[
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Around 1868, \"civil officer under the United States\" was not understood to include apex political positions.\nB. Rules of construction suggest Section Three excludes the apex office of the President.\nII. The ratifying debates did not resolve the inherent ambiguity of Section Three.\nIII. Reading Section Three as excluding the office of the President is textually and historically reasonable.\nA. Though prior drafts of Section Three enumerated the office of the President, the final draft omitted this language.\nB. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction ignored the office of the President and instead focused on Congress and the electoral college.\nC. The final draft of Section Three also focused on Congress and the electoral college, but expanded the text to include lower federal and state offices.\nD. Section Three secured a sufficiently trustworthy electoral college.",
        "reference": "I. Section Three's text is ambiguous about inclusion of the President.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section Three's text is ambiguous about inclusion of the President.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Rules of construction suggest Section Three excludes the apex office of the President.\nII. The ratifying debates did not resolve the inherent ambiguity of Section Three.\nIII. Reading Section Three as excluding the office of the President is textually and historically reasonable.\nA. Though prior drafts of Section Three enumerated the office of the President, the final draft omitted this language.\nB. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction ignored the office of the President and instead focused on Congress and the electoral college.\nC. The final draft of Section Three also focused on Congress and the electoral college, but expanded the text to include lower federal and state offices.\nD. Section Three secured a sufficiently trustworthy electoral college.",
        "reference": "A. Around 1868, \"civil officer under the United States\" was not understood to include apex political positions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section Three's text is ambiguous about inclusion of the President.\nA. Around 1868, \"civil officer under the United States\" was not understood to include apex political positions.\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The ratifying debates did not resolve the inherent ambiguity of Section Three.\nIII. Reading Section Three as excluding the office of the President is textually and historically reasonable.\nA. Though prior drafts of Section Three enumerated the office of the President, the final draft omitted this language.\nB. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction ignored the office of the President and instead focused on Congress and the electoral college.\nC. The final draft of Section Three also focused on Congress and the electoral college, but expanded the text to include lower federal and state offices.\nD. Section Three secured a sufficiently trustworthy electoral college.",
        "reference": "B. Rules of construction suggest Section Three excludes the apex office of the President.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section Three's text is ambiguous about inclusion of the President.\nA. Around 1868, \"civil officer under the United States\" was not understood to include apex political positions.\nB. Rules of construction suggest Section Three excludes the apex office of the President.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Reading Section Three as excluding the office of the President is textually and historically reasonable.\nA. Though prior drafts of Section Three enumerated the office of the President, the final draft omitted this language.\nB. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction ignored the office of the President and instead focused on Congress and the electoral college.\nC. The final draft of Section Three also focused on Congress and the electoral college, but expanded the text to include lower federal and state offices.\nD. Section Three secured a sufficiently trustworthy electoral college.",
        "reference": "II. The ratifying debates did not resolve the inherent ambiguity of Section Three.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section Three's text is ambiguous about inclusion of the President.\nA. Around 1868, \"civil officer under the United States\" was not understood to include apex political positions.\nB. Rules of construction suggest Section Three excludes the apex office of the President.\nII. The ratifying debates did not resolve the inherent ambiguity of Section Three.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Though prior drafts of Section Three enumerated the office of the President, the final draft omitted this language.\nB. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction ignored the office of the President and instead focused on Congress and the electoral college.\nC. The final draft of Section Three also focused on Congress and the electoral college, but expanded the text to include lower federal and state offices.\nD. Section Three secured a sufficiently trustworthy electoral college.",
        "reference": "III. Reading Section Three as excluding the office of the President is textually and historically reasonable.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section Three's text is ambiguous about inclusion of the President.\nA. Around 1868, \"civil officer under the United States\" was not understood to include apex political positions.\nB. Rules of construction suggest Section Three excludes the apex office of the President.\nII. The ratifying debates did not resolve the inherent ambiguity of Section Three.\nIII. Reading Section Three as excluding the office of the President is textually and historically reasonable.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction ignored the office of the President and instead focused on Congress and the electoral college.\nC. The final draft of Section Three also focused on Congress and the electoral college, but expanded the text to include lower federal and state offices.\nD. Section Three secured a sufficiently trustworthy electoral college.",
        "reference": "A. Though prior drafts of Section Three enumerated the office of the President, the final draft omitted this language.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section Three's text is ambiguous about inclusion of the President.\nA. Around 1868, \"civil officer under the United States\" was not understood to include apex political positions.\nB. Rules of construction suggest Section Three excludes the apex office of the President.\nII. The ratifying debates did not resolve the inherent ambiguity of Section Three.\nIII. Reading Section Three as excluding the office of the President is textually and historically reasonable.\nA. Though prior drafts of Section Three enumerated the office of the President, the final draft omitted this language.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The final draft of Section Three also focused on Congress and the electoral college, but expanded the text to include lower federal and state offices.\nD. Section Three secured a sufficiently trustworthy electoral college.",
        "reference": "B. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction ignored the office of the President and instead focused on Congress and the electoral college.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section Three's text is ambiguous about inclusion of the President.\nA. Around 1868, \"civil officer under the United States\" was not understood to include apex political positions.\nB. Rules of construction suggest Section Three excludes the apex office of the President.\nII. The ratifying debates did not resolve the inherent ambiguity of Section Three.\nIII. Reading Section Three as excluding the office of the President is textually and historically reasonable.\nA. Though prior drafts of Section Three enumerated the office of the President, the final draft omitted this language.\nB. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction ignored the office of the President and instead focused on Congress and the electoral college.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Section Three secured a sufficiently trustworthy electoral college.",
        "reference": "C. The final draft of Section Three also focused on Congress and the electoral college, but expanded the text to include lower federal and state offices.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section Three's text is ambiguous about inclusion of the President.\nA. Around 1868, \"civil officer under the United States\" was not understood to include apex political positions.\nB. Rules of construction suggest Section Three excludes the apex office of the President.\nII. The ratifying debates did not resolve the inherent ambiguity of Section Three.\nIII. Reading Section Three as excluding the office of the President is textually and historically reasonable.\nA. Though prior drafts of Section Three enumerated the office of the President, the final draft omitted this language.\nB. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction ignored the office of the President and instead focused on Congress and the electoral college.\nC. The final draft of Section Three also focused on Congress and the electoral college, but expanded the text to include lower federal and state offices.\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Section Three secured a sufficiently trustworthy electoral college.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE PANEL OPINION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IGNORES THE MEANING AND MESSAGE OF WARHOL'S ART\nA. The Second Circuit's Visual Similarity Test Ignores A Work's Meaning And Message\nB. Focusing Only On A Work's Visual Similarity To Another Work Is Inconsistent With The First Amendment\nC. A Test Based Only On Visual Similarity Will Chill The Creation Of New Art",
        "reference": "I. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE IS A FIRST AMENDMENT SAFEGUARD FOR ALL WORKS THAT USE PREEXISTING EXPRESSION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE IS A FIRST AMENDMENT SAFEGUARD FOR ALL WORKS THAT USE PREEXISTING EXPRESSION\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Second Circuit's Visual Similarity Test Ignores A Work's Meaning And Message\nB. Focusing Only On A Work's Visual Similarity To Another Work Is Inconsistent With The First Amendment\nC. A Test Based Only On Visual Similarity Will Chill The Creation Of New Art",
        "reference": "II. THE PANEL OPINION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IGNORES THE MEANING AND MESSAGE OF WARHOL'S ART",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE IS A FIRST AMENDMENT SAFEGUARD FOR ALL WORKS THAT USE PREEXISTING EXPRESSION\nII. THE PANEL OPINION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IGNORES THE MEANING AND MESSAGE OF WARHOL'S ART\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Focusing Only On A Work's Visual Similarity To Another Work Is Inconsistent With The First Amendment\nC. A Test Based Only On Visual Similarity Will Chill The Creation Of New Art",
        "reference": "A. The Second Circuit's Visual Similarity Test Ignores A Work's Meaning And Message",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE IS A FIRST AMENDMENT SAFEGUARD FOR ALL WORKS THAT USE PREEXISTING EXPRESSION\nII. THE PANEL OPINION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IGNORES THE MEANING AND MESSAGE OF WARHOL'S ART\nA. The Second Circuit's Visual Similarity Test Ignores A Work's Meaning And Message\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A Test Based Only On Visual Similarity Will Chill The Creation Of New Art",
        "reference": "B. Focusing Only On A Work's Visual Similarity To Another Work Is Inconsistent With The First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE IS A FIRST AMENDMENT SAFEGUARD FOR ALL WORKS THAT USE PREEXISTING EXPRESSION\nII. THE PANEL OPINION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT IGNORES THE MEANING AND MESSAGE OF WARHOL'S ART\nA. The Second Circuit's Visual Similarity Test Ignores A Work's Meaning And Message\nB. Focusing Only On A Work's Visual Similarity To Another Work Is Inconsistent With The First Amendment\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. A Test Based Only On Visual Similarity Will Chill The Creation Of New Art",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case\n1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits\n2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered\n3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation\nB. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall\nII. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled\nA. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent\nB. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm\nC. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts\nD. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted\nA. [MISSING]\n1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits\n2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered\n3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation\nB. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall\nII. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled\nA. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent\nB. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm\nC. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts\nD. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "reference": "A. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted\nA. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered\n3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation\nB. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall\nII. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled\nA. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent\nB. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm\nC. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts\nD. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "reference": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted\nA. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case\n1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation\nB. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall\nII. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled\nA. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent\nB. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm\nC. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts\nD. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "reference": "2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted\nA. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case\n1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits\n2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered\n3. [MISSING]\nB. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall\nII. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled\nA. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent\nB. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm\nC. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts\nD. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "reference": "3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted\nA. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case\n1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits\n2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered\n3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled\nA. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent\nB. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm\nC. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts\nD. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "reference": "B. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted\nA. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case\n1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits\n2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered\n3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation\nB. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent\nB. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm\nC. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts\nD. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "reference": "II. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted\nA. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case\n1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits\n2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered\n3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation\nB. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall\nII. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm\nC. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts\nD. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "reference": "A. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted\nA. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case\n1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits\n2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered\n3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation\nB. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall\nII. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled\nA. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts\nD. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "reference": "B. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted\nA. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case\n1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits\n2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered\n3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation\nB. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall\nII. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled\nA. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent\nB. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm\nC. [MISSING]\nD. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "reference": "C. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Dismiss This Case As Certiorari Having Been Improvidently Granted\nA. The Law of the Case Doctrine Resolves the Issue Before This Court and This Case\n1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits\n2. Under the law of the case doctrine, the prior decision of this Court in this case should not be reconsidered\n3. The application of the law of the case doctrine is particularly important in this lengthy and complex litigation\nB. The Board Waived the Ability to Challenge Nevada v. Hall\nII. Nevada v. Hall Should Not Be Overruled\nA. The Strong Presumption Against Overruling Precedent\nB. Nevada v. Hall Safeguards a State's Sovereign Power Under the Tenth Amendment in Protecting Its Own Citizens From Harm\nC. Nevada v. Hall Reflects the Original Understanding that a Sovereign Could Be Sued in Another Sovereign's Courts\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. There Is No Compelling Reason for Overruling Nevada v. Hall",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below And The Decisions Of Other Circuit Courts Do Not Present A Conflict That This Court Must Resolve.\nA. This Case Is Not A Proper Vehicle To Address Whether Prejudice Should Be A Mandatory Component Of The Test For Waiver Of Arbitration.\nB. The Purported Conflicts Among The Circuit Courts Are Illusory And Do Not Require Resolution By This Court.\nIII. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
        "reference": "I. Petitioner Has Waived Any Argument That Prejudice Should Not Be A Required Element Of The Standard For Waiver Of Arbitration.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner Has Waived Any Argument That Prejudice Should Not Be A Required Element Of The Standard For Waiver Of Arbitration.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Case Is Not A Proper Vehicle To Address Whether Prejudice Should Be A Mandatory Component Of The Test For Waiver Of Arbitration.\nB. The Purported Conflicts Among The Circuit Courts Are Illusory And Do Not Require Resolution By This Court.\nIII. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
        "reference": "II. The Decision Below And The Decisions Of Other Circuit Courts Do Not Present A Conflict That This Court Must Resolve.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner Has Waived Any Argument That Prejudice Should Not Be A Required Element Of The Standard For Waiver Of Arbitration.\nII. The Decision Below And The Decisions Of Other Circuit Courts Do Not Present A Conflict That This Court Must Resolve.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Purported Conflicts Among The Circuit Courts Are Illusory And Do Not Require Resolution By This Court.\nIII. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
        "reference": "A. This Case Is Not A Proper Vehicle To Address Whether Prejudice Should Be A Mandatory Component Of The Test For Waiver Of Arbitration.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner Has Waived Any Argument That Prejudice Should Not Be A Required Element Of The Standard For Waiver Of Arbitration.\nII. The Decision Below And The Decisions Of Other Circuit Courts Do Not Present A Conflict That This Court Must Resolve.\nA. This Case Is Not A Proper Vehicle To Address Whether Prejudice Should Be A Mandatory Component Of The Test For Waiver Of Arbitration.\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
        "reference": "B. The Purported Conflicts Among The Circuit Courts Are Illusory And Do Not Require Resolution By This Court.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner Has Waived Any Argument That Prejudice Should Not Be A Required Element Of The Standard For Waiver Of Arbitration.\nII. The Decision Below And The Decisions Of Other Circuit Courts Do Not Present A Conflict That This Court Must Resolve.\nA. This Case Is Not A Proper Vehicle To Address Whether Prejudice Should Be A Mandatory Component Of The Test For Waiver Of Arbitration.\nB. The Purported Conflicts Among The Circuit Courts Are Illusory And Do Not Require Resolution By This Court.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Decision Below Does Not Raise Any Important Federal Question Requiring Resolution By This Court.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required\nB. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required\nC. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability\nII. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court\nA. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below\nB. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action\n1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies\n2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies\n3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice\n4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "reference": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required\nC. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability\nII. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court\nA. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below\nB. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action\n1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies\n2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies\n3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice\n4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "reference": "A. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim\nA. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability\nII. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court\nA. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below\nB. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action\n1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies\n2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies\n3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice\n4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "reference": "B. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim\nA. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required\nB. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court\nA. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below\nB. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action\n1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies\n2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies\n3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice\n4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim\nA. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required\nB. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required\nC. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below\nB. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action\n1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies\n2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies\n3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice\n4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "reference": "II. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim\nA. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required\nB. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required\nC. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability\nII. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action\n1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies\n2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies\n3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice\n4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "reference": "A. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim\nA. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required\nB. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required\nC. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability\nII. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court\nA. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies\n2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies\n3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice\n4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "reference": "B. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim\nA. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required\nB. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required\nC. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability\nII. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court\nA. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below\nB. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies\n3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice\n4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "reference": "1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim\nA. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required\nB. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required\nC. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability\nII. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court\nA. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below\nB. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action\n1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice\n4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "reference": "2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim\nA. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required\nB. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required\nC. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability\nII. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court\nA. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below\nB. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action\n1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies\n2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "reference": "3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first clause of Section 14(e) requires a showing of negligence, not scienter, to state a claim\nA. The section's plain text and context establish that scienter is not required\nB. The section's purpose and history confirm that scienter is not required\nC. Petitioners are incorrect that courts are required to construe all private rights of action in favor of avoiding liability\nII. Petitioners' challenge to Section 14(e)'s private right of action is both meritless and not properly before the court\nA. Petitioners waived the challenge by expressly conceding the issue below\nB. Section 14(e) creates a private right of action\n1. Congress adopted the verbatim formulation of Rule 10b-5, which gives rise to private remedies\n2. Congress enacted Section 14(e) to mirror the existing treatment of Section 14(a), which gives rise to private remedies\n3. Courts have uniformly held that a private right exists for the past 50 years, and Congress has made no attempt to disturb this settled practice\n4. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "4. Petitioners and the government have failed to cast any genuine doubt on this settled regime",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Delineate the Factors for Inclusion Under a Totality of the Circumstances Transformativeness Test\nIII. The Purpose and Character Inquiry Should Also Consider Whether the Use of the Copyrighted Work Was Necessary or Could Have Been Accomplished by Using Non-Protectable Material",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Clarify That Its Transformative Test Employs a Totality of the Circumstances Approach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Clarify That Its Transformative Test Employs a Totality of the Circumstances Approach\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Purpose and Character Inquiry Should Also Consider Whether the Use of the Copyrighted Work Was Necessary or Could Have Been Accomplished by Using Non-Protectable Material",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Delineate the Factors for Inclusion Under a Totality of the Circumstances Transformativeness Test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Clarify That Its Transformative Test Employs a Totality of the Circumstances Approach\nII. The Court Should Delineate the Factors for Inclusion Under a Totality of the Circumstances Transformativeness Test\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Purpose and Character Inquiry Should Also Consider Whether the Use of the Copyrighted Work Was Necessary or Could Have Been Accomplished by Using Non-Protectable Material",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation\nB. The legislative history confirms that there is no exception for following a regulatory misinterpretation\nII. The Government Offers No Persuasive Basis To Narrow CUE's Scope\nA. That VA adjudicators are bound is irrelevant\nB. Correcting VA's misapplication of an unambiguous statute involves no change in law or interpretation\nC. Petitioner's argument is consistent with finality principles and the broader statutory context\nIII. The Error In Mr. George's Case Was Outcome Determinative",
        "reference": "I. VA's Defiance Of A Plain Statute Is CUE, Whether Or Not The Error Is Enshrined In A Regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. VA's Defiance Of A Plain Statute Is CUE, Whether Or Not The Error Is Enshrined In A Regulation\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The legislative history confirms that there is no exception for following a regulatory misinterpretation\nII. The Government Offers No Persuasive Basis To Narrow CUE's Scope\nA. That VA adjudicators are bound is irrelevant\nB. Correcting VA's misapplication of an unambiguous statute involves no change in law or interpretation\nC. Petitioner's argument is consistent with finality principles and the broader statutory context\nIII. The Error In Mr. George's Case Was Outcome Determinative",
        "reference": "A. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. VA's Defiance Of A Plain Statute Is CUE, Whether Or Not The Error Is Enshrined In A Regulation\nA. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Government Offers No Persuasive Basis To Narrow CUE's Scope\nA. That VA adjudicators are bound is irrelevant\nB. Correcting VA's misapplication of an unambiguous statute involves no change in law or interpretation\nC. Petitioner's argument is consistent with finality principles and the broader statutory context\nIII. The Error In Mr. George's Case Was Outcome Determinative",
        "reference": "B. The legislative history confirms that there is no exception for following a regulatory misinterpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. VA's Defiance Of A Plain Statute Is CUE, Whether Or Not The Error Is Enshrined In A Regulation\nA. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation\nB. The legislative history confirms that there is no exception for following a regulatory misinterpretation\nII. [MISSING]\nA. That VA adjudicators are bound is irrelevant\nB. Correcting VA's misapplication of an unambiguous statute involves no change in law or interpretation\nC. Petitioner's argument is consistent with finality principles and the broader statutory context\nIII. The Error In Mr. George's Case Was Outcome Determinative",
        "reference": "II. The Government Offers No Persuasive Basis To Narrow CUE's Scope",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. VA's Defiance Of A Plain Statute Is CUE, Whether Or Not The Error Is Enshrined In A Regulation\nA. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation\nB. The legislative history confirms that there is no exception for following a regulatory misinterpretation\nII. The Government Offers No Persuasive Basis To Narrow CUE's Scope\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Correcting VA's misapplication of an unambiguous statute involves no change in law or interpretation\nC. Petitioner's argument is consistent with finality principles and the broader statutory context\nIII. The Error In Mr. George's Case Was Outcome Determinative",
        "reference": "A. That VA adjudicators are bound is irrelevant",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. VA's Defiance Of A Plain Statute Is CUE, Whether Or Not The Error Is Enshrined In A Regulation\nA. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation\nB. The legislative history confirms that there is no exception for following a regulatory misinterpretation\nII. The Government Offers No Persuasive Basis To Narrow CUE's Scope\nA. That VA adjudicators are bound is irrelevant\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner's argument is consistent with finality principles and the broader statutory context\nIII. The Error In Mr. George's Case Was Outcome Determinative",
        "reference": "B. Correcting VA's misapplication of an unambiguous statute involves no change in law or interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. VA's Defiance Of A Plain Statute Is CUE, Whether Or Not The Error Is Enshrined In A Regulation\nA. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation\nB. The legislative history confirms that there is no exception for following a regulatory misinterpretation\nII. The Government Offers No Persuasive Basis To Narrow CUE's Scope\nA. That VA adjudicators are bound is irrelevant\nB. Correcting VA's misapplication of an unambiguous statute involves no change in law or interpretation\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. The Error In Mr. George's Case Was Outcome Determinative",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner's argument is consistent with finality principles and the broader statutory context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. VA's Defiance Of A Plain Statute Is CUE, Whether Or Not The Error Is Enshrined In A Regulation\nA. The CUE statutes contain no exception for VA's adherence to an unlawful regulation\nB. The legislative history confirms that there is no exception for following a regulatory misinterpretation\nII. The Government Offers No Persuasive Basis To Narrow CUE's Scope\nA. That VA adjudicators are bound is irrelevant\nB. Correcting VA's misapplication of an unambiguous statute involves no change in law or interpretation\nC. Petitioner's argument is consistent with finality principles and the broader statutory context\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Error In Mr. George's Case Was Outcome Determinative",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT ABROGATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\nA. The Text Of The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Contain An Unequivocal Expression Of Congress's Intent To Abrogate\n1. Congress easily could have, but did not, refer to Indian tribes\n2. Reference to \"other domestic government\" fails to satisfy the clear-statement rule\nB. Historical Context And Policy Considerations Cannot (And Do Not) Supply The Necessary Clear Statement\n1. Historical context does not support the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity\n2. Weighing competing immunity policies and interests is a job for Congress, not courts",
        "reference": "I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CAN BE ABROGATED ONLY BY CONGRESS'S UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CAN BE ABROGATED ONLY BY CONGRESS'S UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Text Of The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Contain An Unequivocal Expression Of Congress's Intent To Abrogate\n1. Congress easily could have, but did not, refer to Indian tribes\n2. Reference to \"other domestic government\" fails to satisfy the clear-statement rule\nB. Historical Context And Policy Considerations Cannot (And Do Not) Supply The Necessary Clear Statement\n1. Historical context does not support the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity\n2. Weighing competing immunity policies and interests is a job for Congress, not courts",
        "reference": "II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT ABROGATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CAN BE ABROGATED ONLY BY CONGRESS'S UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT\nII. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT ABROGATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Congress easily could have, but did not, refer to Indian tribes\n2. Reference to \"other domestic government\" fails to satisfy the clear-statement rule\nB. Historical Context And Policy Considerations Cannot (And Do Not) Supply The Necessary Clear Statement\n1. Historical context does not support the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity\n2. Weighing competing immunity policies and interests is a job for Congress, not courts",
        "reference": "A. The Text Of The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Contain An Unequivocal Expression Of Congress's Intent To Abrogate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CAN BE ABROGATED ONLY BY CONGRESS'S UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT\nII. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT ABROGATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\nA. The Text Of The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Contain An Unequivocal Expression Of Congress's Intent To Abrogate\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Reference to \"other domestic government\" fails to satisfy the clear-statement rule\nB. Historical Context And Policy Considerations Cannot (And Do Not) Supply The Necessary Clear Statement\n1. Historical context does not support the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity\n2. Weighing competing immunity policies and interests is a job for Congress, not courts",
        "reference": "1. Congress easily could have, but did not, refer to Indian tribes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CAN BE ABROGATED ONLY BY CONGRESS'S UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT\nII. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT ABROGATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\nA. The Text Of The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Contain An Unequivocal Expression Of Congress's Intent To Abrogate\n1. Congress easily could have, but did not, refer to Indian tribes\n2. [MISSING]\nB. Historical Context And Policy Considerations Cannot (And Do Not) Supply The Necessary Clear Statement\n1. Historical context does not support the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity\n2. Weighing competing immunity policies and interests is a job for Congress, not courts",
        "reference": "2. Reference to \"other domestic government\" fails to satisfy the clear-statement rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CAN BE ABROGATED ONLY BY CONGRESS'S UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT\nII. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT ABROGATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\nA. The Text Of The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Contain An Unequivocal Expression Of Congress's Intent To Abrogate\n1. Congress easily could have, but did not, refer to Indian tribes\n2. Reference to \"other domestic government\" fails to satisfy the clear-statement rule\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Historical context does not support the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity\n2. Weighing competing immunity policies and interests is a job for Congress, not courts",
        "reference": "B. Historical Context And Policy Considerations Cannot (And Do Not) Supply The Necessary Clear Statement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CAN BE ABROGATED ONLY BY CONGRESS'S UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT\nII. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT ABROGATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\nA. The Text Of The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Contain An Unequivocal Expression Of Congress's Intent To Abrogate\n1. Congress easily could have, but did not, refer to Indian tribes\n2. Reference to \"other domestic government\" fails to satisfy the clear-statement rule\nB. Historical Context And Policy Considerations Cannot (And Do Not) Supply The Necessary Clear Statement\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Weighing competing immunity policies and interests is a job for Congress, not courts",
        "reference": "1. Historical context does not support the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY CAN BE ABROGATED ONLY BY CONGRESS'S UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT\nII. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT ABROGATE TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\nA. The Text Of The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Contain An Unequivocal Expression Of Congress's Intent To Abrogate\n1. Congress easily could have, but did not, refer to Indian tribes\n2. Reference to \"other domestic government\" fails to satisfy the clear-statement rule\nB. Historical Context And Policy Considerations Cannot (And Do Not) Supply The Necessary Clear Statement\n1. Historical context does not support the abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. Weighing competing immunity policies and interests is a job for Congress, not courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. [MISSING]\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "F. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "II. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "A. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. [MISSING]\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "B. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "C. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Introduction\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress Has Examined the Interstate Commerce Implications of Sales and Use Tax Collection, But the States Have Failed to Convince Congress That Enough Has Been Done by the States and Localities to Warrant Changing the Rules\nD. Real Simplification of the Requirements for Sales and Use Tax Collection Imposed on Remote Sellers Is Possible and Must Precede the Abandonment of the Physical Presence Requirement Applicable to Sales Made in Interstate Commerce",
        "reference": "B. The Continuing Reliance Interest of the Mail Order Industry Properly Warrants Retention of the Physical Presence Standard Until a Meaningful Substitute Can Be Implemented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Introduction\nB. The Continuing Reliance Interest of the Mail Order Industry Properly Warrants Retention of the Physical Presence Standard Until a Meaningful Substitute Can Be Implemented\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Real Simplification of the Requirements for Sales and Use Tax Collection Imposed on Remote Sellers Is Possible and Must Precede the Abandonment of the Physical Presence Requirement Applicable to Sales Made in Interstate Commerce",
        "reference": "C. Congress Has Examined the Interstate Commerce Implications of Sales and Use Tax Collection, But the States Have Failed to Convince Congress That Enough Has Been Done by the States and Localities to Warrant Changing the Rules",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Introduction\nB. The Continuing Reliance Interest of the Mail Order Industry Properly Warrants Retention of the Physical Presence Standard Until a Meaningful Substitute Can Be Implemented\nC. Congress Has Examined the Interstate Commerce Implications of Sales and Use Tax Collection, But the States Have Failed to Convince Congress That Enough Has Been Done by the States and Localities to Warrant Changing the Rules\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Real Simplification of the Requirements for Sales and Use Tax Collection Imposed on Remote Sellers Is Possible and Must Precede the Abandonment of the Physical Presence Requirement Applicable to Sales Made in Interstate Commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. If the Court grants Defendants' petition, it should also review the Fifth Circuit's decision on the remedy for FHFA's unconstitutional structure\nB. There is no obstacle to the Court reaching the important questions presented in Plaintiffs' petition\nC. The Fifth Circuit's ruling on the remedy for FHFA's unconstitutional structure is wrong\nII. At an absolute minimum, the Court should hold Plaintiffs' petition for Seila Law",
        "reference": "I. The Court should grant Plaintiffs' petition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant Plaintiffs' petition\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There is no obstacle to the Court reaching the important questions presented in Plaintiffs' petition\nC. The Fifth Circuit's ruling on the remedy for FHFA's unconstitutional structure is wrong\nII. At an absolute minimum, the Court should hold Plaintiffs' petition for Seila Law",
        "reference": "A. If the Court grants Defendants' petition, it should also review the Fifth Circuit's decision on the remedy for FHFA's unconstitutional structure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant Plaintiffs' petition\nA. If the Court grants Defendants' petition, it should also review the Fifth Circuit's decision on the remedy for FHFA's unconstitutional structure\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Fifth Circuit's ruling on the remedy for FHFA's unconstitutional structure is wrong\nII. At an absolute minimum, the Court should hold Plaintiffs' petition for Seila Law",
        "reference": "B. There is no obstacle to the Court reaching the important questions presented in Plaintiffs' petition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant Plaintiffs' petition\nA. If the Court grants Defendants' petition, it should also review the Fifth Circuit's decision on the remedy for FHFA's unconstitutional structure\nB. There is no obstacle to the Court reaching the important questions presented in Plaintiffs' petition\nC. [MISSING]\nII. At an absolute minimum, the Court should hold Plaintiffs' petition for Seila Law",
        "reference": "C. The Fifth Circuit's ruling on the remedy for FHFA's unconstitutional structure is wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant Plaintiffs' petition\nA. If the Court grants Defendants' petition, it should also review the Fifth Circuit's decision on the remedy for FHFA's unconstitutional structure\nB. There is no obstacle to the Court reaching the important questions presented in Plaintiffs' petition\nC. The Fifth Circuit's ruling on the remedy for FHFA's unconstitutional structure is wrong\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. At an absolute minimum, the Court should hold Plaintiffs' petition for Seila Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1215_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The statutory lineage of the phrase \"statement respecting financial condition\" reinforces the conclusion that the phrase encompasses single-asset statements\nC. The court of appeals' interpretation of Section 523(a)(2) is consistent with Congress's apparent purposes",
        "reference": "A. The statutory text and context show that a statement about a single asset can be a \"statement respecting financial condition\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1215_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The statutory text and context show that a statement about a single asset can be a \"statement respecting financial condition\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The court of appeals' interpretation of Section 523(a)(2) is consistent with Congress's apparent purposes",
        "reference": "B. The statutory lineage of the phrase \"statement respecting financial condition\" reinforces the conclusion that the phrase encompasses single-asset statements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1215_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The statutory text and context show that a statement about a single asset can be a \"statement respecting financial condition\"\nB. The statutory lineage of the phrase \"statement respecting financial condition\" reinforces the conclusion that the phrase encompasses single-asset statements\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The court of appeals' interpretation of Section 523(a)(2) is consistent with Congress's apparent purposes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-10_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Vagueness avoidance is rooted in precedent\nC. Vagueness avoidance requires a narrow construction of Section 1028(a)(1)",
        "reference": "A. Vagueness avoidance is distinct from ordinary constitutional avoidance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-10_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. Vagueness avoidance is distinct from ordinary constitutional avoidance\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Vagueness avoidance requires a narrow construction of Section 1028(a)(1)",
        "reference": "B. Vagueness avoidance is rooted in precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-10_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. Vagueness avoidance is distinct from ordinary constitutional avoidance\nB. Vagueness avoidance is rooted in precedent\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Vagueness avoidance requires a narrow construction of Section 1028(a)(1)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. PROPOSITION 12 IS INCONSISTENT WITH A NATIONAL CANADIAN ANIMAL WELFARE STANDARD\nIII. PROPOSITION 12 IMPLICATES OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL TREATIES\nIV. CALIFORNIA'S EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE BY PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE ON THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE",
        "reference": "I. PROPOSITION 12 REGULATES INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS DOMESTIC COMMERCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. PROPOSITION 12 REGULATES INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS DOMESTIC COMMERCE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. PROPOSITION 12 IMPLICATES OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL TREATIES\nIV. CALIFORNIA'S EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE BY PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE ON THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE",
        "reference": "II. PROPOSITION 12 IS INCONSISTENT WITH A NATIONAL CANADIAN ANIMAL WELFARE STANDARD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. PROPOSITION 12 REGULATES INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS DOMESTIC COMMERCE\nII. PROPOSITION 12 IS INCONSISTENT WITH A NATIONAL CANADIAN ANIMAL WELFARE STANDARD\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. CALIFORNIA'S EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE BY PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE ON THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE",
