time of execution\nC. TDCJ's prohibition of historical religious practices triggers strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. TDCJ cannot make out a successful strict scrutiny affirmative defense under either the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA\nIV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
        "reference": "II. Denying audible clergy prayer and clergy touch also triggers strict scrutiny under RLUIPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Free Exercise Clause protects the right of condemned prisoners to engage in historical religious practices like audible clergy prayer and clergy touch at the time of execution\nA. There is a historical religious practice of audible clergy prayer at the time of execution\nB. There is a historical religious practice of clergy touch at the time of execution\nC. TDCJ's prohibition of historical religious practices triggers strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause\nII. Denying audible clergy prayer and clergy touch also triggers strict scrutiny under RLUIPA\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
        "reference": "III. TDCJ cannot make out a successful strict scrutiny affirmative defense under either the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Free Exercise Clause protects the right of condemned prisoners to engage in historical religious practices like audible clergy prayer and clergy touch at the time of execution\nA. There is a historical religious practice of audible clergy prayer at the time of execution\nB. There is a historical religious practice of clergy touch at the time of execution\nC. TDCJ's prohibition of historical religious practices triggers strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause\nII. Denying audible clergy prayer and clergy touch also triggers strict scrutiny under RLUIPA\nIII. TDCJ cannot make out a successful strict scrutiny affirmative defense under either the Free Exercise Clause or RLUIPA\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Court can and should grant conditional relief to Ramirez",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. READING A PERMIT REQUIREMENT INTO THE CLEAN WATER ACT FOR DISCHARGES INTO GROUNDWATER OR SOIL WOULD INTERFERE WITH COMMONPLACE, ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND \"TRENCHLESS\" CONSTRUCTION METHODS FOR INSTALLING UNDERGROUND UTILITY LINES",
        "reference": "I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE A PERMIT FOR DISCHARGING POLLUTANTS INTO A NONPOINT SOURCE SUCH AS GROUNDWATER OR SOIL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE A PERMIT FOR DISCHARGING POLLUTANTS INTO A NONPOINT SOURCE SUCH AS GROUNDWATER OR SOIL\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. READING A PERMIT REQUIREMENT INTO THE CLEAN WATER ACT FOR DISCHARGES INTO GROUNDWATER OR SOIL WOULD INTERFERE WITH COMMONPLACE, ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND \"TRENCHLESS\" CONSTRUCTION METHODS FOR INSTALLING UNDERGROUND UTILITY LINES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "A. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. [MISSING]\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "B. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "II. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "A. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "B. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "A. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. [MISSING]\nB. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "reference": "4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF REASON SHOULD IMPLEMENT SECTION 1'S CONSUMER-WELFARE GOALS IN A WORKABLE WAY\nA. The Court's Tiers Of Antitrust Scrutiny Balance Consumer-Welfare Goals Against Administrative Considerations\n1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare\n2. The Court has implemented the antitrust laws' consumer-welfare goals with institutional considerations in mind\nB. These Consumer-Welfare And Institutional Concerns Should Guide The Rule Of Reason\nII. THE GOVERNMENT MET ITS BURDEN BY PROVING THAT THE ANTI-STEERING PROVISIONS RESTRAIN COMPETITION AND HARM CONSUMERS\nA. Amex's Restraints, Unlike Vertical Restraints In Other Cases, Implicate Section 1's Primary Purpose\nB. By Limiting Interbrand Competition, The Anti-Steering Provisions Raise Prices Above Competitive Levels\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT WRONGLY REQUIRED THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE THAT THE HIGHER PRICES WERE NOT \"OFFSET\" BY HIGHER REWARDS, BUT IT DID SO IN ANY EVENT\nA. Section 1 Presumes That Higher Prices Caused By Restraining Interbrand Price Competition Inflict Net Consumer Harms\n1. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with the Sherman Act's guiding light that competition generates \"optimal\" products\n2. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with economic principles illustrating that interbrand price restrictions harm consumers even if competition occurs elsewhere\n3. The Second Circuit's analysis conflicts with this Court's administrative concerns\n4. The Second Circuit's need to create a novel market-definition test confirms its error\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The District Court Factually Found That Amex's Restraints Harmed The Cardholder Side Of The Platform Too",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Mandatory Forfeitures Are Increasingly Common and Problematic\nB. Governments Are Increasingly Misusing Mandatory Forfeitures and Fines as Revenue Streams Rather Than as a Proportionate Punishment for a Particular Offense\nC. Excessive Fines, and the Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Whether They May Be Imposed, Hinder Economic Growth\nII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT REVIEW OF STATE FORFEITURES AND FINES IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY CHECK ON ABUSIVE FINES AND SHOULD BE MANDATED BY THIS COURT\nA. The Excessive Fines Clause Is Precisely the Type of Constitutional Provision That Should Be Incorporated\nB. Granting Certiorari Will Prevent Indiana, and Other States, from Ignoring an Essential Element of Ordered Liberty",
        "reference": "I. THE UNCHECKED PROLIFERATION OF DISPROPORTIONATE FORFEITURES AND REVENUE-SEEKING FINES UNDERMINES ECONOMIC GROWTH",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNCHECKED PROLIFERATION OF DISPROPORTIONATE FORFEITURES AND REVENUE-SEEKING FINES UNDERMINES ECONOMIC GROWTH\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Governments Are Increasingly Misusing Mandatory Forfeitures and Fines as Revenue Streams Rather Than as a Proportionate Punishment for a Particular Offense\nC. Excessive Fines, and the Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Whether They May Be Imposed, Hinder Economic Growth\nII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT REVIEW OF STATE FORFEITURES AND FINES IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY CHECK ON ABUSIVE FINES AND SHOULD BE MANDATED BY THIS COURT\nA. The Excessive Fines Clause Is Precisely the Type of Constitutional Provision That Should Be Incorporated\nB. Granting Certiorari Will Prevent Indiana, and Other States, from Ignoring an Essential Element of Ordered Liberty",
        "reference": "A. Mandatory Forfeitures Are Increasingly Common and Problematic",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNCHECKED PROLIFERATION OF DISPROPORTIONATE FORFEITURES AND REVENUE-SEEKING FINES UNDERMINES ECONOMIC GROWTH\nA. Mandatory Forfeitures Are Increasingly Common and Problematic\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Excessive Fines, and the Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Whether They May Be Imposed, Hinder Economic Growth\nII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT REVIEW OF STATE FORFEITURES AND FINES IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY CHECK ON ABUSIVE FINES AND SHOULD BE MANDATED BY THIS COURT\nA. The Excessive Fines Clause Is Precisely the Type of Constitutional Provision That Should Be Incorporated\nB. Granting Certiorari Will Prevent Indiana, and Other States, from Ignoring an Essential Element of Ordered Liberty",
        "reference": "B. Governments Are Increasingly Misusing Mandatory Forfeitures and Fines as Revenue Streams Rather Than as a Proportionate Punishment for a Particular Offense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNCHECKED PROLIFERATION OF DISPROPORTIONATE FORFEITURES AND REVENUE-SEEKING FINES UNDERMINES ECONOMIC GROWTH\nA. Mandatory Forfeitures Are Increasingly Common and Problematic\nB. Governments Are Increasingly Misusing Mandatory Forfeitures and Fines as Revenue Streams Rather Than as a Proportionate Punishment for a Particular Offense\nC. [MISSING]\nII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT REVIEW OF STATE FORFEITURES AND FINES IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY CHECK ON ABUSIVE FINES AND SHOULD BE MANDATED BY THIS COURT\nA. The Excessive Fines Clause Is Precisely the Type of Constitutional Provision That Should Be Incorporated\nB. Granting Certiorari Will Prevent Indiana, and Other States, from Ignoring an Essential Element of Ordered Liberty",
        "reference": "C. Excessive Fines, and the Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Whether They May Be Imposed, Hinder Economic Growth",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNCHECKED PROLIFERATION OF DISPROPORTIONATE FORFEITURES AND REVENUE-SEEKING FINES UNDERMINES ECONOMIC GROWTH\nA. Mandatory Forfeitures Are Increasingly Common and Problematic\nB. Governments Are Increasingly Misusing Mandatory Forfeitures and Fines as Revenue Streams Rather Than as a Proportionate Punishment for a Particular Offense\nC. Excessive Fines, and the Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Whether They May Be Imposed, Hinder Economic Growth\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Excessive Fines Clause Is Precisely the Type of Constitutional Provision That Should Be Incorporated\nB. Granting Certiorari Will Prevent Indiana, and Other States, from Ignoring an Essential Element of Ordered Liberty",
        "reference": "II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT REVIEW OF STATE FORFEITURES AND FINES IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY CHECK ON ABUSIVE FINES AND SHOULD BE MANDATED BY THIS COURT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNCHECKED PROLIFERATION OF DISPROPORTIONATE FORFEITURES AND REVENUE-SEEKING FINES UNDERMINES ECONOMIC GROWTH\nA. Mandatory Forfeitures Are Increasingly Common and Problematic\nB. Governments Are Increasingly Misusing Mandatory Forfeitures and Fines as Revenue Streams Rather Than as a Proportionate Punishment for a Particular Offense\nC. Excessive Fines, and the Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Whether They May Be Imposed, Hinder Economic Growth\nII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT REVIEW OF STATE FORFEITURES AND FINES IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY CHECK ON ABUSIVE FINES AND SHOULD BE MANDATED BY THIS COURT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Granting Certiorari Will Prevent Indiana, and Other States, from Ignoring an Essential Element of Ordered Liberty",
        "reference": "A. The Excessive Fines Clause Is Precisely the Type of Constitutional Provision That Should Be Incorporated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNCHECKED PROLIFERATION OF DISPROPORTIONATE FORFEITURES AND REVENUE-SEEKING FINES UNDERMINES ECONOMIC GROWTH\nA. Mandatory Forfeitures Are Increasingly Common and Problematic\nB. Governments Are Increasingly Misusing Mandatory Forfeitures and Fines as Revenue Streams Rather Than as a Proportionate Punishment for a Particular Offense\nC. Excessive Fines, and the Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Whether They May Be Imposed, Hinder Economic Growth\nII. EIGHTH AMENDMENT REVIEW OF STATE FORFEITURES AND FINES IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY NECESSARY CHECK ON ABUSIVE FINES AND SHOULD BE MANDATED BY THIS COURT\nA. The Excessive Fines Clause Is Precisely the Type of Constitutional Provision That Should Be Incorporated\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Granting Certiorari Will Prevent Indiana, and Other States, from Ignoring an Essential Element of Ordered Liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Decision Below Faithfully Applies This Court's Binding Precedents And Creates No Circuit Split\n1. The decision faithfully applies this Court's jurisprudence\n2. There is no circuit split\nC. The Decision Below Was Correct\n1. Petitioner spoke and acted as a school official, not as a private citizen\n2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
        "reference": "A. The Question Presented In The Petition Is Inapposite And Does Not Determine The Outcome Of This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Question Presented In The Petition Is Inapposite And Does Not Determine The Outcome Of This Case\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The decision faithfully applies this Court's jurisprudence\n2. There is no circuit split\nC. The Decision Below Was Correct\n1. Petitioner spoke and acted as a school official, not as a private citizen\n2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Faithfully Applies This Court's Binding Precedents And Creates No Circuit Split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Question Presented In The Petition Is Inapposite And Does Not Determine The Outcome Of This Case\nB. The Decision Below Faithfully Applies This Court's Binding Precedents And Creates No Circuit Split\n1. [MISSING]\n2. There is no circuit split\nC. The Decision Below Was Correct\n1. Petitioner spoke and acted as a school official, not as a private citizen\n2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
        "reference": "1. The decision faithfully applies this Court's jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Question Presented In The Petition Is Inapposite And Does Not Determine The Outcome Of This Case\nB. The Decision Below Faithfully Applies This Court's Binding Precedents And Creates No Circuit Split\n1. The decision faithfully applies this Court's jurisprudence\n2. [MISSING]\nC. The Decision Below Was Correct\n1. Petitioner spoke and acted as a school official, not as a private citizen\n2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
        "reference": "2. There is no circuit split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Question Presented In The Petition Is Inapposite And Does Not Determine The Outcome Of This Case\nB. The Decision Below Faithfully Applies This Court's Binding Precedents And Creates No Circuit Split\n1. The decision faithfully applies this Court's jurisprudence\n2. There is no circuit split\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Petitioner spoke and acted as a school official, not as a private citizen\n2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
        "reference": "C. The Decision Below Was Correct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Question Presented In The Petition Is Inapposite And Does Not Determine The Outcome Of This Case\nB. The Decision Below Faithfully Applies This Court's Binding Precedents And Creates No Circuit Split\n1. The decision faithfully applies this Court's jurisprudence\n2. There is no circuit split\nC. The Decision Below Was Correct\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
        "reference": "1. Petitioner spoke and acted as a school official, not as a private citizen",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Question Presented In The Petition Is Inapposite And Does Not Determine The Outcome Of This Case\nB. The Decision Below Faithfully Applies This Court's Binding Precedents And Creates No Circuit Split\n1. The decision faithfully applies this Court's jurisprudence\n2. There is no circuit split\nC. The Decision Below Was Correct\n1. Petitioner spoke and acted as a school official, not as a private citizen\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Certificate Rule Harms Authors And Other Copyright Owners\nIII. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect\nIV. The Certificate Rule Is Not Necessary To Satisfy The Objective Of Allowing The Register Of Copyrights To Advise Courts In Infringement Actions\nV. The Policies Underlying The Copyright Act Favor The Application Rule",
        "reference": "I. The Better Reading Of The Statutory Language Favors The Application Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Better Reading Of The Statutory Language Favors The Application Rule\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect\nIV. The Certificate Rule Is Not Necessary To Satisfy The Objective Of Allowing The Register Of Copyrights To Advise Courts In Infringement Actions\nV. The Policies Underlying The Copyright Act Favor The Application Rule",
        "reference": "II. The Certificate Rule Harms Authors And Other Copyright Owners",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Better Reading Of The Statutory Language Favors The Application Rule\nII. The Certificate Rule Harms Authors And Other Copyright Owners\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Certificate Rule Is Not Necessary To Satisfy The Objective Of Allowing The Register Of Copyrights To Advise Courts In Infringement Actions\nV. The Policies Underlying The Copyright Act Favor The Application Rule",
        "reference": "III. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Better Reading Of The Statutory Language Favors The Application Rule\nII. The Certificate Rule Harms Authors And Other Copyright Owners\nIII. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. The Policies Underlying The Copyright Act Favor The Application Rule",
        "reference": "IV. The Certificate Rule Is Not Necessary To Satisfy The Objective Of Allowing The Register Of Copyrights To Advise Courts In Infringement Actions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Better Reading Of The Statutory Language Favors The Application Rule\nII. The Certificate Rule Harms Authors And Other Copyright Owners\nIII. The Application Rule Gives Congress' Objectives Effect\nIV. The Certificate Rule Is Not Necessary To Satisfy The Objective Of Allowing The Register Of Copyrights To Advise Courts In Infringement Actions\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. The Policies Underlying The Copyright Act Favor The Application Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1964(c)'s Text And History Show That It Redresses Only Economic Injury Suffered Directly By The Plaintiff\nB. Choice-Of-Law Rules Applicable At The Time Of RICO's Enactment Show That A Section 1964(c) Plaintiff Suffers His Economic Injury At His Domicile\nC. This Court's Decision In RJR Nabisco Does Not Compel A Contrary Result\nII. At A Minimum, And In The Alternative, A RICO Plaintiff's Injury Is Economic And Is Suffered At His Domicile When The Property In Issue Is A Judgment, Award, Or Debt\nIII. A Bright-Line Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Is Sensible And Administrable\nA. A Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Adheres To The Court's Preference For Bright-Line Rules And The Doctrine Of Prescriptive Comity\nB. RICO Was Not Enacted To Function As A Global Arbitral Award Enforcement Tool\nC. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs Retain Other Remedies",
        "reference": "I. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs May Not Maintain Civil RICO Claims Under Section 1964(c) Because Their Economic Injury Is By Definition Suffered Abroad",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs May Not Maintain Civil RICO Claims Under Section 1964(c) Because Their Economic Injury Is By Definition Suffered Abroad\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Choice-Of-Law Rules Applicable At The Time Of RICO's Enactment Show That A Section 1964(c) Plaintiff Suffers His Economic Injury At His Domicile\nC. This Court's Decision In RJR Nabisco Does Not Compel A Contrary Result\nII. At A Minimum, And In The Alternative, A RICO Plaintiff's Injury Is Economic And Is Suffered At His Domicile When The Property In Issue Is A Judgment, Award, Or Debt\nIII. A Bright-Line Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Is Sensible And Administrable\nA. A Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Adheres To The Court's Preference For Bright-Line Rules And The Doctrine Of Prescriptive Comity\nB. RICO Was Not Enacted To Function As A Global Arbitral Award Enforcement Tool\nC. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs Retain Other Remedies",
        "reference": "A. Section 1964(c)'s Text And History Show That It Redresses Only Economic Injury Suffered Directly By The Plaintiff",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs May Not Maintain Civil RICO Claims Under Section 1964(c) Because Their Economic Injury Is By Definition Suffered Abroad\nA. Section 1964(c)'s Text And History Show That It Redresses Only Economic Injury Suffered Directly By The Plaintiff\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Court's Decision In RJR Nabisco Does Not Compel A Contrary Result\nII. At A Minimum, And In The Alternative, A RICO Plaintiff's Injury Is Economic And Is Suffered At His Domicile When The Property In Issue Is A Judgment, Award, Or Debt\nIII. A Bright-Line Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Is Sensible And Administrable\nA. A Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Adheres To The Court's Preference For Bright-Line Rules And The Doctrine Of Prescriptive Comity\nB. RICO Was Not Enacted To Function As A Global Arbitral Award Enforcement Tool\nC. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs Retain Other Remedies",
        "reference": "B. Choice-Of-Law Rules Applicable At The Time Of RICO's Enactment Show That A Section 1964(c) Plaintiff Suffers His Economic Injury At His Domicile",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs May Not Maintain Civil RICO Claims Under Section 1964(c) Because Their Economic Injury Is By Definition Suffered Abroad\nA. Section 1964(c)'s Text And History Show That It Redresses Only Economic Injury Suffered Directly By The Plaintiff\nB. Choice-Of-Law Rules Applicable At The Time Of RICO's Enactment Show That A Section 1964(c) Plaintiff Suffers His Economic Injury At His Domicile\nC. [MISSING]\nII. At A Minimum, And In The Alternative, A RICO Plaintiff's Injury Is Economic And Is Suffered At His Domicile When The Property In Issue Is A Judgment, Award, Or Debt\nIII. A Bright-Line Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Is Sensible And Administrable\nA. A Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Adheres To The Court's Preference For Bright-Line Rules And The Doctrine Of Prescriptive Comity\nB. RICO Was Not Enacted To Function As A Global Arbitral Award Enforcement Tool\nC. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs Retain Other Remedies",
        "reference": "C. This Court's Decision In RJR Nabisco Does Not Compel A Contrary Result",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs May Not Maintain Civil RICO Claims Under Section 1964(c) Because Their Economic Injury Is By Definition Suffered Abroad\nA. Section 1964(c)'s Text And History Show That It Redresses Only Economic Injury Suffered Directly By The Plaintiff\nB. Choice-Of-Law Rules Applicable At The Time Of RICO's Enactment Show That A Section 1964(c) Plaintiff Suffers His Economic Injury At His Domicile\nC. This Court's Decision In RJR Nabisco Does Not Compel A Contrary Result\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. A Bright-Line Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Is Sensible And Administrable\nA. A Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Adheres To The Court's Preference For Bright-Line Rules And The Doctrine Of Prescriptive Comity\nB. RICO Was Not Enacted To Function As A Global Arbitral Award Enforcement Tool\nC. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs Retain Other Remedies",
        "reference": "II. At A Minimum, And In The Alternative, A RICO Plaintiff's Injury Is Economic And Is Suffered At His Domicile When The Property In Issue Is A Judgment, Award, Or Debt",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs May Not Maintain Civil RICO Claims Under Section 1964(c) Because Their Economic Injury Is By Definition Suffered Abroad\nA. Section 1964(c)'s Text And History Show That It Redresses Only Economic Injury Suffered Directly By The Plaintiff\nB. Choice-Of-Law Rules Applicable At The Time Of RICO's Enactment Show That A Section 1964(c) Plaintiff Suffers His Economic Injury At His Domicile\nC. This Court's Decision In RJR Nabisco Does Not Compel A Contrary Result\nII. At A Minimum, And In The Alternative, A RICO Plaintiff's Injury Is Economic And Is Suffered At His Domicile When The Property In Issue Is A Judgment, Award, Or Debt\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. A Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Adheres To The Court's Preference For Bright-Line Rules And The Doctrine Of Prescriptive Comity\nB. RICO Was Not Enacted To Function As A Global Arbitral Award Enforcement Tool\nC. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs Retain Other Remedies",
        "reference": "III. A Bright-Line Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Is Sensible And Administrable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs May Not Maintain Civil RICO Claims Under Section 1964(c) Because Their Economic Injury Is By Definition Suffered Abroad\nA. Section 1964(c)'s Text And History Show That It Redresses Only Economic Injury Suffered Directly By The Plaintiff\nB. Choice-Of-Law Rules Applicable At The Time Of RICO's Enactment Show That A Section 1964(c) Plaintiff Suffers His Economic Injury At His Domicile\nC. This Court's Decision In RJR Nabisco Does Not Compel A Contrary Result\nII. At A Minimum, And In The Alternative, A RICO Plaintiff's Injury Is Economic And Is Suffered At His Domicile When The Property In Issue Is A Judgment, Award, Or Debt\nIII. A Bright-Line Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Is Sensible And Administrable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. RICO Was Not Enacted To Function As A Global Arbitral Award Enforcement Tool\nC. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs Retain Other Remedies",
        "reference": "A. A Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Adheres To The Court's Preference For Bright-Line Rules And The Doctrine Of Prescriptive Comity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs May Not Maintain Civil RICO Claims Under Section 1964(c) Because Their Economic Injury Is By Definition Suffered Abroad\nA. Section 1964(c)'s Text And History Show That It Redresses Only Economic Injury Suffered Directly By The Plaintiff\nB. Choice-Of-Law Rules Applicable At The Time Of RICO's Enactment Show That A Section 1964(c) Plaintiff Suffers His Economic Injury At His Domicile\nC. This Court's Decision In RJR Nabisco Does Not Compel A Contrary Result\nII. At A Minimum, And In The Alternative, A RICO Plaintiff's Injury Is Economic And Is Suffered At His Domicile When The Property In Issue Is A Judgment, Award, Or Debt\nIII. A Bright-Line Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Is Sensible And Administrable\nA. A Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Adheres To The Court's Preference For Bright-Line Rules And The Doctrine Of Prescriptive Comity\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs Retain Other Remedies",
        "reference": "B. RICO Was Not Enacted To Function As A Global Arbitral Award Enforcement Tool",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs May Not Maintain Civil RICO Claims Under Section 1964(c) Because Their Economic Injury Is By Definition Suffered Abroad\nA. Section 1964(c)'s Text And History Show That It Redresses Only Economic Injury Suffered Directly By The Plaintiff\nB. Choice-Of-Law Rules Applicable At The Time Of RICO's Enactment Show That A Section 1964(c) Plaintiff Suffers His Economic Injury At His Domicile\nC. This Court's Decision In RJR Nabisco Does Not Compel A Contrary Result\nII. At A Minimum, And In The Alternative, A RICO Plaintiff's Injury Is Economic And Is Suffered At His Domicile When The Property In Issue Is A Judgment, Award, Or Debt\nIII. A Bright-Line Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Is Sensible And Administrable\nA. A Plaintiff-Domicile Rule Adheres To The Court's Preference For Bright-Line Rules And The Doctrine Of Prescriptive Comity\nB. RICO Was Not Enacted To Function As A Global Arbitral Award Enforcement Tool\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Foreign-Domiciled Plaintiffs Retain Other Remedies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the States have the Primary Role in Setting Standards of Performance Under the Cooperative Federalism Codified in Section 111(d)(1)\nB. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources be Adequately Demonstrated and Achievable for Application \"At\" and \"To\" Existing Sources\ni. The BSER Set by EPA Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" for Individual Existing Sources\nii. The BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" and Allow States to Establish Emission Limitations that are \"Achievable\" by Existing Sources\niii. The States' Authority to Establish Standards of Performance \"At\" and \"To\" Individual Existing Sources Cannot Be Infringed Upon",
        "reference": "I. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Improperly Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 111 of the Clean Air Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Improperly Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 111 of the Clean Air Act\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources be Adequately Demonstrated and Achievable for Application \"At\" and \"To\" Existing Sources\ni. The BSER Set by EPA Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" for Individual Existing Sources\nii. The BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" and Allow States to Establish Emission Limitations that are \"Achievable\" by Existing Sources\niii. The States' Authority to Establish Standards of Performance \"At\" and \"To\" Individual Existing Sources Cannot Be Infringed Upon",
        "reference": "A. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the States have the Primary Role in Setting Standards of Performance Under the Cooperative Federalism Codified in Section 111(d)(1)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Improperly Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 111 of the Clean Air Act\nA. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the States have the Primary Role in Setting Standards of Performance Under the Cooperative Federalism Codified in Section 111(d)(1)\nB. [MISSING]\ni. The BSER Set by EPA Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" for Individual Existing Sources\nii. The BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" and Allow States to Establish Emission Limitations that are \"Achievable\" by Existing Sources\niii. The States' Authority to Establish Standards of Performance \"At\" and \"To\" Individual Existing Sources Cannot Be Infringed Upon",
        "reference": "B. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources be Adequately Demonstrated and Achievable for Application \"At\" and \"To\" Existing Sources",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Improperly Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 111 of the Clean Air Act\nA. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the States have the Primary Role in Setting Standards of Performance Under the Cooperative Federalism Codified in Section 111(d)(1)\nB. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources be Adequately Demonstrated and Achievable for Application \"At\" and \"To\" Existing Sources\ni. [MISSING]\nii. The BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" and Allow States to Establish Emission Limitations that are \"Achievable\" by Existing Sources\niii. The States' Authority to Establish Standards of Performance \"At\" and \"To\" Individual Existing Sources Cannot Be Infringed Upon",
        "reference": "i. The BSER Set by EPA Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" for Individual Existing Sources",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Improperly Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 111 of the Clean Air Act\nA. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the States have the Primary Role in Setting Standards of Performance Under the Cooperative Federalism Codified in Section 111(d)(1)\nB. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources be Adequately Demonstrated and Achievable for Application \"At\" and \"To\" Existing Sources\ni. The BSER Set by EPA Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" for Individual Existing Sources\nii. [MISSING]\niii. The States' Authority to Establish Standards of Performance \"At\" and \"To\" Individual Existing Sources Cannot Be Infringed Upon",
        "reference": "ii. The BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" and Allow States to Establish Emission Limitations that are \"Achievable\" by Existing Sources",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Improperly Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 111 of the Clean Air Act\nA. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the States have the Primary Role in Setting Standards of Performance Under the Cooperative Federalism Codified in Section 111(d)(1)\nB. The Plain Text of the Clean Air Act Mandates that the BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources be Adequately Demonstrated and Achievable for Application \"At\" and \"To\" Existing Sources\ni. The BSER Set by EPA Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" for Individual Existing Sources\nii. The BSER Set by EPA for Existing Sources Must be \"Adequately Demonstrated\" and Allow States to Establish Emission Limitations that are \"Achievable\" by Existing Sources\niii. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "iii. The States' Authority to Establish Standards of Performance \"At\" and \"To\" Individual Existing Sources Cannot Be Infringed Upon",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Mississippi Legislature values life\nA. The State of Mississippi provides assistance for mothers and families from conception onward\nB. The State of Mississippi provides support for children starting at birth\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting women from the health risks associated with abortions after 15 weeks' gestational age\nIV. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession\nV. The Mississippi Legislature did not impose an undue burden on women",
        "reference": "II. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting unborn life",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Mississippi Legislature values life\nA. The State of Mississippi provides assistance for mothers and families from conception onward\nB. The State of Mississippi provides support for children starting at birth\nII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting unborn life\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession\nV. The Mississippi Legislature did not impose an undue burden on women",
        "reference": "III. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting women from the health risks associated with abortions after 15 weeks' gestational age",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Mississippi Legislature values life\nA. The State of Mississippi provides assistance for mothers and families from conception onward\nB. The State of Mississippi provides support for children starting at birth\nII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting unborn life\nIII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting women from the health risks associated with abortions after 15 weeks' gestational age\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. The Mississippi Legislature did not impose an undue burden on women",
        "reference": "IV. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Mississippi Legislature values life\nA. The State of Mississippi provides assistance for mothers and families from conception onward\nB. The State of Mississippi provides support for children starting at birth\nII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting unborn life\nIII. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting women from the health risks associated with abortions after 15 weeks' gestational age\nIV. The Mississippi Legislature has an interest in protecting the integrity of the medical profession\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. The Mississippi Legislature did not impose an undue burden on women",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The case is not moot\nIII. The public charge rule is valid",
        "reference": "I. The decision below enables evasion of the APA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decision below enables evasion of the APA\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The public charge rule is valid",
        "reference": "II. The case is not moot",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decision below enables evasion of the APA\nII. The case is not moot\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The public charge rule is valid",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Modern restraints give rise to the same sort of burdens and prejudice that underlie the presumption against their use in court\nB. Concerns about shackling's tendency to prejudice the decisionmaker apply to judges, as well as juries\nII. No compelling justification for the blanket imposition of these burdens upon pretrial detainees has been identified\nA. The incidents proffered in support of the presumptive-shackling policy do not justify it\nB. The district courts subject to the court of appeals ruling have not experienced undue burdens\nIII. The presumptive-shackling policy at issue in this case represents a radical departure from principles that have been enshrined in English and American law for centuries\nA. A long-established common law principle bars the use of in-court shackling absent a compelling individualized justification\nB. This common law principle applied to pretrial, as well as trial proceedings",
        "reference": "I. The established principles underlying the presumption against pretrial shackling remain fully applicable to today's courtrooms and restraints",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The established principles underlying the presumption against pretrial shackling remain fully applicable to today's courtrooms and restraints\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Concerns about shackling's tendency to prejudice the decisionmaker apply to judges, as well as juries\nII. No compelling justification for the blanket imposition of these burdens upon pretrial detainees has been identified\nA. The incidents proffered in support of the presumptive-shackling policy do not justify it\nB. The district courts subject to the court of appeals ruling have not experienced undue burdens\nIII. The presumptive-shackling policy at issue in this case represents a radical departure from principles that have been enshrined in English and American law for centuries\nA. A long-established common law principle bars the use of in-court shackling absent a compelling individualized justification\nB. This common law principle applied to pretrial, as well as trial proceedings",
        "reference": "A. Modern restraints give rise to the same sort of burdens and prejudice that underlie the presumption against their use in court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The established principles underlying the presumption against pretrial shackling remain fully applicable to today's courtrooms and restraints\nA. Modern restraints give rise to the same sort of burdens and prejudice that underlie the presumption against their use in court\nB. [MISSING]\nII. No compelling justification for the blanket imposition of these burdens upon pretrial detainees has been identified\nA. The incidents proffered in support of the presumptive-shackling policy do not justify it\nB. The district courts subject to the court of appeals ruling have not experienced undue burdens\nIII. The presumptive-shackling policy at issue in this case represents a radical departure from principles that have been enshrined in English and American law for centuries\nA. A long-established common law principle bars the use of in-court shackling absent a compelling individualized justification\nB. This common law principle applied to pretrial, as well as trial proceedings",
        "reference": "B. Concerns about shackling's tendency to prejudice the decisionmaker apply to judges, as well as juries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The established principles underlying the presumption against pretrial shackling remain fully applicable to today's courtrooms and restraints\nA. Modern restraints give rise to the same sort of burdens and prejudice that underlie the presumption against their use in court\nB. Concerns about shackling's tendency to prejudice the decisionmaker apply to judges, as well as juries\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The incidents proffered in support of the presumptive-shackling policy do not justify it\nB. The district courts subject to the court of appeals ruling have not experienced undue burdens\nIII. The presumptive-shackling policy at issue in this case represents a radical departure from principles that have been enshrined in English and American law for centuries\nA. A long-established common law principle bars the use of in-court shackling absent a compelling individualized justification\nB. This common law principle applied to pretrial, as well as trial proceedings",
        "reference": "II. No compelling justification for the blanket imposition of these burdens upon pretrial detainees has been identified",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The established principles underlying the presumption against pretrial shackling remain fully applicable to today's courtrooms and restraints\nA. Modern restraints give rise to the same sort of burdens and prejudice that underlie the presumption against their use in court\nB. Concerns about shackling's tendency to prejudice the decisionmaker apply to judges, as well as juries\nII. No compelling justification for the blanket imposition of these burdens upon pretrial detainees has been identified\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The district courts subject to the court of appeals ruling have not experienced undue burdens\nIII. The presumptive-shackling policy at issue in this case represents a radical departure from principles that have been enshrined in English and American law for centuries\nA. A long-established common law principle bars the use of in-court shackling absent a compelling individualized justification\nB. This common law principle applied to pretrial, as well as trial proceedings",
        "reference": "A. The incidents proffered in support of the presumptive-shackling policy do not justify it",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The established principles underlying the presumption against pretrial shackling remain fully applicable to today's courtrooms and restraints\nA. Modern restraints give rise to the same sort of burdens and prejudice that underlie the presumption against their use in court\nB. Concerns about shackling's tendency to prejudice the decisionmaker apply to judges, as well as juries\nII. No compelling justification for the blanket imposition of these burdens upon pretrial detainees has been identified\nA. The incidents proffered in support of the presumptive-shackling policy do not justify it\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The presumptive-shackling policy at issue in this case represents a radical departure from principles that have been enshrined in English and American law for centuries\nA. A long-established common law principle bars the use of in-court shackling absent a compelling individualized justification\nB. This common law principle applied to pretrial, as well as trial proceedings",
        "reference": "B. The district courts subject to the court of appeals ruling have not experienced undue burdens",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The established principles underlying the presumption against pretrial shackling remain fully applicable to today's courtrooms and restraints\nA. Modern restraints give rise to the same sort of burdens and prejudice that underlie the presumption against their use in court\nB. Concerns about shackling's tendency to prejudice the decisionmaker apply to judges, as well as juries\nII. No compelling justification for the blanket imposition of these burdens upon pretrial detainees has been identified\nA. The incidents proffered in support of the presumptive-shackling policy do not justify it\nB. The district courts subject to the court of appeals ruling have not experienced undue burdens\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. A long-established common law principle bars the use of in-court shackling absent a compelling individualized justification\nB. This common law principle applied to pretrial, as well as trial proceedings",
        "reference": "III. The presumptive-shackling policy at issue in this case represents a radical departure from principles that have been enshrined in English and American law for centuries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The established principles underlying the presumption against pretrial shackling remain fully applicable to today's courtrooms and restraints\nA. Modern restraints give rise to the same sort of burdens and prejudice that underlie the presumption against their use in court\nB. Concerns about shackling's tendency to prejudice the decisionmaker apply to judges, as well as juries\nII. No compelling justification for the blanket imposition of these burdens upon pretrial detainees has been identified\nA. The incidents proffered in support of the presumptive-shackling policy do not justify it\nB. The district courts subject to the court of appeals ruling have not experienced undue burdens\nIII. The presumptive-shackling policy at issue in this case represents a radical departure from principles that have been enshrined in English and American law for centuries\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This common law principle applied to pretrial, as well as trial proceedings",
        "reference": "A. A long-established common law principle bars the use of in-court shackling absent a compelling individualized justification",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The established principles underlying the presumption against pretrial shackling remain fully applicable to today's courtrooms and restraints\nA. Modern restraints give rise to the same sort of burdens and prejudice that underlie the presumption against their use in court\nB. Concerns about shackling's tendency to prejudice the decisionmaker apply to judges, as well as juries\nII. No compelling justification for the blanket imposition of these burdens upon pretrial detainees has been identified\nA. The incidents proffered in support of the presumptive-shackling policy do not justify it\nB. The district courts subject to the court of appeals ruling have not experienced undue burdens\nIII. The presumptive-shackling policy at issue in this case represents a radical departure from principles that have been enshrined in English and American law for centuries\nA. A long-established common law principle bars the use of in-court shackling absent a compelling individualized justification\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. This common law principle applied to pretrial, as well as trial proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Erroneously Granted Patents Obstruct Innovation By HTIA Members And Other Businesses\nB. Judicial Assessment Of Patent Validity By Itself Is Inadequate For Weeding Out Unjustified Patents\nC. Congress Crafted Inter Partes Review To Give The PTO An Effective Process For Correcting Its Erroneous Patent Grants\nD. Inter Partes Review Has Proven Successful In Identifying And Invalidating Unjustified Patents\nII. The Appointments Clause Challenge Need Not, And Should Not, Disrupt Inter Partes Review\nA. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers\nB. Any Appointments Clause Violation Could Be Addressed By Severing APJ Tenure or Rehearing Restrictions",
        "reference": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential To Maintaining A Properly Balanced Patent System",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential To Maintaining A Properly Balanced Patent System\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Judicial Assessment Of Patent Validity By Itself Is Inadequate For Weeding Out Unjustified Patents\nC. Congress Crafted Inter Partes Review To Give The PTO An Effective Process For Correcting Its Erroneous Patent Grants\nD. Inter Partes Review Has Proven Successful In Identifying And Invalidating Unjustified Patents\nII. The Appointments Clause Challenge Need Not, And Should Not, Disrupt Inter Partes Review\nA. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers\nB. Any Appointments Clause Violation Could Be Addressed By Severing APJ Tenure or Rehearing Restrictions",
        "reference": "A. Erroneously Granted Patents Obstruct Innovation By HTIA Members And Other Businesses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential To Maintaining A Properly Balanced Patent System\nA. Erroneously Granted Patents Obstruct Innovation By HTIA Members And Other Businesses\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress Crafted Inter Partes Review To Give The PTO An Effective Process For Correcting Its Erroneous Patent Grants\nD. Inter Partes Review Has Proven Successful In Identifying And Invalidating Unjustified Patents\nII. The Appointments Clause Challenge Need Not, And Should Not, Disrupt Inter Partes Review\nA. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers\nB. Any Appointments Clause Violation Could Be Addressed By Severing APJ Tenure or Rehearing Restrictions",
        "reference": "B. Judicial Assessment Of Patent Validity By Itself Is Inadequate For Weeding Out Unjustified Patents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential To Maintaining A Properly Balanced Patent System\nA. Erroneously Granted Patents Obstruct Innovation By HTIA Members And Other Businesses\nB. Judicial Assessment Of Patent Validity By Itself Is Inadequate For Weeding Out Unjustified Patents\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Inter Partes Review Has Proven Successful In Identifying And Invalidating Unjustified Patents\nII. The Appointments Clause Challenge Need Not, And Should Not, Disrupt Inter Partes Review\nA. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers\nB. Any Appointments Clause Violation Could Be Addressed By Severing APJ Tenure or Rehearing Restrictions",
        "reference": "C. Congress Crafted Inter Partes Review To Give The PTO An Effective Process For Correcting Its Erroneous Patent Grants",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential To Maintaining A Properly Balanced Patent System\nA. Erroneously Granted Patents Obstruct Innovation By HTIA Members And Other Businesses\nB. Judicial Assessment Of Patent Validity By Itself Is Inadequate For Weeding Out Unjustified Patents\nC. Congress Crafted Inter Partes Review To Give The PTO An Effective Process For Correcting Its Erroneous Patent Grants\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Appointments Clause Challenge Need Not, And Should Not, Disrupt Inter Partes Review\nA. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers\nB. Any Appointments Clause Violation Could Be Addressed By Severing APJ Tenure or Rehearing Restrictions",
        "reference": "D. Inter Partes Review Has Proven Successful In Identifying And Invalidating Unjustified Patents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential To Maintaining A Properly Balanced Patent System\nA. Erroneously Granted Patents Obstruct Innovation By HTIA Members And Other Businesses\nB. Judicial Assessment Of Patent Validity By Itself Is Inadequate For Weeding Out Unjustified Patents\nC. Congress Crafted Inter Partes Review To Give The PTO An Effective Process For Correcting Its Erroneous Patent Grants\nD. Inter Partes Review Has Proven Successful In Identifying And Invalidating Unjustified Patents\nII. [MISSING]\nA. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers\nB. Any Appointments Clause Violation Could Be Addressed By Severing APJ Tenure or Rehearing Restrictions",
        "reference": "II. The Appointments Clause Challenge Need Not, And Should Not, Disrupt Inter Partes Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential To Maintaining A Properly Balanced Patent System\nA. Erroneously Granted Patents Obstruct Innovation By HTIA Members And Other Businesses\nB. Judicial Assessment Of Patent Validity By Itself Is Inadequate For Weeding Out Unjustified Patents\nC. Congress Crafted Inter Partes Review To Give The PTO An Effective Process For Correcting Its Erroneous Patent Grants\nD. Inter Partes Review Has Proven Successful In Identifying And Invalidating Unjustified Patents\nII. The Appointments Clause Challenge Need Not, And Should Not, Disrupt Inter Partes Review\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Any Appointments Clause Violation Could Be Addressed By Severing APJ Tenure or Rehearing Restrictions",
        "reference": "A. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential To Maintaining A Properly Balanced Patent System\nA. Erroneously Granted Patents Obstruct Innovation By HTIA Members And Other Businesses\nB. Judicial Assessment Of Patent Validity By Itself Is Inadequate For Weeding Out Unjustified Patents\nC. Congress Crafted Inter Partes Review To Give The PTO An Effective Process For Correcting Its Erroneous Patent Grants\nD. Inter Partes Review Has Proven Successful In Identifying And Invalidating Unjustified Patents\nII. The Appointments Clause Challenge Need Not, And Should Not, Disrupt Inter Partes Review\nA. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Any Appointments Clause Violation Could Be Addressed By Severing APJ Tenure or Rehearing Restrictions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress Must Clearly Confer Authority To Resolve Major Questions\nB. The D.C. Circuit's Construction Runs Afoul of the Major Questions Doctrine\nII. TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND HISTORY FORECLOSE THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. The Statutory Text Requires the EPA to Base Its Standards on Limits Applicable to and Achievable by Existing Sources\nB. The Statutory Structure Confirms the Limited Scope of the EPA's Authority\nC. The History of section 7411(d) Supports the Narrower, Source-Specific Reading",
        "reference": "I. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE FORECLOSES THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE FORECLOSES THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The D.C. Circuit's Construction Runs Afoul of the Major Questions Doctrine\nII. TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND HISTORY FORECLOSE THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. The Statutory Text Requires the EPA to Base Its Standards on Limits Applicable to and Achievable by Existing Sources\nB. The Statutory Structure Confirms the Limited Scope of the EPA's Authority\nC. The History of section 7411(d) Supports the Narrower, Source-Specific Reading",
        "reference": "A. Congress Must Clearly Confer Authority To Resolve Major Questions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE FORECLOSES THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. Congress Must Clearly Confer Authority To Resolve Major Questions\nB. [MISSING]\nII. TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND HISTORY FORECLOSE THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. The Statutory Text Requires the EPA to Base Its Standards on Limits Applicable to and Achievable by Existing Sources\nB. The Statutory Structure Confirms the Limited Scope of the EPA's Authority\nC. The History of section 7411(d) Supports the Narrower, Source-Specific Reading",
        "reference": "B. The D.C. Circuit's Construction Runs Afoul of the Major Questions Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE FORECLOSES THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. Congress Must Clearly Confer Authority To Resolve Major Questions\nB. The D.C. Circuit's Construction Runs Afoul of the Major Questions Doctrine\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Statutory Text Requires the EPA to Base Its Standards on Limits Applicable to and Achievable by Existing Sources\nB. The Statutory Structure Confirms the Limited Scope of the EPA's Authority\nC. The History of section 7411(d) Supports the Narrower, Source-Specific Reading",
        "reference": "II. TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND HISTORY FORECLOSE THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE FORECLOSES THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. Congress Must Clearly Confer Authority To Resolve Major Questions\nB. The D.C. Circuit's Construction Runs Afoul of the Major Questions Doctrine\nII. TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND HISTORY FORECLOSE THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Statutory Structure Confirms the Limited Scope of the EPA's Authority\nC. The History of section 7411(d) Supports the Narrower, Source-Specific Reading",
        "reference": "A. The Statutory Text Requires the EPA to Base Its Standards on Limits Applicable to and Achievable by Existing Sources",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE FORECLOSES THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. Congress Must Clearly Confer Authority To Resolve Major Questions\nB. The D.C. Circuit's Construction Runs Afoul of the Major Questions Doctrine\nII. TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND HISTORY FORECLOSE THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. The Statutory Text Requires the EPA to Base Its Standards on Limits Applicable to and Achievable by Existing Sources\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The History of section 7411(d) Supports the Narrower, Source-Specific Reading",
        "reference": "B. The Statutory Structure Confirms the Limited Scope of the EPA's Authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE FORECLOSES THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. Congress Must Clearly Confer Authority To Resolve Major Questions\nB. The D.C. Circuit's Construction Runs Afoul of the Major Questions Doctrine\nII. TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND HISTORY FORECLOSE THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nA. The Statutory Text Requires the EPA to Base Its Standards on Limits Applicable to and Achievable by Existing Sources\nB. The Statutory Structure Confirms the Limited Scope of the EPA's Authority\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The History of section 7411(d) Supports the Narrower, Source-Specific Reading",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioner's correct interpretation of \"otherwise available to the public\" in amended Section 102(a)(1) does not create redundancy within the definition of prior art\nIII. This Court's precedents point toward limiting the \"on sale\" bar to public availability",
        "reference": "I. Congress deliberately realigned the Patent Act's provisions on prior art to prevent the inventor's prior confidential activity from barring the ability to obtain a patent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress deliberately realigned the Patent Act's provisions on prior art to prevent the inventor's prior confidential activity from barring the ability to obtain a patent\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Court's precedents point toward limiting the \"on sale\" bar to public availability",
        "reference": "II. Petitioner's correct interpretation of \"otherwise available to the public\" in amended Section 102(a)(1) does not create redundancy within the definition of prior art",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress deliberately realigned the Patent Act's provisions on prior art to prevent the inventor's prior confidential activity from barring the ability to obtain a patent\nII. Petitioner's correct interpretation of \"otherwise available to the public\" in amended Section 102(a)(1) does not create redundancy within the definition of prior art\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This Court's precedents point toward limiting the \"on sale\" bar to public availability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Under the Due Process Clause corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only where they are \"at home\" and not where they merely \"do business.\"\nB. Registration laws cannot be used to circumvent the \"at home\" test and reinstate the discredited \"doing business\" test for general jurisdiction.\nII. Jurisdiction cannot be obtained through the legal fiction of inferring \"consent\" from the fact of registration.\nA. The present case does not establish jurisdiction by consent under this Court's precedents.\nB. There was no express consent in the present case because Pennsylvania's registration scheme does not specify that registering to do business shall count as consent to general jurisdiction.\nC. Petitioner cannot claim that registration to do business in the forum supports an inference of implied general jurisdiction.\nD. Because this case does not implicate the defendant's consent, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examination of the issue of jurisdiction by consent.\nIII. Registration laws would threaten choice of law and state sovereignty.",
        "reference": "I. Basing general jurisdiction on the simple fact of registration to do business in the forum would be inconsistent with this Court's recent opinions interpreting the Due Process Clause.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Basing general jurisdiction on the simple fact of registration to do business in the forum would be inconsistent with this Court's recent opinions interpreting the Due Process Clause.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Registration laws cannot be used to circumvent the \"at home\" test and reinstate the discredited \"doing business\" test for general jurisdiction.\nII. Jurisdiction cannot be obtained through the legal fiction of inferring \"consent\" from the fact of registration.\nA. The present case does not establish jurisdiction by consent under this Court's precedents.\nB. There was no express consent in the present case because Pennsylvania's registration scheme does not specify that registering to do business shall count as consent to general jurisdiction.\nC. Petitioner cannot claim that registration to do business in the forum supports an inference of implied general jurisdiction.\nD. Because this case does not implicate the defendant's consent, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examination of the issue of jurisdiction by consent.\nIII. Registration laws would threaten choice of law and state sovereignty.",
        "reference": "A. Under the Due Process Clause corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only where they are \"at home\" and not where they merely \"do business.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Basing general jurisdiction on the simple fact of registration to do business in the forum would be inconsistent with this Court's recent opinions interpreting the Due Process Clause.\nA. Under the Due Process Clause corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only where they are \"at home\" and not where they merely \"do business.\"\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Jurisdiction cannot be obtained through the legal fiction of inferring \"consent\" from the fact of registration.\nA. The present case does not establish jurisdiction by consent under this Court's precedents.\nB. There was no express consent in the present case because Pennsylvania's registration scheme does not specify that registering to do business shall count as consent to general jurisdiction.\nC. Petitioner cannot claim that registration to do business in the forum supports an inference of implied general jurisdiction.\nD. Because this case does not implicate the defendant's consent, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examination of the issue of jurisdiction by consent.\nIII. Registration laws would threaten choice of law and state sovereignty.",
        "reference": "B. Registration laws cannot be used to circumvent the \"at home\" test and reinstate the discredited \"doing business\" test for general jurisdiction.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Basing general jurisdiction on the simple fact of registration to do business in the forum would be inconsistent with this Court's recent opinions interpreting the Due Process Clause.\nA. Under the Due Process Clause corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only where they are \"at home\" and not where they merely \"do business.\"\nB. Registration laws cannot be used to circumvent the \"at home\" test and reinstate the discredited \"doing business\" test for general jurisdiction.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The present case does not establish jurisdiction by consent under this Court's precedents.\nB. There was no express consent in the present case because Pennsylvania's registration scheme does not specify that registering to do business shall count as consent to general jurisdiction.\nC. Petitioner cannot claim that registration to do business in the forum supports an inference of implied general jurisdiction.\nD. Because this case does not implicate the defendant's consent, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examination of the issue of jurisdiction by consent.\nIII. Registration laws would threaten choice of law and state sovereignty.",
        "reference": "II. Jurisdiction cannot be obtained through the legal fiction of inferring \"consent\" from the fact of registration.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Basing general jurisdiction on the simple fact of registration to do business in the forum would be inconsistent with this Court's recent opinions interpreting the Due Process Clause.\nA. Under the Due Process Clause corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only where they are \"at home\" and not where they merely \"do business.\"\nB. Registration laws cannot be used to circumvent the \"at home\" test and reinstate the discredited \"doing business\" test for general jurisdiction.\nII. Jurisdiction cannot be obtained through the legal fiction of inferring \"consent\" from the fact of registration.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There was no express consent in the present case because Pennsylvania's registration scheme does not specify that registering to do business shall count as consent to general jurisdiction.\nC. Petitioner cannot claim that registration to do business in the forum supports an inference of implied general jurisdiction.\nD. Because this case does not implicate the defendant's consent, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examination of the issue of jurisdiction by consent.\nIII. Registration laws would threaten choice of law and state sovereignty.",
        "reference": "A. The present case does not establish jurisdiction by consent under this Court's precedents.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Basing general jurisdiction on the simple fact of registration to do business in the forum would be inconsistent with this Court's recent opinions interpreting the Due Process Clause.\nA. Under the Due Process Clause corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only where they are \"at home\" and not where they merely \"do business.\"\nB. Registration laws cannot be used to circumvent the \"at home\" test and reinstate the discredited \"doing business\" test for general jurisdiction.\nII. Jurisdiction cannot be obtained through the legal fiction of inferring \"consent\" from the fact of registration.\nA. The present case does not establish jurisdiction by consent under this Court's precedents.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner cannot claim that registration to do business in the forum supports an inference of implied general jurisdiction.\nD. Because this case does not implicate the defendant's consent, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examination of the issue of jurisdiction by consent.\nIII. Registration laws would threaten choice of law and state sovereignty.",
        "reference": "B. There was no express consent in the present case because Pennsylvania's registration scheme does not specify that registering to do business shall count as consent to general jurisdiction.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Basing general jurisdiction on the simple fact of registration to do business in the forum would be inconsistent with this Court's recent opinions interpreting the Due Process Clause.\nA. Under the Due Process Clause corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only where they are \"at home\" and not where they merely \"do business.\"\nB. Registration laws cannot be used to circumvent the \"at home\" test and reinstate the discredited \"doing business\" test for general jurisdiction.\nII. Jurisdiction cannot be obtained through the legal fiction of inferring \"consent\" from the fact of registration.\nA. The present case does not establish jurisdiction by consent under this Court's precedents.\nB. There was no express consent in the present case because Pennsylvania's registration scheme does not specify that registering to do business shall count as consent to general jurisdiction.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Because this case does not implicate the defendant's consent, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examination of the issue of jurisdiction by consent.\nIII. Registration laws would threaten choice of law and state sovereignty.",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner cannot claim that registration to do business in the forum supports an inference of implied general jurisdiction.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Basing general jurisdiction on the simple fact of registration to do business in the forum would be inconsistent with this Court's recent opinions interpreting the Due Process Clause.\nA. Under the Due Process Clause corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only where they are \"at home\" and not where they merely \"do business.\"\nB. Registration laws cannot be used to circumvent the \"at home\" test and reinstate the discredited \"doing business\" test for general jurisdiction.\nII. Jurisdiction cannot be obtained through the legal fiction of inferring \"consent\" from the fact of registration.\nA. The present case does not establish jurisdiction by consent under this Court's precedents.\nB. There was no express consent in the present case because Pennsylvania's registration scheme does not specify that registering to do business shall count as consent to general jurisdiction.\nC. Petitioner cannot claim that registration to do business in the forum supports an inference of implied general jurisdiction.\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. Registration laws would threaten choice of law and state sovereignty.",
        "reference": "D. Because this case does not implicate the defendant's consent, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examination of the issue of jurisdiction by consent.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Basing general jurisdiction on the simple fact of registration to do business in the forum would be inconsistent with this Court's recent opinions interpreting the Due Process Clause.\nA. Under the Due Process Clause corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only where they are \"at home\" and not where they merely \"do business.\"\nB. Registration laws cannot be used to circumvent the \"at home\" test and reinstate the discredited \"doing business\" test for general jurisdiction.\nII. Jurisdiction cannot be obtained through the legal fiction of inferring \"consent\" from the fact of registration.\nA. The present case does not establish jurisdiction by consent under this Court's precedents.\nB. There was no express consent in the present case because Pennsylvania's registration scheme does not specify that registering to do business shall count as consent to general jurisdiction.\nC. Petitioner cannot claim that registration to do business in the forum supports an inference of implied general jurisdiction.\nD. Because this case does not implicate the defendant's consent, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examination of the issue of jurisdiction by consent.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Registration laws would threaten choice of law and state sovereignty.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The History Of Rule 59(e) And Section 2244(b) Shows There Is No Inconsistency Between Those Provisions\nB. Timely Rule 59(e) Motions Provide No Opportunity To Circumvent AEDPA\nC. Respondent's Test For Identifying \"Second Or Successive\" Applications Sweeps In Motions That She Concedes Do Not Implicate Section 2244(b)\nD. Preventing District Courts From Correcting Errors Under Rule 59(e) Does Not Further AEDPA's Objectives\nII. There Is No Conflict Between Applying Rule 4(a)'s Plain Text And AEDPA",