        "reference": "III. PROPOSITION 12 IMPLICATES OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL TREATIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. PROPOSITION 12 REGULATES INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS DOMESTIC COMMERCE\nII. PROPOSITION 12 IS INCONSISTENT WITH A NATIONAL CANADIAN ANIMAL WELFARE STANDARD\nIII. PROPOSITION 12 IMPLICATES OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL TREATIES\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. CALIFORNIA'S EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE BY PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE ON THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\nI. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event\nA. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test\nB. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)\nC. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes\nD. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break\nE. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity\nII. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nA. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction\nB. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense\nC. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "reference": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES\nI. [MISSING]\nA. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test\nB. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)\nC. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes\nD. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break\nE. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity\nII. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nA. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction\nB. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense\nC. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "reference": "I. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES\nI. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)\nC. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes\nD. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break\nE. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity\nII. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nA. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction\nB. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense\nC. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "reference": "A. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES\nI. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event\nA. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes\nD. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break\nE. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity\nII. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nA. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction\nB. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense\nC. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "reference": "B. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES\nI. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event\nA. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test\nB. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)\nC. [MISSING]\nD. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break\nE. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity\nII. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nA. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction\nB. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense\nC. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "reference": "C. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES\nI. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event\nA. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test\nB. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)\nC. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity\nII. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nA. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction\nB. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense\nC. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "reference": "D. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES\nI. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event\nA. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test\nB. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)\nC. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes\nD. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break\nE. [MISSING]\nII. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nA. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction\nB. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense\nC. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "reference": "E. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES\nI. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event\nA. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test\nB. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)\nC. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes\nD. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break\nE. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction\nB. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense\nC. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "reference": "II. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES\nI. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event\nA. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test\nB. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)\nC. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes\nD. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break\nE. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity\nII. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nA. [MISSING]\nB. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense\nC. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "reference": "A. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES\nI. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event\nA. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test\nB. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)\nC. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes\nD. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break\nE. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity\nII. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nA. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "reference": "B. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE ACCA REQUIRES PROOF TO A JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR OFFENSES AROSE FROM DISTINCT CRIMINAL EPISODES\nI. ACCA Is Triggered Only When Conduct Resulting In Multiple Convictions Arose From Multiple Criminal Episodes, Separated By A Significant Intervening Event\nA. Section 924(e)'s text compels a \"multiple criminal episodes\" test\nB. The context, structure, and title of the ACCA support the \"multiple criminal episodes\" reading of section 924(e)\nC. The ACCA's history and purpose further confirm that section 924(e) requires multiple criminal episodes\nD. An ACCA \"occasion\" is an uninterrupted course of conduct that ends only upon a significant break\nE. Any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved by applying the rule of lenity\nII. The Factual Issue Of Whether Offenses Were \"Committed On Occasions Different From One Another\" Requires A Finding By The Jury Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nA. Almendarez-Torres's exception to the jury trial right for the fact of a prior conviction is limited to identifying the elements of the offense of conviction\nB. ACCA's different \"occasions\" requirement turns on facts that cannot be determined from the elements of the offense\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers\nB. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers\nC. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits\nII. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name\n1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties\n2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect\nB. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"\nIII. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "reference": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers\nC. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits\nII. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name\n1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties\n2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect\nB. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"\nIII. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "reference": "A. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits\nII. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name\n1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties\n2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect\nB. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"\nIII. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "reference": "B. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers\nB. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers\nC. [MISSING]\nII. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name\n1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties\n2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect\nB. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"\nIII. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "reference": "C. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers\nB. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers\nC. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits\nII. [MISSING]\nA. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name\n1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties\n2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect\nB. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"\nIII. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "reference": "II. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers\nB. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers\nC. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits\nII. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\n1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties\n2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect\nB. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"\nIII. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "reference": "A. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers\nB. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers\nC. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits\nII. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name\n1. [MISSING]\n2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect\nB. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"\nIII. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "reference": "1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers\nB. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers\nC. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits\nII. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name\n1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties\n2. [MISSING]\nB. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"\nIII. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "reference": "2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers\nB. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers\nC. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits\nII. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name\n1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties\n2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"\nIII. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "reference": "B. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers\nB. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers\nC. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits\nII. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name\n1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties\n2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect\nB. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "reference": "C. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN LAWFULLY DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO BIND THE GOVERNMENT OR THIRD PARTIES IN HER OWN NAME CAN BE AN \"OFFICER\" UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. Only Persons Who Have Been Lawfully Delegated Authority To Bind The Government Or Third Parties Can Be Constitutional Officers\nB. Appointees Who Have Authority To Bind The Government Or Alter Private-Party Rights Only As Agents Of A Superior Officer Are Not Themselves Constitutional Officers\nC. This Court Should Not Expand The Meaning Of The Term \"Officers Of The United States\" Beyond Its Historically Understood Limits\nII. SEC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE NOT \"OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. SEC ALJs Are Not Constitutional \"Officers\" Because They Cannot Bind The Government Or Alter The Rights Of Private Parties In Their Own Name\n1. SEC ALJs Have No Authority To Bind The Government Or Private Parties\n2. SEC ALJs Are Not Comparable To Article III Judges In Any Relevant Respect\nB. SEC ALJs' Employee Status Is Consistent With The Purpose Of The Appointments Clause\nC. Congress Has Not Adopted The View That ALJs Are Constitutional \"Officers Of The United States\"\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE COURT HAS NOT INSTRUCTED THE COURT-APPOINTED AMICUS TO BRIEF THE PARTIES' REMEDIAL AND REMOVAL ARGUMENTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. Sequence of events\n2. CPD training and protocols regarding potentially suicidal individuals\na. Protocol\nb. Training\n3. Edward wasn't at risk for suicide at any pertinent time\n4. What CPD officers could reasonably conclude on August 21, 2015\nB. The First Circuit's Opinion\n1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies\n2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns\n3. The First Circuit reached its conclusion by misapplying summary judgment principles",
        "reference": "A. Material Facts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Material Facts\n1. [MISSING]\n2. CPD training and protocols regarding potentially suicidal individuals\na. Protocol\nb. Training\n3. Edward wasn't at risk for suicide at any pertinent time\n4. What CPD officers could reasonably conclude on August 21, 2015\nB. The First Circuit's Opinion\n1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies\n2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns\n3. The First Circuit reached its conclusion by misapplying summary judgment principles",
        "reference": "1. Sequence of events",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Material Facts\n1. Sequence of events\n2. [MISSING]\na. Protocol\nb. Training\n3. Edward wasn't at risk for suicide at any pertinent time\n4. What CPD officers could reasonably conclude on August 21, 2015\nB. The First Circuit's Opinion\n1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies\n2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns\n3. The First Circuit reached its conclusion by misapplying summary judgment principles",
        "reference": "2. CPD training and protocols regarding potentially suicidal individuals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Material Facts\n1. Sequence of events\n2. CPD training and protocols regarding potentially suicidal individuals\na. Protocol\nb. Training\n3. [MISSING]\n4. What CPD officers could reasonably conclude on August 21, 2015\nB. The First Circuit's Opinion\n1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies\n2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns\n3. The First Circuit reached its conclusion by misapplying summary judgment principles",
        "reference": "3. Edward wasn't at risk for suicide at any pertinent time",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Material Facts\n1. Sequence of events\n2. CPD training and protocols regarding potentially suicidal individuals\na. Protocol\nb. Training\n3. Edward wasn't at risk for suicide at any pertinent time\n4. [MISSING]\nB. The First Circuit's Opinion\n1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies\n2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns\n3. The First Circuit reached its conclusion by misapplying summary judgment principles",
        "reference": "4. What CPD officers could reasonably conclude on August 21, 2015",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Material Facts\n1. Sequence of events\n2. CPD training and protocols regarding potentially suicidal individuals\na. Protocol\nb. Training\n3. Edward wasn't at risk for suicide at any pertinent time\n4. What CPD officers could reasonably conclude on August 21, 2015\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies\n2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns\n3. The First Circuit reached its conclusion by misapplying summary judgment principles",
        "reference": "B. The First Circuit's Opinion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Material Facts\n1. Sequence of events\n2. CPD training and protocols regarding potentially suicidal individuals\na. Protocol\nb. Training\n3. Edward wasn't at risk for suicide at any pertinent time\n4. What CPD officers could reasonably conclude on August 21, 2015\nB. The First Circuit's Opinion\n1. [MISSING]\n2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns\n3. The First Circuit reached its conclusion by misapplying summary judgment principles",
        "reference": "1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Material Facts\n1. Sequence of events\n2. CPD training and protocols regarding potentially suicidal individuals\na. Protocol\nb. Training\n3. Edward wasn't at risk for suicide at any pertinent time\n4. What CPD officers could reasonably conclude on August 21, 2015\nB. The First Circuit's Opinion\n1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The First Circuit reached its conclusion by misapplying summary judgment principles",
        "reference": "2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Material Facts\n1. Sequence of events\n2. CPD training and protocols regarding potentially suicidal individuals\na. Protocol\nb. Training\n3. Edward wasn't at risk for suicide at any pertinent time\n4. What CPD officers could reasonably conclude on August 21, 2015\nB. The First Circuit's Opinion\n1. The Fourth Amendment and mental health emergencies\n2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. The First Circuit reached its conclusion by misapplying summary judgment principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The de minimis test is dicta\nB. Stare decisis does not support adherence to Hardison's de minimis test in any form\n1. Hardison's fleeting attention to Title VII's undue-hardship provision limits its precedential sway\n2. Respondent's failure to defend Hardison's reasoning further saps its stare decisis effect\n3. Stare decisis analysis favors discarding Hardison's de minimis test\nC. Respondent's reimagined de minimis test is fatally flawed\nD. Groff offers the only construction that honors Title VII's text, history, and purpose\nII. Respondent Conflates Effects On Co-Workers With Effects On The Conduct Of The Business\nIII. Reversal Is Required",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Disapprove Hardison's De Minimis Test And Construe \"Undue Hardship\" According To Its Plain Meaning",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Disapprove Hardison's De Minimis Test And Construe \"Undue Hardship\" According To Its Plain Meaning\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Stare decisis does not support adherence to Hardison's de minimis test in any form\n1. Hardison's fleeting attention to Title VII's undue-hardship provision limits its precedential sway\n2. Respondent's failure to defend Hardison's reasoning further saps its stare decisis effect\n3. Stare decisis analysis favors discarding Hardison's de minimis test\nC. Respondent's reimagined de minimis test is fatally flawed\nD. Groff offers the only construction that honors Title VII's text, history, and purpose\nII. Respondent Conflates Effects On Co-Workers With Effects On The Conduct Of The Business\nIII. Reversal Is Required",
        "reference": "A. The de minimis test is dicta",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Disapprove Hardison's De Minimis Test And Construe \"Undue Hardship\" According To Its Plain Meaning\nA. The de minimis test is dicta\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Hardison's fleeting attention to Title VII's undue-hardship provision limits its precedential sway\n2. Respondent's failure to defend Hardison's reasoning further saps its stare decisis effect\n3. Stare decisis analysis favors discarding Hardison's de minimis test\nC. Respondent's reimagined de minimis test is fatally flawed\nD. Groff offers the only construction that honors Title VII's text, history, and purpose\nII. Respondent Conflates Effects On Co-Workers With Effects On The Conduct Of The Business\nIII. Reversal Is Required",
        "reference": "B. Stare decisis does not support adherence to Hardison's de minimis test in any form",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Disapprove Hardison's De Minimis Test And Construe \"Undue Hardship\" According To Its Plain Meaning\nA. The de minimis test is dicta\nB. Stare decisis does not support adherence to Hardison's de minimis test in any form\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Respondent's failure to defend Hardison's reasoning further saps its stare decisis effect\n3. Stare decisis analysis favors discarding Hardison's de minimis test\nC. Respondent's reimagined de minimis test is fatally flawed\nD. Groff offers the only construction that honors Title VII's text, history, and purpose\nII. Respondent Conflates Effects On Co-Workers With Effects On The Conduct Of The Business\nIII. Reversal Is Required",
        "reference": "1. Hardison's fleeting attention to Title VII's undue-hardship provision limits its precedential sway",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Disapprove Hardison's De Minimis Test And Construe \"Undue Hardship\" According To Its Plain Meaning\nA. The de minimis test is dicta\nB. Stare decisis does not support adherence to Hardison's de minimis test in any form\n1. Hardison's fleeting attention to Title VII's undue-hardship provision limits its precedential sway\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Stare decisis analysis favors discarding Hardison's de minimis test\nC. Respondent's reimagined de minimis test is fatally flawed\nD. Groff offers the only construction that honors Title VII's text, history, and purpose\nII. Respondent Conflates Effects On Co-Workers With Effects On The Conduct Of The Business\nIII. Reversal Is Required",
        "reference": "2. Respondent's failure to defend Hardison's reasoning further saps its stare decisis effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Disapprove Hardison's De Minimis Test And Construe \"Undue Hardship\" According To Its Plain Meaning\nA. The de minimis test is dicta\nB. Stare decisis does not support adherence to Hardison's de minimis test in any form\n1. Hardison's fleeting attention to Title VII's undue-hardship provision limits its precedential sway\n2. Respondent's failure to defend Hardison's reasoning further saps its stare decisis effect\n3. [MISSING]\nC. Respondent's reimagined de minimis test is fatally flawed\nD. Groff offers the only construction that honors Title VII's text, history, and purpose\nII. Respondent Conflates Effects On Co-Workers With Effects On The Conduct Of The Business\nIII. Reversal Is Required",
        "reference": "3. Stare decisis analysis favors discarding Hardison's de minimis test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Disapprove Hardison's De Minimis Test And Construe \"Undue Hardship\" According To Its Plain Meaning\nA. The de minimis test is dicta\nB. Stare decisis does not support adherence to Hardison's de minimis test in any form\n1. Hardison's fleeting attention to Title VII's undue-hardship provision limits its precedential sway\n2. Respondent's failure to defend Hardison's reasoning further saps its stare decisis effect\n3. Stare decisis analysis favors discarding Hardison's de minimis test\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Groff offers the only construction that honors Title VII's text, history, and purpose\nII. Respondent Conflates Effects On Co-Workers With Effects On The Conduct Of The Business\nIII. Reversal Is Required",
        "reference": "C. Respondent's reimagined de minimis test is fatally flawed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Disapprove Hardison's De Minimis Test And Construe \"Undue Hardship\" According To Its Plain Meaning\nA. The de minimis test is dicta\nB. Stare decisis does not support adherence to Hardison's de minimis test in any form\n1. Hardison's fleeting attention to Title VII's undue-hardship provision limits its precedential sway\n2. Respondent's failure to defend Hardison's reasoning further saps its stare decisis effect\n3. Stare decisis analysis favors discarding Hardison's de minimis test\nC. Respondent's reimagined de minimis test is fatally flawed\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Respondent Conflates Effects On Co-Workers With Effects On The Conduct Of The Business\nIII. Reversal Is Required",
        "reference": "D. Groff offers the only construction that honors Title VII's text, history, and purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Disapprove Hardison's De Minimis Test And Construe \"Undue Hardship\" According To Its Plain Meaning\nA. The de minimis test is dicta\nB. Stare decisis does not support adherence to Hardison's de minimis test in any form\n1. Hardison's fleeting attention to Title VII's undue-hardship provision limits its precedential sway\n2. Respondent's failure to defend Hardison's reasoning further saps its stare decisis effect\n3. Stare decisis analysis favors discarding Hardison's de minimis test\nC. Respondent's reimagined de minimis test is fatally flawed\nD. Groff offers the only construction that honors Title VII's text, history, and purpose\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Reversal Is Required",
        "reference": "II. Respondent Conflates Effects On Co-Workers With Effects On The Conduct Of The Business",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Disapprove Hardison's De Minimis Test And Construe \"Undue Hardship\" According To Its Plain Meaning\nA. The de minimis test is dicta\nB. Stare decisis does not support adherence to Hardison's de minimis test in any form\n1. Hardison's fleeting attention to Title VII's undue-hardship provision limits its precedential sway\n2. Respondent's failure to defend Hardison's reasoning further saps its stare decisis effect\n3. Stare decisis analysis favors discarding Hardison's de minimis test\nC. Respondent's reimagined de minimis test is fatally flawed\nD. Groff offers the only construction that honors Title VII's text, history, and purpose\nII. Respondent Conflates Effects On Co-Workers With Effects On The Conduct Of The Business\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Reversal Is Required",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "A. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "B. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "C. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "II. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "A. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "B. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "C. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "III. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "IV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "V. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "reference": "A. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Montana Supreme Court's Invalidation of the Scholarship Program Did Not Harmonize the Montana and Federal Constitutions\nA. The Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program for technical severability reasons, not to harmonize the two constitutions\nB. As the court's underlying judgment was unconstitutional, so too is its remedy\nC. Invalidating the program penalizes religious families and schools for exercising their beliefs\nII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Scholarship Program Violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Locke does not allow the complete bar of religious options in public-benefit programs\nB. Trinity Lutheran also does not allow the complete bar of religious options from public-benefit programs\nC. The history of the Free Exercise Clause does not help Respondents\nIII. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Applying Article X, Section 6(1) To Bar Religious Options from the Program Violates the Establishment Clause\nV. Ruling for Petitioners Would Not Create A Parade of Horribles\nA. Petitioners' position would not \"upend national traditions\"\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' position does not \"pose grave federalism concerns\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE INSULAR CASES HAVE NO BASIS IN THE TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION\nIII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES\nIV. IF THE COURT DOES NOT SET ASIDE THE INSULAR CASES, IT SHOULD LIMIT THIS LINE OF CASES\nA. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause\nB. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
        "reference": "I. THE INSULAR CASES REPRESENT A BROKEN PROMISE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR AMERICANS LIVING IN THE TERRITORIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INSULAR CASES REPRESENT A BROKEN PROMISE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR AMERICANS LIVING IN THE TERRITORIES\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES\nIV. IF THE COURT DOES NOT SET ASIDE THE INSULAR CASES, IT SHOULD LIMIT THIS LINE OF CASES\nA. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause\nB. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
        "reference": "II. THE INSULAR CASES HAVE NO BASIS IN THE TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INSULAR CASES REPRESENT A BROKEN PROMISE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR AMERICANS LIVING IN THE TERRITORIES\nII. THE INSULAR CASES HAVE NO BASIS IN THE TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. IF THE COURT DOES NOT SET ASIDE THE INSULAR CASES, IT SHOULD LIMIT THIS LINE OF CASES\nA. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause\nB. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
        "reference": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INSULAR CASES REPRESENT A BROKEN PROMISE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR AMERICANS LIVING IN THE TERRITORIES\nII. THE INSULAR CASES HAVE NO BASIS IN THE TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION\nIII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause\nB. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
        "reference": "IV. IF THE COURT DOES NOT SET ASIDE THE INSULAR CASES, IT SHOULD LIMIT THIS LINE OF CASES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INSULAR CASES REPRESENT A BROKEN PROMISE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR AMERICANS LIVING IN THE TERRITORIES\nII. THE INSULAR CASES HAVE NO BASIS IN THE TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION\nIII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES\nIV. IF THE COURT DOES NOT SET ASIDE THE INSULAR CASES, IT SHOULD LIMIT THIS LINE OF CASES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
        "reference": "A. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INSULAR CASES REPRESENT A BROKEN PROMISE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR AMERICANS LIVING IN THE TERRITORIES\nII. THE INSULAR CASES HAVE NO BASIS IN THE TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION\nIII. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES\nIV. IF THE COURT DOES NOT SET ASIDE THE INSULAR CASES, IT SHOULD LIMIT THIS LINE OF CASES\nA. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The decision below is incorrect",
        "reference": "A. The question presented is important and warrants review at this time",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The question presented is important and warrants review at this time\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. To the extent the Court granted certiorari to resolve PDR's claimed \"circuit split\" regarding the question presented, PDR has abandoned that argument and the appeal should be dismissed as improvidently granted\nB. The plain language of the Hobbs Act bars a district court from determining the validity of a \"final order\" of the FCC, such as the 2006 Order\nC. When a district court declines to \"accept\" a final order of the FCC interpreting the TCPA on the basis that it conflicts with the statute, the court \"determines the validity of\" the order in violation of the Hobbs Act\nD. The Hobbs Act's jurisdictional limitations are not limited to actions against the government\nE. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures\nF. PDR's new constitutional arguments fail\nII. PDR forfeited its new argument regarding \"legislative rules\" and \"interpretive rules,\" and the argument fails on the merits",
        "reference": "I. The Hobbs Act required the district court to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the TCPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Hobbs Act required the district court to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the TCPA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The plain language of the Hobbs Act bars a district court from determining the validity of a \"final order\" of the FCC, such as the 2006 Order\nC. When a district court declines to \"accept\" a final order of the FCC interpreting the TCPA on the basis that it conflicts with the statute, the court \"determines the validity of\" the order in violation of the Hobbs Act\nD. The Hobbs Act's jurisdictional limitations are not limited to actions against the government\nE. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures\nF. PDR's new constitutional arguments fail\nII. PDR forfeited its new argument regarding \"legislative rules\" and \"interpretive rules,\" and the argument fails on the merits",
        "reference": "A. To the extent the Court granted certiorari to resolve PDR's claimed \"circuit split\" regarding the question presented, PDR has abandoned that argument and the appeal should be dismissed as improvidently granted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Hobbs Act required the district court to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the TCPA\nA. To the extent the Court granted certiorari to resolve PDR's claimed \"circuit split\" regarding the question presented, PDR has abandoned that argument and the appeal should be dismissed as improvidently granted\nB. [MISSING]\nC. When a district court declines to \"accept\" a final order of the FCC interpreting the TCPA on the basis that it conflicts with the statute, the court \"determines the validity of\" the order in violation of the Hobbs Act\nD. The Hobbs Act's jurisdictional limitations are not limited to actions against the government\nE. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures\nF. PDR's new constitutional arguments fail\nII. PDR forfeited its new argument regarding \"legislative rules\" and \"interpretive rules,\" and the argument fails on the merits",
        "reference": "B. The plain language of the Hobbs Act bars a district court from determining the validity of a \"final order\" of the FCC, such as the 2006 Order",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Hobbs Act required the district court to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the TCPA\nA. To the extent the Court granted certiorari to resolve PDR's claimed \"circuit split\" regarding the question presented, PDR has abandoned that argument and the appeal should be dismissed as improvidently granted\nB. The plain language of the Hobbs Act bars a district court from determining the validity of a \"final order\" of the FCC, such as the 2006 Order\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Hobbs Act's jurisdictional limitations are not limited to actions against the government\nE. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures\nF. PDR's new constitutional arguments fail\nII. PDR forfeited its new argument regarding \"legislative rules\" and \"interpretive rules,\" and the argument fails on the merits",
        "reference": "C. When a district court declines to \"accept\" a final order of the FCC interpreting the TCPA on the basis that it conflicts with the statute, the court \"determines the validity of\" the order in violation of the Hobbs Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Hobbs Act required the district court to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the TCPA\nA. To the extent the Court granted certiorari to resolve PDR's claimed \"circuit split\" regarding the question presented, PDR has abandoned that argument and the appeal should be dismissed as improvidently granted\nB. The plain language of the Hobbs Act bars a district court from determining the validity of a \"final order\" of the FCC, such as the 2006 Order\nC. When a district court declines to \"accept\" a final order of the FCC interpreting the TCPA on the basis that it conflicts with the statute, the court \"determines the validity of\" the order in violation of the Hobbs Act\nD. [MISSING]\nE. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures\nF. PDR's new constitutional arguments fail\nII. PDR forfeited its new argument regarding \"legislative rules\" and \"interpretive rules,\" and the argument fails on the merits",
        "reference": "D. The Hobbs Act's jurisdictional limitations are not limited to actions against the government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Hobbs Act required the district court to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the TCPA\nA. To the extent the Court granted certiorari to resolve PDR's claimed \"circuit split\" regarding the question presented, PDR has abandoned that argument and the appeal should be dismissed as improvidently granted\nB. The plain language of the Hobbs Act bars a district court from determining the validity of a \"final order\" of the FCC, such as the 2006 Order\nC. When a district court declines to \"accept\" a final order of the FCC interpreting the TCPA on the basis that it conflicts with the statute, the court \"determines the validity of\" the order in violation of the Hobbs Act\nD. The Hobbs Act's jurisdictional limitations are not limited to actions against the government\nE. [MISSING]\nF. PDR's new constitutional arguments fail\nII. PDR forfeited its new argument regarding \"legislative rules\" and \"interpretive rules,\" and the argument fails on the merits",
        "reference": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Hobbs Act required the district court to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the TCPA\nA. To the extent the Court granted certiorari to resolve PDR's claimed \"circuit split\" regarding the question presented, PDR has abandoned that argument and the appeal should be dismissed as improvidently granted\nB. The plain language of the Hobbs Act bars a district court from determining the validity of a \"final order\" of the FCC, such as the 2006 Order\nC. When a district court declines to \"accept\" a final order of the FCC interpreting the TCPA on the basis that it conflicts with the statute, the court \"determines the validity of\" the order in violation of the Hobbs Act\nD. The Hobbs Act's jurisdictional limitations are not limited to actions against the government\nE. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures\nF. [MISSING]\nII. PDR forfeited its new argument regarding \"legislative rules\" and \"interpretive rules,\" and the argument fails on the merits",
        "reference": "F. PDR's new constitutional arguments fail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Hobbs Act required the district court to accept the FCC's legal interpretation of the TCPA\nA. To the extent the Court granted certiorari to resolve PDR's claimed \"circuit split\" regarding the question presented, PDR has abandoned that argument and the appeal should be dismissed as improvidently granted\nB. The plain language of the Hobbs Act bars a district court from determining the validity of a \"final order\" of the FCC, such as the 2006 Order\nC. When a district court declines to \"accept\" a final order of the FCC interpreting the TCPA on the basis that it conflicts with the statute, the court \"determines the validity of\" the order in violation of the Hobbs Act\nD. The Hobbs Act's jurisdictional limitations are not limited to actions against the government\nE. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures\nF. PDR's new constitutional arguments fail\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. PDR forfeited its new argument regarding \"legislative rules\" and \"interpretive rules,\" and the argument fails on the merits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Nearly All Candidates Use Social Media To Advocate Their Election.\nA. Social Media Is An Essential Campaign Tool.\nB. Incumbents Discuss Their Jobs On Social Media To Persuade Voters To Reelect Them.\nC. At The Federal Level, Incumbents Typically Maintain Separate Social Media Accounts.\nD. Candidates Moderate Social Media Communications To Shape Their Electoral Message.\nIII. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
        "reference": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Social Media Is An Essential Campaign Tool.\nB. Incumbents Discuss Their Jobs On Social Media To Persuade Voters To Reelect Them.\nC. At The Federal Level, Incumbents Typically Maintain Separate Social Media Accounts.\nD. Candidates Moderate Social Media Communications To Shape Their Electoral Message.\nIII. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
        "reference": "II. Nearly All Candidates Use Social Media To Advocate Their Election.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.\nII. Nearly All Candidates Use Social Media To Advocate Their Election.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Incumbents Discuss Their Jobs On Social Media To Persuade Voters To Reelect Them.\nC. At The Federal Level, Incumbents Typically Maintain Separate Social Media Accounts.\nD. Candidates Moderate Social Media Communications To Shape Their Electoral Message.\nIII. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
        "reference": "A. Social Media Is An Essential Campaign Tool.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.\nII. Nearly All Candidates Use Social Media To Advocate Their Election.\nA. Social Media Is An Essential Campaign Tool.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. At The Federal Level, Incumbents Typically Maintain Separate Social Media Accounts.\nD. Candidates Moderate Social Media Communications To Shape Their Electoral Message.\nIII. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
        "reference": "B. Incumbents Discuss Their Jobs On Social Media To Persuade Voters To Reelect Them.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.\nII. Nearly All Candidates Use Social Media To Advocate Their Election.\nA. Social Media Is An Essential Campaign Tool.\nB. Incumbents Discuss Their Jobs On Social Media To Persuade Voters To Reelect Them.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Candidates Moderate Social Media Communications To Shape Their Electoral Message.\nIII. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
        "reference": "C. At The Federal Level, Incumbents Typically Maintain Separate Social Media Accounts.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.\nII. Nearly All Candidates Use Social Media To Advocate Their Election.\nA. Social Media Is An Essential Campaign Tool.\nB. Incumbents Discuss Their Jobs On Social Media To Persuade Voters To Reelect Them.\nC. At The Federal Level, Incumbents Typically Maintain Separate Social Media Accounts.\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
        "reference": "D. Candidates Moderate Social Media Communications To Shape Their Electoral Message.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Amendment Safeguards The Right Of All Candidates To Freely Advocate Their Election.\nII. Nearly All Candidates Use Social Media To Advocate Their Election.\nA. Social Media Is An Essential Campaign Tool.\nB. Incumbents Discuss Their Jobs On Social Media To Persuade Voters To Reelect Them.\nC. At The Federal Level, Incumbents Typically Maintain Separate Social Media Accounts.\nD. Candidates Moderate Social Media Communications To Shape Their Electoral Message.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1519_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Unaffordable restitution awards thwart rehabilitation\nB. These concerns affect white-collar defendants as well\nC. Independent internal investigations are especially likely to produce massive, unaffordable restitution awards\nII. Unaffordable restitution awards harm victims, waste money, and diminish respect for the courts",
        "reference": "I. Massive restitution awards, including awards for expensive internal investigations, impede rehabilitation and make defendants more likely to commit new crimes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1519_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Massive restitution awards, including awards for expensive internal investigations, impede rehabilitation and make defendants more likely to commit new crimes\nA. [MISSING]\nB. These concerns affect white-collar defendants as well\nC. Independent internal investigations are especially likely to produce massive, unaffordable restitution awards\nII. Unaffordable restitution awards harm victims, waste money, and diminish respect for the courts",
        "reference": "A. Unaffordable restitution awards thwart rehabilitation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1519_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Massive restitution awards, including awards for expensive internal investigations, impede rehabilitation and make defendants more likely to commit new crimes\nA. Unaffordable restitution awards thwart rehabilitation\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Independent internal investigations are especially likely to produce massive, unaffordable restitution awards\nII. Unaffordable restitution awards harm victims, waste money, and diminish respect for the courts",
        "reference": "B. These concerns affect white-collar defendants as well",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1519_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Massive restitution awards, including awards for expensive internal investigations, impede rehabilitation and make defendants more likely to commit new crimes\nA. Unaffordable restitution awards thwart rehabilitation\nB. These concerns affect white-collar defendants as well\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Unaffordable restitution awards harm victims, waste money, and diminish respect for the courts",
        "reference": "C. Independent internal investigations are especially likely to produce massive, unaffordable restitution awards",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1519_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Massive restitution awards, including awards for expensive internal investigations, impede rehabilitation and make defendants more likely to commit new crimes\nA. Unaffordable restitution awards thwart rehabilitation\nB. These concerns affect white-collar defendants as well\nC. Independent internal investigations are especially likely to produce massive, unaffordable restitution awards\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Unaffordable restitution awards harm victims, waste money, and diminish respect for the courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\n2. This Court's Intervention Is Needed to Dislodge Offended Observer Standing from the Lower Courts\n3. Respondents' Claims Perfectly Illustrate the Problems with Offended Observer Standing\n4. Respondents' Remaining Contentions Merit No More than Summary Treatment",
        "reference": "1. Offended Observer Standing Is Consistent with Article III",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Offended Observer Standing Is Consistent with Article III\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Respondents' Claims Perfectly Illustrate the Problems with Offended Observer Standing\n4. Respondents' Remaining Contentions Merit No More than Summary Treatment",
        "reference": "2. This Court's Intervention Is Needed to Dislodge Offended Observer Standing from the Lower Courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Offended Observer Standing Is Consistent with Article III\n2. This Court's Intervention Is Needed to Dislodge Offended Observer Standing from the Lower Courts\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Respondents' Remaining Contentions Merit No More than Summary Treatment",
        "reference": "3. Respondents' Claims Perfectly Illustrate the Problems with Offended Observer Standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-278_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. Offended Observer Standing Is Consistent with Article III\n2. This Court's Intervention Is Needed to Dislodge Offended Observer Standing from the Lower Courts\n3. Respondents' Claims Perfectly Illustrate the Problems with Offended Observer Standing\n4. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "4. Respondents' Remaining Contentions Merit No More than Summary Treatment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "A. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. [MISSING]\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "B. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "II. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "III. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "IV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "A. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "B. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. [MISSING]\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "C. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. [MISSING]\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "V. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. [MISSING]\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "VI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "reference": "A. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"But For\" Was Not the Causation Standard in 1866\nA. \"Torts\" Was Not a Separate Field of Law When Section 1981 Was Passed\nB. Negligence and Intentional Torts Were Not Formally Distinguished; Scholars Battle Over to What Degree and When Negligence Recognized \"Fault\" Principles .. 6\nII. After Negligence Transformed, Intentional Torts Continued to Favor Strict Liability\nIII. The Correct Common Law Context for Section 1981 Claims Is Intentional Torts and Its Form of Strict Liability and Proximate Cause; Thus, Generally, Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor\nIV. Comcast and the Government Misconstrue Section 1981\nA. Under Section 1981, Injury Occurs When Race is Used as a Motivating Factor\n1. Congress Created an \"Absolute Right\" Arising Out of Citizenship\n2. Congress Knew That Denial of Work and Its Benefits was Essential to Black Oppression\nB. The Original Public Meaning of Section 1981 Was That Race Discrimination Could Not Be a Motivating Factor in Contracting\nC. The Plain Language of Section 1981 Confirms an Injury is Committed Once Race is a Motivating Factor\nV. The Relevant Common Law Commands that Race Cannot Be a Motivating Factor, Even if an Employer Claims There are Additional Legitimate Factors to Explain Conduct\nVI. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Complaint\nA. Respondent's Complaint is Sufficient\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Trial Court Did Not Treat the Allegations of the Complaint as True and Improperly Took Judicial Notice of Controversial Documents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES IN CALIFORNIA ARE NOT ISOLATED AND CAN BE \u2014AND ARE \u2014CONTACTED BY UNIONS IN VARIOUS WAYS\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE LECHMERE ISSUE",
        "reference": "I. BY GRANTING AUTOMATIC ACCESS TO NONEMPLOYEE UNION ORGANIZERS, THE ACCESS REGULATION VIO- LATES LECHMERE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. BY GRANTING AUTOMATIC ACCESS TO NONEMPLOYEE UNION ORGANIZERS, THE ACCESS REGULATION VIO- LATES LECHMERE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE LECHMERE ISSUE",
        "reference": "II. AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES IN CALIFORNIA ARE NOT ISOLATED AND CAN BE \u2014AND ARE \u2014CONTACTED BY UNIONS IN VARIOUS WAYS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. BY GRANTING AUTOMATIC ACCESS TO NONEMPLOYEE UNION ORGANIZERS, THE ACCESS REGULATION VIO- LATES LECHMERE\nII. AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES IN CALIFORNIA ARE NOT ISOLATED AND CAN BE \u2014AND ARE \u2014CONTACTED BY UNIONS IN VARIOUS WAYS\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE LECHMERE ISSUE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. This case is critical to ensure the Agencies apply and develop constitutional, lawful rules\n1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague\n2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause\n3. The current WOTUS definition encroaches on the traditional province of the states\n4. The current WOTUS definition violates this Court's Rapanos decision",
        "reference": "A. This case is critical and fortuitously timely",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. This case is critical and fortuitously timely\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague\n2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause\n3. The current WOTUS definition encroaches on the traditional province of the states\n4. The current WOTUS definition violates this Court's Rapanos decision",
        "reference": "B. This case is critical to ensure the Agencies apply and develop constitutional, lawful rules",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. This case is critical and fortuitously timely\nB. This case is critical to ensure the Agencies apply and develop constitutional, lawful rules\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause\n3. The current WOTUS definition encroaches on the traditional province of the states\n4. The current WOTUS definition violates this Court's Rapanos decision",
        "reference": "1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. This case is critical and fortuitously timely\nB. This case is critical to ensure the Agencies apply and develop constitutional, lawful rules\n1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The current WOTUS definition encroaches on the traditional province of the states\n4. The current WOTUS definition violates this Court's Rapanos decision",
        "reference": "2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. This case is critical and fortuitously timely\nB. This case is critical to ensure the Agencies apply and develop constitutional, lawful rules\n1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague\n2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The current WOTUS definition violates this Court's Rapanos decision",
        "reference": "3. The current WOTUS definition encroaches on the traditional province of the states",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. This case is critical and fortuitously timely\nB. This case is critical to ensure the Agencies apply and develop constitutional, lawful rules\n1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague\n2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause\n3. The current WOTUS definition encroaches on the traditional province of the states\n4. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "4. The current WOTUS definition violates this Court's Rapanos decision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "A. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "B. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "C. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. [MISSING]\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. [MISSING]\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "D. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. [MISSING]\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "II. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "reference": "A. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not constrain Congress when it creates territorial offices under Article IV\nA. Territorial governments established under Article IV need not conform to structural separation-of-powers constraints that dictate how the federal government must be organized\nB. The Appointments Clause does not govern Congress's establishment of territorial offices under Article IV\nC. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not apply to territorial officials\n1. Since the Founding, Congress has structured territorial governments without regard to the Appointments Clause\n2. Current territorial and D.C. governance regimes do not comply with the Appointments Clause\nD. The court of appeals' contrary arguments are irreconcilable with this Court's precedents and historical practice\n1. The court of appeals' attempts to distinguish this Court's Article IV precedents are unavailing\n2. Administration of a federal statute does not make Article IV officials \"officers of the United States.\"\n3. Historical practice refutes the court of appeals' decision\nII. The Board members are territorial officials who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nA. Territorial offices created under Article IV and imbued with strictly local authority are not subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Board members are territorial officers, not officers \"of the United States.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Allowing compensation of college athletes threatens to undermine amateurism in high school athletics",
        "reference": "I. Amateurism \u2014 the principle that the dedicated pursuit of excellence in sports for nonmonetary reasons develops well-rounded young men and women \u2014 benefits students, schools, and the community",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Amateurism \u2014 the principle that the dedicated pursuit of excellence in sports for nonmonetary reasons develops well-rounded young men and women \u2014 benefits students, schools, and the community\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Allowing compensation of college athletes threatens to undermine amateurism in high school athletics",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"\nB. The North Carolina Legislature Fulfilled Its Constitutional Role.\nC. The North Carolina Supreme Court Replaced The Legislature's Districting Maps With Its Own.\nII. The Federal Constitution Prohibits State Courts From Usurping State Legislatures.\nA. State Courts May Not Use State Constitutions To Override Legislative Districting Authority.\nB. In This Context, Federal Courts Must Set Aside Strained State Court Interpretations Of State Law.\nC. There Is A Pressing Need For Supervision.",
        "reference": "I. The Federal Constitution Requires North Carolina's Legislature To Determine Its Federal Congressional Districts.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Constitution Requires North Carolina's Legislature To Determine Its Federal Congressional Districts.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The North Carolina Legislature Fulfilled Its Constitutional Role.\nC. The North Carolina Supreme Court Replaced The Legislature's Districting Maps With Its Own.\nII. The Federal Constitution Prohibits State Courts From Usurping State Legislatures.\nA. State Courts May Not Use State Constitutions To Override Legislative Districting Authority.\nB. In This Context, Federal Courts Must Set Aside Strained State Court Interpretations Of State Law.\nC. There Is A Pressing Need For Supervision.",
        "reference": "A. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Constitution Requires North Carolina's Legislature To Determine Its Federal Congressional Districts.\nA. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The North Carolina Supreme Court Replaced The Legislature's Districting Maps With Its Own.\nII. The Federal Constitution Prohibits State Courts From Usurping State Legislatures.\nA. State Courts May Not Use State Constitutions To Override Legislative Districting Authority.\nB. In This Context, Federal Courts Must Set Aside Strained State Court Interpretations Of State Law.\nC. There Is A Pressing Need For Supervision.",
        "reference": "B. The North Carolina Legislature Fulfilled Its Constitutional Role.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Constitution Requires North Carolina's Legislature To Determine Its Federal Congressional Districts.\nA. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"\nB. The North Carolina Legislature Fulfilled Its Constitutional Role.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Federal Constitution Prohibits State Courts From Usurping State Legislatures.\nA. State Courts May Not Use State Constitutions To Override Legislative Districting Authority.\nB. In This Context, Federal Courts Must Set Aside Strained State Court Interpretations Of State Law.\nC. There Is A Pressing Need For Supervision.",
        "reference": "C. The North Carolina Supreme Court Replaced The Legislature's Districting Maps With Its Own.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Constitution Requires North Carolina's Legislature To Determine Its Federal Congressional Districts.\nA. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"\nB. The North Carolina Legislature Fulfilled Its Constitutional Role.\nC. The North Carolina Supreme Court Replaced The Legislature's Districting Maps With Its Own.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. State Courts May Not Use State Constitutions To Override Legislative Districting Authority.\nB. In This Context, Federal Courts Must Set Aside Strained State Court Interpretations Of State Law.\nC. There Is A Pressing Need For Supervision.",
        "reference": "II. The Federal Constitution Prohibits State Courts From Usurping State Legislatures.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Constitution Requires North Carolina's Legislature To Determine Its Federal Congressional Districts.\nA. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"\nB. The North Carolina Legislature Fulfilled Its Constitutional Role.\nC. The North Carolina Supreme Court Replaced The Legislature's Districting Maps With Its Own.\nII. The Federal Constitution Prohibits State Courts From Usurping State Legislatures.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. In This Context, Federal Courts Must Set Aside Strained State Court Interpretations Of State Law.\nC. There Is A Pressing Need For Supervision.",
        "reference": "A. State Courts May Not Use State Constitutions To Override Legislative Districting Authority.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Constitution Requires North Carolina's Legislature To Determine Its Federal Congressional Districts.\nA. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"\nB. The North Carolina Legislature Fulfilled Its Constitutional Role.\nC. The North Carolina Supreme Court Replaced The Legislature's Districting Maps With Its Own.\nII. The Federal Constitution Prohibits State Courts From Usurping State Legislatures.\nA. State Courts May Not Use State Constitutions To Override Legislative Districting Authority.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. There Is A Pressing Need For Supervision.",
        "reference": "B. In This Context, Federal Courts Must Set Aside Strained State Court Interpretations Of State Law.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Constitution Requires North Carolina's Legislature To Determine Its Federal Congressional Districts.\nA. The Elections Clause Grants Districting Authority To Each State's \"Legislature.\"\nB. The North Carolina Legislature Fulfilled Its Constitutional Role.\nC. The North Carolina Supreme Court Replaced The Legislature's Districting Maps With Its Own.\nII. The Federal Constitution Prohibits State Courts From Usurping State Legislatures.\nA. State Courts May Not Use State Constitutions To Override Legislative Districting Authority.\nB. In This Context, Federal Courts Must Set Aside Strained State Court Interpretations Of State Law.\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. There Is A Pressing Need For Supervision.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. By using the phrase \"undue hardship\" in the 1972 amendment, Congress codified a 1967 EEOC regulation and agency decisions interpreting it.\nB. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.\nC. The EEOC's pre-1972 decisions show that \"undue hardship\" meant a burden or expense that was immense or extreme in relation to the employer's overall business.\nD. Applying the codified EEOC standard to this case shows that Petitioner should prevail.\nII. Hardison's De-Minimis-Plus Standard Severely Burdens the Religious Exercise of Seventh-day Adventists and Other Sabbath Observers.\nA. Observing the Sabbath is of utmost importance to Seventh-day Adventists.\nB. Hardison's de minimis plus standard disproportionately discriminates against religious minorities like amicus.",
        "reference": "I. \"Undue Hardship\" Is a Legal Term of Art from a 1967 EEOC Regulation and pre-1972 EEOC Decisions Interpreting It, Providing Much Greater Protection than Hardison's Test.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"Undue Hardship\" Is a Legal Term of Art from a 1967 EEOC Regulation and pre-1972 EEOC Decisions Interpreting It, Providing Much Greater Protection than Hardison's Test.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.\nC. The EEOC's pre-1972 decisions show that \"undue hardship\" meant a burden or expense that was immense or extreme in relation to the employer's overall business.\nD. Applying the codified EEOC standard to this case shows that Petitioner should prevail.\nII. Hardison's De-Minimis-Plus Standard Severely Burdens the Religious Exercise of Seventh-day Adventists and Other Sabbath Observers.\nA. Observing the Sabbath is of utmost importance to Seventh-day Adventists.\nB. Hardison's de minimis plus standard disproportionately discriminates against religious minorities like amicus.",
        "reference": "A. By using the phrase \"undue hardship\" in the 1972 amendment, Congress codified a 1967 EEOC regulation and agency decisions interpreting it.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"Undue Hardship\" Is a Legal Term of Art from a 1967 EEOC Regulation and pre-1972 EEOC Decisions Interpreting It, Providing Much Greater Protection than Hardison's Test.\nA. By using the phrase \"undue hardship\" in the 1972 amendment, Congress codified a 1967 EEOC regulation and agency decisions interpreting it.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The EEOC's pre-1972 decisions show that \"undue hardship\" meant a burden or expense that was immense or extreme in relation to the employer's overall business.\nD. Applying the codified EEOC standard to this case shows that Petitioner should prevail.\nII. Hardison's De-Minimis-Plus Standard Severely Burdens the Religious Exercise of Seventh-day Adventists and Other Sabbath Observers.\nA. Observing the Sabbath is of utmost importance to Seventh-day Adventists.\nB. Hardison's de minimis plus standard disproportionately discriminates against religious minorities like amicus.",
        "reference": "B. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"Undue Hardship\" Is a Legal Term of Art from a 1967 EEOC Regulation and pre-1972 EEOC Decisions Interpreting It, Providing Much Greater Protection than Hardison's Test.\nA. By using the phrase \"undue hardship\" in the 1972 amendment, Congress codified a 1967 EEOC regulation and agency decisions interpreting it.\nB. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Applying the codified EEOC standard to this case shows that Petitioner should prevail.\nII. Hardison's De-Minimis-Plus Standard Severely Burdens the Religious Exercise of Seventh-day Adventists and Other Sabbath Observers.\nA. Observing the Sabbath is of utmost importance to Seventh-day Adventists.\nB. Hardison's de minimis plus standard disproportionately discriminates against religious minorities like amicus.",
        "reference": "C. The EEOC's pre-1972 decisions show that \"undue hardship\" meant a burden or expense that was immense or extreme in relation to the employer's overall business.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"Undue Hardship\" Is a Legal Term of Art from a 1967 EEOC Regulation and pre-1972 EEOC Decisions Interpreting It, Providing Much Greater Protection than Hardison's Test.\nA. By using the phrase \"undue hardship\" in the 1972 amendment, Congress codified a 1967 EEOC regulation and agency decisions interpreting it.\nB. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.\nC. The EEOC's pre-1972 decisions show that \"undue hardship\" meant a burden or expense that was immense or extreme in relation to the employer's overall business.\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Hardison's De-Minimis-Plus Standard Severely Burdens the Religious Exercise of Seventh-day Adventists and Other Sabbath Observers.\nA. Observing the Sabbath is of utmost importance to Seventh-day Adventists.\nB. Hardison's de minimis plus standard disproportionately discriminates against religious minorities like amicus.",
        "reference": "D. Applying the codified EEOC standard to this case shows that Petitioner should prevail.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"Undue Hardship\" Is a Legal Term of Art from a 1967 EEOC Regulation and pre-1972 EEOC Decisions Interpreting It, Providing Much Greater Protection than Hardison's Test.\nA. By using the phrase \"undue hardship\" in the 1972 amendment, Congress codified a 1967 EEOC regulation and agency decisions interpreting it.\nB. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.\nC. The EEOC's pre-1972 decisions show that \"undue hardship\" meant a burden or expense that was immense or extreme in relation to the employer's overall business.\nD. Applying the codified EEOC standard to this case shows that Petitioner should prevail.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Observing the Sabbath is of utmost importance to Seventh-day Adventists.\nB. Hardison's de minimis plus standard disproportionately discriminates against religious minorities like amicus.",
        "reference": "II. Hardison's De-Minimis-Plus Standard Severely Burdens the Religious Exercise of Seventh-day Adventists and Other Sabbath Observers.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"Undue Hardship\" Is a Legal Term of Art from a 1967 EEOC Regulation and pre-1972 EEOC Decisions Interpreting It, Providing Much Greater Protection than Hardison's Test.\nA. By using the phrase \"undue hardship\" in the 1972 amendment, Congress codified a 1967 EEOC regulation and agency decisions interpreting it.\nB. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.\nC. The EEOC's pre-1972 decisions show that \"undue hardship\" meant a burden or expense that was immense or extreme in relation to the employer's overall business.\nD. Applying the codified EEOC standard to this case shows that Petitioner should prevail.\nII. Hardison's De-Minimis-Plus Standard Severely Burdens the Religious Exercise of Seventh-day Adventists and Other Sabbath Observers.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Hardison's de minimis plus standard disproportionately discriminates against religious minorities like amicus.",
        "reference": "A. Observing the Sabbath is of utmost importance to Seventh-day Adventists.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"Undue Hardship\" Is a Legal Term of Art from a 1967 EEOC Regulation and pre-1972 EEOC Decisions Interpreting It, Providing Much Greater Protection than Hardison's Test.\nA. By using the phrase \"undue hardship\" in the 1972 amendment, Congress codified a 1967 EEOC regulation and agency decisions interpreting it.\nB. Before 1972, the EEOC consistently interpreted \"undue hardship\" to require something more than a \"de minimis plus\" or even \"significant\" burden.\nC. The EEOC's pre-1972 decisions show that \"undue hardship\" meant a burden or expense that was immense or extreme in relation to the employer's overall business.\nD. Applying the codified EEOC standard to this case shows that Petitioner should prevail.\nII. Hardison's De-Minimis-Plus Standard Severely Burdens the Religious Exercise of Seventh-day Adventists and Other Sabbath Observers.\nA. Observing the Sabbath is of utmost importance to Seventh-day Adventists.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Hardison's de minimis plus standard disproportionately discriminates against religious minorities like amicus.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "II. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "A. The individual plaintiffs lack standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "B. The state plaintiffs lack standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. [MISSING]\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "III. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "A. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "B. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "IV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERBODIES THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS\nA. Tidal Waters\nB. The \"Navigable Waters of the United States\" or The Daniel Ball Waters\nC. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters\nD. Navigable in Fact Waterbodies\nE. The Agencies' Regulatory Definition of \"Waters of the United States\" or The \"(a)(1)\" Waters\nII. THE TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE THE DANIEL BALL WATERS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Agencies Incorrectly Interpret The Term Traditional Navigable Waters\nIII. THE EPA HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT PRIEST LAKE IS A \"NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES\"",
        "reference": "A. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy Equate the Traditional Navigable Waters With The Daniel Ball Waters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERBODIES THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS\nA. Tidal Waters\nB. The \"Navigable Waters of the United States\" or The Daniel Ball Waters\nC. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters\nD. Navigable in Fact Waterbodies\nE. The Agencies' Regulatory Definition of \"Waters of the United States\" or The \"(a)(1)\" Waters\nII. THE TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE THE DANIEL BALL WATERS\nA. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy Equate the Traditional Navigable Waters With The Daniel Ball Waters\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THE EPA HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT PRIEST LAKE IS A \"NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES\"",
        "reference": "B. The Agencies Incorrectly Interpret The Term Traditional Navigable Waters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERBODIES THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS\nA. Tidal Waters\nB. The \"Navigable Waters of the United States\" or The Daniel Ball Waters\nC. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters\nD. Navigable in Fact Waterbodies\nE. The Agencies' Regulatory Definition of \"Waters of the United States\" or The \"(a)(1)\" Waters\nII. THE TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE THE DANIEL BALL WATERS\nA. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy Equate the Traditional Navigable Waters With The Daniel Ball Waters\nB. The Agencies Incorrectly Interpret The Term Traditional Navigable Waters\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE EPA HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT PRIEST LAKE IS A \"NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Maritime Law Seeks To Protect Maritime Commerce Through Standards That Are Simple, Practical And Ensure \"Uniform Rules Of Conduct\"\nB. Maritime Law Does Not Permit Liability Against Manufacturers That Neither Made, Sold, Nor Distributed The Product That Allegedly Caused Plaintiffs Harm\nC. Expansion Of Liability Is Particularly Unwarranted In Maritime Cases Where The Navy Exercised Plenary Control Over Shipboard Products And Warnings\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO CORE PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. The Decision Below Introduces Needless Complexity And Promotes Anomalous Results\nB. The Decision Below Is Impractical And Undermines The Safety Of Sailors\nC. The Decision Below Raises Substantial Fairness Concerns",
        "reference": "I. MARITIME LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT LIABILITY AGAINST MILITARY SUPPLIERS THAT NEITHER MANUFACTURED, SUPPLIED NOR SOLD THE PRODUCT ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED INJURY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARITIME LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT LIABILITY AGAINST MILITARY SUPPLIERS THAT NEITHER MANUFACTURED, SUPPLIED NOR SOLD THE PRODUCT ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED INJURY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Maritime Law Does Not Permit Liability Against Manufacturers That Neither Made, Sold, Nor Distributed The Product That Allegedly Caused Plaintiffs Harm\nC. Expansion Of Liability Is Particularly Unwarranted In Maritime Cases Where The Navy Exercised Plenary Control Over Shipboard Products And Warnings\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO CORE PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. The Decision Below Introduces Needless Complexity And Promotes Anomalous Results\nB. The Decision Below Is Impractical And Undermines The Safety Of Sailors\nC. The Decision Below Raises Substantial Fairness Concerns",
        "reference": "A. Maritime Law Seeks To Protect Maritime Commerce Through Standards That Are Simple, Practical And Ensure \"Uniform Rules Of Conduct\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARITIME LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT LIABILITY AGAINST MILITARY SUPPLIERS THAT NEITHER MANUFACTURED, SUPPLIED NOR SOLD THE PRODUCT ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED INJURY\nA. Maritime Law Seeks To Protect Maritime Commerce Through Standards That Are Simple, Practical And Ensure \"Uniform Rules Of Conduct\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Expansion Of Liability Is Particularly Unwarranted In Maritime Cases Where The Navy Exercised Plenary Control Over Shipboard Products And Warnings\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO CORE PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. The Decision Below Introduces Needless Complexity And Promotes Anomalous Results\nB. The Decision Below Is Impractical And Undermines The Safety Of Sailors\nC. The Decision Below Raises Substantial Fairness Concerns",
        "reference": "B. Maritime Law Does Not Permit Liability Against Manufacturers That Neither Made, Sold, Nor Distributed The Product That Allegedly Caused Plaintiffs Harm",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARITIME LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT LIABILITY AGAINST MILITARY SUPPLIERS THAT NEITHER MANUFACTURED, SUPPLIED NOR SOLD THE PRODUCT ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED INJURY\nA. Maritime Law Seeks To Protect Maritime Commerce Through Standards That Are Simple, Practical And Ensure \"Uniform Rules Of Conduct\"\nB. Maritime Law Does Not Permit Liability Against Manufacturers That Neither Made, Sold, Nor Distributed The Product That Allegedly Caused Plaintiffs Harm\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO CORE PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. The Decision Below Introduces Needless Complexity And Promotes Anomalous Results\nB. The Decision Below Is Impractical And Undermines The Safety Of Sailors\nC. The Decision Below Raises Substantial Fairness Concerns",
        "reference": "C. Expansion Of Liability Is Particularly Unwarranted In Maritime Cases Where The Navy Exercised Plenary Control Over Shipboard Products And Warnings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARITIME LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT LIABILITY AGAINST MILITARY SUPPLIERS THAT NEITHER MANUFACTURED, SUPPLIED NOR SOLD THE PRODUCT ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED INJURY\nA. Maritime Law Seeks To Protect Maritime Commerce Through Standards That Are Simple, Practical And Ensure \"Uniform Rules Of Conduct\"\nB. Maritime Law Does Not Permit Liability Against Manufacturers That Neither Made, Sold, Nor Distributed The Product That Allegedly Caused Plaintiffs Harm\nC. Expansion Of Liability Is Particularly Unwarranted In Maritime Cases Where The Navy Exercised Plenary Control Over Shipboard Products And Warnings\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Decision Below Introduces Needless Complexity And Promotes Anomalous Results\nB. The Decision Below Is Impractical And Undermines The Safety Of Sailors\nC. The Decision Below Raises Substantial Fairness Concerns",
        "reference": "II. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO CORE PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME LAW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARITIME LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT LIABILITY AGAINST MILITARY SUPPLIERS THAT NEITHER MANUFACTURED, SUPPLIED NOR SOLD THE PRODUCT ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED INJURY\nA. Maritime Law Seeks To Protect Maritime Commerce Through Standards That Are Simple, Practical And Ensure \"Uniform Rules Of Conduct\"\nB. Maritime Law Does Not Permit Liability Against Manufacturers That Neither Made, Sold, Nor Distributed The Product That Allegedly Caused Plaintiffs Harm\nC. Expansion Of Liability Is Particularly Unwarranted In Maritime Cases Where The Navy Exercised Plenary Control Over Shipboard Products And Warnings\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO CORE PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Decision Below Is Impractical And Undermines The Safety Of Sailors\nC. The Decision Below Raises Substantial Fairness Concerns",
        "reference": "A. The Decision Below Introduces Needless Complexity And Promotes Anomalous Results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARITIME LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT LIABILITY AGAINST MILITARY SUPPLIERS THAT NEITHER MANUFACTURED, SUPPLIED NOR SOLD THE PRODUCT ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED INJURY\nA. Maritime Law Seeks To Protect Maritime Commerce Through Standards That Are Simple, Practical And Ensure \"Uniform Rules Of Conduct\"\nB. Maritime Law Does Not Permit Liability Against Manufacturers That Neither Made, Sold, Nor Distributed The Product That Allegedly Caused Plaintiffs Harm\nC. Expansion Of Liability Is Particularly Unwarranted In Maritime Cases Where The Navy Exercised Plenary Control Over Shipboard Products And Warnings\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO CORE PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. The Decision Below Introduces Needless Complexity And Promotes Anomalous Results\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Decision Below Raises Substantial Fairness Concerns",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Is Impractical And Undermines The Safety Of Sailors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARITIME LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT LIABILITY AGAINST MILITARY SUPPLIERS THAT NEITHER MANUFACTURED, SUPPLIED NOR SOLD THE PRODUCT ALLEGED TO HAVE CAUSED INJURY\nA. Maritime Law Seeks To Protect Maritime Commerce Through Standards That Are Simple, Practical And Ensure \"Uniform Rules Of Conduct\"\nB. Maritime Law Does Not Permit Liability Against Manufacturers That Neither Made, Sold, Nor Distributed The Product That Allegedly Caused Plaintiffs Harm\nC. Expansion Of Liability Is Particularly Unwarranted In Maritime Cases Where The Navy Exercised Plenary Control Over Shipboard Products And Warnings\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO CORE PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME LAW\nA. The Decision Below Introduces Needless Complexity And Promotes Anomalous Results\nB. The Decision Below Is Impractical And Undermines The Safety Of Sailors\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Decision Below Raises Substantial Fairness Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Wetlands are \"waters.\"\nB. Wetlands and streams contribute significantly to the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of traditional navigable waters\nII. THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST REASONABLY BALANCES SCIENCE AND POLICY TO ADVANCE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nIII. PETITIONERS' PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SCIENCE AND WOULD FRUSTRATE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nA. Scientific models demonstrate the magnitude of reduction of Clean Water Act protections for wetlands and streams under a \"continuous surface-water connection\" requirement\nB. Because the boundaries of a wetland can almost always be delineated, the \"difficult-to-tell\" requirement would effectively eliminate Clean Water Act jurisdiction over all wetlands",
        "reference": "I. THE DEFINITION OF \"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" MUST BE INFORMED BY SCIENCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DEFINITION OF \"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" MUST BE INFORMED BY SCIENCE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Wetlands and streams contribute significantly to the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of traditional navigable waters\nII. THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST REASONABLY BALANCES SCIENCE AND POLICY TO ADVANCE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nIII. PETITIONERS' PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SCIENCE AND WOULD FRUSTRATE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nA. Scientific models demonstrate the magnitude of reduction of Clean Water Act protections for wetlands and streams under a \"continuous surface-water connection\" requirement\nB. Because the boundaries of a wetland can almost always be delineated, the \"difficult-to-tell\" requirement would effectively eliminate Clean Water Act jurisdiction over all wetlands",
        "reference": "A. Wetlands are \"waters.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DEFINITION OF \"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" MUST BE INFORMED BY SCIENCE\nA. Wetlands are \"waters.\"\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST REASONABLY BALANCES SCIENCE AND POLICY TO ADVANCE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nIII. PETITIONERS' PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SCIENCE AND WOULD FRUSTRATE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nA. Scientific models demonstrate the magnitude of reduction of Clean Water Act protections for wetlands and streams under a \"continuous surface-water connection\" requirement\nB. Because the boundaries of a wetland can almost always be delineated, the \"difficult-to-tell\" requirement would effectively eliminate Clean Water Act jurisdiction over all wetlands",
        "reference": "B. Wetlands and streams contribute significantly to the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of traditional navigable waters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DEFINITION OF \"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" MUST BE INFORMED BY SCIENCE\nA. Wetlands are \"waters.\"\nB. Wetlands and streams contribute significantly to the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of traditional navigable waters\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. PETITIONERS' PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SCIENCE AND WOULD FRUSTRATE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nA. Scientific models demonstrate the magnitude of reduction of Clean Water Act protections for wetlands and streams under a \"continuous surface-water connection\" requirement\nB. Because the boundaries of a wetland can almost always be delineated, the \"difficult-to-tell\" requirement would effectively eliminate Clean Water Act jurisdiction over all wetlands",
        "reference": "II. THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST REASONABLY BALANCES SCIENCE AND POLICY TO ADVANCE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DEFINITION OF \"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" MUST BE INFORMED BY SCIENCE\nA. Wetlands are \"waters.\"\nB. Wetlands and streams contribute significantly to the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of traditional navigable waters\nII. THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST REASONABLY BALANCES SCIENCE AND POLICY TO ADVANCE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Scientific models demonstrate the magnitude of reduction of Clean Water Act protections for wetlands and streams under a \"continuous surface-water connection\" requirement\nB. Because the boundaries of a wetland can almost always be delineated, the \"difficult-to-tell\" requirement would effectively eliminate Clean Water Act jurisdiction over all wetlands",
        "reference": "III. PETITIONERS' PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SCIENCE AND WOULD FRUSTRATE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DEFINITION OF \"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" MUST BE INFORMED BY SCIENCE\nA. Wetlands are \"waters.\"\nB. Wetlands and streams contribute significantly to the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of traditional navigable waters\nII. THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST REASONABLY BALANCES SCIENCE AND POLICY TO ADVANCE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nIII. PETITIONERS' PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SCIENCE AND WOULD FRUSTRATE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Because the boundaries of a wetland can almost always be delineated, the \"difficult-to-tell\" requirement would effectively eliminate Clean Water Act jurisdiction over all wetlands",
        "reference": "A. Scientific models demonstrate the magnitude of reduction of Clean Water Act protections for wetlands and streams under a \"continuous surface-water connection\" requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DEFINITION OF \"WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES\" MUST BE INFORMED BY SCIENCE\nA. Wetlands are \"waters.\"\nB. Wetlands and streams contribute significantly to the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of traditional navigable waters\nII. THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST REASONABLY BALANCES SCIENCE AND POLICY TO ADVANCE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nIII. PETITIONERS' PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SCIENCE AND WOULD FRUSTRATE THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVE\nA. Scientific models demonstrate the magnitude of reduction of Clean Water Act protections for wetlands and streams under a \"continuous surface-water connection\" requirement\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Because the boundaries of a wetland can almost always be delineated, the \"difficult-to-tell\" requirement would effectively eliminate Clean Water Act jurisdiction over all wetlands",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "A. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. [MISSING]\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "B. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. [MISSING]\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. [MISSING]\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. [MISSING]\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. [MISSING]\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. [MISSING]\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "C. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "II. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "reference": "A. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That A Pre-Viability Prohibition On Elective Abortions Is Constitutional Where, As Here, A Rational Basis Supports The Prohibition\nA. The Constitution Does Not Protect A Right To Abortion Or Limit The States' Authority To Restrict Abortion\nB. This Court Should Overrule Its Precedents Subjecting Abortion Restrictions To Heightened Scrutiny\n1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong\n2. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Hopelessly Unworkable\n3. This Court's Abortion Precedents Have Inflicted Severe Damage\n4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents\n5. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents\nC. This Court Should Conclude That The Act Satisfies Rational-Basis Review And So Is Constitutional\nII. At Minimum This Court Should Hold That Viability Is Not A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions And Should Reject The Judgment Below\nA. This Court Should Reject Viability As A Barrier To Prohibiting Elective Abortions\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Statutory Text Precludes the 2005 Rule\nA. HHS's Interpretation Defies Statutory Text, Context, and Purpose\nB. HHS's Arguments Conflict with the Statute's Text and Purposes\nIII. The 2005 Rule Is Not a Reasonable Interpretation of the DSH Provision",
        "reference": "I. The 2005 Rule Is Not a Legitimate Exercise of Agency Expertise That Could Trigger Deference",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The 2005 Rule Is Not a Legitimate Exercise of Agency Expertise That Could Trigger Deference\nII. [MISSING]\nA. HHS's Interpretation Defies Statutory Text, Context, and Purpose\nB. HHS's Arguments Conflict with the Statute's Text and Purposes\nIII. The 2005 Rule Is Not a Reasonable Interpretation of the DSH Provision",
        "reference": "II. The Statutory Text Precludes the 2005 Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The 2005 Rule Is Not a Legitimate Exercise of Agency Expertise That Could Trigger Deference\nII. The Statutory Text Precludes the 2005 Rule\nA. [MISSING]\nB. HHS's Arguments Conflict with the Statute's Text and Purposes\nIII. The 2005 Rule Is Not a Reasonable Interpretation of the DSH Provision",
        "reference": "A. HHS's Interpretation Defies Statutory Text, Context, and Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The 2005 Rule Is Not a Legitimate Exercise of Agency Expertise That Could Trigger Deference\nII. The Statutory Text Precludes the 2005 Rule\nA. HHS's Interpretation Defies Statutory Text, Context, and Purpose\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The 2005 Rule Is Not a Reasonable Interpretation of the DSH Provision",
        "reference": "B. HHS's Arguments Conflict with the Statute's Text and Purposes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The 2005 Rule Is Not a Legitimate Exercise of Agency Expertise That Could Trigger Deference\nII. The Statutory Text Precludes the 2005 Rule\nA. HHS's Interpretation Defies Statutory Text, Context, and Purpose\nB. HHS's Arguments Conflict with the Statute's Text and Purposes\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The 2005 Rule Is Not a Reasonable Interpretation of the DSH Provision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-196_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Decision Below Is Incorrect\nC. This case is an excellent vehicle for considering the question presented",
        "reference": "A. The Decision Below Implicates A Conflict Among The Courts Of Appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-196_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Decision Below Implicates A Conflict Among The Courts Of Appeals\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This case is an excellent vehicle for considering the question presented",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Is Incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-196_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Decision Below Implicates A Conflict Among The Courts Of Appeals\nB. The Decision Below Is Incorrect\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This case is an excellent vehicle for considering the question presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "THE [MISSING]",
        "reference": "THE COURT SHOULD DECIDE THIS CASE WITHOUT RESOLVING THE JURISDICTIONAL CHARACTER OF SECTION 2000e-5",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Under Illinois Brick, a plaintiff cannot state a claim for treble damages under Section 4 by alleging that the defendant unlawfully overcharged a third party who in turn passed on the overcharge to the plaintiff\nB. Illinois Brick bars respondents' treble-damages claim because that claim depends on allegations that third-party app developers passed on all or part of Apple's alleged unlawful overcharge\nC. Respondents are not \"direct purchasers\" in the sense in which the Illinois Brick Court used that term",
        "reference": "I. Section 4 of the Clayton Act does not authorize damages claims that are premised on a theory of passed-on harm",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 4 of the Clayton Act does not authorize damages claims that are premised on a theory of passed-on harm\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Illinois Brick bars respondents' treble-damages claim because that claim depends on allegations that third-party app developers passed on all or part of Apple's alleged unlawful overcharge\nC. Respondents are not \"direct purchasers\" in the sense in which the Illinois Brick Court used that term",
        "reference": "A. Under Illinois Brick, a plaintiff cannot state a claim for treble damages under Section 4 by alleging that the defendant unlawfully overcharged a third party who in turn passed on the overcharge to the plaintiff",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 4 of the Clayton Act does not authorize damages claims that are premised on a theory of passed-on harm\nA. Under Illinois Brick, a plaintiff cannot state a claim for treble damages under Section 4 by alleging that the defendant unlawfully overcharged a third party who in turn passed on the overcharge to the plaintiff\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Respondents are not \"direct purchasers\" in the sense in which the Illinois Brick Court used that term",
        "reference": "B. Illinois Brick bars respondents' treble-damages claim because that claim depends on allegations that third-party app developers passed on all or part of Apple's alleged unlawful overcharge",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 4 of the Clayton Act does not authorize damages claims that are premised on a theory of passed-on harm\nA. Under Illinois Brick, a plaintiff cannot state a claim for treble damages under Section 4 by alleging that the defendant unlawfully overcharged a third party who in turn passed on the overcharge to the plaintiff\nB. Illinois Brick bars respondents' treble-damages claim because that claim depends on allegations that third-party app developers passed on all or part of Apple's alleged unlawful overcharge\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Respondents are not \"direct purchasers\" in the sense in which the Illinois Brick Court used that term",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The government does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause by tolerating private religious expression\nB. The Establishment Clause cannot be violated by a fear that someone will misperceive private religious speech as the government's speech\nII. Using unfounded Establishment Clause concerns to ban religious expression \u2014 as the district did here \u2014 is unconstitutional content- and viewpoint-based discrimination",
        "reference": "I. There is no reasonable argument that Coach Kennedy's private religious expression violated the Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no reasonable argument that Coach Kennedy's private religious expression violated the Establishment Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Establishment Clause cannot be violated by a fear that someone will misperceive private religious speech as the government's speech\nII. Using unfounded Establishment Clause concerns to ban religious expression \u2014 as the district did here \u2014 is unconstitutional content- and viewpoint-based discrimination",
        "reference": "A. The government does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause by tolerating private religious expression",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no reasonable argument that Coach Kennedy's private religious expression violated the Establishment Clause\nA. The government does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause by tolerating private religious expression\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Using unfounded Establishment Clause concerns to ban religious expression \u2014 as the district did here \u2014 is unconstitutional content- and viewpoint-based discrimination",
        "reference": "B. The Establishment Clause cannot be violated by a fear that someone will misperceive private religious speech as the government's speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no reasonable argument that Coach Kennedy's private religious expression violated the Establishment Clause\nA. The government does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause by tolerating private religious expression\nB. The Establishment Clause cannot be violated by a fear that someone will misperceive private religious speech as the government's speech\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Using unfounded Establishment Clause concerns to ban religious expression \u2014 as the district did here \u2014 is unconstitutional content- and viewpoint-based discrimination",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S MINORITY APPROACH IS WRONG\nIII. SUSKI'S REMAINING ARGUMENT IS FORFEITED, MERITLESS, AND IRRELEVANT",
        "reference": "I. AS SUSKI AGREES, THE JOINT PETITION PRESENTS A DEEP AND IMPORTANT SPLIT THAT WARRANTS REVIEW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS SUSKI AGREES, THE JOINT PETITION PRESENTS A DEEP AND IMPORTANT SPLIT THAT WARRANTS REVIEW\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. SUSKI'S REMAINING ARGUMENT IS FORFEITED, MERITLESS, AND IRRELEVANT",
        "reference": "II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S MINORITY APPROACH IS WRONG",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS SUSKI AGREES, THE JOINT PETITION PRESENTS A DEEP AND IMPORTANT SPLIT THAT WARRANTS REVIEW\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S MINORITY APPROACH IS WRONG\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. SUSKI'S REMAINING ARGUMENT IS FORFEITED, MERITLESS, AND IRRELEVANT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Fifth Circuit's decision upsets a settled understanding on a recurring and important question of federal law\nIII. The Fifth Circuit's decision is wrong",
        "reference": "I. The Fifth Circuit's decision creates a square circuit split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fifth Circuit's decision creates a square circuit split\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Fifth Circuit's decision is wrong",
        "reference": "II. The Fifth Circuit's decision upsets a settled understanding on a recurring and important question of federal law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fifth Circuit's decision creates a square circuit split\nII. The Fifth Circuit's decision upsets a settled understanding on a recurring and important question of federal law\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Fifth Circuit's decision is wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "II. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "A. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "B. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "C. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "D. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "III. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "reference": "A. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE 2017 AMENDMENT DOES NOT CHANGE THIS COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 5000A AS OFFERING A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. THE PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING\nA. The individual plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to complain about a voluntary choice\n2. Even assuming that Section 5000A obligates the purchase of insurance, that obligation is unenforceable and therefore inflicts no legally cognizable injury\nB. The state plaintiffs lack standing\n1. The speculative assertion that Section 5000A increases States' costs does not support standing\n2. Any harms flowing from other parts of the ACA are not a basis for standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 5000A\nIII. SECTION 5000A DOES NOT EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY\nA. Enacting a statute that repeals previous legal obligations does not exceed Congress's powers\nB. Even if Congress's action did require an enumerated power, it can be upheld under the Necessary and Proper Clause\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT\nA. Congress's decision to leave the rest of the Act in place when it amended Section 5000A answers the severability question\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Even if there were no direct evidence of Congress's actual intent, this Court's precedent would still compel severance of the mandate from the rest of the Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The legal distinction between companies and their investors is a core principle of business law.\nB. Corporate separateness should not be ignored under the First Amendment.\nC. An expansive ruling that fails to distinguish between the interests of companies and their investors could create unpredictable consequences and pose significant difficulties for lower courts.\nII. Courts Should Not Reflexively Defer To Political Or Religious Beliefs Asserted By For-Profit Enterprises To Gain Exemptions From Regulatory Constraints Applicable To Competitors.",