        "reference": "I. A Timely Rule 59(e) Motion Is Not Subject To Section 2244(b)'s Restrictions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Timely Rule 59(e) Motion Is Not Subject To Section 2244(b)'s Restrictions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Timely Rule 59(e) Motions Provide No Opportunity To Circumvent AEDPA\nC. Respondent's Test For Identifying \"Second Or Successive\" Applications Sweeps In Motions That She Concedes Do Not Implicate Section 2244(b)\nD. Preventing District Courts From Correcting Errors Under Rule 59(e) Does Not Further AEDPA's Objectives\nII. There Is No Conflict Between Applying Rule 4(a)'s Plain Text And AEDPA",
        "reference": "A. The History Of Rule 59(e) And Section 2244(b) Shows There Is No Inconsistency Between Those Provisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Timely Rule 59(e) Motion Is Not Subject To Section 2244(b)'s Restrictions\nA. The History Of Rule 59(e) And Section 2244(b) Shows There Is No Inconsistency Between Those Provisions\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Respondent's Test For Identifying \"Second Or Successive\" Applications Sweeps In Motions That She Concedes Do Not Implicate Section 2244(b)\nD. Preventing District Courts From Correcting Errors Under Rule 59(e) Does Not Further AEDPA's Objectives\nII. There Is No Conflict Between Applying Rule 4(a)'s Plain Text And AEDPA",
        "reference": "B. Timely Rule 59(e) Motions Provide No Opportunity To Circumvent AEDPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Timely Rule 59(e) Motion Is Not Subject To Section 2244(b)'s Restrictions\nA. The History Of Rule 59(e) And Section 2244(b) Shows There Is No Inconsistency Between Those Provisions\nB. Timely Rule 59(e) Motions Provide No Opportunity To Circumvent AEDPA\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Preventing District Courts From Correcting Errors Under Rule 59(e) Does Not Further AEDPA's Objectives\nII. There Is No Conflict Between Applying Rule 4(a)'s Plain Text And AEDPA",
        "reference": "C. Respondent's Test For Identifying \"Second Or Successive\" Applications Sweeps In Motions That She Concedes Do Not Implicate Section 2244(b)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Timely Rule 59(e) Motion Is Not Subject To Section 2244(b)'s Restrictions\nA. The History Of Rule 59(e) And Section 2244(b) Shows There Is No Inconsistency Between Those Provisions\nB. Timely Rule 59(e) Motions Provide No Opportunity To Circumvent AEDPA\nC. Respondent's Test For Identifying \"Second Or Successive\" Applications Sweeps In Motions That She Concedes Do Not Implicate Section 2244(b)\nD. [MISSING]\nII. There Is No Conflict Between Applying Rule 4(a)'s Plain Text And AEDPA",
        "reference": "D. Preventing District Courts From Correcting Errors Under Rule 59(e) Does Not Further AEDPA's Objectives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Timely Rule 59(e) Motion Is Not Subject To Section 2244(b)'s Restrictions\nA. The History Of Rule 59(e) And Section 2244(b) Shows There Is No Inconsistency Between Those Provisions\nB. Timely Rule 59(e) Motions Provide No Opportunity To Circumvent AEDPA\nC. Respondent's Test For Identifying \"Second Or Successive\" Applications Sweeps In Motions That She Concedes Do Not Implicate Section 2244(b)\nD. Preventing District Courts From Correcting Errors Under Rule 59(e) Does Not Further AEDPA's Objectives\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. There Is No Conflict Between Applying Rule 4(a)'s Plain Text And AEDPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Court Has Repeatedly Applied a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard Under the FAA\nB. This Court's Cases Support Applying a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard in this Case\nC. Application of a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard is Consistent with Oxford\nD. A Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard Would Obviate the Concerns Expressed in the Oxford Concurrence",
        "reference": "I. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO PERMIT CLASS ARBITRATION UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR AND UNMISTAKEABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES SO INTENDED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO PERMIT CLASS ARBITRATION UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR AND UNMISTAKEABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES SO INTENDED\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's Cases Support Applying a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard in this Case\nC. Application of a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard is Consistent with Oxford\nD. A Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard Would Obviate the Concerns Expressed in the Oxford Concurrence",
        "reference": "A. This Court Has Repeatedly Applied a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard Under the FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO PERMIT CLASS ARBITRATION UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR AND UNMISTAKEABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES SO INTENDED\nA. This Court Has Repeatedly Applied a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard Under the FAA\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Application of a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard is Consistent with Oxford\nD. A Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard Would Obviate the Concerns Expressed in the Oxford Concurrence",
        "reference": "B. This Court's Cases Support Applying a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard in this Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO PERMIT CLASS ARBITRATION UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR AND UNMISTAKEABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES SO INTENDED\nA. This Court Has Repeatedly Applied a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard Under the FAA\nB. This Court's Cases Support Applying a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard in this Case\nC. [MISSING]\nD. A Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard Would Obviate the Concerns Expressed in the Oxford Concurrence",
        "reference": "C. Application of a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard is Consistent with Oxford",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO PERMIT CLASS ARBITRATION UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR AND UNMISTAKEABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE PARTIES SO INTENDED\nA. This Court Has Repeatedly Applied a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard Under the FAA\nB. This Court's Cases Support Applying a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard in this Case\nC. Application of a Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard is Consistent with Oxford\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. A Clear-and-Unmistakeable Standard Would Obviate the Concerns Expressed in the Oxford Concurrence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A Statutory Scheme Of Administrative And Judicial Review Typically Strips Courts Of Jurisdiction Over Claims That Have Not Been Presented To The Agency\nB. Title VII Sets Out An Intricate Scheme of Administrative And Judicial Review That Bars Jurisdiction Over Claims That Have Not Been Pressed Before The EEOC\nC. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
        "reference": "I. TITLE VII'S INTEGRATED SCHEME OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS THROUGH WHICH COURTS MAY OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER A CLAIM",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. TITLE VII'S INTEGRATED SCHEME OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS THROUGH WHICH COURTS MAY OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER A CLAIM\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Title VII Sets Out An Intricate Scheme of Administrative And Judicial Review That Bars Jurisdiction Over Claims That Have Not Been Pressed Before The EEOC\nC. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
        "reference": "A. A Statutory Scheme Of Administrative And Judicial Review Typically Strips Courts Of Jurisdiction Over Claims That Have Not Been Presented To The Agency",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. TITLE VII'S INTEGRATED SCHEME OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS THROUGH WHICH COURTS MAY OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER A CLAIM\nA. A Statutory Scheme Of Administrative And Judicial Review Typically Strips Courts Of Jurisdiction Over Claims That Have Not Been Presented To The Agency\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
        "reference": "B. Title VII Sets Out An Intricate Scheme of Administrative And Judicial Review That Bars Jurisdiction Over Claims That Have Not Been Pressed Before The EEOC",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. TITLE VII'S INTEGRATED SCHEME OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS THROUGH WHICH COURTS MAY OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER A CLAIM\nA. A Statutory Scheme Of Administrative And Judicial Review Typically Strips Courts Of Jurisdiction Over Claims That Have Not Been Presented To The Agency\nB. Title VII Sets Out An Intricate Scheme of Administrative And Judicial Review That Bars Jurisdiction Over Claims That Have Not Been Pressed Before The EEOC\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. STATES ARE CIRCUMVENTING THE EXTENSIVE FEDERAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY SYSTEM THAT PROTECTS PUBLIC HEALTH\nA. States Have Violated The FDCA By Importing Unapproved Drugs For Use In Executions\nB. States Have Obtained Compounded Drugs Of Questionable Quality From Unlicensed And Secret Pharmacies\nC. States Have Breached Supply Chain Controls and Misled Healthcare Providers In Efforts To Obtain Drugs For Lethal Injection\nD. States' Secrecy Laws Hide Potentially Illegal And Unsafe Conduct From Scrutiny\nE. States Are Expanding The List Of Drug Products Used In Lethal Injections, Creating Increased Risks\nIII. WHEN STATES CIRCUMVENT THE DRUG SAFETY REGIME, THEY CREATE SERIOUS RISKS",
        "reference": "I. FEDERAL LAW PROTECTS THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. FEDERAL LAW PROTECTS THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN\nII. [MISSING]\nA. States Have Violated The FDCA By Importing Unapproved Drugs For Use In Executions\nB. States Have Obtained Compounded Drugs Of Questionable Quality From Unlicensed And Secret Pharmacies\nC. States Have Breached Supply Chain Controls and Misled Healthcare Providers In Efforts To Obtain Drugs For Lethal Injection\nD. States' Secrecy Laws Hide Potentially Illegal And Unsafe Conduct From Scrutiny\nE. States Are Expanding The List Of Drug Products Used In Lethal Injections, Creating Increased Risks\nIII. WHEN STATES CIRCUMVENT THE DRUG SAFETY REGIME, THEY CREATE SERIOUS RISKS",
        "reference": "II. STATES ARE CIRCUMVENTING THE EXTENSIVE FEDERAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY SYSTEM THAT PROTECTS PUBLIC HEALTH",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. FEDERAL LAW PROTECTS THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN\nII. STATES ARE CIRCUMVENTING THE EXTENSIVE FEDERAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY SYSTEM THAT PROTECTS PUBLIC HEALTH\nA. [MISSING]\nB. States Have Obtained Compounded Drugs Of Questionable Quality From Unlicensed And Secret Pharmacies\nC. States Have Breached Supply Chain Controls and Misled Healthcare Providers In Efforts To Obtain Drugs For Lethal Injection\nD. States' Secrecy Laws Hide Potentially Illegal And Unsafe Conduct From Scrutiny\nE. States Are Expanding The List Of Drug Products Used In Lethal Injections, Creating Increased Risks\nIII. WHEN STATES CIRCUMVENT THE DRUG SAFETY REGIME, THEY CREATE SERIOUS RISKS",
        "reference": "A. States Have Violated The FDCA By Importing Unapproved Drugs For Use In Executions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. FEDERAL LAW PROTECTS THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN\nII. STATES ARE CIRCUMVENTING THE EXTENSIVE FEDERAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY SYSTEM THAT PROTECTS PUBLIC HEALTH\nA. States Have Violated The FDCA By Importing Unapproved Drugs For Use In Executions\nB. [MISSING]\nC. States Have Breached Supply Chain Controls and Misled Healthcare Providers In Efforts To Obtain Drugs For Lethal Injection\nD. States' Secrecy Laws Hide Potentially Illegal And Unsafe Conduct From Scrutiny\nE. States Are Expanding The List Of Drug Products Used In Lethal Injections, Creating Increased Risks\nIII. WHEN STATES CIRCUMVENT THE DRUG SAFETY REGIME, THEY CREATE SERIOUS RISKS",
        "reference": "B. States Have Obtained Compounded Drugs Of Questionable Quality From Unlicensed And Secret Pharmacies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. FEDERAL LAW PROTECTS THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN\nII. STATES ARE CIRCUMVENTING THE EXTENSIVE FEDERAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY SYSTEM THAT PROTECTS PUBLIC HEALTH\nA. States Have Violated The FDCA By Importing Unapproved Drugs For Use In Executions\nB. States Have Obtained Compounded Drugs Of Questionable Quality From Unlicensed And Secret Pharmacies\nC. [MISSING]\nD. States' Secrecy Laws Hide Potentially Illegal And Unsafe Conduct From Scrutiny\nE. States Are Expanding The List Of Drug Products Used In Lethal Injections, Creating Increased Risks\nIII. WHEN STATES CIRCUMVENT THE DRUG SAFETY REGIME, THEY CREATE SERIOUS RISKS",
        "reference": "C. States Have Breached Supply Chain Controls and Misled Healthcare Providers In Efforts To Obtain Drugs For Lethal Injection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. FEDERAL LAW PROTECTS THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN\nII. STATES ARE CIRCUMVENTING THE EXTENSIVE FEDERAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY SYSTEM THAT PROTECTS PUBLIC HEALTH\nA. States Have Violated The FDCA By Importing Unapproved Drugs For Use In Executions\nB. States Have Obtained Compounded Drugs Of Questionable Quality From Unlicensed And Secret Pharmacies\nC. States Have Breached Supply Chain Controls and Misled Healthcare Providers In Efforts To Obtain Drugs For Lethal Injection\nD. [MISSING]\nE. States Are Expanding The List Of Drug Products Used In Lethal Injections, Creating Increased Risks\nIII. WHEN STATES CIRCUMVENT THE DRUG SAFETY REGIME, THEY CREATE SERIOUS RISKS",
        "reference": "D. States' Secrecy Laws Hide Potentially Illegal And Unsafe Conduct From Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. FEDERAL LAW PROTECTS THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN\nII. STATES ARE CIRCUMVENTING THE EXTENSIVE FEDERAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY SYSTEM THAT PROTECTS PUBLIC HEALTH\nA. States Have Violated The FDCA By Importing Unapproved Drugs For Use In Executions\nB. States Have Obtained Compounded Drugs Of Questionable Quality From Unlicensed And Secret Pharmacies\nC. States Have Breached Supply Chain Controls and Misled Healthcare Providers In Efforts To Obtain Drugs For Lethal Injection\nD. States' Secrecy Laws Hide Potentially Illegal And Unsafe Conduct From Scrutiny\nE. [MISSING]\nIII. WHEN STATES CIRCUMVENT THE DRUG SAFETY REGIME, THEY CREATE SERIOUS RISKS",
        "reference": "E. States Are Expanding The List Of Drug Products Used In Lethal Injections, Creating Increased Risks",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. FEDERAL LAW PROTECTS THE INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. DRUG SUPPLY CHAIN\nII. STATES ARE CIRCUMVENTING THE EXTENSIVE FEDERAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY SYSTEM THAT PROTECTS PUBLIC HEALTH\nA. States Have Violated The FDCA By Importing Unapproved Drugs For Use In Executions\nB. States Have Obtained Compounded Drugs Of Questionable Quality From Unlicensed And Secret Pharmacies\nC. States Have Breached Supply Chain Controls and Misled Healthcare Providers In Efforts To Obtain Drugs For Lethal Injection\nD. States' Secrecy Laws Hide Potentially Illegal And Unsafe Conduct From Scrutiny\nE. States Are Expanding The List Of Drug Products Used In Lethal Injections, Creating Increased Risks\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. WHEN STATES CIRCUMVENT THE DRUG SAFETY REGIME, THEY CREATE SERIOUS RISKS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership\nB. The Reconsideration Order Fully Complied With Section 202(h)\nII. No Principle Of Administrative Law Supports The Third Circuit's Judgment\nA. The FCC's Recognition Of Minority And Female Ownership As A Policy Goal In Some Contexts Does Not Convert It Into A Mandatory Factor In Section 202(h) Reviews\nB. In Any Event, The FCC Adequately Considered Minority And Female Ownership\nIII. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
        "reference": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Reconsideration Order Fully Complied With Section 202(h)\nII. No Principle Of Administrative Law Supports The Third Circuit's Judgment\nA. The FCC's Recognition Of Minority And Female Ownership As A Policy Goal In Some Contexts Does Not Convert It Into A Mandatory Factor In Section 202(h) Reviews\nB. In Any Event, The FCC Adequately Considered Minority And Female Ownership\nIII. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
        "reference": "A. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required\nA. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership\nB. [MISSING]\nII. No Principle Of Administrative Law Supports The Third Circuit's Judgment\nA. The FCC's Recognition Of Minority And Female Ownership As A Policy Goal In Some Contexts Does Not Convert It Into A Mandatory Factor In Section 202(h) Reviews\nB. In Any Event, The FCC Adequately Considered Minority And Female Ownership\nIII. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
        "reference": "B. The Reconsideration Order Fully Complied With Section 202(h)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required\nA. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership\nB. The Reconsideration Order Fully Complied With Section 202(h)\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The FCC's Recognition Of Minority And Female Ownership As A Policy Goal In Some Contexts Does Not Convert It Into A Mandatory Factor In Section 202(h) Reviews\nB. In Any Event, The FCC Adequately Considered Minority And Female Ownership\nIII. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
        "reference": "II. No Principle Of Administrative Law Supports The Third Circuit's Judgment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required\nA. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership\nB. The Reconsideration Order Fully Complied With Section 202(h)\nII. No Principle Of Administrative Law Supports The Third Circuit's Judgment\nA. [MISSING]\nB. In Any Event, The FCC Adequately Considered Minority And Female Ownership\nIII. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
        "reference": "A. The FCC's Recognition Of Minority And Female Ownership As A Policy Goal In Some Contexts Does Not Convert It Into A Mandatory Factor In Section 202(h) Reviews",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required\nA. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership\nB. The Reconsideration Order Fully Complied With Section 202(h)\nII. No Principle Of Administrative Law Supports The Third Circuit's Judgment\nA. The FCC's Recognition Of Minority And Female Ownership As A Policy Goal In Some Contexts Does Not Convert It Into A Mandatory Factor In Section 202(h) Reviews\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
        "reference": "B. In Any Event, The FCC Adequately Considered Minority And Female Ownership",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required\nA. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership\nB. The Reconsideration Order Fully Complied With Section 202(h)\nII. No Principle Of Administrative Law Supports The Third Circuit's Judgment\nA. The FCC's Recognition Of Minority And Female Ownership As A Policy Goal In Some Contexts Does Not Convert It Into A Mandatory Factor In Section 202(h) Reviews\nB. In Any Event, The FCC Adequately Considered Minority And Female Ownership\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Third Circuit's Remedy Is Vastly Overbroad, And The Panel Improperly Retained Jurisdiction Over The Commission's Section 202(h) Reviews",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Presents a Justiciable Issue on the Vacatur of the ACE Rule\nIII. The Non-Governmental Organization and Trade Association's Arguments are Meritless",
        "reference": "I. North Dakota is Injured by the D.C. Circuit's Vacatur of the ACE Rule and That Decision Presents a Case and Controversy for This Court's Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. North Dakota is Injured by the D.C. Circuit's Vacatur of the ACE Rule and That Decision Presents a Case and Controversy for This Court's Review\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Non-Governmental Organization and Trade Association's Arguments are Meritless",
        "reference": "II. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Presents a Justiciable Issue on the Vacatur of the ACE Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. North Dakota is Injured by the D.C. Circuit's Vacatur of the ACE Rule and That Decision Presents a Case and Controversy for This Court's Review\nII. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Presents a Justiciable Issue on the Vacatur of the ACE Rule\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Non-Governmental Organization and Trade Association's Arguments are Meritless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Major Questions Doctrine Applies To The Department's Action Here Because We Would Normally Expect Congress To Decide Whether To Spend $500 Billion On A Blanket Loan Forgiveness Program.",
        "reference": "I. The Major Questions Doctrine Should Apply Whenever An Agency, Wielding Authority The Constitution Vests In Congress, Sets Policy That We Would Normally Expect Congress Itself To Establish.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Major Questions Doctrine Should Apply Whenever An Agency, Wielding Authority The Constitution Vests In Congress, Sets Policy That We Would Normally Expect Congress Itself To Establish.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Major Questions Doctrine Applies To The Department's Action Here Because We Would Normally Expect Congress To Decide Whether To Spend $500 Billion On A Blanket Loan Forgiveness Program.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Eleventh Circuit's ruling is a formula for government abuse",
        "reference": "I. Nominal damages are critical for preserving and protecting constitutional rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Nominal damages are critical for preserving and protecting constitutional rights\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's ruling is a formula for government abuse",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)\n1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"\n2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity\nB. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance\n1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)\n2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\n3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\nC. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "reference": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"\n2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity\nB. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance\n1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)\n2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\n3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\nC. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "reference": "A. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION\nA. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity\nB. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance\n1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)\n2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\n3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\nC. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "reference": "1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION\nA. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)\n1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance\n1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)\n2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\n3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\nC. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "reference": "2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION\nA. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)\n1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"\n2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity\nB. [MISSING]\n1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)\n2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\n3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\nC. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "reference": "B. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION\nA. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)\n1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"\n2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity\nB. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\n3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\nC. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "reference": "1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION\nA. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)\n1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"\n2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity\nB. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance\n1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\nC. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "reference": "2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION\nA. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)\n1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"\n2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity\nB. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance\n1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)\n2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\n3. [MISSING]\nC. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "reference": "3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION\nA. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)\n1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"\n2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity\nB. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance\n1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)\n2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\n3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "reference": "C. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION\nA. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)\n1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"\n2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity\nB. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance\n1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)\n2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\n3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\nC. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation\nD. [MISSING]\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "reference": "D. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE AUTHORIZES ONLY AN EXTENSION OF A SMALL REFINERY'S INITIAL TEMPORARY EXEMPTION\nA. The Plain Text of section 7545(o)(9) Confirms the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of Subparagraph (B)(i)\n1. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) cannot mean \"to grant\" or \"make available\"\n2. The term \"extension\" in section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) requires temporal continuity\nB. The Structure of the Small Refinery Exemption Provisions Confirms That They Are Only a Temporary Bridge to Compliance\n1. \"Extension of exemption\" has the same meaning throughout section 7545(o)(9)\n2. Ability to petition EPA \"at any time\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\n3. The statutory definition of \"small refinery\" does not alter the eligibility criteria for an extension of the exemption\nC. The Purposes of section 7545(o)(9) and the Renewable Fuel Standard Program Confirm the Tenth Circuit's Interpretation\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Lack Merit and Cannot Overcome the Text, Structure, and Purpose of section 7545(o)(9)\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. CHEVRON DEFERENCE DOES NOT APPLY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The common law supports a no-probable-cause element for retaliatory arrest claims\nIII. Hartman v. Moore supports a no-probable-cause element for retaliatory arrest claims",
        "reference": "I. The text of section 1983 permits a no-probable-cause element for retaliatory arrest claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The text of section 1983 permits a no-probable-cause element for retaliatory arrest claims\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Hartman v. Moore supports a no-probable-cause element for retaliatory arrest claims",
        "reference": "II. The common law supports a no-probable-cause element for retaliatory arrest claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The text of section 1983 permits a no-probable-cause element for retaliatory arrest claims\nII. The common law supports a no-probable-cause element for retaliatory arrest claims\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Hartman v. Moore supports a no-probable-cause element for retaliatory arrest claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. In the Anglo-American tradition before the Founding, religious speech lay at the origins and core of freedom of speech.\nB. At the Founding, the Framers chose, and the American people adopted, broad protections for religious speech.\nC. Since the Founding, religious speech has consistently been treated as core speech under the Free Speech Clause that enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection.\nII. The text, history, and tradition of the Free Speech Clause show that religious speech receives the highest level of protection available.\nIII. Employing core speech analysis to resolve this appeal will have additional salutary effects on free speech jurisprudence.",
        "reference": "I. The history and tradition of freedom of speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The history and tradition of freedom of speech\nA. [MISSING]\nB. At the Founding, the Framers chose, and the American people adopted, broad protections for religious speech.\nC. Since the Founding, religious speech has consistently been treated as core speech under the Free Speech Clause that enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection.\nII. The text, history, and tradition of the Free Speech Clause show that religious speech receives the highest level of protection available.\nIII. Employing core speech analysis to resolve this appeal will have additional salutary effects on free speech jurisprudence.",
        "reference": "A. In the Anglo-American tradition before the Founding, religious speech lay at the origins and core of freedom of speech.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The history and tradition of freedom of speech\nA. In the Anglo-American tradition before the Founding, religious speech lay at the origins and core of freedom of speech.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Since the Founding, religious speech has consistently been treated as core speech under the Free Speech Clause that enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection.\nII. The text, history, and tradition of the Free Speech Clause show that religious speech receives the highest level of protection available.\nIII. Employing core speech analysis to resolve this appeal will have additional salutary effects on free speech jurisprudence.",
        "reference": "B. At the Founding, the Framers chose, and the American people adopted, broad protections for religious speech.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The history and tradition of freedom of speech\nA. In the Anglo-American tradition before the Founding, religious speech lay at the origins and core of freedom of speech.\nB. At the Founding, the Framers chose, and the American people adopted, broad protections for religious speech.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The text, history, and tradition of the Free Speech Clause show that religious speech receives the highest level of protection available.\nIII. Employing core speech analysis to resolve this appeal will have additional salutary effects on free speech jurisprudence.",
        "reference": "C. Since the Founding, religious speech has consistently been treated as core speech under the Free Speech Clause that enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The history and tradition of freedom of speech\nA. In the Anglo-American tradition before the Founding, religious speech lay at the origins and core of freedom of speech.\nB. At the Founding, the Framers chose, and the American people adopted, broad protections for religious speech.\nC. Since the Founding, religious speech has consistently been treated as core speech under the Free Speech Clause that enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Employing core speech analysis to resolve this appeal will have additional salutary effects on free speech jurisprudence.",
        "reference": "II. The text, history, and tradition of the Free Speech Clause show that religious speech receives the highest level of protection available.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The history and tradition of freedom of speech\nA. In the Anglo-American tradition before the Founding, religious speech lay at the origins and core of freedom of speech.\nB. At the Founding, the Framers chose, and the American people adopted, broad protections for religious speech.\nC. Since the Founding, religious speech has consistently been treated as core speech under the Free Speech Clause that enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection.\nII. The text, history, and tradition of the Free Speech Clause show that religious speech receives the highest level of protection available.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Employing core speech analysis to resolve this appeal will have additional salutary effects on free speech jurisprudence.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Louisiana Has a History of Substandard Abortion Providers\nB. The Investigation and Oversight Afforded by Admitting Privileges Could Have Prevented Substandard Care\nC. The Experience in Pennsylvania With Kermit Gosnell Demonstrates Why Reproductive Care Should Not Be Denied Appropriate Oversight\nII. Like Most Regulations, the Admitting Privileges Requirement May Accelerate the Retirement of Change-Averse Providers, but the Industry Has Long Compensated for Retirements\nA. Demand for Abortion Services Has Been Declining Significantly and Steadily for Decades, Resulting in an Unattractive Environment for New Providers\nB. Louisiana Women Will Have Adequate Access to Abortion Even If It Requires Physicians to Have Admitting Privileges",
        "reference": "I. Admitting Privileges Serve the Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Admitting Privileges Serve the Purpose\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Investigation and Oversight Afforded by Admitting Privileges Could Have Prevented Substandard Care\nC. The Experience in Pennsylvania With Kermit Gosnell Demonstrates Why Reproductive Care Should Not Be Denied Appropriate Oversight\nII. Like Most Regulations, the Admitting Privileges Requirement May Accelerate the Retirement of Change-Averse Providers, but the Industry Has Long Compensated for Retirements\nA. Demand for Abortion Services Has Been Declining Significantly and Steadily for Decades, Resulting in an Unattractive Environment for New Providers\nB. Louisiana Women Will Have Adequate Access to Abortion Even If It Requires Physicians to Have Admitting Privileges",
        "reference": "A. Louisiana Has a History of Substandard Abortion Providers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Admitting Privileges Serve the Purpose\nA. Louisiana Has a History of Substandard Abortion Providers\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Experience in Pennsylvania With Kermit Gosnell Demonstrates Why Reproductive Care Should Not Be Denied Appropriate Oversight\nII. Like Most Regulations, the Admitting Privileges Requirement May Accelerate the Retirement of Change-Averse Providers, but the Industry Has Long Compensated for Retirements\nA. Demand for Abortion Services Has Been Declining Significantly and Steadily for Decades, Resulting in an Unattractive Environment for New Providers\nB. Louisiana Women Will Have Adequate Access to Abortion Even If It Requires Physicians to Have Admitting Privileges",
        "reference": "B. The Investigation and Oversight Afforded by Admitting Privileges Could Have Prevented Substandard Care",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Admitting Privileges Serve the Purpose\nA. Louisiana Has a History of Substandard Abortion Providers\nB. The Investigation and Oversight Afforded by Admitting Privileges Could Have Prevented Substandard Care\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Like Most Regulations, the Admitting Privileges Requirement May Accelerate the Retirement of Change-Averse Providers, but the Industry Has Long Compensated for Retirements\nA. Demand for Abortion Services Has Been Declining Significantly and Steadily for Decades, Resulting in an Unattractive Environment for New Providers\nB. Louisiana Women Will Have Adequate Access to Abortion Even If It Requires Physicians to Have Admitting Privileges",
        "reference": "C. The Experience in Pennsylvania With Kermit Gosnell Demonstrates Why Reproductive Care Should Not Be Denied Appropriate Oversight",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Admitting Privileges Serve the Purpose\nA. Louisiana Has a History of Substandard Abortion Providers\nB. The Investigation and Oversight Afforded by Admitting Privileges Could Have Prevented Substandard Care\nC. The Experience in Pennsylvania With Kermit Gosnell Demonstrates Why Reproductive Care Should Not Be Denied Appropriate Oversight\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Demand for Abortion Services Has Been Declining Significantly and Steadily for Decades, Resulting in an Unattractive Environment for New Providers\nB. Louisiana Women Will Have Adequate Access to Abortion Even If It Requires Physicians to Have Admitting Privileges",
        "reference": "II. Like Most Regulations, the Admitting Privileges Requirement May Accelerate the Retirement of Change-Averse Providers, but the Industry Has Long Compensated for Retirements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Admitting Privileges Serve the Purpose\nA. Louisiana Has a History of Substandard Abortion Providers\nB. The Investigation and Oversight Afforded by Admitting Privileges Could Have Prevented Substandard Care\nC. The Experience in Pennsylvania With Kermit Gosnell Demonstrates Why Reproductive Care Should Not Be Denied Appropriate Oversight\nII. Like Most Regulations, the Admitting Privileges Requirement May Accelerate the Retirement of Change-Averse Providers, but the Industry Has Long Compensated for Retirements\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Louisiana Women Will Have Adequate Access to Abortion Even If It Requires Physicians to Have Admitting Privileges",
        "reference": "A. Demand for Abortion Services Has Been Declining Significantly and Steadily for Decades, Resulting in an Unattractive Environment for New Providers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Admitting Privileges Serve the Purpose\nA. Louisiana Has a History of Substandard Abortion Providers\nB. The Investigation and Oversight Afforded by Admitting Privileges Could Have Prevented Substandard Care\nC. The Experience in Pennsylvania With Kermit Gosnell Demonstrates Why Reproductive Care Should Not Be Denied Appropriate Oversight\nII. Like Most Regulations, the Admitting Privileges Requirement May Accelerate the Retirement of Change-Averse Providers, but the Industry Has Long Compensated for Retirements\nA. Demand for Abortion Services Has Been Declining Significantly and Steadily for Decades, Resulting in an Unattractive Environment for New Providers\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Louisiana Women Will Have Adequate Access to Abortion Even If It Requires Physicians to Have Admitting Privileges",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-459_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "Providing [MISSING]",
        "reference": "Providing notices to appear that comply with Section 1229(a)(1) is both feasible and desirable from the standpoint of the efficient administration of the immigration system",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\n2. The Bladensburg Cross is a war memorial honoring those from the community who died serving their country in World War I, not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.\nA. Standing is an important issue that is embedded in this case.\nB. This Court has limited the degree to which psychological injuries can confer standing to challenge governmental actions.\nC. Respondents' claims of injury do not confer Article III standing.\n3. A reasonable observer would see the Bladensburg Cross as a war memorial that incorporates religious imagery, not as an attempt to advance or endorse religion.",
        "reference": "1. The Bladensburg Cross is an appropriate and securely constitutional way to remember the fallen of World War I from Prince George's County.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Bladensburg Cross is an appropriate and securely constitutional way to remember the fallen of World War I from Prince George's County.\n2. [MISSING]\nA. Standing is an important issue that is embedded in this case.\nB. This Court has limited the degree to which psychological injuries can confer standing to challenge governmental actions.\nC. Respondents' claims of injury do not confer Article III standing.\n3. A reasonable observer would see the Bladensburg Cross as a war memorial that incorporates religious imagery, not as an attempt to advance or endorse religion.",
        "reference": "2. The Bladensburg Cross is a war memorial honoring those from the community who died serving their country in World War I, not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Bladensburg Cross is an appropriate and securely constitutional way to remember the fallen of World War I from Prince George's County.\n2. The Bladensburg Cross is a war memorial honoring those from the community who died serving their country in World War I, not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court has limited the degree to which psychological injuries can confer standing to challenge governmental actions.\nC. Respondents' claims of injury do not confer Article III standing.\n3. A reasonable observer would see the Bladensburg Cross as a war memorial that incorporates religious imagery, not as an attempt to advance or endorse religion.",
        "reference": "A. Standing is an important issue that is embedded in this case.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Bladensburg Cross is an appropriate and securely constitutional way to remember the fallen of World War I from Prince George's County.\n2. The Bladensburg Cross is a war memorial honoring those from the community who died serving their country in World War I, not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.\nA. Standing is an important issue that is embedded in this case.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Respondents' claims of injury do not confer Article III standing.\n3. A reasonable observer would see the Bladensburg Cross as a war memorial that incorporates religious imagery, not as an attempt to advance or endorse religion.",
        "reference": "B. This Court has limited the degree to which psychological injuries can confer standing to challenge governmental actions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Bladensburg Cross is an appropriate and securely constitutional way to remember the fallen of World War I from Prince George's County.\n2. The Bladensburg Cross is a war memorial honoring those from the community who died serving their country in World War I, not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.\nA. Standing is an important issue that is embedded in this case.\nB. This Court has limited the degree to which psychological injuries can confer standing to challenge governmental actions.\nC. [MISSING]\n3. A reasonable observer would see the Bladensburg Cross as a war memorial that incorporates religious imagery, not as an attempt to advance or endorse religion.",
        "reference": "C. Respondents' claims of injury do not confer Article III standing.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Bladensburg Cross is an appropriate and securely constitutional way to remember the fallen of World War I from Prince George's County.\n2. The Bladensburg Cross is a war memorial honoring those from the community who died serving their country in World War I, not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.\nA. Standing is an important issue that is embedded in this case.\nB. This Court has limited the degree to which psychological injuries can confer standing to challenge governmental actions.\nC. Respondents' claims of injury do not confer Article III standing.\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. A reasonable observer would see the Bladensburg Cross as a war memorial that incorporates religious imagery, not as an attempt to advance or endorse religion.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in disclosures made pursuant to ERISA\nC. The reasoning supporting the court of appeals' purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2) is flawed\n1. Construing \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to encompass information made known to participants in ERISA-mandated disclosures does not impose a constructive knowledge standard\n2. Section 1113(2)'s repealed constructive knowledge provision does not suggest that participants lack actual knowledge of disclosures provided to them\nII. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD DISRUPT ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES BY IMPOSING UNDUE BURDENS ON PLAN FIDUCIARIES\nA. Section 1113(2) should be construed in a manner that preserves its important role in avoiding undue burdens on employers\nB. A purely subjective interpretation of Section 1113(2) will impose significant costs on plan fiduciaries\nC. No countervailing congressional objective justifies the increased burdens imposed by the purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2)",
        "reference": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THE PLAN FIDUCIARY DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THE PLAN FIDUCIARY DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in disclosures made pursuant to ERISA\nC. The reasoning supporting the court of appeals' purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2) is flawed\n1. Construing \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to encompass information made known to participants in ERISA-mandated disclosures does not impose a constructive knowledge standard\n2. Section 1113(2)'s repealed constructive knowledge provision does not suggest that participants lack actual knowledge of disclosures provided to them\nII. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD DISRUPT ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES BY IMPOSING UNDUE BURDENS ON PLAN FIDUCIARIES\nA. Section 1113(2) should be construed in a manner that preserves its important role in avoiding undue burdens on employers\nB. A purely subjective interpretation of Section 1113(2) will impose significant costs on plan fiduciaries\nC. No countervailing congressional objective justifies the increased burdens imposed by the purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2)",
        "reference": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THE PLAN FIDUCIARY DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA\nA. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The reasoning supporting the court of appeals' purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2) is flawed\n1. Construing \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to encompass information made known to participants in ERISA-mandated disclosures does not impose a constructive knowledge standard\n2. Section 1113(2)'s repealed constructive knowledge provision does not suggest that participants lack actual knowledge of disclosures provided to them\nII. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD DISRUPT ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES BY IMPOSING UNDUE BURDENS ON PLAN FIDUCIARIES\nA. Section 1113(2) should be construed in a manner that preserves its important role in avoiding undue burdens on employers\nB. A purely subjective interpretation of Section 1113(2) will impose significant costs on plan fiduciaries\nC. No countervailing congressional objective justifies the increased burdens imposed by the purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2)",
        "reference": "B. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in disclosures made pursuant to ERISA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THE PLAN FIDUCIARY DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA\nA. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in disclosures made pursuant to ERISA\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Construing \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to encompass information made known to participants in ERISA-mandated disclosures does not impose a constructive knowledge standard\n2. Section 1113(2)'s repealed constructive knowledge provision does not suggest that participants lack actual knowledge of disclosures provided to them\nII. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD DISRUPT ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES BY IMPOSING UNDUE BURDENS ON PLAN FIDUCIARIES\nA. Section 1113(2) should be construed in a manner that preserves its important role in avoiding undue burdens on employers\nB. A purely subjective interpretation of Section 1113(2) will impose significant costs on plan fiduciaries\nC. No countervailing congressional objective justifies the increased burdens imposed by the purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2)",
        "reference": "C. The reasoning supporting the court of appeals' purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2) is flawed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THE PLAN FIDUCIARY DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA\nA. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in disclosures made pursuant to ERISA\nC. The reasoning supporting the court of appeals' purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2) is flawed\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Section 1113(2)'s repealed constructive knowledge provision does not suggest that participants lack actual knowledge of disclosures provided to them\nII. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD DISRUPT ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES BY IMPOSING UNDUE BURDENS ON PLAN FIDUCIARIES\nA. Section 1113(2) should be construed in a manner that preserves its important role in avoiding undue burdens on employers\nB. A purely subjective interpretation of Section 1113(2) will impose significant costs on plan fiduciaries\nC. No countervailing congressional objective justifies the increased burdens imposed by the purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2)",
        "reference": "1. Construing \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to encompass information made known to participants in ERISA-mandated disclosures does not impose a constructive knowledge standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THE PLAN FIDUCIARY DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA\nA. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in disclosures made pursuant to ERISA\nC. The reasoning supporting the court of appeals' purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2) is flawed\n1. Construing \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to encompass information made known to participants in ERISA-mandated disclosures does not impose a constructive knowledge standard\n2. [MISSING]\nII. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD DISRUPT ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES BY IMPOSING UNDUE BURDENS ON PLAN FIDUCIARIES\nA. Section 1113(2) should be construed in a manner that preserves its important role in avoiding undue burdens on employers\nB. A purely subjective interpretation of Section 1113(2) will impose significant costs on plan fiduciaries\nC. No countervailing congressional objective justifies the increased burdens imposed by the purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2)",
        "reference": "2. Section 1113(2)'s repealed constructive knowledge provision does not suggest that participants lack actual knowledge of disclosures provided to them",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THE PLAN FIDUCIARY DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA\nA. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in disclosures made pursuant to ERISA\nC. The reasoning supporting the court of appeals' purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2) is flawed\n1. Construing \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to encompass information made known to participants in ERISA-mandated disclosures does not impose a constructive knowledge standard\n2. Section 1113(2)'s repealed constructive knowledge provision does not suggest that participants lack actual knowledge of disclosures provided to them\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1113(2) should be construed in a manner that preserves its important role in avoiding undue burdens on employers\nB. A purely subjective interpretation of Section 1113(2) will impose significant costs on plan fiduciaries\nC. No countervailing congressional objective justifies the increased burdens imposed by the purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2)",
        "reference": "II. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD DISRUPT ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES BY IMPOSING UNDUE BURDENS ON PLAN FIDUCIARIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THE PLAN FIDUCIARY DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA\nA. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in disclosures made pursuant to ERISA\nC. The reasoning supporting the court of appeals' purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2) is flawed\n1. Construing \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to encompass information made known to participants in ERISA-mandated disclosures does not impose a constructive knowledge standard\n2. Section 1113(2)'s repealed constructive knowledge provision does not suggest that participants lack actual knowledge of disclosures provided to them\nII. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD DISRUPT ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES BY IMPOSING UNDUE BURDENS ON PLAN FIDUCIARIES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A purely subjective interpretation of Section 1113(2) will impose significant costs on plan fiduciaries\nC. No countervailing congressional objective justifies the increased burdens imposed by the purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2)",
        "reference": "A. Section 1113(2) should be construed in a manner that preserves its important role in avoiding undue burdens on employers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THE PLAN FIDUCIARY DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA\nA. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in disclosures made pursuant to ERISA\nC. The reasoning supporting the court of appeals' purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2) is flawed\n1. Construing \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to encompass information made known to participants in ERISA-mandated disclosures does not impose a constructive knowledge standard\n2. Section 1113(2)'s repealed constructive knowledge provision does not suggest that participants lack actual knowledge of disclosures provided to them\nII. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD DISRUPT ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES BY IMPOSING UNDUE BURDENS ON PLAN FIDUCIARIES\nA. Section 1113(2) should be construed in a manner that preserves its important role in avoiding undue burdens on employers\nB. [MISSING]\nC. No countervailing congressional objective justifies the increased burdens imposed by the purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2)",
        "reference": "B. A purely subjective interpretation of Section 1113(2) will impose significant costs on plan fiduciaries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT THE PLAN FIDUCIARY DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA\nA. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in disclosures made pursuant to ERISA\nC. The reasoning supporting the court of appeals' purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2) is flawed\n1. Construing \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to encompass information made known to participants in ERISA-mandated disclosures does not impose a constructive knowledge standard\n2. Section 1113(2)'s repealed constructive knowledge provision does not suggest that participants lack actual knowledge of disclosures provided to them\nII. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD DISRUPT ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES BY IMPOSING UNDUE BURDENS ON PLAN FIDUCIARIES\nA. Section 1113(2) should be construed in a manner that preserves its important role in avoiding undue burdens on employers\nB. A purely subjective interpretation of Section 1113(2) will impose significant costs on plan fiduciaries\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. No countervailing congressional objective justifies the increased burdens imposed by the purely subjective construction of Section 1113(2)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1155_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence\nB. The Board's determinations here easily satisfy the substantial-evidence standard\nC. The court of appeals overturned the Board's reasonable determinations based on an erroneous judicially created presumption\nD. Respondents' arguments that the decisions below properly rest on a presumption of credibility are wrong\nII. The court of appeals compounded its error in Dai by failing to follow the ordinary remand rule",
        "reference": "I. The court of appeals erred by failing to apply the substantial-evidence standard of review required by the INA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1155_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred by failing to apply the substantial-evidence standard of review required by the INA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Board's determinations here easily satisfy the substantial-evidence standard\nC. The court of appeals overturned the Board's reasonable determinations based on an erroneous judicially created presumption\nD. Respondents' arguments that the decisions below properly rest on a presumption of credibility are wrong\nII. The court of appeals compounded its error in Dai by failing to follow the ordinary remand rule",
        "reference": "A. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1155_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred by failing to apply the substantial-evidence standard of review required by the INA\nA. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The court of appeals overturned the Board's reasonable determinations based on an erroneous judicially created presumption\nD. Respondents' arguments that the decisions below properly rest on a presumption of credibility are wrong\nII. The court of appeals compounded its error in Dai by failing to follow the ordinary remand rule",
        "reference": "B. The Board's determinations here easily satisfy the substantial-evidence standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1155_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred by failing to apply the substantial-evidence standard of review required by the INA\nA. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence\nB. The Board's determinations here easily satisfy the substantial-evidence standard\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Respondents' arguments that the decisions below properly rest on a presumption of credibility are wrong\nII. The court of appeals compounded its error in Dai by failing to follow the ordinary remand rule",
        "reference": "C. The court of appeals overturned the Board's reasonable determinations based on an erroneous judicially created presumption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1155_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred by failing to apply the substantial-evidence standard of review required by the INA\nA. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence\nB. The Board's determinations here easily satisfy the substantial-evidence standard\nC. The court of appeals overturned the Board's reasonable determinations based on an erroneous judicially created presumption\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The court of appeals compounded its error in Dai by failing to follow the ordinary remand rule",
        "reference": "D. Respondents' arguments that the decisions below properly rest on a presumption of credibility are wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1155_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred by failing to apply the substantial-evidence standard of review required by the INA\nA. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence\nB. The Board's determinations here easily satisfy the substantial-evidence standard\nC. The court of appeals overturned the Board's reasonable determinations based on an erroneous judicially created presumption\nD. Respondents' arguments that the decisions below properly rest on a presumption of credibility are wrong\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The court of appeals compounded its error in Dai by failing to follow the ordinary remand rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1363_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Timing Of A Noncitizen's Detention On Immigration Charges Is Highly Relevant Under Section 1226(c) Precisely Because Mandatory Detention Applies To Low-Level Offenders\nIII. The Government's Reading Would Raise Significant Doubts About The Constitutionality Of The Statute\nIV. The Government Understates Its Ability To Take Noncitizens Into Immigration Custody Promptly After Their Release From Criminal Custody",
        "reference": "I. Mandatory Detention Applies To Individuals Who Have Committed Low-Level Offenses That Pose No Danger To The Public And For Whom Removal is Not Preordained",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1363_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Mandatory Detention Applies To Individuals Who Have Committed Low-Level Offenses That Pose No Danger To The Public And For Whom Removal is Not Preordained\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Government's Reading Would Raise Significant Doubts About The Constitutionality Of The Statute\nIV. The Government Understates Its Ability To Take Noncitizens Into Immigration Custody Promptly After Their Release From Criminal Custody",
        "reference": "II. The Timing Of A Noncitizen's Detention On Immigration Charges Is Highly Relevant Under Section 1226(c) Precisely Because Mandatory Detention Applies To Low-Level Offenders",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1363_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Mandatory Detention Applies To Individuals Who Have Committed Low-Level Offenses That Pose No Danger To The Public And For Whom Removal is Not Preordained\nII. The Timing Of A Noncitizen's Detention On Immigration Charges Is Highly Relevant Under Section 1226(c) Precisely Because Mandatory Detention Applies To Low-Level Offenders\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Government Understates Its Ability To Take Noncitizens Into Immigration Custody Promptly After Their Release From Criminal Custody",
        "reference": "III. The Government's Reading Would Raise Significant Doubts About The Constitutionality Of The Statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1363_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Mandatory Detention Applies To Individuals Who Have Committed Low-Level Offenses That Pose No Danger To The Public And For Whom Removal is Not Preordained\nII. The Timing Of A Noncitizen's Detention On Immigration Charges Is Highly Relevant Under Section 1226(c) Precisely Because Mandatory Detention Applies To Low-Level Offenders\nIII. The Government's Reading Would Raise Significant Doubts About The Constitutionality Of The Statute\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Government Understates Its Ability To Take Noncitizens Into Immigration Custody Promptly After Their Release From Criminal Custody",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "A. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "B. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "C. Steele Is Not to the Contrary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "D. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. [MISSING]\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "II. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "A. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "B. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. [MISSING]\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "C. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "III. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "reference": "A. International Distorts the Lanham Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. International Cannot Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality or Trademarks' Territorial Nature\nB. The Act's \"Commerce\" Definition Does Not Support Extraterritoriality\nC. Steele Is Not to the Contrary\nD. Extraterritoriality Risks International Discord\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Uses\nA. International Waived Any \"Domestic Application\" Argument\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\n1. The Act's Text Requires Domestic Use\n2. The Act's \"Focus\" Is Marks' Use in Commerce\nC. International's and the Government's \"Effects\" Tests Defy Extraterritoriality Principles\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. International Distorts the Lanham Act\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Judgment Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Plausible View",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Cady Tailored The Community Caretaking Exception To The Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches\nB. The Court Has Never Applied The Community Caretaking Exception Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches\nC. Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady's Reliance On The Reduced Privacy Interest In Vehicles\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless Intrusions Into The Home\nB. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances\nC. The Community Caretaking Exception Is Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment's Protection Of The Home\nIII. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY\nIV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING",
        "reference": "I. CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court Has Never Applied The Community Caretaking Exception Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches\nC. Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady's Reliance On The Reduced Privacy Interest In Vehicles\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless Intrusions Into The Home\nB. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances\nC. The Community Caretaking Exception Is Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment's Protection Of The Home\nIII. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY\nIV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING",
        "reference": "A. Cady Tailored The Community Caretaking Exception To The Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES\nA. Cady Tailored The Community Caretaking Exception To The Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady's Reliance On The Reduced Privacy Interest In Vehicles\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless Intrusions Into The Home\nB. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances\nC. The Community Caretaking Exception Is Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment's Protection Of The Home\nIII. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY\nIV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING",
        "reference": "B. The Court Has Never Applied The Community Caretaking Exception Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES\nA. Cady Tailored The Community Caretaking Exception To The Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches\nB. The Court Has Never Applied The Community Caretaking Exception Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless Intrusions Into The Home\nB. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances\nC. The Community Caretaking Exception Is Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment's Protection Of The Home\nIII. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY\nIV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING",
        "reference": "C. Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady's Reliance On The Reduced Privacy Interest In Vehicles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES\nA. Cady Tailored The Community Caretaking Exception To The Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches\nB. The Court Has Never Applied The Community Caretaking Exception Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches\nC. Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady's Reliance On The Reduced Privacy Interest In Vehicles\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless Intrusions Into The Home\nB. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances\nC. The Community Caretaking Exception Is Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment's Protection Of The Home\nIII. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY\nIV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING",
        "reference": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES\nA. Cady Tailored The Community Caretaking Exception To The Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches\nB. The Court Has Never Applied The Community Caretaking Exception Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches\nC. Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady's Reliance On The Reduced Privacy Interest In Vehicles\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances\nC. The Community Caretaking Exception Is Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment's Protection Of The Home\nIII. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY\nIV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING",