        "reference": "I. Because Of The Separate Legal Personality Of Companies And Their Investors, The Court Should Not Reflexively Project The Constitutional Interests Of Investors Onto The Enterprise.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Because Of The Separate Legal Personality Of Companies And Their Investors, The Court Should Not Reflexively Project The Constitutional Interests Of Investors Onto The Enterprise.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Corporate separateness should not be ignored under the First Amendment.\nC. An expansive ruling that fails to distinguish between the interests of companies and their investors could create unpredictable consequences and pose significant difficulties for lower courts.\nII. Courts Should Not Reflexively Defer To Political Or Religious Beliefs Asserted By For-Profit Enterprises To Gain Exemptions From Regulatory Constraints Applicable To Competitors.",
        "reference": "A. The legal distinction between companies and their investors is a core principle of business law.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Because Of The Separate Legal Personality Of Companies And Their Investors, The Court Should Not Reflexively Project The Constitutional Interests Of Investors Onto The Enterprise.\nA. The legal distinction between companies and their investors is a core principle of business law.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. An expansive ruling that fails to distinguish between the interests of companies and their investors could create unpredictable consequences and pose significant difficulties for lower courts.\nII. Courts Should Not Reflexively Defer To Political Or Religious Beliefs Asserted By For-Profit Enterprises To Gain Exemptions From Regulatory Constraints Applicable To Competitors.",
        "reference": "B. Corporate separateness should not be ignored under the First Amendment.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Because Of The Separate Legal Personality Of Companies And Their Investors, The Court Should Not Reflexively Project The Constitutional Interests Of Investors Onto The Enterprise.\nA. The legal distinction between companies and their investors is a core principle of business law.\nB. Corporate separateness should not be ignored under the First Amendment.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Courts Should Not Reflexively Defer To Political Or Religious Beliefs Asserted By For-Profit Enterprises To Gain Exemptions From Regulatory Constraints Applicable To Competitors.",
        "reference": "C. An expansive ruling that fails to distinguish between the interests of companies and their investors could create unpredictable consequences and pose significant difficulties for lower courts.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Because Of The Separate Legal Personality Of Companies And Their Investors, The Court Should Not Reflexively Project The Constitutional Interests Of Investors Onto The Enterprise.\nA. The legal distinction between companies and their investors is a core principle of business law.\nB. Corporate separateness should not be ignored under the First Amendment.\nC. An expansive ruling that fails to distinguish between the interests of companies and their investors could create unpredictable consequences and pose significant difficulties for lower courts.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Courts Should Not Reflexively Defer To Political Or Religious Beliefs Asserted By For-Profit Enterprises To Gain Exemptions From Regulatory Constraints Applicable To Competitors.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog\nA. Unit 1 is critical habitat, as a matter of law, because it is essential for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog\nB. Unit 1 is no less \"essential\" because its current state needs work before its full conservation value, as a future translocation site, can be realized\nC. Neither does Unit 1's private ownership mean it is not essential under the Act\nIII. Section 4(a)(3) directs designation of critical habitat, without altering its definition\nIV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail\nA. There is no policy justification for restraining the designation process Congress established\nB. The designation raises no serious constitutional question\nV. There is no basis for setting aside the critical habitat designation on economic grounds",
        "reference": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Unit 1 is critical habitat, as a matter of law, because it is essential for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog\nB. Unit 1 is no less \"essential\" because its current state needs work before its full conservation value, as a future translocation site, can be realized\nC. Neither does Unit 1's private ownership mean it is not essential under the Act\nIII. Section 4(a)(3) directs designation of critical habitat, without altering its definition\nIV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail\nA. There is no policy justification for restraining the designation process Congress established\nB. The designation raises no serious constitutional question\nV. There is no basis for setting aside the critical habitat designation on economic grounds",
        "reference": "II. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction\nII. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Unit 1 is no less \"essential\" because its current state needs work before its full conservation value, as a future translocation site, can be realized\nC. Neither does Unit 1's private ownership mean it is not essential under the Act\nIII. Section 4(a)(3) directs designation of critical habitat, without altering its definition\nIV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail\nA. There is no policy justification for restraining the designation process Congress established\nB. The designation raises no serious constitutional question\nV. There is no basis for setting aside the critical habitat designation on economic grounds",
        "reference": "A. Unit 1 is critical habitat, as a matter of law, because it is essential for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction\nII. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog\nA. Unit 1 is critical habitat, as a matter of law, because it is essential for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Neither does Unit 1's private ownership mean it is not essential under the Act\nIII. Section 4(a)(3) directs designation of critical habitat, without altering its definition\nIV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail\nA. There is no policy justification for restraining the designation process Congress established\nB. The designation raises no serious constitutional question\nV. There is no basis for setting aside the critical habitat designation on economic grounds",
        "reference": "B. Unit 1 is no less \"essential\" because its current state needs work before its full conservation value, as a future translocation site, can be realized",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction\nII. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog\nA. Unit 1 is critical habitat, as a matter of law, because it is essential for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog\nB. Unit 1 is no less \"essential\" because its current state needs work before its full conservation value, as a future translocation site, can be realized\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. Section 4(a)(3) directs designation of critical habitat, without altering its definition\nIV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail\nA. There is no policy justification for restraining the designation process Congress established\nB. The designation raises no serious constitutional question\nV. There is no basis for setting aside the critical habitat designation on economic grounds",
        "reference": "C. Neither does Unit 1's private ownership mean it is not essential under the Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction\nII. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog\nA. Unit 1 is critical habitat, as a matter of law, because it is essential for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog\nB. Unit 1 is no less \"essential\" because its current state needs work before its full conservation value, as a future translocation site, can be realized\nC. Neither does Unit 1's private ownership mean it is not essential under the Act\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail\nA. There is no policy justification for restraining the designation process Congress established\nB. The designation raises no serious constitutional question\nV. There is no basis for setting aside the critical habitat designation on economic grounds",
        "reference": "III. Section 4(a)(3) directs designation of critical habitat, without altering its definition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction\nII. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog\nA. Unit 1 is critical habitat, as a matter of law, because it is essential for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog\nB. Unit 1 is no less \"essential\" because its current state needs work before its full conservation value, as a future translocation site, can be realized\nC. Neither does Unit 1's private ownership mean it is not essential under the Act\nIII. Section 4(a)(3) directs designation of critical habitat, without altering its definition\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. There is no policy justification for restraining the designation process Congress established\nB. The designation raises no serious constitutional question\nV. There is no basis for setting aside the critical habitat designation on economic grounds",
        "reference": "IV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction\nII. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog\nA. Unit 1 is critical habitat, as a matter of law, because it is essential for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog\nB. Unit 1 is no less \"essential\" because its current state needs work before its full conservation value, as a future translocation site, can be realized\nC. Neither does Unit 1's private ownership mean it is not essential under the Act\nIII. Section 4(a)(3) directs designation of critical habitat, without altering its definition\nIV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The designation raises no serious constitutional question\nV. There is no basis for setting aside the critical habitat designation on economic grounds",
        "reference": "A. There is no policy justification for restraining the designation process Congress established",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction\nII. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog\nA. Unit 1 is critical habitat, as a matter of law, because it is essential for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog\nB. Unit 1 is no less \"essential\" because its current state needs work before its full conservation value, as a future translocation site, can be realized\nC. Neither does Unit 1's private ownership mean it is not essential under the Act\nIII. Section 4(a)(3) directs designation of critical habitat, without altering its definition\nIV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail\nA. There is no policy justification for restraining the designation process Congress established\nB. [MISSING]\nV. There is no basis for setting aside the critical habitat designation on economic grounds",
        "reference": "B. The designation raises no serious constitutional question",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner has incurred no harm sufficient for Article III jurisdiction\nII. The Service lawfully designated Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog\nA. Unit 1 is critical habitat, as a matter of law, because it is essential for the conservation of the dusky gopher frog\nB. Unit 1 is no less \"essential\" because its current state needs work before its full conservation value, as a future translocation site, can be realized\nC. Neither does Unit 1's private ownership mean it is not essential under the Act\nIII. Section 4(a)(3) directs designation of critical habitat, without altering its definition\nIV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail\nA. There is no policy justification for restraining the designation process Congress established\nB. The designation raises no serious constitutional question\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. There is no basis for setting aside the critical habitat designation on economic grounds",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent\nIII. Background Tort Principles Confirm Petitioner's Burden to Prove Retaliatory Intent",
        "reference": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Background Tort Principles Confirm Petitioner's Burden to Prove Retaliatory Intent",
        "reference": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's Reading Has Been Tried And Discredited in the Context of the Federal Rail Safety Act\nII. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Background Tort Principles Confirm Petitioner's Burden to Prove Retaliatory Intent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not silently displace the state-secrets privilege\nC. There is no occasion for the Court to address the scope of the state-secrets dismissal remedy",
        "reference": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means of litigating the merits of an action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means of litigating the merits of an action\nB. [MISSING]\nC. There is no occasion for the Court to address the scope of the state-secrets dismissal remedy",
        "reference": "B. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not silently displace the state-secrets privilege",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means of litigating the merits of an action\nB. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not silently displace the state-secrets privilege\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. There is no occasion for the Court to address the scope of the state-secrets dismissal remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The circuit split is limited to only two decisions from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits\n2. Especially when splits are new and undeveloped, this Court benefits from allowing more courts time to consider the issue\n3. Whether emotional distress damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act is a complex question that merits the attention of the lower courts\nB. Congress may act to resolve any uncertainty surrounding the question presented, obviating the need for the Court's review",
        "reference": "A. The extraordinarily undeveloped and narrow circuit split merits further consideration in the lower courts before this Court addresses the question presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The extraordinarily undeveloped and narrow circuit split merits further consideration in the lower courts before this Court addresses the question presented\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Especially when splits are new and undeveloped, this Court benefits from allowing more courts time to consider the issue\n3. Whether emotional distress damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act is a complex question that merits the attention of the lower courts\nB. Congress may act to resolve any uncertainty surrounding the question presented, obviating the need for the Court's review",
        "reference": "1. The circuit split is limited to only two decisions from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The extraordinarily undeveloped and narrow circuit split merits further consideration in the lower courts before this Court addresses the question presented\n1. The circuit split is limited to only two decisions from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Whether emotional distress damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act is a complex question that merits the attention of the lower courts\nB. Congress may act to resolve any uncertainty surrounding the question presented, obviating the need for the Court's review",
        "reference": "2. Especially when splits are new and undeveloped, this Court benefits from allowing more courts time to consider the issue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The extraordinarily undeveloped and narrow circuit split merits further consideration in the lower courts before this Court addresses the question presented\n1. The circuit split is limited to only two decisions from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits\n2. Especially when splits are new and undeveloped, this Court benefits from allowing more courts time to consider the issue\n3. [MISSING]\nB. Congress may act to resolve any uncertainty surrounding the question presented, obviating the need for the Court's review",
        "reference": "3. Whether emotional distress damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act is a complex question that merits the attention of the lower courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The extraordinarily undeveloped and narrow circuit split merits further consideration in the lower courts before this Court addresses the question presented\n1. The circuit split is limited to only two decisions from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits\n2. Especially when splits are new and undeveloped, this Court benefits from allowing more courts time to consider the issue\n3. Whether emotional distress damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act is a complex question that merits the attention of the lower courts\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Congress may act to resolve any uncertainty surrounding the question presented, obviating the need for the Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. In enacting the Reproductive FACT Act, California specifically targeted pregnancy resource centers for their disfavored speech",
        "reference": "I. This Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit and protect the speech rights of pro-life, pregnancy resource centers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit and protect the speech rights of pro-life, pregnancy resource centers\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. In enacting the Reproductive FACT Act, California specifically targeted pregnancy resource centers for their disfavored speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Georgia's repugnant verdicts rule is nothing more than a rarely applicable exception to the general inconsistent verdicts rule applied by this Court and many states\nB. Georgia is the only state that has addressed repugnant verdicts, so there is no split in authority\nII. McElrath could have raised these arguments previously and chose not to do so\nIII. The Georgia Supreme Court's decision conforms to this Court's precedents on double jeopardy and inconsistent verdicts",
        "reference": "I. This case does not present a recurring or important question worthy of certiorari",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This case does not present a recurring or important question worthy of certiorari\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Georgia is the only state that has addressed repugnant verdicts, so there is no split in authority\nII. McElrath could have raised these arguments previously and chose not to do so\nIII. The Georgia Supreme Court's decision conforms to this Court's precedents on double jeopardy and inconsistent verdicts",
        "reference": "A. Georgia's repugnant verdicts rule is nothing more than a rarely applicable exception to the general inconsistent verdicts rule applied by this Court and many states",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This case does not present a recurring or important question worthy of certiorari\nA. Georgia's repugnant verdicts rule is nothing more than a rarely applicable exception to the general inconsistent verdicts rule applied by this Court and many states\nB. [MISSING]\nII. McElrath could have raised these arguments previously and chose not to do so\nIII. The Georgia Supreme Court's decision conforms to this Court's precedents on double jeopardy and inconsistent verdicts",
        "reference": "B. Georgia is the only state that has addressed repugnant verdicts, so there is no split in authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This case does not present a recurring or important question worthy of certiorari\nA. Georgia's repugnant verdicts rule is nothing more than a rarely applicable exception to the general inconsistent verdicts rule applied by this Court and many states\nB. Georgia is the only state that has addressed repugnant verdicts, so there is no split in authority\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Georgia Supreme Court's decision conforms to this Court's precedents on double jeopardy and inconsistent verdicts",
        "reference": "II. McElrath could have raised these arguments previously and chose not to do so",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This case does not present a recurring or important question worthy of certiorari\nA. Georgia's repugnant verdicts rule is nothing more than a rarely applicable exception to the general inconsistent verdicts rule applied by this Court and many states\nB. Georgia is the only state that has addressed repugnant verdicts, so there is no split in authority\nII. McElrath could have raised these arguments previously and chose not to do so\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Georgia Supreme Court's decision conforms to this Court's precedents on double jeopardy and inconsistent verdicts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Censure involves governmental speech exempt from the First Amendment\nB. Censure alone does not impinge First Amendment rights\nC. Respondent's rule has no basis in doctrine or common sense\nII. Respondent's Rule Threatens Grave Consequences For Higher Education Institutions\nA. This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has always permitted colleges and universities to self-govern and promote their chosen values\nB. Censure is how boards promote self-governance, protect institutional missions, and ensure compliance with the law",
        "reference": "I. Respondent's Rule Is Wrong And Unadministrable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's Rule Is Wrong And Unadministrable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Censure alone does not impinge First Amendment rights\nC. Respondent's rule has no basis in doctrine or common sense\nII. Respondent's Rule Threatens Grave Consequences For Higher Education Institutions\nA. This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has always permitted colleges and universities to self-govern and promote their chosen values\nB. Censure is how boards promote self-governance, protect institutional missions, and ensure compliance with the law",
        "reference": "A. Censure involves governmental speech exempt from the First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's Rule Is Wrong And Unadministrable\nA. Censure involves governmental speech exempt from the First Amendment\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Respondent's rule has no basis in doctrine or common sense\nII. Respondent's Rule Threatens Grave Consequences For Higher Education Institutions\nA. This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has always permitted colleges and universities to self-govern and promote their chosen values\nB. Censure is how boards promote self-governance, protect institutional missions, and ensure compliance with the law",
        "reference": "B. Censure alone does not impinge First Amendment rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's Rule Is Wrong And Unadministrable\nA. Censure involves governmental speech exempt from the First Amendment\nB. Censure alone does not impinge First Amendment rights\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Respondent's Rule Threatens Grave Consequences For Higher Education Institutions\nA. This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has always permitted colleges and universities to self-govern and promote their chosen values\nB. Censure is how boards promote self-governance, protect institutional missions, and ensure compliance with the law",
        "reference": "C. Respondent's rule has no basis in doctrine or common sense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's Rule Is Wrong And Unadministrable\nA. Censure involves governmental speech exempt from the First Amendment\nB. Censure alone does not impinge First Amendment rights\nC. Respondent's rule has no basis in doctrine or common sense\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has always permitted colleges and universities to self-govern and promote their chosen values\nB. Censure is how boards promote self-governance, protect institutional missions, and ensure compliance with the law",
        "reference": "II. Respondent's Rule Threatens Grave Consequences For Higher Education Institutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's Rule Is Wrong And Unadministrable\nA. Censure involves governmental speech exempt from the First Amendment\nB. Censure alone does not impinge First Amendment rights\nC. Respondent's rule has no basis in doctrine or common sense\nII. Respondent's Rule Threatens Grave Consequences For Higher Education Institutions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Censure is how boards promote self-governance, protect institutional missions, and ensure compliance with the law",
        "reference": "A. This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has always permitted colleges and universities to self-govern and promote their chosen values",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's Rule Is Wrong And Unadministrable\nA. Censure involves governmental speech exempt from the First Amendment\nB. Censure alone does not impinge First Amendment rights\nC. Respondent's rule has no basis in doctrine or common sense\nII. Respondent's Rule Threatens Grave Consequences For Higher Education Institutions\nA. This Court's First Amendment jurisprudence has always permitted colleges and universities to self-govern and promote their chosen values\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Censure is how boards promote self-governance, protect institutional missions, and ensure compliance with the law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "A. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "B. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "C. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. [MISSING]\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. [MISSING]\nE. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "reference": "D. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Concept of Cy Pres Is Ensconced in American Jurisprudence\nII. Cy Pres Awards Are Legal and Constitutional\nA. The Challenge to Cy Pres Based upon Article III Misapprehends the Requirements of Standing\nB. The Rules Enabling Act Does Not Prevent Cy Pres Distributions\nC. Any First Amendment Concern Lacks Merit\nD. The Existing Rules Are Sufficient to Address Petitioner's Concern About Conflicts of Interest and Scandalous Behavior\nIII. Guidance to Consider in Evaluating the Distribution of Cy Pres\nA. Distributing Settlement Funds to Class Members Should Always Be the First Priority\nB. Factors to Be Considered in the Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\nC. Making the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients\n1. The Defendant Should Not Select Cy Pres Recipients\n2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients\n3. The Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients Should Be Undertaken by the Class Representative and Class Counsel\nD. Proper Beneficiaries for the Distribution of Cy Pres Funds\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. There Is a Need for \"Cy Pres Only\" Settlements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Act 900 Expressly Purports to Regulate the Federally-Regulated J.B. Hunt Plan and the Benefits it Provides to its Members\nIII. Arkansas is One of Several States that Purport to Regulate ERISA-Regulated Plans, Thus Subjecting the Plans to a Patchwork of Complex and Often Inconsistent Regulations, All of Which Are Preempted by ERISA\na. Disclosure/Transparency\nb. MAC Lists\nc. Mail-Order\nd. Prompt Pay\ne. Specialty\nf. Penalties\nIV. Act 900 Improperly Affects Plan Design",
        "reference": "I. Act 900 has a Direct and Adverse Economic Effect on this Self-Funded Plan",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Act 900 has a Direct and Adverse Economic Effect on this Self-Funded Plan\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Arkansas is One of Several States that Purport to Regulate ERISA-Regulated Plans, Thus Subjecting the Plans to a Patchwork of Complex and Often Inconsistent Regulations, All of Which Are Preempted by ERISA\na. Disclosure/Transparency\nb. MAC Lists\nc. Mail-Order\nd. Prompt Pay\ne. Specialty\nf. Penalties\nIV. Act 900 Improperly Affects Plan Design",
        "reference": "II. Act 900 Expressly Purports to Regulate the Federally-Regulated J.B. Hunt Plan and the Benefits it Provides to its Members",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Act 900 has a Direct and Adverse Economic Effect on this Self-Funded Plan\nII. Act 900 Expressly Purports to Regulate the Federally-Regulated J.B. Hunt Plan and the Benefits it Provides to its Members\nIII. [MISSING]\na. Disclosure/Transparency\nb. MAC Lists\nc. Mail-Order\nd. Prompt Pay\ne. Specialty\nf. Penalties\nIV. Act 900 Improperly Affects Plan Design",
        "reference": "III. Arkansas is One of Several States that Purport to Regulate ERISA-Regulated Plans, Thus Subjecting the Plans to a Patchwork of Complex and Often Inconsistent Regulations, All of Which Are Preempted by ERISA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Act 900 has a Direct and Adverse Economic Effect on this Self-Funded Plan\nII. Act 900 Expressly Purports to Regulate the Federally-Regulated J.B. Hunt Plan and the Benefits it Provides to its Members\nIII. Arkansas is One of Several States that Purport to Regulate ERISA-Regulated Plans, Thus Subjecting the Plans to a Patchwork of Complex and Often Inconsistent Regulations, All of Which Are Preempted by ERISA\na. Disclosure/Transparency\nb. [MISSING]\nc. Mail-Order\nd. Prompt Pay\ne. Specialty\nf. Penalties\nIV. Act 900 Improperly Affects Plan Design",
        "reference": "b. MAC Lists",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Act 900 has a Direct and Adverse Economic Effect on this Self-Funded Plan\nII. Act 900 Expressly Purports to Regulate the Federally-Regulated J.B. Hunt Plan and the Benefits it Provides to its Members\nIII. Arkansas is One of Several States that Purport to Regulate ERISA-Regulated Plans, Thus Subjecting the Plans to a Patchwork of Complex and Often Inconsistent Regulations, All of Which Are Preempted by ERISA\na. Disclosure/Transparency\nb. MAC Lists\nc. Mail-Order\nd. [MISSING]\ne. Specialty\nf. Penalties\nIV. Act 900 Improperly Affects Plan Design",
        "reference": "d. Prompt Pay",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Act 900 has a Direct and Adverse Economic Effect on this Self-Funded Plan\nII. Act 900 Expressly Purports to Regulate the Federally-Regulated J.B. Hunt Plan and the Benefits it Provides to its Members\nIII. Arkansas is One of Several States that Purport to Regulate ERISA-Regulated Plans, Thus Subjecting the Plans to a Patchwork of Complex and Often Inconsistent Regulations, All of Which Are Preempted by ERISA\na. Disclosure/Transparency\nb. MAC Lists\nc. Mail-Order\nd. Prompt Pay\ne. Specialty\nf. Penalties\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Act 900 Improperly Affects Plan Design",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Courts of Appeals Are Irreconcilably Split Over Reed\nIII. This Case Presents a Recurring Question of Profound Nationwide Importance\nIV. This Case Cleanly Presents the Question for Review",
        "reference": "I. Reed Does Not Mandate Strict Scrutiny Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Reed Does Not Mandate Strict Scrutiny Here\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Case Presents a Recurring Question of Profound Nationwide Importance\nIV. This Case Cleanly Presents the Question for Review",
        "reference": "II. The Courts of Appeals Are Irreconcilably Split Over Reed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Reed Does Not Mandate Strict Scrutiny Here\nII. The Courts of Appeals Are Irreconcilably Split Over Reed\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. This Case Cleanly Presents the Question for Review",
        "reference": "III. This Case Presents a Recurring Question of Profound Nationwide Importance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Reed Does Not Mandate Strict Scrutiny Here\nII. The Courts of Appeals Are Irreconcilably Split Over Reed\nIII. This Case Presents a Recurring Question of Profound Nationwide Importance\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. This Case Cleanly Presents the Question for Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE CHOICE TO BE SILENT ENCOMPASSES MORE THAN A RIGHT TO DISASSOCIATE OR DISAGREE",
        "reference": "I. UNDER KNOX, THE OPT-OUT REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS IS CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNDER KNOX, THE OPT-OUT REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS IS CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE CHOICE TO BE SILENT ENCOMPASSES MORE THAN A RIGHT TO DISASSOCIATE OR DISAGREE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Fannie And Freddie Did Not Require A \"Rescue\" In 2008\nB. The Conservatorship Of Fannie And Freddie Stemmed From A Policy Decision by Treasury\nC. Treasury And FHFA Used The Conservatorship To Lay The Groundwork For The Net Worth Sweep\nII. A COMBINATION OF TEMPORARY AND ARTIFICIAL NON-CASH ACCOUNTING ENTRIES IMPOSED BY FHFA FORCED THE COMPANIES TO DRAW $187 BILLION IN SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK FROM TREASURY\nIII. THE FEDERAL PARTIES IMPOSED THE NET WORTH SWEEP IN AUGUST 2012 TO ENSURE THAT INCOME FROM REVERSALS OF THE COMPANIES' NON-CASH ACCOUNTING EXPENSES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED ENTIRELY TO TREASURY, PREVENTING THE COMPANIES FROM REBUILDING THEIR CAPITAL",
        "reference": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONALIZATION OF THE COMPANIES WAS NOT A RESCUE, BUT A PLANNED TAKEOVER BY TREASURY FOR POLICY REASONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONALIZATION OF THE COMPANIES WAS NOT A RESCUE, BUT A PLANNED TAKEOVER BY TREASURY FOR POLICY REASONS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Conservatorship Of Fannie And Freddie Stemmed From A Policy Decision by Treasury\nC. Treasury And FHFA Used The Conservatorship To Lay The Groundwork For The Net Worth Sweep\nII. A COMBINATION OF TEMPORARY AND ARTIFICIAL NON-CASH ACCOUNTING ENTRIES IMPOSED BY FHFA FORCED THE COMPANIES TO DRAW $187 BILLION IN SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK FROM TREASURY\nIII. THE FEDERAL PARTIES IMPOSED THE NET WORTH SWEEP IN AUGUST 2012 TO ENSURE THAT INCOME FROM REVERSALS OF THE COMPANIES' NON-CASH ACCOUNTING EXPENSES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED ENTIRELY TO TREASURY, PREVENTING THE COMPANIES FROM REBUILDING THEIR CAPITAL",
        "reference": "A. Fannie And Freddie Did Not Require A \"Rescue\" In 2008",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONALIZATION OF THE COMPANIES WAS NOT A RESCUE, BUT A PLANNED TAKEOVER BY TREASURY FOR POLICY REASONS\nA. Fannie And Freddie Did Not Require A \"Rescue\" In 2008\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Treasury And FHFA Used The Conservatorship To Lay The Groundwork For The Net Worth Sweep\nII. A COMBINATION OF TEMPORARY AND ARTIFICIAL NON-CASH ACCOUNTING ENTRIES IMPOSED BY FHFA FORCED THE COMPANIES TO DRAW $187 BILLION IN SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK FROM TREASURY\nIII. THE FEDERAL PARTIES IMPOSED THE NET WORTH SWEEP IN AUGUST 2012 TO ENSURE THAT INCOME FROM REVERSALS OF THE COMPANIES' NON-CASH ACCOUNTING EXPENSES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED ENTIRELY TO TREASURY, PREVENTING THE COMPANIES FROM REBUILDING THEIR CAPITAL",
        "reference": "B. The Conservatorship Of Fannie And Freddie Stemmed From A Policy Decision by Treasury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONALIZATION OF THE COMPANIES WAS NOT A RESCUE, BUT A PLANNED TAKEOVER BY TREASURY FOR POLICY REASONS\nA. Fannie And Freddie Did Not Require A \"Rescue\" In 2008\nB. The Conservatorship Of Fannie And Freddie Stemmed From A Policy Decision by Treasury\nC. [MISSING]\nII. A COMBINATION OF TEMPORARY AND ARTIFICIAL NON-CASH ACCOUNTING ENTRIES IMPOSED BY FHFA FORCED THE COMPANIES TO DRAW $187 BILLION IN SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK FROM TREASURY\nIII. THE FEDERAL PARTIES IMPOSED THE NET WORTH SWEEP IN AUGUST 2012 TO ENSURE THAT INCOME FROM REVERSALS OF THE COMPANIES' NON-CASH ACCOUNTING EXPENSES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED ENTIRELY TO TREASURY, PREVENTING THE COMPANIES FROM REBUILDING THEIR CAPITAL",
        "reference": "C. Treasury And FHFA Used The Conservatorship To Lay The Groundwork For The Net Worth Sweep",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONALIZATION OF THE COMPANIES WAS NOT A RESCUE, BUT A PLANNED TAKEOVER BY TREASURY FOR POLICY REASONS\nA. Fannie And Freddie Did Not Require A \"Rescue\" In 2008\nB. The Conservatorship Of Fannie And Freddie Stemmed From A Policy Decision by Treasury\nC. Treasury And FHFA Used The Conservatorship To Lay The Groundwork For The Net Worth Sweep\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE FEDERAL PARTIES IMPOSED THE NET WORTH SWEEP IN AUGUST 2012 TO ENSURE THAT INCOME FROM REVERSALS OF THE COMPANIES' NON-CASH ACCOUNTING EXPENSES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED ENTIRELY TO TREASURY, PREVENTING THE COMPANIES FROM REBUILDING THEIR CAPITAL",
        "reference": "II. A COMBINATION OF TEMPORARY AND ARTIFICIAL NON-CASH ACCOUNTING ENTRIES IMPOSED BY FHFA FORCED THE COMPANIES TO DRAW $187 BILLION IN SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK FROM TREASURY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S NATIONALIZATION OF THE COMPANIES WAS NOT A RESCUE, BUT A PLANNED TAKEOVER BY TREASURY FOR POLICY REASONS\nA. Fannie And Freddie Did Not Require A \"Rescue\" In 2008\nB. The Conservatorship Of Fannie And Freddie Stemmed From A Policy Decision by Treasury\nC. Treasury And FHFA Used The Conservatorship To Lay The Groundwork For The Net Worth Sweep\nII. A COMBINATION OF TEMPORARY AND ARTIFICIAL NON-CASH ACCOUNTING ENTRIES IMPOSED BY FHFA FORCED THE COMPANIES TO DRAW $187 BILLION IN SENIOR PREFERRED STOCK FROM TREASURY\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE FEDERAL PARTIES IMPOSED THE NET WORTH SWEEP IN AUGUST 2012 TO ENSURE THAT INCOME FROM REVERSALS OF THE COMPANIES' NON-CASH ACCOUNTING EXPENSES WOULD BE TRANSFERRED ENTIRELY TO TREASURY, PREVENTING THE COMPANIES FROM REBUILDING THEIR CAPITAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important\nIII. The Decision Below Is Wrong\nIV. This Case Is the Right Vehicle",
        "reference": "I. The Invalidation of an Important Federal Statute Warrants the Court's Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Invalidation of an Important Federal Statute Warrants the Court's Review\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decision Below Is Wrong\nIV. This Case Is the Right Vehicle",
        "reference": "II. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Invalidation of an Important Federal Statute Warrants the Court's Review\nII. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. This Case Is the Right Vehicle",
        "reference": "III. The Decision Below Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Invalidation of an Important Federal Statute Warrants the Court's Review\nII. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important\nIII. The Decision Below Is Wrong\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. This Case Is the Right Vehicle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities\nB. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com\nC. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines\nA. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services\nB. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance\nIII. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable\nA. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses\nB. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "reference": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation\nA. [MISSING]\nB. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com\nC. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines\nA. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services\nB. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance\nIII. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable\nA. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses\nB. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "reference": "A. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation\nA. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities\nB. [MISSING]\nC. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines\nA. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services\nB. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance\nIII. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable\nA. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses\nB. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "reference": "B. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation\nA. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities\nB. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines\nA. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services\nB. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance\nIII. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable\nA. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses\nB. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "reference": "C. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation\nA. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities\nB. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com\nC. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services\nB. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance\nIII. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable\nA. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses\nB. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "reference": "II. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation\nA. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities\nB. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com\nC. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance\nIII. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable\nA. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses\nB. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "reference": "A. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation\nA. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities\nB. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com\nC. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines\nA. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable\nA. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses\nB. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "reference": "B. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation\nA. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities\nB. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com\nC. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines\nA. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services\nB. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses\nB. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "reference": "III. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation\nA. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities\nB. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com\nC. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines\nA. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services\nB. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance\nIII. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "reference": "A. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation\nA. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities\nB. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com\nC. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines\nA. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services\nB. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance\nIII. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable\nA. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "reference": "B. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Is a Generic Commercial Identifier Akin to an Entity Designation\nA. The Generic Top-Level Domain \".com\" Was Created to Identify the Genus of Web Addresses Belonging to Commercial Entities\nB. \"Dot Com\" Has Become a Generic Term for Companies with Web Addresses Ending in .com\nC. \".com\" Is at Least As Generic a Term for Online Companies As \"Co.\" Is for Offline Companies\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts with Competition-Protective Trademark Doctrines\nA. The Decision Below Would Impair Businesses' Ability to Use Domain Names That Identify Their Goods and Services\nB. Top-Level Domains Are Functional and Thus Lack Trademark Significance\nIII. The Public Interest Overwhelmingly Supports the PTO's Rule That Generic TLDs Cannot Make Generic Words Protectable\nA. New Trademark Protection Is Unnecessary Because the DNS Already Ensures that Domain Names Reliably Identify and Distinguish Online Businesses\nB. Extending Protection to Generic Words Combined with gTLDs Will Disrupt and Complicate Trademark Examination Procedures\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Fourth Circuit's Approach Will Disproportionately Hurt Small Businesses by Increasing the Risk of Trademark Litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Judicial review of the immigration-related actions of the political branches is deferential\nB. The Proclamation is constitutional under this Court's deferential standards applicable to challenges to the political branches' immigration-related actions\nII. The Proclamation is constitutional even under a traditional Establishment Clause analysis",
        "reference": "I. The Proclamation meets the deferential standards applicable to the immigration policymaking and enforcement decisions of the political branches",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Proclamation meets the deferential standards applicable to the immigration policymaking and enforcement decisions of the political branches\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Proclamation is constitutional under this Court's deferential standards applicable to challenges to the political branches' immigration-related actions\nII. The Proclamation is constitutional even under a traditional Establishment Clause analysis",
        "reference": "A. Judicial review of the immigration-related actions of the political branches is deferential",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Proclamation meets the deferential standards applicable to the immigration policymaking and enforcement decisions of the political branches\nA. Judicial review of the immigration-related actions of the political branches is deferential\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Proclamation is constitutional even under a traditional Establishment Clause analysis",
        "reference": "B. The Proclamation is constitutional under this Court's deferential standards applicable to challenges to the political branches' immigration-related actions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Proclamation meets the deferential standards applicable to the immigration policymaking and enforcement decisions of the political branches\nA. Judicial review of the immigration-related actions of the political branches is deferential\nB. The Proclamation is constitutional under this Court's deferential standards applicable to challenges to the political branches' immigration-related actions\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Proclamation is constitutional even under a traditional Establishment Clause analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. If the Court grants certiorari on the first question presented, it should review the second question",
        "reference": "A. The first question presented warrants review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The first question presented warrants review\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. If the Court grants certiorari on the first question presented, it should review the second question",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE BY STATES LIKE INDIANA UNDERSCORES THE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE",
        "reference": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN REFUSING TO ANALYZE WHETHER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO THE STATES, THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT IGNORED ITS OBLIGATION TO ENFORCE THE U.S. CONSTITUTION\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE ABUSE OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE BY STATES LIKE INDIANA UNDERSCORES THE PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. There Exists No Crisis of Criminal Jurisdiction on the Creek Reservation\nIII. Civil Society Has Not Plunged into Chaos on the Creek Reservation\nIV. Congress Is Actively Engaged in Protecting Public Safety on the Creek Reservation",
        "reference": "I. Oklahoma Confuses the Court for a Political Branch of Government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Oklahoma Confuses the Court for a Political Branch of Government\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Civil Society Has Not Plunged into Chaos on the Creek Reservation\nIV. Congress Is Actively Engaged in Protecting Public Safety on the Creek Reservation",
        "reference": "II. There Exists No Crisis of Criminal Jurisdiction on the Creek Reservation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Oklahoma Confuses the Court for a Political Branch of Government\nII. There Exists No Crisis of Criminal Jurisdiction on the Creek Reservation\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Congress Is Actively Engaged in Protecting Public Safety on the Creek Reservation",
        "reference": "III. Civil Society Has Not Plunged into Chaos on the Creek Reservation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Oklahoma Confuses the Court for a Political Branch of Government\nII. There Exists No Crisis of Criminal Jurisdiction on the Creek Reservation\nIII. Civil Society Has Not Plunged into Chaos on the Creek Reservation\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Congress Is Actively Engaged in Protecting Public Safety on the Creek Reservation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client\nB. Counsel Are Required To File a Notice of Appeal Even When They Fail To Identify Any Appealable Issues\nII. This Court Should Grant Certiorari To Preserve the Role of Courts as the Final Arbiter of Appeals\nIII. The Decision Below Creates Needless Confusion and Uncertainty for Criminal Defense Lawyers",
        "reference": "I. Criminal Defendants Have a Right to Counsel Who Will File a Notice of Appeal on Their Behalf",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Criminal Defendants Have a Right to Counsel Who Will File a Notice of Appeal on Their Behalf\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Counsel Are Required To File a Notice of Appeal Even When They Fail To Identify Any Appealable Issues\nII. This Court Should Grant Certiorari To Preserve the Role of Courts as the Final Arbiter of Appeals\nIII. The Decision Below Creates Needless Confusion and Uncertainty for Criminal Defense Lawyers",
        "reference": "A. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Criminal Defendants Have a Right to Counsel Who Will File a Notice of Appeal on Their Behalf\nA. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client\nB. [MISSING]\nII. This Court Should Grant Certiorari To Preserve the Role of Courts as the Final Arbiter of Appeals\nIII. The Decision Below Creates Needless Confusion and Uncertainty for Criminal Defense Lawyers",
        "reference": "B. Counsel Are Required To File a Notice of Appeal Even When They Fail To Identify Any Appealable Issues",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Criminal Defendants Have a Right to Counsel Who Will File a Notice of Appeal on Their Behalf\nA. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client\nB. Counsel Are Required To File a Notice of Appeal Even When They Fail To Identify Any Appealable Issues\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decision Below Creates Needless Confusion and Uncertainty for Criminal Defense Lawyers",