        "reference": "A. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless Intrusions Into The Home",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES\nA. Cady Tailored The Community Caretaking Exception To The Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches\nB. The Court Has Never Applied The Community Caretaking Exception Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches\nC. Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady's Reliance On The Reduced Privacy Interest In Vehicles\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless Intrusions Into The Home\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Community Caretaking Exception Is Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment's Protection Of The Home\nIII. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY\nIV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING",
        "reference": "B. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES\nA. Cady Tailored The Community Caretaking Exception To The Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches\nB. The Court Has Never Applied The Community Caretaking Exception Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches\nC. Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady's Reliance On The Reduced Privacy Interest In Vehicles\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless Intrusions Into The Home\nB. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY\nIV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING",
        "reference": "C. The Community Caretaking Exception Is Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment's Protection Of The Home",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES\nA. Cady Tailored The Community Caretaking Exception To The Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches\nB. The Court Has Never Applied The Community Caretaking Exception Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches\nC. Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady's Reliance On The Reduced Privacy Interest In Vehicles\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless Intrusions Into The Home\nB. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances\nC. The Community Caretaking Exception Is Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment's Protection Of The Home\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING",
        "reference": "III. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES ONLY TO SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES\nA. Cady Tailored The Community Caretaking Exception To The Unique Context Of Motor Vehicle Searches\nB. The Court Has Never Applied The Community Caretaking Exception Outside The Context Of Vehicle Searches\nC. Black-Letter Law Affirms Cady's Reliance On The Reduced Privacy Interest In Vehicles\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT HOMES BE INSULATED FROM THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. The Common Law Spurned Warrantless Intrusions Into The Home\nB. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances\nC. The Community Caretaking Exception Is Antithetical To The Fourth Amendment's Protection Of The Home\nIII. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND OTHERS HAVE AMPLE TOOLS TO HELP PEOPLE IN NEED WITHOUT EXTENDING CADY\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXTENDING CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION ARE UNAVAILING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "II. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. [MISSING]\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "A. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "1. American Legion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "3. Valley Forge",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. [MISSING]\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "5. Town of Greece",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "B. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "C. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. [MISSING]\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "D. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. [MISSING]\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. [MISSING]\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "E. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. [MISSING]\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "F. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. [MISSING]\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. [MISSING]\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "III. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "IV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "A. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "B. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.34
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. [MISSING]\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "C. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. [MISSING]\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "D. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. [MISSING]\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. [MISSING]\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "V. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "A. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. [MISSING]\nC. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "reference": "B. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are completely unanimous: Every circuit has adopted the Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard and many circuits have emphatically rejected ACLJ's conception of standing\nII. ACLJ's conception of standing would require mass overturning of this Court's constitutional precedents and settled First Amendment rights\nA. This Court's Establishment Clause precedents firmly support Direct Unwelcome Contact standing\n1. American Legion\n2. Schempp\n3. Valley Forge\n4. Lee\n5. Town of Greece\nB. This Court recently reaffirmed its jurisdiction over pure symbolic harm in Uzuegbunam\nC. The Direct Unwelcome Contact Standard is detached from Lemon\nD. Requiring Plaintiffs to avoid witnessing an expected constitutional violation to maintain standing goes against this Court's cases and the First Amendment itself\n1. This Court rejected the \"self-inflicted\" injury argument in FEC v. Cruz\n2. Imposing a duty to avoid compounds and multiplies the Establishment Clause injury\nE. ACLJ's argument deprives citizens of inalienable Free Speech rights\nF. Adopting ACLJ's argument would destroy symbolic-injury standing in all First Amendment contexts \u2014 including Free Speech and Free Exercise\n1. Symbolic standing is not unique to the Establishment Clause\n2. ACLJ's argument threatens all symbolic injury cases\nIII. That Plaintiffs support private prayer is no barrier to their standing to challenge government prayer\nIV. Ocala's argument is predicated on two false premises: (1) that the Establishment Clause uniquely benefits atheists; and (2) that it disadvantages Christians\nA. Christians make up a large portion of \"offended observer\" cases\nB. The Establishment Clause protects prayer and Christianity from government overreach and corrosive secularism\n1. The Establishment Clause was added to the Constitution to prevent government control over prayer to protect religious liberty\n2. Allowing the Church to maintain autonomy over prayer benefits Christianity\n3. The Establishment Clause protects Christianity's role in society\nC. The Establishment Clause guards against a different injury than the Equal Protection Clause\nD. The preservation of a free government depends on enforcement of the Establishment Clause\n1. ACLJ seeks to render the Establishment Clause a nullity\n2. The Establishment Clause is uniquely and foremost a restraint on government power\nV. This case is a bad vehicle to challenge the standing issue presented\nA. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief\nB. The City categorically excluded observant Jewish citizens\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. ACLJ is using the machinery of this Court to advance its own ideological interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Congress did not change the meaning of \"on-sale\" and \"public use\" in enacting the AIA\nA. The residual term \"otherwise available to the public\" covers a growing non-overlapping category of prior art\nB. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels statutory construction that preserves the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use\"\nIII. Congress neither considered nor intended the collateral abandonment of the \"experimental use\" doctrine that is inextricably linked to the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use.\"\nIV. Congress did not intend to repeal the patent forfeiture bars\nA. Helsinn's purported repeal permits an indefinite grace period for secret exploitation of inventions for which Congress evidenced no intention\nB. Congress has not considered the real effects of repealing the secret commercialization patent forfeiture bars\nC. Congress could not have intended to effectuate the policies underlying the repeal of the forfeiture bars\nD. Congress has not abandoned the equitable common-law rules that continue to operate alongside the statutory terms",
        "reference": "I. The terms \"on sale\" and \"public use\" are ingrained in the fabric of the American innovation practice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The terms \"on sale\" and \"public use\" are ingrained in the fabric of the American innovation practice\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The residual term \"otherwise available to the public\" covers a growing non-overlapping category of prior art\nB. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels statutory construction that preserves the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use\"\nIII. Congress neither considered nor intended the collateral abandonment of the \"experimental use\" doctrine that is inextricably linked to the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use.\"\nIV. Congress did not intend to repeal the patent forfeiture bars\nA. Helsinn's purported repeal permits an indefinite grace period for secret exploitation of inventions for which Congress evidenced no intention\nB. Congress has not considered the real effects of repealing the secret commercialization patent forfeiture bars\nC. Congress could not have intended to effectuate the policies underlying the repeal of the forfeiture bars\nD. Congress has not abandoned the equitable common-law rules that continue to operate alongside the statutory terms",
        "reference": "II. Congress did not change the meaning of \"on-sale\" and \"public use\" in enacting the AIA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The terms \"on sale\" and \"public use\" are ingrained in the fabric of the American innovation practice\nII. Congress did not change the meaning of \"on-sale\" and \"public use\" in enacting the AIA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels statutory construction that preserves the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use\"\nIII. Congress neither considered nor intended the collateral abandonment of the \"experimental use\" doctrine that is inextricably linked to the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use.\"\nIV. Congress did not intend to repeal the patent forfeiture bars\nA. Helsinn's purported repeal permits an indefinite grace period for secret exploitation of inventions for which Congress evidenced no intention\nB. Congress has not considered the real effects of repealing the secret commercialization patent forfeiture bars\nC. Congress could not have intended to effectuate the policies underlying the repeal of the forfeiture bars\nD. Congress has not abandoned the equitable common-law rules that continue to operate alongside the statutory terms",
        "reference": "A. The residual term \"otherwise available to the public\" covers a growing non-overlapping category of prior art",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The terms \"on sale\" and \"public use\" are ingrained in the fabric of the American innovation practice\nII. Congress did not change the meaning of \"on-sale\" and \"public use\" in enacting the AIA\nA. The residual term \"otherwise available to the public\" covers a growing non-overlapping category of prior art\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Congress neither considered nor intended the collateral abandonment of the \"experimental use\" doctrine that is inextricably linked to the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use.\"\nIV. Congress did not intend to repeal the patent forfeiture bars\nA. Helsinn's purported repeal permits an indefinite grace period for secret exploitation of inventions for which Congress evidenced no intention\nB. Congress has not considered the real effects of repealing the secret commercialization patent forfeiture bars\nC. Congress could not have intended to effectuate the policies underlying the repeal of the forfeiture bars\nD. Congress has not abandoned the equitable common-law rules that continue to operate alongside the statutory terms",
        "reference": "B. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels statutory construction that preserves the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The terms \"on sale\" and \"public use\" are ingrained in the fabric of the American innovation practice\nII. Congress did not change the meaning of \"on-sale\" and \"public use\" in enacting the AIA\nA. The residual term \"otherwise available to the public\" covers a growing non-overlapping category of prior art\nB. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels statutory construction that preserves the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use\"\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Congress did not intend to repeal the patent forfeiture bars\nA. Helsinn's purported repeal permits an indefinite grace period for secret exploitation of inventions for which Congress evidenced no intention\nB. Congress has not considered the real effects of repealing the secret commercialization patent forfeiture bars\nC. Congress could not have intended to effectuate the policies underlying the repeal of the forfeiture bars\nD. Congress has not abandoned the equitable common-law rules that continue to operate alongside the statutory terms",
        "reference": "III. Congress neither considered nor intended the collateral abandonment of the \"experimental use\" doctrine that is inextricably linked to the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The terms \"on sale\" and \"public use\" are ingrained in the fabric of the American innovation practice\nII. Congress did not change the meaning of \"on-sale\" and \"public use\" in enacting the AIA\nA. The residual term \"otherwise available to the public\" covers a growing non-overlapping category of prior art\nB. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels statutory construction that preserves the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use\"\nIII. Congress neither considered nor intended the collateral abandonment of the \"experimental use\" doctrine that is inextricably linked to the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use.\"\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Helsinn's purported repeal permits an indefinite grace period for secret exploitation of inventions for which Congress evidenced no intention\nB. Congress has not considered the real effects of repealing the secret commercialization patent forfeiture bars\nC. Congress could not have intended to effectuate the policies underlying the repeal of the forfeiture bars\nD. Congress has not abandoned the equitable common-law rules that continue to operate alongside the statutory terms",
        "reference": "IV. Congress did not intend to repeal the patent forfeiture bars",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The terms \"on sale\" and \"public use\" are ingrained in the fabric of the American innovation practice\nII. Congress did not change the meaning of \"on-sale\" and \"public use\" in enacting the AIA\nA. The residual term \"otherwise available to the public\" covers a growing non-overlapping category of prior art\nB. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels statutory construction that preserves the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use\"\nIII. Congress neither considered nor intended the collateral abandonment of the \"experimental use\" doctrine that is inextricably linked to the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use.\"\nIV. Congress did not intend to repeal the patent forfeiture bars\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress has not considered the real effects of repealing the secret commercialization patent forfeiture bars\nC. Congress could not have intended to effectuate the policies underlying the repeal of the forfeiture bars\nD. Congress has not abandoned the equitable common-law rules that continue to operate alongside the statutory terms",
        "reference": "A. Helsinn's purported repeal permits an indefinite grace period for secret exploitation of inventions for which Congress evidenced no intention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The terms \"on sale\" and \"public use\" are ingrained in the fabric of the American innovation practice\nII. Congress did not change the meaning of \"on-sale\" and \"public use\" in enacting the AIA\nA. The residual term \"otherwise available to the public\" covers a growing non-overlapping category of prior art\nB. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels statutory construction that preserves the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use\"\nIII. Congress neither considered nor intended the collateral abandonment of the \"experimental use\" doctrine that is inextricably linked to the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use.\"\nIV. Congress did not intend to repeal the patent forfeiture bars\nA. Helsinn's purported repeal permits an indefinite grace period for secret exploitation of inventions for which Congress evidenced no intention\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress could not have intended to effectuate the policies underlying the repeal of the forfeiture bars\nD. Congress has not abandoned the equitable common-law rules that continue to operate alongside the statutory terms",
        "reference": "B. Congress has not considered the real effects of repealing the secret commercialization patent forfeiture bars",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The terms \"on sale\" and \"public use\" are ingrained in the fabric of the American innovation practice\nII. Congress did not change the meaning of \"on-sale\" and \"public use\" in enacting the AIA\nA. The residual term \"otherwise available to the public\" covers a growing non-overlapping category of prior art\nB. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels statutory construction that preserves the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use\"\nIII. Congress neither considered nor intended the collateral abandonment of the \"experimental use\" doctrine that is inextricably linked to the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use.\"\nIV. Congress did not intend to repeal the patent forfeiture bars\nA. Helsinn's purported repeal permits an indefinite grace period for secret exploitation of inventions for which Congress evidenced no intention\nB. Congress has not considered the real effects of repealing the secret commercialization patent forfeiture bars\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Congress has not abandoned the equitable common-law rules that continue to operate alongside the statutory terms",
        "reference": "C. Congress could not have intended to effectuate the policies underlying the repeal of the forfeiture bars",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The terms \"on sale\" and \"public use\" are ingrained in the fabric of the American innovation practice\nII. Congress did not change the meaning of \"on-sale\" and \"public use\" in enacting the AIA\nA. The residual term \"otherwise available to the public\" covers a growing non-overlapping category of prior art\nB. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels statutory construction that preserves the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use\"\nIII. Congress neither considered nor intended the collateral abandonment of the \"experimental use\" doctrine that is inextricably linked to the settled meaning of \"on sale\" and \"public use.\"\nIV. Congress did not intend to repeal the patent forfeiture bars\nA. Helsinn's purported repeal permits an indefinite grace period for secret exploitation of inventions for which Congress evidenced no intention\nB. Congress has not considered the real effects of repealing the secret commercialization patent forfeiture bars\nC. Congress could not have intended to effectuate the policies underlying the repeal of the forfeiture bars\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Congress has not abandoned the equitable common-law rules that continue to operate alongside the statutory terms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority\nB. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle\n1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority\n2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit\nA. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns\nB. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context\nC. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes\nD. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "reference": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent\nA. [MISSING]\nB. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle\n1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority\n2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit\nA. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns\nB. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context\nC. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes\nD. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "reference": "A. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent\nA. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority\n2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit\nA. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns\nB. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context\nC. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes\nD. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "reference": "B. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent\nA. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority\nB. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit\nA. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns\nB. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context\nC. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes\nD. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "reference": "1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent\nA. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority\nB. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle\n1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit\nA. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns\nB. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context\nC. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes\nD. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "reference": "2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent\nA. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority\nB. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle\n1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority\n2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue\n3. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit\nA. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns\nB. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context\nC. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes\nD. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "reference": "3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent\nA. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority\nB. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle\n1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority\n2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. [MISSING]\nA. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns\nB. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context\nC. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes\nD. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "reference": "II. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent\nA. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority\nB. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle\n1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority\n2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit\nA. [MISSING]\nB. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context\nC. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes\nD. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "reference": "A. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent\nA. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority\nB. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle\n1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority\n2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit\nA. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns\nB. [MISSING]\nC. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes\nD. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "reference": "B. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent\nA. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority\nB. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle\n1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority\n2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit\nA. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns\nB. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "reference": "C. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SORNA delegated nonlegislative power to the Executive consistent with this Court's precedent\nA. Congress may delegate discretion to the Executive if it supplies an intelligible principle by defining the general policy, the official to whom authority is delegated, and the limits of the delegated authority\nB. SORNA comports with this Court's precedent because the statute as a whole supplies an intelligible principle\n1. Congress identified the official to whom authority is delegated and the limits of the delegated authority\n2. Congress identified the general policy it intended the Attorney General to pursue\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Petitioner's arguments that the Court should apply a special, heightened nondelegation standard to SORNA lack merit\nA. SORNA does not implicate retroactivity concerns\nB. SORNA does not implicate federalism concerns in this context\nC. SORNA does not empower the Attorney General to create federal crimes\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Petitioner has not justified departing from this Court's nondelegation cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "A. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "B. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "C. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "A. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "B. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "C. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "III. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "A. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "B. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SHIELDS THE HOME FROM WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES\nA. Warrantless Invasions Of The Home Are Presumptively Unreasonable Regardless Of Their Purpose\nB. Absent Consent, Only Exigent Circumstances Requiring Immediate Action Can Overcome The Presumption Of Unreasonableness\nC. The Presumption Against Warrantless Searches And Seizures In The Home Comports With The Text And Original Meaning Of The Fourth Amendment\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS THAT THE HOME BE INSULATED FROM CADY'S COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION\nA. Extending The Community Caretaking Exception To The Home Would Eliminate Safeguards That Cady Deemed Critical\nB. Extending Cady's Exception To The Home Would Eviscerate The Fourth Amendment\nC. Officials Already Have Ample Tools For Addressing Public Health And Safety Concerns\nIII. RESPONDENTS' EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY THEIR RULE ARE UNAVAILING\nA. Community Caretaking Searches Are Not Exempt From The Fourth Amendment's Warrant Requirement\nB. There Is No Basis For Creating A New Exception To The Warrant Requirement\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. RESPONDENTS' WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN PETITIONER'S HOME VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Rule 51 Requires A Party To Timely Assert An Argument, And The Grounds Supporting It, In The District Court\nB. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges\nII. Petitioner And The Government's Contrary Rule Does Not Withstand Scrutiny\nIII. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To Relief",
        "reference": "I. A Defendant Must Raise The Basis For A Substantive-Reasonableness Argument In The District Court To Preserve It For Appellate Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Defendant Must Raise The Basis For A Substantive-Reasonableness Argument In The District Court To Preserve It For Appellate Review\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges\nII. Petitioner And The Government's Contrary Rule Does Not Withstand Scrutiny\nIII. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To Relief",
        "reference": "A. Rule 51 Requires A Party To Timely Assert An Argument, And The Grounds Supporting It, In The District Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Defendant Must Raise The Basis For A Substantive-Reasonableness Argument In The District Court To Preserve It For Appellate Review\nA. Rule 51 Requires A Party To Timely Assert An Argument, And The Grounds Supporting It, In The District Court\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioner And The Government's Contrary Rule Does Not Withstand Scrutiny\nIII. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To Relief",
        "reference": "B. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Defendant Must Raise The Basis For A Substantive-Reasonableness Argument In The District Court To Preserve It For Appellate Review\nA. Rule 51 Requires A Party To Timely Assert An Argument, And The Grounds Supporting It, In The District Court\nB. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To Relief",
        "reference": "II. Petitioner And The Government's Contrary Rule Does Not Withstand Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Defendant Must Raise The Basis For A Substantive-Reasonableness Argument In The District Court To Preserve It For Appellate Review\nA. Rule 51 Requires A Party To Timely Assert An Argument, And The Grounds Supporting It, In The District Court\nB. The Timely Assertion Rule Applies To Substantive Reasonableness Challenges\nII. Petitioner And The Government's Contrary Rule Does Not Withstand Scrutiny\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To Relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 2's results test is untenable\nA. The Constitution gives states broad leeway to adopt common-sense election integrity measures\nB. If Section 2 requires invalidation of neutral state laws without proof of intentional discrimination, then the statute exceeds Congress' enforcement power\nC. If Section 2's results test requires states to pervasively consider race in crafting election laws, it also conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause\nD. At a minimum, this Court should interpret Section 2 to require a substantial disparate impact and evidence that the challenged law caused the disparate impact\nIII. The Court should also consider, and reverse, the Ninth Circuit's finding of discriminatory intent",
        "reference": "I. The Court should grant certiorari because the scope of Section 2's results test is a critically important issue that has repeatedly evaded this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant certiorari because the scope of Section 2's results test is a critically important issue that has repeatedly evaded this Court's review\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Constitution gives states broad leeway to adopt common-sense election integrity measures\nB. If Section 2 requires invalidation of neutral state laws without proof of intentional discrimination, then the statute exceeds Congress' enforcement power\nC. If Section 2's results test requires states to pervasively consider race in crafting election laws, it also conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause\nD. At a minimum, this Court should interpret Section 2 to require a substantial disparate impact and evidence that the challenged law caused the disparate impact\nIII. The Court should also consider, and reverse, the Ninth Circuit's finding of discriminatory intent",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 2's results test is untenable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant certiorari because the scope of Section 2's results test is a critically important issue that has repeatedly evaded this Court's review\nII. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 2's results test is untenable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. If Section 2 requires invalidation of neutral state laws without proof of intentional discrimination, then the statute exceeds Congress' enforcement power\nC. If Section 2's results test requires states to pervasively consider race in crafting election laws, it also conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause\nD. At a minimum, this Court should interpret Section 2 to require a substantial disparate impact and evidence that the challenged law caused the disparate impact\nIII. The Court should also consider, and reverse, the Ninth Circuit's finding of discriminatory intent",
        "reference": "A. The Constitution gives states broad leeway to adopt common-sense election integrity measures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant certiorari because the scope of Section 2's results test is a critically important issue that has repeatedly evaded this Court's review\nII. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 2's results test is untenable\nA. The Constitution gives states broad leeway to adopt common-sense election integrity measures\nB. [MISSING]\nC. If Section 2's results test requires states to pervasively consider race in crafting election laws, it also conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause\nD. At a minimum, this Court should interpret Section 2 to require a substantial disparate impact and evidence that the challenged law caused the disparate impact\nIII. The Court should also consider, and reverse, the Ninth Circuit's finding of discriminatory intent",
        "reference": "B. If Section 2 requires invalidation of neutral state laws without proof of intentional discrimination, then the statute exceeds Congress' enforcement power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant certiorari because the scope of Section 2's results test is a critically important issue that has repeatedly evaded this Court's review\nII. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 2's results test is untenable\nA. The Constitution gives states broad leeway to adopt common-sense election integrity measures\nB. If Section 2 requires invalidation of neutral state laws without proof of intentional discrimination, then the statute exceeds Congress' enforcement power\nC. [MISSING]\nD. At a minimum, this Court should interpret Section 2 to require a substantial disparate impact and evidence that the challenged law caused the disparate impact\nIII. The Court should also consider, and reverse, the Ninth Circuit's finding of discriminatory intent",
        "reference": "C. If Section 2's results test requires states to pervasively consider race in crafting election laws, it also conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant certiorari because the scope of Section 2's results test is a critically important issue that has repeatedly evaded this Court's review\nII. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 2's results test is untenable\nA. The Constitution gives states broad leeway to adopt common-sense election integrity measures\nB. If Section 2 requires invalidation of neutral state laws without proof of intentional discrimination, then the statute exceeds Congress' enforcement power\nC. If Section 2's results test requires states to pervasively consider race in crafting election laws, it also conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. The Court should also consider, and reverse, the Ninth Circuit's finding of discriminatory intent",
        "reference": "D. At a minimum, this Court should interpret Section 2 to require a substantial disparate impact and evidence that the challenged law caused the disparate impact",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant certiorari because the scope of Section 2's results test is a critically important issue that has repeatedly evaded this Court's review\nII. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 2's results test is untenable\nA. The Constitution gives states broad leeway to adopt common-sense election integrity measures\nB. If Section 2 requires invalidation of neutral state laws without proof of intentional discrimination, then the statute exceeds Congress' enforcement power\nC. If Section 2's results test requires states to pervasively consider race in crafting election laws, it also conflicts with the Equal Protection Clause\nD. At a minimum, this Court should interpret Section 2 to require a substantial disparate impact and evidence that the challenged law caused the disparate impact\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Court should also consider, and reverse, the Ninth Circuit's finding of discriminatory intent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "ARGUMENTS [MISSING]\nI. SECTION THREE HAS INDEPENDENT LEGAL EFFECT.\nA. Text.\nB. Constitutional Structure.\nC. History.\nD. Common Sense.\nE. Griffin's Case.\nII. SECTION THREE'S DISQUALIFICATION CAN (AND LIKELY MUST) BE GIVEN EFFECT IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.\nIII. COLORADO ELECTION LAW ALLOWS ELECTORS TO TEST THE QUALIFICATIONS OF PRIMARY CANDIDATES.\nV. POLICY CONCERNS DO NOT JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES \u2014 ESPECIALLY WHEN THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A POLITICAL SOLUTION ANYWAY.",
        "reference": "ARGUMENTS EXTRACTED FROM TABLE OF CONTENTS:",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "ARGUMENTS EXTRACTED FROM TABLE OF CONTENTS:\nI. [MISSING]\nA. Text.\nB. Constitutional Structure.\nC. History.\nD. Common Sense.\nE. Griffin's Case.\nII. SECTION THREE'S DISQUALIFICATION CAN (AND LIKELY MUST) BE GIVEN EFFECT IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.\nIII. COLORADO ELECTION LAW ALLOWS ELECTORS TO TEST THE QUALIFICATIONS OF PRIMARY CANDIDATES.\nV. POLICY CONCERNS DO NOT JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES \u2014 ESPECIALLY WHEN THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A POLITICAL SOLUTION ANYWAY.",
        "reference": "I. SECTION THREE HAS INDEPENDENT LEGAL EFFECT.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "ARGUMENTS EXTRACTED FROM TABLE OF CONTENTS:\nI. SECTION THREE HAS INDEPENDENT LEGAL EFFECT.\nA. Text.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. History.\nD. Common Sense.\nE. Griffin's Case.\nII. SECTION THREE'S DISQUALIFICATION CAN (AND LIKELY MUST) BE GIVEN EFFECT IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.\nIII. COLORADO ELECTION LAW ALLOWS ELECTORS TO TEST THE QUALIFICATIONS OF PRIMARY CANDIDATES.\nV. POLICY CONCERNS DO NOT JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES \u2014 ESPECIALLY WHEN THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A POLITICAL SOLUTION ANYWAY.",
        "reference": "B. Constitutional Structure.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "ARGUMENTS EXTRACTED FROM TABLE OF CONTENTS:\nI. SECTION THREE HAS INDEPENDENT LEGAL EFFECT.\nA. Text.\nB. Constitutional Structure.\nC. History.\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Griffin's Case.\nII. SECTION THREE'S DISQUALIFICATION CAN (AND LIKELY MUST) BE GIVEN EFFECT IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.\nIII. COLORADO ELECTION LAW ALLOWS ELECTORS TO TEST THE QUALIFICATIONS OF PRIMARY CANDIDATES.\nV. POLICY CONCERNS DO NOT JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES \u2014 ESPECIALLY WHEN THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A POLITICAL SOLUTION ANYWAY.",
        "reference": "D. Common Sense.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "ARGUMENTS EXTRACTED FROM TABLE OF CONTENTS:\nI. SECTION THREE HAS INDEPENDENT LEGAL EFFECT.\nA. Text.\nB. Constitutional Structure.\nC. History.\nD. Common Sense.\nE. [MISSING]\nII. SECTION THREE'S DISQUALIFICATION CAN (AND LIKELY MUST) BE GIVEN EFFECT IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.\nIII. COLORADO ELECTION LAW ALLOWS ELECTORS TO TEST THE QUALIFICATIONS OF PRIMARY CANDIDATES.\nV. POLICY CONCERNS DO NOT JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES \u2014 ESPECIALLY WHEN THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A POLITICAL SOLUTION ANYWAY.",
        "reference": "E. Griffin's Case.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "ARGUMENTS EXTRACTED FROM TABLE OF CONTENTS:\nI. SECTION THREE HAS INDEPENDENT LEGAL EFFECT.\nA. Text.\nB. Constitutional Structure.\nC. History.\nD. Common Sense.\nE. Griffin's Case.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. COLORADO ELECTION LAW ALLOWS ELECTORS TO TEST THE QUALIFICATIONS OF PRIMARY CANDIDATES.\nV. POLICY CONCERNS DO NOT JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES \u2014 ESPECIALLY WHEN THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A POLITICAL SOLUTION ANYWAY.",
        "reference": "II. SECTION THREE'S DISQUALIFICATION CAN (AND LIKELY MUST) BE GIVEN EFFECT IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "ARGUMENTS EXTRACTED FROM TABLE OF CONTENTS:\nI. SECTION THREE HAS INDEPENDENT LEGAL EFFECT.\nA. Text.\nB. Constitutional Structure.\nC. History.\nD. Common Sense.\nE. Griffin's Case.\nII. SECTION THREE'S DISQUALIFICATION CAN (AND LIKELY MUST) BE GIVEN EFFECT IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.\nIII. [MISSING]\nV. POLICY CONCERNS DO NOT JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES \u2014 ESPECIALLY WHEN THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A POLITICAL SOLUTION ANYWAY.",
        "reference": "III. COLORADO ELECTION LAW ALLOWS ELECTORS TO TEST THE QUALIFICATIONS OF PRIMARY CANDIDATES.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "ARGUMENTS EXTRACTED FROM TABLE OF CONTENTS:\nI. SECTION THREE HAS INDEPENDENT LEGAL EFFECT.\nA. Text.\nB. Constitutional Structure.\nC. History.\nD. Common Sense.\nE. Griffin's Case.\nII. SECTION THREE'S DISQUALIFICATION CAN (AND LIKELY MUST) BE GIVEN EFFECT IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.\nIII. COLORADO ELECTION LAW ALLOWS ELECTORS TO TEST THE QUALIFICATIONS OF PRIMARY CANDIDATES.\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. POLICY CONCERNS DO NOT JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES \u2014 ESPECIALLY WHEN THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A POLITICAL SOLUTION ANYWAY.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The district court erred in its analysis of intentional vote dilution in the 2013 congressional and State House plans\nA. Plaintiffs' claims of intentional vote dilution require them to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with a discriminatory racial purpose\nB. The district court incorrectly presumed discriminatory intent and shifted the burden of proof to the state\nC. This Court should reject the basis for the district court's findings of intentional discrimination\n1. Application of a strong presumption of good faith is appropriate in this case\n2. Neither the district court nor plaintiffs' filings to date in this Court have identified sufficient evidence to rebut the strong presumption of good faith\nIII. The district court erred in concluding that Congressional District 35 is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander",
        "reference": "I. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over these appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over these appeals\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Plaintiffs' claims of intentional vote dilution require them to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with a discriminatory racial purpose\nB. The district court incorrectly presumed discriminatory intent and shifted the burden of proof to the state\nC. This Court should reject the basis for the district court's findings of intentional discrimination\n1. Application of a strong presumption of good faith is appropriate in this case\n2. Neither the district court nor plaintiffs' filings to date in this Court have identified sufficient evidence to rebut the strong presumption of good faith\nIII. The district court erred in concluding that Congressional District 35 is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander",
        "reference": "II. The district court erred in its analysis of intentional vote dilution in the 2013 congressional and State House plans",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over these appeals\nII. The district court erred in its analysis of intentional vote dilution in the 2013 congressional and State House plans\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The district court incorrectly presumed discriminatory intent and shifted the burden of proof to the state\nC. This Court should reject the basis for the district court's findings of intentional discrimination\n1. Application of a strong presumption of good faith is appropriate in this case\n2. Neither the district court nor plaintiffs' filings to date in this Court have identified sufficient evidence to rebut the strong presumption of good faith\nIII. The district court erred in concluding that Congressional District 35 is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander",
        "reference": "A. Plaintiffs' claims of intentional vote dilution require them to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with a discriminatory racial purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over these appeals\nII. The district court erred in its analysis of intentional vote dilution in the 2013 congressional and State House plans\nA. Plaintiffs' claims of intentional vote dilution require them to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with a discriminatory racial purpose\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Court should reject the basis for the district court's findings of intentional discrimination\n1. Application of a strong presumption of good faith is appropriate in this case\n2. Neither the district court nor plaintiffs' filings to date in this Court have identified sufficient evidence to rebut the strong presumption of good faith\nIII. The district court erred in concluding that Congressional District 35 is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander",
        "reference": "B. The district court incorrectly presumed discriminatory intent and shifted the burden of proof to the state",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over these appeals\nII. The district court erred in its analysis of intentional vote dilution in the 2013 congressional and State House plans\nA. Plaintiffs' claims of intentional vote dilution require them to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with a discriminatory racial purpose\nB. The district court incorrectly presumed discriminatory intent and shifted the burden of proof to the state\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Application of a strong presumption of good faith is appropriate in this case\n2. Neither the district court nor plaintiffs' filings to date in this Court have identified sufficient evidence to rebut the strong presumption of good faith\nIII. The district court erred in concluding that Congressional District 35 is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander",
        "reference": "C. This Court should reject the basis for the district court's findings of intentional discrimination",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over these appeals\nII. The district court erred in its analysis of intentional vote dilution in the 2013 congressional and State House plans\nA. Plaintiffs' claims of intentional vote dilution require them to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with a discriminatory racial purpose\nB. The district court incorrectly presumed discriminatory intent and shifted the burden of proof to the state\nC. This Court should reject the basis for the district court's findings of intentional discrimination\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Neither the district court nor plaintiffs' filings to date in this Court have identified sufficient evidence to rebut the strong presumption of good faith\nIII. The district court erred in concluding that Congressional District 35 is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander",
        "reference": "1. Application of a strong presumption of good faith is appropriate in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over these appeals\nII. The district court erred in its analysis of intentional vote dilution in the 2013 congressional and State House plans\nA. Plaintiffs' claims of intentional vote dilution require them to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with a discriminatory racial purpose\nB. The district court incorrectly presumed discriminatory intent and shifted the burden of proof to the state\nC. This Court should reject the basis for the district court's findings of intentional discrimination\n1. Application of a strong presumption of good faith is appropriate in this case\n2. [MISSING]\nIII. The district court erred in concluding that Congressional District 35 is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander",
        "reference": "2. Neither the district court nor plaintiffs' filings to date in this Court have identified sufficient evidence to rebut the strong presumption of good faith",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over these appeals\nII. The district court erred in its analysis of intentional vote dilution in the 2013 congressional and State House plans\nA. Plaintiffs' claims of intentional vote dilution require them to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with a discriminatory racial purpose\nB. The district court incorrectly presumed discriminatory intent and shifted the burden of proof to the state\nC. This Court should reject the basis for the district court's findings of intentional discrimination\n1. Application of a strong presumption of good faith is appropriate in this case\n2. Neither the district court nor plaintiffs' filings to date in this Court have identified sufficient evidence to rebut the strong presumption of good faith\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The district court erred in concluding that Congressional District 35 is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The history and language of the Copyright Act demonstrate that Oracle's software is not a noncopyrightable \"method of operation.\"\n2. Google fails to show that this Court's precedents demonstrate that the \"merger\" doctrine applies here.\n3. Google seeks to substitute its own one-sided view of industry custom and practice for the laws Congress has passed.\nB. Google Fails To Show That Its Copying Of The Heart Of Oracle's Software For Lucrative Commercial Purposes Constitutes \"Fair Use.\"\n1. The Federal Circuit applied the proper standard of review.\n2. Google's extrastatutory factors do not argue in favor of \"fair use.\"\n3. The Federal Circuit correctly found that the four traditional statutory factors do not favor \"fair use.\"",
        "reference": "A. Google And Its Amici Seek To Overturn Existing U.S. Copyright Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. Google And Its Amici Seek To Overturn Existing U.S. Copyright Law\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Google fails to show that this Court's precedents demonstrate that the \"merger\" doctrine applies here.\n3. Google seeks to substitute its own one-sided view of industry custom and practice for the laws Congress has passed.\nB. Google Fails To Show That Its Copying Of The Heart Of Oracle's Software For Lucrative Commercial Purposes Constitutes \"Fair Use.\"\n1. The Federal Circuit applied the proper standard of review.\n2. Google's extrastatutory factors do not argue in favor of \"fair use.\"\n3. The Federal Circuit correctly found that the four traditional statutory factors do not favor \"fair use.\"",
        "reference": "1. The history and language of the Copyright Act demonstrate that Oracle's software is not a noncopyrightable \"method of operation.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. Google And Its Amici Seek To Overturn Existing U.S. Copyright Law\n1. The history and language of the Copyright Act demonstrate that Oracle's software is not a noncopyrightable \"method of operation.\"\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Google seeks to substitute its own one-sided view of industry custom and practice for the laws Congress has passed.\nB. Google Fails To Show That Its Copying Of The Heart Of Oracle's Software For Lucrative Commercial Purposes Constitutes \"Fair Use.\"\n1. The Federal Circuit applied the proper standard of review.\n2. Google's extrastatutory factors do not argue in favor of \"fair use.\"\n3. The Federal Circuit correctly found that the four traditional statutory factors do not favor \"fair use.\"",
        "reference": "2. Google fails to show that this Court's precedents demonstrate that the \"merger\" doctrine applies here.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. Google And Its Amici Seek To Overturn Existing U.S. Copyright Law\n1. The history and language of the Copyright Act demonstrate that Oracle's software is not a noncopyrightable \"method of operation.\"\n2. Google fails to show that this Court's precedents demonstrate that the \"merger\" doctrine applies here.\n3. [MISSING]\nB. Google Fails To Show That Its Copying Of The Heart Of Oracle's Software For Lucrative Commercial Purposes Constitutes \"Fair Use.\"\n1. The Federal Circuit applied the proper standard of review.\n2. Google's extrastatutory factors do not argue in favor of \"fair use.\"\n3. The Federal Circuit correctly found that the four traditional statutory factors do not favor \"fair use.\"",
        "reference": "3. Google seeks to substitute its own one-sided view of industry custom and practice for the laws Congress has passed.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. Google And Its Amici Seek To Overturn Existing U.S. Copyright Law\n1. The history and language of the Copyright Act demonstrate that Oracle's software is not a noncopyrightable \"method of operation.\"\n2. Google fails to show that this Court's precedents demonstrate that the \"merger\" doctrine applies here.\n3. Google seeks to substitute its own one-sided view of industry custom and practice for the laws Congress has passed.\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Federal Circuit applied the proper standard of review.\n2. Google's extrastatutory factors do not argue in favor of \"fair use.\"\n3. The Federal Circuit correctly found that the four traditional statutory factors do not favor \"fair use.\"",
        "reference": "B. Google Fails To Show That Its Copying Of The Heart Of Oracle's Software For Lucrative Commercial Purposes Constitutes \"Fair Use.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. Google And Its Amici Seek To Overturn Existing U.S. Copyright Law\n1. The history and language of the Copyright Act demonstrate that Oracle's software is not a noncopyrightable \"method of operation.\"\n2. Google fails to show that this Court's precedents demonstrate that the \"merger\" doctrine applies here.\n3. Google seeks to substitute its own one-sided view of industry custom and practice for the laws Congress has passed.\nB. Google Fails To Show That Its Copying Of The Heart Of Oracle's Software For Lucrative Commercial Purposes Constitutes \"Fair Use.\"\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Google's extrastatutory factors do not argue in favor of \"fair use.\"\n3. The Federal Circuit correctly found that the four traditional statutory factors do not favor \"fair use.\"",
        "reference": "1. The Federal Circuit applied the proper standard of review.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. Google And Its Amici Seek To Overturn Existing U.S. Copyright Law\n1. The history and language of the Copyright Act demonstrate that Oracle's software is not a noncopyrightable \"method of operation.\"\n2. Google fails to show that this Court's precedents demonstrate that the \"merger\" doctrine applies here.\n3. Google seeks to substitute its own one-sided view of industry custom and practice for the laws Congress has passed.\nB. Google Fails To Show That Its Copying Of The Heart Of Oracle's Software For Lucrative Commercial Purposes Constitutes \"Fair Use.\"\n1. The Federal Circuit applied the proper standard of review.\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Federal Circuit correctly found that the four traditional statutory factors do not favor \"fair use.\"",
        "reference": "2. Google's extrastatutory factors do not argue in favor of \"fair use.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. Google And Its Amici Seek To Overturn Existing U.S. Copyright Law\n1. The history and language of the Copyright Act demonstrate that Oracle's software is not a noncopyrightable \"method of operation.\"\n2. Google fails to show that this Court's precedents demonstrate that the \"merger\" doctrine applies here.\n3. Google seeks to substitute its own one-sided view of industry custom and practice for the laws Congress has passed.\nB. Google Fails To Show That Its Copying Of The Heart Of Oracle's Software For Lucrative Commercial Purposes Constitutes \"Fair Use.\"\n1. The Federal Circuit applied the proper standard of review.\n2. Google's extrastatutory factors do not argue in favor of \"fair use.\"\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. The Federal Circuit correctly found that the four traditional statutory factors do not favor \"fair use.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1063_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan\nB. Petitioner Cites No Authority that Actually Supports His Novel Proposal\nC. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate\nII. PETITIONER CANNOT OVERCOME STARE DECISIS\nIII. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR THE COURT TO REVIEW THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD\nA. Petitioner Is a Public Figure Under Any Standard\nB. Petitioner's Claims Are Dismissible on Alternate Grounds",
        "reference": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OR COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1063_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OR COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner Cites No Authority that Actually Supports His Novel Proposal\nC. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate\nII. PETITIONER CANNOT OVERCOME STARE DECISIS\nIII. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR THE COURT TO REVIEW THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD\nA. Petitioner Is a Public Figure Under Any Standard\nB. Petitioner's Claims Are Dismissible on Alternate Grounds",
        "reference": "A. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1063_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OR COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI\nA. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate\nII. PETITIONER CANNOT OVERCOME STARE DECISIS\nIII. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR THE COURT TO REVIEW THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD\nA. Petitioner Is a Public Figure Under Any Standard\nB. Petitioner's Claims Are Dismissible on Alternate Grounds",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner Cites No Authority that Actually Supports His Novel Proposal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1063_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OR COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI\nA. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan\nB. Petitioner Cites No Authority that Actually Supports His Novel Proposal\nC. [MISSING]\nII. PETITIONER CANNOT OVERCOME STARE DECISIS\nIII. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR THE COURT TO REVIEW THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD\nA. Petitioner Is a Public Figure Under Any Standard\nB. Petitioner's Claims Are Dismissible on Alternate Grounds",
        "reference": "C. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1063_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OR COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI\nA. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan\nB. Petitioner Cites No Authority that Actually Supports His Novel Proposal\nC. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR THE COURT TO REVIEW THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD\nA. Petitioner Is a Public Figure Under Any Standard\nB. Petitioner's Claims Are Dismissible on Alternate Grounds",
        "reference": "II. PETITIONER CANNOT OVERCOME STARE DECISIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1063_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OR COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI\nA. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan\nB. Petitioner Cites No Authority that Actually Supports His Novel Proposal\nC. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate\nII. PETITIONER CANNOT OVERCOME STARE DECISIS\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner Is a Public Figure Under Any Standard\nB. Petitioner's Claims Are Dismissible on Alternate Grounds",
        "reference": "III. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR THE COURT TO REVIEW THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1063_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OR COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI\nA. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan\nB. Petitioner Cites No Authority that Actually Supports His Novel Proposal\nC. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate\nII. PETITIONER CANNOT OVERCOME STARE DECISIS\nIII. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR THE COURT TO REVIEW THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner's Claims Are Dismissible on Alternate Grounds",
        "reference": "A. Petitioner Is a Public Figure Under Any Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1063_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OR COMPELLING REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI\nA. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan\nB. Petitioner Cites No Authority that Actually Supports His Novel Proposal\nC. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate\nII. PETITIONER CANNOT OVERCOME STARE DECISIS\nIII. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR THE COURT TO REVIEW THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD\nA. Petitioner Is a Public Figure Under Any Standard\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's Claims Are Dismissible on Alternate Grounds",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. For nearly 40 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts where special factors counsel hesitation\nB. This case presents a new context for a Bivens remedy\nC. Multiple special factors counsel hesitation before extending a Bivens remedy to aliens injured abroad\n1. Claims by aliens injured abroad implicate foreign affairs and national security\n2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate\n3. The presumption against extraterritoriality reinforces the inappropriateness of extending Bivens to aliens injured abroad\nD. The purported inadequacy of alternative remedies cannot justify extending Bivens",
        "reference": "The judicially created Bivens remedy should not be extended to aliens injured abroad",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "The judicially created Bivens remedy should not be extended to aliens injured abroad\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This case presents a new context for a Bivens remedy\nC. Multiple special factors counsel hesitation before extending a Bivens remedy to aliens injured abroad\n1. Claims by aliens injured abroad implicate foreign affairs and national security\n2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate\n3. The presumption against extraterritoriality reinforces the inappropriateness of extending Bivens to aliens injured abroad\nD. The purported inadequacy of alternative remedies cannot justify extending Bivens",
        "reference": "A. For nearly 40 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts where special factors counsel hesitation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "The judicially created Bivens remedy should not be extended to aliens injured abroad\nA. For nearly 40 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts where special factors counsel hesitation\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Multiple special factors counsel hesitation before extending a Bivens remedy to aliens injured abroad\n1. Claims by aliens injured abroad implicate foreign affairs and national security\n2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate\n3. The presumption against extraterritoriality reinforces the inappropriateness of extending Bivens to aliens injured abroad\nD. The purported inadequacy of alternative remedies cannot justify extending Bivens",
        "reference": "B. This case presents a new context for a Bivens remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "The judicially created Bivens remedy should not be extended to aliens injured abroad\nA. For nearly 40 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts where special factors counsel hesitation\nB. This case presents a new context for a Bivens remedy\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Claims by aliens injured abroad implicate foreign affairs and national security\n2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate\n3. The presumption against extraterritoriality reinforces the inappropriateness of extending Bivens to aliens injured abroad\nD. The purported inadequacy of alternative remedies cannot justify extending Bivens",
        "reference": "C. Multiple special factors counsel hesitation before extending a Bivens remedy to aliens injured abroad",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "The judicially created Bivens remedy should not be extended to aliens injured abroad\nA. For nearly 40 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts where special factors counsel hesitation\nB. This case presents a new context for a Bivens remedy\nC. Multiple special factors counsel hesitation before extending a Bivens remedy to aliens injured abroad\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate\n3. The presumption against extraterritoriality reinforces the inappropriateness of extending Bivens to aliens injured abroad\nD. The purported inadequacy of alternative remedies cannot justify extending Bivens",
        "reference": "1. Claims by aliens injured abroad implicate foreign affairs and national security",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "The judicially created Bivens remedy should not be extended to aliens injured abroad\nA. For nearly 40 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts where special factors counsel hesitation\nB. This case presents a new context for a Bivens remedy\nC. Multiple special factors counsel hesitation before extending a Bivens remedy to aliens injured abroad\n1. Claims by aliens injured abroad implicate foreign affairs and national security\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The presumption against extraterritoriality reinforces the inappropriateness of extending Bivens to aliens injured abroad\nD. The purported inadequacy of alternative remedies cannot justify extending Bivens",
        "reference": "2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "The judicially created Bivens remedy should not be extended to aliens injured abroad\nA. For nearly 40 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts where special factors counsel hesitation\nB. This case presents a new context for a Bivens remedy\nC. Multiple special factors counsel hesitation before extending a Bivens remedy to aliens injured abroad\n1. Claims by aliens injured abroad implicate foreign affairs and national security\n2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate\n3. [MISSING]\nD. The purported inadequacy of alternative remedies cannot justify extending Bivens",
        "reference": "3. The presumption against extraterritoriality reinforces the inappropriateness of extending Bivens to aliens injured abroad",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "The judicially created Bivens remedy should not be extended to aliens injured abroad\nA. For nearly 40 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts where special factors counsel hesitation\nB. This case presents a new context for a Bivens remedy\nC. Multiple special factors counsel hesitation before extending a Bivens remedy to aliens injured abroad\n1. Claims by aliens injured abroad implicate foreign affairs and national security\n2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate\n3. The presumption against extraterritoriality reinforces the inappropriateness of extending Bivens to aliens injured abroad\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The purported inadequacy of alternative remedies cannot justify extending Bivens",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "II. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "III. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "A. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "B. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. [MISSING]\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "C. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "IV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "A. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "1. The Act Is Content-Based",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "B. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. [MISSING]\nC. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "reference": "2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WORK OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nII. THE STAFF AND VOLUNTEERS OF PREGNANCY CENTERS\nIII. THE ACT'S IMPACT ON SPEECH\nA. The Act Compels Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers To Speak Words With Which They Profoundly Disagree\nB. The Act Chills Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers' Staff And Volunteers\nC. The Act Fundamentally Alters \u2014 Indeed, Outright Precludes \u2014 Constitutionally Protected Speech Of Non-Medically Licensed Pregnancy Centers\nIV. THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Act Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Act Is Content-Based\n2. The Act Is Viewpoint-Based\nB. The Act Fails Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Requirements Imposed on Non-Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Act Fails Even Intermediate Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Constitution's text, structure, and history confirm that states ceded their sovereign immunity in the plan of the Convention\nB. The Court's precedents support a finding of a plan of the Convention waiver for the war powers\nII. An Adverse Ruling Would Harm the National Defense and Leave Thousands of Veterans Vulnerable to Discrimination on the Basis of their Military Service",
        "reference": "I. The States Surrendered Their Sovereign Immunity To Suits Authorized by the War Powers In the Plan of the Convention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The States Surrendered Their Sovereign Immunity To Suits Authorized by the War Powers In the Plan of the Convention\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court's precedents support a finding of a plan of the Convention waiver for the war powers\nII. An Adverse Ruling Would Harm the National Defense and Leave Thousands of Veterans Vulnerable to Discrimination on the Basis of their Military Service",
        "reference": "A. The Constitution's text, structure, and history confirm that states ceded their sovereign immunity in the plan of the Convention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The States Surrendered Their Sovereign Immunity To Suits Authorized by the War Powers In the Plan of the Convention\nA. The Constitution's text, structure, and history confirm that states ceded their sovereign immunity in the plan of the Convention\nB. [MISSING]\nII. An Adverse Ruling Would Harm the National Defense and Leave Thousands of Veterans Vulnerable to Discrimination on the Basis of their Military Service",
        "reference": "B. The Court's precedents support a finding of a plan of the Convention waiver for the war powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The States Surrendered Their Sovereign Immunity To Suits Authorized by the War Powers In the Plan of the Convention\nA. The Constitution's text, structure, and history confirm that states ceded their sovereign immunity in the plan of the Convention\nB. The Court's precedents support a finding of a plan of the Convention waiver for the war powers\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. An Adverse Ruling Would Harm the National Defense and Leave Thousands of Veterans Vulnerable to Discrimination on the Basis of their Military Service",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "II. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "III. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "IV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "A. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "B. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "C. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "D. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. [MISSING]\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "E. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. [MISSING]\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "F. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. [MISSING]\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "G. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. [MISSING]\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "V. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. [MISSING]\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "VI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. [MISSING]\nVIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "reference": "VII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT MUST DO BETTER THAN ITS DOBBS OPINION (OR DISSENT), LEST IT LOSE PUBLIC CREDIBILITY\nII. JUSTICE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON WAS CHOSEN BY OPEN RACIAL/GENDER SELECTION, SO THE COURT'S MEMBERS MAY BE OBLIGED TO OPPOSE HER SEAT ON THE COURT IF THEY TRULY OPPOSE RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nIII. SUPPORTING ISRAEL, A.K.A. \"AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR JEWS\", MAKES IT AWKWARD TO SAY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS EVIL AND MUST BE BANNED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ABOLISH AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BEFORE ALUMNI-CHILD COLLEGE-ADMISSION PRIVILEGES \u2014THEMSELVES A FORM OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION \u2014HAVE BEEN ABOLISHED\nA. The Court Might Consider Sua Sponte Abolishing Alumni-Child (or Similar) Admissions Advantages\nB. Why Didn't Petitioner Sue Respondents Over Alumni-Child Admission Advantages?\nC. The Court's Members Should Be Transparent About Any Admissions Privileges Their Families Have Received or Will Receive, Including Alumni-Child, Donor, or Other Privileges\nD. Just Because Some Alumni Children Are Also from Underrepresented Minorities, That Does Not Justify Keeping Alumni-Child Privileges\nE. Underrepresented Minorities Should Be Able to Opt Out of Preferential Treatment in Admissions, if They Feel Stigmatized by It\nF. Giving Admissions Privileges to Children of Donors Is Reminiscent of Prostitution/Bribery\nG. Petitioner's Simulated Alternative, Ending Privilege Preferences, Has Good Points, but Does Not Logically Imply Affirmative Action Must End.. and It Also Massively, Wrongly Hurts Underrepresented-Minority Applicants\nV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DOES NOT LOGICALLY REQUIRE BIAS AGAINST ASIAN AMERICANS OR OTHER GROUPS\nVI. TWO ASIAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION\nVII. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SHOULD SURVIVE FOR AT LEAST THE \"25-YEAR GRACE PERIOD\" GRANTED IN GRUTTER, AND POSSIBLY LONGER\nVIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "VIII. GRUTTER IS NOT PLESSY, ESPECIALLY GIVEN BROWN, COLIN POWELL'S EMBRACE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING'S ADVOCATING ACTUAL QUOTAS FOR UNDERREPRESENTED MINORITIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "A. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. [MISSING]\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "B. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. [MISSING]\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "C. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. [MISSING]\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. [MISSING]\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. [MISSING]\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "D. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. [MISSING]\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. [MISSING]\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "E. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. [MISSING]\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "II. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "A. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "B. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "III. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "A. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania Law Should Determine The Enforceability Of The Choice-Of-Law Clause, And Under Pennsylvania Law, Courts Consider Pennsylvania Public Policy\nA. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary\nB. Great Lakes mischaracterizes Wilburn Boat\nC. There is no established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts\n1. There is no pre-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\n2. There is no post-Wilburn Boat case law demonstrating an established federal rule\nD. This Court's case law supports Raiders' position that state law should be applied to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause\n1. Cassirer supports Raiders' position\n2. The Bremen and Carnival support Raiders' position\nE. Under Pennsylvania law, a court should apply Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187, which in turn requires consideration of Pennsylvania public policy\nII. Alternatively, If The Court Were To Adopt A Federal Common Law Rule, It Should Apply The Rule Of Restatement (Second) Of Conflict Of Laws section 187, Rather Than Petitioner's Contrived Proposed Rule\nA. If a federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime insurance contracts were needed, the Restatement's test strikes the appropriate balance between predictability, fairness, and respect for local substantive law\nB. The contrived federal common law rule that Great Lakes favors is baseless\nIII. Raiders' Position Is Good Policy\nA. It makes sense to consider Pennsylvania public policy in determining whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Great Lakes' policy arguments are unpersuasive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress Regarded Independence as Fundamental to the Bureau's Design\nB. Severance Would Radically Transform Financial Regulation, Upending the Balance Struck by Congress Over Decades\nC. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute\nD. The Court Must Reach the Severability Issue as a Jurisdictional Matter\nII. If the Removal Bar Can Be Severed, the Court Must Hold the Bureau's Action to Date Invalid\nA. The Actions of an Official Unconstitutionally Insulated from Removal Are Invalid\nB. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury\nC. Following Lucia, the Court Should Preclude Ratification of the Bureau's Invalid Action",
        "reference": "I. The For-Cause Removal Bar Cannot Be Severed from Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The For-Cause Removal Bar Cannot Be Severed from Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Severance Would Radically Transform Financial Regulation, Upending the Balance Struck by Congress Over Decades\nC. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute\nD. The Court Must Reach the Severability Issue as a Jurisdictional Matter\nII. If the Removal Bar Can Be Severed, the Court Must Hold the Bureau's Action to Date Invalid\nA. The Actions of an Official Unconstitutionally Insulated from Removal Are Invalid\nB. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury\nC. Following Lucia, the Court Should Preclude Ratification of the Bureau's Invalid Action",
        "reference": "A. Congress Regarded Independence as Fundamental to the Bureau's Design",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The For-Cause Removal Bar Cannot Be Severed from Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act\nA. Congress Regarded Independence as Fundamental to the Bureau's Design\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute\nD. The Court Must Reach the Severability Issue as a Jurisdictional Matter\nII. If the Removal Bar Can Be Severed, the Court Must Hold the Bureau's Action to Date Invalid\nA. The Actions of an Official Unconstitutionally Insulated from Removal Are Invalid\nB. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury\nC. Following Lucia, the Court Should Preclude Ratification of the Bureau's Invalid Action",
        "reference": "B. Severance Would Radically Transform Financial Regulation, Upending the Balance Struck by Congress Over Decades",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The For-Cause Removal Bar Cannot Be Severed from Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act\nA. Congress Regarded Independence as Fundamental to the Bureau's Design\nB. Severance Would Radically Transform Financial Regulation, Upending the Balance Struck by Congress Over Decades\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Court Must Reach the Severability Issue as a Jurisdictional Matter\nII. If the Removal Bar Can Be Severed, the Court Must Hold the Bureau's Action to Date Invalid\nA. The Actions of an Official Unconstitutionally Insulated from Removal Are Invalid\nB. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury\nC. Following Lucia, the Court Should Preclude Ratification of the Bureau's Invalid Action",
        "reference": "C. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The For-Cause Removal Bar Cannot Be Severed from Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act\nA. Congress Regarded Independence as Fundamental to the Bureau's Design\nB. Severance Would Radically Transform Financial Regulation, Upending the Balance Struck by Congress Over Decades\nC. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute\nD. [MISSING]\nII. If the Removal Bar Can Be Severed, the Court Must Hold the Bureau's Action to Date Invalid\nA. The Actions of an Official Unconstitutionally Insulated from Removal Are Invalid\nB. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury\nC. Following Lucia, the Court Should Preclude Ratification of the Bureau's Invalid Action",
        "reference": "D. The Court Must Reach the Severability Issue as a Jurisdictional Matter",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The For-Cause Removal Bar Cannot Be Severed from Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act\nA. Congress Regarded Independence as Fundamental to the Bureau's Design\nB. Severance Would Radically Transform Financial Regulation, Upending the Balance Struck by Congress Over Decades\nC. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute\nD. The Court Must Reach the Severability Issue as a Jurisdictional Matter\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Actions of an Official Unconstitutionally Insulated from Removal Are Invalid\nB. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury\nC. Following Lucia, the Court Should Preclude Ratification of the Bureau's Invalid Action",
        "reference": "II. If the Removal Bar Can Be Severed, the Court Must Hold the Bureau's Action to Date Invalid",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The For-Cause Removal Bar Cannot Be Severed from Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act\nA. Congress Regarded Independence as Fundamental to the Bureau's Design\nB. Severance Would Radically Transform Financial Regulation, Upending the Balance Struck by Congress Over Decades\nC. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute\nD. The Court Must Reach the Severability Issue as a Jurisdictional Matter\nII. If the Removal Bar Can Be Severed, the Court Must Hold the Bureau's Action to Date Invalid\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury\nC. Following Lucia, the Court Should Preclude Ratification of the Bureau's Invalid Action",
        "reference": "A. The Actions of an Official Unconstitutionally Insulated from Removal Are Invalid",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The For-Cause Removal Bar Cannot Be Severed from Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act\nA. Congress Regarded Independence as Fundamental to the Bureau's Design\nB. Severance Would Radically Transform Financial Regulation, Upending the Balance Struck by Congress Over Decades\nC. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute\nD. The Court Must Reach the Severability Issue as a Jurisdictional Matter\nII. If the Removal Bar Can Be Severed, the Court Must Hold the Bureau's Action to Date Invalid\nA. The Actions of an Official Unconstitutionally Insulated from Removal Are Invalid\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Following Lucia, the Court Should Preclude Ratification of the Bureau's Invalid Action",
        "reference": "B. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The For-Cause Removal Bar Cannot Be Severed from Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act\nA. Congress Regarded Independence as Fundamental to the Bureau's Design\nB. Severance Would Radically Transform Financial Regulation, Upending the Balance Struck by Congress Over Decades\nC. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute\nD. The Court Must Reach the Severability Issue as a Jurisdictional Matter\nII. If the Removal Bar Can Be Severed, the Court Must Hold the Bureau's Action to Date Invalid\nA. The Actions of an Official Unconstitutionally Insulated from Removal Are Invalid\nB. Invalidation Is Necessary To Redress Petitioner's Injury\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Following Lucia, the Court Should Preclude Ratification of the Bureau's Invalid Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THERE IS NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENFORCE THE DISQUALIFICATION CLAUSE\nA. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests Section Three is not self-executing\nB. History, case law, and congressional action all demonstrate that Section Three is not self-executing\nC. Construing Section Three as self-executing also contradicts the intent and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool to increase federal power\nD. There is no conflict between the relief requested by Donald J. Trump and Hassan v. Colorado\nIII. THEN-PRESIDENT TRUMP DID NOT INCITE JANUARY 6TH PROTESTORS TO ENGAGE IN INSURRECTION",
        "reference": "I. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION THREE WOULD ENABLE PARTISAN OFFICIALS TO DISQUALIFY POLITICAL OPPONENTS BY UNILATERALLY DECLARING THEM INSURRECTIONISTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION THREE WOULD ENABLE PARTISAN OFFICIALS TO DISQUALIFY POLITICAL OPPONENTS BY UNILATERALLY DECLARING THEM INSURRECTIONISTS\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests Section Three is not self-executing\nB. History, case law, and congressional action all demonstrate that Section Three is not self-executing\nC. Construing Section Three as self-executing also contradicts the intent and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool to increase federal power\nD. There is no conflict between the relief requested by Donald J. Trump and Hassan v. Colorado\nIII. THEN-PRESIDENT TRUMP DID NOT INCITE JANUARY 6TH PROTESTORS TO ENGAGE IN INSURRECTION",
        "reference": "II. THERE IS NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENFORCE THE DISQUALIFICATION CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION THREE WOULD ENABLE PARTISAN OFFICIALS TO DISQUALIFY POLITICAL OPPONENTS BY UNILATERALLY DECLARING THEM INSURRECTIONISTS\nII. THERE IS NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENFORCE THE DISQUALIFICATION CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. History, case law, and congressional action all demonstrate that Section Three is not self-executing\nC. Construing Section Three as self-executing also contradicts the intent and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool to increase federal power\nD. There is no conflict between the relief requested by Donald J. Trump and Hassan v. Colorado\nIII. THEN-PRESIDENT TRUMP DID NOT INCITE JANUARY 6TH PROTESTORS TO ENGAGE IN INSURRECTION",
        "reference": "A. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests Section Three is not self-executing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION THREE WOULD ENABLE PARTISAN OFFICIALS TO DISQUALIFY POLITICAL OPPONENTS BY UNILATERALLY DECLARING THEM INSURRECTIONISTS\nII. THERE IS NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENFORCE THE DISQUALIFICATION CLAUSE\nA. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests Section Three is not self-executing\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Construing Section Three as self-executing also contradicts the intent and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool to increase federal power\nD. There is no conflict between the relief requested by Donald J. Trump and Hassan v. Colorado\nIII. THEN-PRESIDENT TRUMP DID NOT INCITE JANUARY 6TH PROTESTORS TO ENGAGE IN INSURRECTION",
        "reference": "B. History, case law, and congressional action all demonstrate that Section Three is not self-executing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION THREE WOULD ENABLE PARTISAN OFFICIALS TO DISQUALIFY POLITICAL OPPONENTS BY UNILATERALLY DECLARING THEM INSURRECTIONISTS\nII. THERE IS NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENFORCE THE DISQUALIFICATION CLAUSE\nA. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests Section Three is not self-executing\nB. History, case law, and congressional action all demonstrate that Section Three is not self-executing\nC. [MISSING]\nD. There is no conflict between the relief requested by Donald J. Trump and Hassan v. Colorado\nIII. THEN-PRESIDENT TRUMP DID NOT INCITE JANUARY 6TH PROTESTORS TO ENGAGE IN INSURRECTION",
        "reference": "C. Construing Section Three as self-executing also contradicts the intent and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool to increase federal power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION THREE WOULD ENABLE PARTISAN OFFICIALS TO DISQUALIFY POLITICAL OPPONENTS BY UNILATERALLY DECLARING THEM INSURRECTIONISTS\nII. THERE IS NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENFORCE THE DISQUALIFICATION CLAUSE\nA. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests Section Three is not self-executing\nB. History, case law, and congressional action all demonstrate that Section Three is not self-executing\nC. Construing Section Three as self-executing also contradicts the intent and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool to increase federal power\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. THEN-PRESIDENT TRUMP DID NOT INCITE JANUARY 6TH PROTESTORS TO ENGAGE IN INSURRECTION",
        "reference": "D. There is no conflict between the relief requested by Donald J. Trump and Hassan v. Colorado",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION THREE WOULD ENABLE PARTISAN OFFICIALS TO DISQUALIFY POLITICAL OPPONENTS BY UNILATERALLY DECLARING THEM INSURRECTIONISTS\nII. THERE IS NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION TO ENFORCE THE DISQUALIFICATION CLAUSE\nA. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment suggests Section Three is not self-executing\nB. History, case law, and congressional action all demonstrate that Section Three is not self-executing\nC. Construing Section Three as self-executing also contradicts the intent and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment as a tool to increase federal power\nD. There is no conflict between the relief requested by Donald J. Trump and Hassan v. Colorado\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THEN-PRESIDENT TRUMP DID NOT INCITE JANUARY 6TH PROTESTORS TO ENGAGE IN INSURRECTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. CADA Does Not Violate the Compelled Speech Doctrine.\nA. CADA Neither Compels Affirmation of Belief nor Imposes a State-Chosen Message.\nB. CADA Does Not Force Speakers to Incorporate Unwanted Elements into Their Own Messages.\nC. Petitioner's Comparison of Its Website Services to Works by Great Artists is Inapposite.\nIII. Petitioner's Position Would Replace a Clear Rule with an Unworkable Standard That Has No Limiting Principle.\nIV. This Court Should Not Decide an As-Applied Challenge Asserted by a Business that has Never Offered the Service it Claims is Protected.",
        "reference": "I. CADA Does Not Regulate Speech.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADA Does Not Regulate Speech.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. CADA Neither Compels Affirmation of Belief nor Imposes a State-Chosen Message.\nB. CADA Does Not Force Speakers to Incorporate Unwanted Elements into Their Own Messages.\nC. Petitioner's Comparison of Its Website Services to Works by Great Artists is Inapposite.\nIII. Petitioner's Position Would Replace a Clear Rule with an Unworkable Standard That Has No Limiting Principle.\nIV. This Court Should Not Decide an As-Applied Challenge Asserted by a Business that has Never Offered the Service it Claims is Protected.",
        "reference": "II. CADA Does Not Violate the Compelled Speech Doctrine.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADA Does Not Regulate Speech.\nII. CADA Does Not Violate the Compelled Speech Doctrine.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. CADA Does Not Force Speakers to Incorporate Unwanted Elements into Their Own Messages.\nC. Petitioner's Comparison of Its Website Services to Works by Great Artists is Inapposite.\nIII. Petitioner's Position Would Replace a Clear Rule with an Unworkable Standard That Has No Limiting Principle.\nIV. This Court Should Not Decide an As-Applied Challenge Asserted by a Business that has Never Offered the Service it Claims is Protected.",
        "reference": "A. CADA Neither Compels Affirmation of Belief nor Imposes a State-Chosen Message.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADA Does Not Regulate Speech.\nII. CADA Does Not Violate the Compelled Speech Doctrine.\nA. CADA Neither Compels Affirmation of Belief nor Imposes a State-Chosen Message.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner's Comparison of Its Website Services to Works by Great Artists is Inapposite.\nIII. Petitioner's Position Would Replace a Clear Rule with an Unworkable Standard That Has No Limiting Principle.\nIV. This Court Should Not Decide an As-Applied Challenge Asserted by a Business that has Never Offered the Service it Claims is Protected.",
        "reference": "B. CADA Does Not Force Speakers to Incorporate Unwanted Elements into Their Own Messages.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADA Does Not Regulate Speech.\nII. CADA Does Not Violate the Compelled Speech Doctrine.\nA. CADA Neither Compels Affirmation of Belief nor Imposes a State-Chosen Message.\nB. CADA Does Not Force Speakers to Incorporate Unwanted Elements into Their Own Messages.\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. Petitioner's Position Would Replace a Clear Rule with an Unworkable Standard That Has No Limiting Principle.\nIV. This Court Should Not Decide an As-Applied Challenge Asserted by a Business that has Never Offered the Service it Claims is Protected.",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner's Comparison of Its Website Services to Works by Great Artists is Inapposite.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADA Does Not Regulate Speech.\nII. CADA Does Not Violate the Compelled Speech Doctrine.\nA. CADA Neither Compels Affirmation of Belief nor Imposes a State-Chosen Message.\nB. CADA Does Not Force Speakers to Incorporate Unwanted Elements into Their Own Messages.\nC. Petitioner's Comparison of Its Website Services to Works by Great Artists is Inapposite.\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. This Court Should Not Decide an As-Applied Challenge Asserted by a Business that has Never Offered the Service it Claims is Protected.",
        "reference": "III. Petitioner's Position Would Replace a Clear Rule with an Unworkable Standard That Has No Limiting Principle.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADA Does Not Regulate Speech.\nII. CADA Does Not Violate the Compelled Speech Doctrine.\nA. CADA Neither Compels Affirmation of Belief nor Imposes a State-Chosen Message.\nB. CADA Does Not Force Speakers to Incorporate Unwanted Elements into Their Own Messages.\nC. Petitioner's Comparison of Its Website Services to Works by Great Artists is Inapposite.\nIII. Petitioner's Position Would Replace a Clear Rule with an Unworkable Standard That Has No Limiting Principle.\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. This Court Should Not Decide an As-Applied Challenge Asserted by a Business that has Never Offered the Service it Claims is Protected.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioners Have Protectable Interests\nB. Petitioners' Interests Could Be Impaired By The Outcome Of This Suit\nC. Alternatively, Petitioners Should Have Been Granted Permissive Intervention\nII. Respondents' Mootness Arguments Remain Unpersuasive\nIII. Respondents' Defenses Of This Repeal Underscore The Importance Of Intervention",
        "reference": "I. Petitioners Are Entitled To Intervene Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners Are Entitled To Intervene Here\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' Interests Could Be Impaired By The Outcome Of This Suit\nC. Alternatively, Petitioners Should Have Been Granted Permissive Intervention\nII. Respondents' Mootness Arguments Remain Unpersuasive\nIII. Respondents' Defenses Of This Repeal Underscore The Importance Of Intervention",
        "reference": "A. Petitioners Have Protectable Interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners Are Entitled To Intervene Here\nA. Petitioners Have Protectable Interests\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Alternatively, Petitioners Should Have Been Granted Permissive Intervention\nII. Respondents' Mootness Arguments Remain Unpersuasive\nIII. Respondents' Defenses Of This Repeal Underscore The Importance Of Intervention",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' Interests Could Be Impaired By The Outcome Of This Suit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners Are Entitled To Intervene Here\nA. Petitioners Have Protectable Interests\nB. Petitioners' Interests Could Be Impaired By The Outcome Of This Suit\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Respondents' Mootness Arguments Remain Unpersuasive\nIII. Respondents' Defenses Of This Repeal Underscore The Importance Of Intervention",
        "reference": "C. Alternatively, Petitioners Should Have Been Granted Permissive Intervention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners Are Entitled To Intervene Here\nA. Petitioners Have Protectable Interests\nB. Petitioners' Interests Could Be Impaired By The Outcome Of This Suit\nC. Alternatively, Petitioners Should Have Been Granted Permissive Intervention\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Respondents' Defenses Of This Repeal Underscore The Importance Of Intervention",
        "reference": "II. Respondents' Mootness Arguments Remain Unpersuasive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners Are Entitled To Intervene Here\nA. Petitioners Have Protectable Interests\nB. Petitioners' Interests Could Be Impaired By The Outcome Of This Suit\nC. Alternatively, Petitioners Should Have Been Granted Permissive Intervention\nII. Respondents' Mootness Arguments Remain Unpersuasive\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Respondents' Defenses Of This Repeal Underscore The Importance Of Intervention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-761_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The decision below is final, not interlocutory\n2. The record is fully developed\nB. The Ninth Circuit Decision Reflects an Intractable Conflict with Five Other Courts of Appeals and with this Court\n1. The circuit split is real\n2. This Court's case law does not support the ruling below\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Denying Qualified Immunity is Presented Here and Warrants Review if the Court Wishes to Reach it\n1. Whether Richey's claimed right is clearly established is fairly included in the question presented\n2. The Ninth Circuit denial of qualified immunity warrants review",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit Ruling is Final and the Record is Fully Developed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-761_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit Ruling is Final and the Record is Fully Developed\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The record is fully developed\nB. The Ninth Circuit Decision Reflects an Intractable Conflict with Five Other Courts of Appeals and with this Court\n1. The circuit split is real\n2. This Court's case law does not support the ruling below\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Denying Qualified Immunity is Presented Here and Warrants Review if the Court Wishes to Reach it\n1. Whether Richey's claimed right is clearly established is fairly included in the question presented\n2. The Ninth Circuit denial of qualified immunity warrants review",
        "reference": "1. The decision below is final, not interlocutory",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-761_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit Ruling is Final and the Record is Fully Developed\n1. The decision below is final, not interlocutory\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit Decision Reflects an Intractable Conflict with Five Other Courts of Appeals and with this Court\n1. The circuit split is real\n2. This Court's case law does not support the ruling below\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Denying Qualified Immunity is Presented Here and Warrants Review if the Court Wishes to Reach it\n1. Whether Richey's claimed right is clearly established is fairly included in the question presented\n2. The Ninth Circuit denial of qualified immunity warrants review",
        "reference": "2. The record is fully developed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-761_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit Ruling is Final and the Record is Fully Developed\n1. The decision below is final, not interlocutory\n2. The record is fully developed\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The circuit split is real\n2. This Court's case law does not support the ruling below\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Denying Qualified Immunity is Presented Here and Warrants Review if the Court Wishes to Reach it\n1. Whether Richey's claimed right is clearly established is fairly included in the question presented\n2. The Ninth Circuit denial of qualified immunity warrants review",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit Decision Reflects an Intractable Conflict with Five Other Courts of Appeals and with this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-761_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit Ruling is Final and the Record is Fully Developed\n1. The decision below is final, not interlocutory\n2. The record is fully developed\nB. The Ninth Circuit Decision Reflects an Intractable Conflict with Five Other Courts of Appeals and with this Court\n1. [MISSING]\n2. This Court's case law does not support the ruling below\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Denying Qualified Immunity is Presented Here and Warrants Review if the Court Wishes to Reach it\n1. Whether Richey's claimed right is clearly established is fairly included in the question presented\n2. The Ninth Circuit denial of qualified immunity warrants review",
        "reference": "1. The circuit split is real",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-761_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit Ruling is Final and the Record is Fully Developed\n1. The decision below is final, not interlocutory\n2. The record is fully developed\nB. The Ninth Circuit Decision Reflects an Intractable Conflict with Five Other Courts of Appeals and with this Court\n1. The circuit split is real\n2. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Denying Qualified Immunity is Presented Here and Warrants Review if the Court Wishes to Reach it\n1. Whether Richey's claimed right is clearly established is fairly included in the question presented\n2. The Ninth Circuit denial of qualified immunity warrants review",
        "reference": "2. This Court's case law does not support the ruling below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-761_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit Ruling is Final and the Record is Fully Developed\n1. The decision below is final, not interlocutory\n2. The record is fully developed\nB. The Ninth Circuit Decision Reflects an Intractable Conflict with Five Other Courts of Appeals and with this Court\n1. The circuit split is real\n2. This Court's case law does not support the ruling below\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Whether Richey's claimed right is clearly established is fairly included in the question presented\n2. The Ninth Circuit denial of qualified immunity warrants review",
        "reference": "C. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Denying Qualified Immunity is Presented Here and Warrants Review if the Court Wishes to Reach it",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-761_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit Ruling is Final and the Record is Fully Developed\n1. The decision below is final, not interlocutory\n2. The record is fully developed\nB. The Ninth Circuit Decision Reflects an Intractable Conflict with Five Other Courts of Appeals and with this Court\n1. The circuit split is real\n2. This Court's case law does not support the ruling below\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Denying Qualified Immunity is Presented Here and Warrants Review if the Court Wishes to Reach it\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Ninth Circuit denial of qualified immunity warrants review",
        "reference": "1. Whether Richey's claimed right is clearly established is fairly included in the question presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-761_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit Ruling is Final and the Record is Fully Developed\n1. The decision below is final, not interlocutory\n2. The record is fully developed\nB. The Ninth Circuit Decision Reflects an Intractable Conflict with Five Other Courts of Appeals and with this Court\n1. The circuit split is real\n2. This Court's case law does not support the ruling below\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Denying Qualified Immunity is Presented Here and Warrants Review if the Court Wishes to Reach it\n1. Whether Richey's claimed right is clearly established is fairly included in the question presented\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. The Ninth Circuit denial of qualified immunity warrants review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "A. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "B. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. [MISSING]\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. [MISSING]\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "C. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "II. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "A. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "B. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "C. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. [MISSING]\nE. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "reference": "D. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION CONTRAVENES THE TEXT, ORIGINAL MEANING, AND PURPOSE OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE\nA. The Text of the Double Jeopardy Clause Contains No Exception for Separate Sovereigns\nB. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is at War with the Original Meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n1. The Framers Understood the Double Jeopardy Clause to Incorporate the English Common Law Rule Prohibiting Successive Prosecutions by Separate Sovereigns\n2. Early American Cases and Treatises Reflect the Hutchinson Rule\n3. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Developed in Dicta, Long after the Founding\nC. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Conflicts With the Purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause and With Core Principles of Federalism\nII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PREVENT THIS COURT FROM VINDICATING THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT NOT TO BE HELD TWICE IN JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Was Egregiously Wrong from Its Inception\nB. Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause Against the States Eviscerated the Core Doctrinal Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nC. The Multiplication of Federal Criminal Law Reversed the Factual Premise of the Separate Sovereigns Exception\nD. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Unworkable\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. No Reliance Interests Justify Retaining the Separate Sovereigns Exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. \"TRANSFORMATIVENESS,\" WHICH IS MERELY AN ASPECT OF THE FIRST FACTOR, IS NOT \u2014 AND SHOULD NOT BE \u2014 THE SINE QUA NON OF FAIR USE\nB. \"TRANSFORMATIVENESS\" CANNOT ECLIPSE AN AUTHOR'S EXCLUSIVE STATUTORY RIGHT TO CREATE DERIVATIVE WORKS\nII. A WORK'S PURPOSE OR MEANING MUST BE DETERMINED BASED ON THE REASONABLE PERCEPTION OF THAT WORK, AND CANNOT DEPEND SOLELY ON THE SUBJECTIVE OPINIONS OF INDIVIDUALS\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE NOTION OF A CELEBRITY PLAGIARIST EXCEPTION TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT",
        "reference": "I. NO ONE FACTOR, OR ASPECT THEREOF, SHOULD DOMINATE FAIR USE ANALYSIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. NO ONE FACTOR, OR ASPECT THEREOF, SHOULD DOMINATE FAIR USE ANALYSIS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. \"TRANSFORMATIVENESS\" CANNOT ECLIPSE AN AUTHOR'S EXCLUSIVE STATUTORY RIGHT TO CREATE DERIVATIVE WORKS\nII. A WORK'S PURPOSE OR MEANING MUST BE DETERMINED BASED ON THE REASONABLE PERCEPTION OF THAT WORK, AND CANNOT DEPEND SOLELY ON THE SUBJECTIVE OPINIONS OF INDIVIDUALS\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE NOTION OF A CELEBRITY PLAGIARIST EXCEPTION TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT",
        "reference": "A. \"TRANSFORMATIVENESS,\" WHICH IS MERELY AN ASPECT OF THE FIRST FACTOR, IS NOT \u2014 AND SHOULD NOT BE \u2014 THE SINE QUA NON OF FAIR USE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. NO ONE FACTOR, OR ASPECT THEREOF, SHOULD DOMINATE FAIR USE ANALYSIS\nA. \"TRANSFORMATIVENESS,\" WHICH IS MERELY AN ASPECT OF THE FIRST FACTOR, IS NOT \u2014 AND SHOULD NOT BE \u2014 THE SINE QUA NON OF FAIR USE\nB. [MISSING]\nII. A WORK'S PURPOSE OR MEANING MUST BE DETERMINED BASED ON THE REASONABLE PERCEPTION OF THAT WORK, AND CANNOT DEPEND SOLELY ON THE SUBJECTIVE OPINIONS OF INDIVIDUALS\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE NOTION OF A CELEBRITY PLAGIARIST EXCEPTION TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT",
        "reference": "B. \"TRANSFORMATIVENESS\" CANNOT ECLIPSE AN AUTHOR'S EXCLUSIVE STATUTORY RIGHT TO CREATE DERIVATIVE WORKS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. NO ONE FACTOR, OR ASPECT THEREOF, SHOULD DOMINATE FAIR USE ANALYSIS\nA. \"TRANSFORMATIVENESS,\" WHICH IS MERELY AN ASPECT OF THE FIRST FACTOR, IS NOT \u2014 AND SHOULD NOT BE \u2014 THE SINE QUA NON OF FAIR USE\nB. \"TRANSFORMATIVENESS\" CANNOT ECLIPSE AN AUTHOR'S EXCLUSIVE STATUTORY RIGHT TO CREATE DERIVATIVE WORKS\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE NOTION OF A CELEBRITY PLAGIARIST EXCEPTION TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT",
        "reference": "II. A WORK'S PURPOSE OR MEANING MUST BE DETERMINED BASED ON THE REASONABLE PERCEPTION OF THAT WORK, AND CANNOT DEPEND SOLELY ON THE SUBJECTIVE OPINIONS OF INDIVIDUALS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. NO ONE FACTOR, OR ASPECT THEREOF, SHOULD DOMINATE FAIR USE ANALYSIS\nA. \"TRANSFORMATIVENESS,\" WHICH IS MERELY AN ASPECT OF THE FIRST FACTOR, IS NOT \u2014 AND SHOULD NOT BE \u2014 THE SINE QUA NON OF FAIR USE\nB. \"TRANSFORMATIVENESS\" CANNOT ECLIPSE AN AUTHOR'S EXCLUSIVE STATUTORY RIGHT TO CREATE DERIVATIVE WORKS\nII. A WORK'S PURPOSE OR MEANING MUST BE DETERMINED BASED ON THE REASONABLE PERCEPTION OF THAT WORK, AND CANNOT DEPEND SOLELY ON THE SUBJECTIVE OPINIONS OF INDIVIDUALS\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE NOTION OF A CELEBRITY PLAGIARIST EXCEPTION TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Subsequent Amendments to the Constitution Protect the Right of Individuals To Associate for Political Ends and Guarantee that All Americans Enjoy Equal Protection of the Laws, Regardless of Political Affiliation\nIII. Partisan Gerrymandering that Has the Purpose and Effect of Subordinating Adherents of a Political Party and Severely Limiting the Effectiveness of Their Votes Violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments\nIV. The Constitution Requires Redress by the Courts When States Subordinate Adherents of a Political Party Based on Viewpoint in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments",
        "reference": "I. At the Framing, the Constitution Established a System of Government in Which the People Choose Their Elected Representatives, Not the Other Way Around",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. At the Framing, the Constitution Established a System of Government in Which the People Choose Their Elected Representatives, Not the Other Way Around\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Partisan Gerrymandering that Has the Purpose and Effect of Subordinating Adherents of a Political Party and Severely Limiting the Effectiveness of Their Votes Violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments\nIV. The Constitution Requires Redress by the Courts When States Subordinate Adherents of a Political Party Based on Viewpoint in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments",
        "reference": "II. Subsequent Amendments to the Constitution Protect the Right of Individuals To Associate for Political Ends and Guarantee that All Americans Enjoy Equal Protection of the Laws, Regardless of Political Affiliation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. At the Framing, the Constitution Established a System of Government in Which the People Choose Their Elected Representatives, Not the Other Way Around\nII. Subsequent Amendments to the Constitution Protect the Right of Individuals To Associate for Political Ends and Guarantee that All Americans Enjoy Equal Protection of the Laws, Regardless of Political Affiliation\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Constitution Requires Redress by the Courts When States Subordinate Adherents of a Political Party Based on Viewpoint in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments",
        "reference": "III. Partisan Gerrymandering that Has the Purpose and Effect of Subordinating Adherents of a Political Party and Severely Limiting the Effectiveness of Their Votes Violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. At the Framing, the Constitution Established a System of Government in Which the People Choose Their Elected Representatives, Not the Other Way Around\nII. Subsequent Amendments to the Constitution Protect the Right of Individuals To Associate for Political Ends and Guarantee that All Americans Enjoy Equal Protection of the Laws, Regardless of Political Affiliation\nIII. Partisan Gerrymandering that Has the Purpose and Effect of Subordinating Adherents of a Political Party and Severely Limiting the Effectiveness of Their Votes Violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Constitution Requires Redress by the Courts When States Subordinate Adherents of a Political Party Based on Viewpoint in Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The SEC's ALJs Are Inferior Officers of the United States\nB. The SEC's ALJs Are Not Mere Employees\nII. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT A REMEDY COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION\nA. This Court Has Uniformly Rejected Efforts to Salvage Actions Undertaken by Improperly Appointed Officials\nB. Merely Assigning a New Name to Efforts to Salvage Prior Proceedings Is Insufficient to Distinguish Ryder and Nguyen\nC. The Court Should Reach the Ratification Issue Now, Rather than Remanding the Case and Awaiting Its Inevitable Return to This Court",
        "reference": "I. BECAUSE THE SEC'S ALJS ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THEIR APPOINTMENT BY THE CHIEF ALJ VIOLATES THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BECAUSE THE SEC'S ALJS ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THEIR APPOINTMENT BY THE CHIEF ALJ VIOLATES THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The SEC's ALJs Are Not Mere Employees\nII. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT A REMEDY COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION\nA. This Court Has Uniformly Rejected Efforts to Salvage Actions Undertaken by Improperly Appointed Officials\nB. Merely Assigning a New Name to Efforts to Salvage Prior Proceedings Is Insufficient to Distinguish Ryder and Nguyen\nC. The Court Should Reach the Ratification Issue Now, Rather than Remanding the Case and Awaiting Its Inevitable Return to This Court",
        "reference": "A. The SEC's ALJs Are Inferior Officers of the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BECAUSE THE SEC'S ALJS ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THEIR APPOINTMENT BY THE CHIEF ALJ VIOLATES THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. The SEC's ALJs Are Inferior Officers of the United States\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT A REMEDY COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION\nA. This Court Has Uniformly Rejected Efforts to Salvage Actions Undertaken by Improperly Appointed Officials\nB. Merely Assigning a New Name to Efforts to Salvage Prior Proceedings Is Insufficient to Distinguish Ryder and Nguyen\nC. The Court Should Reach the Ratification Issue Now, Rather than Remanding the Case and Awaiting Its Inevitable Return to This Court",
        "reference": "B. The SEC's ALJs Are Not Mere Employees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BECAUSE THE SEC'S ALJS ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THEIR APPOINTMENT BY THE CHIEF ALJ VIOLATES THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. The SEC's ALJs Are Inferior Officers of the United States\nB. The SEC's ALJs Are Not Mere Employees\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court Has Uniformly Rejected Efforts to Salvage Actions Undertaken by Improperly Appointed Officials\nB. Merely Assigning a New Name to Efforts to Salvage Prior Proceedings Is Insufficient to Distinguish Ryder and Nguyen\nC. The Court Should Reach the Ratification Issue Now, Rather than Remanding the Case and Awaiting Its Inevitable Return to This Court",
        "reference": "II. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT A REMEDY COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BECAUSE THE SEC'S ALJS ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THEIR APPOINTMENT BY THE CHIEF ALJ VIOLATES THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. The SEC's ALJs Are Inferior Officers of the United States\nB. The SEC's ALJs Are Not Mere Employees\nII. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT A REMEDY COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Merely Assigning a New Name to Efforts to Salvage Prior Proceedings Is Insufficient to Distinguish Ryder and Nguyen\nC. The Court Should Reach the Ratification Issue Now, Rather than Remanding the Case and Awaiting Its Inevitable Return to This Court",
        "reference": "A. This Court Has Uniformly Rejected Efforts to Salvage Actions Undertaken by Improperly Appointed Officials",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BECAUSE THE SEC'S ALJS ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THEIR APPOINTMENT BY THE CHIEF ALJ VIOLATES THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. The SEC's ALJs Are Inferior Officers of the United States\nB. The SEC's ALJs Are Not Mere Employees\nII. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT A REMEDY COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION\nA. This Court Has Uniformly Rejected Efforts to Salvage Actions Undertaken by Improperly Appointed Officials\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court Should Reach the Ratification Issue Now, Rather than Remanding the Case and Awaiting Its Inevitable Return to This Court",
        "reference": "B. Merely Assigning a New Name to Efforts to Salvage Prior Proceedings Is Insufficient to Distinguish Ryder and Nguyen",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BECAUSE THE SEC'S ALJS ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, THEIR APPOINTMENT BY THE CHIEF ALJ VIOLATES THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. The SEC's ALJs Are Inferior Officers of the United States\nB. The SEC's ALJs Are Not Mere Employees\nII. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT A REMEDY COMMENSURATE WITH THE GRAVITY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION\nA. This Court Has Uniformly Rejected Efforts to Salvage Actions Undertaken by Improperly Appointed Officials\nB. Merely Assigning a New Name to Efforts to Salvage Prior Proceedings Is Insufficient to Distinguish Ryder and Nguyen\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Court Should Reach the Ratification Issue Now, Rather than Remanding the Case and Awaiting Its Inevitable Return to This Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Residual cy pres\nB. Full cy pres\nC. Why the distinction matters\n1. Full cy pres cases are remarkably rare\n2. The questions preserved for appeal by Petitioners' objection and then presented in the cert. petition are few and narrow\n3. A decision setting rules for residual cy pres cases would raise complex procedural and constitutional concerns\nII. This Full Cy Pres Settlement Meets Rule 23(e)(2)'s Requirement That It Be Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate\nIII. Rule 23 Does Not Prohibit Class Certification In Full Cy Pres Cases",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Dismiss The Writ As Improvidently Granted Or Render A Narrow Decision Because The Questions Presented \u2014And Facts Of The Case \u2014Involve Only Rarely-Arising Full Cy Pres Settlements And Are Therefore Exceptionally Limited In Nature",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss The Writ As Improvidently Granted Or Render A Narrow Decision Because The Questions Presented \u2014And Facts Of The Case \u2014Involve Only Rarely-Arising Full Cy Pres Settlements And Are Therefore Exceptionally Limited In Nature\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Full cy pres\nC. Why the distinction matters\n1. Full cy pres cases are remarkably rare\n2. The questions preserved for appeal by Petitioners' objection and then presented in the cert. petition are few and narrow\n3. A decision setting rules for residual cy pres cases would raise complex procedural and constitutional concerns\nII. This Full Cy Pres Settlement Meets Rule 23(e)(2)'s Requirement That It Be Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate\nIII. Rule 23 Does Not Prohibit Class Certification In Full Cy Pres Cases",
        "reference": "A. Residual cy pres",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss The Writ As Improvidently Granted Or Render A Narrow Decision Because The Questions Presented \u2014And Facts Of The Case \u2014Involve Only Rarely-Arising Full Cy Pres Settlements And Are Therefore Exceptionally Limited In Nature\nA. Residual cy pres\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Why the distinction matters\n1. Full cy pres cases are remarkably rare\n2. The questions preserved for appeal by Petitioners' objection and then presented in the cert. petition are few and narrow\n3. A decision setting rules for residual cy pres cases would raise complex procedural and constitutional concerns\nII. This Full Cy Pres Settlement Meets Rule 23(e)(2)'s Requirement That It Be Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate\nIII. Rule 23 Does Not Prohibit Class Certification In Full Cy Pres Cases",
        "reference": "B. Full cy pres",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss The Writ As Improvidently Granted Or Render A Narrow Decision Because The Questions Presented \u2014And Facts Of The Case \u2014Involve Only Rarely-Arising Full Cy Pres Settlements And Are Therefore Exceptionally Limited In Nature\nA. Residual cy pres\nB. Full cy pres\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Full cy pres cases are remarkably rare\n2. The questions preserved for appeal by Petitioners' objection and then presented in the cert. petition are few and narrow\n3. A decision setting rules for residual cy pres cases would raise complex procedural and constitutional concerns\nII. This Full Cy Pres Settlement Meets Rule 23(e)(2)'s Requirement That It Be Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate\nIII. Rule 23 Does Not Prohibit Class Certification In Full Cy Pres Cases",
        "reference": "C. Why the distinction matters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss The Writ As Improvidently Granted Or Render A Narrow Decision Because The Questions Presented \u2014And Facts Of The Case \u2014Involve Only Rarely-Arising Full Cy Pres Settlements And Are Therefore Exceptionally Limited In Nature\nA. Residual cy pres\nB. Full cy pres\nC. Why the distinction matters\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The questions preserved for appeal by Petitioners' objection and then presented in the cert. petition are few and narrow\n3. A decision setting rules for residual cy pres cases would raise complex procedural and constitutional concerns\nII. This Full Cy Pres Settlement Meets Rule 23(e)(2)'s Requirement That It Be Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate\nIII. Rule 23 Does Not Prohibit Class Certification In Full Cy Pres Cases",
        "reference": "1. Full cy pres cases are remarkably rare",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss The Writ As Improvidently Granted Or Render A Narrow Decision Because The Questions Presented \u2014And Facts Of The Case \u2014Involve Only Rarely-Arising Full Cy Pres Settlements And Are Therefore Exceptionally Limited In Nature\nA. Residual cy pres\nB. Full cy pres\nC. Why the distinction matters\n1. Full cy pres cases are remarkably rare\n2. [MISSING]\n3. A decision setting rules for residual cy pres cases would raise complex procedural and constitutional concerns\nII. This Full Cy Pres Settlement Meets Rule 23(e)(2)'s Requirement That It Be Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate\nIII. Rule 23 Does Not Prohibit Class Certification In Full Cy Pres Cases",
        "reference": "2. The questions preserved for appeal by Petitioners' objection and then presented in the cert. petition are few and narrow",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss The Writ As Improvidently Granted Or Render A Narrow Decision Because The Questions Presented \u2014And Facts Of The Case \u2014Involve Only Rarely-Arising Full Cy Pres Settlements And Are Therefore Exceptionally Limited In Nature\nA. Residual cy pres\nB. Full cy pres\nC. Why the distinction matters\n1. Full cy pres cases are remarkably rare\n2. The questions preserved for appeal by Petitioners' objection and then presented in the cert. petition are few and narrow\n3. [MISSING]\nII. This Full Cy Pres Settlement Meets Rule 23(e)(2)'s Requirement That It Be Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate\nIII. Rule 23 Does Not Prohibit Class Certification In Full Cy Pres Cases",
        "reference": "3. A decision setting rules for residual cy pres cases would raise complex procedural and constitutional concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss The Writ As Improvidently Granted Or Render A Narrow Decision Because The Questions Presented \u2014And Facts Of The Case \u2014Involve Only Rarely-Arising Full Cy Pres Settlements And Are Therefore Exceptionally Limited In Nature\nA. Residual cy pres\nB. Full cy pres\nC. Why the distinction matters\n1. Full cy pres cases are remarkably rare\n2. The questions preserved for appeal by Petitioners' objection and then presented in the cert. petition are few and narrow\n3. A decision setting rules for residual cy pres cases would raise complex procedural and constitutional concerns\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Rule 23 Does Not Prohibit Class Certification In Full Cy Pres Cases",
        "reference": "II. This Full Cy Pres Settlement Meets Rule 23(e)(2)'s Requirement That It Be Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss The Writ As Improvidently Granted Or Render A Narrow Decision Because The Questions Presented \u2014And Facts Of The Case \u2014Involve Only Rarely-Arising Full Cy Pres Settlements And Are Therefore Exceptionally Limited In Nature\nA. Residual cy pres\nB. Full cy pres\nC. Why the distinction matters\n1. Full cy pres cases are remarkably rare\n2. The questions preserved for appeal by Petitioners' objection and then presented in the cert. petition are few and narrow\n3. A decision setting rules for residual cy pres cases would raise complex procedural and constitutional concerns\nII. This Full Cy Pres Settlement Meets Rule 23(e)(2)'s Requirement That It Be Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Rule 23 Does Not Prohibit Class Certification In Full Cy Pres Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money\nB. The FTC Has the Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief Under Section 13(b)\nII. The FTC's Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief Under Section 13(b) is Critical for Deterring Unfair Competitive Practices in the Marketplace",
        "reference": "I. The Established Meaning of \"Injunction\" Empowers the FTC to Seek Court Orders to Recover Money from Wrongdoers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Established Meaning of \"Injunction\" Empowers the FTC to Seek Court Orders to Recover Money from Wrongdoers\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The FTC Has the Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief Under Section 13(b)\nII. The FTC's Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief Under Section 13(b) is Critical for Deterring Unfair Competitive Practices in the Marketplace",
        "reference": "A. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Established Meaning of \"Injunction\" Empowers the FTC to Seek Court Orders to Recover Money from Wrongdoers\nA. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The FTC's Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief Under Section 13(b) is Critical for Deterring Unfair Competitive Practices in the Marketplace",
        "reference": "B. The FTC Has the Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief Under Section 13(b)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Established Meaning of \"Injunction\" Empowers the FTC to Seek Court Orders to Recover Money from Wrongdoers\nA. Injunctions Can Be Commands to Undertake Specific Acts and Include Orders to Return Property and Money\nB. The FTC Has the Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief Under Section 13(b)\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The FTC's Authority to Obtain Monetary Relief Under Section 13(b) is Critical for Deterring Unfair Competitive Practices in the Marketplace",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Notice-and-Comment serves an important purpose by allowing interested parties and the public the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process\nC. Public comments submitted through the notice-and-comment process would have been beneficial in exposing legal weaknesses of the Program\nD. The HEROES Act does not justify the Department's decision to avoid notice-and-comment\nE. The APA's exemption to notice-and-comment pertaining to loans does not apply",
        "reference": "A. The Debt Forgiveness Program is a rule subject to the APA's notice-and-comment process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Debt Forgiveness Program is a rule subject to the APA's notice-and-comment process\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Public comments submitted through the notice-and-comment process would have been beneficial in exposing legal weaknesses of the Program\nD. The HEROES Act does not justify the Department's decision to avoid notice-and-comment\nE. The APA's exemption to notice-and-comment pertaining to loans does not apply",
        "reference": "B. Notice-and-Comment serves an important purpose by allowing interested parties and the public the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Debt Forgiveness Program is a rule subject to the APA's notice-and-comment process\nB. Notice-and-Comment serves an important purpose by allowing interested parties and the public the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The HEROES Act does not justify the Department's decision to avoid notice-and-comment\nE. The APA's exemption to notice-and-comment pertaining to loans does not apply",
        "reference": "C. Public comments submitted through the notice-and-comment process would have been beneficial in exposing legal weaknesses of the Program",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Debt Forgiveness Program is a rule subject to the APA's notice-and-comment process\nB. Notice-and-Comment serves an important purpose by allowing interested parties and the public the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process\nC. Public comments submitted through the notice-and-comment process would have been beneficial in exposing legal weaknesses of the Program\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The APA's exemption to notice-and-comment pertaining to loans does not apply",
        "reference": "D. The HEROES Act does not justify the Department's decision to avoid notice-and-comment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Debt Forgiveness Program is a rule subject to the APA's notice-and-comment process\nB. Notice-and-Comment serves an important purpose by allowing interested parties and the public the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process\nC. Public comments submitted through the notice-and-comment process would have been beneficial in exposing legal weaknesses of the Program\nD. The HEROES Act does not justify the Department's decision to avoid notice-and-comment\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. The APA's exemption to notice-and-comment pertaining to loans does not apply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Well-settled tort-law principles forbid such liability\nB. The principles of maritime law require the same rule\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ALTERNATIVE APPROACH CONTRADICTS THE COMMON LAW AND UNDERMINES THE PURPOSES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. Tort-law principles do not support the foreseeability-based test that the Third Circuit adopted\nB. The Third Circuit's approach contradicts the principles of maritime law\nIII. THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW",
        "reference": "I. MANUFACTURERS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY THIRD-PARTY ASBESTOS ADDED TO THEIR EQUIPMENT POST-SALE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. MANUFACTURERS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY THIRD-PARTY ASBESTOS ADDED TO THEIR EQUIPMENT POST-SALE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The principles of maritime law require the same rule\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ALTERNATIVE APPROACH CONTRADICTS THE COMMON LAW AND UNDERMINES THE PURPOSES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. Tort-law principles do not support the foreseeability-based test that the Third Circuit adopted\nB. The Third Circuit's approach contradicts the principles of maritime law\nIII. THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW",
        "reference": "A. Well-settled tort-law principles forbid such liability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. MANUFACTURERS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY THIRD-PARTY ASBESTOS ADDED TO THEIR EQUIPMENT POST-SALE\nA. Well-settled tort-law principles forbid such liability\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ALTERNATIVE APPROACH CONTRADICTS THE COMMON LAW AND UNDERMINES THE PURPOSES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. Tort-law principles do not support the foreseeability-based test that the Third Circuit adopted\nB. The Third Circuit's approach contradicts the principles of maritime law\nIII. THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW",
        "reference": "B. The principles of maritime law require the same rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. MANUFACTURERS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY THIRD-PARTY ASBESTOS ADDED TO THEIR EQUIPMENT POST-SALE\nA. Well-settled tort-law principles forbid such liability\nB. The principles of maritime law require the same rule\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Tort-law principles do not support the foreseeability-based test that the Third Circuit adopted\nB. The Third Circuit's approach contradicts the principles of maritime law\nIII. THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW",
        "reference": "II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ALTERNATIVE APPROACH CONTRADICTS THE COMMON LAW AND UNDERMINES THE PURPOSES OF MARITIME LAW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. MANUFACTURERS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY THIRD-PARTY ASBESTOS ADDED TO THEIR EQUIPMENT POST-SALE\nA. Well-settled tort-law principles forbid such liability\nB. The principles of maritime law require the same rule\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ALTERNATIVE APPROACH CONTRADICTS THE COMMON LAW AND UNDERMINES THE PURPOSES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Third Circuit's approach contradicts the principles of maritime law\nIII. THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW",
        "reference": "A. Tort-law principles do not support the foreseeability-based test that the Third Circuit adopted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. MANUFACTURERS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY THIRD-PARTY ASBESTOS ADDED TO THEIR EQUIPMENT POST-SALE\nA. Well-settled tort-law principles forbid such liability\nB. The principles of maritime law require the same rule\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ALTERNATIVE APPROACH CONTRADICTS THE COMMON LAW AND UNDERMINES THE PURPOSES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. Tort-law principles do not support the foreseeability-based test that the Third Circuit adopted\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW",
        "reference": "B. The Third Circuit's approach contradicts the principles of maritime law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. MANUFACTURERS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY THIRD-PARTY ASBESTOS ADDED TO THEIR EQUIPMENT POST-SALE\nA. Well-settled tort-law principles forbid such liability\nB. The principles of maritime law require the same rule\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ALTERNATIVE APPROACH CONTRADICTS THE COMMON LAW AND UNDERMINES THE PURPOSES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. Tort-law principles do not support the foreseeability-based test that the Third Circuit adopted\nB. The Third Circuit's approach contradicts the principles of maritime law\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The debates over the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment itself show that the Framers understood the Amendment to require race neutrality\nB. The debates over the 1875 Act confirm that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes colorblindness\nC. The practice among the States underscores that the Fourteenth Amendment requires race neutrality\nII. CONTRARY THEORIES DO NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY",
        "reference": "I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RENDERS THE CONSTITUTION COLORBLIND",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RENDERS THE CONSTITUTION COLORBLIND\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The debates over the 1875 Act confirm that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes colorblindness\nC. The practice among the States underscores that the Fourteenth Amendment requires race neutrality\nII. CONTRARY THEORIES DO NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY",
        "reference": "A. The debates over the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment itself show that the Framers understood the Amendment to require race neutrality",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. The question whether the ATS authorizes liability for domestic corporations warrants review.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The question whether respondents' claims are impermissibly extraterritorial warrants review.\nD. The petition in Cargill is a suitable vehicle for review of all three questions.",
        "reference": "B. The Court should add the question of whether the ATS imposes aiding-and-abetting liability.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. The question whether the ATS authorizes liability for domestic corporations warrants review.\nB. The Court should add the question of whether the ATS imposes aiding-and-abetting liability.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The petition in Cargill is a suitable vehicle for review of all three questions.",
        "reference": "C. The question whether respondents' claims are impermissibly extraterritorial warrants review.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. The question whether the ATS authorizes liability for domestic corporations warrants review.\nB. The Court should add the question of whether the ATS imposes aiding-and-abetting liability.\nC. The question whether respondents' claims are impermissibly extraterritorial warrants review.\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The petition in Cargill is a suitable vehicle for review of all three questions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Chevron's delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies unlawfully places the power to make law and the power to enforce it in the same hands\nB. Chevron's delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies prevents courts from exercising their judicial power to \"say what the law is.\"\nC. As the decision below shows, Chevron deference encourages agencies to rewrite even clear statutes, and encourages courts to abdicate their judicial role\nII. In light of these constitutional problems, the Court should overrule Chevron or \u2014at the very least \u2014take steps to mitigate its most pernicious effects\nA. Courts should not extend Chevron deference without first performing a rigorous statutory analysis\nB. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the statute at issue presses the limits of the nondelegation doctrine\nC. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the agency's action invokes the outer limits of Congress's enumerated powers",