        "reference": "II. This Court Should Grant Certiorari To Preserve the Role of Courts as the Final Arbiter of Appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Criminal Defendants Have a Right to Counsel Who Will File a Notice of Appeal on Their Behalf\nA. Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Law, Legal Ethics, and Agency Law Vest the Final Decision to Appeal in the Client\nB. Counsel Are Required To File a Notice of Appeal Even When They Fail To Identify Any Appealable Issues\nII. This Court Should Grant Certiorari To Preserve the Role of Courts as the Final Arbiter of Appeals\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Decision Below Creates Needless Confusion and Uncertainty for Criminal Defense Lawyers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Federalism And Separation Of Powers Principles Require A \"Clear Notice\" Standard\nB. Common Law Contract Principles Confirm That A \"Clear Notice\" Standard Is Warranted\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Compel A Different Result\nII. IN ALL EVENTS, FNHRA DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO section 1983 CLAIMS\nA. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983\nB. The Absence Of An Express Damages Remedy In FNHRA For Residents Of Privately Owned Facilities Confirms That Congress Did Not Intend Residents Of Publicly Owned Facilities To Have A section 1983 Remedy\nC. FNHRA Does Not \"Unambiguously Confer\" The Two \"Rights\" Respondent Asserts\nD. The Savings Clause Does Not Preserve A section 1983 Remedy",
        "reference": "I. UNLESS A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE PROVIDES CLEAR NOTICE THAT ACCEPTING STATES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LAWSUITS, SUCH STATUTES DO NOT \"SECURE\" RIGHTS UNDER section 1983",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNLESS A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE PROVIDES CLEAR NOTICE THAT ACCEPTING STATES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LAWSUITS, SUCH STATUTES DO NOT \"SECURE\" RIGHTS UNDER section 1983\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Common Law Contract Principles Confirm That A \"Clear Notice\" Standard Is Warranted\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Compel A Different Result\nII. IN ALL EVENTS, FNHRA DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO section 1983 CLAIMS\nA. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983\nB. The Absence Of An Express Damages Remedy In FNHRA For Residents Of Privately Owned Facilities Confirms That Congress Did Not Intend Residents Of Publicly Owned Facilities To Have A section 1983 Remedy\nC. FNHRA Does Not \"Unambiguously Confer\" The Two \"Rights\" Respondent Asserts\nD. The Savings Clause Does Not Preserve A section 1983 Remedy",
        "reference": "A. Federalism And Separation Of Powers Principles Require A \"Clear Notice\" Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNLESS A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE PROVIDES CLEAR NOTICE THAT ACCEPTING STATES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LAWSUITS, SUCH STATUTES DO NOT \"SECURE\" RIGHTS UNDER section 1983\nA. Federalism And Separation Of Powers Principles Require A \"Clear Notice\" Standard\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Compel A Different Result\nII. IN ALL EVENTS, FNHRA DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO section 1983 CLAIMS\nA. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983\nB. The Absence Of An Express Damages Remedy In FNHRA For Residents Of Privately Owned Facilities Confirms That Congress Did Not Intend Residents Of Publicly Owned Facilities To Have A section 1983 Remedy\nC. FNHRA Does Not \"Unambiguously Confer\" The Two \"Rights\" Respondent Asserts\nD. The Savings Clause Does Not Preserve A section 1983 Remedy",
        "reference": "B. Common Law Contract Principles Confirm That A \"Clear Notice\" Standard Is Warranted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNLESS A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE PROVIDES CLEAR NOTICE THAT ACCEPTING STATES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LAWSUITS, SUCH STATUTES DO NOT \"SECURE\" RIGHTS UNDER section 1983\nA. Federalism And Separation Of Powers Principles Require A \"Clear Notice\" Standard\nB. Common Law Contract Principles Confirm That A \"Clear Notice\" Standard Is Warranted\nC. [MISSING]\nII. IN ALL EVENTS, FNHRA DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO section 1983 CLAIMS\nA. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983\nB. The Absence Of An Express Damages Remedy In FNHRA For Residents Of Privately Owned Facilities Confirms That Congress Did Not Intend Residents Of Publicly Owned Facilities To Have A section 1983 Remedy\nC. FNHRA Does Not \"Unambiguously Confer\" The Two \"Rights\" Respondent Asserts\nD. The Savings Clause Does Not Preserve A section 1983 Remedy",
        "reference": "C. Stare Decisis Does Not Compel A Different Result",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNLESS A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE PROVIDES CLEAR NOTICE THAT ACCEPTING STATES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LAWSUITS, SUCH STATUTES DO NOT \"SECURE\" RIGHTS UNDER section 1983\nA. Federalism And Separation Of Powers Principles Require A \"Clear Notice\" Standard\nB. Common Law Contract Principles Confirm That A \"Clear Notice\" Standard Is Warranted\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Compel A Different Result\nII. [MISSING]\nA. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983\nB. The Absence Of An Express Damages Remedy In FNHRA For Residents Of Privately Owned Facilities Confirms That Congress Did Not Intend Residents Of Publicly Owned Facilities To Have A section 1983 Remedy\nC. FNHRA Does Not \"Unambiguously Confer\" The Two \"Rights\" Respondent Asserts\nD. The Savings Clause Does Not Preserve A section 1983 Remedy",
        "reference": "II. IN ALL EVENTS, FNHRA DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO section 1983 CLAIMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNLESS A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE PROVIDES CLEAR NOTICE THAT ACCEPTING STATES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LAWSUITS, SUCH STATUTES DO NOT \"SECURE\" RIGHTS UNDER section 1983\nA. Federalism And Separation Of Powers Principles Require A \"Clear Notice\" Standard\nB. Common Law Contract Principles Confirm That A \"Clear Notice\" Standard Is Warranted\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Compel A Different Result\nII. IN ALL EVENTS, FNHRA DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO section 1983 CLAIMS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Absence Of An Express Damages Remedy In FNHRA For Residents Of Privately Owned Facilities Confirms That Congress Did Not Intend Residents Of Publicly Owned Facilities To Have A section 1983 Remedy\nC. FNHRA Does Not \"Unambiguously Confer\" The Two \"Rights\" Respondent Asserts\nD. The Savings Clause Does Not Preserve A section 1983 Remedy",
        "reference": "A. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNLESS A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE PROVIDES CLEAR NOTICE THAT ACCEPTING STATES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LAWSUITS, SUCH STATUTES DO NOT \"SECURE\" RIGHTS UNDER section 1983\nA. Federalism And Separation Of Powers Principles Require A \"Clear Notice\" Standard\nB. Common Law Contract Principles Confirm That A \"Clear Notice\" Standard Is Warranted\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Compel A Different Result\nII. IN ALL EVENTS, FNHRA DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO section 1983 CLAIMS\nA. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983\nB. [MISSING]\nC. FNHRA Does Not \"Unambiguously Confer\" The Two \"Rights\" Respondent Asserts\nD. The Savings Clause Does Not Preserve A section 1983 Remedy",
        "reference": "B. The Absence Of An Express Damages Remedy In FNHRA For Residents Of Privately Owned Facilities Confirms That Congress Did Not Intend Residents Of Publicly Owned Facilities To Have A section 1983 Remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNLESS A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE PROVIDES CLEAR NOTICE THAT ACCEPTING STATES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LAWSUITS, SUCH STATUTES DO NOT \"SECURE\" RIGHTS UNDER section 1983\nA. Federalism And Separation Of Powers Principles Require A \"Clear Notice\" Standard\nB. Common Law Contract Principles Confirm That A \"Clear Notice\" Standard Is Warranted\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Compel A Different Result\nII. IN ALL EVENTS, FNHRA DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO section 1983 CLAIMS\nA. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983\nB. The Absence Of An Express Damages Remedy In FNHRA For Residents Of Privately Owned Facilities Confirms That Congress Did Not Intend Residents Of Publicly Owned Facilities To Have A section 1983 Remedy\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Savings Clause Does Not Preserve A section 1983 Remedy",
        "reference": "C. FNHRA Does Not \"Unambiguously Confer\" The Two \"Rights\" Respondent Asserts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNLESS A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE PROVIDES CLEAR NOTICE THAT ACCEPTING STATES WILL BE SUBJECT TO PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT LAWSUITS, SUCH STATUTES DO NOT \"SECURE\" RIGHTS UNDER section 1983\nA. Federalism And Separation Of Powers Principles Require A \"Clear Notice\" Standard\nB. Common Law Contract Principles Confirm That A \"Clear Notice\" Standard Is Warranted\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Compel A Different Result\nII. IN ALL EVENTS, FNHRA DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO section 1983 CLAIMS\nA. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983\nB. The Absence Of An Express Damages Remedy In FNHRA For Residents Of Privately Owned Facilities Confirms That Congress Did Not Intend Residents Of Publicly Owned Facilities To Have A section 1983 Remedy\nC. FNHRA Does Not \"Unambiguously Confer\" The Two \"Rights\" Respondent Asserts\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The Savings Clause Does Not Preserve A section 1983 Remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. [MISSING]\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "II. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "A. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "2. Marissa Molina",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "3. Vanessa Luna",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. [MISSING]\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "4. Erik Kwak",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. [MISSING]\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "5. Denise Panaligan",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. [MISSING]\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "B. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "C. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APA REQUIRES AN AGENCY TO CONSIDER \"SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS\" WHEN IMPLEMENTING A POLICY CHANGE\nII. DACA HAS ENGENDERED SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS IN TEACH FOR AMERICA, TEACHERS, SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS\nA. DACA Freed Undocumented Young People to Pursue Productive Lives\n1. Alejandro Fuentes Mena\n2. Marissa Molina\n3. Vanessa Luna\n4. Erik Kwak\n5. Denise Panaligan\n6. Miriam Gonzalez Avila\nB. DACA Teachers Provide Special Value to Students, Schools, and Communities\n1. Teacher Diversity Redresses Achievement Gaps and Promotes Positive Student Outcomes\n2. Excellent Teachers Offer Great Value, Especially in Teacher Shortage Areas\nC. Teach For America Has Expended Considerable Resources Recruiting and Supporting Talented DACA Teachers\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE DEPARTMENT ACTED ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY BY RESCINDING DACA WITHOUT CONSIDERING SERIOUS RELIANCE INTERESTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. As a general rule, the President must possess unrestricted authority to remove principal executive officers\n1. The Decision of 1789\n2. Myers\n3. Humphrey's Executor\n4. Free Enterprise Fund\nB. The Humphrey's Executor exception should not be extended to a single-headed agency like the Bureau\nC. The contrary reasoning of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits is erroneous\nD. If this Court were to conclude that Humphrey's Executor cannot be distinguished, it should narrow or overrule that decision\nII. The removal restriction is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "reference": "I. The statutory restriction on the President's ability to remove the Bureau's Director violates the separation of powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statutory restriction on the President's ability to remove the Bureau's Director violates the separation of powers\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The Decision of 1789\n2. Myers\n3. Humphrey's Executor\n4. Free Enterprise Fund\nB. The Humphrey's Executor exception should not be extended to a single-headed agency like the Bureau\nC. The contrary reasoning of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits is erroneous\nD. If this Court were to conclude that Humphrey's Executor cannot be distinguished, it should narrow or overrule that decision\nII. The removal restriction is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "reference": "A. As a general rule, the President must possess unrestricted authority to remove principal executive officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statutory restriction on the President's ability to remove the Bureau's Director violates the separation of powers\nA. As a general rule, the President must possess unrestricted authority to remove principal executive officers\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Myers\n3. Humphrey's Executor\n4. Free Enterprise Fund\nB. The Humphrey's Executor exception should not be extended to a single-headed agency like the Bureau\nC. The contrary reasoning of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits is erroneous\nD. If this Court were to conclude that Humphrey's Executor cannot be distinguished, it should narrow or overrule that decision\nII. The removal restriction is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "reference": "1. The Decision of 1789",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statutory restriction on the President's ability to remove the Bureau's Director violates the separation of powers\nA. As a general rule, the President must possess unrestricted authority to remove principal executive officers\n1. The Decision of 1789\n2. Myers\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Free Enterprise Fund\nB. The Humphrey's Executor exception should not be extended to a single-headed agency like the Bureau\nC. The contrary reasoning of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits is erroneous\nD. If this Court were to conclude that Humphrey's Executor cannot be distinguished, it should narrow or overrule that decision\nII. The removal restriction is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "reference": "3. Humphrey's Executor",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statutory restriction on the President's ability to remove the Bureau's Director violates the separation of powers\nA. As a general rule, the President must possess unrestricted authority to remove principal executive officers\n1. The Decision of 1789\n2. Myers\n3. Humphrey's Executor\n4. [MISSING]\nB. The Humphrey's Executor exception should not be extended to a single-headed agency like the Bureau\nC. The contrary reasoning of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits is erroneous\nD. If this Court were to conclude that Humphrey's Executor cannot be distinguished, it should narrow or overrule that decision\nII. The removal restriction is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "reference": "4. Free Enterprise Fund",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statutory restriction on the President's ability to remove the Bureau's Director violates the separation of powers\nA. As a general rule, the President must possess unrestricted authority to remove principal executive officers\n1. The Decision of 1789\n2. Myers\n3. Humphrey's Executor\n4. Free Enterprise Fund\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The contrary reasoning of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits is erroneous\nD. If this Court were to conclude that Humphrey's Executor cannot be distinguished, it should narrow or overrule that decision\nII. The removal restriction is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "reference": "B. The Humphrey's Executor exception should not be extended to a single-headed agency like the Bureau",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statutory restriction on the President's ability to remove the Bureau's Director violates the separation of powers\nA. As a general rule, the President must possess unrestricted authority to remove principal executive officers\n1. The Decision of 1789\n2. Myers\n3. Humphrey's Executor\n4. Free Enterprise Fund\nB. The Humphrey's Executor exception should not be extended to a single-headed agency like the Bureau\nC. [MISSING]\nD. If this Court were to conclude that Humphrey's Executor cannot be distinguished, it should narrow or overrule that decision\nII. The removal restriction is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "reference": "C. The contrary reasoning of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits is erroneous",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statutory restriction on the President's ability to remove the Bureau's Director violates the separation of powers\nA. As a general rule, the President must possess unrestricted authority to remove principal executive officers\n1. The Decision of 1789\n2. Myers\n3. Humphrey's Executor\n4. Free Enterprise Fund\nB. The Humphrey's Executor exception should not be extended to a single-headed agency like the Bureau\nC. The contrary reasoning of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits is erroneous\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The removal restriction is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "reference": "D. If this Court were to conclude that Humphrey's Executor cannot be distinguished, it should narrow or overrule that decision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statutory restriction on the President's ability to remove the Bureau's Director violates the separation of powers\nA. As a general rule, the President must possess unrestricted authority to remove principal executive officers\n1. The Decision of 1789\n2. Myers\n3. Humphrey's Executor\n4. Free Enterprise Fund\nB. The Humphrey's Executor exception should not be extended to a single-headed agency like the Bureau\nC. The contrary reasoning of the Ninth and D.C. Circuits is erroneous\nD. If this Court were to conclude that Humphrey's Executor cannot be distinguished, it should narrow or overrule that decision\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The removal restriction is severable from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-483_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Seventh Circuit's Stringent Rational Basis Analysis Openly Conflicts with the Eighth Circuit, which Gives Greater Deference to a State's Legislative Judgment\nB. Lower Federal Courts Have Reached Conflicting Conclusions as to Whether Fetal Remains Statutes Implicate a Woman's Fundamental Right to Choose and, If So, What the Proper Standard of Review Is Post-Hellerstedt\nII. Certiorari Should Be Granted Because the Seventh Circuit Misapplies the Rational Basis Standard of Review that This Court Has Articulated, Thereby Impermissibly Interfering with the Legislative Function",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Circuits Are in Conflict over the Appropriate Standard of Review to Apply to Fetal Remains Statutes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-483_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Circuits Are in Conflict over the Appropriate Standard of Review to Apply to Fetal Remains Statutes\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Lower Federal Courts Have Reached Conflicting Conclusions as to Whether Fetal Remains Statutes Implicate a Woman's Fundamental Right to Choose and, If So, What the Proper Standard of Review Is Post-Hellerstedt\nII. Certiorari Should Be Granted Because the Seventh Circuit Misapplies the Rational Basis Standard of Review that This Court Has Articulated, Thereby Impermissibly Interfering with the Legislative Function",
        "reference": "A. The Seventh Circuit's Stringent Rational Basis Analysis Openly Conflicts with the Eighth Circuit, which Gives Greater Deference to a State's Legislative Judgment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-483_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Circuits Are in Conflict over the Appropriate Standard of Review to Apply to Fetal Remains Statutes\nA. The Seventh Circuit's Stringent Rational Basis Analysis Openly Conflicts with the Eighth Circuit, which Gives Greater Deference to a State's Legislative Judgment\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Certiorari Should Be Granted Because the Seventh Circuit Misapplies the Rational Basis Standard of Review that This Court Has Articulated, Thereby Impermissibly Interfering with the Legislative Function",
        "reference": "B. Lower Federal Courts Have Reached Conflicting Conclusions as to Whether Fetal Remains Statutes Implicate a Woman's Fundamental Right to Choose and, If So, What the Proper Standard of Review Is Post-Hellerstedt",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-483_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Circuits Are in Conflict over the Appropriate Standard of Review to Apply to Fetal Remains Statutes\nA. The Seventh Circuit's Stringent Rational Basis Analysis Openly Conflicts with the Eighth Circuit, which Gives Greater Deference to a State's Legislative Judgment\nB. Lower Federal Courts Have Reached Conflicting Conclusions as to Whether Fetal Remains Statutes Implicate a Woman's Fundamental Right to Choose and, If So, What the Proper Standard of Review Is Post-Hellerstedt\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Certiorari Should Be Granted Because the Seventh Circuit Misapplies the Rational Basis Standard of Review that This Court Has Articulated, Thereby Impermissibly Interfering with the Legislative Function",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "B. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "C. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "D. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. [MISSING]\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "E. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. [MISSING]\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "F. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. [MISSING]\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "2. The Proposed Government Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. [MISSING]\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "II. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. [MISSING]\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "4. Intent Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. [MISSING]\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "5. Special Standard for Remoteness",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. [MISSING]\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "6. Special Standard for Routine Services",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. [MISSING]\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. [MISSING]\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "III. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "reference": "A. The Allegations of The Complaint",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER section 2333(d)(2) IS NOT LIMITED TO INSTANCES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR ACT OF ASSISTANCE IS CLOSELY CONNECTED TO THE PARTICULAR ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM THAT INJURED THE PLAINTIFF\nA. Introduction\nB. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise\nC. The Text of section 2333(d)(2) Applies To Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise\nD. The Statutory Context Supports Interpreting section 2333(d)(2) To Apply To Assisting A Terrorist Enterprise\nE. The Other Arguments of Defendants and The United States Are Not Persuasive\nF. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)\n1. The Proposed Twitter/Facebook Standard\n2. The Proposed Government Standard\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT ANY OF THE NEW LEGAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS PROPOSED BY DEFENDANTS OR THE UNITED STATES\n1. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Connected To The Reina Attack\n2. Knowledge of Accounts or Postings Used for Particular Attacks\n3. Knowledge of Substantial Assistance\n4. Intent Requirement\n5. Special Standard for Remoteness\n6. Special Standard for Routine Services\n7. Special Standard for Widely Available, Ordinary Services\n8. Requirement of Direct Knowledge\nIII. THE COMPLAINT PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THE DEFENDANTS KNOWINGLY ASSISTED ISIS'S TERRORIST ACTIVITIES\nA. The Allegations of The Complaint\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Defendants' Asserted Lack of More Specific Knowledge",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-882_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Government's Interpretation Of The Relevant Provisions Is Mistaken",
        "reference": "A. The Government Is Right About The Need For Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-882_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Government Is Right About The Need For Review\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Government's Interpretation Of The Relevant Provisions Is Mistaken",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Washington Supreme Court Erred in Recognizing an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. This Court's Decision in County of Yakima Did Not Recognize an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity from Suit\nB. Only Congress or an Indian Tribe May Limit a Tribe's Sovereign Immunity\nC. A State's Exercise of in rem Jurisdiction over Property Acquired by an Indian Tribe Works an Impermissible Diminution of the Tribe's Sovereignty\nD. All Sovereigns, and Particularly Indian Tribes, Have Interests in Ownership and Control of Their Land Protected by Sovereign Immunity\nIII. Once a Tribe Invokes Sovereign Immunity from Suit, Courts May Not Adjudicate Tribal Rights and Interests in the Absence of the Tribe\nIV. The Lundgrens Had and Continue to Have a Means to Seek Redress for Their Claim",
        "reference": "I. Federal Courts and Congress Have Long Recognized That Indian Tribes Retain Inherent Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts and Congress Have Long Recognized That Indian Tribes Retain Inherent Sovereign Immunity\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court's Decision in County of Yakima Did Not Recognize an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity from Suit\nB. Only Congress or an Indian Tribe May Limit a Tribe's Sovereign Immunity\nC. A State's Exercise of in rem Jurisdiction over Property Acquired by an Indian Tribe Works an Impermissible Diminution of the Tribe's Sovereignty\nD. All Sovereigns, and Particularly Indian Tribes, Have Interests in Ownership and Control of Their Land Protected by Sovereign Immunity\nIII. Once a Tribe Invokes Sovereign Immunity from Suit, Courts May Not Adjudicate Tribal Rights and Interests in the Absence of the Tribe\nIV. The Lundgrens Had and Continue to Have a Means to Seek Redress for Their Claim",
        "reference": "II. The Washington Supreme Court Erred in Recognizing an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts and Congress Have Long Recognized That Indian Tribes Retain Inherent Sovereign Immunity\nII. The Washington Supreme Court Erred in Recognizing an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Only Congress or an Indian Tribe May Limit a Tribe's Sovereign Immunity\nC. A State's Exercise of in rem Jurisdiction over Property Acquired by an Indian Tribe Works an Impermissible Diminution of the Tribe's Sovereignty\nD. All Sovereigns, and Particularly Indian Tribes, Have Interests in Ownership and Control of Their Land Protected by Sovereign Immunity\nIII. Once a Tribe Invokes Sovereign Immunity from Suit, Courts May Not Adjudicate Tribal Rights and Interests in the Absence of the Tribe\nIV. The Lundgrens Had and Continue to Have a Means to Seek Redress for Their Claim",
        "reference": "A. This Court's Decision in County of Yakima Did Not Recognize an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity from Suit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts and Congress Have Long Recognized That Indian Tribes Retain Inherent Sovereign Immunity\nII. The Washington Supreme Court Erred in Recognizing an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. This Court's Decision in County of Yakima Did Not Recognize an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity from Suit\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A State's Exercise of in rem Jurisdiction over Property Acquired by an Indian Tribe Works an Impermissible Diminution of the Tribe's Sovereignty\nD. All Sovereigns, and Particularly Indian Tribes, Have Interests in Ownership and Control of Their Land Protected by Sovereign Immunity\nIII. Once a Tribe Invokes Sovereign Immunity from Suit, Courts May Not Adjudicate Tribal Rights and Interests in the Absence of the Tribe\nIV. The Lundgrens Had and Continue to Have a Means to Seek Redress for Their Claim",
        "reference": "B. Only Congress or an Indian Tribe May Limit a Tribe's Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts and Congress Have Long Recognized That Indian Tribes Retain Inherent Sovereign Immunity\nII. The Washington Supreme Court Erred in Recognizing an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. This Court's Decision in County of Yakima Did Not Recognize an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity from Suit\nB. Only Congress or an Indian Tribe May Limit a Tribe's Sovereign Immunity\nC. [MISSING]\nD. All Sovereigns, and Particularly Indian Tribes, Have Interests in Ownership and Control of Their Land Protected by Sovereign Immunity\nIII. Once a Tribe Invokes Sovereign Immunity from Suit, Courts May Not Adjudicate Tribal Rights and Interests in the Absence of the Tribe\nIV. The Lundgrens Had and Continue to Have a Means to Seek Redress for Their Claim",
        "reference": "C. A State's Exercise of in rem Jurisdiction over Property Acquired by an Indian Tribe Works an Impermissible Diminution of the Tribe's Sovereignty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts and Congress Have Long Recognized That Indian Tribes Retain Inherent Sovereign Immunity\nII. The Washington Supreme Court Erred in Recognizing an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. This Court's Decision in County of Yakima Did Not Recognize an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity from Suit\nB. Only Congress or an Indian Tribe May Limit a Tribe's Sovereign Immunity\nC. A State's Exercise of in rem Jurisdiction over Property Acquired by an Indian Tribe Works an Impermissible Diminution of the Tribe's Sovereignty\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. Once a Tribe Invokes Sovereign Immunity from Suit, Courts May Not Adjudicate Tribal Rights and Interests in the Absence of the Tribe\nIV. The Lundgrens Had and Continue to Have a Means to Seek Redress for Their Claim",
        "reference": "D. All Sovereigns, and Particularly Indian Tribes, Have Interests in Ownership and Control of Their Land Protected by Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts and Congress Have Long Recognized That Indian Tribes Retain Inherent Sovereign Immunity\nII. The Washington Supreme Court Erred in Recognizing an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. This Court's Decision in County of Yakima Did Not Recognize an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity from Suit\nB. Only Congress or an Indian Tribe May Limit a Tribe's Sovereign Immunity\nC. A State's Exercise of in rem Jurisdiction over Property Acquired by an Indian Tribe Works an Impermissible Diminution of the Tribe's Sovereignty\nD. All Sovereigns, and Particularly Indian Tribes, Have Interests in Ownership and Control of Their Land Protected by Sovereign Immunity\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Lundgrens Had and Continue to Have a Means to Seek Redress for Their Claim",
        "reference": "III. Once a Tribe Invokes Sovereign Immunity from Suit, Courts May Not Adjudicate Tribal Rights and Interests in the Absence of the Tribe",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts and Congress Have Long Recognized That Indian Tribes Retain Inherent Sovereign Immunity\nII. The Washington Supreme Court Erred in Recognizing an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity\nA. This Court's Decision in County of Yakima Did Not Recognize an in rem Exception to Tribal Sovereign Immunity from Suit\nB. Only Congress or an Indian Tribe May Limit a Tribe's Sovereign Immunity\nC. A State's Exercise of in rem Jurisdiction over Property Acquired by an Indian Tribe Works an Impermissible Diminution of the Tribe's Sovereignty\nD. All Sovereigns, and Particularly Indian Tribes, Have Interests in Ownership and Control of Their Land Protected by Sovereign Immunity\nIII. Once a Tribe Invokes Sovereign Immunity from Suit, Courts May Not Adjudicate Tribal Rights and Interests in the Absence of the Tribe\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Lundgrens Had and Continue to Have a Means to Seek Redress for Their Claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1566_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Application of \"Federal Common Law\" Ignores Congress' Clear Statutory Mandate in the FSIA\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Choice-of-Law Rule Undermines Fundamental Principles of Federalism and Separation of Powers\nC. TBC's Result-Oriented Argument Provides No Basis to Ignore the Ninth Circuit's Fundamental Errors in Adopting Federal Common Law\nD. This Is an Appropriate Case to Resolve the Circuit Split",
        "reference": "I. THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CONCERNING CHOICE-OF-LAW UNDER THE FSIA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1566_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CONCERNING CHOICE-OF-LAW UNDER THE FSIA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Choice-of-Law Rule Undermines Fundamental Principles of Federalism and Separation of Powers\nC. TBC's Result-Oriented Argument Provides No Basis to Ignore the Ninth Circuit's Fundamental Errors in Adopting Federal Common Law\nD. This Is an Appropriate Case to Resolve the Circuit Split",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit's Application of \"Federal Common Law\" Ignores Congress' Clear Statutory Mandate in the FSIA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1566_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CONCERNING CHOICE-OF-LAW UNDER THE FSIA\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Application of \"Federal Common Law\" Ignores Congress' Clear Statutory Mandate in the FSIA\nB. [MISSING]\nC. TBC's Result-Oriented Argument Provides No Basis to Ignore the Ninth Circuit's Fundamental Errors in Adopting Federal Common Law\nD. This Is an Appropriate Case to Resolve the Circuit Split",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Choice-of-Law Rule Undermines Fundamental Principles of Federalism and Separation of Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1566_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CONCERNING CHOICE-OF-LAW UNDER THE FSIA\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Application of \"Federal Common Law\" Ignores Congress' Clear Statutory Mandate in the FSIA\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Choice-of-Law Rule Undermines Fundamental Principles of Federalism and Separation of Powers\nC. [MISSING]\nD. This Is an Appropriate Case to Resolve the Circuit Split",
        "reference": "C. TBC's Result-Oriented Argument Provides No Basis to Ignore the Ninth Circuit's Fundamental Errors in Adopting Federal Common Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1566_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CONCERNING CHOICE-OF-LAW UNDER THE FSIA\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Application of \"Federal Common Law\" Ignores Congress' Clear Statutory Mandate in the FSIA\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Choice-of-Law Rule Undermines Fundamental Principles of Federalism and Separation of Powers\nC. TBC's Result-Oriented Argument Provides No Basis to Ignore the Ninth Circuit's Fundamental Errors in Adopting Federal Common Law\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. This Is an Appropriate Case to Resolve the Circuit Split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. SEVERANCE WILL NOT REMEDY DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS\nA. AIA Shenanigans Discussed\nB. Patent Trial Appeals Board Bias",
        "reference": "I. ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS\nII. [MISSING]\nA. AIA Shenanigans Discussed\nB. Patent Trial Appeals Board Bias",
        "reference": "II. SEVERANCE WILL NOT REMEDY DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS\nII. SEVERANCE WILL NOT REMEDY DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Patent Trial Appeals Board Bias",
        "reference": "A. AIA Shenanigans Discussed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS\nII. SEVERANCE WILL NOT REMEDY DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS\nA. AIA Shenanigans Discussed\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Patent Trial Appeals Board Bias",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Under the modern dormant commerce clause doctrine, the role of the physical presence nexus standard in Quill is to serve as a test for undue burdens\nB. As a bright-line test for undue burdens, sales volume thresholds are much more workable than physical presence\nII. Physical presence, as a test for sales and use tax nexus, not only produces irrational results, but is increasingly incapable of providing a predictable bright line\nIII. Collateral concerns do not justify retaining physical presence as a nexus standard\nA. The reliance interests of sellers need not be disturbed if the Court determines that the physical presence test has become unworkable as a test for undue burdens\nB. This Court cannot justify retaining a dormant commerce clause standard that unreasonably restricts state authority because Congress may have unexpressed intent regarding that standard\nC. Revision of the sales tax nexus standard can be accomplished without the states imposing undue burdens, nor do they have any interest in imposing such burdens on interstate commerce",
        "reference": "I. Fundamental dormant commerce clause doctrines evolve when necessary; so too should a test meant to serve those doctrines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Fundamental dormant commerce clause doctrines evolve when necessary; so too should a test meant to serve those doctrines\nA. [MISSING]\nB. As a bright-line test for undue burdens, sales volume thresholds are much more workable than physical presence\nII. Physical presence, as a test for sales and use tax nexus, not only produces irrational results, but is increasingly incapable of providing a predictable bright line\nIII. Collateral concerns do not justify retaining physical presence as a nexus standard\nA. The reliance interests of sellers need not be disturbed if the Court determines that the physical presence test has become unworkable as a test for undue burdens\nB. This Court cannot justify retaining a dormant commerce clause standard that unreasonably restricts state authority because Congress may have unexpressed intent regarding that standard\nC. Revision of the sales tax nexus standard can be accomplished without the states imposing undue burdens, nor do they have any interest in imposing such burdens on interstate commerce",
        "reference": "A. Under the modern dormant commerce clause doctrine, the role of the physical presence nexus standard in Quill is to serve as a test for undue burdens",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Fundamental dormant commerce clause doctrines evolve when necessary; so too should a test meant to serve those doctrines\nA. Under the modern dormant commerce clause doctrine, the role of the physical presence nexus standard in Quill is to serve as a test for undue burdens\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Physical presence, as a test for sales and use tax nexus, not only produces irrational results, but is increasingly incapable of providing a predictable bright line\nIII. Collateral concerns do not justify retaining physical presence as a nexus standard\nA. The reliance interests of sellers need not be disturbed if the Court determines that the physical presence test has become unworkable as a test for undue burdens\nB. This Court cannot justify retaining a dormant commerce clause standard that unreasonably restricts state authority because Congress may have unexpressed intent regarding that standard\nC. Revision of the sales tax nexus standard can be accomplished without the states imposing undue burdens, nor do they have any interest in imposing such burdens on interstate commerce",
        "reference": "B. As a bright-line test for undue burdens, sales volume thresholds are much more workable than physical presence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Fundamental dormant commerce clause doctrines evolve when necessary; so too should a test meant to serve those doctrines\nA. Under the modern dormant commerce clause doctrine, the role of the physical presence nexus standard in Quill is to serve as a test for undue burdens\nB. As a bright-line test for undue burdens, sales volume thresholds are much more workable than physical presence\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Collateral concerns do not justify retaining physical presence as a nexus standard\nA. The reliance interests of sellers need not be disturbed if the Court determines that the physical presence test has become unworkable as a test for undue burdens\nB. This Court cannot justify retaining a dormant commerce clause standard that unreasonably restricts state authority because Congress may have unexpressed intent regarding that standard\nC. Revision of the sales tax nexus standard can be accomplished without the states imposing undue burdens, nor do they have any interest in imposing such burdens on interstate commerce",
        "reference": "II. Physical presence, as a test for sales and use tax nexus, not only produces irrational results, but is increasingly incapable of providing a predictable bright line",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Fundamental dormant commerce clause doctrines evolve when necessary; so too should a test meant to serve those doctrines\nA. Under the modern dormant commerce clause doctrine, the role of the physical presence nexus standard in Quill is to serve as a test for undue burdens\nB. As a bright-line test for undue burdens, sales volume thresholds are much more workable than physical presence\nII. Physical presence, as a test for sales and use tax nexus, not only produces irrational results, but is increasingly incapable of providing a predictable bright line\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The reliance interests of sellers need not be disturbed if the Court determines that the physical presence test has become unworkable as a test for undue burdens\nB. This Court cannot justify retaining a dormant commerce clause standard that unreasonably restricts state authority because Congress may have unexpressed intent regarding that standard\nC. Revision of the sales tax nexus standard can be accomplished without the states imposing undue burdens, nor do they have any interest in imposing such burdens on interstate commerce",
        "reference": "III. Collateral concerns do not justify retaining physical presence as a nexus standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Fundamental dormant commerce clause doctrines evolve when necessary; so too should a test meant to serve those doctrines\nA. Under the modern dormant commerce clause doctrine, the role of the physical presence nexus standard in Quill is to serve as a test for undue burdens\nB. As a bright-line test for undue burdens, sales volume thresholds are much more workable than physical presence\nII. Physical presence, as a test for sales and use tax nexus, not only produces irrational results, but is increasingly incapable of providing a predictable bright line\nIII. Collateral concerns do not justify retaining physical presence as a nexus standard\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court cannot justify retaining a dormant commerce clause standard that unreasonably restricts state authority because Congress may have unexpressed intent regarding that standard\nC. Revision of the sales tax nexus standard can be accomplished without the states imposing undue burdens, nor do they have any interest in imposing such burdens on interstate commerce",
        "reference": "A. The reliance interests of sellers need not be disturbed if the Court determines that the physical presence test has become unworkable as a test for undue burdens",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Fundamental dormant commerce clause doctrines evolve when necessary; so too should a test meant to serve those doctrines\nA. Under the modern dormant commerce clause doctrine, the role of the physical presence nexus standard in Quill is to serve as a test for undue burdens\nB. As a bright-line test for undue burdens, sales volume thresholds are much more workable than physical presence\nII. Physical presence, as a test for sales and use tax nexus, not only produces irrational results, but is increasingly incapable of providing a predictable bright line\nIII. Collateral concerns do not justify retaining physical presence as a nexus standard\nA. The reliance interests of sellers need not be disturbed if the Court determines that the physical presence test has become unworkable as a test for undue burdens\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Revision of the sales tax nexus standard can be accomplished without the states imposing undue burdens, nor do they have any interest in imposing such burdens on interstate commerce",
        "reference": "B. This Court cannot justify retaining a dormant commerce clause standard that unreasonably restricts state authority because Congress may have unexpressed intent regarding that standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Fundamental dormant commerce clause doctrines evolve when necessary; so too should a test meant to serve those doctrines\nA. Under the modern dormant commerce clause doctrine, the role of the physical presence nexus standard in Quill is to serve as a test for undue burdens\nB. As a bright-line test for undue burdens, sales volume thresholds are much more workable than physical presence\nII. Physical presence, as a test for sales and use tax nexus, not only produces irrational results, but is increasingly incapable of providing a predictable bright line\nIII. Collateral concerns do not justify retaining physical presence as a nexus standard\nA. The reliance interests of sellers need not be disturbed if the Court determines that the physical presence test has become unworkable as a test for undue burdens\nB. This Court cannot justify retaining a dormant commerce clause standard that unreasonably restricts state authority because Congress may have unexpressed intent regarding that standard\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Revision of the sales tax nexus standard can be accomplished without the states imposing undue burdens, nor do they have any interest in imposing such burdens on interstate commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1495_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court should make clear that government employers are not liable for the decisions of prosecutors over whom they have no control\nA. Municipal liability cannot be imposed under section 1983 because the City of Hays did not control the prosecutorial decision to use Vogt's statement in the criminal case\nB. The sole and exclusive remedy for the alleged violation is the exclusion of the compelled statement",
        "reference": "I. The Tenth Circuit's decision pressures government employers to be less vigilant in discovering and correcting employee misconduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1495_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tenth Circuit's decision pressures government employers to be less vigilant in discovering and correcting employee misconduct\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Municipal liability cannot be imposed under section 1983 because the City of Hays did not control the prosecutorial decision to use Vogt's statement in the criminal case\nB. The sole and exclusive remedy for the alleged violation is the exclusion of the compelled statement",
        "reference": "II. The Court should make clear that government employers are not liable for the decisions of prosecutors over whom they have no control",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1495_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tenth Circuit's decision pressures government employers to be less vigilant in discovering and correcting employee misconduct\nII. The Court should make clear that government employers are not liable for the decisions of prosecutors over whom they have no control\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The sole and exclusive remedy for the alleged violation is the exclusion of the compelled statement",
        "reference": "A. Municipal liability cannot be imposed under section 1983 because the City of Hays did not control the prosecutorial decision to use Vogt's statement in the criminal case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1495_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tenth Circuit's decision pressures government employers to be less vigilant in discovering and correcting employee misconduct\nII. The Court should make clear that government employers are not liable for the decisions of prosecutors over whom they have no control\nA. Municipal liability cannot be imposed under section 1983 because the City of Hays did not control the prosecutorial decision to use Vogt's statement in the criminal case\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The sole and exclusive remedy for the alleged violation is the exclusion of the compelled statement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Seventh Circuit's Narrowed Standard Precludes Consideration of Contemporaneous Evidence of Knowledge that a Claim is False or Fraudulent\nB. The Seventh Circuit's Standard Erects Serious Obstacles to Congress's Efforts to Make the FCA a More Effective Fraud Enforcement Tool\nII. The Seventh Circuit's Evidentiary Limitations Conflict With this Court's Decision in Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar",
        "reference": "I. The Question Presented Raises Critically Important Issues Regarding the Correct Application of the FCA Knowledge Standard Congress Enacted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Question Presented Raises Critically Important Issues Regarding the Correct Application of the FCA Knowledge Standard Congress Enacted\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Seventh Circuit's Standard Erects Serious Obstacles to Congress's Efforts to Make the FCA a More Effective Fraud Enforcement Tool\nII. The Seventh Circuit's Evidentiary Limitations Conflict With this Court's Decision in Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar",
        "reference": "A. The Seventh Circuit's Narrowed Standard Precludes Consideration of Contemporaneous Evidence of Knowledge that a Claim is False or Fraudulent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Question Presented Raises Critically Important Issues Regarding the Correct Application of the FCA Knowledge Standard Congress Enacted\nA. The Seventh Circuit's Narrowed Standard Precludes Consideration of Contemporaneous Evidence of Knowledge that a Claim is False or Fraudulent\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Seventh Circuit's Evidentiary Limitations Conflict With this Court's Decision in Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar",
        "reference": "B. The Seventh Circuit's Standard Erects Serious Obstacles to Congress's Efforts to Make the FCA a More Effective Fraud Enforcement Tool",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Question Presented Raises Critically Important Issues Regarding the Correct Application of the FCA Knowledge Standard Congress Enacted\nA. The Seventh Circuit's Narrowed Standard Precludes Consideration of Contemporaneous Evidence of Knowledge that a Claim is False or Fraudulent\nB. The Seventh Circuit's Standard Erects Serious Obstacles to Congress's Efforts to Make the FCA a More Effective Fraud Enforcement Tool\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Seventh Circuit's Evidentiary Limitations Conflict With this Court's Decision in Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-382_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Guam's Proposed Rule Will Undermine the Purposes of CERCLA's Statute of Limitations for Contribution Claims",