        "reference": "I. Chevron deference undermines the separation of powers by allowing unelected, unaccountable agencies to wield vast amounts of legislative and judicial power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron deference undermines the separation of powers by allowing unelected, unaccountable agencies to wield vast amounts of legislative and judicial power\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Chevron's delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies prevents courts from exercising their judicial power to \"say what the law is.\"\nC. As the decision below shows, Chevron deference encourages agencies to rewrite even clear statutes, and encourages courts to abdicate their judicial role\nII. In light of these constitutional problems, the Court should overrule Chevron or \u2014at the very least \u2014take steps to mitigate its most pernicious effects\nA. Courts should not extend Chevron deference without first performing a rigorous statutory analysis\nB. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the statute at issue presses the limits of the nondelegation doctrine\nC. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the agency's action invokes the outer limits of Congress's enumerated powers",
        "reference": "A. Chevron's delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies unlawfully places the power to make law and the power to enforce it in the same hands",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron deference undermines the separation of powers by allowing unelected, unaccountable agencies to wield vast amounts of legislative and judicial power\nA. Chevron's delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies unlawfully places the power to make law and the power to enforce it in the same hands\nB. [MISSING]\nC. As the decision below shows, Chevron deference encourages agencies to rewrite even clear statutes, and encourages courts to abdicate their judicial role\nII. In light of these constitutional problems, the Court should overrule Chevron or \u2014at the very least \u2014take steps to mitigate its most pernicious effects\nA. Courts should not extend Chevron deference without first performing a rigorous statutory analysis\nB. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the statute at issue presses the limits of the nondelegation doctrine\nC. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the agency's action invokes the outer limits of Congress's enumerated powers",
        "reference": "B. Chevron's delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies prevents courts from exercising their judicial power to \"say what the law is.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron deference undermines the separation of powers by allowing unelected, unaccountable agencies to wield vast amounts of legislative and judicial power\nA. Chevron's delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies unlawfully places the power to make law and the power to enforce it in the same hands\nB. Chevron's delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies prevents courts from exercising their judicial power to \"say what the law is.\"\nC. [MISSING]\nII. In light of these constitutional problems, the Court should overrule Chevron or \u2014at the very least \u2014take steps to mitigate its most pernicious effects\nA. Courts should not extend Chevron deference without first performing a rigorous statutory analysis\nB. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the statute at issue presses the limits of the nondelegation doctrine\nC. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the agency's action invokes the outer limits of Congress's enumerated powers",
        "reference": "C. As the decision below shows, Chevron deference encourages agencies to rewrite even clear statutes, and encourages courts to abdicate their judicial role",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron deference undermines the separation of powers by allowing unelected, unaccountable agencies to wield vast amounts of legislative and judicial power\nA. Chevron's delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies unlawfully places the power to make law and the power to enforce it in the same hands\nB. Chevron's delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies prevents courts from exercising their judicial power to \"say what the law is.\"\nC. As the decision below shows, Chevron deference encourages agencies to rewrite even clear statutes, and encourages courts to abdicate their judicial role\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Courts should not extend Chevron deference without first performing a rigorous statutory analysis\nB. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the statute at issue presses the limits of the nondelegation doctrine\nC. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the agency's action invokes the outer limits of Congress's enumerated powers",
        "reference": "II. In light of these constitutional problems, the Court should overrule Chevron or \u2014at the very least \u2014take steps to mitigate its most pernicious effects",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron deference undermines the separation of powers by allowing unelected, unaccountable agencies to wield vast amounts of legislative and judicial power\nA. Chevron's delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies unlawfully places the power to make law and the power to enforce it in the same hands\nB. Chevron's delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies prevents courts from exercising their judicial power to \"say what the law is.\"\nC. As the decision below shows, Chevron deference encourages agencies to rewrite even clear statutes, and encourages courts to abdicate their judicial role\nII. In light of these constitutional problems, the Court should overrule Chevron or \u2014at the very least \u2014take steps to mitigate its most pernicious effects\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the statute at issue presses the limits of the nondelegation doctrine\nC. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the agency's action invokes the outer limits of Congress's enumerated powers",
        "reference": "A. Courts should not extend Chevron deference without first performing a rigorous statutory analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron deference undermines the separation of powers by allowing unelected, unaccountable agencies to wield vast amounts of legislative and judicial power\nA. Chevron's delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies unlawfully places the power to make law and the power to enforce it in the same hands\nB. Chevron's delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies prevents courts from exercising their judicial power to \"say what the law is.\"\nC. As the decision below shows, Chevron deference encourages agencies to rewrite even clear statutes, and encourages courts to abdicate their judicial role\nII. In light of these constitutional problems, the Court should overrule Chevron or \u2014at the very least \u2014take steps to mitigate its most pernicious effects\nA. Courts should not extend Chevron deference without first performing a rigorous statutory analysis\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the agency's action invokes the outer limits of Congress's enumerated powers",
        "reference": "B. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the statute at issue presses the limits of the nondelegation doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron deference undermines the separation of powers by allowing unelected, unaccountable agencies to wield vast amounts of legislative and judicial power\nA. Chevron's delegation of policymaking authority to administrative agencies unlawfully places the power to make law and the power to enforce it in the same hands\nB. Chevron's delegation of interpretive authority to administrative agencies prevents courts from exercising their judicial power to \"say what the law is.\"\nC. As the decision below shows, Chevron deference encourages agencies to rewrite even clear statutes, and encourages courts to abdicate their judicial role\nII. In light of these constitutional problems, the Court should overrule Chevron or \u2014at the very least \u2014take steps to mitigate its most pernicious effects\nA. Courts should not extend Chevron deference without first performing a rigorous statutory analysis\nB. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the statute at issue presses the limits of the nondelegation doctrine\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Courts should not extend Chevron deference when the agency's action invokes the outer limits of Congress's enumerated powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Bankruptcy Code's Default Rule Is Discharge Absent Unambiguous Text Otherwise\nB. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s Text Bars Discharge Only When Individual Debtors Commit Fraud\nC. The Rest of Section 523 Confirms This Reading\nD. Allowing Innocent Partners to Discharge Debts Furthers Bankruptcy Policy\nII. Contrary Interpretations Are Untenable\nA. The Anyone's-Fraud-Counts Reading Is Wrong\nB. Strang Does Not Require Barring Innocent Partners from Discharge",
        "reference": "I. Section 523(a)(2)(A) Permits Bankruptcy Discharges for Innocent Partners",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 523(a)(2)(A) Permits Bankruptcy Discharges for Innocent Partners\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s Text Bars Discharge Only When Individual Debtors Commit Fraud\nC. The Rest of Section 523 Confirms This Reading\nD. Allowing Innocent Partners to Discharge Debts Furthers Bankruptcy Policy\nII. Contrary Interpretations Are Untenable\nA. The Anyone's-Fraud-Counts Reading Is Wrong\nB. Strang Does Not Require Barring Innocent Partners from Discharge",
        "reference": "A. The Bankruptcy Code's Default Rule Is Discharge Absent Unambiguous Text Otherwise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 523(a)(2)(A) Permits Bankruptcy Discharges for Innocent Partners\nA. The Bankruptcy Code's Default Rule Is Discharge Absent Unambiguous Text Otherwise\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Rest of Section 523 Confirms This Reading\nD. Allowing Innocent Partners to Discharge Debts Furthers Bankruptcy Policy\nII. Contrary Interpretations Are Untenable\nA. The Anyone's-Fraud-Counts Reading Is Wrong\nB. Strang Does Not Require Barring Innocent Partners from Discharge",
        "reference": "B. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s Text Bars Discharge Only When Individual Debtors Commit Fraud",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 523(a)(2)(A) Permits Bankruptcy Discharges for Innocent Partners\nA. The Bankruptcy Code's Default Rule Is Discharge Absent Unambiguous Text Otherwise\nB. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s Text Bars Discharge Only When Individual Debtors Commit Fraud\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Allowing Innocent Partners to Discharge Debts Furthers Bankruptcy Policy\nII. Contrary Interpretations Are Untenable\nA. The Anyone's-Fraud-Counts Reading Is Wrong\nB. Strang Does Not Require Barring Innocent Partners from Discharge",
        "reference": "C. The Rest of Section 523 Confirms This Reading",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 523(a)(2)(A) Permits Bankruptcy Discharges for Innocent Partners\nA. The Bankruptcy Code's Default Rule Is Discharge Absent Unambiguous Text Otherwise\nB. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s Text Bars Discharge Only When Individual Debtors Commit Fraud\nC. The Rest of Section 523 Confirms This Reading\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Contrary Interpretations Are Untenable\nA. The Anyone's-Fraud-Counts Reading Is Wrong\nB. Strang Does Not Require Barring Innocent Partners from Discharge",
        "reference": "D. Allowing Innocent Partners to Discharge Debts Furthers Bankruptcy Policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 523(a)(2)(A) Permits Bankruptcy Discharges for Innocent Partners\nA. The Bankruptcy Code's Default Rule Is Discharge Absent Unambiguous Text Otherwise\nB. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s Text Bars Discharge Only When Individual Debtors Commit Fraud\nC. The Rest of Section 523 Confirms This Reading\nD. Allowing Innocent Partners to Discharge Debts Furthers Bankruptcy Policy\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Anyone's-Fraud-Counts Reading Is Wrong\nB. Strang Does Not Require Barring Innocent Partners from Discharge",
        "reference": "II. Contrary Interpretations Are Untenable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 523(a)(2)(A) Permits Bankruptcy Discharges for Innocent Partners\nA. The Bankruptcy Code's Default Rule Is Discharge Absent Unambiguous Text Otherwise\nB. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s Text Bars Discharge Only When Individual Debtors Commit Fraud\nC. The Rest of Section 523 Confirms This Reading\nD. Allowing Innocent Partners to Discharge Debts Furthers Bankruptcy Policy\nII. Contrary Interpretations Are Untenable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Strang Does Not Require Barring Innocent Partners from Discharge",
        "reference": "A. The Anyone's-Fraud-Counts Reading Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 523(a)(2)(A) Permits Bankruptcy Discharges for Innocent Partners\nA. The Bankruptcy Code's Default Rule Is Discharge Absent Unambiguous Text Otherwise\nB. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s Text Bars Discharge Only When Individual Debtors Commit Fraud\nC. The Rest of Section 523 Confirms This Reading\nD. Allowing Innocent Partners to Discharge Debts Furthers Bankruptcy Policy\nII. Contrary Interpretations Are Untenable\nA. The Anyone's-Fraud-Counts Reading Is Wrong\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Strang Does Not Require Barring Innocent Partners from Discharge",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial hearsay without regard to rules of evidence\nB. Applying the \"opening the door\" rule to testimonial hearsay would flout the historical development and purposes of the Confrontation Clause\nII. The opening-the-door rule is not a valid exception to the Confrontation Clause\nA. Opening the door is not a legitimate species of equitable forfeiture\nB. Case law restricting the invocation of prophylactic rules does not apply here\nC. New York's opening-the-door rule is not justified by the rule of completeness",
        "reference": "I. The evidentiary \"opening the door\" rule does not supersede the constitutional right to be confronted with adverse witnesses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The evidentiary \"opening the door\" rule does not supersede the constitutional right to be confronted with adverse witnesses\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Applying the \"opening the door\" rule to testimonial hearsay would flout the historical development and purposes of the Confrontation Clause\nII. The opening-the-door rule is not a valid exception to the Confrontation Clause\nA. Opening the door is not a legitimate species of equitable forfeiture\nB. Case law restricting the invocation of prophylactic rules does not apply here\nC. New York's opening-the-door rule is not justified by the rule of completeness",
        "reference": "A. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial hearsay without regard to rules of evidence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The evidentiary \"opening the door\" rule does not supersede the constitutional right to be confronted with adverse witnesses\nA. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial hearsay without regard to rules of evidence\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The opening-the-door rule is not a valid exception to the Confrontation Clause\nA. Opening the door is not a legitimate species of equitable forfeiture\nB. Case law restricting the invocation of prophylactic rules does not apply here\nC. New York's opening-the-door rule is not justified by the rule of completeness",
        "reference": "B. Applying the \"opening the door\" rule to testimonial hearsay would flout the historical development and purposes of the Confrontation Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The evidentiary \"opening the door\" rule does not supersede the constitutional right to be confronted with adverse witnesses\nA. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial hearsay without regard to rules of evidence\nB. Applying the \"opening the door\" rule to testimonial hearsay would flout the historical development and purposes of the Confrontation Clause\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Opening the door is not a legitimate species of equitable forfeiture\nB. Case law restricting the invocation of prophylactic rules does not apply here\nC. New York's opening-the-door rule is not justified by the rule of completeness",
        "reference": "II. The opening-the-door rule is not a valid exception to the Confrontation Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The evidentiary \"opening the door\" rule does not supersede the constitutional right to be confronted with adverse witnesses\nA. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial hearsay without regard to rules of evidence\nB. Applying the \"opening the door\" rule to testimonial hearsay would flout the historical development and purposes of the Confrontation Clause\nII. The opening-the-door rule is not a valid exception to the Confrontation Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Case law restricting the invocation of prophylactic rules does not apply here\nC. New York's opening-the-door rule is not justified by the rule of completeness",
        "reference": "A. Opening the door is not a legitimate species of equitable forfeiture",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The evidentiary \"opening the door\" rule does not supersede the constitutional right to be confronted with adverse witnesses\nA. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial hearsay without regard to rules of evidence\nB. Applying the \"opening the door\" rule to testimonial hearsay would flout the historical development and purposes of the Confrontation Clause\nII. The opening-the-door rule is not a valid exception to the Confrontation Clause\nA. Opening the door is not a legitimate species of equitable forfeiture\nB. [MISSING]\nC. New York's opening-the-door rule is not justified by the rule of completeness",
        "reference": "B. Case law restricting the invocation of prophylactic rules does not apply here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The evidentiary \"opening the door\" rule does not supersede the constitutional right to be confronted with adverse witnesses\nA. The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial hearsay without regard to rules of evidence\nB. Applying the \"opening the door\" rule to testimonial hearsay would flout the historical development and purposes of the Confrontation Clause\nII. The opening-the-door rule is not a valid exception to the Confrontation Clause\nA. Opening the door is not a legitimate species of equitable forfeiture\nB. Case law restricting the invocation of prophylactic rules does not apply here\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. New York's opening-the-door rule is not justified by the rule of completeness",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "A. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. [MISSING]\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "D. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "II. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "A. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "reference": "2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners lack standing to invoke this Court's appellate jurisdiction\nA. The court of appeals' decision will not cause the CPP to take effect\nB. Petitioners are not injured by the court of appeals' vacatur of the ACE Rule\nC. Petitioners seek what would in substance be an impermissible advisory opinion intended to constrain EPA in its future rulemaking\nD. This Court should dismiss the certiorari petitions for lack of standing or, in the alternative, vacate the D.C. Circuit's holding that Section 7411 does not unambiguously preclude outside-the-fenceline measures\nII. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rested on an erroneous view of Section 7411\nA. Section 7411 does not unambiguously compel the interpretation in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules\n1. The CPP Repeal and ACE Rules rest on an interpretation that limits both States and EPA to inside-the-fenceline measures\n2. Section 7411(d)(1)(A) should not be construed to limit state plans to inside-the-fenceline measures\n3. Nothing in Section 7411(a)(1) unambiguously limits EPA's BSER to inside-the-fenceline measures\nB. Petitioners' text-based arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER\n2. Petitioners' arguments focused on generation shifting are unsound\nC. Petitioners' reliance on various interpretive canons is misplaced\n1. Petitioners cannot support their interpretation by characterizing the CPP as involving a \"major question\"\n2. The constitutional-avoidance canon is inapplicable here\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. The federalism canon undermines, rather than supports, the interpretation adopted in the CPP Repeal and ACE Rules",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Judicial Review in Arizona Respects the Legislative Process of Redistricting",
        "reference": "I. The Commission is the Arizona Body Constitutionally Charged with Drawing the State's Congressional Districts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Commission is the Arizona Body Constitutionally Charged with Drawing the State's Congressional Districts\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Judicial Review in Arizona Respects the Legislative Process of Redistricting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 2254(e)(2) does not apply to evidence developed in Martinez proceedings\nB. The constitutional avoidance canon supports construing Section 2254(e)(2) to incorporate an effective remedy for ineffective-assistance claims in initial-review collateral proceedings\nII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-TRIAL EVIDENCE IS IMPERATIVE TO ENSURE THAT THE CLAIMS OF INNOCENT INDIVIDUALS CAN BE HEARD",
        "reference": "I. MARTINEZ AND SECTION 2254(e)(2) PERMIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVIDENCE THAT A LITIGANT COULD NOT PRESENT AT TRIAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARTINEZ AND SECTION 2254(e)(2) PERMIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVIDENCE THAT A LITIGANT COULD NOT PRESENT AT TRIAL\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The constitutional avoidance canon supports construing Section 2254(e)(2) to incorporate an effective remedy for ineffective-assistance claims in initial-review collateral proceedings\nII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-TRIAL EVIDENCE IS IMPERATIVE TO ENSURE THAT THE CLAIMS OF INNOCENT INDIVIDUALS CAN BE HEARD",
        "reference": "A. Section 2254(e)(2) does not apply to evidence developed in Martinez proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARTINEZ AND SECTION 2254(e)(2) PERMIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVIDENCE THAT A LITIGANT COULD NOT PRESENT AT TRIAL\nA. Section 2254(e)(2) does not apply to evidence developed in Martinez proceedings\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-TRIAL EVIDENCE IS IMPERATIVE TO ENSURE THAT THE CLAIMS OF INNOCENT INDIVIDUALS CAN BE HEARD",
        "reference": "B. The constitutional avoidance canon supports construing Section 2254(e)(2) to incorporate an effective remedy for ineffective-assistance claims in initial-review collateral proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARTINEZ AND SECTION 2254(e)(2) PERMIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVIDENCE THAT A LITIGANT COULD NOT PRESENT AT TRIAL\nA. Section 2254(e)(2) does not apply to evidence developed in Martinez proceedings\nB. The constitutional avoidance canon supports construing Section 2254(e)(2) to incorporate an effective remedy for ineffective-assistance claims in initial-review collateral proceedings\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-TRIAL EVIDENCE IS IMPERATIVE TO ENSURE THAT THE CLAIMS OF INNOCENT INDIVIDUALS CAN BE HEARD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. There is a split among the Circuit Courts over whether humorous goods are exempt from a claim under the Lanham Act\nIII. The split among the Circuit Courts will increase the strain on the federal courts and lead to unabashed forum shopping",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit's decision will harm the public by permitting consumer confusion, thwarting the purpose of the Lanham Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's decision will harm the public by permitting consumer confusion, thwarting the purpose of the Lanham Act\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The split among the Circuit Courts will increase the strain on the federal courts and lead to unabashed forum shopping",
        "reference": "II. There is a split among the Circuit Courts over whether humorous goods are exempt from a claim under the Lanham Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's decision will harm the public by permitting consumer confusion, thwarting the purpose of the Lanham Act\nII. There is a split among the Circuit Courts over whether humorous goods are exempt from a claim under the Lanham Act\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The split among the Circuit Courts will increase the strain on the federal courts and lead to unabashed forum shopping",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. REED'S LOGIC APPLIES TO COMMERCIAL SPEECH",
        "reference": "I. THE ON-PREMISES VERSUS OFF-PREMISES REGULATION IN THIS CASE IS A CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTION ON SPEECH",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ON-PREMISES VERSUS OFF-PREMISES REGULATION IN THIS CASE IS A CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTION ON SPEECH\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. REED'S LOGIC APPLIES TO COMMERCIAL SPEECH",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity\n2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate\n2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect\nA. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale\nB. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual\nC. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "reference": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity\n2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate\n2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect\nA. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale\nB. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual\nC. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "reference": "A. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority\nA. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate\n2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect\nA. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale\nB. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual\nC. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "reference": "1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority\nA. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate\n2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect\nA. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale\nB. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual\nC. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "reference": "2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority\nA. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity\n2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate\n2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect\nA. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale\nB. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual\nC. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "reference": "B. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in ordering the Secretary to implement the discretionary contiguous-territory-return authority\nA. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) establishes a discretionary border-management tool, not an obligatory duty\n1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity\n2. The radical implications of the court of appeals' interpretation confirm that the court erred\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that DHS is violating Section 1225's purported detention mandate by releasing noncitizens on bond or parole\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The INA permits DHS to consider detention capacity when making parole and bond determinations\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect\nA. The October 29 termination is a new agency decision, not a post hoc rationale\nB. The Secretary's explanation for the October 29 termination decision was not pretextual\nC. The October 29 termination decision did not violate principles of appellate procedure",
        "reference": "1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not an inflexible detention mandate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RENDERS THE CONSTITUTION COLORBLIND\nA. The debates over the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment itself show that the Framers understood the Amendment to require race neutrality\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The practice among the States underscores that the Fourteenth Amendment requires race neutrality\nII. CONTRARY THEORIES DO NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY",
        "reference": "B. The debates over the 1875 Act confirm that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes colorblindness",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RENDERS THE CONSTITUTION COLORBLIND\nA. The debates over the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment itself show that the Framers understood the Amendment to require race neutrality\nB. The debates over the 1875 Act confirm that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes colorblindness\nC. [MISSING]\nII. CONTRARY THEORIES DO NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY",
        "reference": "C. The practice among the States underscores that the Fourteenth Amendment requires race neutrality",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RENDERS THE CONSTITUTION COLORBLIND\nA. The debates over the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment itself show that the Framers understood the Amendment to require race neutrality\nB. The debates over the 1875 Act confirm that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes colorblindness\nC. The practice among the States underscores that the Fourteenth Amendment requires race neutrality\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. CONTRARY THEORIES DO NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "II. The Decision Below Was Correct.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "A. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. [MISSING]\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "B. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. [MISSING]\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. [MISSING]\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "C. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "D. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. [MISSING]\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "E. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "III. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "reference": "A. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on the Question This Case Presents.\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. Even under Petitioners' reading of the Elections Clause's text, the court below was correct.\nB. This Court's precedents foreclose Petitioners' arguments, as the court below rightly recognized.\n1. This Court has already held that nonlegislative officials can help regulate federal elections.\n2. This Court has already held that legislatures are bound by their state constitutions when regulating federal elections.\n3. This Court has already held that state courts may formulate congressional districting maps.\nC. The decision below is consistent with the historical record.\nD. Petitioners' argument defies bedrock principles of federalism.\nE. Petitioners' reading would upend elections regimes in all fifty States.\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Analyzing the Elections Clause.\nA. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Ongoing proceedings in the North Carolina Supreme Court could complicate this Court's review.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A [MISSING]\nA. A sentencing claim that a defendant did not specifically identify to the district court is subject to plain-error review on appeal\nB. A specific request for a lower sentence can satisfy Rule 51's contemporaneous objection requirement\n1. Under Rule 51's text, a defendant preserves a substantive challenge to a sentence by arguing for a different one\n2. Requiring a substantive reasonableness objection would not serve the purposes of the plain-error rule\n3. Prevailing circuit practice reflects the proper approach\nC. This Court should vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the court of appeals, which should in turn affirm petitioner's revocation term",
        "reference": "A criminal defendant who advocated for a shorter term of imprisonment need not also object after the district court's ruling to preserve a claim that a longer term is substantively unreasonable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A criminal defendant who advocated for a shorter term of imprisonment need not also object after the district court's ruling to preserve a claim that a longer term is substantively unreasonable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A specific request for a lower sentence can satisfy Rule 51's contemporaneous objection requirement\n1. Under Rule 51's text, a defendant preserves a substantive challenge to a sentence by arguing for a different one\n2. Requiring a substantive reasonableness objection would not serve the purposes of the plain-error rule\n3. Prevailing circuit practice reflects the proper approach\nC. This Court should vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the court of appeals, which should in turn affirm petitioner's revocation term",
        "reference": "A. A sentencing claim that a defendant did not specifically identify to the district court is subject to plain-error review on appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A criminal defendant who advocated for a shorter term of imprisonment need not also object after the district court's ruling to preserve a claim that a longer term is substantively unreasonable\nA. A sentencing claim that a defendant did not specifically identify to the district court is subject to plain-error review on appeal\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Under Rule 51's text, a defendant preserves a substantive challenge to a sentence by arguing for a different one\n2. Requiring a substantive reasonableness objection would not serve the purposes of the plain-error rule\n3. Prevailing circuit practice reflects the proper approach\nC. This Court should vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the court of appeals, which should in turn affirm petitioner's revocation term",
        "reference": "B. A specific request for a lower sentence can satisfy Rule 51's contemporaneous objection requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A criminal defendant who advocated for a shorter term of imprisonment need not also object after the district court's ruling to preserve a claim that a longer term is substantively unreasonable\nA. A sentencing claim that a defendant did not specifically identify to the district court is subject to plain-error review on appeal\nB. A specific request for a lower sentence can satisfy Rule 51's contemporaneous objection requirement\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Requiring a substantive reasonableness objection would not serve the purposes of the plain-error rule\n3. Prevailing circuit practice reflects the proper approach\nC. This Court should vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the court of appeals, which should in turn affirm petitioner's revocation term",
        "reference": "1. Under Rule 51's text, a defendant preserves a substantive challenge to a sentence by arguing for a different one",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A criminal defendant who advocated for a shorter term of imprisonment need not also object after the district court's ruling to preserve a claim that a longer term is substantively unreasonable\nA. A sentencing claim that a defendant did not specifically identify to the district court is subject to plain-error review on appeal\nB. A specific request for a lower sentence can satisfy Rule 51's contemporaneous objection requirement\n1. Under Rule 51's text, a defendant preserves a substantive challenge to a sentence by arguing for a different one\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Prevailing circuit practice reflects the proper approach\nC. This Court should vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the court of appeals, which should in turn affirm petitioner's revocation term",
        "reference": "2. Requiring a substantive reasonableness objection would not serve the purposes of the plain-error rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A criminal defendant who advocated for a shorter term of imprisonment need not also object after the district court's ruling to preserve a claim that a longer term is substantively unreasonable\nA. A sentencing claim that a defendant did not specifically identify to the district court is subject to plain-error review on appeal\nB. A specific request for a lower sentence can satisfy Rule 51's contemporaneous objection requirement\n1. Under Rule 51's text, a defendant preserves a substantive challenge to a sentence by arguing for a different one\n2. Requiring a substantive reasonableness objection would not serve the purposes of the plain-error rule\n3. [MISSING]\nC. This Court should vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the court of appeals, which should in turn affirm petitioner's revocation term",
        "reference": "3. Prevailing circuit practice reflects the proper approach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A criminal defendant who advocated for a shorter term of imprisonment need not also object after the district court's ruling to preserve a claim that a longer term is substantively unreasonable\nA. A sentencing claim that a defendant did not specifically identify to the district court is subject to plain-error review on appeal\nB. A specific request for a lower sentence can satisfy Rule 51's contemporaneous objection requirement\n1. Under Rule 51's text, a defendant preserves a substantive challenge to a sentence by arguing for a different one\n2. Requiring a substantive reasonableness objection would not serve the purposes of the plain-error rule\n3. Prevailing circuit practice reflects the proper approach\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This Court should vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the court of appeals, which should in turn affirm petitioner's revocation term",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Baseball Cases: Federal Baseball and Toolson\nB. The College Sports Cases: Board of Regents and Alston\nII. Toolson Has Had Disastrous Consequences for Hundreds of Thousands of American Workers\nIII. The Court Need Not Reprise Toolson",
        "reference": "I. This Case is Like Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case is Like Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953)\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The College Sports Cases: Board of Regents and Alston\nII. Toolson Has Had Disastrous Consequences for Hundreds of Thousands of American Workers\nIII. The Court Need Not Reprise Toolson",
        "reference": "A. The Baseball Cases: Federal Baseball and Toolson",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case is Like Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953)\nA. The Baseball Cases: Federal Baseball and Toolson\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Toolson Has Had Disastrous Consequences for Hundreds of Thousands of American Workers\nIII. The Court Need Not Reprise Toolson",
        "reference": "B. The College Sports Cases: Board of Regents and Alston",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case is Like Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953)\nA. The Baseball Cases: Federal Baseball and Toolson\nB. The College Sports Cases: Board of Regents and Alston\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Court Need Not Reprise Toolson",
        "reference": "II. Toolson Has Had Disastrous Consequences for Hundreds of Thousands of American Workers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case is Like Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953)\nA. The Baseball Cases: Federal Baseball and Toolson\nB. The College Sports Cases: Board of Regents and Alston\nII. Toolson Has Had Disastrous Consequences for Hundreds of Thousands of American Workers\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Court Need Not Reprise Toolson",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1084_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Alabama Court's Opinion Leaves No Doubt That It Applied An Unreasonably Incorrect Rule\nB. Summary Reversal Here Would Radically Transform Habeas Review\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE\nA. Trial Counsel's Performance Was Constitutionally Deficient\nB. Trial Counsel's Performance Prejudiced Reeves",
        "reference": "I. THE STATE'S PETITION RELIES ON A CLEAR MISREADING OF THE ALABAMA COURT'S OPINION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1084_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE'S PETITION RELIES ON A CLEAR MISREADING OF THE ALABAMA COURT'S OPINION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Summary Reversal Here Would Radically Transform Habeas Review\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE\nA. Trial Counsel's Performance Was Constitutionally Deficient\nB. Trial Counsel's Performance Prejudiced Reeves",
        "reference": "A. The Alabama Court's Opinion Leaves No Doubt That It Applied An Unreasonably Incorrect Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1084_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE'S PETITION RELIES ON A CLEAR MISREADING OF THE ALABAMA COURT'S OPINION\nA. The Alabama Court's Opinion Leaves No Doubt That It Applied An Unreasonably Incorrect Rule\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE\nA. Trial Counsel's Performance Was Constitutionally Deficient\nB. Trial Counsel's Performance Prejudiced Reeves",
        "reference": "B. Summary Reversal Here Would Radically Transform Habeas Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1084_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE'S PETITION RELIES ON A CLEAR MISREADING OF THE ALABAMA COURT'S OPINION\nA. The Alabama Court's Opinion Leaves No Doubt That It Applied An Unreasonably Incorrect Rule\nB. Summary Reversal Here Would Radically Transform Habeas Review\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Trial Counsel's Performance Was Constitutionally Deficient\nB. Trial Counsel's Performance Prejudiced Reeves",
        "reference": "II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1084_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE'S PETITION RELIES ON A CLEAR MISREADING OF THE ALABAMA COURT'S OPINION\nA. The Alabama Court's Opinion Leaves No Doubt That It Applied An Unreasonably Incorrect Rule\nB. Summary Reversal Here Would Radically Transform Habeas Review\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Trial Counsel's Performance Prejudiced Reeves",
        "reference": "A. Trial Counsel's Performance Was Constitutionally Deficient",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1084_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE'S PETITION RELIES ON A CLEAR MISREADING OF THE ALABAMA COURT'S OPINION\nA. The Alabama Court's Opinion Leaves No Doubt That It Applied An Unreasonably Incorrect Rule\nB. Summary Reversal Here Would Radically Transform Habeas Review\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT TRIAL COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE\nA. Trial Counsel's Performance Was Constitutionally Deficient\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Trial Counsel's Performance Prejudiced Reeves",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Government Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption Favoring Judicial Review\nB. The Government's Preclusion Arguments Lack Merit\nC. Even Assuming That Section 1395l(t)(12) Encompasses Paragraph (14) Determinations, Preclusion Is Still Unwarranted\nII. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates\nIII. Chevron Deference Cannot Justify The Agency's Action",
        "reference": "I. Section 1395l(t)(12) Does Not Preclude Petitioners' Suit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1395l(t)(12) Does Not Preclude Petitioners' Suit\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Government's Preclusion Arguments Lack Merit\nC. Even Assuming That Section 1395l(t)(12) Encompasses Paragraph (14) Determinations, Preclusion Is Still Unwarranted\nII. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates\nIII. Chevron Deference Cannot Justify The Agency's Action",
        "reference": "A. The Government Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption Favoring Judicial Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1395l(t)(12) Does Not Preclude Petitioners' Suit\nA. The Government Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption Favoring Judicial Review\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Even Assuming That Section 1395l(t)(12) Encompasses Paragraph (14) Determinations, Preclusion Is Still Unwarranted\nII. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates\nIII. Chevron Deference Cannot Justify The Agency's Action",
        "reference": "B. The Government's Preclusion Arguments Lack Merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1395l(t)(12) Does Not Preclude Petitioners' Suit\nA. The Government Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption Favoring Judicial Review\nB. The Government's Preclusion Arguments Lack Merit\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates\nIII. Chevron Deference Cannot Justify The Agency's Action",
        "reference": "C. Even Assuming That Section 1395l(t)(12) Encompasses Paragraph (14) Determinations, Preclusion Is Still Unwarranted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1395l(t)(12) Does Not Preclude Petitioners' Suit\nA. The Government Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption Favoring Judicial Review\nB. The Government's Preclusion Arguments Lack Merit\nC. Even Assuming That Section 1395l(t)(12) Encompasses Paragraph (14) Determinations, Preclusion Is Still Unwarranted\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Chevron Deference Cannot Justify The Agency's Action",
        "reference": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1395l(t)(12) Does Not Preclude Petitioners' Suit\nA. The Government Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption Favoring Judicial Review\nB. The Government's Preclusion Arguments Lack Merit\nC. Even Assuming That Section 1395l(t)(12) Encompasses Paragraph (14) Determinations, Preclusion Is Still Unwarranted\nII. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Chevron Deference Cannot Justify The Agency's Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Plain Text Confirms That \"Random or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" and \"Produce\"\nB. Historical Context Reinforces That the Statutory Text Means What It Says\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Is Deeply Flawed And Divorced From Statutory Text\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Reading Has Untenable Practical And Constitutional Consequences",
        "reference": "I. The Phrase \"Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" In The Definition Of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Phrase \"Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" In The Definition Of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce.\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Historical Context Reinforces That the Statutory Text Means What It Says\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Is Deeply Flawed And Divorced From Statutory Text\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Reading Has Untenable Practical And Constitutional Consequences",
        "reference": "A. The Plain Text Confirms That \"Random or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" and \"Produce\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Phrase \"Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" In The Definition Of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce.\"\nA. The Plain Text Confirms That \"Random or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" and \"Produce\"\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Is Deeply Flawed And Divorced From Statutory Text\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Reading Has Untenable Practical And Constitutional Consequences",
        "reference": "B. Historical Context Reinforces That the Statutory Text Means What It Says",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Phrase \"Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" In The Definition Of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce.\"\nA. The Plain Text Confirms That \"Random or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" and \"Produce\"\nB. Historical Context Reinforces That the Statutory Text Means What It Says\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Reading Has Untenable Practical And Constitutional Consequences",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Is Deeply Flawed And Divorced From Statutory Text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Phrase \"Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" In The Definition Of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce.\"\nA. The Plain Text Confirms That \"Random or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" and \"Produce\"\nB. Historical Context Reinforces That the Statutory Text Means What It Says\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Is Deeply Flawed And Divorced From Statutory Text\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Ninth Circuit's Reading Has Untenable Practical And Constitutional Consequences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period\nB. Section 1692k(d)'s clear text displaces any default presumption in favor of a discovery rule\nC. The FDCPA's purposes do not justify departing from the statutory text\nII. Petitioner identifies no valid basis for excusing his noncompliance with the FDCPA's filing deadline\nA. Traditional principles of equitable tolling apply to the FDCPA, but petitioner forfeited any equitable-tolling argument in this case\nB. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
        "reference": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1692k(d)'s clear text displaces any default presumption in favor of a discovery rule\nC. The FDCPA's purposes do not justify departing from the statutory text\nII. Petitioner identifies no valid basis for excusing his noncompliance with the FDCPA's filing deadline\nA. Traditional principles of equitable tolling apply to the FDCPA, but petitioner forfeited any equitable-tolling argument in this case\nB. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
        "reference": "A. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period\nA. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The FDCPA's purposes do not justify departing from the statutory text\nII. Petitioner identifies no valid basis for excusing his noncompliance with the FDCPA's filing deadline\nA. Traditional principles of equitable tolling apply to the FDCPA, but petitioner forfeited any equitable-tolling argument in this case\nB. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
        "reference": "B. Section 1692k(d)'s clear text displaces any default presumption in favor of a discovery rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period\nA. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period\nB. Section 1692k(d)'s clear text displaces any default presumption in favor of a discovery rule\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioner identifies no valid basis for excusing his noncompliance with the FDCPA's filing deadline\nA. Traditional principles of equitable tolling apply to the FDCPA, but petitioner forfeited any equitable-tolling argument in this case\nB. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
        "reference": "C. The FDCPA's purposes do not justify departing from the statutory text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period\nA. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period\nB. Section 1692k(d)'s clear text displaces any default presumption in favor of a discovery rule\nC. The FDCPA's purposes do not justify departing from the statutory text\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Traditional principles of equitable tolling apply to the FDCPA, but petitioner forfeited any equitable-tolling argument in this case\nB. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
        "reference": "II. Petitioner identifies no valid basis for excusing his noncompliance with the FDCPA's filing deadline",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period\nA. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period\nB. Section 1692k(d)'s clear text displaces any default presumption in favor of a discovery rule\nC. The FDCPA's purposes do not justify departing from the statutory text\nII. Petitioner identifies no valid basis for excusing his noncompliance with the FDCPA's filing deadline\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
        "reference": "A. Traditional principles of equitable tolling apply to the FDCPA, but petitioner forfeited any equitable-tolling argument in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period\nA. The FDCPA's text unambiguously makes the occurrence of an alleged violation the starting point for the Act's limitations period\nB. Section 1692k(d)'s clear text displaces any default presumption in favor of a discovery rule\nC. The FDCPA's purposes do not justify departing from the statutory text\nII. Petitioner identifies no valid basis for excusing his noncompliance with the FDCPA's filing deadline\nA. Traditional principles of equitable tolling apply to the FDCPA, but petitioner forfeited any equitable-tolling argument in this case\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The special rule the Court has recognized for fraud suits does not apply to petitioner's FDCPA claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Safeco Does Not Support Respondents' Rule\nIII. The Statutory Text and Common Law Foreclose Respondents' Rule\nA. Respondents Have No Good Answer to Petitioners' Lead Statutory Argument\nB. Respondents' Interpretation of the False Claims Act's Definition of \"Knowingly\" Is Unpersuasive\nIV. Respondents' Policy Arguments Lack Merit",
        "reference": "I. Respondents' Factual Recitation Is Inaccurate and Does Not Support Their Legal Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' Factual Recitation Is Inaccurate and Does Not Support Their Legal Rule\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Statutory Text and Common Law Foreclose Respondents' Rule\nA. Respondents Have No Good Answer to Petitioners' Lead Statutory Argument\nB. Respondents' Interpretation of the False Claims Act's Definition of \"Knowingly\" Is Unpersuasive\nIV. Respondents' Policy Arguments Lack Merit",
        "reference": "II. Safeco Does Not Support Respondents' Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' Factual Recitation Is Inaccurate and Does Not Support Their Legal Rule\nII. Safeco Does Not Support Respondents' Rule\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Respondents Have No Good Answer to Petitioners' Lead Statutory Argument\nB. Respondents' Interpretation of the False Claims Act's Definition of \"Knowingly\" Is Unpersuasive\nIV. Respondents' Policy Arguments Lack Merit",
        "reference": "III. The Statutory Text and Common Law Foreclose Respondents' Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' Factual Recitation Is Inaccurate and Does Not Support Their Legal Rule\nII. Safeco Does Not Support Respondents' Rule\nIII. The Statutory Text and Common Law Foreclose Respondents' Rule\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Respondents' Interpretation of the False Claims Act's Definition of \"Knowingly\" Is Unpersuasive\nIV. Respondents' Policy Arguments Lack Merit",
        "reference": "A. Respondents Have No Good Answer to Petitioners' Lead Statutory Argument",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' Factual Recitation Is Inaccurate and Does Not Support Their Legal Rule\nII. Safeco Does Not Support Respondents' Rule\nIII. The Statutory Text and Common Law Foreclose Respondents' Rule\nA. Respondents Have No Good Answer to Petitioners' Lead Statutory Argument\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. Respondents' Policy Arguments Lack Merit",
        "reference": "B. Respondents' Interpretation of the False Claims Act's Definition of \"Knowingly\" Is Unpersuasive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' Factual Recitation Is Inaccurate and Does Not Support Their Legal Rule\nII. Safeco Does Not Support Respondents' Rule\nIII. The Statutory Text and Common Law Foreclose Respondents' Rule\nA. Respondents Have No Good Answer to Petitioners' Lead Statutory Argument\nB. Respondents' Interpretation of the False Claims Act's Definition of \"Knowingly\" Is Unpersuasive\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Respondents' Policy Arguments Lack Merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The insanity defense's moral culpability principle is deeply rooted\nB. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications\nC. This Court's precedents do not support abolition\nD. The policy arguments for abolition are mistaken\nII. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT\nA. Mr. Kahler's Eighth Amendment challenge is squarely before this Court\nB. Abolishing the insanity defense is a cruel and unusual innovation in punishment\nIII. KANSAS'S CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT",
        "reference": "I. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications\nC. This Court's precedents do not support abolition\nD. The policy arguments for abolition are mistaken\nII. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT\nA. Mr. Kahler's Eighth Amendment challenge is squarely before this Court\nB. Abolishing the insanity defense is a cruel and unusual innovation in punishment\nIII. KANSAS'S CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT",
        "reference": "A. The insanity defense's moral culpability principle is deeply rooted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS\nA. The insanity defense's moral culpability principle is deeply rooted\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Court's precedents do not support abolition\nD. The policy arguments for abolition are mistaken\nII. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT\nA. Mr. Kahler's Eighth Amendment challenge is squarely before this Court\nB. Abolishing the insanity defense is a cruel and unusual innovation in punishment\nIII. KANSAS'S CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT",
        "reference": "B. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS\nA. The insanity defense's moral culpability principle is deeply rooted\nB. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The policy arguments for abolition are mistaken\nII. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT\nA. Mr. Kahler's Eighth Amendment challenge is squarely before this Court\nB. Abolishing the insanity defense is a cruel and unusual innovation in punishment\nIII. KANSAS'S CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT",
        "reference": "C. This Court's precedents do not support abolition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS\nA. The insanity defense's moral culpability principle is deeply rooted\nB. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications\nC. This Court's precedents do not support abolition\nD. [MISSING]\nII. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT\nA. Mr. Kahler's Eighth Amendment challenge is squarely before this Court\nB. Abolishing the insanity defense is a cruel and unusual innovation in punishment\nIII. KANSAS'S CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT",
        "reference": "D. The policy arguments for abolition are mistaken",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS\nA. The insanity defense's moral culpability principle is deeply rooted\nB. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications\nC. This Court's precedents do not support abolition\nD. The policy arguments for abolition are mistaken\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Mr. Kahler's Eighth Amendment challenge is squarely before this Court\nB. Abolishing the insanity defense is a cruel and unusual innovation in punishment\nIII. KANSAS'S CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT",
        "reference": "II. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS\nA. The insanity defense's moral culpability principle is deeply rooted\nB. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications\nC. This Court's precedents do not support abolition\nD. The policy arguments for abolition are mistaken\nII. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Abolishing the insanity defense is a cruel and unusual innovation in punishment\nIII. KANSAS'S CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT",
        "reference": "A. Mr. Kahler's Eighth Amendment challenge is squarely before this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS\nA. The insanity defense's moral culpability principle is deeply rooted\nB. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications\nC. This Court's precedents do not support abolition\nD. The policy arguments for abolition are mistaken\nII. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT\nA. Mr. Kahler's Eighth Amendment challenge is squarely before this Court\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. KANSAS'S CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT",
        "reference": "B. Abolishing the insanity defense is a cruel and unusual innovation in punishment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS\nA. The insanity defense's moral culpability principle is deeply rooted\nB. Kansas has abandoned moral culpability in criminal law, with startling implications\nC. This Court's precedents do not support abolition\nD. The policy arguments for abolition are mistaken\nII. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT\nA. Mr. Kahler's Eighth Amendment challenge is squarely before this Court\nB. Abolishing the insanity defense is a cruel and unusual innovation in punishment\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. KANSAS'S CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Even if creditors are entitled to withhold possession of property of the estate in rare cases, the argument for doing so justifies only temporary action\nIII. The stay of acts to prevent a debtor from taking possession of property of the estate is consistent with the broader statutory framework",
        "reference": "I. The value of the \"plain meaning\" rule is diminished if the Court allows legislative history or past practice to undermine the terms of the statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The value of the \"plain meaning\" rule is diminished if the Court allows legislative history or past practice to undermine the terms of the statute\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The stay of acts to prevent a debtor from taking possession of property of the estate is consistent with the broader statutory framework",
        "reference": "II. Even if creditors are entitled to withhold possession of property of the estate in rare cases, the argument for doing so justifies only temporary action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The value of the \"plain meaning\" rule is diminished if the Court allows legislative history or past practice to undermine the terms of the statute\nII. Even if creditors are entitled to withhold possession of property of the estate in rare cases, the argument for doing so justifies only temporary action\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The stay of acts to prevent a debtor from taking possession of property of the estate is consistent with the broader statutory framework",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Test Adopted by the Third Circuit for Determining Whether a Government Official Participated in Impermissible Anti-Religious Conduct is Less Protective Than the Test Mandated by This Court\nB. The City Unconstitutionally Suggested That the Religious Ground for CSS's Conscience-Based Objection Was Illegitimate\nII. Jews and Other Religious Minorities Are Particularly Threatened by the Third Circuit's Disregard for First Amendment Precedent",
        "reference": "I. The Third Circuit Misapplied This Court's First Amendment Holdings in a Manner That Threatens Religious Minorities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit Misapplied This Court's First Amendment Holdings in a Manner That Threatens Religious Minorities\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The City Unconstitutionally Suggested That the Religious Ground for CSS's Conscience-Based Objection Was Illegitimate\nII. Jews and Other Religious Minorities Are Particularly Threatened by the Third Circuit's Disregard for First Amendment Precedent",
        "reference": "A. The Test Adopted by the Third Circuit for Determining Whether a Government Official Participated in Impermissible Anti-Religious Conduct is Less Protective Than the Test Mandated by This Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit Misapplied This Court's First Amendment Holdings in a Manner That Threatens Religious Minorities\nA. The Test Adopted by the Third Circuit for Determining Whether a Government Official Participated in Impermissible Anti-Religious Conduct is Less Protective Than the Test Mandated by This Court\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Jews and Other Religious Minorities Are Particularly Threatened by the Third Circuit's Disregard for First Amendment Precedent",
        "reference": "B. The City Unconstitutionally Suggested That the Religious Ground for CSS's Conscience-Based Objection Was Illegitimate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit Misapplied This Court's First Amendment Holdings in a Manner That Threatens Religious Minorities\nA. The Test Adopted by the Third Circuit for Determining Whether a Government Official Participated in Impermissible Anti-Religious Conduct is Less Protective Than the Test Mandated by This Court\nB. The City Unconstitutionally Suggested That the Religious Ground for CSS's Conscience-Based Objection Was Illegitimate\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Jews and Other Religious Minorities Are Particularly Threatened by the Third Circuit's Disregard for First Amendment Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. NFIB Wrongly Applied the Saving Construction to the Individual Mandate",
        "reference": "I. The Individual Mandate is not a Proper Exercise of the Taxing Power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Individual Mandate is not a Proper Exercise of the Taxing Power\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. NFIB Wrongly Applied the Saving Construction to the Individual Mandate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "A. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "B. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. [MISSING]\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "C. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. [MISSING]\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "D. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. [MISSING]\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. [MISSING]\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "II. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "A. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "B. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "C. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "reference": "D. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule 59(e) Motion Is a Second or Successive Habeas Application When It Presents a Habeas Claim That Has Been or Could Have Been Adjudicated\nA. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"\nB. Gonzalez holds that habeas claims in a post-judgment motion render that motion a second or successive habeas application\nC. Gonzalez's text-based rule confirms that a Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive habeas application when it re-urges habeas claims that were already rejected\nD. There is no principled reason to exempt Rule 59(e) motions containing habeas claims from AEDPA's second-or-successive requirements\n1. Principles of finality and the law of judgments show why Rules 59(e) and 60(b) warrant the same treatment under AEDPA\n2. Post-judgment motions in the district court are fundamentally different from post-judgment motions in the court of appeals\n3. Common law analogues do not require a different outcome\n4. AEDPA trumps contrary rules of procedure\nII. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Is an Unauthorized Second or Successive Habeas Application Does Not Extend the Time to Appeal\nA. Authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite for filing a second or successive application\nB. A filing the district court lacks jurisdiction to accept and entertain cannot extend the time to appeal\nC. This case does not implicate the recharacterization issue the Court addressed in Castro\nD. The second-or-successive hurdles are part of the federal habeas review that AEDPA provides a state prisoner\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Fifth Circuit Had No Jurisdiction to Entertain Banister's Untimely Appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Internet Has Created New Ways to Inflict Serious and Permanent Harm Upon Donors That Simply Didn't Exist in the Days of NAACP v. Alabama\nIII. Valuable Insight to the Risks of Public Disclosure Faced by Donors Can Be Found in the Examples of Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters\nIV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative\n1. Vandalism\n2. Death Threats\n3. Physical Violence\n4. Destruction of Livelihood\n5. Harassment in the Workplace\nV. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Consider the Severe Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters in Assessing the Grave Risks of Disclosure Facing Petitioners and Their Donors",
        "reference": "I. The \"Civic Courage\" Required to Exercise First Amendment Rights Affecting the Integrity of the Legislative Process and the Election of Public Officials Is Not a Burden Imposed Upon Charities and Their Donors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Civic Courage\" Required to Exercise First Amendment Rights Affecting the Integrity of the Legislative Process and the Election of Public Officials Is Not a Burden Imposed Upon Charities and Their Donors\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Valuable Insight to the Risks of Public Disclosure Faced by Donors Can Be Found in the Examples of Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters\nIV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative\n1. Vandalism\n2. Death Threats\n3. Physical Violence\n4. Destruction of Livelihood\n5. Harassment in the Workplace\nV. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Consider the Severe Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters in Assessing the Grave Risks of Disclosure Facing Petitioners and Their Donors",