        "reference": "I. The United States' Proposed Rule Provides Critical Clarity and Consistency to Private Parties With Potential Contribution Liability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-382_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The United States' Proposed Rule Provides Critical Clarity and Consistency to Private Parties With Potential Contribution Liability\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Guam's Proposed Rule Will Undermine the Purposes of CERCLA's Statute of Limitations for Contribution Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.\nD. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.\nE. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.\nF. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.\nA. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.\nB. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "reference": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.\nD. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.\nE. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.\nF. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.\nA. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.\nB. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "reference": "II. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.\nD. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.\nE. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.\nF. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.\nA. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.\nB. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "reference": "A. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.\nD. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.\nE. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.\nF. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.\nA. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.\nB. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "reference": "B. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.\nE. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.\nF. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.\nA. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.\nB. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "reference": "C. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.\nF. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.\nA. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.\nB. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "reference": "D. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.\nD. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.\nE. [MISSING]\nF. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.\nA. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.\nB. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "reference": "E. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.\nD. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.\nE. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.\nF. [MISSING]\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.\nA. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.\nB. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "reference": "F. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.\nD. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.\nE. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.\nF. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.\nB. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "reference": "III. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.\nD. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.\nE. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.\nF. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "reference": "A. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to this decision of the Ninth Circuit, the Constitution and most court decisions strongly support free speech including religious speech in public school settings.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause does not forbid the acknowledgement of God even in government speech.\nD. However, Coach Kennedy's prayers are not government speech.\nE. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use/misuse of the endorsement test.\nF. The adoption of an appropriately worded school district policy would alleviate any possible Establishment Clause coercion or endorsement concern.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.\nA. The Bremerton School District policy has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The policy communicates a message of exclusion, telling religious persons that they are not welcome in the public arena.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. A court does not \"determine the validity of\" a regulation by disagreeing with the interpretation embraced in the regulation",
        "reference": "A. The Hobbs Act's use of the term \"determine the validity of\" incorporated preexisting statutory usage",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Hobbs Act's use of the term \"determine the validity of\" incorporated preexisting statutory usage\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. A court does not \"determine the validity of\" a regulation by disagreeing with the interpretation embraced in the regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONCLUDE THAT DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS DISCRIMINATION \"BECAUSE OF SEX\" IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII",
        "reference": "A. THE COURT MUST GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE CIRCUITS THAT DO NOT RECOGNIZE SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII HAVE ALREADY CONSIDERED AND REJECTED THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS COURT'S DECISIONS IN PRICE WATERHOUSE AND ONCALE SUPPORT SUCH CLAIMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 5.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. THE COURT MUST GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE CIRCUITS THAT DO NOT RECOGNIZE SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII HAVE ALREADY CONSIDERED AND REJECTED THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS COURT'S DECISIONS IN PRICE WATERHOUSE AND ONCALE SUPPORT SUCH CLAIMS\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONCLUDE THAT DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS DISCRIMINATION \"BECAUSE OF SEX\" IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 5.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Statutory Background\nB. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here\nC. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose\n1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings\n2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation\n3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception\nII. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity\nA. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States\nB. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity\nC. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "reference": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here\nC. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose\n1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings\n2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation\n3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception\nII. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity\nA. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States\nB. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity\nC. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "reference": "A. Statutory Background",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA\nA. Statutory Background\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose\n1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings\n2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation\n3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception\nII. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity\nA. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States\nB. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity\nC. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "reference": "B. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA\nA. Statutory Background\nB. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings\n2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation\n3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception\nII. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity\nA. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States\nB. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity\nC. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "reference": "C. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA\nA. Statutory Background\nB. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here\nC. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose\n1. [MISSING]\n2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation\n3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception\nII. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity\nA. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States\nB. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity\nC. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "reference": "1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA\nA. Statutory Background\nB. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here\nC. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose\n1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception\nII. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity\nA. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States\nB. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity\nC. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "reference": "2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA\nA. Statutory Background\nB. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here\nC. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose\n1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings\n2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation\n3. [MISSING]\nII. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity\nA. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States\nB. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity\nC. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "reference": "3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA\nA. Statutory Background\nB. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here\nC. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose\n1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings\n2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation\n3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception\nII. [MISSING]\nA. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States\nB. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity\nC. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "reference": "II. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA\nA. Statutory Background\nB. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here\nC. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose\n1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings\n2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation\n3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception\nII. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity\nC. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "reference": "A. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA\nA. Statutory Background\nB. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here\nC. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose\n1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings\n2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation\n3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception\nII. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity\nA. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "reference": "B. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are immune under the FSIA\nA. Statutory Background\nB. The original understanding of the expropriation exception does not reach the domestic takings alleged here\nC. The court of appeals' expansion of the expropriation exception to alleged violations of human rights law conflicts with the statute's text, context, history, and purpose\n1. The court of appeals abandoned the consensus view that the expropriation exception applies only to foreign takings\n2. \"Taken in violation of international law\" is a term of art meaning violations of the international law of expropriation\n3. The text, context, and purpose of the FSIA support the original understanding of the exception\nII. Respondents' claims should be dismissed based on international comity\nA. International comity allows courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over cases of grave concern to foreign sovereigns with minimal connection to the United States\nB. The court of appeals erred by concluding that the FSIA displaced abstention based on international comity\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Principles of comity require abstention here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal\n1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed\n2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action\na. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable\nb. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions\nD. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals\n1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal\n2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291\n3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "reference": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal\n1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed\n2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action\na. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable\nb. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions\nD. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals\n1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal\n2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291\n3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "reference": "B. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction\nB. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed\n2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action\na. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable\nb. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions\nD. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals\n1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal\n2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291\n3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "reference": "C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction\nB. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action\na. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable\nb. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions\nD. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals\n1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal\n2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291\n3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "reference": "1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction\nB. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal\n1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed\n2. [MISSING]\na. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable\nb. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions\nD. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals\n1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal\n2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291\n3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "reference": "2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction\nB. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal\n1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed\n2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action\na. [MISSING]\nb. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions\nD. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals\n1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal\n2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291\n3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "reference": "a. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction\nB. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal\n1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed\n2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action\na. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable\nb. [MISSING]\nD. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals\n1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal\n2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291\n3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "reference": "b. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction\nB. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal\n1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed\n2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action\na. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable\nb. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions\nD. [MISSING]\n1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal\n2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291\n3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "reference": "D. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction\nB. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal\n1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed\n2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action\na. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable\nb. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions\nD. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291\n3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "reference": "1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction\nB. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal\n1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed\n2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action\na. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable\nb. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions\nD. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals\n1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "reference": "2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals \"shall\" have jurisdiction over a final decision of a district court. 28 U.S.C. section 1291. Petitioner filed a timely appeal from an order dismissing her case. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction\nB. Allowing appeals from final judgments in consolidated cases does not force the courts of appeals to decide piecemeal appeals\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) permits a court to certify for interlocutory appeal a judgment as to one, \"but fewer than all\" claims. Here, the judgment dismissed all of petitioner's claims. The Third Circuit erred when it concluded that petitioner could have sought certification via a Rule 54(b) appeal\n1. Rule 54(b) does not apply when a case is completely dismissed\n2. Consolidated cases are not merged into a single action\na. Historically, this Court recognized that consolidated cases were not merged and were separately appealable\nb. Numerous and varied applications of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that Rule 42 does not result in the merger of actions\nD. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals\n1. The current approach taken by the majority of the circuits creates too much uncertainty as to when to appeal\n2. The rule followed in the Ninth, Tenth and Federal circuits is inefficient and contrary to the express language of Section 1291\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. The court should adopt the same rule that it adopted in Gelboim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. In Many Faiths, The Laying On Of Hands Is An Important Religious Sacrament\nIII. Allowing Texas To Execute Ramirez While Preventing His Pastor From Performing The Sacrament Of Laying On Of Hands Is A Substantial Burden On Ramirez's Religious Exercise",
        "reference": "I. Government Action That Denies Someone The Ability To Engage In A Particular \"Religious Exercise\" \"As Broadly Defined By RLUIPA\" Substantially Burdens Religion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Government Action That Denies Someone The Ability To Engage In A Particular \"Religious Exercise\" \"As Broadly Defined By RLUIPA\" Substantially Burdens Religion\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Allowing Texas To Execute Ramirez While Preventing His Pastor From Performing The Sacrament Of Laying On Of Hands Is A Substantial Burden On Ramirez's Religious Exercise",
        "reference": "II. In Many Faiths, The Laying On Of Hands Is An Important Religious Sacrament",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Government Action That Denies Someone The Ability To Engage In A Particular \"Religious Exercise\" \"As Broadly Defined By RLUIPA\" Substantially Burdens Religion\nII. In Many Faiths, The Laying On Of Hands Is An Important Religious Sacrament\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Allowing Texas To Execute Ramirez While Preventing His Pastor From Performing The Sacrament Of Laying On Of Hands Is A Substantial Burden On Ramirez's Religious Exercise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Despite this history and recent record of strong minority turnout, Wisconsin's Act 23 was subjected to a long and bitter battle based on Section 2\nIII. Wisconsin's experience illustrates the need for a clear, easy-to-apply rule from this Court",
        "reference": "I. Wisconsin historically has embraced African-Americans and other minorities in the political process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin historically has embraced African-Americans and other minorities in the political process\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Wisconsin's experience illustrates the need for a clear, easy-to-apply rule from this Court",
        "reference": "II. Despite this history and recent record of strong minority turnout, Wisconsin's Act 23 was subjected to a long and bitter battle based on Section 2",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Wisconsin historically has embraced African-Americans and other minorities in the political process\nII. Despite this history and recent record of strong minority turnout, Wisconsin's Act 23 was subjected to a long and bitter battle based on Section 2\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Wisconsin's experience illustrates the need for a clear, easy-to-apply rule from this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics\nB. This Court has repeatedly recognized the anti-Catholic origins of the Blaine Amendments\nC. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause\nD. Montana's Blaine is easily recognizable as a presumptively unconstitutional Blaine Amendment\nII. Enforcing the Blaine Amendment to exclude religious actors from state programs is separately unconstitutional under Trinity Lutheran\nA. Montana's broad exclusion of religious actors constitutes status discrimination in violation of Trinity Lutheran\nB. Montana's application of its Blaine Amendment is not justified by Locke\nIII. Razing the entire scholarship program as a \"remedy\" for violating the Blaine Amendment only makes the Free Exercise violation worse",
        "reference": "I. The Court should mark all Blaine Amendments as presumptively unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should mark all Blaine Amendments as presumptively unconstitutional\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court has repeatedly recognized the anti-Catholic origins of the Blaine Amendments\nC. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause\nD. Montana's Blaine is easily recognizable as a presumptively unconstitutional Blaine Amendment\nII. Enforcing the Blaine Amendment to exclude religious actors from state programs is separately unconstitutional under Trinity Lutheran\nA. Montana's broad exclusion of religious actors constitutes status discrimination in violation of Trinity Lutheran\nB. Montana's application of its Blaine Amendment is not justified by Locke\nIII. Razing the entire scholarship program as a \"remedy\" for violating the Blaine Amendment only makes the Free Exercise violation worse",
        "reference": "A. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should mark all Blaine Amendments as presumptively unconstitutional\nA. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause\nD. Montana's Blaine is easily recognizable as a presumptively unconstitutional Blaine Amendment\nII. Enforcing the Blaine Amendment to exclude religious actors from state programs is separately unconstitutional under Trinity Lutheran\nA. Montana's broad exclusion of religious actors constitutes status discrimination in violation of Trinity Lutheran\nB. Montana's application of its Blaine Amendment is not justified by Locke\nIII. Razing the entire scholarship program as a \"remedy\" for violating the Blaine Amendment only makes the Free Exercise violation worse",
        "reference": "B. This Court has repeatedly recognized the anti-Catholic origins of the Blaine Amendments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should mark all Blaine Amendments as presumptively unconstitutional\nA. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics\nB. This Court has repeatedly recognized the anti-Catholic origins of the Blaine Amendments\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Montana's Blaine is easily recognizable as a presumptively unconstitutional Blaine Amendment\nII. Enforcing the Blaine Amendment to exclude religious actors from state programs is separately unconstitutional under Trinity Lutheran\nA. Montana's broad exclusion of religious actors constitutes status discrimination in violation of Trinity Lutheran\nB. Montana's application of its Blaine Amendment is not justified by Locke\nIII. Razing the entire scholarship program as a \"remedy\" for violating the Blaine Amendment only makes the Free Exercise violation worse",
        "reference": "C. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should mark all Blaine Amendments as presumptively unconstitutional\nA. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics\nB. This Court has repeatedly recognized the anti-Catholic origins of the Blaine Amendments\nC. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Enforcing the Blaine Amendment to exclude religious actors from state programs is separately unconstitutional under Trinity Lutheran\nA. Montana's broad exclusion of religious actors constitutes status discrimination in violation of Trinity Lutheran\nB. Montana's application of its Blaine Amendment is not justified by Locke\nIII. Razing the entire scholarship program as a \"remedy\" for violating the Blaine Amendment only makes the Free Exercise violation worse",
        "reference": "D. Montana's Blaine is easily recognizable as a presumptively unconstitutional Blaine Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should mark all Blaine Amendments as presumptively unconstitutional\nA. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics\nB. This Court has repeatedly recognized the anti-Catholic origins of the Blaine Amendments\nC. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause\nD. Montana's Blaine is easily recognizable as a presumptively unconstitutional Blaine Amendment\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Montana's broad exclusion of religious actors constitutes status discrimination in violation of Trinity Lutheran\nB. Montana's application of its Blaine Amendment is not justified by Locke\nIII. Razing the entire scholarship program as a \"remedy\" for violating the Blaine Amendment only makes the Free Exercise violation worse",
        "reference": "II. Enforcing the Blaine Amendment to exclude religious actors from state programs is separately unconstitutional under Trinity Lutheran",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should mark all Blaine Amendments as presumptively unconstitutional\nA. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics\nB. This Court has repeatedly recognized the anti-Catholic origins of the Blaine Amendments\nC. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause\nD. Montana's Blaine is easily recognizable as a presumptively unconstitutional Blaine Amendment\nII. Enforcing the Blaine Amendment to exclude religious actors from state programs is separately unconstitutional under Trinity Lutheran\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Montana's application of its Blaine Amendment is not justified by Locke\nIII. Razing the entire scholarship program as a \"remedy\" for violating the Blaine Amendment only makes the Free Exercise violation worse",
        "reference": "A. Montana's broad exclusion of religious actors constitutes status discrimination in violation of Trinity Lutheran",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should mark all Blaine Amendments as presumptively unconstitutional\nA. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics\nB. This Court has repeatedly recognized the anti-Catholic origins of the Blaine Amendments\nC. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause\nD. Montana's Blaine is easily recognizable as a presumptively unconstitutional Blaine Amendment\nII. Enforcing the Blaine Amendment to exclude religious actors from state programs is separately unconstitutional under Trinity Lutheran\nA. Montana's broad exclusion of religious actors constitutes status discrimination in violation of Trinity Lutheran\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Razing the entire scholarship program as a \"remedy\" for violating the Blaine Amendment only makes the Free Exercise violation worse",
        "reference": "B. Montana's application of its Blaine Amendment is not justified by Locke",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should mark all Blaine Amendments as presumptively unconstitutional\nA. Blaine Amendments, including the Montana Blaine Amendment, were adopted as part of a national campaign against Catholics\nB. This Court has repeatedly recognized the anti-Catholic origins of the Blaine Amendments\nC. Because of their recognized anti-Catholic origins, Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional under the Free Exercise Clause\nD. Montana's Blaine is easily recognizable as a presumptively unconstitutional Blaine Amendment\nII. Enforcing the Blaine Amendment to exclude religious actors from state programs is separately unconstitutional under Trinity Lutheran\nA. Montana's broad exclusion of religious actors constitutes status discrimination in violation of Trinity Lutheran\nB. Montana's application of its Blaine Amendment is not justified by Locke\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Razing the entire scholarship program as a \"remedy\" for violating the Blaine Amendment only makes the Free Exercise violation worse",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1284_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioners did not argue below that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite for denying outdoor exercise; they instead focused on the duration of the restriction on outdoor exercise\nB. Petitioners relied exclusively on within-jurisdiction precedent below and failed to preserve any argument based on out-of-jurisdiction case law\nC. There is no circuit split because no out-of-jurisdiction case holds that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite to the denial of outdoor exercise\nII. The decisions below correctly applied settled United States Supreme Court precedent\nA. This Court has established a clear and consistent framework for qualified immunity that should not be overturned\nB. The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that there was no \"clearly established\" in-jurisdiction law supporting Petitioners' claims",
        "reference": "I. Petitioners' \"security rationale\" argument and their argument based on out-of-circuit cases were never raised below, and, in any event, their purported circuit split does not exist",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1284_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' \"security rationale\" argument and their argument based on out-of-circuit cases were never raised below, and, in any event, their purported circuit split does not exist\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners relied exclusively on within-jurisdiction precedent below and failed to preserve any argument based on out-of-jurisdiction case law\nC. There is no circuit split because no out-of-jurisdiction case holds that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite to the denial of outdoor exercise\nII. The decisions below correctly applied settled United States Supreme Court precedent\nA. This Court has established a clear and consistent framework for qualified immunity that should not be overturned\nB. The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that there was no \"clearly established\" in-jurisdiction law supporting Petitioners' claims",
        "reference": "A. Petitioners did not argue below that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite for denying outdoor exercise; they instead focused on the duration of the restriction on outdoor exercise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1284_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' \"security rationale\" argument and their argument based on out-of-circuit cases were never raised below, and, in any event, their purported circuit split does not exist\nA. Petitioners did not argue below that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite for denying outdoor exercise; they instead focused on the duration of the restriction on outdoor exercise\nB. [MISSING]\nC. There is no circuit split because no out-of-jurisdiction case holds that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite to the denial of outdoor exercise\nII. The decisions below correctly applied settled United States Supreme Court precedent\nA. This Court has established a clear and consistent framework for qualified immunity that should not be overturned\nB. The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that there was no \"clearly established\" in-jurisdiction law supporting Petitioners' claims",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners relied exclusively on within-jurisdiction precedent below and failed to preserve any argument based on out-of-jurisdiction case law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1284_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' \"security rationale\" argument and their argument based on out-of-circuit cases were never raised below, and, in any event, their purported circuit split does not exist\nA. Petitioners did not argue below that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite for denying outdoor exercise; they instead focused on the duration of the restriction on outdoor exercise\nB. Petitioners relied exclusively on within-jurisdiction precedent below and failed to preserve any argument based on out-of-jurisdiction case law\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The decisions below correctly applied settled United States Supreme Court precedent\nA. This Court has established a clear and consistent framework for qualified immunity that should not be overturned\nB. The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that there was no \"clearly established\" in-jurisdiction law supporting Petitioners' claims",
        "reference": "C. There is no circuit split because no out-of-jurisdiction case holds that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite to the denial of outdoor exercise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1284_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' \"security rationale\" argument and their argument based on out-of-circuit cases were never raised below, and, in any event, their purported circuit split does not exist\nA. Petitioners did not argue below that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite for denying outdoor exercise; they instead focused on the duration of the restriction on outdoor exercise\nB. Petitioners relied exclusively on within-jurisdiction precedent below and failed to preserve any argument based on out-of-jurisdiction case law\nC. There is no circuit split because no out-of-jurisdiction case holds that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite to the denial of outdoor exercise\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court has established a clear and consistent framework for qualified immunity that should not be overturned\nB. The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that there was no \"clearly established\" in-jurisdiction law supporting Petitioners' claims",
        "reference": "II. The decisions below correctly applied settled United States Supreme Court precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1284_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' \"security rationale\" argument and their argument based on out-of-circuit cases were never raised below, and, in any event, their purported circuit split does not exist\nA. Petitioners did not argue below that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite for denying outdoor exercise; they instead focused on the duration of the restriction on outdoor exercise\nB. Petitioners relied exclusively on within-jurisdiction precedent below and failed to preserve any argument based on out-of-jurisdiction case law\nC. There is no circuit split because no out-of-jurisdiction case holds that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite to the denial of outdoor exercise\nII. The decisions below correctly applied settled United States Supreme Court precedent\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that there was no \"clearly established\" in-jurisdiction law supporting Petitioners' claims",
        "reference": "A. This Court has established a clear and consistent framework for qualified immunity that should not be overturned",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1284_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' \"security rationale\" argument and their argument based on out-of-circuit cases were never raised below, and, in any event, their purported circuit split does not exist\nA. Petitioners did not argue below that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite for denying outdoor exercise; they instead focused on the duration of the restriction on outdoor exercise\nB. Petitioners relied exclusively on within-jurisdiction precedent below and failed to preserve any argument based on out-of-jurisdiction case law\nC. There is no circuit split because no out-of-jurisdiction case holds that a \"security rationale\" is a prerequisite to the denial of outdoor exercise\nII. The decisions below correctly applied settled United States Supreme Court precedent\nA. This Court has established a clear and consistent framework for qualified immunity that should not be overturned\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that there was no \"clearly established\" in-jurisdiction law supporting Petitioners' claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Will Foreclose Arbitration in a Broad Swathe of Cases and Lead to Anomalous Results Under the FAA\nIII. Denying Any Possibility of Arbitration Where Consent is Based on Conduct Will Impair the Utility of International Arbitration and Hinder International Trade\nIV. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding is Based on an Overly Restrictive Interpretation of Article II(2) of the New York Convention",
        "reference": "I. The Eleventh Circuit's Signature Requirement Is Contrary to an Emerging International Consensus that Arbitration Agreements May be Extended to Non-Signatories Based on Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eleventh Circuit's Signature Requirement Is Contrary to an Emerging International Consensus that Arbitration Agreements May be Extended to Non-Signatories Based on Conduct\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Denying Any Possibility of Arbitration Where Consent is Based on Conduct Will Impair the Utility of International Arbitration and Hinder International Trade\nIV. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding is Based on an Overly Restrictive Interpretation of Article II(2) of the New York Convention",
        "reference": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Will Foreclose Arbitration in a Broad Swathe of Cases and Lead to Anomalous Results Under the FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eleventh Circuit's Signature Requirement Is Contrary to an Emerging International Consensus that Arbitration Agreements May be Extended to Non-Signatories Based on Conduct\nII. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Will Foreclose Arbitration in a Broad Swathe of Cases and Lead to Anomalous Results Under the FAA\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding is Based on an Overly Restrictive Interpretation of Article II(2) of the New York Convention",
        "reference": "III. Denying Any Possibility of Arbitration Where Consent is Based on Conduct Will Impair the Utility of International Arbitration and Hinder International Trade",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eleventh Circuit's Signature Requirement Is Contrary to an Emerging International Consensus that Arbitration Agreements May be Extended to Non-Signatories Based on Conduct\nII. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Will Foreclose Arbitration in a Broad Swathe of Cases and Lead to Anomalous Results Under the FAA\nIII. Denying Any Possibility of Arbitration Where Consent is Based on Conduct Will Impair the Utility of International Arbitration and Hinder International Trade\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding is Based on an Overly Restrictive Interpretation of Article II(2) of the New York Convention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Administrative efficiency is a minimally legitimate government interest\u2014not an important or compelling one\nB. The Court should take this opportunity to make clear that the \"informational interest\" does not apply\n1. Compelled disclosure can have distorting and misleading effects on the marketplace of ideas\n2. Disclosure mandates rely on the false assumption that government is an impartial umpire\nII. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the chilling effect was legally erroneous",
        "reference": "I. The government's interest in the personal identifying information of donors to organizations not engaged in direct political advocacy is minimal at best",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's interest in the personal identifying information of donors to organizations not engaged in direct political advocacy is minimal at best\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court should take this opportunity to make clear that the \"informational interest\" does not apply\n1. Compelled disclosure can have distorting and misleading effects on the marketplace of ideas\n2. Disclosure mandates rely on the false assumption that government is an impartial umpire\nII. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the chilling effect was legally erroneous",
        "reference": "A. Administrative efficiency is a minimally legitimate government interest\u2014not an important or compelling one",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's interest in the personal identifying information of donors to organizations not engaged in direct political advocacy is minimal at best\nA. Administrative efficiency is a minimally legitimate government interest\u2014not an important or compelling one\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Compelled disclosure can have distorting and misleading effects on the marketplace of ideas\n2. Disclosure mandates rely on the false assumption that government is an impartial umpire\nII. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the chilling effect was legally erroneous",
        "reference": "B. The Court should take this opportunity to make clear that the \"informational interest\" does not apply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's interest in the personal identifying information of donors to organizations not engaged in direct political advocacy is minimal at best\nA. Administrative efficiency is a minimally legitimate government interest\u2014not an important or compelling one\nB. The Court should take this opportunity to make clear that the \"informational interest\" does not apply\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Disclosure mandates rely on the false assumption that government is an impartial umpire\nII. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the chilling effect was legally erroneous",
        "reference": "1. Compelled disclosure can have distorting and misleading effects on the marketplace of ideas",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's interest in the personal identifying information of donors to organizations not engaged in direct political advocacy is minimal at best\nA. Administrative efficiency is a minimally legitimate government interest\u2014not an important or compelling one\nB. The Court should take this opportunity to make clear that the \"informational interest\" does not apply\n1. Compelled disclosure can have distorting and misleading effects on the marketplace of ideas\n2. [MISSING]\nII. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the chilling effect was legally erroneous",
        "reference": "2. Disclosure mandates rely on the false assumption that government is an impartial umpire",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's interest in the personal identifying information of donors to organizations not engaged in direct political advocacy is minimal at best\nA. Administrative efficiency is a minimally legitimate government interest\u2014not an important or compelling one\nB. The Court should take this opportunity to make clear that the \"informational interest\" does not apply\n1. Compelled disclosure can have distorting and misleading effects on the marketplace of ideas\n2. Disclosure mandates rely on the false assumption that government is an impartial umpire\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the chilling effect was legally erroneous",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Allegheny County as a case study in microcosm\nB. Specific examples of harm and of extraordinary practical and public-policy disruptions that would arise were CSS's position to prevail\nC. Extrapolating Allegheny County analysis to the nation as a whole\nII. CSS's suggested workaround is untenable and unduly burdensome\nIII. Allowing contractors rather than the government to dictate the terms of government contracts or requests for proposals would undermine government contracting principles and would risk inequitably increasing the costs to taxpayers",
        "reference": "I. The requested relief threatens the ability of Pennsylvania county governments to maintain networks of private providers contracted to meet each county's overall human service needs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The requested relief threatens the ability of Pennsylvania county governments to maintain networks of private providers contracted to meet each county's overall human service needs\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Specific examples of harm and of extraordinary practical and public-policy disruptions that would arise were CSS's position to prevail\nC. Extrapolating Allegheny County analysis to the nation as a whole\nII. CSS's suggested workaround is untenable and unduly burdensome\nIII. Allowing contractors rather than the government to dictate the terms of government contracts or requests for proposals would undermine government contracting principles and would risk inequitably increasing the costs to taxpayers",
        "reference": "A. Allegheny County as a case study in microcosm",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The requested relief threatens the ability of Pennsylvania county governments to maintain networks of private providers contracted to meet each county's overall human service needs\nA. Allegheny County as a case study in microcosm\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Extrapolating Allegheny County analysis to the nation as a whole\nII. CSS's suggested workaround is untenable and unduly burdensome\nIII. Allowing contractors rather than the government to dictate the terms of government contracts or requests for proposals would undermine government contracting principles and would risk inequitably increasing the costs to taxpayers",
        "reference": "B. Specific examples of harm and of extraordinary practical and public-policy disruptions that would arise were CSS's position to prevail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The requested relief threatens the ability of Pennsylvania county governments to maintain networks of private providers contracted to meet each county's overall human service needs\nA. Allegheny County as a case study in microcosm\nB. Specific examples of harm and of extraordinary practical and public-policy disruptions that would arise were CSS's position to prevail\nC. [MISSING]\nII. CSS's suggested workaround is untenable and unduly burdensome\nIII. Allowing contractors rather than the government to dictate the terms of government contracts or requests for proposals would undermine government contracting principles and would risk inequitably increasing the costs to taxpayers",
        "reference": "C. Extrapolating Allegheny County analysis to the nation as a whole",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The requested relief threatens the ability of Pennsylvania county governments to maintain networks of private providers contracted to meet each county's overall human service needs\nA. Allegheny County as a case study in microcosm\nB. Specific examples of harm and of extraordinary practical and public-policy disruptions that would arise were CSS's position to prevail\nC. Extrapolating Allegheny County analysis to the nation as a whole\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Allowing contractors rather than the government to dictate the terms of government contracts or requests for proposals would undermine government contracting principles and would risk inequitably increasing the costs to taxpayers",
        "reference": "II. CSS's suggested workaround is untenable and unduly burdensome",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The requested relief threatens the ability of Pennsylvania county governments to maintain networks of private providers contracted to meet each county's overall human service needs\nA. Allegheny County as a case study in microcosm\nB. Specific examples of harm and of extraordinary practical and public-policy disruptions that would arise were CSS's position to prevail\nC. Extrapolating Allegheny County analysis to the nation as a whole\nII. CSS's suggested workaround is untenable and unduly burdensome\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Allowing contractors rather than the government to dictate the terms of government contracts or requests for proposals would undermine government contracting principles and would risk inequitably increasing the costs to taxpayers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil\nB. The Third Circuit Misconstrues The Substantial Burden Test\n1. The Third Circuit impermissibly questioned the reasonableness of Petitioner's religious beliefs\n2. The Third Circuit's analysis improperly focused on the administrative burdens of complying with the Accommodation, instead of the significant penalties for refusing to participate in the Accommodation scheme in accordance with objectors' religious beliefs\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF RFRA WILL HAVE SWEEPING, DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IF UPHELD\nA. The Third Circuit's Substantial Burden Analysis Would Allow Courts To Override Any Sincerely Held Religious Belief\nB. If The Third Circuit's Decision Is Upheld, It Will Incentivize Regulators To Utilize Similar False \"Accommodations\" Which Stifle Religious Freedom",
        "reference": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN PRECEDENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN PRECEDENT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Third Circuit Misconstrues The Substantial Burden Test\n1. The Third Circuit impermissibly questioned the reasonableness of Petitioner's religious beliefs\n2. The Third Circuit's analysis improperly focused on the administrative burdens of complying with the Accommodation, instead of the significant penalties for refusing to participate in the Accommodation scheme in accordance with objectors' religious beliefs\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF RFRA WILL HAVE SWEEPING, DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IF UPHELD\nA. The Third Circuit's Substantial Burden Analysis Would Allow Courts To Override Any Sincerely Held Religious Belief\nB. If The Third Circuit's Decision Is Upheld, It Will Incentivize Regulators To Utilize Similar False \"Accommodations\" Which Stifle Religious Freedom",
        "reference": "A. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN PRECEDENT\nA. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Third Circuit impermissibly questioned the reasonableness of Petitioner's religious beliefs\n2. The Third Circuit's analysis improperly focused on the administrative burdens of complying with the Accommodation, instead of the significant penalties for refusing to participate in the Accommodation scheme in accordance with objectors' religious beliefs\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF RFRA WILL HAVE SWEEPING, DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IF UPHELD\nA. The Third Circuit's Substantial Burden Analysis Would Allow Courts To Override Any Sincerely Held Religious Belief\nB. If The Third Circuit's Decision Is Upheld, It Will Incentivize Regulators To Utilize Similar False \"Accommodations\" Which Stifle Religious Freedom",
        "reference": "B. The Third Circuit Misconstrues The Substantial Burden Test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN PRECEDENT\nA. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil\nB. The Third Circuit Misconstrues The Substantial Burden Test\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Third Circuit's analysis improperly focused on the administrative burdens of complying with the Accommodation, instead of the significant penalties for refusing to participate in the Accommodation scheme in accordance with objectors' religious beliefs\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF RFRA WILL HAVE SWEEPING, DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IF UPHELD\nA. The Third Circuit's Substantial Burden Analysis Would Allow Courts To Override Any Sincerely Held Religious Belief\nB. If The Third Circuit's Decision Is Upheld, It Will Incentivize Regulators To Utilize Similar False \"Accommodations\" Which Stifle Religious Freedom",
        "reference": "1. The Third Circuit impermissibly questioned the reasonableness of Petitioner's religious beliefs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN PRECEDENT\nA. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil\nB. The Third Circuit Misconstrues The Substantial Burden Test\n1. The Third Circuit impermissibly questioned the reasonableness of Petitioner's religious beliefs\n2. [MISSING]\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF RFRA WILL HAVE SWEEPING, DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IF UPHELD\nA. The Third Circuit's Substantial Burden Analysis Would Allow Courts To Override Any Sincerely Held Religious Belief\nB. If The Third Circuit's Decision Is Upheld, It Will Incentivize Regulators To Utilize Similar False \"Accommodations\" Which Stifle Religious Freedom",
        "reference": "2. The Third Circuit's analysis improperly focused on the administrative burdens of complying with the Accommodation, instead of the significant penalties for refusing to participate in the Accommodation scheme in accordance with objectors' religious beliefs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN PRECEDENT\nA. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil\nB. The Third Circuit Misconstrues The Substantial Burden Test\n1. The Third Circuit impermissibly questioned the reasonableness of Petitioner's religious beliefs\n2. The Third Circuit's analysis improperly focused on the administrative burdens of complying with the Accommodation, instead of the significant penalties for refusing to participate in the Accommodation scheme in accordance with objectors' religious beliefs\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Third Circuit's Substantial Burden Analysis Would Allow Courts To Override Any Sincerely Held Religious Belief\nB. If The Third Circuit's Decision Is Upheld, It Will Incentivize Regulators To Utilize Similar False \"Accommodations\" Which Stifle Religious Freedom",
        "reference": "II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF RFRA WILL HAVE SWEEPING, DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IF UPHELD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN PRECEDENT\nA. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil\nB. The Third Circuit Misconstrues The Substantial Burden Test\n1. The Third Circuit impermissibly questioned the reasonableness of Petitioner's religious beliefs\n2. The Third Circuit's analysis improperly focused on the administrative burdens of complying with the Accommodation, instead of the significant penalties for refusing to participate in the Accommodation scheme in accordance with objectors' religious beliefs\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF RFRA WILL HAVE SWEEPING, DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IF UPHELD\nA. [MISSING]\nB. If The Third Circuit's Decision Is Upheld, It Will Incentivize Regulators To Utilize Similar False \"Accommodations\" Which Stifle Religious Freedom",
        "reference": "A. The Third Circuit's Substantial Burden Analysis Would Allow Courts To Override Any Sincerely Held Religious Belief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN PRECEDENT\nA. It Is Undisputed That Petitioner Sincerely Believes That The \"Accommodation\" Makes It Complicit In Moral Evil\nB. The Third Circuit Misconstrues The Substantial Burden Test\n1. The Third Circuit impermissibly questioned the reasonableness of Petitioner's religious beliefs\n2. The Third Circuit's analysis improperly focused on the administrative burdens of complying with the Accommodation, instead of the significant penalties for refusing to participate in the Accommodation scheme in accordance with objectors' religious beliefs\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S FLAWED INTERPRETATION OF RFRA WILL HAVE SWEEPING, DETRIMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IF UPHELD\nA. The Third Circuit's Substantial Burden Analysis Would Allow Courts To Override Any Sincerely Held Religious Belief\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. If The Third Circuit's Decision Is Upheld, It Will Incentivize Regulators To Utilize Similar False \"Accommodations\" Which Stifle Religious Freedom",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Court has correctly rejected an atextual carveout of Spending Clause legislation from the \"laws\" giving rise to suits under Section 1983\nB. Congress expressly ratified the application of Section 1983 to Social Security Act programs\nC. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here\nII. The statutory context rebuts the presumption that the individual rights at issue are enforceable under Section 1983\nA. The provisions at issue here create individual rights\nB. The surrounding statutory context overcomes the presumption that the rights FNHRA establishes are enforceable under Section 1983",
        "reference": "I. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents holding that suits may be brought under Section 1983 based on rights established in Spending Clause legislation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents holding that suits may be brought under Section 1983 based on rights established in Spending Clause legislation\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress expressly ratified the application of Section 1983 to Social Security Act programs\nC. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here\nII. The statutory context rebuts the presumption that the individual rights at issue are enforceable under Section 1983\nA. The provisions at issue here create individual rights\nB. The surrounding statutory context overcomes the presumption that the rights FNHRA establishes are enforceable under Section 1983",
        "reference": "A. This Court has correctly rejected an atextual carveout of Spending Clause legislation from the \"laws\" giving rise to suits under Section 1983",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents holding that suits may be brought under Section 1983 based on rights established in Spending Clause legislation\nA. This Court has correctly rejected an atextual carveout of Spending Clause legislation from the \"laws\" giving rise to suits under Section 1983\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here\nII. The statutory context rebuts the presumption that the individual rights at issue are enforceable under Section 1983\nA. The provisions at issue here create individual rights\nB. The surrounding statutory context overcomes the presumption that the rights FNHRA establishes are enforceable under Section 1983",
        "reference": "B. Congress expressly ratified the application of Section 1983 to Social Security Act programs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents holding that suits may be brought under Section 1983 based on rights established in Spending Clause legislation\nA. This Court has correctly rejected an atextual carveout of Spending Clause legislation from the \"laws\" giving rise to suits under Section 1983\nB. Congress expressly ratified the application of Section 1983 to Social Security Act programs\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The statutory context rebuts the presumption that the individual rights at issue are enforceable under Section 1983\nA. The provisions at issue here create individual rights\nB. The surrounding statutory context overcomes the presumption that the rights FNHRA establishes are enforceable under Section 1983",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents holding that suits may be brought under Section 1983 based on rights established in Spending Clause legislation\nA. This Court has correctly rejected an atextual carveout of Spending Clause legislation from the \"laws\" giving rise to suits under Section 1983\nB. Congress expressly ratified the application of Section 1983 to Social Security Act programs\nC. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The provisions at issue here create individual rights\nB. The surrounding statutory context overcomes the presumption that the rights FNHRA establishes are enforceable under Section 1983",
        "reference": "II. The statutory context rebuts the presumption that the individual rights at issue are enforceable under Section 1983",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents holding that suits may be brought under Section 1983 based on rights established in Spending Clause legislation\nA. This Court has correctly rejected an atextual carveout of Spending Clause legislation from the \"laws\" giving rise to suits under Section 1983\nB. Congress expressly ratified the application of Section 1983 to Social Security Act programs\nC. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here\nII. The statutory context rebuts the presumption that the individual rights at issue are enforceable under Section 1983\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The surrounding statutory context overcomes the presumption that the rights FNHRA establishes are enforceable under Section 1983",
        "reference": "A. The provisions at issue here create individual rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents holding that suits may be brought under Section 1983 based on rights established in Spending Clause legislation\nA. This Court has correctly rejected an atextual carveout of Spending Clause legislation from the \"laws\" giving rise to suits under Section 1983\nB. Congress expressly ratified the application of Section 1983 to Social Security Act programs\nC. Petitioners offer no sound reason to overrule the precedent at issue here\nII. The statutory context rebuts the presumption that the individual rights at issue are enforceable under Section 1983\nA. The provisions at issue here create individual rights\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The surrounding statutory context overcomes the presumption that the rights FNHRA establishes are enforceable under Section 1983",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction\nB. Even After the United States Asserted General Criminal Jurisdiction, Crimes by Non-Indians Against Indians Remained a Core Concern of Federal Statutes and Treaties\nC. Even As States Gained Authority Over Crimes Between Non-Indians, Congress And This Court Repeatedly Rejected Efforts To Increase State Authority Over Crimes Involving Indians\nD. Between 1940 and 1994, Congress Repeatedly Legislated Its Understanding That States Lacked Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Without Express Congressional Consent\nE. Modern Statutes Underscore this Historic Exclusion by Limiting State Jurisdiction and Enhancing Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes against Indians\nF. Conclusion\nII. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Would Undermine Safety Throughout the United States\nA. The Public Safety Crisis Facing Indian People Developed Largely under State Jurisdiction\nB. State Jurisdiction Undermines Support and Accountability for Tribal and Federal Legal Systems\nC. State Jurisdiction Contributes to Mistrust and Ineffective Responses to Crimes Against Indians",
        "reference": "I. Since the Founding, Federal Statutes Have Excluded State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since the Founding, Federal Statutes Have Excluded State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Even After the United States Asserted General Criminal Jurisdiction, Crimes by Non-Indians Against Indians Remained a Core Concern of Federal Statutes and Treaties\nC. Even As States Gained Authority Over Crimes Between Non-Indians, Congress And This Court Repeatedly Rejected Efforts To Increase State Authority Over Crimes Involving Indians\nD. Between 1940 and 1994, Congress Repeatedly Legislated Its Understanding That States Lacked Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Without Express Congressional Consent\nE. Modern Statutes Underscore this Historic Exclusion by Limiting State Jurisdiction and Enhancing Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes against Indians\nF. Conclusion\nII. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Would Undermine Safety Throughout the United States\nA. The Public Safety Crisis Facing Indian People Developed Largely under State Jurisdiction\nB. State Jurisdiction Undermines Support and Accountability for Tribal and Federal Legal Systems\nC. State Jurisdiction Contributes to Mistrust and Ineffective Responses to Crimes Against Indians",
        "reference": "A. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since the Founding, Federal Statutes Have Excluded State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes\nA. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Even As States Gained Authority Over Crimes Between Non-Indians, Congress And This Court Repeatedly Rejected Efforts To Increase State Authority Over Crimes Involving Indians\nD. Between 1940 and 1994, Congress Repeatedly Legislated Its Understanding That States Lacked Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Without Express Congressional Consent\nE. Modern Statutes Underscore this Historic Exclusion by Limiting State Jurisdiction and Enhancing Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes against Indians\nF. Conclusion\nII. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Would Undermine Safety Throughout the United States\nA. The Public Safety Crisis Facing Indian People Developed Largely under State Jurisdiction\nB. State Jurisdiction Undermines Support and Accountability for Tribal and Federal Legal Systems\nC. State Jurisdiction Contributes to Mistrust and Ineffective Responses to Crimes Against Indians",
        "reference": "B. Even After the United States Asserted General Criminal Jurisdiction, Crimes by Non-Indians Against Indians Remained a Core Concern of Federal Statutes and Treaties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since the Founding, Federal Statutes Have Excluded State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes\nA. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction\nB. Even After the United States Asserted General Criminal Jurisdiction, Crimes by Non-Indians Against Indians Remained a Core Concern of Federal Statutes and Treaties\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Between 1940 and 1994, Congress Repeatedly Legislated Its Understanding That States Lacked Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Without Express Congressional Consent\nE. Modern Statutes Underscore this Historic Exclusion by Limiting State Jurisdiction and Enhancing Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes against Indians\nF. Conclusion\nII. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Would Undermine Safety Throughout the United States\nA. The Public Safety Crisis Facing Indian People Developed Largely under State Jurisdiction\nB. State Jurisdiction Undermines Support and Accountability for Tribal and Federal Legal Systems\nC. State Jurisdiction Contributes to Mistrust and Ineffective Responses to Crimes Against Indians",
        "reference": "C. Even As States Gained Authority Over Crimes Between Non-Indians, Congress And This Court Repeatedly Rejected Efforts To Increase State Authority Over Crimes Involving Indians",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since the Founding, Federal Statutes Have Excluded State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes\nA. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction\nB. Even After the United States Asserted General Criminal Jurisdiction, Crimes by Non-Indians Against Indians Remained a Core Concern of Federal Statutes and Treaties\nC. Even As States Gained Authority Over Crimes Between Non-Indians, Congress And This Court Repeatedly Rejected Efforts To Increase State Authority Over Crimes Involving Indians\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Modern Statutes Underscore this Historic Exclusion by Limiting State Jurisdiction and Enhancing Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes against Indians\nF. Conclusion\nII. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Would Undermine Safety Throughout the United States\nA. The Public Safety Crisis Facing Indian People Developed Largely under State Jurisdiction\nB. State Jurisdiction Undermines Support and Accountability for Tribal and Federal Legal Systems\nC. State Jurisdiction Contributes to Mistrust and Ineffective Responses to Crimes Against Indians",
        "reference": "D. Between 1940 and 1994, Congress Repeatedly Legislated Its Understanding That States Lacked Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Without Express Congressional Consent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since the Founding, Federal Statutes Have Excluded State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes\nA. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction\nB. Even After the United States Asserted General Criminal Jurisdiction, Crimes by Non-Indians Against Indians Remained a Core Concern of Federal Statutes and Treaties\nC. Even As States Gained Authority Over Crimes Between Non-Indians, Congress And This Court Repeatedly Rejected Efforts To Increase State Authority Over Crimes Involving Indians\nD. Between 1940 and 1994, Congress Repeatedly Legislated Its Understanding That States Lacked Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Without Express Congressional Consent\nE. [MISSING]\nF. Conclusion\nII. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Would Undermine Safety Throughout the United States\nA. The Public Safety Crisis Facing Indian People Developed Largely under State Jurisdiction\nB. State Jurisdiction Undermines Support and Accountability for Tribal and Federal Legal Systems\nC. State Jurisdiction Contributes to Mistrust and Ineffective Responses to Crimes Against Indians",
        "reference": "E. Modern Statutes Underscore this Historic Exclusion by Limiting State Jurisdiction and Enhancing Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes against Indians",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since the Founding, Federal Statutes Have Excluded State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes\nA. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction\nB. Even After the United States Asserted General Criminal Jurisdiction, Crimes by Non-Indians Against Indians Remained a Core Concern of Federal Statutes and Treaties\nC. Even As States Gained Authority Over Crimes Between Non-Indians, Congress And This Court Repeatedly Rejected Efforts To Increase State Authority Over Crimes Involving Indians\nD. Between 1940 and 1994, Congress Repeatedly Legislated Its Understanding That States Lacked Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Without Express Congressional Consent\nE. Modern Statutes Underscore this Historic Exclusion by Limiting State Jurisdiction and Enhancing Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes against Indians\nF. Conclusion\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Public Safety Crisis Facing Indian People Developed Largely under State Jurisdiction\nB. State Jurisdiction Undermines Support and Accountability for Tribal and Federal Legal Systems\nC. State Jurisdiction Contributes to Mistrust and Ineffective Responses to Crimes Against Indians",
        "reference": "II. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Would Undermine Safety Throughout the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since the Founding, Federal Statutes Have Excluded State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes\nA. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction\nB. Even After the United States Asserted General Criminal Jurisdiction, Crimes by Non-Indians Against Indians Remained a Core Concern of Federal Statutes and Treaties\nC. Even As States Gained Authority Over Crimes Between Non-Indians, Congress And This Court Repeatedly Rejected Efforts To Increase State Authority Over Crimes Involving Indians\nD. Between 1940 and 1994, Congress Repeatedly Legislated Its Understanding That States Lacked Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Without Express Congressional Consent\nE. Modern Statutes Underscore this Historic Exclusion by Limiting State Jurisdiction and Enhancing Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes against Indians\nF. Conclusion\nII. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Would Undermine Safety Throughout the United States\nA. [MISSING]\nB. State Jurisdiction Undermines Support and Accountability for Tribal and Federal Legal Systems\nC. State Jurisdiction Contributes to Mistrust and Ineffective Responses to Crimes Against Indians",
        "reference": "A. The Public Safety Crisis Facing Indian People Developed Largely under State Jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since the Founding, Federal Statutes Have Excluded State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes\nA. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction\nB. Even After the United States Asserted General Criminal Jurisdiction, Crimes by Non-Indians Against Indians Remained a Core Concern of Federal Statutes and Treaties\nC. Even As States Gained Authority Over Crimes Between Non-Indians, Congress And This Court Repeatedly Rejected Efforts To Increase State Authority Over Crimes Involving Indians\nD. Between 1940 and 1994, Congress Repeatedly Legislated Its Understanding That States Lacked Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Without Express Congressional Consent\nE. Modern Statutes Underscore this Historic Exclusion by Limiting State Jurisdiction and Enhancing Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes against Indians\nF. Conclusion\nII. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Would Undermine Safety Throughout the United States\nA. The Public Safety Crisis Facing Indian People Developed Largely under State Jurisdiction\nB. [MISSING]\nC. State Jurisdiction Contributes to Mistrust and Ineffective Responses to Crimes Against Indians",
        "reference": "B. State Jurisdiction Undermines Support and Accountability for Tribal and Federal Legal Systems",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since the Founding, Federal Statutes Have Excluded State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes\nA. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction\nB. Even After the United States Asserted General Criminal Jurisdiction, Crimes by Non-Indians Against Indians Remained a Core Concern of Federal Statutes and Treaties\nC. Even As States Gained Authority Over Crimes Between Non-Indians, Congress And This Court Repeatedly Rejected Efforts To Increase State Authority Over Crimes Involving Indians\nD. Between 1940 and 1994, Congress Repeatedly Legislated Its Understanding That States Lacked Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Without Express Congressional Consent\nE. Modern Statutes Underscore this Historic Exclusion by Limiting State Jurisdiction and Enhancing Tribal Jurisdiction over Crimes against Indians\nF. Conclusion\nII. State Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian Against Indian Crime Would Undermine Safety Throughout the United States\nA. The Public Safety Crisis Facing Indian People Developed Largely under State Jurisdiction\nB. State Jurisdiction Undermines Support and Accountability for Tribal and Federal Legal Systems\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. State Jurisdiction Contributes to Mistrust and Ineffective Responses to Crimes Against Indians",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) unambiguously permits mailing the service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nB. Petitioner's alternative interpretation is contrary to the plain text of Section 1608(a)(3)\nC. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations\nD. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the legislative history\nE. The government has no legitimate interest in the adoption of petitioner's interpretation",
        "reference": "I. Under the FSIA, a plaintiff may effect service on a foreign state by mailing a service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the FSIA, a plaintiff may effect service on a foreign state by mailing a service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner's alternative interpretation is contrary to the plain text of Section 1608(a)(3)\nC. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations\nD. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the legislative history\nE. The government has no legitimate interest in the adoption of petitioner's interpretation",
        "reference": "A. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) unambiguously permits mailing the service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the FSIA, a plaintiff may effect service on a foreign state by mailing a service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nA. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) unambiguously permits mailing the service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations\nD. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the legislative history\nE. The government has no legitimate interest in the adoption of petitioner's interpretation",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's alternative interpretation is contrary to the plain text of Section 1608(a)(3)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the FSIA, a plaintiff may effect service on a foreign state by mailing a service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nA. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) unambiguously permits mailing the service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nB. Petitioner's alternative interpretation is contrary to the plain text of Section 1608(a)(3)\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the legislative history\nE. The government has no legitimate interest in the adoption of petitioner's interpretation",
        "reference": "C. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the FSIA, a plaintiff may effect service on a foreign state by mailing a service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nA. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) unambiguously permits mailing the service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nB. Petitioner's alternative interpretation is contrary to the plain text of Section 1608(a)(3)\nC. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The government has no legitimate interest in the adoption of petitioner's interpretation",
        "reference": "D. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the legislative history",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the FSIA, a plaintiff may effect service on a foreign state by mailing a service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nA. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) unambiguously permits mailing the service packet to the foreign minister at the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nB. Petitioner's alternative interpretation is contrary to the plain text of Section 1608(a)(3)\nC. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations\nD. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1608(a)(3) is consistent with the legislative history\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. The government has no legitimate interest in the adoption of petitioner's interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. An \"Examine the Content of the Sign\" Test Is Consistent with This Court's Jurisprudence and the Reed Concurrence\nIII. Austin's Sign Code Favors Commercial Speech Over Noncommercial Speech\nIV. Austin's Sign Code Favors Popular, Majoritarian Noncommercial Speech Over Unpopular, Minority Noncommercial Speech\nV. Austin's Sign Ordinance Prevents Speakers from Remaining Anonymous, and Thus Unconstitutionally Chills Speech",
        "reference": "I. Austin's Sign Code Is Facially Content-Based Under McCullen and Reed Because It Requires Officials to Examine the Communicative Content of Signs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Austin's Sign Code Is Facially Content-Based Under McCullen and Reed Because It Requires Officials to Examine the Communicative Content of Signs\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Austin's Sign Code Favors Commercial Speech Over Noncommercial Speech\nIV. Austin's Sign Code Favors Popular, Majoritarian Noncommercial Speech Over Unpopular, Minority Noncommercial Speech\nV. Austin's Sign Ordinance Prevents Speakers from Remaining Anonymous, and Thus Unconstitutionally Chills Speech",
        "reference": "II. An \"Examine the Content of the Sign\" Test Is Consistent with This Court's Jurisprudence and the Reed Concurrence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Austin's Sign Code Is Facially Content-Based Under McCullen and Reed Because It Requires Officials to Examine the Communicative Content of Signs\nII. An \"Examine the Content of the Sign\" Test Is Consistent with This Court's Jurisprudence and the Reed Concurrence\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Austin's Sign Code Favors Popular, Majoritarian Noncommercial Speech Over Unpopular, Minority Noncommercial Speech\nV. Austin's Sign Ordinance Prevents Speakers from Remaining Anonymous, and Thus Unconstitutionally Chills Speech",
        "reference": "III. Austin's Sign Code Favors Commercial Speech Over Noncommercial Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Austin's Sign Code Is Facially Content-Based Under McCullen and Reed Because It Requires Officials to Examine the Communicative Content of Signs\nII. An \"Examine the Content of the Sign\" Test Is Consistent with This Court's Jurisprudence and the Reed Concurrence\nIII. Austin's Sign Code Favors Commercial Speech Over Noncommercial Speech\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. Austin's Sign Ordinance Prevents Speakers from Remaining Anonymous, and Thus Unconstitutionally Chills Speech",
        "reference": "IV. Austin's Sign Code Favors Popular, Majoritarian Noncommercial Speech Over Unpopular, Minority Noncommercial Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Austin's Sign Code Is Facially Content-Based Under McCullen and Reed Because It Requires Officials to Examine the Communicative Content of Signs\nII. An \"Examine the Content of the Sign\" Test Is Consistent with This Court's Jurisprudence and the Reed Concurrence\nIII. Austin's Sign Code Favors Commercial Speech Over Noncommercial Speech\nIV. Austin's Sign Code Favors Popular, Majoritarian Noncommercial Speech Over Unpopular, Minority Noncommercial Speech\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. Austin's Sign Ordinance Prevents Speakers from Remaining Anonymous, and Thus Unconstitutionally Chills Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "A. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. [MISSING]\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. [MISSING]\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "a. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. [MISSING]\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "b. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. [MISSING]\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. [MISSING]\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "B. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "II. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "reference": "A. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD\nA. The Encouragement Provision Criminalizes Protected Speech\n1. The words \"encourage\" and \"induce\" are expansive and encompass speech\n2. The statutory context and the government's own enforcement practices confirm the encouragement provision's sweeping scope\n3. The encouragement provision lacks critical indicia of an \"aiding-and-abetting\" or \"solicitation\" statute\na. The encouragement provision is not an \"aiding-and-abetting\" statute\nb. The encouragement provision is not a \"solicitation\" statute\n4. The encouragement provision's statutory history also confirms its broad sweep\n5. Constitutional avoidance cannot save the encouragement provision\nB. Properly Interpreted, The Encouragement Provision Encompasses A Substantial Amount Of Protected Speech And Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad\nII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT PROVISION IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON OTHER GROUNDS\nA. The Encouragement Provision Impermissibly Discriminates Based On Content And Viewpoint\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Encouragement Provision Is Impermissibly Vague",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Precedents of This Court so Hold\nB. Although State Law Helps Define the Nature of Property and Its Ownership, the Due Process Takings Clause Operates Based on the General, American Understanding of Rights",
        "reference": "I. The Economic Impact of a Government Taxing Authority Taking a Property Owner's Equity above the Tax Debt is Large",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Economic Impact of a Government Taxing Authority Taking a Property Owner's Equity above the Tax Debt is Large\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Although State Law Helps Define the Nature of Property and Its Ownership, the Due Process Takings Clause Operates Based on the General, American Understanding of Rights",
        "reference": "A. The Precedents of This Court so Hold",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Economic Impact of a Government Taxing Authority Taking a Property Owner's Equity above the Tax Debt is Large\nA. The Precedents of This Court so Hold\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Although State Law Helps Define the Nature of Property and Its Ownership, the Due Process Takings Clause Operates Based on the General, American Understanding of Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test\nB. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless\nC. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate\nII. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)\nA. The Court's decision in Reynolds\nB. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"\nC. SORNA's legislative history\nIII. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns\nA. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate\nB. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "reference": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless\nC. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate\nII. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)\nA. The Court's decision in Reynolds\nB. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"\nC. SORNA's legislative history\nIII. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns\nA. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate\nB. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "reference": "A. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text\nA. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate\nII. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)\nA. The Court's decision in Reynolds\nB. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"\nC. SORNA's legislative history\nIII. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns\nA. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate\nB. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "reference": "B. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text\nA. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test\nB. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)\nA. The Court's decision in Reynolds\nB. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"\nC. SORNA's legislative history\nIII. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns\nA. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate\nB. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "reference": "C. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text\nA. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test\nB. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless\nC. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Court's decision in Reynolds\nB. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"\nC. SORNA's legislative history\nIII. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns\nA. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate\nB. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "reference": "II. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text\nA. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test\nB. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless\nC. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate\nII. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)\nA. [MISSING]\nB. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"\nC. SORNA's legislative history\nIII. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns\nA. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate\nB. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "reference": "A. The Court's decision in Reynolds",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text\nA. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test\nB. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless\nC. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate\nII. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)\nA. The Court's decision in Reynolds\nB. [MISSING]\nC. SORNA's legislative history\nIII. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns\nA. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate\nB. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "reference": "B. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text\nA. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test\nB. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless\nC. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate\nII. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)\nA. The Court's decision in Reynolds\nB. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns\nA. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate\nB. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "reference": "C. SORNA's legislative history",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text\nA. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test\nB. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless\nC. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate\nII. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)\nA. The Court's decision in Reynolds\nB. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"\nC. SORNA's legislative history\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate\nB. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "reference": "III. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text\nA. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test\nB. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless\nC. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate\nII. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)\nA. The Court's decision in Reynolds\nB. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"\nC. SORNA's legislative history\nIII. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "reference": "A. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court cannot engraft an intelligible principle onto Section 20913(d)'s unambiguously standardless text\nA. Congress must state more than a precatory \"general policy\" to satisfy the intelligible-principle test\nB. Searching beyond Section 20913(d) for an intelligible principle is improper because that provision is unambiguously standardless\nC. The delegations previously sanctioned by this Court included explicit textual standards to bind the delegate\nII. The Government's sources do not reveal any \"feasibility\" standard in Section 20913(d)\nA. The Court's decision in Reynolds\nB. SORNA's preamble and definition of \"sex offender\"\nC. SORNA's legislative history\nIII. Section 20913(d)'s delegation requires clear and meaningful legislative guidance because it implicates a unique combination of separation-of-powers concerns\nA. The guidance required under the intelligible-principle test depends on the power conferred and the identity of the delegate\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Given the nature of Section 20913(d)'s delegation, Congress must provide clear and meaningful guidance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that this Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in a statute\n2. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" has not included either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\"\n3. Not including the terms \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\" within Title VII's list of enumerated classifications confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on either basis\n4. The statutory history of Title VII and other statutes confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual identity or sexual orientation\nB. Both the text of Title VII and its statutory history confirm that the word \"sex\" does not have a broad meaning that encompasses all characteristics that are related in some manner to \"sex\"\n1. Title VII's definition of \"sex\" should not be read broadly to include all activities, beliefs or practices that have something to do with sex\n2. The plain text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not support a broad reading of the word \"sex\" in Title VII\n3. The statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, together with the case law decided before it was enacted, shows that the 1991 Act did not incorporate a broad definition of discrimination because of sex\nC. The Court should not usurp the role of Congress by amending the plain text of Title VII to include two of the numerous human classifications that Congress has not decided to include",
        "reference": "A. This Court should find that the Employees do not have a viable claim under Title VII because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" does not include either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation,\" a conclusion confirmed by the statutory history of Title VII",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court should find that the Employees do not have a viable claim under Title VII because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" does not include either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation,\" a conclusion confirmed by the statutory history of Title VII\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" has not included either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\"\n3. Not including the terms \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\" within Title VII's list of enumerated classifications confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on either basis\n4. The statutory history of Title VII and other statutes confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual identity or sexual orientation\nB. Both the text of Title VII and its statutory history confirm that the word \"sex\" does not have a broad meaning that encompasses all characteristics that are related in some manner to \"sex\"\n1. Title VII's definition of \"sex\" should not be read broadly to include all activities, beliefs or practices that have something to do with sex\n2. The plain text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not support a broad reading of the word \"sex\" in Title VII\n3. The statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, together with the case law decided before it was enacted, shows that the 1991 Act did not incorporate a broad definition of discrimination because of sex\nC. The Court should not usurp the role of Congress by amending the plain text of Title VII to include two of the numerous human classifications that Congress has not decided to include",
        "reference": "1. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that this Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in a statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court should find that the Employees do not have a viable claim under Title VII because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" does not include either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation,\" a conclusion confirmed by the statutory history of Title VII\n1. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that this Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in a statute\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Not including the terms \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\" within Title VII's list of enumerated classifications confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on either basis\n4. The statutory history of Title VII and other statutes confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual identity or sexual orientation\nB. Both the text of Title VII and its statutory history confirm that the word \"sex\" does not have a broad meaning that encompasses all characteristics that are related in some manner to \"sex\"\n1. Title VII's definition of \"sex\" should not be read broadly to include all activities, beliefs or practices that have something to do with sex\n2. The plain text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not support a broad reading of the word \"sex\" in Title VII\n3. The statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, together with the case law decided before it was enacted, shows that the 1991 Act did not incorporate a broad definition of discrimination because of sex\nC. The Court should not usurp the role of Congress by amending the plain text of Title VII to include two of the numerous human classifications that Congress has not decided to include",
        "reference": "2. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" has not included either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court should find that the Employees do not have a viable claim under Title VII because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" does not include either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation,\" a conclusion confirmed by the statutory history of Title VII\n1. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that this Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in a statute\n2. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" has not included either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\"\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The statutory history of Title VII and other statutes confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual identity or sexual orientation\nB. Both the text of Title VII and its statutory history confirm that the word \"sex\" does not have a broad meaning that encompasses all characteristics that are related in some manner to \"sex\"\n1. Title VII's definition of \"sex\" should not be read broadly to include all activities, beliefs or practices that have something to do with sex\n2. The plain text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not support a broad reading of the word \"sex\" in Title VII\n3. The statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, together with the case law decided before it was enacted, shows that the 1991 Act did not incorporate a broad definition of discrimination because of sex\nC. The Court should not usurp the role of Congress by amending the plain text of Title VII to include two of the numerous human classifications that Congress has not decided to include",
        "reference": "3. Not including the terms \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\" within Title VII's list of enumerated classifications confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on either basis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court should find that the Employees do not have a viable claim under Title VII because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" does not include either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation,\" a conclusion confirmed by the statutory history of Title VII\n1. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that this Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in a statute\n2. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" has not included either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\"\n3. Not including the terms \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\" within Title VII's list of enumerated classifications confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on either basis\n4. [MISSING]\nB. Both the text of Title VII and its statutory history confirm that the word \"sex\" does not have a broad meaning that encompasses all characteristics that are related in some manner to \"sex\"\n1. Title VII's definition of \"sex\" should not be read broadly to include all activities, beliefs or practices that have something to do with sex\n2. The plain text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not support a broad reading of the word \"sex\" in Title VII\n3. The statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, together with the case law decided before it was enacted, shows that the 1991 Act did not incorporate a broad definition of discrimination because of sex\nC. The Court should not usurp the role of Congress by amending the plain text of Title VII to include two of the numerous human classifications that Congress has not decided to include",
        "reference": "4. The statutory history of Title VII and other statutes confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual identity or sexual orientation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court should find that the Employees do not have a viable claim under Title VII because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" does not include either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation,\" a conclusion confirmed by the statutory history of Title VII\n1. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that this Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in a statute\n2. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" has not included either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\"\n3. Not including the terms \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\" within Title VII's list of enumerated classifications confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on either basis\n4. The statutory history of Title VII and other statutes confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual identity or sexual orientation\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Title VII's definition of \"sex\" should not be read broadly to include all activities, beliefs or practices that have something to do with sex\n2. The plain text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not support a broad reading of the word \"sex\" in Title VII\n3. The statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, together with the case law decided before it was enacted, shows that the 1991 Act did not incorporate a broad definition of discrimination because of sex\nC. The Court should not usurp the role of Congress by amending the plain text of Title VII to include two of the numerous human classifications that Congress has not decided to include",