        "reference": "II. The Internet Has Created New Ways to Inflict Serious and Permanent Harm Upon Donors That Simply Didn't Exist in the Days of NAACP v. Alabama",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Civic Courage\" Required to Exercise First Amendment Rights Affecting the Integrity of the Legislative Process and the Election of Public Officials Is Not a Burden Imposed Upon Charities and Their Donors\nII. The Internet Has Created New Ways to Inflict Serious and Permanent Harm Upon Donors That Simply Didn't Exist in the Days of NAACP v. Alabama\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative\n1. Vandalism\n2. Death Threats\n3. Physical Violence\n4. Destruction of Livelihood\n5. Harassment in the Workplace\nV. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Consider the Severe Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters in Assessing the Grave Risks of Disclosure Facing Petitioners and Their Donors",
        "reference": "III. Valuable Insight to the Risks of Public Disclosure Faced by Donors Can Be Found in the Examples of Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Civic Courage\" Required to Exercise First Amendment Rights Affecting the Integrity of the Legislative Process and the Election of Public Officials Is Not a Burden Imposed Upon Charities and Their Donors\nII. The Internet Has Created New Ways to Inflict Serious and Permanent Harm Upon Donors That Simply Didn't Exist in the Days of NAACP v. Alabama\nIII. Valuable Insight to the Risks of Public Disclosure Faced by Donors Can Be Found in the Examples of Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters\nIV. [MISSING]\n1. Vandalism\n2. Death Threats\n3. Physical Violence\n4. Destruction of Livelihood\n5. Harassment in the Workplace\nV. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Consider the Severe Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters in Assessing the Grave Risks of Disclosure Facing Petitioners and Their Donors",
        "reference": "IV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Civic Courage\" Required to Exercise First Amendment Rights Affecting the Integrity of the Legislative Process and the Election of Public Officials Is Not a Burden Imposed Upon Charities and Their Donors\nII. The Internet Has Created New Ways to Inflict Serious and Permanent Harm Upon Donors That Simply Didn't Exist in the Days of NAACP v. Alabama\nIII. Valuable Insight to the Risks of Public Disclosure Faced by Donors Can Be Found in the Examples of Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters\nIV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative\n1. Vandalism\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Physical Violence\n4. Destruction of Livelihood\n5. Harassment in the Workplace\nV. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Consider the Severe Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters in Assessing the Grave Risks of Disclosure Facing Petitioners and Their Donors",
        "reference": "2. Death Threats",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Civic Courage\" Required to Exercise First Amendment Rights Affecting the Integrity of the Legislative Process and the Election of Public Officials Is Not a Burden Imposed Upon Charities and Their Donors\nII. The Internet Has Created New Ways to Inflict Serious and Permanent Harm Upon Donors That Simply Didn't Exist in the Days of NAACP v. Alabama\nIII. Valuable Insight to the Risks of Public Disclosure Faced by Donors Can Be Found in the Examples of Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters\nIV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative\n1. Vandalism\n2. Death Threats\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Destruction of Livelihood\n5. Harassment in the Workplace\nV. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Consider the Severe Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters in Assessing the Grave Risks of Disclosure Facing Petitioners and Their Donors",
        "reference": "3. Physical Violence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Civic Courage\" Required to Exercise First Amendment Rights Affecting the Integrity of the Legislative Process and the Election of Public Officials Is Not a Burden Imposed Upon Charities and Their Donors\nII. The Internet Has Created New Ways to Inflict Serious and Permanent Harm Upon Donors That Simply Didn't Exist in the Days of NAACP v. Alabama\nIII. Valuable Insight to the Risks of Public Disclosure Faced by Donors Can Be Found in the Examples of Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters\nIV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative\n1. Vandalism\n2. Death Threats\n3. Physical Violence\n4. [MISSING]\n5. Harassment in the Workplace\nV. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Consider the Severe Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters in Assessing the Grave Risks of Disclosure Facing Petitioners and Their Donors",
        "reference": "4. Destruction of Livelihood",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Civic Courage\" Required to Exercise First Amendment Rights Affecting the Integrity of the Legislative Process and the Election of Public Officials Is Not a Burden Imposed Upon Charities and Their Donors\nII. The Internet Has Created New Ways to Inflict Serious and Permanent Harm Upon Donors That Simply Didn't Exist in the Days of NAACP v. Alabama\nIII. Valuable Insight to the Risks of Public Disclosure Faced by Donors Can Be Found in the Examples of Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters\nIV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative\n1. Vandalism\n2. Death Threats\n3. Physical Violence\n4. Destruction of Livelihood\n5. [MISSING]\nV. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Consider the Severe Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters in Assessing the Grave Risks of Disclosure Facing Petitioners and Their Donors",
        "reference": "5. Harassment in the Workplace",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Civic Courage\" Required to Exercise First Amendment Rights Affecting the Integrity of the Legislative Process and the Election of Public Officials Is Not a Burden Imposed Upon Charities and Their Donors\nII. The Internet Has Created New Ways to Inflict Serious and Permanent Harm Upon Donors That Simply Didn't Exist in the Days of NAACP v. Alabama\nIII. Valuable Insight to the Risks of Public Disclosure Faced by Donors Can Be Found in the Examples of Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters\nIV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative\n1. Vandalism\n2. Death Threats\n3. Physical Violence\n4. Destruction of Livelihood\n5. Harassment in the Workplace\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Consider the Severe Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters in Assessing the Grave Risks of Disclosure Facing Petitioners and Their Donors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Article III Requires A Plaintiff To Demonstrate More Than The \"Psychological Consequence\" Of Observing An Alleged Violation Of Federal Law\nB. The Fourth Circuit's \"Direct Contact\" Standard Presents A Conflict Among The Circuits On What Is Required To Establish Standing\nII. THE DECISION BELOW SQUARELY PRESENTS A CIRCUIT CONFLICT ON THE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING PUBLIC DISPLAYS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. The Decision Below Exacerbates A Conflict Concerning The Test For Assessing Public Displays Under The Establishment Clause\nB. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Van Orden\nC. Review Should Be Granted Because The Decision Below Calls Into Question The Legality Of Numerous Memorials Throughout The Nation",
        "reference": "I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S \"OFFENDED BYSTANDER\" TEST IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S ARTICLE III STANDING DECISIONS AND PRESENTS A CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S \"OFFENDED BYSTANDER\" TEST IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S ARTICLE III STANDING DECISIONS AND PRESENTS A CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Fourth Circuit's \"Direct Contact\" Standard Presents A Conflict Among The Circuits On What Is Required To Establish Standing\nII. THE DECISION BELOW SQUARELY PRESENTS A CIRCUIT CONFLICT ON THE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING PUBLIC DISPLAYS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. The Decision Below Exacerbates A Conflict Concerning The Test For Assessing Public Displays Under The Establishment Clause\nB. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Van Orden\nC. Review Should Be Granted Because The Decision Below Calls Into Question The Legality Of Numerous Memorials Throughout The Nation",
        "reference": "A. Article III Requires A Plaintiff To Demonstrate More Than The \"Psychological Consequence\" Of Observing An Alleged Violation Of Federal Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S \"OFFENDED BYSTANDER\" TEST IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S ARTICLE III STANDING DECISIONS AND PRESENTS A CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS\nA. Article III Requires A Plaintiff To Demonstrate More Than The \"Psychological Consequence\" Of Observing An Alleged Violation Of Federal Law\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE DECISION BELOW SQUARELY PRESENTS A CIRCUIT CONFLICT ON THE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING PUBLIC DISPLAYS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. The Decision Below Exacerbates A Conflict Concerning The Test For Assessing Public Displays Under The Establishment Clause\nB. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Van Orden\nC. Review Should Be Granted Because The Decision Below Calls Into Question The Legality Of Numerous Memorials Throughout The Nation",
        "reference": "B. The Fourth Circuit's \"Direct Contact\" Standard Presents A Conflict Among The Circuits On What Is Required To Establish Standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S \"OFFENDED BYSTANDER\" TEST IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S ARTICLE III STANDING DECISIONS AND PRESENTS A CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS\nA. Article III Requires A Plaintiff To Demonstrate More Than The \"Psychological Consequence\" Of Observing An Alleged Violation Of Federal Law\nB. The Fourth Circuit's \"Direct Contact\" Standard Presents A Conflict Among The Circuits On What Is Required To Establish Standing\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Decision Below Exacerbates A Conflict Concerning The Test For Assessing Public Displays Under The Establishment Clause\nB. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Van Orden\nC. Review Should Be Granted Because The Decision Below Calls Into Question The Legality Of Numerous Memorials Throughout The Nation",
        "reference": "II. THE DECISION BELOW SQUARELY PRESENTS A CIRCUIT CONFLICT ON THE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING PUBLIC DISPLAYS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S \"OFFENDED BYSTANDER\" TEST IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S ARTICLE III STANDING DECISIONS AND PRESENTS A CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS\nA. Article III Requires A Plaintiff To Demonstrate More Than The \"Psychological Consequence\" Of Observing An Alleged Violation Of Federal Law\nB. The Fourth Circuit's \"Direct Contact\" Standard Presents A Conflict Among The Circuits On What Is Required To Establish Standing\nII. THE DECISION BELOW SQUARELY PRESENTS A CIRCUIT CONFLICT ON THE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING PUBLIC DISPLAYS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Van Orden\nC. Review Should Be Granted Because The Decision Below Calls Into Question The Legality Of Numerous Memorials Throughout The Nation",
        "reference": "A. The Decision Below Exacerbates A Conflict Concerning The Test For Assessing Public Displays Under The Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S \"OFFENDED BYSTANDER\" TEST IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S ARTICLE III STANDING DECISIONS AND PRESENTS A CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS\nA. Article III Requires A Plaintiff To Demonstrate More Than The \"Psychological Consequence\" Of Observing An Alleged Violation Of Federal Law\nB. The Fourth Circuit's \"Direct Contact\" Standard Presents A Conflict Among The Circuits On What Is Required To Establish Standing\nII. THE DECISION BELOW SQUARELY PRESENTS A CIRCUIT CONFLICT ON THE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING PUBLIC DISPLAYS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. The Decision Below Exacerbates A Conflict Concerning The Test For Assessing Public Displays Under The Establishment Clause\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Review Should Be Granted Because The Decision Below Calls Into Question The Legality Of Numerous Memorials Throughout The Nation",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Van Orden",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S \"OFFENDED BYSTANDER\" TEST IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S ARTICLE III STANDING DECISIONS AND PRESENTS A CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS\nA. Article III Requires A Plaintiff To Demonstrate More Than The \"Psychological Consequence\" Of Observing An Alleged Violation Of Federal Law\nB. The Fourth Circuit's \"Direct Contact\" Standard Presents A Conflict Among The Circuits On What Is Required To Establish Standing\nII. THE DECISION BELOW SQUARELY PRESENTS A CIRCUIT CONFLICT ON THE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING PUBLIC DISPLAYS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. The Decision Below Exacerbates A Conflict Concerning The Test For Assessing Public Displays Under The Establishment Clause\nB. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Van Orden\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Review Should Be Granted Because The Decision Below Calls Into Question The Legality Of Numerous Memorials Throughout The Nation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. These Cases Are Poor Vehicles for This Court's Review\nA. Guzman Chavez May Moot These Appeals\nB. Both Cases are Interlocutory Appeals with Undeveloped Records, and Have Ongoing Proceedings in District Court That Will Develop Facts Relevant to the Question Presented\nIII. The Decisions Below Are Correct\nA. The Rulings Below Avoid the Serious Constitutional Concerns Presented by Prolonged Detention Without a Hearing\nB. Section 1231(a)(6) is Ambiguous as to the Procedure Required, and the Courts Below Properly Construed It to Require Bond Hearings\nIV. The Practical Consequences of the Decisions Below Do Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "reference": "I. There Is No Mature Split, and the Issue Warrants Further Percolation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Mature Split, and the Issue Warrants Further Percolation\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Guzman Chavez May Moot These Appeals\nB. Both Cases are Interlocutory Appeals with Undeveloped Records, and Have Ongoing Proceedings in District Court That Will Develop Facts Relevant to the Question Presented\nIII. The Decisions Below Are Correct\nA. The Rulings Below Avoid the Serious Constitutional Concerns Presented by Prolonged Detention Without a Hearing\nB. Section 1231(a)(6) is Ambiguous as to the Procedure Required, and the Courts Below Properly Construed It to Require Bond Hearings\nIV. The Practical Consequences of the Decisions Below Do Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "reference": "II. These Cases Are Poor Vehicles for This Court's Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Mature Split, and the Issue Warrants Further Percolation\nII. These Cases Are Poor Vehicles for This Court's Review\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Both Cases are Interlocutory Appeals with Undeveloped Records, and Have Ongoing Proceedings in District Court That Will Develop Facts Relevant to the Question Presented\nIII. The Decisions Below Are Correct\nA. The Rulings Below Avoid the Serious Constitutional Concerns Presented by Prolonged Detention Without a Hearing\nB. Section 1231(a)(6) is Ambiguous as to the Procedure Required, and the Courts Below Properly Construed It to Require Bond Hearings\nIV. The Practical Consequences of the Decisions Below Do Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "reference": "A. Guzman Chavez May Moot These Appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Mature Split, and the Issue Warrants Further Percolation\nII. These Cases Are Poor Vehicles for This Court's Review\nA. Guzman Chavez May Moot These Appeals\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decisions Below Are Correct\nA. The Rulings Below Avoid the Serious Constitutional Concerns Presented by Prolonged Detention Without a Hearing\nB. Section 1231(a)(6) is Ambiguous as to the Procedure Required, and the Courts Below Properly Construed It to Require Bond Hearings\nIV. The Practical Consequences of the Decisions Below Do Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "reference": "B. Both Cases are Interlocutory Appeals with Undeveloped Records, and Have Ongoing Proceedings in District Court That Will Develop Facts Relevant to the Question Presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Mature Split, and the Issue Warrants Further Percolation\nII. These Cases Are Poor Vehicles for This Court's Review\nA. Guzman Chavez May Moot These Appeals\nB. Both Cases are Interlocutory Appeals with Undeveloped Records, and Have Ongoing Proceedings in District Court That Will Develop Facts Relevant to the Question Presented\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Rulings Below Avoid the Serious Constitutional Concerns Presented by Prolonged Detention Without a Hearing\nB. Section 1231(a)(6) is Ambiguous as to the Procedure Required, and the Courts Below Properly Construed It to Require Bond Hearings\nIV. The Practical Consequences of the Decisions Below Do Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "reference": "III. The Decisions Below Are Correct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Mature Split, and the Issue Warrants Further Percolation\nII. These Cases Are Poor Vehicles for This Court's Review\nA. Guzman Chavez May Moot These Appeals\nB. Both Cases are Interlocutory Appeals with Undeveloped Records, and Have Ongoing Proceedings in District Court That Will Develop Facts Relevant to the Question Presented\nIII. The Decisions Below Are Correct\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1231(a)(6) is Ambiguous as to the Procedure Required, and the Courts Below Properly Construed It to Require Bond Hearings\nIV. The Practical Consequences of the Decisions Below Do Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "reference": "A. The Rulings Below Avoid the Serious Constitutional Concerns Presented by Prolonged Detention Without a Hearing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Mature Split, and the Issue Warrants Further Percolation\nII. These Cases Are Poor Vehicles for This Court's Review\nA. Guzman Chavez May Moot These Appeals\nB. Both Cases are Interlocutory Appeals with Undeveloped Records, and Have Ongoing Proceedings in District Court That Will Develop Facts Relevant to the Question Presented\nIII. The Decisions Below Are Correct\nA. The Rulings Below Avoid the Serious Constitutional Concerns Presented by Prolonged Detention Without a Hearing\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. The Practical Consequences of the Decisions Below Do Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "reference": "B. Section 1231(a)(6) is Ambiguous as to the Procedure Required, and the Courts Below Properly Construed It to Require Bond Hearings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Mature Split, and the Issue Warrants Further Percolation\nII. These Cases Are Poor Vehicles for This Court's Review\nA. Guzman Chavez May Moot These Appeals\nB. Both Cases are Interlocutory Appeals with Undeveloped Records, and Have Ongoing Proceedings in District Court That Will Develop Facts Relevant to the Question Presented\nIII. The Decisions Below Are Correct\nA. The Rulings Below Avoid the Serious Constitutional Concerns Presented by Prolonged Detention Without a Hearing\nB. Section 1231(a)(6) is Ambiguous as to the Procedure Required, and the Courts Below Properly Construed It to Require Bond Hearings\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Practical Consequences of the Decisions Below Do Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Defense [MISSING]\nA. Defense Counsel Does Not Perform Deficiently When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver\nB. Defense Counsel Does Not Presumptively Prejudice His Client When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver\nC. Practical Considerations Do Not Support Adopting A Presumption Of Prejudice Here",
        "reference": "Defense Counsel Does Not Perform Deficiently And Does Not Presumptively Prejudice His Client When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Defense Counsel Does Not Perform Deficiently And Does Not Presumptively Prejudice His Client When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Defense Counsel Does Not Presumptively Prejudice His Client When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver\nC. Practical Considerations Do Not Support Adopting A Presumption Of Prejudice Here",
        "reference": "A. Defense Counsel Does Not Perform Deficiently When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Defense Counsel Does Not Perform Deficiently And Does Not Presumptively Prejudice His Client When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver\nA. Defense Counsel Does Not Perform Deficiently When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Practical Considerations Do Not Support Adopting A Presumption Of Prejudice Here",
        "reference": "B. Defense Counsel Does Not Presumptively Prejudice His Client When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Defense Counsel Does Not Perform Deficiently And Does Not Presumptively Prejudice His Client When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver\nA. Defense Counsel Does Not Perform Deficiently When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver\nB. Defense Counsel Does Not Presumptively Prejudice His Client When He Declines The Client's Request To Appeal Issues Within The Scope Of A Valid Appeal Waiver\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Practical Considerations Do Not Support Adopting A Presumption Of Prejudice Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "Under [MISSING]\nA. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator\nB. The differences between the TCPA's prohibitions and the predecessor state laws on which the TCPA was based support petitioner's reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)\nC. The TCPA's regulatory history provides no sound reason for the Court to reject the most natural reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)\nD. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
        "reference": "Under the TCPA, a device is an \"automatic telephone dialing system\" only if it has the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator to store or produce telephone numbers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "Under the TCPA, a device is an \"automatic telephone dialing system\" only if it has the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator to store or produce telephone numbers\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The differences between the TCPA's prohibitions and the predecessor state laws on which the TCPA was based support petitioner's reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)\nC. The TCPA's regulatory history provides no sound reason for the Court to reject the most natural reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)\nD. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
        "reference": "A. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "Under the TCPA, a device is an \"automatic telephone dialing system\" only if it has the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator to store or produce telephone numbers\nA. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The TCPA's regulatory history provides no sound reason for the Court to reject the most natural reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)\nD. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
        "reference": "B. The differences between the TCPA's prohibitions and the predecessor state laws on which the TCPA was based support petitioner's reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "Under the TCPA, a device is an \"automatic telephone dialing system\" only if it has the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator to store or produce telephone numbers\nA. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator\nB. The differences between the TCPA's prohibitions and the predecessor state laws on which the TCPA was based support petitioner's reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
        "reference": "C. The TCPA's regulatory history provides no sound reason for the Court to reject the most natural reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "Under the TCPA, a device is an \"automatic telephone dialing system\" only if it has the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator to store or produce telephone numbers\nA. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator\nB. The differences between the TCPA's prohibitions and the predecessor state laws on which the TCPA was based support petitioner's reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)\nC. The TCPA's regulatory history provides no sound reason for the Court to reject the most natural reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-857_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Saving-clause relief would not provide an end run around Section 2255(h) or create difficult issues for the courts\nIII. The government and amicus fail to grapple with substantial constitutional concerns\nIV. The government erroneously reads Section 2255(e) to apply only to intervening decisions by this court\nV. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
        "reference": "I. Amicus misunderstands petitioner's test and Section 2255(e)'s purpose, text, and coverage",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-857_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Amicus misunderstands petitioner's test and Section 2255(e)'s purpose, text, and coverage\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The government and amicus fail to grapple with substantial constitutional concerns\nIV. The government erroneously reads Section 2255(e) to apply only to intervening decisions by this court\nV. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
        "reference": "II. Saving-clause relief would not provide an end run around Section 2255(h) or create difficult issues for the courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-857_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Amicus misunderstands petitioner's test and Section 2255(e)'s purpose, text, and coverage\nII. Saving-clause relief would not provide an end run around Section 2255(h) or create difficult issues for the courts\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The government erroneously reads Section 2255(e) to apply only to intervening decisions by this court\nV. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
        "reference": "III. The government and amicus fail to grapple with substantial constitutional concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-857_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Amicus misunderstands petitioner's test and Section 2255(e)'s purpose, text, and coverage\nII. Saving-clause relief would not provide an end run around Section 2255(h) or create difficult issues for the courts\nIII. The government and amicus fail to grapple with substantial constitutional concerns\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
        "reference": "IV. The government erroneously reads Section 2255(e) to apply only to intervening decisions by this court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-857_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Amicus misunderstands petitioner's test and Section 2255(e)'s purpose, text, and coverage\nII. Saving-clause relief would not provide an end run around Section 2255(h) or create difficult issues for the courts\nIII. The government and amicus fail to grapple with substantial constitutional concerns\nIV. The government erroneously reads Section 2255(e) to apply only to intervening decisions by this court\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-846_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's review is warranted",
        "reference": "A. The lower court's decision is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-846_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The lower court's decision is incorrect\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. This Court's review is warranted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Text of the Copyright Act Is Clear\nB. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing\nC. \"Costs,\" \"Expenses,\" and \"Fees\" Are Not the Distinct Terms Petitioners Suggest\nD. Giving section 505 its Plain Meaning Does Not Create Any Superfluity\nII. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent\nIII. Historical Context Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Full Costs\nA. \"Full Costs\" Did Not Have Any of the Various Meanings Petitioners Try to Give it in 1831\nB. \"Full Costs\" Was Not Limited to \"Party and Party\" Costs in England in 1831\nIV. Policy Considerations Support Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include All Forms Of Costs",
        "reference": "I. The Copyright Act's \"Full Costs\" Provision Authorizes Recovery Of All Litigation Costs, Not Just A Subset",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright Act's \"Full Costs\" Provision Authorizes Recovery Of All Litigation Costs, Not Just A Subset\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing\nC. \"Costs,\" \"Expenses,\" and \"Fees\" Are Not the Distinct Terms Petitioners Suggest\nD. Giving section 505 its Plain Meaning Does Not Create Any Superfluity\nII. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent\nIII. Historical Context Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Full Costs\nA. \"Full Costs\" Did Not Have Any of the Various Meanings Petitioners Try to Give it in 1831\nB. \"Full Costs\" Was Not Limited to \"Party and Party\" Costs in England in 1831\nIV. Policy Considerations Support Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include All Forms Of Costs",
        "reference": "A. The Text of the Copyright Act Is Clear",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright Act's \"Full Costs\" Provision Authorizes Recovery Of All Litigation Costs, Not Just A Subset\nA. The Text of the Copyright Act Is Clear\nB. [MISSING]\nC. \"Costs,\" \"Expenses,\" and \"Fees\" Are Not the Distinct Terms Petitioners Suggest\nD. Giving section 505 its Plain Meaning Does Not Create Any Superfluity\nII. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent\nIII. Historical Context Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Full Costs\nA. \"Full Costs\" Did Not Have Any of the Various Meanings Petitioners Try to Give it in 1831\nB. \"Full Costs\" Was Not Limited to \"Party and Party\" Costs in England in 1831\nIV. Policy Considerations Support Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include All Forms Of Costs",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright Act's \"Full Costs\" Provision Authorizes Recovery Of All Litigation Costs, Not Just A Subset\nA. The Text of the Copyright Act Is Clear\nB. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Giving section 505 its Plain Meaning Does Not Create Any Superfluity\nII. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent\nIII. Historical Context Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Full Costs\nA. \"Full Costs\" Did Not Have Any of the Various Meanings Petitioners Try to Give it in 1831\nB. \"Full Costs\" Was Not Limited to \"Party and Party\" Costs in England in 1831\nIV. Policy Considerations Support Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include All Forms Of Costs",
        "reference": "C. \"Costs,\" \"Expenses,\" and \"Fees\" Are Not the Distinct Terms Petitioners Suggest",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright Act's \"Full Costs\" Provision Authorizes Recovery Of All Litigation Costs, Not Just A Subset\nA. The Text of the Copyright Act Is Clear\nB. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing\nC. \"Costs,\" \"Expenses,\" and \"Fees\" Are Not the Distinct Terms Petitioners Suggest\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent\nIII. Historical Context Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Full Costs\nA. \"Full Costs\" Did Not Have Any of the Various Meanings Petitioners Try to Give it in 1831\nB. \"Full Costs\" Was Not Limited to \"Party and Party\" Costs in England in 1831\nIV. Policy Considerations Support Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include All Forms Of Costs",
        "reference": "D. Giving section 505 its Plain Meaning Does Not Create Any Superfluity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright Act's \"Full Costs\" Provision Authorizes Recovery Of All Litigation Costs, Not Just A Subset\nA. The Text of the Copyright Act Is Clear\nB. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing\nC. \"Costs,\" \"Expenses,\" and \"Fees\" Are Not the Distinct Terms Petitioners Suggest\nD. Giving section 505 its Plain Meaning Does Not Create Any Superfluity\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Historical Context Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Full Costs\nA. \"Full Costs\" Did Not Have Any of the Various Meanings Petitioners Try to Give it in 1831\nB. \"Full Costs\" Was Not Limited to \"Party and Party\" Costs in England in 1831\nIV. Policy Considerations Support Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include All Forms Of Costs",
        "reference": "II. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright Act's \"Full Costs\" Provision Authorizes Recovery Of All Litigation Costs, Not Just A Subset\nA. The Text of the Copyright Act Is Clear\nB. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing\nC. \"Costs,\" \"Expenses,\" and \"Fees\" Are Not the Distinct Terms Petitioners Suggest\nD. Giving section 505 its Plain Meaning Does Not Create Any Superfluity\nII. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. \"Full Costs\" Did Not Have Any of the Various Meanings Petitioners Try to Give it in 1831\nB. \"Full Costs\" Was Not Limited to \"Party and Party\" Costs in England in 1831\nIV. Policy Considerations Support Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include All Forms Of Costs",
        "reference": "III. Historical Context Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Full Costs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright Act's \"Full Costs\" Provision Authorizes Recovery Of All Litigation Costs, Not Just A Subset\nA. The Text of the Copyright Act Is Clear\nB. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing\nC. \"Costs,\" \"Expenses,\" and \"Fees\" Are Not the Distinct Terms Petitioners Suggest\nD. Giving section 505 its Plain Meaning Does Not Create Any Superfluity\nII. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent\nIII. Historical Context Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Full Costs\nA. [MISSING]\nB. \"Full Costs\" Was Not Limited to \"Party and Party\" Costs in England in 1831\nIV. Policy Considerations Support Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include All Forms Of Costs",
        "reference": "A. \"Full Costs\" Did Not Have Any of the Various Meanings Petitioners Try to Give it in 1831",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright Act's \"Full Costs\" Provision Authorizes Recovery Of All Litigation Costs, Not Just A Subset\nA. The Text of the Copyright Act Is Clear\nB. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing\nC. \"Costs,\" \"Expenses,\" and \"Fees\" Are Not the Distinct Terms Petitioners Suggest\nD. Giving section 505 its Plain Meaning Does Not Create Any Superfluity\nII. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent\nIII. Historical Context Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Full Costs\nA. \"Full Costs\" Did Not Have Any of the Various Meanings Petitioners Try to Give it in 1831\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. Policy Considerations Support Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include All Forms Of Costs",
        "reference": "B. \"Full Costs\" Was Not Limited to \"Party and Party\" Costs in England in 1831",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright Act's \"Full Costs\" Provision Authorizes Recovery Of All Litigation Costs, Not Just A Subset\nA. The Text of the Copyright Act Is Clear\nB. Petitioners' Effort to Read \"Full Costs\" as a Constraint on District Court Discretion Is Unavailing\nC. \"Costs,\" \"Expenses,\" and \"Fees\" Are Not the Distinct Terms Petitioners Suggest\nD. Giving section 505 its Plain Meaning Does Not Create Any Superfluity\nII. The Plain-Text Reading Of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedent\nIII. Historical Context Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Full Costs\nA. \"Full Costs\" Did Not Have Any of the Various Meanings Petitioners Try to Give it in 1831\nB. \"Full Costs\" Was Not Limited to \"Party and Party\" Costs in England in 1831\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Policy Considerations Support Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include All Forms Of Costs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Class Device Is Not Superior if the Unnamed Plaintiffs Will Receive No Direct Benefit Under a Proposed Settlement",
        "reference": "I. Rule 23 Cannot Function as a Substantive Remedial Scheme",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Rule 23 Cannot Function as a Substantive Remedial Scheme\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Class Device Is Not Superior if the Unnamed Plaintiffs Will Receive No Direct Benefit Under a Proposed Settlement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review\nA. There Is No Meaningful Conflict Among The Courts Of Appeals\nB. This Case Is An Extremely Poor Vehicle Because The District Court's Factual Findings Bar An Equitable Accounting Of Defendant's Profits Under Any Standard\nC. The Court Of Appeals' Holding Is Correct\n1. Section 1117(a)'s \"Principles Of Equity\" Expressly Incorporated A Willfulness Requirement\n2. The 1999 Amendment Did Not Alter The Standard For An Accounting",
        "reference": "I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Address The Profits Disgorgement Issue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Address The Profits Disgorgement Issue\nII. [MISSING]\nA. There Is No Meaningful Conflict Among The Courts Of Appeals\nB. This Case Is An Extremely Poor Vehicle Because The District Court's Factual Findings Bar An Equitable Accounting Of Defendant's Profits Under Any Standard\nC. The Court Of Appeals' Holding Is Correct\n1. Section 1117(a)'s \"Principles Of Equity\" Expressly Incorporated A Willfulness Requirement\n2. The 1999 Amendment Did Not Alter The Standard For An Accounting",
        "reference": "II. The Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Address The Profits Disgorgement Issue\nII. The Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Case Is An Extremely Poor Vehicle Because The District Court's Factual Findings Bar An Equitable Accounting Of Defendant's Profits Under Any Standard\nC. The Court Of Appeals' Holding Is Correct\n1. Section 1117(a)'s \"Principles Of Equity\" Expressly Incorporated A Willfulness Requirement\n2. The 1999 Amendment Did Not Alter The Standard For An Accounting",
        "reference": "A. There Is No Meaningful Conflict Among The Courts Of Appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Address The Profits Disgorgement Issue\nII. The Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review\nA. There Is No Meaningful Conflict Among The Courts Of Appeals\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court Of Appeals' Holding Is Correct\n1. Section 1117(a)'s \"Principles Of Equity\" Expressly Incorporated A Willfulness Requirement\n2. The 1999 Amendment Did Not Alter The Standard For An Accounting",
        "reference": "B. This Case Is An Extremely Poor Vehicle Because The District Court's Factual Findings Bar An Equitable Accounting Of Defendant's Profits Under Any Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Address The Profits Disgorgement Issue\nII. The Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review\nA. There Is No Meaningful Conflict Among The Courts Of Appeals\nB. This Case Is An Extremely Poor Vehicle Because The District Court's Factual Findings Bar An Equitable Accounting Of Defendant's Profits Under Any Standard\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Section 1117(a)'s \"Principles Of Equity\" Expressly Incorporated A Willfulness Requirement\n2. The 1999 Amendment Did Not Alter The Standard For An Accounting",
        "reference": "C. The Court Of Appeals' Holding Is Correct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Address The Profits Disgorgement Issue\nII. The Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review\nA. There Is No Meaningful Conflict Among The Courts Of Appeals\nB. This Case Is An Extremely Poor Vehicle Because The District Court's Factual Findings Bar An Equitable Accounting Of Defendant's Profits Under Any Standard\nC. The Court Of Appeals' Holding Is Correct\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The 1999 Amendment Did Not Alter The Standard For An Accounting",
        "reference": "1. Section 1117(a)'s \"Principles Of Equity\" Expressly Incorporated A Willfulness Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Address The Profits Disgorgement Issue\nII. The Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review\nA. There Is No Meaningful Conflict Among The Courts Of Appeals\nB. This Case Is An Extremely Poor Vehicle Because The District Court's Factual Findings Bar An Equitable Accounting Of Defendant's Profits Under Any Standard\nC. The Court Of Appeals' Holding Is Correct\n1. Section 1117(a)'s \"Principles Of Equity\" Expressly Incorporated A Willfulness Requirement\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. The 1999 Amendment Did Not Alter The Standard For An Accounting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Is Content-Based And Fails Strict Scrutiny\nB. The Cellphone-Call Ban Must Be Invalidated\nII. Rewriting The TCPA's Cellphone-Call Ban Would Burden More Speech By Exacerbating The Flood Of TCPA Litigation And Is Unnecessary To Protect Consumer Privacy\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Encourages Abusive Litigation And Chills Core Speech\nB. Rewriting The TCPA Is Not Necessary To Prevent Harassing Calls",
        "reference": "I. The TCPA's Content-Based Cellphone-Call Ban Violates The First Amendment And Must Be Invalidated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The TCPA's Content-Based Cellphone-Call Ban Violates The First Amendment And Must Be Invalidated\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Cellphone-Call Ban Must Be Invalidated\nII. Rewriting The TCPA's Cellphone-Call Ban Would Burden More Speech By Exacerbating The Flood Of TCPA Litigation And Is Unnecessary To Protect Consumer Privacy\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Encourages Abusive Litigation And Chills Core Speech\nB. Rewriting The TCPA Is Not Necessary To Prevent Harassing Calls",
        "reference": "A. The Cellphone-Call Ban Is Content-Based And Fails Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The TCPA's Content-Based Cellphone-Call Ban Violates The First Amendment And Must Be Invalidated\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Is Content-Based And Fails Strict Scrutiny\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Rewriting The TCPA's Cellphone-Call Ban Would Burden More Speech By Exacerbating The Flood Of TCPA Litigation And Is Unnecessary To Protect Consumer Privacy\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Encourages Abusive Litigation And Chills Core Speech\nB. Rewriting The TCPA Is Not Necessary To Prevent Harassing Calls",
        "reference": "B. The Cellphone-Call Ban Must Be Invalidated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The TCPA's Content-Based Cellphone-Call Ban Violates The First Amendment And Must Be Invalidated\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Is Content-Based And Fails Strict Scrutiny\nB. The Cellphone-Call Ban Must Be Invalidated\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Encourages Abusive Litigation And Chills Core Speech\nB. Rewriting The TCPA Is Not Necessary To Prevent Harassing Calls",
        "reference": "II. Rewriting The TCPA's Cellphone-Call Ban Would Burden More Speech By Exacerbating The Flood Of TCPA Litigation And Is Unnecessary To Protect Consumer Privacy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The TCPA's Content-Based Cellphone-Call Ban Violates The First Amendment And Must Be Invalidated\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Is Content-Based And Fails Strict Scrutiny\nB. The Cellphone-Call Ban Must Be Invalidated\nII. Rewriting The TCPA's Cellphone-Call Ban Would Burden More Speech By Exacerbating The Flood Of TCPA Litigation And Is Unnecessary To Protect Consumer Privacy\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Rewriting The TCPA Is Not Necessary To Prevent Harassing Calls",
        "reference": "A. The Cellphone-Call Ban Encourages Abusive Litigation And Chills Core Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The TCPA's Content-Based Cellphone-Call Ban Violates The First Amendment And Must Be Invalidated\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Is Content-Based And Fails Strict Scrutiny\nB. The Cellphone-Call Ban Must Be Invalidated\nII. Rewriting The TCPA's Cellphone-Call Ban Would Burden More Speech By Exacerbating The Flood Of TCPA Litigation And Is Unnecessary To Protect Consumer Privacy\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Encourages Abusive Litigation And Chills Core Speech\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Rewriting The TCPA Is Not Necessary To Prevent Harassing Calls",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The question whether an employer may demonstrate undue hardship by showing that the requested accommodation burdens the employee's coworkers does not warrant review",
        "reference": "A. This case would be a poor vehicle in which to revisit Hardison's de minimis standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. This case would be a poor vehicle in which to revisit Hardison's de minimis standard\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The question whether an employer may demonstrate undue hardship by showing that the requested accommodation burdens the employee's coworkers does not warrant review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "A. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "B. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "C. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. [MISSING]\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "II. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "A. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. [MISSING]\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. [MISSING]\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "a. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. [MISSING]\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "b. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. [MISSING]\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "c. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. [MISSING]\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "d. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "reference": "2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The OPPS statute precludes review of the challenged rate adjustments\nA. Congress precluded review of OPPS components to ensure a workable reimbursement scheme\nB. The OPPS preclusion provision applies to the rate adjustments at issue here\nC. The preclusion analysis advanced by petitioners and the court of appeals is mistaken\nII. The challenged rate adjustments are within the agency's statutory authority\nA. HHS permissibly exercised its statutory authority to adjust the price-based drug reimbursement rate \"as necessary for purposes of paragraph (14)\nB. Petitioners' contentions that the rate adjustments exceeded HHS's statutory authority lack merit\n1. Aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs for 340B hospitals is a \"purpose of\" paragraph (14) that HHS may pursue under subclause (II)\na. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs\nb. HHS has authority to align reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs under subclause (II)\nc. HHS has authority to vary reimbursement rates by hospital group under subclause (II)\nd. Section 340B does not foreclose the adjustment to reimbursement rates at issue here\n2. HHS's reduction in the reimbursement rate for 340B hospitals to reflect their substantial discounts is an \"adjustment\" under subclause (II)\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Deference to HHS's interpretation is warranted but unnecessary to sustain the rate adjustments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE\nA. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components\nB. The Court's Rationales for Less Than Full Protection Do Not Apply to Trademarks\nIII. CENTRAL HUDSON SHOULD BE OVERRULED AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE REPUDIATED\nA. Central Hudson Is Unworkable and Lacks Constitutional Principles\nB. Principles of Stare Decisis Do Not Support Preserving Central Hudson",
        "reference": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components\nB. The Court's Rationales for Less Than Full Protection Do Not Apply to Trademarks\nIII. CENTRAL HUDSON SHOULD BE OVERRULED AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE REPUDIATED\nA. Central Hudson Is Unworkable and Lacks Constitutional Principles\nB. Principles of Stare Decisis Do Not Support Preserving Central Hudson",
        "reference": "II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION\nII. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court's Rationales for Less Than Full Protection Do Not Apply to Trademarks\nIII. CENTRAL HUDSON SHOULD BE OVERRULED AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE REPUDIATED\nA. Central Hudson Is Unworkable and Lacks Constitutional Principles\nB. Principles of Stare Decisis Do Not Support Preserving Central Hudson",
        "reference": "A. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION\nII. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE\nA. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. CENTRAL HUDSON SHOULD BE OVERRULED AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE REPUDIATED\nA. Central Hudson Is Unworkable and Lacks Constitutional Principles\nB. Principles of Stare Decisis Do Not Support Preserving Central Hudson",
        "reference": "B. The Court's Rationales for Less Than Full Protection Do Not Apply to Trademarks",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION\nII. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE\nA. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components\nB. The Court's Rationales for Less Than Full Protection Do Not Apply to Trademarks\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Central Hudson Is Unworkable and Lacks Constitutional Principles\nB. Principles of Stare Decisis Do Not Support Preserving Central Hudson",
        "reference": "III. CENTRAL HUDSON SHOULD BE OVERRULED AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE REPUDIATED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION\nII. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE\nA. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components\nB. The Court's Rationales for Less Than Full Protection Do Not Apply to Trademarks\nIII. CENTRAL HUDSON SHOULD BE OVERRULED AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE REPUDIATED\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Principles of Stare Decisis Do Not Support Preserving Central Hudson",
        "reference": "A. Central Hudson Is Unworkable and Lacks Constitutional Principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. STRICT SCRUTINY MUST APPLY BECAUSE THE SCANDALOUS MARKS PROVISION IS A VIEWPOINT AND CONTENT-BASED SPEECH RESTRICTION\nII. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE\nA. Trademarks Are Fully Protected Because They Combine Expressive Speech with Commercial Components\nB. The Court's Rationales for Less Than Full Protection Do Not Apply to Trademarks\nIII. CENTRAL HUDSON SHOULD BE OVERRULED AND THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE REPUDIATED\nA. Central Hudson Is Unworkable and Lacks Constitutional Principles\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Principles of Stare Decisis Do Not Support Preserving Central Hudson",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences\nB. Officers May Rely on Common Sense and Informed Inferences About Human Behavior\nC. Officers Need Not Rule Out Innocent Conduct Before Making an Investigatory Stop\nD. Delaware v. Prouse Does Not Support the Decision Below Because This Was Not a Random Stop\nII. The Decision Below Invites Confusion and Threatens to Hinder Valid Prosecution Efforts. 12",
        "reference": "I. The Kansas Supreme Court Misapplied the Reasonable-Suspicion Standard and Imported Requirements from the Beyond-a-Reasonable-Doubt Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Kansas Supreme Court Misapplied the Reasonable-Suspicion Standard and Imported Requirements from the Beyond-a-Reasonable-Doubt Standard\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Officers May Rely on Common Sense and Informed Inferences About Human Behavior\nC. Officers Need Not Rule Out Innocent Conduct Before Making an Investigatory Stop\nD. Delaware v. Prouse Does Not Support the Decision Below Because This Was Not a Random Stop\nII. The Decision Below Invites Confusion and Threatens to Hinder Valid Prosecution Efforts. 12",
        "reference": "A. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Kansas Supreme Court Misapplied the Reasonable-Suspicion Standard and Imported Requirements from the Beyond-a-Reasonable-Doubt Standard\nA. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Officers Need Not Rule Out Innocent Conduct Before Making an Investigatory Stop\nD. Delaware v. Prouse Does Not Support the Decision Below Because This Was Not a Random Stop\nII. The Decision Below Invites Confusion and Threatens to Hinder Valid Prosecution Efforts. 12",
        "reference": "B. Officers May Rely on Common Sense and Informed Inferences About Human Behavior",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Kansas Supreme Court Misapplied the Reasonable-Suspicion Standard and Imported Requirements from the Beyond-a-Reasonable-Doubt Standard\nA. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences\nB. Officers May Rely on Common Sense and Informed Inferences About Human Behavior\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Delaware v. Prouse Does Not Support the Decision Below Because This Was Not a Random Stop\nII. The Decision Below Invites Confusion and Threatens to Hinder Valid Prosecution Efforts. 12",
        "reference": "C. Officers Need Not Rule Out Innocent Conduct Before Making an Investigatory Stop",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Kansas Supreme Court Misapplied the Reasonable-Suspicion Standard and Imported Requirements from the Beyond-a-Reasonable-Doubt Standard\nA. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences\nB. Officers May Rely on Common Sense and Informed Inferences About Human Behavior\nC. Officers Need Not Rule Out Innocent Conduct Before Making an Investigatory Stop\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below Invites Confusion and Threatens to Hinder Valid Prosecution Efforts. 12",
        "reference": "D. Delaware v. Prouse Does Not Support the Decision Below Because This Was Not a Random Stop",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Kansas Supreme Court Misapplied the Reasonable-Suspicion Standard and Imported Requirements from the Beyond-a-Reasonable-Doubt Standard\nA. Officers May Have Reasonable Suspicion by Stacking Inferences\nB. Officers May Rely on Common Sense and Informed Inferences About Human Behavior\nC. Officers Need Not Rule Out Innocent Conduct Before Making an Investigatory Stop\nD. Delaware v. Prouse Does Not Support the Decision Below Because This Was Not a Random Stop\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Decision Below Invites Confusion and Threatens to Hinder Valid Prosecution Efforts. 12",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court's application of Chevron deference reflects the distinction between implementation of law and interpretation of law\nIII. Auer ignores the line between interpretation and legislative rulemaking\nIV. Overruling Auer does not require overruling Chevron",
        "reference": "I. Congress gives Executive Branch agencies the power to bind regulated parties by implementing laws, not by interpreting them",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress gives Executive Branch agencies the power to bind regulated parties by implementing laws, not by interpreting them\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Auer ignores the line between interpretation and legislative rulemaking\nIV. Overruling Auer does not require overruling Chevron",
        "reference": "II. This Court's application of Chevron deference reflects the distinction between implementation of law and interpretation of law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress gives Executive Branch agencies the power to bind regulated parties by implementing laws, not by interpreting them\nII. This Court's application of Chevron deference reflects the distinction between implementation of law and interpretation of law\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Overruling Auer does not require overruling Chevron",
        "reference": "III. Auer ignores the line between interpretation and legislative rulemaking",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress gives Executive Branch agencies the power to bind regulated parties by implementing laws, not by interpreting them\nII. This Court's application of Chevron deference reflects the distinction between implementation of law and interpretation of law\nIII. Auer ignores the line between interpretation and legislative rulemaking\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Overruling Auer does not require overruling Chevron",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below Is Impossible To Reconcile With This Court's Atomic Energy Act Cases\nIII. The Decision Below Provides A Roadmap For State And Local Governments To Evade The Preemptive Force Of Federal Law",
        "reference": "I. Congress Has Made The Eminently Sensible Judgment That The Federal Government Is Best Positioned To Regulate The Complex Field Of Nuclear Safety Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Has Made The Eminently Sensible Judgment That The Federal Government Is Best Positioned To Regulate The Complex Field Of Nuclear Safety Concerns\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decision Below Provides A Roadmap For State And Local Governments To Evade The Preemptive Force Of Federal Law",
        "reference": "II. The Decision Below Is Impossible To Reconcile With This Court's Atomic Energy Act Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Has Made The Eminently Sensible Judgment That The Federal Government Is Best Positioned To Regulate The Complex Field Of Nuclear Safety Concerns\nII. The Decision Below Is Impossible To Reconcile With This Court's Atomic Energy Act Cases\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Decision Below Provides A Roadmap For State And Local Governments To Evade The Preemptive Force Of Federal Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The public display of a cross is a historic and uninterrupted practice that does not violate the Establishment Clause\nA. The Explorers\nB. The Colonists\nC. The Americans of the 1800s\nIII. The First Circuit erred in holding that the flag display constitutes government speech\nIV. The flagpole constitutes a designated forum in which content and viewpoint based discrimination are prohibited",
        "reference": "I. The Constitution does not forbid recognition of Christianity's foundational influence upon American history, law, and culture",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution does not forbid recognition of Christianity's foundational influence upon American history, law, and culture\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Explorers\nB. The Colonists\nC. The Americans of the 1800s\nIII. The First Circuit erred in holding that the flag display constitutes government speech\nIV. The flagpole constitutes a designated forum in which content and viewpoint based discrimination are prohibited",
        "reference": "II. The public display of a cross is a historic and uninterrupted practice that does not violate the Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution does not forbid recognition of Christianity's foundational influence upon American history, law, and culture\nII. The public display of a cross is a historic and uninterrupted practice that does not violate the Establishment Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Colonists\nC. The Americans of the 1800s\nIII. The First Circuit erred in holding that the flag display constitutes government speech\nIV. The flagpole constitutes a designated forum in which content and viewpoint based discrimination are prohibited",
        "reference": "A. The Explorers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution does not forbid recognition of Christianity's foundational influence upon American history, law, and culture\nII. The public display of a cross is a historic and uninterrupted practice that does not violate the Establishment Clause\nA. The Explorers\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Americans of the 1800s\nIII. The First Circuit erred in holding that the flag display constitutes government speech\nIV. The flagpole constitutes a designated forum in which content and viewpoint based discrimination are prohibited",
        "reference": "B. The Colonists",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution does not forbid recognition of Christianity's foundational influence upon American history, law, and culture\nII. The public display of a cross is a historic and uninterrupted practice that does not violate the Establishment Clause\nA. The Explorers\nB. The Colonists\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. The First Circuit erred in holding that the flag display constitutes government speech\nIV. The flagpole constitutes a designated forum in which content and viewpoint based discrimination are prohibited",
        "reference": "C. The Americans of the 1800s",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution does not forbid recognition of Christianity's foundational influence upon American history, law, and culture\nII. The public display of a cross is a historic and uninterrupted practice that does not violate the Establishment Clause\nA. The Explorers\nB. The Colonists\nC. The Americans of the 1800s\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The flagpole constitutes a designated forum in which content and viewpoint based discrimination are prohibited",
        "reference": "III. The First Circuit erred in holding that the flag display constitutes government speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution does not forbid recognition of Christianity's foundational influence upon American history, law, and culture\nII. The public display of a cross is a historic and uninterrupted practice that does not violate the Establishment Clause\nA. The Explorers\nB. The Colonists\nC. The Americans of the 1800s\nIII. The First Circuit erred in holding that the flag display constitutes government speech\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The flagpole constitutes a designated forum in which content and viewpoint based discrimination are prohibited",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The First Amendment Forbids Governments From Disfavoring Religious Viewpoints Or Excluding Them From The Public Square\nA. Since The Founding, America Has Allowed Religious Speech In The Public Square\nB. This Court's Precedents Protect And Affirm The Important Position Of Religious Speech In The Public Square\nC. Boston Cannot Constitutionally Exclude Petitioners' Religious Speech From The Public Square",
        "reference": "I. Governments Have Shown Increasing Hostility Toward Religious Speakers In The Public Square",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Governments Have Shown Increasing Hostility Toward Religious Speakers In The Public Square\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Since The Founding, America Has Allowed Religious Speech In The Public Square\nB. This Court's Precedents Protect And Affirm The Important Position Of Religious Speech In The Public Square\nC. Boston Cannot Constitutionally Exclude Petitioners' Religious Speech From The Public Square",
        "reference": "II. The First Amendment Forbids Governments From Disfavoring Religious Viewpoints Or Excluding Them From The Public Square",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Governments Have Shown Increasing Hostility Toward Religious Speakers In The Public Square\nII. The First Amendment Forbids Governments From Disfavoring Religious Viewpoints Or Excluding Them From The Public Square\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's Precedents Protect And Affirm The Important Position Of Religious Speech In The Public Square\nC. Boston Cannot Constitutionally Exclude Petitioners' Religious Speech From The Public Square",
        "reference": "A. Since The Founding, America Has Allowed Religious Speech In The Public Square",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Governments Have Shown Increasing Hostility Toward Religious Speakers In The Public Square\nII. The First Amendment Forbids Governments From Disfavoring Religious Viewpoints Or Excluding Them From The Public Square\nA. Since The Founding, America Has Allowed Religious Speech In The Public Square\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Boston Cannot Constitutionally Exclude Petitioners' Religious Speech From The Public Square",
        "reference": "B. This Court's Precedents Protect And Affirm The Important Position Of Religious Speech In The Public Square",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Governments Have Shown Increasing Hostility Toward Religious Speakers In The Public Square\nII. The First Amendment Forbids Governments From Disfavoring Religious Viewpoints Or Excluding Them From The Public Square\nA. Since The Founding, America Has Allowed Religious Speech In The Public Square\nB. This Court's Precedents Protect And Affirm The Important Position Of Religious Speech In The Public Square\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Boston Cannot Constitutionally Exclude Petitioners' Religious Speech From The Public Square",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The individual respondents lack standing\nB. The state respondents have not established standing\nII. Section 5000A does not violate the Constitution\nA. Section 5000A does not command Americans to purchase health insurance\nB. Section 5000A does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority\nIII. If the minimum coverage provision is now unconstitutional, it is severable from the rest of the ACA\nA. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision\nB. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
        "reference": "I. Respondents have not established standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents have not established standing\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The state respondents have not established standing\nII. Section 5000A does not violate the Constitution\nA. Section 5000A does not command Americans to purchase health insurance\nB. Section 5000A does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority\nIII. If the minimum coverage provision is now unconstitutional, it is severable from the rest of the ACA\nA. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision\nB. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
        "reference": "A. The individual respondents lack standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents have not established standing\nA. The individual respondents lack standing\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Section 5000A does not violate the Constitution\nA. Section 5000A does not command Americans to purchase health insurance\nB. Section 5000A does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority\nIII. If the minimum coverage provision is now unconstitutional, it is severable from the rest of the ACA\nA. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision\nB. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
        "reference": "B. The state respondents have not established standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents have not established standing\nA. The individual respondents lack standing\nB. The state respondents have not established standing\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Section 5000A does not command Americans to purchase health insurance\nB. Section 5000A does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority\nIII. If the minimum coverage provision is now unconstitutional, it is severable from the rest of the ACA\nA. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision\nB. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
        "reference": "II. Section 5000A does not violate the Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents have not established standing\nA. The individual respondents lack standing\nB. The state respondents have not established standing\nII. Section 5000A does not violate the Constitution\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 5000A does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority\nIII. If the minimum coverage provision is now unconstitutional, it is severable from the rest of the ACA\nA. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision\nB. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
        "reference": "A. Section 5000A does not command Americans to purchase health insurance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents have not established standing\nA. The individual respondents lack standing\nB. The state respondents have not established standing\nII. Section 5000A does not violate the Constitution\nA. Section 5000A does not command Americans to purchase health insurance\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. If the minimum coverage provision is now unconstitutional, it is severable from the rest of the ACA\nA. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision\nB. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
        "reference": "B. Section 5000A does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents have not established standing\nA. The individual respondents lack standing\nB. The state respondents have not established standing\nII. Section 5000A does not violate the Constitution\nA. Section 5000A does not command Americans to purchase health insurance\nB. Section 5000A does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision\nB. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
        "reference": "III. If the minimum coverage provision is now unconstitutional, it is severable from the rest of the ACA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents have not established standing\nA. The individual respondents lack standing\nB. The state respondents have not established standing\nII. Section 5000A does not violate the Constitution\nA. Section 5000A does not command Americans to purchase health insurance\nB. Section 5000A does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority\nIII. If the minimum coverage provision is now unconstitutional, it is severable from the rest of the ACA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
        "reference": "A. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents have not established standing\nA. The individual respondents lack standing\nB. The state respondents have not established standing\nII. Section 5000A does not violate the Constitution\nA. Section 5000A does not command Americans to purchase health insurance\nB. Section 5000A does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority\nIII. If the minimum coverage provision is now unconstitutional, it is severable from the rest of the ACA\nA. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The relatively recent explosion of small-refinery exemptions has hurt the renewable fuel industry, with severe impacts on producers of biomass-based diesel\nB. Small-refinery exemptions also harm energy security, the environment, and the rural economy\nII. The eventual phase-out of small-refinery exemptions will not cause the severe harms Petitioners and their amici claim\nA. Refiners can blend renewable fuels\nB. Refiners can pass on the costs of RINs and can take advantage of other compliance flexibilities",
        "reference": "I. Expansive small-refinery exemptions undermine the RFS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Expansive small-refinery exemptions undermine the RFS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Small-refinery exemptions also harm energy security, the environment, and the rural economy\nII. The eventual phase-out of small-refinery exemptions will not cause the severe harms Petitioners and their amici claim\nA. Refiners can blend renewable fuels\nB. Refiners can pass on the costs of RINs and can take advantage of other compliance flexibilities",
        "reference": "A. The relatively recent explosion of small-refinery exemptions has hurt the renewable fuel industry, with severe impacts on producers of biomass-based diesel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Expansive small-refinery exemptions undermine the RFS\nA. The relatively recent explosion of small-refinery exemptions has hurt the renewable fuel industry, with severe impacts on producers of biomass-based diesel\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The eventual phase-out of small-refinery exemptions will not cause the severe harms Petitioners and their amici claim\nA. Refiners can blend renewable fuels\nB. Refiners can pass on the costs of RINs and can take advantage of other compliance flexibilities",
        "reference": "B. Small-refinery exemptions also harm energy security, the environment, and the rural economy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Expansive small-refinery exemptions undermine the RFS\nA. The relatively recent explosion of small-refinery exemptions has hurt the renewable fuel industry, with severe impacts on producers of biomass-based diesel\nB. Small-refinery exemptions also harm energy security, the environment, and the rural economy\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Refiners can blend renewable fuels\nB. Refiners can pass on the costs of RINs and can take advantage of other compliance flexibilities",
        "reference": "II. The eventual phase-out of small-refinery exemptions will not cause the severe harms Petitioners and their amici claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Expansive small-refinery exemptions undermine the RFS\nA. The relatively recent explosion of small-refinery exemptions has hurt the renewable fuel industry, with severe impacts on producers of biomass-based diesel\nB. Small-refinery exemptions also harm energy security, the environment, and the rural economy\nII. The eventual phase-out of small-refinery exemptions will not cause the severe harms Petitioners and their amici claim\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Refiners can pass on the costs of RINs and can take advantage of other compliance flexibilities",
        "reference": "A. Refiners can blend renewable fuels",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Expansive small-refinery exemptions undermine the RFS\nA. The relatively recent explosion of small-refinery exemptions has hurt the renewable fuel industry, with severe impacts on producers of biomass-based diesel\nB. Small-refinery exemptions also harm energy security, the environment, and the rural economy\nII. The eventual phase-out of small-refinery exemptions will not cause the severe harms Petitioners and their amici claim\nA. Refiners can blend renewable fuels\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Refiners can pass on the costs of RINs and can take advantage of other compliance flexibilities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is protected expression\nB. Every circuit to consider the issue has adopted or endorsed the Rogers test\nC. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split\nD. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Rogers applies\nII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted and Applied the TDRA as Required by the First Amendment, and Consistently with Existing Law\nA. The TDRA may not regulate a work of creative expression, which is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nB. The Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nC. The TDRA's noncommercial-use exception is an independent statutory basis for protecting expression\nD. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "reference": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict or Split on the Application of the Rogers Test to Expressive Works",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict or Split on the Application of the Rogers Test to Expressive Works\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Every circuit to consider the issue has adopted or endorsed the Rogers test\nC. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split\nD. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Rogers applies\nII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted and Applied the TDRA as Required by the First Amendment, and Consistently with Existing Law\nA. The TDRA may not regulate a work of creative expression, which is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nB. The Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nC. The TDRA's noncommercial-use exception is an independent statutory basis for protecting expression\nD. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is protected expression",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict or Split on the Application of the Rogers Test to Expressive Works\nA. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is protected expression\nB. [MISSING]\nC. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split\nD. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Rogers applies\nII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted and Applied the TDRA as Required by the First Amendment, and Consistently with Existing Law\nA. The TDRA may not regulate a work of creative expression, which is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nB. The Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nC. The TDRA's noncommercial-use exception is an independent statutory basis for protecting expression\nD. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "reference": "B. Every circuit to consider the issue has adopted or endorsed the Rogers test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict or Split on the Application of the Rogers Test to Expressive Works\nA. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is protected expression\nB. Every circuit to consider the issue has adopted or endorsed the Rogers test\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Rogers applies\nII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted and Applied the TDRA as Required by the First Amendment, and Consistently with Existing Law\nA. The TDRA may not regulate a work of creative expression, which is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nB. The Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nC. The TDRA's noncommercial-use exception is an independent statutory basis for protecting expression\nD. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "reference": "C. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict or Split on the Application of the Rogers Test to Expressive Works\nA. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is protected expression\nB. Every circuit to consider the issue has adopted or endorsed the Rogers test\nC. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted and Applied the TDRA as Required by the First Amendment, and Consistently with Existing Law\nA. The TDRA may not regulate a work of creative expression, which is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nB. The Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nC. The TDRA's noncommercial-use exception is an independent statutory basis for protecting expression\nD. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "reference": "D. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Rogers applies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict or Split on the Application of the Rogers Test to Expressive Works\nA. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is protected expression\nB. Every circuit to consider the issue has adopted or endorsed the Rogers test\nC. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split\nD. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Rogers applies\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The TDRA may not regulate a work of creative expression, which is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nB. The Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nC. The TDRA's noncommercial-use exception is an independent statutory basis for protecting expression\nD. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted and Applied the TDRA as Required by the First Amendment, and Consistently with Existing Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict or Split on the Application of the Rogers Test to Expressive Works\nA. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is protected expression\nB. Every circuit to consider the issue has adopted or endorsed the Rogers test\nC. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split\nD. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Rogers applies\nII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted and Applied the TDRA as Required by the First Amendment, and Consistently with Existing Law\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nC. The TDRA's noncommercial-use exception is an independent statutory basis for protecting expression\nD. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "reference": "A. The TDRA may not regulate a work of creative expression, which is fully protected, noncommercial speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict or Split on the Application of the Rogers Test to Expressive Works\nA. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is protected expression\nB. Every circuit to consider the issue has adopted or endorsed the Rogers test\nC. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split\nD. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Rogers applies\nII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted and Applied the TDRA as Required by the First Amendment, and Consistently with Existing Law\nA. The TDRA may not regulate a work of creative expression, which is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The TDRA's noncommercial-use exception is an independent statutory basis for protecting expression\nD. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "reference": "B. The Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is fully protected, noncommercial speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict or Split on the Application of the Rogers Test to Expressive Works\nA. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is protected expression\nB. Every circuit to consider the issue has adopted or endorsed the Rogers test\nC. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split\nD. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Rogers applies\nII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted and Applied the TDRA as Required by the First Amendment, and Consistently with Existing Law\nA. The TDRA may not regulate a work of creative expression, which is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nB. The Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nC. [MISSING]\nD. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "reference": "C. The TDRA's noncommercial-use exception is an independent statutory basis for protecting expression",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict or Split on the Application of the Rogers Test to Expressive Works\nA. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is protected expression\nB. Every circuit to consider the issue has adopted or endorsed the Rogers test\nC. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split\nD. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Rogers applies\nII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted and Applied the TDRA as Required by the First Amendment, and Consistently with Existing Law\nA. The TDRA may not regulate a work of creative expression, which is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nB. The Bad Spaniels parody dog toy is fully protected, noncommercial speech\nC. The TDRA's noncommercial-use exception is an independent statutory basis for protecting expression\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. JDPI's cases do not represent a circuit split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY PORTION OF GROWERS' PROPERTIES VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED\nIII. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY DURATION VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED\nIV. EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE DEFINITION OF PROPERTY PROTECTED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION\nV. THIS ACTION ILLUSTRATES DEEP CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN THIS COURT'S EXISTING PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IN AN APPROPRIATE CASE",
        "reference": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY DURATION VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED\nIV. EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE DEFINITION OF PROPERTY PROTECTED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION\nV. THIS ACTION ILLUSTRATES DEEP CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN THIS COURT'S EXISTING PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IN AN APPROPRIATE CASE",
        "reference": "II. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY PORTION OF GROWERS' PROPERTIES VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY\nII. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY PORTION OF GROWERS' PROPERTIES VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE DEFINITION OF PROPERTY PROTECTED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION\nV. THIS ACTION ILLUSTRATES DEEP CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN THIS COURT'S EXISTING PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IN AN APPROPRIATE CASE",
        "reference": "III. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY DURATION VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY\nII. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY PORTION OF GROWERS' PROPERTIES VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED\nIII. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY DURATION VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. THIS ACTION ILLUSTRATES DEEP CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN THIS COURT'S EXISTING PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IN AN APPROPRIATE CASE",
        "reference": "IV. EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE DEFINITION OF PROPERTY PROTECTED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY\nII. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY PORTION OF GROWERS' PROPERTIES VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED\nIII. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY DURATION VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED\nIV. EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE DEFINITION OF PROPERTY PROTECTED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. THIS ACTION ILLUSTRATES DEEP CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN THIS COURT'S EXISTING PROPERTY JURISPRUDENCE THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IN AN APPROPRIATE CASE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5554_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner's [MISSING]\nA. Force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance for purposes of Florida robbery is \"physical force\" under the ACCA's elements clause\nB. Petitioner's narrowing constructions of \"physical force\" cannot be squared with Johnson\nC. This Court should not adopt petitioner's expansive interpretation of Florida robbery",
        "reference": "Petitioner's Florida robbery conviction was a conviction for a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5554_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner's Florida robbery conviction was a conviction for a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner's narrowing constructions of \"physical force\" cannot be squared with Johnson\nC. This Court should not adopt petitioner's expansive interpretation of Florida robbery",
        "reference": "A. Force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance for purposes of Florida robbery is \"physical force\" under the ACCA's elements clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5554_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner's Florida robbery conviction was a conviction for a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause\nA. Force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance for purposes of Florida robbery is \"physical force\" under the ACCA's elements clause\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Court should not adopt petitioner's expansive interpretation of Florida robbery",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's narrowing constructions of \"physical force\" cannot be squared with Johnson",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5554_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner's Florida robbery conviction was a conviction for a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause\nA. Force sufficient to overcome a victim's resistance for purposes of Florida robbery is \"physical force\" under the ACCA's elements clause\nB. Petitioner's narrowing constructions of \"physical force\" cannot be squared with Johnson\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This Court should not adopt petitioner's expansive interpretation of Florida robbery",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The decision below is incorrect",
        "reference": "A. The question presented warrants review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The question presented warrants review\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Rules Enabling Act, consistent with this Court's decision in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933), does not allow the consolidation of cases to deprive a party of a substantive right. Respondents argue that the consolidation in this case prevents petitioner from appealing a final judgment. Because the Section 1291 right of appeal is a substantive right, respondents' argument must fail\nC. A Rule 42 consolidation does not merge cases into a single unit for any purpose\nD. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is inapplicable\nE. The courts of appeals are well-equipped to address the problems conjured up by respondents and amici\n1. Courts of appeals are perfectly capable of deciding whether cases should be consolidated\n2. The fear of piecemeal appeals is illusory\n3. District courts could solve many of the \"management\" issues related to consolidated cases by requiring parties to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)\nF. Respondents' solution leaves appellants in consolidated cases without a bright line rule",
        "reference": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A Rule 42 consolidation does not merge cases into a single unit for any purpose\nD. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is inapplicable\nE. The courts of appeals are well-equipped to address the problems conjured up by respondents and amici\n1. Courts of appeals are perfectly capable of deciding whether cases should be consolidated\n2. The fear of piecemeal appeals is illusory\n3. District courts could solve many of the \"management\" issues related to consolidated cases by requiring parties to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)\nF. Respondents' solution leaves appellants in consolidated cases without a bright line rule",
        "reference": "B. The Rules Enabling Act, consistent with this Court's decision in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933), does not allow the consolidation of cases to deprive a party of a substantive right. Respondents argue that the consolidation in this case prevents petitioner from appealing a final judgment. Because the Section 1291 right of appeal is a substantive right, respondents' argument must fail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"\nB. The Rules Enabling Act, consistent with this Court's decision in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933), does not allow the consolidation of cases to deprive a party of a substantive right. Respondents argue that the consolidation in this case prevents petitioner from appealing a final judgment. Because the Section 1291 right of appeal is a substantive right, respondents' argument must fail\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is inapplicable\nE. The courts of appeals are well-equipped to address the problems conjured up by respondents and amici\n1. Courts of appeals are perfectly capable of deciding whether cases should be consolidated\n2. The fear of piecemeal appeals is illusory\n3. District courts could solve many of the \"management\" issues related to consolidated cases by requiring parties to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)\nF. Respondents' solution leaves appellants in consolidated cases without a bright line rule",
        "reference": "C. A Rule 42 consolidation does not merge cases into a single unit for any purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"\nB. The Rules Enabling Act, consistent with this Court's decision in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933), does not allow the consolidation of cases to deprive a party of a substantive right. Respondents argue that the consolidation in this case prevents petitioner from appealing a final judgment. Because the Section 1291 right of appeal is a substantive right, respondents' argument must fail\nC. A Rule 42 consolidation does not merge cases into a single unit for any purpose\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The courts of appeals are well-equipped to address the problems conjured up by respondents and amici\n1. Courts of appeals are perfectly capable of deciding whether cases should be consolidated\n2. The fear of piecemeal appeals is illusory\n3. District courts could solve many of the \"management\" issues related to consolidated cases by requiring parties to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)\nF. Respondents' solution leaves appellants in consolidated cases without a bright line rule",
        "reference": "D. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is inapplicable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"\nB. The Rules Enabling Act, consistent with this Court's decision in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933), does not allow the consolidation of cases to deprive a party of a substantive right. Respondents argue that the consolidation in this case prevents petitioner from appealing a final judgment. Because the Section 1291 right of appeal is a substantive right, respondents' argument must fail\nC. A Rule 42 consolidation does not merge cases into a single unit for any purpose\nD. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is inapplicable\nE. [MISSING]\n1. Courts of appeals are perfectly capable of deciding whether cases should be consolidated\n2. The fear of piecemeal appeals is illusory\n3. District courts could solve many of the \"management\" issues related to consolidated cases by requiring parties to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)\nF. Respondents' solution leaves appellants in consolidated cases without a bright line rule",
        "reference": "E. The courts of appeals are well-equipped to address the problems conjured up by respondents and amici",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"\nB. The Rules Enabling Act, consistent with this Court's decision in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933), does not allow the consolidation of cases to deprive a party of a substantive right. Respondents argue that the consolidation in this case prevents petitioner from appealing a final judgment. Because the Section 1291 right of appeal is a substantive right, respondents' argument must fail\nC. A Rule 42 consolidation does not merge cases into a single unit for any purpose\nD. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is inapplicable\nE. The courts of appeals are well-equipped to address the problems conjured up by respondents and amici\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The fear of piecemeal appeals is illusory\n3. District courts could solve many of the \"management\" issues related to consolidated cases by requiring parties to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)\nF. Respondents' solution leaves appellants in consolidated cases without a bright line rule",
        "reference": "1. Courts of appeals are perfectly capable of deciding whether cases should be consolidated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"\nB. The Rules Enabling Act, consistent with this Court's decision in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933), does not allow the consolidation of cases to deprive a party of a substantive right. Respondents argue that the consolidation in this case prevents petitioner from appealing a final judgment. Because the Section 1291 right of appeal is a substantive right, respondents' argument must fail\nC. A Rule 42 consolidation does not merge cases into a single unit for any purpose\nD. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is inapplicable\nE. The courts of appeals are well-equipped to address the problems conjured up by respondents and amici\n1. Courts of appeals are perfectly capable of deciding whether cases should be consolidated\n2. [MISSING]\n3. District courts could solve many of the \"management\" issues related to consolidated cases by requiring parties to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)\nF. Respondents' solution leaves appellants in consolidated cases without a bright line rule",
        "reference": "2. The fear of piecemeal appeals is illusory",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"\nB. The Rules Enabling Act, consistent with this Court's decision in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933), does not allow the consolidation of cases to deprive a party of a substantive right. Respondents argue that the consolidation in this case prevents petitioner from appealing a final judgment. Because the Section 1291 right of appeal is a substantive right, respondents' argument must fail\nC. A Rule 42 consolidation does not merge cases into a single unit for any purpose\nD. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is inapplicable\nE. The courts of appeals are well-equipped to address the problems conjured up by respondents and amici\n1. Courts of appeals are perfectly capable of deciding whether cases should be consolidated\n2. The fear of piecemeal appeals is illusory\n3. [MISSING]\nF. Respondents' solution leaves appellants in consolidated cases without a bright line rule",
        "reference": "3. District courts could solve many of the \"management\" issues related to consolidated cases by requiring parties to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"\nB. The Rules Enabling Act, consistent with this Court's decision in Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933), does not allow the consolidation of cases to deprive a party of a substantive right. Respondents argue that the consolidation in this case prevents petitioner from appealing a final judgment. Because the Section 1291 right of appeal is a substantive right, respondents' argument must fail\nC. A Rule 42 consolidation does not merge cases into a single unit for any purpose\nD. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is inapplicable\nE. The courts of appeals are well-equipped to address the problems conjured up by respondents and amici\n1. Courts of appeals are perfectly capable of deciding whether cases should be consolidated\n2. The fear of piecemeal appeals is illusory\n3. District courts could solve many of the \"management\" issues related to consolidated cases by requiring parties to follow Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1)\nF. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "F. Respondents' solution leaves appellants in consolidated cases without a bright line rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. ABOOD STRIKES A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN THE MULTIPLE INTERESTS AT STAKE BY RECOGNIZING THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER AND GOVERNMENT AS SOVEREIGN\nIII. THIS COURT HAS ADOPTED SIGNIFICANT SAFEGUARDS THAT MINIMIZE ANY FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERN OVER AGENCY FEES\nIV. PETITIONER'S SUGGESTED RULE IS UNWORKABLE AND UNPRINCIPLED AND WOULD THREATEN FUNDAMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS",
        "reference": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS COURT HAS ADOPTED SIGNIFICANT SAFEGUARDS THAT MINIMIZE ANY FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERN OVER AGENCY FEES\nIV. PETITIONER'S SUGGESTED RULE IS UNWORKABLE AND UNPRINCIPLED AND WOULD THREATEN FUNDAMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS",
        "reference": "II. ABOOD STRIKES A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN THE MULTIPLE INTERESTS AT STAKE BY RECOGNIZING THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER AND GOVERNMENT AS SOVEREIGN",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE\nII. ABOOD STRIKES A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN THE MULTIPLE INTERESTS AT STAKE BY RECOGNIZING THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER AND GOVERNMENT AS SOVEREIGN\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. PETITIONER'S SUGGESTED RULE IS UNWORKABLE AND UNPRINCIPLED AND WOULD THREATEN FUNDAMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS",
        "reference": "III. THIS COURT HAS ADOPTED SIGNIFICANT SAFEGUARDS THAT MINIMIZE ANY FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERN OVER AGENCY FEES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE\nII. ABOOD STRIKES A PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN THE MULTIPLE INTERESTS AT STAKE BY RECOGNIZING THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER AND GOVERNMENT AS SOVEREIGN\nIII. THIS COURT HAS ADOPTED SIGNIFICANT SAFEGUARDS THAT MINIMIZE ANY FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERN OVER AGENCY FEES\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. PETITIONER'S SUGGESTED RULE IS UNWORKABLE AND UNPRINCIPLED AND WOULD THREATEN FUNDAMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 404 Relief is Discretionary\nB. Section 404 Authorizes District Courts to Apply the Section 3553(a) Factors Afresh, Taking Into Account Post-Sentencing Conduct and Efforts at Rehabilitation\nC. The Government's Reading of Section 404 is Difficult to Square with the Section 3553(a) Factors\nII. Section 404 Covers 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders\nA. The Government's Interpretation of Section 404 is so Arbitrary as to Raise Equal Protection Questions\nB. The Rule of Lenity and Constitutional Avoidance Canon Resolve Any Lingering Doubts in Favor of Petitioner",
        "reference": "I. Section 404 Provides a Chance at a Second Chance \u2014 Not a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 404 Provides a Chance at a Second Chance \u2014 Not a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 404 Authorizes District Courts to Apply the Section 3553(a) Factors Afresh, Taking Into Account Post-Sentencing Conduct and Efforts at Rehabilitation\nC. The Government's Reading of Section 404 is Difficult to Square with the Section 3553(a) Factors\nII. Section 404 Covers 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders\nA. The Government's Interpretation of Section 404 is so Arbitrary as to Raise Equal Protection Questions\nB. The Rule of Lenity and Constitutional Avoidance Canon Resolve Any Lingering Doubts in Favor of Petitioner",
        "reference": "A. Section 404 Relief is Discretionary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 404 Provides a Chance at a Second Chance \u2014 Not a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card\nA. Section 404 Relief is Discretionary\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Government's Reading of Section 404 is Difficult to Square with the Section 3553(a) Factors\nII. Section 404 Covers 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders\nA. The Government's Interpretation of Section 404 is so Arbitrary as to Raise Equal Protection Questions\nB. The Rule of Lenity and Constitutional Avoidance Canon Resolve Any Lingering Doubts in Favor of Petitioner",
        "reference": "B. Section 404 Authorizes District Courts to Apply the Section 3553(a) Factors Afresh, Taking Into Account Post-Sentencing Conduct and Efforts at Rehabilitation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 404 Provides a Chance at a Second Chance \u2014 Not a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card\nA. Section 404 Relief is Discretionary\nB. Section 404 Authorizes District Courts to Apply the Section 3553(a) Factors Afresh, Taking Into Account Post-Sentencing Conduct and Efforts at Rehabilitation\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Section 404 Covers 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders\nA. The Government's Interpretation of Section 404 is so Arbitrary as to Raise Equal Protection Questions\nB. The Rule of Lenity and Constitutional Avoidance Canon Resolve Any Lingering Doubts in Favor of Petitioner",
        "reference": "C. The Government's Reading of Section 404 is Difficult to Square with the Section 3553(a) Factors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 404 Provides a Chance at a Second Chance \u2014 Not a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card\nA. Section 404 Relief is Discretionary\nB. Section 404 Authorizes District Courts to Apply the Section 3553(a) Factors Afresh, Taking Into Account Post-Sentencing Conduct and Efforts at Rehabilitation\nC. The Government's Reading of Section 404 is Difficult to Square with the Section 3553(a) Factors\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Government's Interpretation of Section 404 is so Arbitrary as to Raise Equal Protection Questions\nB. The Rule of Lenity and Constitutional Avoidance Canon Resolve Any Lingering Doubts in Favor of Petitioner",
        "reference": "II. Section 404 Covers 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 404 Provides a Chance at a Second Chance \u2014 Not a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card\nA. Section 404 Relief is Discretionary\nB. Section 404 Authorizes District Courts to Apply the Section 3553(a) Factors Afresh, Taking Into Account Post-Sentencing Conduct and Efforts at Rehabilitation\nC. The Government's Reading of Section 404 is Difficult to Square with the Section 3553(a) Factors\nII. Section 404 Covers 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Rule of Lenity and Constitutional Avoidance Canon Resolve Any Lingering Doubts in Favor of Petitioner",
        "reference": "A. The Government's Interpretation of Section 404 is so Arbitrary as to Raise Equal Protection Questions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 404 Provides a Chance at a Second Chance \u2014 Not a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card\nA. Section 404 Relief is Discretionary\nB. Section 404 Authorizes District Courts to Apply the Section 3553(a) Factors Afresh, Taking Into Account Post-Sentencing Conduct and Efforts at Rehabilitation\nC. The Government's Reading of Section 404 is Difficult to Square with the Section 3553(a) Factors\nII. Section 404 Covers 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders\nA. The Government's Interpretation of Section 404 is so Arbitrary as to Raise Equal Protection Questions\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Rule of Lenity and Constitutional Avoidance Canon Resolve Any Lingering Doubts in Favor of Petitioner",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. INVESTORS SUFFER LOSSES FOLLOWING DISCLOSURE OF ESG TRANSGRESSIONS\nA. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved\nB. Investor Selloffs Frequently Follow Disclosures of ESG Transgressions\nC. Investors Are Also Harmed by Reputational Damages That Result from ESG Transgressions\nIII. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE WOULD BENEFIT INVESTORS\nA. Voluntary Efforts to Enhance ESG Compliance Have Been Ineffective\nB. The U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Adequately Protect Investors from ESG Transgressions\nC. The Alien Tort Statute Would Enhance Corporate Accountability and Provide Benefits to ESG-Minded Investors",
        "reference": "I. THE NUMBER OF ESG INVESTORS HAS GROWN EXPONENTIALLY IN RECENT YEARS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NUMBER OF ESG INVESTORS HAS GROWN EXPONENTIALLY IN RECENT YEARS\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved\nB. Investor Selloffs Frequently Follow Disclosures of ESG Transgressions\nC. Investors Are Also Harmed by Reputational Damages That Result from ESG Transgressions\nIII. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE WOULD BENEFIT INVESTORS\nA. Voluntary Efforts to Enhance ESG Compliance Have Been Ineffective\nB. The U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Adequately Protect Investors from ESG Transgressions\nC. The Alien Tort Statute Would Enhance Corporate Accountability and Provide Benefits to ESG-Minded Investors",
        "reference": "II. INVESTORS SUFFER LOSSES FOLLOWING DISCLOSURE OF ESG TRANSGRESSIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NUMBER OF ESG INVESTORS HAS GROWN EXPONENTIALLY IN RECENT YEARS\nII. INVESTORS SUFFER LOSSES FOLLOWING DISCLOSURE OF ESG TRANSGRESSIONS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Investor Selloffs Frequently Follow Disclosures of ESG Transgressions\nC. Investors Are Also Harmed by Reputational Damages That Result from ESG Transgressions\nIII. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE WOULD BENEFIT INVESTORS\nA. Voluntary Efforts to Enhance ESG Compliance Have Been Ineffective\nB. The U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Adequately Protect Investors from ESG Transgressions\nC. The Alien Tort Statute Would Enhance Corporate Accountability and Provide Benefits to ESG-Minded Investors",
        "reference": "A. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NUMBER OF ESG INVESTORS HAS GROWN EXPONENTIALLY IN RECENT YEARS\nII. INVESTORS SUFFER LOSSES FOLLOWING DISCLOSURE OF ESG TRANSGRESSIONS\nA. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Investors Are Also Harmed by Reputational Damages That Result from ESG Transgressions\nIII. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE WOULD BENEFIT INVESTORS\nA. Voluntary Efforts to Enhance ESG Compliance Have Been Ineffective\nB. The U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Adequately Protect Investors from ESG Transgressions\nC. The Alien Tort Statute Would Enhance Corporate Accountability and Provide Benefits to ESG-Minded Investors",
        "reference": "B. Investor Selloffs Frequently Follow Disclosures of ESG Transgressions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NUMBER OF ESG INVESTORS HAS GROWN EXPONENTIALLY IN RECENT YEARS\nII. INVESTORS SUFFER LOSSES FOLLOWING DISCLOSURE OF ESG TRANSGRESSIONS\nA. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved\nB. Investor Selloffs Frequently Follow Disclosures of ESG Transgressions\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE WOULD BENEFIT INVESTORS\nA. Voluntary Efforts to Enhance ESG Compliance Have Been Ineffective\nB. The U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Adequately Protect Investors from ESG Transgressions\nC. The Alien Tort Statute Would Enhance Corporate Accountability and Provide Benefits to ESG-Minded Investors",
        "reference": "C. Investors Are Also Harmed by Reputational Damages That Result from ESG Transgressions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NUMBER OF ESG INVESTORS HAS GROWN EXPONENTIALLY IN RECENT YEARS\nII. INVESTORS SUFFER LOSSES FOLLOWING DISCLOSURE OF ESG TRANSGRESSIONS\nA. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved\nB. Investor Selloffs Frequently Follow Disclosures of ESG Transgressions\nC. Investors Are Also Harmed by Reputational Damages That Result from ESG Transgressions\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Voluntary Efforts to Enhance ESG Compliance Have Been Ineffective\nB. The U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Adequately Protect Investors from ESG Transgressions\nC. The Alien Tort Statute Would Enhance Corporate Accountability and Provide Benefits to ESG-Minded Investors",
        "reference": "III. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE WOULD BENEFIT INVESTORS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NUMBER OF ESG INVESTORS HAS GROWN EXPONENTIALLY IN RECENT YEARS\nII. INVESTORS SUFFER LOSSES FOLLOWING DISCLOSURE OF ESG TRANSGRESSIONS\nA. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved\nB. Investor Selloffs Frequently Follow Disclosures of ESG Transgressions\nC. Investors Are Also Harmed by Reputational Damages That Result from ESG Transgressions\nIII. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE WOULD BENEFIT INVESTORS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Adequately Protect Investors from ESG Transgressions\nC. The Alien Tort Statute Would Enhance Corporate Accountability and Provide Benefits to ESG-Minded Investors",
        "reference": "A. Voluntary Efforts to Enhance ESG Compliance Have Been Ineffective",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NUMBER OF ESG INVESTORS HAS GROWN EXPONENTIALLY IN RECENT YEARS\nII. INVESTORS SUFFER LOSSES FOLLOWING DISCLOSURE OF ESG TRANSGRESSIONS\nA. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved\nB. Investor Selloffs Frequently Follow Disclosures of ESG Transgressions\nC. Investors Are Also Harmed by Reputational Damages That Result from ESG Transgressions\nIII. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE WOULD BENEFIT INVESTORS\nA. Voluntary Efforts to Enhance ESG Compliance Have Been Ineffective\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Alien Tort Statute Would Enhance Corporate Accountability and Provide Benefits to ESG-Minded Investors",
        "reference": "B. The U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Adequately Protect Investors from ESG Transgressions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NUMBER OF ESG INVESTORS HAS GROWN EXPONENTIALLY IN RECENT YEARS\nII. INVESTORS SUFFER LOSSES FOLLOWING DISCLOSURE OF ESG TRANSGRESSIONS\nA. Standards of Materiality Have Evolved\nB. Investor Selloffs Frequently Follow Disclosures of ESG Transgressions\nC. Investors Are Also Harmed by Reputational Damages That Result from ESG Transgressions\nIII. CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE WOULD BENEFIT INVESTORS\nA. Voluntary Efforts to Enhance ESG Compliance Have Been Ineffective\nB. The U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Adequately Protect Investors from ESG Transgressions\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Alien Tort Statute Would Enhance Corporate Accountability and Provide Benefits to ESG-Minded Investors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "PERMITTING [MISSING]\nA. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government\nB. The Government's Position Expands The Board's Jurisdiction Beyond The Boundaries Congress Set And Improperly Skews Incentives",
        "reference": "PERMITTING AN AIA PETITION BY THE GOVERNMENT IS UNLAWFUL AND UNFAIR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "PERMITTING AN AIA PETITION BY THE GOVERNMENT IS UNLAWFUL AND UNFAIR\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Government's Position Expands The Board's Jurisdiction Beyond The Boundaries Congress Set And Improperly Skews Incentives",
        "reference": "A. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "PERMITTING AN AIA PETITION BY THE GOVERNMENT IS UNLAWFUL AND UNFAIR\nA. The Presumption Against Treating The Sovereign As A \"Person\" Applies Regardless Of Whether It Would Benefit The Government\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Government's Position Expands The Board's Jurisdiction Beyond The Boundaries Congress Set And Improperly Skews Incentives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. An elected body's censure resolution against a member is governmental speech that does not infringe that member's free-speech rights\nC. This Court need not address circumstances beyond the mere censure of a member of an elected body",
        "reference": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Court need not address circumstances beyond the mere censure of a member of an elected body",
        "reference": "B. An elected body's censure resolution against a member is governmental speech that does not infringe that member's free-speech rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure\nB. An elected body's censure resolution against a member is governmental speech that does not infringe that member's free-speech rights\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This Court need not address circumstances beyond the mere censure of a member of an elected body",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Whether Grutter should be overruled is a question of exceptional importance\nIII. Whether the First Circuit misapplied strict scrutiny is a question of exceptional importance",
        "reference": "I. There is no obstacle to this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no obstacle to this Court's review\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Whether the First Circuit misapplied strict scrutiny is a question of exceptional importance",
        "reference": "II. Whether Grutter should be overruled is a question of exceptional importance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no obstacle to this Court's review\nII. Whether Grutter should be overruled is a question of exceptional importance\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Whether the First Circuit misapplied strict scrutiny is a question of exceptional importance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Lower Courts Afford the First Fair Use Factor Undue Weight\nB. Transformativeness Is Not Binary\nC. The Fourth Fair Use Factor Plays a Critical Role in Protecting the Derivative Work Right\nII. PETITIONER'S USE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY TRANSFORMATIVE FOR FAIR USE BECAUSE IT COMPETES WITH THE VIBRANT MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS\nA. The Prince Series Images Constitute Derivative Works\nB. Petitioner's Continued Use of the Prince Series Images Supplants the Normal Market To License Photographs For Derivative Works",
        "reference": "I. THE EVER-EXPANDING REACH OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS THREATENS COPYRIGHT OWNERS' MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE EVER-EXPANDING REACH OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS THREATENS COPYRIGHT OWNERS' MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Transformativeness Is Not Binary\nC. The Fourth Fair Use Factor Plays a Critical Role in Protecting the Derivative Work Right\nII. PETITIONER'S USE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY TRANSFORMATIVE FOR FAIR USE BECAUSE IT COMPETES WITH THE VIBRANT MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS\nA. The Prince Series Images Constitute Derivative Works\nB. Petitioner's Continued Use of the Prince Series Images Supplants the Normal Market To License Photographs For Derivative Works",
        "reference": "A. Lower Courts Afford the First Fair Use Factor Undue Weight",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE EVER-EXPANDING REACH OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS THREATENS COPYRIGHT OWNERS' MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS\nA. Lower Courts Afford the First Fair Use Factor Undue Weight\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Fourth Fair Use Factor Plays a Critical Role in Protecting the Derivative Work Right\nII. PETITIONER'S USE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY TRANSFORMATIVE FOR FAIR USE BECAUSE IT COMPETES WITH THE VIBRANT MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS\nA. The Prince Series Images Constitute Derivative Works\nB. Petitioner's Continued Use of the Prince Series Images Supplants the Normal Market To License Photographs For Derivative Works",
        "reference": "B. Transformativeness Is Not Binary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE EVER-EXPANDING REACH OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS THREATENS COPYRIGHT OWNERS' MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS\nA. Lower Courts Afford the First Fair Use Factor Undue Weight\nB. Transformativeness Is Not Binary\nC. [MISSING]\nII. PETITIONER'S USE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY TRANSFORMATIVE FOR FAIR USE BECAUSE IT COMPETES WITH THE VIBRANT MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS\nA. The Prince Series Images Constitute Derivative Works\nB. Petitioner's Continued Use of the Prince Series Images Supplants the Normal Market To License Photographs For Derivative Works",
        "reference": "C. The Fourth Fair Use Factor Plays a Critical Role in Protecting the Derivative Work Right",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE EVER-EXPANDING REACH OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS THREATENS COPYRIGHT OWNERS' MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS\nA. Lower Courts Afford the First Fair Use Factor Undue Weight\nB. Transformativeness Is Not Binary\nC. The Fourth Fair Use Factor Plays a Critical Role in Protecting the Derivative Work Right\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Prince Series Images Constitute Derivative Works\nB. Petitioner's Continued Use of the Prince Series Images Supplants the Normal Market To License Photographs For Derivative Works",
        "reference": "II. PETITIONER'S USE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY TRANSFORMATIVE FOR FAIR USE BECAUSE IT COMPETES WITH THE VIBRANT MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE EVER-EXPANDING REACH OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS THREATENS COPYRIGHT OWNERS' MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS\nA. Lower Courts Afford the First Fair Use Factor Undue Weight\nB. Transformativeness Is Not Binary\nC. The Fourth Fair Use Factor Plays a Critical Role in Protecting the Derivative Work Right\nII. PETITIONER'S USE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY TRANSFORMATIVE FOR FAIR USE BECAUSE IT COMPETES WITH THE VIBRANT MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner's Continued Use of the Prince Series Images Supplants the Normal Market To License Photographs For Derivative Works",
        "reference": "A. The Prince Series Images Constitute Derivative Works",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE EVER-EXPANDING REACH OF TRANSFORMATIVENESS THREATENS COPYRIGHT OWNERS' MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS\nA. Lower Courts Afford the First Fair Use Factor Undue Weight\nB. Transformativeness Is Not Binary\nC. The Fourth Fair Use Factor Plays a Critical Role in Protecting the Derivative Work Right\nII. PETITIONER'S USE IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY TRANSFORMATIVE FOR FAIR USE BECAUSE IT COMPETES WITH THE VIBRANT MARKET FOR DERIVATIVE WORKS BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS\nA. The Prince Series Images Constitute Derivative Works\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's Continued Use of the Prince Series Images Supplants the Normal Market To License Photographs For Derivative Works",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5181_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\nA. The Florida Supreme Court's per se Harmless Error Violates the United States Constitution\n2. Respondent's Arguments Under Florida Supreme Court's Recent Plurality Decision in Reynolds Underscore the Need for this Court to Evaluate Under Caldwell\n3. Respondent erroneously claims there is no structural error.",
        "reference": "1. Respondent Incorrectly Asserts that the Florida Supreme Court's Decision in this Matter is Immune From This Court's Review.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5181_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Respondent Incorrectly Asserts that the Florida Supreme Court's Decision in this Matter is Immune From This Court's Review.\nA. [MISSING]\n2. Respondent's Arguments Under Florida Supreme Court's Recent Plurality Decision in Reynolds Underscore the Need for this Court to Evaluate Under Caldwell\n3. Respondent erroneously claims there is no structural error.",
        "reference": "A. The Florida Supreme Court's per se Harmless Error Violates the United States Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5181_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Respondent Incorrectly Asserts that the Florida Supreme Court's Decision in this Matter is Immune From This Court's Review.\nA. The Florida Supreme Court's per se Harmless Error Violates the United States Constitution\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Respondent erroneously claims there is no structural error.",
        "reference": "2. Respondent's Arguments Under Florida Supreme Court's Recent Plurality Decision in Reynolds Underscore the Need for this Court to Evaluate Under Caldwell",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5181_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Respondent Incorrectly Asserts that the Florida Supreme Court's Decision in this Matter is Immune From This Court's Review.\nA. The Florida Supreme Court's per se Harmless Error Violates the United States Constitution\n2. Respondent's Arguments Under Florida Supreme Court's Recent Plurality Decision in Reynolds Underscore the Need for this Court to Evaluate Under Caldwell\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. Respondent erroneously claims there is no structural error.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS MUST ACCOUNT FOR THE DYNAMICS OF MULTI-SIDED FIRMS\nA. Antitrust Analysis Must Reflect Competitive Realities\nB. The Judge-Made Tests Of Market Definition And Market Power Must Account For Multi-Sidedness\nC. Courts Must Consider Multi-Sidedness In Assessing A Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case\nIII. IGNORING THE EFFECTS OF MULTI-SIDEDNESS THREATENS INNOVATION",
        "reference": "I. MULTI-SIDED FIRMS FACE THE CONSTRAINT OF INTERRELATED DEMAND",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. MULTI-SIDED FIRMS FACE THE CONSTRAINT OF INTERRELATED DEMAND\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Antitrust Analysis Must Reflect Competitive Realities\nB. The Judge-Made Tests Of Market Definition And Market Power Must Account For Multi-Sidedness\nC. Courts Must Consider Multi-Sidedness In Assessing A Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case\nIII. IGNORING THE EFFECTS OF MULTI-SIDEDNESS THREATENS INNOVATION",
        "reference": "II. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS MUST ACCOUNT FOR THE DYNAMICS OF MULTI-SIDED FIRMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. MULTI-SIDED FIRMS FACE THE CONSTRAINT OF INTERRELATED DEMAND\nII. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS MUST ACCOUNT FOR THE DYNAMICS OF MULTI-SIDED FIRMS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Judge-Made Tests Of Market Definition And Market Power Must Account For Multi-Sidedness\nC. Courts Must Consider Multi-Sidedness In Assessing A Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case\nIII. IGNORING THE EFFECTS OF MULTI-SIDEDNESS THREATENS INNOVATION",
        "reference": "A. Antitrust Analysis Must Reflect Competitive Realities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. MULTI-SIDED FIRMS FACE THE CONSTRAINT OF INTERRELATED DEMAND\nII. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS MUST ACCOUNT FOR THE DYNAMICS OF MULTI-SIDED FIRMS\nA. Antitrust Analysis Must Reflect Competitive Realities\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Courts Must Consider Multi-Sidedness In Assessing A Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case\nIII. IGNORING THE EFFECTS OF MULTI-SIDEDNESS THREATENS INNOVATION",
        "reference": "B. The Judge-Made Tests Of Market Definition And Market Power Must Account For Multi-Sidedness",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. MULTI-SIDED FIRMS FACE THE CONSTRAINT OF INTERRELATED DEMAND\nII. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS MUST ACCOUNT FOR THE DYNAMICS OF MULTI-SIDED FIRMS\nA. Antitrust Analysis Must Reflect Competitive Realities\nB. The Judge-Made Tests Of Market Definition And Market Power Must Account For Multi-Sidedness\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. IGNORING THE EFFECTS OF MULTI-SIDEDNESS THREATENS INNOVATION",
        "reference": "C. Courts Must Consider Multi-Sidedness In Assessing A Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. MULTI-SIDED FIRMS FACE THE CONSTRAINT OF INTERRELATED DEMAND\nII. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS MUST ACCOUNT FOR THE DYNAMICS OF MULTI-SIDED FIRMS\nA. Antitrust Analysis Must Reflect Competitive Realities\nB. The Judge-Made Tests Of Market Definition And Market Power Must Account For Multi-Sidedness\nC. Courts Must Consider Multi-Sidedness In Assessing A Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. IGNORING THE EFFECTS OF MULTI-SIDEDNESS THREATENS INNOVATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "A. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "B. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "C. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. [MISSING]\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "D. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "II. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "A. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. [MISSING]\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "B. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. [MISSING]\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "C. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. [MISSING]\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "reference": "D. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE APPLIES WITH FULL FORCE IN THIS CASE\nA. The American Rule Is That \"Each Litigant Pays His Own Attorney's Fees, Win Or Lose\"\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, the American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nC. The American Rule Is More Strongly Implicated If Attorneys' Fees Are Imposed Against a Winning Party\nD. The Government Is Wrong to Abandon the American Rule\nII. THE STATUTES DO NOT PROVIDE \"EXPLICIT STATUTORY AUTHORITY\" FOR DEVIATING FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nA. Only \"Explicit Statutory Authority\" Can Overcome the American Rule's Presumption\nB. \"Expenses Of The Proceeding\" Is a Term of Art That Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\nC. \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Is at Best Ambiguous As to Attorneys' Fees\n1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous\n2. Prorated Government Attorney Salaries Are Not \"of the Proceeding\"\nD. For Nearly Two Centuries, \"Expenses of the Proceeding\" Was Interpreted as Not Including Attorneys' Fees\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. PRESENTING LIVE TESTIMONY IN DISTRICT COURT IS A RIGHT, NOT A PRIVILEGE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Text, Context, And Origins Of section 1782 Demonstrate That The Statute Reaches Only Proceedings Conducted By A Governmental Entity Exercising Governmental Authority\nB. Congress Has Used The Term \"Arbitral Tribunals\" To Refer To Arbitration Entities\nC. Limiting section 1782 To Proceedings Conducted By Governmental Entities Abroad Harmonizes The Statute With The Federal Arbitration Act\nII. THIS ARBITRAL PANEL DOES NOT WIELD GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND THUS IS NOT A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782\nA. The Arbitration Is Being Adjudicated By A Private Deliberative Body Without Governmental Intervention, Control, Or Oversight\nB. The Treaty Does Not Convert The Panel Into A Governmental Entity Wielding Governmental Authority",
        "reference": "I. THE TERM \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" AS USED IN section 1782 MEANS A GOVERNMENTAL BODY WIELDING GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY OF ONE OR MORE STATES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TERM \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" AS USED IN section 1782 MEANS A GOVERNMENTAL BODY WIELDING GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY OF ONE OR MORE STATES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress Has Used The Term \"Arbitral Tribunals\" To Refer To Arbitration Entities\nC. Limiting section 1782 To Proceedings Conducted By Governmental Entities Abroad Harmonizes The Statute With The Federal Arbitration Act\nII. THIS ARBITRAL PANEL DOES NOT WIELD GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND THUS IS NOT A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782\nA. The Arbitration Is Being Adjudicated By A Private Deliberative Body Without Governmental Intervention, Control, Or Oversight\nB. The Treaty Does Not Convert The Panel Into A Governmental Entity Wielding Governmental Authority",
        "reference": "A. The Text, Context, And Origins Of section 1782 Demonstrate That The Statute Reaches Only Proceedings Conducted By A Governmental Entity Exercising Governmental Authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TERM \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" AS USED IN section 1782 MEANS A GOVERNMENTAL BODY WIELDING GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY OF ONE OR MORE STATES\nA. The Text, Context, And Origins Of section 1782 Demonstrate That The Statute Reaches Only Proceedings Conducted By A Governmental Entity Exercising Governmental Authority\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Limiting section 1782 To Proceedings Conducted By Governmental Entities Abroad Harmonizes The Statute With The Federal Arbitration Act\nII. THIS ARBITRAL PANEL DOES NOT WIELD GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND THUS IS NOT A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782\nA. The Arbitration Is Being Adjudicated By A Private Deliberative Body Without Governmental Intervention, Control, Or Oversight\nB. The Treaty Does Not Convert The Panel Into A Governmental Entity Wielding Governmental Authority",
        "reference": "B. Congress Has Used The Term \"Arbitral Tribunals\" To Refer To Arbitration Entities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TERM \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" AS USED IN section 1782 MEANS A GOVERNMENTAL BODY WIELDING GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY OF ONE OR MORE STATES\nA. The Text, Context, And Origins Of section 1782 Demonstrate That The Statute Reaches Only Proceedings Conducted By A Governmental Entity Exercising Governmental Authority\nB. Congress Has Used The Term \"Arbitral Tribunals\" To Refer To Arbitration Entities\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THIS ARBITRAL PANEL DOES NOT WIELD GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND THUS IS NOT A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782\nA. The Arbitration Is Being Adjudicated By A Private Deliberative Body Without Governmental Intervention, Control, Or Oversight\nB. The Treaty Does Not Convert The Panel Into A Governmental Entity Wielding Governmental Authority",
        "reference": "C. Limiting section 1782 To Proceedings Conducted By Governmental Entities Abroad Harmonizes The Statute With The Federal Arbitration Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TERM \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" AS USED IN section 1782 MEANS A GOVERNMENTAL BODY WIELDING GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY OF ONE OR MORE STATES\nA. The Text, Context, And Origins Of section 1782 Demonstrate That The Statute Reaches Only Proceedings Conducted By A Governmental Entity Exercising Governmental Authority\nB. Congress Has Used The Term \"Arbitral Tribunals\" To Refer To Arbitration Entities\nC. Limiting section 1782 To Proceedings Conducted By Governmental Entities Abroad Harmonizes The Statute With The Federal Arbitration Act\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Arbitration Is Being Adjudicated By A Private Deliberative Body Without Governmental Intervention, Control, Or Oversight\nB. The Treaty Does Not Convert The Panel Into A Governmental Entity Wielding Governmental Authority",
        "reference": "II. THIS ARBITRAL PANEL DOES NOT WIELD GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND THUS IS NOT A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TERM \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" AS USED IN section 1782 MEANS A GOVERNMENTAL BODY WIELDING GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY OF ONE OR MORE STATES\nA. The Text, Context, And Origins Of section 1782 Demonstrate That The Statute Reaches Only Proceedings Conducted By A Governmental Entity Exercising Governmental Authority\nB. Congress Has Used The Term \"Arbitral Tribunals\" To Refer To Arbitration Entities\nC. Limiting section 1782 To Proceedings Conducted By Governmental Entities Abroad Harmonizes The Statute With The Federal Arbitration Act\nII. THIS ARBITRAL PANEL DOES NOT WIELD GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND THUS IS NOT A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Treaty Does Not Convert The Panel Into A Governmental Entity Wielding Governmental Authority",
        "reference": "A. The Arbitration Is Being Adjudicated By A Private Deliberative Body Without Governmental Intervention, Control, Or Oversight",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TERM \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" AS USED IN section 1782 MEANS A GOVERNMENTAL BODY WIELDING GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY OF ONE OR MORE STATES\nA. The Text, Context, And Origins Of section 1782 Demonstrate That The Statute Reaches Only Proceedings Conducted By A Governmental Entity Exercising Governmental Authority\nB. Congress Has Used The Term \"Arbitral Tribunals\" To Refer To Arbitration Entities\nC. Limiting section 1782 To Proceedings Conducted By Governmental Entities Abroad Harmonizes The Statute With The Federal Arbitration Act\nII. THIS ARBITRAL PANEL DOES NOT WIELD GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY AND THUS IS NOT A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782\nA. The Arbitration Is Being Adjudicated By A Private Deliberative Body Without Governmental Intervention, Control, Or Oversight\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Treaty Does Not Convert The Panel Into A Governmental Entity Wielding Governmental Authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well\nA. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population\nB. The MPCP has increased academic achievement\nC. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime\nIII. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced\nA. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance\nB. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities\nC. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools\nD. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools\nIV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "reference": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population\nB. The MPCP has increased academic achievement\nC. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime\nIII. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced\nA. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance\nB. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities\nC. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools\nD. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools\nIV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "reference": "II. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students\nII. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The MPCP has increased academic achievement\nC. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime\nIII. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced\nA. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance\nB. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities\nC. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools\nD. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools\nIV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "reference": "A. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students\nII. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well\nA. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime\nIII. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced\nA. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance\nB. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities\nC. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools\nD. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools\nIV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "reference": "B. The MPCP has increased academic achievement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students\nII. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well\nA. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population\nB. The MPCP has increased academic achievement\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced\nA. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance\nB. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities\nC. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools\nD. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools\nIV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "reference": "C. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students\nII. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well\nA. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population\nB. The MPCP has increased academic achievement\nC. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance\nB. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities\nC. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools\nD. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools\nIV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "reference": "III. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students\nII. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well\nA. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population\nB. The MPCP has increased academic achievement\nC. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime\nIII. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities\nC. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools\nD. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools\nIV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "reference": "A. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students\nII. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well\nA. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population\nB. The MPCP has increased academic achievement\nC. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime\nIII. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced\nA. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools\nD. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools\nIV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "reference": "B. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students\nII. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well\nA. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population\nB. The MPCP has increased academic achievement\nC. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime\nIII. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced\nA. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance\nB. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools\nIV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "reference": "C. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students\nII. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well\nA. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population\nB. The MPCP has increased academic achievement\nC. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime\nIII. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced\nA. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance\nB. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities\nC. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools\nD. [MISSING]\nIV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "reference": "D. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin Created the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program Because the Milwaukee Public School System Was Failing Its Students\nII. The MPCP Has Worked Extremely Well\nA. The MPCP is used by a predominately minority population\nB. The MPCP has increased academic achievement\nC. Students attending private schools in the MPCP are less likely to be exposed to or engage in crime\nIII. The Typical Criticisms of School Choice Are Misplaced\nA. Private schools in the MPCP are accountable for performance\nB. Private schools in the MPCP educate students with disabilities\nC. The MPCP has not contributed to racially segregated schools\nD. Private schools in the MPCP do more with less funding than public schools and have not adversely affected the funding for public schools\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Amicus' Expansion of School Choice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1498_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Solicitor General Manufactures \"Tension\" by Assuming that the Washington Supreme Court Interpreted Its Statute Erroneously\nIII. The Solicitor General's Unsubstantiated Claims of Harm Do Not Merit Certiorari",
        "reference": "I. The Solicitor General's Disagreement with the Washington Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Washington Fuel Tax Does Not Merit Certiorari",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1498_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Solicitor General's Disagreement with the Washington Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Washington Fuel Tax Does Not Merit Certiorari\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Solicitor General's Unsubstantiated Claims of Harm Do Not Merit Certiorari",
        "reference": "II. The Solicitor General Manufactures \"Tension\" by Assuming that the Washington Supreme Court Interpreted Its Statute Erroneously",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1498_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Solicitor General's Disagreement with the Washington Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Washington Fuel Tax Does Not Merit Certiorari\nII. The Solicitor General Manufactures \"Tension\" by Assuming that the Washington Supreme Court Interpreted Its Statute Erroneously\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Solicitor General's Unsubstantiated Claims of Harm Do Not Merit Certiorari",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\n2. 303 Creative is only the latest example of Colorado and western-state officials ignoring the rights of religious people\n3. Western-state courts and officials need a clear message from this Court: summary reversal",
        "reference": "1. The Tenth Circuit's decision is egregiously wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Tenth Circuit's decision is egregiously wrong\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Western-state courts and officials need a clear message from this Court: summary reversal",
        "reference": "2. 303 Creative is only the latest example of Colorado and western-state officials ignoring the rights of religious people",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Tenth Circuit's decision is egregiously wrong\n2. 303 Creative is only the latest example of Colorado and western-state officials ignoring the rights of religious people\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. Western-state courts and officials need a clear message from this Court: summary reversal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-108_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A crime that could be \"punished by death\" under the UCMJ was \"punishable by death\" for purposes of the UCMJ's statute of limitations\nB. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context\nII. Briggs's rape charge was also timely under the 2006 NDAA",
        "reference": "I. Respondents' rapes were subject to prosecution at any time under the UCMJ because rape was \"punishable by death\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-108_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' rapes were subject to prosecution at any time under the UCMJ because rape was \"punishable by death\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context\nII. Briggs's rape charge was also timely under the 2006 NDAA",
        "reference": "A. A crime that could be \"punished by death\" under the UCMJ was \"punishable by death\" for purposes of the UCMJ's statute of limitations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-108_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' rapes were subject to prosecution at any time under the UCMJ because rape was \"punishable by death\"\nA. A crime that could be \"punished by death\" under the UCMJ was \"punishable by death\" for purposes of the UCMJ's statute of limitations\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Briggs's rape charge was also timely under the 2006 NDAA",
        "reference": "B. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-108_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' rapes were subject to prosecution at any time under the UCMJ because rape was \"punishable by death\"\nA. A crime that could be \"punished by death\" under the UCMJ was \"punishable by death\" for purposes of the UCMJ's statute of limitations\nB. Even if a constitutional analysis were required, the Constitution does not forbid capital punishment for rape in the military context\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Briggs's rape charge was also timely under the 2006 NDAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Forced Disclosure of Private Associations Gives Rise to a First Amendment Injury\nB. Disclosure Also Burdens the First Amendment Right To Solicit Charitable Donations\nC. The Ninth Circuit Misunderstood This Court's Cases To Require Proof That Disclosure Will Cause Secondary Injury\nD. Proof of Concrete Injury Is Not Required in the Context of Facial Challenges\nII. The California Disclosure Requirement Should Be Struck Down as Overbroad on Its Face\nA. Facial Challenges Are Particularly Appropriate in the First Amendment Context\nB. California's Disclosure Requirement Is Overbroad on Its Face",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Rejected the First Amendment Facial Challenge",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Rejected the First Amendment Facial Challenge\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Disclosure Also Burdens the First Amendment Right To Solicit Charitable Donations\nC. The Ninth Circuit Misunderstood This Court's Cases To Require Proof That Disclosure Will Cause Secondary Injury\nD. Proof of Concrete Injury Is Not Required in the Context of Facial Challenges\nII. The California Disclosure Requirement Should Be Struck Down as Overbroad on Its Face\nA. Facial Challenges Are Particularly Appropriate in the First Amendment Context\nB. California's Disclosure Requirement Is Overbroad on Its Face",
        "reference": "A. Forced Disclosure of Private Associations Gives Rise to a First Amendment Injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Rejected the First Amendment Facial Challenge\nA. Forced Disclosure of Private Associations Gives Rise to a First Amendment Injury\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit Misunderstood This Court's Cases To Require Proof That Disclosure Will Cause Secondary Injury\nD. Proof of Concrete Injury Is Not Required in the Context of Facial Challenges\nII. The California Disclosure Requirement Should Be Struck Down as Overbroad on Its Face\nA. Facial Challenges Are Particularly Appropriate in the First Amendment Context\nB. California's Disclosure Requirement Is Overbroad on Its Face",
        "reference": "B. Disclosure Also Burdens the First Amendment Right To Solicit Charitable Donations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Rejected the First Amendment Facial Challenge\nA. Forced Disclosure of Private Associations Gives Rise to a First Amendment Injury\nB. Disclosure Also Burdens the First Amendment Right To Solicit Charitable Donations\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Proof of Concrete Injury Is Not Required in the Context of Facial Challenges\nII. The California Disclosure Requirement Should Be Struck Down as Overbroad on Its Face\nA. Facial Challenges Are Particularly Appropriate in the First Amendment Context\nB. California's Disclosure Requirement Is Overbroad on Its Face",
        "reference": "C. The Ninth Circuit Misunderstood This Court's Cases To Require Proof That Disclosure Will Cause Secondary Injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Rejected the First Amendment Facial Challenge\nA. Forced Disclosure of Private Associations Gives Rise to a First Amendment Injury\nB. Disclosure Also Burdens the First Amendment Right To Solicit Charitable Donations\nC. The Ninth Circuit Misunderstood This Court's Cases To Require Proof That Disclosure Will Cause Secondary Injury\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The California Disclosure Requirement Should Be Struck Down as Overbroad on Its Face\nA. Facial Challenges Are Particularly Appropriate in the First Amendment Context\nB. California's Disclosure Requirement Is Overbroad on Its Face",
        "reference": "D. Proof of Concrete Injury Is Not Required in the Context of Facial Challenges",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Rejected the First Amendment Facial Challenge\nA. Forced Disclosure of Private Associations Gives Rise to a First Amendment Injury\nB. Disclosure Also Burdens the First Amendment Right To Solicit Charitable Donations\nC. The Ninth Circuit Misunderstood This Court's Cases To Require Proof That Disclosure Will Cause Secondary Injury\nD. Proof of Concrete Injury Is Not Required in the Context of Facial Challenges\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Facial Challenges Are Particularly Appropriate in the First Amendment Context\nB. California's Disclosure Requirement Is Overbroad on Its Face",
        "reference": "II. The California Disclosure Requirement Should Be Struck Down as Overbroad on Its Face",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Rejected the First Amendment Facial Challenge\nA. Forced Disclosure of Private Associations Gives Rise to a First Amendment Injury\nB. Disclosure Also Burdens the First Amendment Right To Solicit Charitable Donations\nC. The Ninth Circuit Misunderstood This Court's Cases To Require Proof That Disclosure Will Cause Secondary Injury\nD. Proof of Concrete Injury Is Not Required in the Context of Facial Challenges\nII. The California Disclosure Requirement Should Be Struck Down as Overbroad on Its Face\nA. [MISSING]\nB. California's Disclosure Requirement Is Overbroad on Its Face",
        "reference": "A. Facial Challenges Are Particularly Appropriate in the First Amendment Context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously Rejected the First Amendment Facial Challenge\nA. Forced Disclosure of Private Associations Gives Rise to a First Amendment Injury\nB. Disclosure Also Burdens the First Amendment Right To Solicit Charitable Donations\nC. The Ninth Circuit Misunderstood This Court's Cases To Require Proof That Disclosure Will Cause Secondary Injury\nD. Proof of Concrete Injury Is Not Required in the Context of Facial Challenges\nII. The California Disclosure Requirement Should Be Struck Down as Overbroad on Its Face\nA. Facial Challenges Are Particularly Appropriate in the First Amendment Context\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. California's Disclosure Requirement Is Overbroad on Its Face",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief045.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Firearm possession and use is uniquely related to public safety concerns\nIII. New York City's experience demonstrates lawmakers' need for deference and discretion\nA. The law at issue has helped New York City dramatically lower violent crimes involving firearms\nB. Petitioners' efforts to paint New York's common-sense gun restrictions as discriminatory should be rejected",
        "reference": "I. The New York licensing system, upheld by the Second Circuit, properly accommodates individual and governmental interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief045.pdf",
        "text": "I. The New York licensing system, upheld by the Second Circuit, properly accommodates individual and governmental interests\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. New York City's experience demonstrates lawmakers' need for deference and discretion\nA. The law at issue has helped New York City dramatically lower violent crimes involving firearms\nB. Petitioners' efforts to paint New York's common-sense gun restrictions as discriminatory should be rejected",
        "reference": "II. Firearm possession and use is uniquely related to public safety concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief045.pdf",
        "text": "I. The New York licensing system, upheld by the Second Circuit, properly accommodates individual and governmental interests\nII. Firearm possession and use is uniquely related to public safety concerns\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The law at issue has helped New York City dramatically lower violent crimes involving firearms\nB. Petitioners' efforts to paint New York's common-sense gun restrictions as discriminatory should be rejected",
        "reference": "III. New York City's experience demonstrates lawmakers' need for deference and discretion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief045.pdf",
        "text": "I. The New York licensing system, upheld by the Second Circuit, properly accommodates individual and governmental interests\nII. Firearm possession and use is uniquely related to public safety concerns\nIII. New York City's experience demonstrates lawmakers' need for deference and discretion\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' efforts to paint New York's common-sense gun restrictions as discriminatory should be rejected",
        "reference": "A. The law at issue has helped New York City dramatically lower violent crimes involving firearms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief045.pdf",
        "text": "I. The New York licensing system, upheld by the Second Circuit, properly accommodates individual and governmental interests\nII. Firearm possession and use is uniquely related to public safety concerns\nIII. New York City's experience demonstrates lawmakers' need for deference and discretion\nA. The law at issue has helped New York City dramatically lower violent crimes involving firearms\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' efforts to paint New York's common-sense gun restrictions as discriminatory should be rejected",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\n2. The TVA Mishandles Burr\n3. Circuit Split\n4. The Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Fall Under the Suits in Admiralty Act\na. The TVA Has No \"Capital Stock\"\nb. The TVA Act \"Repealed\" Any Conflicting SIAA Immunity Exception\nc. Even if the SIAA Applied, It Would Not Immunize the TVA",
        "reference": "1. Engrafting a Discretionary Function Exception Onto the TVA's Suability Clause Would Thwart Statutes and Thus Abrade the Separation of Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Engrafting a Discretionary Function Exception Onto the TVA's Suability Clause Would Thwart Statutes and Thus Abrade the Separation of Powers\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Circuit Split\n4. The Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Fall Under the Suits in Admiralty Act\na. The TVA Has No \"Capital Stock\"\nb. The TVA Act \"Repealed\" Any Conflicting SIAA Immunity Exception\nc. Even if the SIAA Applied, It Would Not Immunize the TVA",
        "reference": "2. The TVA Mishandles Burr",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Engrafting a Discretionary Function Exception Onto the TVA's Suability Clause Would Thwart Statutes and Thus Abrade the Separation of Powers\n2. The TVA Mishandles Burr\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Fall Under the Suits in Admiralty Act\na. The TVA Has No \"Capital Stock\"\nb. The TVA Act \"Repealed\" Any Conflicting SIAA Immunity Exception\nc. Even if the SIAA Applied, It Would Not Immunize the TVA",
        "reference": "3. Circuit Split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Engrafting a Discretionary Function Exception Onto the TVA's Suability Clause Would Thwart Statutes and Thus Abrade the Separation of Powers\n2. The TVA Mishandles Burr\n3. Circuit Split\n4. [MISSING]\na. The TVA Has No \"Capital Stock\"\nb. The TVA Act \"Repealed\" Any Conflicting SIAA Immunity Exception\nc. Even if the SIAA Applied, It Would Not Immunize the TVA",
        "reference": "4. The Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Fall Under the Suits in Admiralty Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Engrafting a Discretionary Function Exception Onto the TVA's Suability Clause Would Thwart Statutes and Thus Abrade the Separation of Powers\n2. The TVA Mishandles Burr\n3. Circuit Split\n4. The Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Fall Under the Suits in Admiralty Act\na. [MISSING]\nb. The TVA Act \"Repealed\" Any Conflicting SIAA Immunity Exception\nc. Even if the SIAA Applied, It Would Not Immunize the TVA",
        "reference": "a. The TVA Has No \"Capital Stock\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Engrafting a Discretionary Function Exception Onto the TVA's Suability Clause Would Thwart Statutes and Thus Abrade the Separation of Powers\n2. The TVA Mishandles Burr\n3. Circuit Split\n4. The Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Fall Under the Suits in Admiralty Act\na. The TVA Has No \"Capital Stock\"\nb. [MISSING]\nc. Even if the SIAA Applied, It Would Not Immunize the TVA",
        "reference": "b. The TVA Act \"Repealed\" Any Conflicting SIAA Immunity Exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Engrafting a Discretionary Function Exception Onto the TVA's Suability Clause Would Thwart Statutes and Thus Abrade the Separation of Powers\n2. The TVA Mishandles Burr\n3. Circuit Split\n4. The Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Fall Under the Suits in Admiralty Act\na. The TVA Has No \"Capital Stock\"\nb. The TVA Act \"Repealed\" Any Conflicting SIAA Immunity Exception\nc. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "c. Even if the SIAA Applied, It Would Not Immunize the TVA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The government used the state secrets privilege to foreclose Kareem's justiciable claim demanding his Fifth Amendment right to due process before his government could kill him\nB. The government admits that its view of the state secrets privilege is so sweeping that it would allow it to target and kill U.S. citizens without due process, including a federal judge on U.S. soil\nII. Dispositive deference to the Executive's claim of a risk to national security violates the separation of powers and results in abuses of the state secrets privilege\nIII. Courts should evaluate claims of state secrets privilege in the specific context of the case and reject them where they are facially unreasonable\nIV. State secrets should be subject to the ordinary limitations on privilege",
        "reference": "I. The government's position on the state secrets privilege has no limiting principle and leads to the absurd conclusion that it has the power to decide to kill its own citizens in secret without any due process or right to judicial relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's position on the state secrets privilege has no limiting principle and leads to the absurd conclusion that it has the power to decide to kill its own citizens in secret without any due process or right to judicial relief\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The government admits that its view of the state secrets privilege is so sweeping that it would allow it to target and kill U.S. citizens without due process, including a federal judge on U.S. soil\nII. Dispositive deference to the Executive's claim of a risk to national security violates the separation of powers and results in abuses of the state secrets privilege\nIII. Courts should evaluate claims of state secrets privilege in the specific context of the case and reject them where they are facially unreasonable\nIV. State secrets should be subject to the ordinary limitations on privilege",
        "reference": "A. The government used the state secrets privilege to foreclose Kareem's justiciable claim demanding his Fifth Amendment right to due process before his government could kill him",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's position on the state secrets privilege has no limiting principle and leads to the absurd conclusion that it has the power to decide to kill its own citizens in secret without any due process or right to judicial relief\nA. The government used the state secrets privilege to foreclose Kareem's justiciable claim demanding his Fifth Amendment right to due process before his government could kill him\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Dispositive deference to the Executive's claim of a risk to national security violates the separation of powers and results in abuses of the state secrets privilege\nIII. Courts should evaluate claims of state secrets privilege in the specific context of the case and reject them where they are facially unreasonable\nIV. State secrets should be subject to the ordinary limitations on privilege",
        "reference": "B. The government admits that its view of the state secrets privilege is so sweeping that it would allow it to target and kill U.S. citizens without due process, including a federal judge on U.S. soil",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's position on the state secrets privilege has no limiting principle and leads to the absurd conclusion that it has the power to decide to kill its own citizens in secret without any due process or right to judicial relief\nA. The government used the state secrets privilege to foreclose Kareem's justiciable claim demanding his Fifth Amendment right to due process before his government could kill him\nB. The government admits that its view of the state secrets privilege is so sweeping that it would allow it to target and kill U.S. citizens without due process, including a federal judge on U.S. soil\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Courts should evaluate claims of state secrets privilege in the specific context of the case and reject them where they are facially unreasonable\nIV. State secrets should be subject to the ordinary limitations on privilege",
        "reference": "II. Dispositive deference to the Executive's claim of a risk to national security violates the separation of powers and results in abuses of the state secrets privilege",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's position on the state secrets privilege has no limiting principle and leads to the absurd conclusion that it has the power to decide to kill its own citizens in secret without any due process or right to judicial relief\nA. The government used the state secrets privilege to foreclose Kareem's justiciable claim demanding his Fifth Amendment right to due process before his government could kill him\nB. The government admits that its view of the state secrets privilege is so sweeping that it would allow it to target and kill U.S. citizens without due process, including a federal judge on U.S. soil\nII. Dispositive deference to the Executive's claim of a risk to national security violates the separation of powers and results in abuses of the state secrets privilege\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. State secrets should be subject to the ordinary limitations on privilege",
        "reference": "III. Courts should evaluate claims of state secrets privilege in the specific context of the case and reject them where they are facially unreasonable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's position on the state secrets privilege has no limiting principle and leads to the absurd conclusion that it has the power to decide to kill its own citizens in secret without any due process or right to judicial relief\nA. The government used the state secrets privilege to foreclose Kareem's justiciable claim demanding his Fifth Amendment right to due process before his government could kill him\nB. The government admits that its view of the state secrets privilege is so sweeping that it would allow it to target and kill U.S. citizens without due process, including a federal judge on U.S. soil\nII. Dispositive deference to the Executive's claim of a risk to national security violates the separation of powers and results in abuses of the state secrets privilege\nIII. Courts should evaluate claims of state secrets privilege in the specific context of the case and reject them where they are facially unreasonable\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. State secrets should be subject to the ordinary limitations on privilege",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The plain meaning of \"expenses\" includes personnel expenses\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that \"the expenses of the proceedings\" for which an applicant is liable include the USPTO personnel expenditures that are attributable to the Section 145 proceedings\nC. The history of Section 145 supports the USPTO's reading of the term \"expenses\"\nII. The American Rule on fee-shifting does not require a contrary result\nA. Section 145 does not implicate the American Rule\nB. Section 145 provides clear and explicit authority to require an applicant to pay the USPTO's personnel expenses",
        "reference": "I. A disappointed patent applicant who files a civil action under Section 145 must reimburse the USPTO for the expenses the agency incurs when its personnel devote their time to the proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A disappointed patent applicant who files a civil action under Section 145 must reimburse the USPTO for the expenses the agency incurs when its personnel devote their time to the proceedings\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that \"the expenses of the proceedings\" for which an applicant is liable include the USPTO personnel expenditures that are attributable to the Section 145 proceedings\nC. The history of Section 145 supports the USPTO's reading of the term \"expenses\"\nII. The American Rule on fee-shifting does not require a contrary result\nA. Section 145 does not implicate the American Rule\nB. Section 145 provides clear and explicit authority to require an applicant to pay the USPTO's personnel expenses",
        "reference": "A. The plain meaning of \"expenses\" includes personnel expenses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A disappointed patent applicant who files a civil action under Section 145 must reimburse the USPTO for the expenses the agency incurs when its personnel devote their time to the proceedings\nA. The plain meaning of \"expenses\" includes personnel expenses\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The history of Section 145 supports the USPTO's reading of the term \"expenses\"\nII. The American Rule on fee-shifting does not require a contrary result\nA. Section 145 does not implicate the American Rule\nB. Section 145 provides clear and explicit authority to require an applicant to pay the USPTO's personnel expenses",
        "reference": "B. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that \"the expenses of the proceedings\" for which an applicant is liable include the USPTO personnel expenditures that are attributable to the Section 145 proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A disappointed patent applicant who files a civil action under Section 145 must reimburse the USPTO for the expenses the agency incurs when its personnel devote their time to the proceedings\nA. The plain meaning of \"expenses\" includes personnel expenses\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that \"the expenses of the proceedings\" for which an applicant is liable include the USPTO personnel expenditures that are attributable to the Section 145 proceedings\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The American Rule on fee-shifting does not require a contrary result\nA. Section 145 does not implicate the American Rule\nB. Section 145 provides clear and explicit authority to require an applicant to pay the USPTO's personnel expenses",
        "reference": "C. The history of Section 145 supports the USPTO's reading of the term \"expenses\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A disappointed patent applicant who files a civil action under Section 145 must reimburse the USPTO for the expenses the agency incurs when its personnel devote their time to the proceedings\nA. The plain meaning of \"expenses\" includes personnel expenses\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that \"the expenses of the proceedings\" for which an applicant is liable include the USPTO personnel expenditures that are attributable to the Section 145 proceedings\nC. The history of Section 145 supports the USPTO's reading of the term \"expenses\"\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Section 145 does not implicate the American Rule\nB. Section 145 provides clear and explicit authority to require an applicant to pay the USPTO's personnel expenses",
        "reference": "II. The American Rule on fee-shifting does not require a contrary result",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A disappointed patent applicant who files a civil action under Section 145 must reimburse the USPTO for the expenses the agency incurs when its personnel devote their time to the proceedings\nA. The plain meaning of \"expenses\" includes personnel expenses\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that \"the expenses of the proceedings\" for which an applicant is liable include the USPTO personnel expenditures that are attributable to the Section 145 proceedings\nC. The history of Section 145 supports the USPTO's reading of the term \"expenses\"\nII. The American Rule on fee-shifting does not require a contrary result\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 145 provides clear and explicit authority to require an applicant to pay the USPTO's personnel expenses",
        "reference": "A. Section 145 does not implicate the American Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A disappointed patent applicant who files a civil action under Section 145 must reimburse the USPTO for the expenses the agency incurs when its personnel devote their time to the proceedings\nA. The plain meaning of \"expenses\" includes personnel expenses\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that \"the expenses of the proceedings\" for which an applicant is liable include the USPTO personnel expenditures that are attributable to the Section 145 proceedings\nC. The history of Section 145 supports the USPTO's reading of the term \"expenses\"\nII. The American Rule on fee-shifting does not require a contrary result\nA. Section 145 does not implicate the American Rule\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Section 145 provides clear and explicit authority to require an applicant to pay the USPTO's personnel expenses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A [MISSING]\nA. But-for causation is the default rule for federal anti-discrimination laws\nB. Section 1981 retains the default rule of but-for causation\n1. The text of Section 1981 supports a but-for rule\n2. The broader statutory structure confirms that a but-for rule applies\n3. The history and purpose of Section 1981 underscore that Congress intended a but-for rule\nC. The court of appeals erred in requiring a Section 1981 plaintiff to plead only that race was a motivating factor",
        "reference": "A Section 1981 plaintiff must establish but-for causation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A Section 1981 plaintiff must establish but-for causation\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1981 retains the default rule of but-for causation\n1. The text of Section 1981 supports a but-for rule\n2. The broader statutory structure confirms that a but-for rule applies\n3. The history and purpose of Section 1981 underscore that Congress intended a but-for rule\nC. The court of appeals erred in requiring a Section 1981 plaintiff to plead only that race was a motivating factor",
        "reference": "A. But-for causation is the default rule for federal anti-discrimination laws",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A Section 1981 plaintiff must establish but-for causation\nA. But-for causation is the default rule for federal anti-discrimination laws\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The text of Section 1981 supports a but-for rule\n2. The broader statutory structure confirms that a but-for rule applies\n3. The history and purpose of Section 1981 underscore that Congress intended a but-for rule\nC. The court of appeals erred in requiring a Section 1981 plaintiff to plead only that race was a motivating factor",
        "reference": "B. Section 1981 retains the default rule of but-for causation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A Section 1981 plaintiff must establish but-for causation\nA. But-for causation is the default rule for federal anti-discrimination laws\nB. Section 1981 retains the default rule of but-for causation\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The broader statutory structure confirms that a but-for rule applies\n3. The history and purpose of Section 1981 underscore that Congress intended a but-for rule\nC. The court of appeals erred in requiring a Section 1981 plaintiff to plead only that race was a motivating factor",
        "reference": "1. The text of Section 1981 supports a but-for rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A Section 1981 plaintiff must establish but-for causation\nA. But-for causation is the default rule for federal anti-discrimination laws\nB. Section 1981 retains the default rule of but-for causation\n1. The text of Section 1981 supports a but-for rule\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The history and purpose of Section 1981 underscore that Congress intended a but-for rule\nC. The court of appeals erred in requiring a Section 1981 plaintiff to plead only that race was a motivating factor",
        "reference": "2. The broader statutory structure confirms that a but-for rule applies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A Section 1981 plaintiff must establish but-for causation\nA. But-for causation is the default rule for federal anti-discrimination laws\nB. Section 1981 retains the default rule of but-for causation\n1. The text of Section 1981 supports a but-for rule\n2. The broader statutory structure confirms that a but-for rule applies\n3. [MISSING]\nC. The court of appeals erred in requiring a Section 1981 plaintiff to plead only that race was a motivating factor",
        "reference": "3. The history and purpose of Section 1981 underscore that Congress intended a but-for rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A Section 1981 plaintiff must establish but-for causation\nA. But-for causation is the default rule for federal anti-discrimination laws\nB. Section 1981 retains the default rule of but-for causation\n1. The text of Section 1981 supports a but-for rule\n2. The broader statutory structure confirms that a but-for rule applies\n3. The history and purpose of Section 1981 underscore that Congress intended a but-for rule\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The court of appeals erred in requiring a Section 1981 plaintiff to plead only that race was a motivating factor",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. USING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CRITERIA LIMITS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nA. Compactness is a Non-partisan Criteria\nB. Contiguity Ensures Legitimacy\nC. Preserving Counties and Political Subdivisions is a Clear and Objective Criteria\nD. Communities of Interest is a Legitimate State Policy\nE. Preservation of Core Existing Districts Creates Consistency\nF. Avoiding Pairing Incumbents Respects Voters' Choices\nG. Combining the Criteria Increases the Limitations on Discretion by a Legislative Body\nIII. FAILURE TO AFFIRM RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING CRITERIA ENCOURAGES LITIGATION",
        "reference": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Compactness is a Non-partisan Criteria\nB. Contiguity Ensures Legitimacy\nC. Preserving Counties and Political Subdivisions is a Clear and Objective Criteria\nD. Communities of Interest is a Legitimate State Policy\nE. Preservation of Core Existing Districts Creates Consistency\nF. Avoiding Pairing Incumbents Respects Voters' Choices\nG. Combining the Criteria Increases the Limitations on Discretion by a Legislative Body\nIII. FAILURE TO AFFIRM RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING CRITERIA ENCOURAGES LITIGATION",
        "reference": "II. USING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CRITERIA LIMITS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nII. USING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CRITERIA LIMITS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Contiguity Ensures Legitimacy\nC. Preserving Counties and Political Subdivisions is a Clear and Objective Criteria\nD. Communities of Interest is a Legitimate State Policy\nE. Preservation of Core Existing Districts Creates Consistency\nF. Avoiding Pairing Incumbents Respects Voters' Choices\nG. Combining the Criteria Increases the Limitations on Discretion by a Legislative Body\nIII. FAILURE TO AFFIRM RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING CRITERIA ENCOURAGES LITIGATION",
        "reference": "A. Compactness is a Non-partisan Criteria",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nII. USING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CRITERIA LIMITS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nA. Compactness is a Non-partisan Criteria\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Preserving Counties and Political Subdivisions is a Clear and Objective Criteria\nD. Communities of Interest is a Legitimate State Policy\nE. Preservation of Core Existing Districts Creates Consistency\nF. Avoiding Pairing Incumbents Respects Voters' Choices\nG. Combining the Criteria Increases the Limitations on Discretion by a Legislative Body\nIII. FAILURE TO AFFIRM RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING CRITERIA ENCOURAGES LITIGATION",
        "reference": "B. Contiguity Ensures Legitimacy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nII. USING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CRITERIA LIMITS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nA. Compactness is a Non-partisan Criteria\nB. Contiguity Ensures Legitimacy\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Communities of Interest is a Legitimate State Policy\nE. Preservation of Core Existing Districts Creates Consistency\nF. Avoiding Pairing Incumbents Respects Voters' Choices\nG. Combining the Criteria Increases the Limitations on Discretion by a Legislative Body\nIII. FAILURE TO AFFIRM RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING CRITERIA ENCOURAGES LITIGATION",
        "reference": "C. Preserving Counties and Political Subdivisions is a Clear and Objective Criteria",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nII. USING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CRITERIA LIMITS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nA. Compactness is a Non-partisan Criteria\nB. Contiguity Ensures Legitimacy\nC. Preserving Counties and Political Subdivisions is a Clear and Objective Criteria\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Preservation of Core Existing Districts Creates Consistency\nF. Avoiding Pairing Incumbents Respects Voters' Choices\nG. Combining the Criteria Increases the Limitations on Discretion by a Legislative Body\nIII. FAILURE TO AFFIRM RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING CRITERIA ENCOURAGES LITIGATION",
        "reference": "D. Communities of Interest is a Legitimate State Policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nII. USING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CRITERIA LIMITS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nA. Compactness is a Non-partisan Criteria\nB. Contiguity Ensures Legitimacy\nC. Preserving Counties and Political Subdivisions is a Clear and Objective Criteria\nD. Communities of Interest is a Legitimate State Policy\nE. [MISSING]\nF. Avoiding Pairing Incumbents Respects Voters' Choices\nG. Combining the Criteria Increases the Limitations on Discretion by a Legislative Body\nIII. FAILURE TO AFFIRM RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING CRITERIA ENCOURAGES LITIGATION",
        "reference": "E. Preservation of Core Existing Districts Creates Consistency",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nII. USING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CRITERIA LIMITS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nA. Compactness is a Non-partisan Criteria\nB. Contiguity Ensures Legitimacy\nC. Preserving Counties and Political Subdivisions is a Clear and Objective Criteria\nD. Communities of Interest is a Legitimate State Policy\nE. Preservation of Core Existing Districts Creates Consistency\nF. [MISSING]\nG. Combining the Criteria Increases the Limitations on Discretion by a Legislative Body\nIII. FAILURE TO AFFIRM RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING CRITERIA ENCOURAGES LITIGATION",
        "reference": "F. Avoiding Pairing Incumbents Respects Voters' Choices",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nII. USING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CRITERIA LIMITS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nA. Compactness is a Non-partisan Criteria\nB. Contiguity Ensures Legitimacy\nC. Preserving Counties and Political Subdivisions is a Clear and Objective Criteria\nD. Communities of Interest is a Legitimate State Policy\nE. Preservation of Core Existing Districts Creates Consistency\nF. Avoiding Pairing Incumbents Respects Voters' Choices\nG. [MISSING]\nIII. FAILURE TO AFFIRM RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING CRITERIA ENCOURAGES LITIGATION",
        "reference": "G. Combining the Criteria Increases the Limitations on Discretion by a Legislative Body",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nII. USING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CRITERIA LIMITS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nA. Compactness is a Non-partisan Criteria\nB. Contiguity Ensures Legitimacy\nC. Preserving Counties and Political Subdivisions is a Clear and Objective Criteria\nD. Communities of Interest is a Legitimate State Policy\nE. Preservation of Core Existing Districts Creates Consistency\nF. Avoiding Pairing Incumbents Respects Voters' Choices\nG. Combining the Criteria Increases the Limitations on Discretion by a Legislative Body\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. FAILURE TO AFFIRM RELIANCE ON TRADITIONAL REDISTRICTING CRITERIA ENCOURAGES LITIGATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Stolt-Nielsen v. Animal Feeds Requires A \"Contractual Basis\" Authorizing Class Arbitration, Which Cannot Be Found In The Parties' Basic Agreement To Arbitrate Their Disputes\nB. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously \"Found\" A Contractual Basis In Contract Language That Merely Provides The Employee With Express Notice Of the Consequences of Agreeing To Arbitrate Disputes With His Employer\nC. In Effect, The Ninth Circuit's Decision Would Erroneously Impose Class Arbitration As A Mandatory Implied Term In Any Standard Bilateral Arbitration Agreement That Did Not Expressly Preclude It\nD. In Addition To Stolt-Nielsen, The Court Effectively Decided, In Oxford Health v. Sutter, That There Can Be No Contractual Basis Authorizing Class Arbitration In A Standard Bilateral Arbitration Agreement Such As This One",
        "reference": "I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT PERMIT A COURT TO ORDER CLASS ARBITRATION WHEN, AS HERE, TWO PARTIES HAVE SIMPLY AGREED TO ARBITRATE THEIR DISPUTES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT PERMIT A COURT TO ORDER CLASS ARBITRATION WHEN, AS HERE, TWO PARTIES HAVE SIMPLY AGREED TO ARBITRATE THEIR DISPUTES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously \"Found\" A Contractual Basis In Contract Language That Merely Provides The Employee With Express Notice Of the Consequences of Agreeing To Arbitrate Disputes With His Employer\nC. In Effect, The Ninth Circuit's Decision Would Erroneously Impose Class Arbitration As A Mandatory Implied Term In Any Standard Bilateral Arbitration Agreement That Did Not Expressly Preclude It\nD. In Addition To Stolt-Nielsen, The Court Effectively Decided, In Oxford Health v. Sutter, That There Can Be No Contractual Basis Authorizing Class Arbitration In A Standard Bilateral Arbitration Agreement Such As This One",
        "reference": "A. Stolt-Nielsen v. Animal Feeds Requires A \"Contractual Basis\" Authorizing Class Arbitration, Which Cannot Be Found In The Parties' Basic Agreement To Arbitrate Their Disputes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT PERMIT A COURT TO ORDER CLASS ARBITRATION WHEN, AS HERE, TWO PARTIES HAVE SIMPLY AGREED TO ARBITRATE THEIR DISPUTES\nA. Stolt-Nielsen v. Animal Feeds Requires A \"Contractual Basis\" Authorizing Class Arbitration, Which Cannot Be Found In The Parties' Basic Agreement To Arbitrate Their Disputes\nB. [MISSING]\nC. In Effect, The Ninth Circuit's Decision Would Erroneously Impose Class Arbitration As A Mandatory Implied Term In Any Standard Bilateral Arbitration Agreement That Did Not Expressly Preclude It\nD. In Addition To Stolt-Nielsen, The Court Effectively Decided, In Oxford Health v. Sutter, That There Can Be No Contractual Basis Authorizing Class Arbitration In A Standard Bilateral Arbitration Agreement Such As This One",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously \"Found\" A Contractual Basis In Contract Language That Merely Provides The Employee With Express Notice Of the Consequences of Agreeing To Arbitrate Disputes With His Employer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT PERMIT A COURT TO ORDER CLASS ARBITRATION WHEN, AS HERE, TWO PARTIES HAVE SIMPLY AGREED TO ARBITRATE THEIR DISPUTES\nA. Stolt-Nielsen v. Animal Feeds Requires A \"Contractual Basis\" Authorizing Class Arbitration, Which Cannot Be Found In The Parties' Basic Agreement To Arbitrate Their Disputes\nB. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously \"Found\" A Contractual Basis In Contract Language That Merely Provides The Employee With Express Notice Of the Consequences of Agreeing To Arbitrate Disputes With His Employer\nC. [MISSING]\nD. In Addition To Stolt-Nielsen, The Court Effectively Decided, In Oxford Health v. Sutter, That There Can Be No Contractual Basis Authorizing Class Arbitration In A Standard Bilateral Arbitration Agreement Such As This One",
        "reference": "C. In Effect, The Ninth Circuit's Decision Would Erroneously Impose Class Arbitration As A Mandatory Implied Term In Any Standard Bilateral Arbitration Agreement That Did Not Expressly Preclude It",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT DOES NOT PERMIT A COURT TO ORDER CLASS ARBITRATION WHEN, AS HERE, TWO PARTIES HAVE SIMPLY AGREED TO ARBITRATE THEIR DISPUTES\nA. Stolt-Nielsen v. Animal Feeds Requires A \"Contractual Basis\" Authorizing Class Arbitration, Which Cannot Be Found In The Parties' Basic Agreement To Arbitrate Their Disputes\nB. The Ninth Circuit Erroneously \"Found\" A Contractual Basis In Contract Language That Merely Provides The Employee With Express Notice Of the Consequences of Agreeing To Arbitrate Disputes With His Employer\nC. In Effect, The Ninth Circuit's Decision Would Erroneously Impose Class Arbitration As A Mandatory Implied Term In Any Standard Bilateral Arbitration Agreement That Did Not Expressly Preclude It\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. In Addition To Stolt-Nielsen, The Court Effectively Decided, In Oxford Health v. Sutter, That There Can Be No Contractual Basis Authorizing Class Arbitration In A Standard Bilateral Arbitration Agreement Such As This One",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Cannot Be Squared with This Court's Precedent\nIII. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Would Permit States To Stymie the Development of Atomic Energy\nIV. Respondents Have Repeatedly Conceded that Virginia's Ban Is Grounded in Impermissible Radiological Safety Concerns Related to Milling and Tailings Activities\nV. Virginia's Ban Is Also Preempted Because it Frustrates the AEA's Purposes and Objectives",
        "reference": "I. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Is Flatly Contrary to the Text of the AEA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Is Flatly Contrary to the Text of the AEA\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Would Permit States To Stymie the Development of Atomic Energy\nIV. Respondents Have Repeatedly Conceded that Virginia's Ban Is Grounded in Impermissible Radiological Safety Concerns Related to Milling and Tailings Activities\nV. Virginia's Ban Is Also Preempted Because it Frustrates the AEA's Purposes and Objectives",
        "reference": "II. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Cannot Be Squared with This Court's Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Is Flatly Contrary to the Text of the AEA\nII. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Cannot Be Squared with This Court's Precedent\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Respondents Have Repeatedly Conceded that Virginia's Ban Is Grounded in Impermissible Radiological Safety Concerns Related to Milling and Tailings Activities\nV. Virginia's Ban Is Also Preempted Because it Frustrates the AEA's Purposes and Objectives",
        "reference": "III. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Would Permit States To Stymie the Development of Atomic Energy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Is Flatly Contrary to the Text of the AEA\nII. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Cannot Be Squared with This Court's Precedent\nIII. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Would Permit States To Stymie the Development of Atomic Energy\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. Virginia's Ban Is Also Preempted Because it Frustrates the AEA's Purposes and Objectives",
        "reference": "IV. Respondents Have Repeatedly Conceded that Virginia's Ban Is Grounded in Impermissible Radiological Safety Concerns Related to Milling and Tailings Activities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Is Flatly Contrary to the Text of the AEA\nII. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Cannot Be Squared with This Court's Precedent\nIII. Respondents' Approach to Field Preemption Would Permit States To Stymie the Development of Atomic Energy\nIV. Respondents Have Repeatedly Conceded that Virginia's Ban Is Grounded in Impermissible Radiological Safety Concerns Related to Milling and Tailings Activities\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. Virginia's Ban Is Also Preempted Because it Frustrates the AEA's Purposes and Objectives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The significant nexus test best serves the text, purpose, and structure of the Clean Water Act, particularly in the arid west.\nIII. The question before this Court is limited and should not be used to announce a broad change in how the agencies regulate under the Clean Water Act.",
        "reference": "I. The Clean Water Act created a framework of cooperative federalism with a robust federal floor of water quality protection.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Clean Water Act created a framework of cooperative federalism with a robust federal floor of water quality protection.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The question before this Court is limited and should not be used to announce a broad change in how the agencies regulate under the Clean Water Act.",
        "reference": "II. The significant nexus test best serves the text, purpose, and structure of the Clean Water Act, particularly in the arid west.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Clean Water Act created a framework of cooperative federalism with a robust federal floor of water quality protection.\nII. The significant nexus test best serves the text, purpose, and structure of the Clean Water Act, particularly in the arid west.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The question before this Court is limited and should not be used to announce a broad change in how the agencies regulate under the Clean Water Act.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is Well Established And Applies Especially Where The Public Interest Demands And Where The Officer Has Executive Or Legislative Authority\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies To Constitutional Violations\nC. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions\nII. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Applied The De Facto Officer Doctrine Based On The Facts Here\nA. De Facto Validity Of The Board's Actions To Date Is Required To Avoid Massive Disruption To Puerto Rico's Recovery Efforts\nB. Any Supposed Appointments Clause Violation Was Merely Formal, Not Functional, And Certainly Insufficient To Justify The Enormously Harmful Remedy Sought\nC. The Board Acted In Good Faith\nD. The Court Of Appeals Properly Stayed Issuance Of Its Mandate Pending Final Disposition In This Court\nE. In The Alternative, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Should Be Applied To All Board Actions Prior To The Court Of Appeals' Decision",
        "reference": "I. Under The De Facto Officer Doctrine, The Prior Actions Of Unconstitutionally Appointed Officers Are Deemed Valid When Doing So Is Equitable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under The De Facto Officer Doctrine, The Prior Actions Of Unconstitutionally Appointed Officers Are Deemed Valid When Doing So Is Equitable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies To Constitutional Violations\nC. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions\nII. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Applied The De Facto Officer Doctrine Based On The Facts Here\nA. De Facto Validity Of The Board's Actions To Date Is Required To Avoid Massive Disruption To Puerto Rico's Recovery Efforts\nB. Any Supposed Appointments Clause Violation Was Merely Formal, Not Functional, And Certainly Insufficient To Justify The Enormously Harmful Remedy Sought\nC. The Board Acted In Good Faith\nD. The Court Of Appeals Properly Stayed Issuance Of Its Mandate Pending Final Disposition In This Court\nE. In The Alternative, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Should Be Applied To All Board Actions Prior To The Court Of Appeals' Decision",
        "reference": "A. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is Well Established And Applies Especially Where The Public Interest Demands And Where The Officer Has Executive Or Legislative Authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under The De Facto Officer Doctrine, The Prior Actions Of Unconstitutionally Appointed Officers Are Deemed Valid When Doing So Is Equitable\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is Well Established And Applies Especially Where The Public Interest Demands And Where The Officer Has Executive Or Legislative Authority\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions\nII. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Applied The De Facto Officer Doctrine Based On The Facts Here\nA. De Facto Validity Of The Board's Actions To Date Is Required To Avoid Massive Disruption To Puerto Rico's Recovery Efforts\nB. Any Supposed Appointments Clause Violation Was Merely Formal, Not Functional, And Certainly Insufficient To Justify The Enormously Harmful Remedy Sought\nC. The Board Acted In Good Faith\nD. The Court Of Appeals Properly Stayed Issuance Of Its Mandate Pending Final Disposition In This Court\nE. In The Alternative, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Should Be Applied To All Board Actions Prior To The Court Of Appeals' Decision",
        "reference": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies To Constitutional Violations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under The De Facto Officer Doctrine, The Prior Actions Of Unconstitutionally Appointed Officers Are Deemed Valid When Doing So Is Equitable\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is Well Established And Applies Especially Where The Public Interest Demands And Where The Officer Has Executive Or Legislative Authority\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies To Constitutional Violations\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Applied The De Facto Officer Doctrine Based On The Facts Here\nA. De Facto Validity Of The Board's Actions To Date Is Required To Avoid Massive Disruption To Puerto Rico's Recovery Efforts\nB. Any Supposed Appointments Clause Violation Was Merely Formal, Not Functional, And Certainly Insufficient To Justify The Enormously Harmful Remedy Sought\nC. The Board Acted In Good Faith\nD. The Court Of Appeals Properly Stayed Issuance Of Its Mandate Pending Final Disposition In This Court\nE. In The Alternative, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Should Be Applied To All Board Actions Prior To The Court Of Appeals' Decision",
        "reference": "C. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under The De Facto Officer Doctrine, The Prior Actions Of Unconstitutionally Appointed Officers Are Deemed Valid When Doing So Is Equitable\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is Well Established And Applies Especially Where The Public Interest Demands And Where The Officer Has Executive Or Legislative Authority\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies To Constitutional Violations\nC. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions\nII. [MISSING]\nA. De Facto Validity Of The Board's Actions To Date Is Required To Avoid Massive Disruption To Puerto Rico's Recovery Efforts\nB. Any Supposed Appointments Clause Violation Was Merely Formal, Not Functional, And Certainly Insufficient To Justify The Enormously Harmful Remedy Sought\nC. The Board Acted In Good Faith\nD. The Court Of Appeals Properly Stayed Issuance Of Its Mandate Pending Final Disposition In This Court\nE. In The Alternative, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Should Be Applied To All Board Actions Prior To The Court Of Appeals' Decision",
        "reference": "II. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Applied The De Facto Officer Doctrine Based On The Facts Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under The De Facto Officer Doctrine, The Prior Actions Of Unconstitutionally Appointed Officers Are Deemed Valid When Doing So Is Equitable\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is Well Established And Applies Especially Where The Public Interest Demands And Where The Officer Has Executive Or Legislative Authority\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies To Constitutional Violations\nC. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions\nII. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Applied The De Facto Officer Doctrine Based On The Facts Here\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Any Supposed Appointments Clause Violation Was Merely Formal, Not Functional, And Certainly Insufficient To Justify The Enormously Harmful Remedy Sought\nC. The Board Acted In Good Faith\nD. The Court Of Appeals Properly Stayed Issuance Of Its Mandate Pending Final Disposition In This Court\nE. In The Alternative, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Should Be Applied To All Board Actions Prior To The Court Of Appeals' Decision",
        "reference": "A. De Facto Validity Of The Board's Actions To Date Is Required To Avoid Massive Disruption To Puerto Rico's Recovery Efforts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under The De Facto Officer Doctrine, The Prior Actions Of Unconstitutionally Appointed Officers Are Deemed Valid When Doing So Is Equitable\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is Well Established And Applies Especially Where The Public Interest Demands And Where The Officer Has Executive Or Legislative Authority\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies To Constitutional Violations\nC. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions\nII. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Applied The De Facto Officer Doctrine Based On The Facts Here\nA. De Facto Validity Of The Board's Actions To Date Is Required To Avoid Massive Disruption To Puerto Rico's Recovery Efforts\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Board Acted In Good Faith\nD. The Court Of Appeals Properly Stayed Issuance Of Its Mandate Pending Final Disposition In This Court\nE. In The Alternative, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Should Be Applied To All Board Actions Prior To The Court Of Appeals' Decision",
        "reference": "B. Any Supposed Appointments Clause Violation Was Merely Formal, Not Functional, And Certainly Insufficient To Justify The Enormously Harmful Remedy Sought",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under The De Facto Officer Doctrine, The Prior Actions Of Unconstitutionally Appointed Officers Are Deemed Valid When Doing So Is Equitable\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is Well Established And Applies Especially Where The Public Interest Demands And Where The Officer Has Executive Or Legislative Authority\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies To Constitutional Violations\nC. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions\nII. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Applied The De Facto Officer Doctrine Based On The Facts Here\nA. De Facto Validity Of The Board's Actions To Date Is Required To Avoid Massive Disruption To Puerto Rico's Recovery Efforts\nB. Any Supposed Appointments Clause Violation Was Merely Formal, Not Functional, And Certainly Insufficient To Justify The Enormously Harmful Remedy Sought\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Court Of Appeals Properly Stayed Issuance Of Its Mandate Pending Final Disposition In This Court\nE. In The Alternative, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Should Be Applied To All Board Actions Prior To The Court Of Appeals' Decision",
        "reference": "C. The Board Acted In Good Faith",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under The De Facto Officer Doctrine, The Prior Actions Of Unconstitutionally Appointed Officers Are Deemed Valid When Doing So Is Equitable\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is Well Established And Applies Especially Where The Public Interest Demands And Where The Officer Has Executive Or Legislative Authority\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies To Constitutional Violations\nC. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions\nII. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Applied The De Facto Officer Doctrine Based On The Facts Here\nA. De Facto Validity Of The Board's Actions To Date Is Required To Avoid Massive Disruption To Puerto Rico's Recovery Efforts\nB. Any Supposed Appointments Clause Violation Was Merely Formal, Not Functional, And Certainly Insufficient To Justify The Enormously Harmful Remedy Sought\nC. The Board Acted In Good Faith\nD. [MISSING]\nE. In The Alternative, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Should Be Applied To All Board Actions Prior To The Court Of Appeals' Decision",
        "reference": "D. The Court Of Appeals Properly Stayed Issuance Of Its Mandate Pending Final Disposition In This Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under The De Facto Officer Doctrine, The Prior Actions Of Unconstitutionally Appointed Officers Are Deemed Valid When Doing So Is Equitable\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is Well Established And Applies Especially Where The Public Interest Demands And Where The Officer Has Executive Or Legislative Authority\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Applies To Constitutional Violations\nC. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions\nII. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Applied The De Facto Officer Doctrine Based On The Facts Here\nA. De Facto Validity Of The Board's Actions To Date Is Required To Avoid Massive Disruption To Puerto Rico's Recovery Efforts\nB. Any Supposed Appointments Clause Violation Was Merely Formal, Not Functional, And Certainly Insufficient To Justify The Enormously Harmful Remedy Sought\nC. The Board Acted In Good Faith\nD. The Court Of Appeals Properly Stayed Issuance Of Its Mandate Pending Final Disposition In This Court\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. In The Alternative, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Should Be Applied To All Board Actions Prior To The Court Of Appeals' Decision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Ameliorative Measures Are A Crucial Component to a Grave Risk Analysis\nIII. Sister Signatories Mandate Consideration of Ameliorative Measures",
        "reference": "I. Any Circuit Split Does Not Ultimately Impact a District Court's Discretion to Issue Ameliorative Measures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Any Circuit Split Does Not Ultimately Impact a District Court's Discretion to Issue Ameliorative Measures\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Sister Signatories Mandate Consideration of Ameliorative Measures",
        "reference": "II. Ameliorative Measures Are A Crucial Component to a Grave Risk Analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Any Circuit Split Does Not Ultimately Impact a District Court's Discretion to Issue Ameliorative Measures\nII. Ameliorative Measures Are A Crucial Component to a Grave Risk Analysis\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Sister Signatories Mandate Consideration of Ameliorative Measures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Separation of Powers and Our Constitution's Promise of an Independent Judiciary Protect Individual Liberty\nB. Chevron Deference Threatens Individual Liberty By Transferring Legislative and Judicial Powers to the Executive\n1. Chevron Stacks the Deck Against the American People\n2. Chevron Transfers Legislative Powers to Unelected Executive Officials\n3. Chevron Transfers Judicial Authority to Unelected Executive Officials\n4. Chevron and Its Constitutionally Challenged Companion, Brand X, Are At Odds with Due Process\nII. Chevron Violates the APA",
        "reference": "I. Chevron Deference Violates the Separation of Powers and Threatens Individual Liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron Deference Violates the Separation of Powers and Threatens Individual Liberty\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Chevron Deference Threatens Individual Liberty By Transferring Legislative and Judicial Powers to the Executive\n1. Chevron Stacks the Deck Against the American People\n2. Chevron Transfers Legislative Powers to Unelected Executive Officials\n3. Chevron Transfers Judicial Authority to Unelected Executive Officials\n4. Chevron and Its Constitutionally Challenged Companion, Brand X, Are At Odds with Due Process\nII. Chevron Violates the APA",
        "reference": "A. The Separation of Powers and Our Constitution's Promise of an Independent Judiciary Protect Individual Liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron Deference Violates the Separation of Powers and Threatens Individual Liberty\nA. The Separation of Powers and Our Constitution's Promise of an Independent Judiciary Protect Individual Liberty\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Chevron Stacks the Deck Against the American People\n2. Chevron Transfers Legislative Powers to Unelected Executive Officials\n3. Chevron Transfers Judicial Authority to Unelected Executive Officials\n4. Chevron and Its Constitutionally Challenged Companion, Brand X, Are At Odds with Due Process\nII. Chevron Violates the APA",
        "reference": "B. Chevron Deference Threatens Individual Liberty By Transferring Legislative and Judicial Powers to the Executive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron Deference Violates the Separation of Powers and Threatens Individual Liberty\nA. The Separation of Powers and Our Constitution's Promise of an Independent Judiciary Protect Individual Liberty\nB. Chevron Deference Threatens Individual Liberty By Transferring Legislative and Judicial Powers to the Executive\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Chevron Transfers Legislative Powers to Unelected Executive Officials\n3. Chevron Transfers Judicial Authority to Unelected Executive Officials\n4. Chevron and Its Constitutionally Challenged Companion, Brand X, Are At Odds with Due Process\nII. Chevron Violates the APA",
        "reference": "1. Chevron Stacks the Deck Against the American People",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron Deference Violates the Separation of Powers and Threatens Individual Liberty\nA. The Separation of Powers and Our Constitution's Promise of an Independent Judiciary Protect Individual Liberty\nB. Chevron Deference Threatens Individual Liberty By Transferring Legislative and Judicial Powers to the Executive\n1. Chevron Stacks the Deck Against the American People\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Chevron Transfers Judicial Authority to Unelected Executive Officials\n4. Chevron and Its Constitutionally Challenged Companion, Brand X, Are At Odds with Due Process\nII. Chevron Violates the APA",
        "reference": "2. Chevron Transfers Legislative Powers to Unelected Executive Officials",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron Deference Violates the Separation of Powers and Threatens Individual Liberty\nA. The Separation of Powers and Our Constitution's Promise of an Independent Judiciary Protect Individual Liberty\nB. Chevron Deference Threatens Individual Liberty By Transferring Legislative and Judicial Powers to the Executive\n1. Chevron Stacks the Deck Against the American People\n2. Chevron Transfers Legislative Powers to Unelected Executive Officials\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Chevron and Its Constitutionally Challenged Companion, Brand X, Are At Odds with Due Process\nII. Chevron Violates the APA",
        "reference": "3. Chevron Transfers Judicial Authority to Unelected Executive Officials",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron Deference Violates the Separation of Powers and Threatens Individual Liberty\nA. The Separation of Powers and Our Constitution's Promise of an Independent Judiciary Protect Individual Liberty\nB. Chevron Deference Threatens Individual Liberty By Transferring Legislative and Judicial Powers to the Executive\n1. Chevron Stacks the Deck Against the American People\n2. Chevron Transfers Legislative Powers to Unelected Executive Officials\n3. Chevron Transfers Judicial Authority to Unelected Executive Officials\n4. [MISSING]\nII. Chevron Violates the APA",
        "reference": "4. Chevron and Its Constitutionally Challenged Companion, Brand X, Are At Odds with Due Process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    }
]