        "reference": "B. Both the text of Title VII and its statutory history confirm that the word \"sex\" does not have a broad meaning that encompasses all characteristics that are related in some manner to \"sex\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court should find that the Employees do not have a viable claim under Title VII because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" does not include either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation,\" a conclusion confirmed by the statutory history of Title VII\n1. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that this Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in a statute\n2. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" has not included either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\"\n3. Not including the terms \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\" within Title VII's list of enumerated classifications confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on either basis\n4. The statutory history of Title VII and other statutes confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual identity or sexual orientation\nB. Both the text of Title VII and its statutory history confirm that the word \"sex\" does not have a broad meaning that encompasses all characteristics that are related in some manner to \"sex\"\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The plain text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not support a broad reading of the word \"sex\" in Title VII\n3. The statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, together with the case law decided before it was enacted, shows that the 1991 Act did not incorporate a broad definition of discrimination because of sex\nC. The Court should not usurp the role of Congress by amending the plain text of Title VII to include two of the numerous human classifications that Congress has not decided to include",
        "reference": "1. Title VII's definition of \"sex\" should not be read broadly to include all activities, beliefs or practices that have something to do with sex",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court should find that the Employees do not have a viable claim under Title VII because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" does not include either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation,\" a conclusion confirmed by the statutory history of Title VII\n1. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that this Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in a statute\n2. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" has not included either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\"\n3. Not including the terms \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\" within Title VII's list of enumerated classifications confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on either basis\n4. The statutory history of Title VII and other statutes confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual identity or sexual orientation\nB. Both the text of Title VII and its statutory history confirm that the word \"sex\" does not have a broad meaning that encompasses all characteristics that are related in some manner to \"sex\"\n1. Title VII's definition of \"sex\" should not be read broadly to include all activities, beliefs or practices that have something to do with sex\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, together with the case law decided before it was enacted, shows that the 1991 Act did not incorporate a broad definition of discrimination because of sex\nC. The Court should not usurp the role of Congress by amending the plain text of Title VII to include two of the numerous human classifications that Congress has not decided to include",
        "reference": "2. The plain text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not support a broad reading of the word \"sex\" in Title VII",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court should find that the Employees do not have a viable claim under Title VII because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" does not include either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation,\" a conclusion confirmed by the statutory history of Title VII\n1. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that this Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in a statute\n2. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" has not included either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\"\n3. Not including the terms \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\" within Title VII's list of enumerated classifications confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on either basis\n4. The statutory history of Title VII and other statutes confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual identity or sexual orientation\nB. Both the text of Title VII and its statutory history confirm that the word \"sex\" does not have a broad meaning that encompasses all characteristics that are related in some manner to \"sex\"\n1. Title VII's definition of \"sex\" should not be read broadly to include all activities, beliefs or practices that have something to do with sex\n2. The plain text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not support a broad reading of the word \"sex\" in Title VII\n3. [MISSING]\nC. The Court should not usurp the role of Congress by amending the plain text of Title VII to include two of the numerous human classifications that Congress has not decided to include",
        "reference": "3. The statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, together with the case law decided before it was enacted, shows that the 1991 Act did not incorporate a broad definition of discrimination because of sex",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court should find that the Employees do not have a viable claim under Title VII because the plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" does not include either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation,\" a conclusion confirmed by the statutory history of Title VII\n1. The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that this Court applies the plain and ordinary meaning of the words in a statute\n2. The plain and ordinary meaning of the word \"sex\" has not included either \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\"\n3. Not including the terms \"gender identity\" or \"sexual orientation\" within Title VII's list of enumerated classifications confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on either basis\n4. The statutory history of Title VII and other statutes confirms that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual identity or sexual orientation\nB. Both the text of Title VII and its statutory history confirm that the word \"sex\" does not have a broad meaning that encompasses all characteristics that are related in some manner to \"sex\"\n1. Title VII's definition of \"sex\" should not be read broadly to include all activities, beliefs or practices that have something to do with sex\n2. The plain text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not support a broad reading of the word \"sex\" in Title VII\n3. The statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, together with the case law decided before it was enacted, shows that the 1991 Act did not incorporate a broad definition of discrimination because of sex\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Court should not usurp the role of Congress by amending the plain text of Title VII to include two of the numerous human classifications that Congress has not decided to include",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Experiences of Legal Aid's LGBT Clients Demonstrate The Inevitable Overlap Between Sex Stereotyping And Discrimination On the Basis of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation\nB. Social Science Research Further Confirms That Discrimination On The Basis Of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Is Rooted In Sex Stereotypes\nII. Attempts To Distinguish Between Sex Stereotyping And Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lead To Absurd Results",
        "reference": "I. Discrimination On The Basis Of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Is A Form Of Sex Discrimination Based On Sex Stereotyping",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Discrimination On The Basis Of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Is A Form Of Sex Discrimination Based On Sex Stereotyping\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Social Science Research Further Confirms That Discrimination On The Basis Of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Is Rooted In Sex Stereotypes\nII. Attempts To Distinguish Between Sex Stereotyping And Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lead To Absurd Results",
        "reference": "A. The Experiences of Legal Aid's LGBT Clients Demonstrate The Inevitable Overlap Between Sex Stereotyping And Discrimination On the Basis of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Discrimination On The Basis Of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Is A Form Of Sex Discrimination Based On Sex Stereotyping\nA. The Experiences of Legal Aid's LGBT Clients Demonstrate The Inevitable Overlap Between Sex Stereotyping And Discrimination On the Basis of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Attempts To Distinguish Between Sex Stereotyping And Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lead To Absurd Results",
        "reference": "B. Social Science Research Further Confirms That Discrimination On The Basis Of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Is Rooted In Sex Stereotypes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Discrimination On The Basis Of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Is A Form Of Sex Discrimination Based On Sex Stereotyping\nA. The Experiences of Legal Aid's LGBT Clients Demonstrate The Inevitable Overlap Between Sex Stereotyping And Discrimination On the Basis of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation\nB. Social Science Research Further Confirms That Discrimination On The Basis Of Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Is Rooted In Sex Stereotypes\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Attempts To Distinguish Between Sex Stereotyping And Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lead To Absurd Results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Copyright Act Reflects Congress's Intent To Make Copyright Holders Whole\nB. Categorically Excluding Nontaxable Costs From \"Full Costs\" Would Thwart Congress's Intent",
        "reference": "I. Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include Recovery Of Nontaxable Costs Best Effectuates The Copyright Act's Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include Recovery Of Nontaxable Costs Best Effectuates The Copyright Act's Purpose\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Categorically Excluding Nontaxable Costs From \"Full Costs\" Would Thwart Congress's Intent",
        "reference": "A. The Copyright Act Reflects Congress's Intent To Make Copyright Holders Whole",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Interpreting \"Full Costs\" To Include Recovery Of Nontaxable Costs Best Effectuates The Copyright Act's Purpose\nA. The Copyright Act Reflects Congress's Intent To Make Copyright Holders Whole\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Categorically Excluding Nontaxable Costs From \"Full Costs\" Would Thwart Congress's Intent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "II. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "A. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "III. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "A. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. [MISSING]\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "B. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. [MISSING]\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "reference": "C. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Copyright Owner's Exclusive Right To Control Derivative Works Should Not Be Undermined By A User's Ability To Invoke A \"Transformative Use.\"\nII. Petitioner Argues For An Overbroad Test That Would Nullify The Derivative Work Right.\nA. The First Fair Use Factor Requires Consideration Of Whether A Secondary Use Has A Further Purpose Or Different Character.\nB. Petitioner's Test Would Upend Existing And New Creative Industries.\nIII. A Workable Transformative Use Test Should Be Fully Consistent With The Language And Purpose Of The Copyright Act.\nA. Where The Derivative Use Right And Transformative Use Tests Overlap, The Derivative Work Right Must Retain Primacy.\nB. Courts Must Consider Both The Purpose And The Character Of The Secondary Use.\n1. A Transformative Purpose Should Be Closely Tied To The Purposes Listed In The Preamble To Section 107.\n2. A Transformative Character Cannot Supersede The Original.\n3. Courts Should Resolve Transformative Use On A Sliding Scale Of Purpose And Character.\nC. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The Transformative Use Analysis Cannot Replace The Fourth Factor.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Fourteenth Amendment Transformed the Nation's Federal System To Prevent States from Violating the Freedoms Set Forth in the Bill of Rights\nIII. The Fourteenth Amendment's Text and History Require Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to the States",
        "reference": "I. The Fourteenth Amendment Was a Response to Rampant Infringement of Fundamental Liberties by the States, Including Deprivations of Property Rights and the Oppressive Use of Fines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fourteenth Amendment Was a Response to Rampant Infringement of Fundamental Liberties by the States, Including Deprivations of Property Rights and the Oppressive Use of Fines\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Fourteenth Amendment's Text and History Require Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to the States",
        "reference": "II. The Fourteenth Amendment Transformed the Nation's Federal System To Prevent States from Violating the Freedoms Set Forth in the Bill of Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fourteenth Amendment Was a Response to Rampant Infringement of Fundamental Liberties by the States, Including Deprivations of Property Rights and the Oppressive Use of Fines\nII. The Fourteenth Amendment Transformed the Nation's Federal System To Prevent States from Violating the Freedoms Set Forth in the Bill of Rights\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Fourteenth Amendment's Text and History Require Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to the States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Mr. Kluge requested and received a reasonable Title VII accommodation that the school district erased based on complaints of ideological offense.\nB. Mr. Kluge sues and the district court grants summary judgment to the school district, citing Hardison.\nC. The district, the United States, and other amici use Hardison as a bludgeon against Mr. Kluge on appeal.\nII. Hardison's test for reasonable religious accommodations is divorced from, and opposed to, Title VII's language, with devastating results for Mr. Kluge and other people of faith.\nIII. This Court should grant review and overrule Hardison at the earliest opportunity \u2014 stare decisis is no impediment.",
        "reference": "I. Hardison arose in the Sabbatarian context but its corrosive effects on Title VII and religious liberty extend far beyond, as Mr. Kluge's experience makes clear.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Hardison arose in the Sabbatarian context but its corrosive effects on Title VII and religious liberty extend far beyond, as Mr. Kluge's experience makes clear.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Mr. Kluge sues and the district court grants summary judgment to the school district, citing Hardison.\nC. The district, the United States, and other amici use Hardison as a bludgeon against Mr. Kluge on appeal.\nII. Hardison's test for reasonable religious accommodations is divorced from, and opposed to, Title VII's language, with devastating results for Mr. Kluge and other people of faith.\nIII. This Court should grant review and overrule Hardison at the earliest opportunity \u2014 stare decisis is no impediment.",
        "reference": "A. Mr. Kluge requested and received a reasonable Title VII accommodation that the school district erased based on complaints of ideological offense.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Hardison arose in the Sabbatarian context but its corrosive effects on Title VII and religious liberty extend far beyond, as Mr. Kluge's experience makes clear.\nA. Mr. Kluge requested and received a reasonable Title VII accommodation that the school district erased based on complaints of ideological offense.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The district, the United States, and other amici use Hardison as a bludgeon against Mr. Kluge on appeal.\nII. Hardison's test for reasonable religious accommodations is divorced from, and opposed to, Title VII's language, with devastating results for Mr. Kluge and other people of faith.\nIII. This Court should grant review and overrule Hardison at the earliest opportunity \u2014 stare decisis is no impediment.",
        "reference": "B. Mr. Kluge sues and the district court grants summary judgment to the school district, citing Hardison.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Hardison arose in the Sabbatarian context but its corrosive effects on Title VII and religious liberty extend far beyond, as Mr. Kluge's experience makes clear.\nA. Mr. Kluge requested and received a reasonable Title VII accommodation that the school district erased based on complaints of ideological offense.\nB. Mr. Kluge sues and the district court grants summary judgment to the school district, citing Hardison.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Hardison's test for reasonable religious accommodations is divorced from, and opposed to, Title VII's language, with devastating results for Mr. Kluge and other people of faith.\nIII. This Court should grant review and overrule Hardison at the earliest opportunity \u2014 stare decisis is no impediment.",
        "reference": "C. The district, the United States, and other amici use Hardison as a bludgeon against Mr. Kluge on appeal.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Hardison arose in the Sabbatarian context but its corrosive effects on Title VII and religious liberty extend far beyond, as Mr. Kluge's experience makes clear.\nA. Mr. Kluge requested and received a reasonable Title VII accommodation that the school district erased based on complaints of ideological offense.\nB. Mr. Kluge sues and the district court grants summary judgment to the school district, citing Hardison.\nC. The district, the United States, and other amici use Hardison as a bludgeon against Mr. Kluge on appeal.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Court should grant review and overrule Hardison at the earliest opportunity \u2014 stare decisis is no impediment.",
        "reference": "II. Hardison's test for reasonable religious accommodations is divorced from, and opposed to, Title VII's language, with devastating results for Mr. Kluge and other people of faith.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Hardison arose in the Sabbatarian context but its corrosive effects on Title VII and religious liberty extend far beyond, as Mr. Kluge's experience makes clear.\nA. Mr. Kluge requested and received a reasonable Title VII accommodation that the school district erased based on complaints of ideological offense.\nB. Mr. Kluge sues and the district court grants summary judgment to the school district, citing Hardison.\nC. The district, the United States, and other amici use Hardison as a bludgeon against Mr. Kluge on appeal.\nII. Hardison's test for reasonable religious accommodations is divorced from, and opposed to, Title VII's language, with devastating results for Mr. Kluge and other people of faith.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This Court should grant review and overrule Hardison at the earliest opportunity \u2014 stare decisis is no impediment.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Essential to the ADA framework is the requirement that the employee requesting accommodation can perform the essential functions of the position\nIII. Employers must consider the hardships of a proposed religious accommodation prior to implementation",
        "reference": "I. Employers may establish undue hardship by showing a negative impact on coworkers and other persons",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Employers may establish undue hardship by showing a negative impact on coworkers and other persons\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Employers must consider the hardships of a proposed religious accommodation prior to implementation",
        "reference": "II. Essential to the ADA framework is the requirement that the employee requesting accommodation can perform the essential functions of the position",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Employers may establish undue hardship by showing a negative impact on coworkers and other persons\nII. Essential to the ADA framework is the requirement that the employee requesting accommodation can perform the essential functions of the position\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Employers must consider the hardships of a proposed religious accommodation prior to implementation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking\nB. State Laws Cannot Override Protections For Private Property Rights Provided By The Takings Clause\nII. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO PREVENT THE CONTINUED LOSS OF HOME EQUITY AND THE RESULTING DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON ELDERLY AND MINORITY HOMEOWNERS",
        "reference": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO CLARIFY WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO CLARIFY WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. State Laws Cannot Override Protections For Private Property Rights Provided By The Takings Clause\nII. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO PREVENT THE CONTINUED LOSS OF HOME EQUITY AND THE RESULTING DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON ELDERLY AND MINORITY HOMEOWNERS",
        "reference": "A. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO CLARIFY WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE\nA. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO PREVENT THE CONTINUED LOSS OF HOME EQUITY AND THE RESULTING DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON ELDERLY AND MINORITY HOMEOWNERS",
        "reference": "B. State Laws Cannot Override Protections For Private Property Rights Provided By The Takings Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO CLARIFY WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE\nA. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking\nB. State Laws Cannot Override Protections For Private Property Rights Provided By The Takings Clause\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO PREVENT THE CONTINUED LOSS OF HOME EQUITY AND THE RESULTING DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT ON ELDERLY AND MINORITY HOMEOWNERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. [MISSING]\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "II. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. [MISSING]\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "A. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. [MISSING]\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "B. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "C. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "III. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "A. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. [MISSING]\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "IV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "reference": "A. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized The Importance Of Clear, Predictable Rules In The Antitrust Context\nII. Antitrust Law Has Achieved A Measure Of Predictability By Establishing Clear Rules To Govern Certain Categories Of Typically Procompetitive Conduct\nA. It is settled law that non-collusive vertical restraints are evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm\nC. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm\nIII. Reversing The Decision Below And Adopting Petitioners' Approach Would Undermine These Well-Defined Rules And Unsettle Antitrust Law\nA. The decision below reaffirms the critical antitrust rules that businesses have come to rely on\nB. Petitioners' approach would undermine those rules and usher in an era of uncertain antitrust liability\n1. Petitioners' approach effectively subjects non-collusive vertical restraints to quick-look scrutiny\n2. Petitioners' approach permits antitrust liability even in the face of increased output and lack of market power\nIV. The Resulting Uncertainty Would Chill A Broad Range Of Common Procompetitive Conduct, Thereby Harming Businesses, Consumers, And The U.S. Economy\nA. Exclusive-dealing arrangements and most-favored-nation clauses are common, procompetitive devices that have long been evaluated under the traditional rule of reason\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' approach would have a chilling effect on these and other procompetitive vertical restraints by potentially subjecting them to heightened review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. ONLY CONGRESS CAN AMEND THE FTC ACT TO PROVIDE THE FTC THE REMEDIAL PROCESS IT WANTS; THE JUDICIARY IS NEITHER AUTHORIZED NOR CAPABLE OF MAKING SUCH CHANGES ITSELF\nA. Only Congressional Amendment Of Statutes Is Consistent with the Separation of Powers\nB. The Judiciary Is an Unskilled Statutory Editor\n1. Judicial Statutory Editing Breeds Confusion\n2. Judicial Statutory Editing Produces Inconsistency\nC. Only Congress Can Create Statutes That Successfully Balance Competing Policy Interests",
        "reference": "I. THE FTC INDEED NEEDS A QUICK PATH TO MONETARY RELIEF \u2014 BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN SUCH A PATH ALREADY EXISTS IN THE FTC ACT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FTC INDEED NEEDS A QUICK PATH TO MONETARY RELIEF \u2014 BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN SUCH A PATH ALREADY EXISTS IN THE FTC ACT\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Only Congressional Amendment Of Statutes Is Consistent with the Separation of Powers\nB. The Judiciary Is an Unskilled Statutory Editor\n1. Judicial Statutory Editing Breeds Confusion\n2. Judicial Statutory Editing Produces Inconsistency\nC. Only Congress Can Create Statutes That Successfully Balance Competing Policy Interests",
        "reference": "II. ONLY CONGRESS CAN AMEND THE FTC ACT TO PROVIDE THE FTC THE REMEDIAL PROCESS IT WANTS; THE JUDICIARY IS NEITHER AUTHORIZED NOR CAPABLE OF MAKING SUCH CHANGES ITSELF",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FTC INDEED NEEDS A QUICK PATH TO MONETARY RELIEF \u2014 BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN SUCH A PATH ALREADY EXISTS IN THE FTC ACT\nII. ONLY CONGRESS CAN AMEND THE FTC ACT TO PROVIDE THE FTC THE REMEDIAL PROCESS IT WANTS; THE JUDICIARY IS NEITHER AUTHORIZED NOR CAPABLE OF MAKING SUCH CHANGES ITSELF\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Judiciary Is an Unskilled Statutory Editor\n1. Judicial Statutory Editing Breeds Confusion\n2. Judicial Statutory Editing Produces Inconsistency\nC. Only Congress Can Create Statutes That Successfully Balance Competing Policy Interests",
        "reference": "A. Only Congressional Amendment Of Statutes Is Consistent with the Separation of Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FTC INDEED NEEDS A QUICK PATH TO MONETARY RELIEF \u2014 BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN SUCH A PATH ALREADY EXISTS IN THE FTC ACT\nII. ONLY CONGRESS CAN AMEND THE FTC ACT TO PROVIDE THE FTC THE REMEDIAL PROCESS IT WANTS; THE JUDICIARY IS NEITHER AUTHORIZED NOR CAPABLE OF MAKING SUCH CHANGES ITSELF\nA. Only Congressional Amendment Of Statutes Is Consistent with the Separation of Powers\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Judicial Statutory Editing Breeds Confusion\n2. Judicial Statutory Editing Produces Inconsistency\nC. Only Congress Can Create Statutes That Successfully Balance Competing Policy Interests",
        "reference": "B. The Judiciary Is an Unskilled Statutory Editor",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FTC INDEED NEEDS A QUICK PATH TO MONETARY RELIEF \u2014 BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN SUCH A PATH ALREADY EXISTS IN THE FTC ACT\nII. ONLY CONGRESS CAN AMEND THE FTC ACT TO PROVIDE THE FTC THE REMEDIAL PROCESS IT WANTS; THE JUDICIARY IS NEITHER AUTHORIZED NOR CAPABLE OF MAKING SUCH CHANGES ITSELF\nA. Only Congressional Amendment Of Statutes Is Consistent with the Separation of Powers\nB. The Judiciary Is an Unskilled Statutory Editor\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Judicial Statutory Editing Produces Inconsistency\nC. Only Congress Can Create Statutes That Successfully Balance Competing Policy Interests",
        "reference": "1. Judicial Statutory Editing Breeds Confusion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FTC INDEED NEEDS A QUICK PATH TO MONETARY RELIEF \u2014 BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN SUCH A PATH ALREADY EXISTS IN THE FTC ACT\nII. ONLY CONGRESS CAN AMEND THE FTC ACT TO PROVIDE THE FTC THE REMEDIAL PROCESS IT WANTS; THE JUDICIARY IS NEITHER AUTHORIZED NOR CAPABLE OF MAKING SUCH CHANGES ITSELF\nA. Only Congressional Amendment Of Statutes Is Consistent with the Separation of Powers\nB. The Judiciary Is an Unskilled Statutory Editor\n1. Judicial Statutory Editing Breeds Confusion\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Only Congress Can Create Statutes That Successfully Balance Competing Policy Interests",
        "reference": "2. Judicial Statutory Editing Produces Inconsistency",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FTC INDEED NEEDS A QUICK PATH TO MONETARY RELIEF \u2014 BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN SUCH A PATH ALREADY EXISTS IN THE FTC ACT\nII. ONLY CONGRESS CAN AMEND THE FTC ACT TO PROVIDE THE FTC THE REMEDIAL PROCESS IT WANTS; THE JUDICIARY IS NEITHER AUTHORIZED NOR CAPABLE OF MAKING SUCH CHANGES ITSELF\nA. Only Congressional Amendment Of Statutes Is Consistent with the Separation of Powers\nB. The Judiciary Is an Unskilled Statutory Editor\n1. Judicial Statutory Editing Breeds Confusion\n2. Judicial Statutory Editing Produces Inconsistency\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Only Congress Can Create Statutes That Successfully Balance Competing Policy Interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle\nB. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions\nC. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard\nD. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions\nE. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual\nF. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)\nII. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim\nIII. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter\nIV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged\nV. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "reference": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions\nC. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard\nD. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions\nE. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual\nF. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)\nII. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim\nIII. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter\nIV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged\nV. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "reference": "A. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art\nA. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard\nD. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions\nE. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual\nF. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)\nII. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim\nIII. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter\nIV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged\nV. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "reference": "B. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art\nA. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle\nB. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions\nE. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual\nF. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)\nII. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim\nIII. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter\nIV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged\nV. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "reference": "C. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art\nA. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle\nB. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions\nC. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual\nF. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)\nII. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim\nIII. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter\nIV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged\nV. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "reference": "D. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art\nA. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle\nB. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions\nC. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard\nD. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions\nE. [MISSING]\nF. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)\nII. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim\nIII. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter\nIV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged\nV. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "reference": "E. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art\nA. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle\nB. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions\nC. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard\nD. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions\nE. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual\nF. [MISSING]\nII. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim\nIII. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter\nIV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged\nV. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "reference": "F. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art\nA. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle\nB. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions\nC. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard\nD. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions\nE. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual\nF. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter\nIV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged\nV. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "reference": "II. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art\nA. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle\nB. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions\nC. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard\nD. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions\nE. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual\nF. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)\nII. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged\nV. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "reference": "III. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art\nA. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle\nB. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions\nC. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard\nD. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions\nE. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual\nF. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)\nII. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim\nIII. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "reference": "IV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Repealed 35 U.S.C. section 102 And Replaced It With A First-Inventor To File Statute Eliminating Each Of section 102's Bars To Patenting Except For Lack Of Novelty Over Prior Art\nA. The America Invents Act Made Historic Reforms To U.S. Patent Law By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle\nB. Congress Internationalized Patentability Law, Including By Adopting The First-Inventor-To-File Principle, In Order To Simplify section 102 And Limit It To Novelty And Prior Art Provisions\nC. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard\nD. Congress's Adoption Of The First-Inventor-To-File Principle Permitted Elimination Of All section 102 \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provisions\nE. Any Contention That New section 102(a)(1) Reenacted A \"Loss Of Right To Patent\" Provision Is Non-Textual\nF. Congress Left No Tenable Ground On Which To Hold That More Than A Novelty Bar Remains in New section 102(a)(1)\nII. Under The America Invents Act, \"On Sale\" Activities Must Make The Subject Matter Defined By A Claim Available To The Public In Order For section 102(a)(1) To Bar A Patent On The Claim\nIII. New section 102(b)(1)(B) Confirms The Sole Bar To Patenting Under section 102(a)(1) Arises From Publicly Disclosed Subject Matter\nIV. The Mere Repetition Of The Words \"On Sale\" From The Repealed Statute Provides No Basis For Concluding The Law In The New Statute Remains Unchanged\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. Whatever Policy Justification May Have Existed For The \"On Sale\" Bar Applied By The Federal Circuit, It Has Disappeared Under The America Invents Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Laufer lacks standing because Title III and the Reservation Rule do not confer a freestanding informational right on individuals who do not seek to use a hotel's reservation service\nC. Acheson's broader arguments lack merit\n1. Acheson's other attempts to distinguish Havens Realty lack merit\n2. TransUnion does not suggest that a tester's motivation deprives her of a concrete injury\n3. That a tester's injury is in some sense \"self-inflicted\" does not defeat Article III standing\nD. Even if Laufer had standing, her claims may be moot",
        "reference": "A. A plaintiff's desire to test a defendant's compliance with the law does not deprive her of standing to sue for a violation of a statutory right to be free from discrimination",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. A plaintiff's desire to test a defendant's compliance with the law does not deprive her of standing to sue for a violation of a statutory right to be free from discrimination\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Acheson's broader arguments lack merit\n1. Acheson's other attempts to distinguish Havens Realty lack merit\n2. TransUnion does not suggest that a tester's motivation deprives her of a concrete injury\n3. That a tester's injury is in some sense \"self-inflicted\" does not defeat Article III standing\nD. Even if Laufer had standing, her claims may be moot",
        "reference": "B. Laufer lacks standing because Title III and the Reservation Rule do not confer a freestanding informational right on individuals who do not seek to use a hotel's reservation service",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. A plaintiff's desire to test a defendant's compliance with the law does not deprive her of standing to sue for a violation of a statutory right to be free from discrimination\nB. Laufer lacks standing because Title III and the Reservation Rule do not confer a freestanding informational right on individuals who do not seek to use a hotel's reservation service\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Acheson's other attempts to distinguish Havens Realty lack merit\n2. TransUnion does not suggest that a tester's motivation deprives her of a concrete injury\n3. That a tester's injury is in some sense \"self-inflicted\" does not defeat Article III standing\nD. Even if Laufer had standing, her claims may be moot",
        "reference": "C. Acheson's broader arguments lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. A plaintiff's desire to test a defendant's compliance with the law does not deprive her of standing to sue for a violation of a statutory right to be free from discrimination\nB. Laufer lacks standing because Title III and the Reservation Rule do not confer a freestanding informational right on individuals who do not seek to use a hotel's reservation service\nC. Acheson's broader arguments lack merit\n1. [MISSING]\n2. TransUnion does not suggest that a tester's motivation deprives her of a concrete injury\n3. That a tester's injury is in some sense \"self-inflicted\" does not defeat Article III standing\nD. Even if Laufer had standing, her claims may be moot",
        "reference": "1. Acheson's other attempts to distinguish Havens Realty lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. A plaintiff's desire to test a defendant's compliance with the law does not deprive her of standing to sue for a violation of a statutory right to be free from discrimination\nB. Laufer lacks standing because Title III and the Reservation Rule do not confer a freestanding informational right on individuals who do not seek to use a hotel's reservation service\nC. Acheson's broader arguments lack merit\n1. Acheson's other attempts to distinguish Havens Realty lack merit\n2. [MISSING]\n3. That a tester's injury is in some sense \"self-inflicted\" does not defeat Article III standing\nD. Even if Laufer had standing, her claims may be moot",
        "reference": "2. TransUnion does not suggest that a tester's motivation deprives her of a concrete injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. A plaintiff's desire to test a defendant's compliance with the law does not deprive her of standing to sue for a violation of a statutory right to be free from discrimination\nB. Laufer lacks standing because Title III and the Reservation Rule do not confer a freestanding informational right on individuals who do not seek to use a hotel's reservation service\nC. Acheson's broader arguments lack merit\n1. Acheson's other attempts to distinguish Havens Realty lack merit\n2. TransUnion does not suggest that a tester's motivation deprives her of a concrete injury\n3. [MISSING]\nD. Even if Laufer had standing, her claims may be moot",
        "reference": "3. That a tester's injury is in some sense \"self-inflicted\" does not defeat Article III standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. A plaintiff's desire to test a defendant's compliance with the law does not deprive her of standing to sue for a violation of a statutory right to be free from discrimination\nB. Laufer lacks standing because Title III and the Reservation Rule do not confer a freestanding informational right on individuals who do not seek to use a hotel's reservation service\nC. Acheson's broader arguments lack merit\n1. Acheson's other attempts to distinguish Havens Realty lack merit\n2. TransUnion does not suggest that a tester's motivation deprives her of a concrete injury\n3. That a tester's injury is in some sense \"self-inflicted\" does not defeat Article III standing\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Even if Laufer had standing, her claims may be moot",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "A. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "B. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "C. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. [MISSING]\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "II. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "A. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. [MISSING]\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "B. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "reference": "C. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Intellectual Property Clause Does Not Allow Congress to Authorize Lawsuits Against States\nA. The Constitution preserves state sovereign immunity\nB. The Constitution overrides state sovereign immunity only rarely\nC. The Intellectual Property Clause does not satisfy this Court's abrogation test\n1. Allen's arguments are foreclosed by Florida Prepaid\n2. Allen's reading of the Intellectual Property Clause clashes with its text and this Court's precedents\n3. The Court's ruling in Katz does not support abrogation here\nII. The Copyright Remedy Act Was Not a Valid Exercise of Congress's Section 5 Power to Enforce the Due Process Clause\nA. Congress did not identify widespread unconstitutional conduct by States\n1. Congress paid no attention to whether States had infringed intentionally\n2. Congress did not adequately consider whether alternative remedies satisfied due process\n3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations\n4. The Act cannot be upheld based on fears of future infringement\nB. Congress's chosen remedy was not proportional to any constitutional problem that Congress identified\nC. Allen has not alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Stare Decisis Supports the Decision Below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Constitutional Background in Germany\ni. The census decision (1983)\nii. The decision on online searches (2008)\nB. Constitutional Background in the EU\nII. THE SECURELY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO DATA PROTECTION HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AT THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Implementation of Data Privacy in Germany and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nB. Implementation of Data Privacy in the EU and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nIII. THE GOALS OF PREVENTING AND PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM ARE BEST SERVED BY THE USE OF THE MLAT PROCEDURES",
        "reference": "I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT OF DATA PROTECTION IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY AND THE EU",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT OF DATA PROTECTION IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. [MISSING]\ni. The census decision (1983)\nii. The decision on online searches (2008)\nB. Constitutional Background in the EU\nII. THE SECURELY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO DATA PROTECTION HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AT THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Implementation of Data Privacy in Germany and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nB. Implementation of Data Privacy in the EU and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nIII. THE GOALS OF PREVENTING AND PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM ARE BEST SERVED BY THE USE OF THE MLAT PROCEDURES",
        "reference": "A. Constitutional Background in Germany",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT OF DATA PROTECTION IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Constitutional Background in Germany\ni. [MISSING]\nii. The decision on online searches (2008)\nB. Constitutional Background in the EU\nII. THE SECURELY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO DATA PROTECTION HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AT THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Implementation of Data Privacy in Germany and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nB. Implementation of Data Privacy in the EU and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nIII. THE GOALS OF PREVENTING AND PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM ARE BEST SERVED BY THE USE OF THE MLAT PROCEDURES",
        "reference": "i. The census decision (1983)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT OF DATA PROTECTION IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Constitutional Background in Germany\ni. The census decision (1983)\nii. [MISSING]\nB. Constitutional Background in the EU\nII. THE SECURELY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO DATA PROTECTION HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AT THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Implementation of Data Privacy in Germany and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nB. Implementation of Data Privacy in the EU and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nIII. THE GOALS OF PREVENTING AND PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM ARE BEST SERVED BY THE USE OF THE MLAT PROCEDURES",
        "reference": "ii. The decision on online searches (2008)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT OF DATA PROTECTION IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Constitutional Background in Germany\ni. The census decision (1983)\nii. The decision on online searches (2008)\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE SECURELY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO DATA PROTECTION HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AT THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Implementation of Data Privacy in Germany and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nB. Implementation of Data Privacy in the EU and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nIII. THE GOALS OF PREVENTING AND PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM ARE BEST SERVED BY THE USE OF THE MLAT PROCEDURES",
        "reference": "B. Constitutional Background in the EU",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT OF DATA PROTECTION IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Constitutional Background in Germany\ni. The census decision (1983)\nii. The decision on online searches (2008)\nB. Constitutional Background in the EU\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Implementation of Data Privacy in Germany and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nB. Implementation of Data Privacy in the EU and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nIII. THE GOALS OF PREVENTING AND PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM ARE BEST SERVED BY THE USE OF THE MLAT PROCEDURES",
        "reference": "II. THE SECURELY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO DATA PROTECTION HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AT THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS IN GERMANY AND THE EU",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT OF DATA PROTECTION IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Constitutional Background in Germany\ni. The census decision (1983)\nii. The decision on online searches (2008)\nB. Constitutional Background in the EU\nII. THE SECURELY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO DATA PROTECTION HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AT THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Implementation of Data Privacy in the EU and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nIII. THE GOALS OF PREVENTING AND PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM ARE BEST SERVED BY THE USE OF THE MLAT PROCEDURES",
        "reference": "A. Implementation of Data Privacy in Germany and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT OF DATA PROTECTION IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Constitutional Background in Germany\ni. The census decision (1983)\nii. The decision on online searches (2008)\nB. Constitutional Background in the EU\nII. THE SECURELY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO DATA PROTECTION HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AT THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Implementation of Data Privacy in Germany and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THE GOALS OF PREVENTING AND PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM ARE BEST SERVED BY THE USE OF THE MLAT PROCEDURES",
        "reference": "B. Implementation of Data Privacy in the EU and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT OF DATA PROTECTION IS WELL-ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Constitutional Background in Germany\ni. The census decision (1983)\nii. The decision on online searches (2008)\nB. Constitutional Background in the EU\nII. THE SECURELY GUARANTEED RIGHTS TO DATA PROTECTION HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED AT THE LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LEVELS IN GERMANY AND THE EU\nA. Implementation of Data Privacy in Germany and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nB. Implementation of Data Privacy in the EU and Its Balancing With Other Important Societal Interests\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE GOALS OF PREVENTING AND PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND TERRORISM ARE BEST SERVED BY THE USE OF THE MLAT PROCEDURES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The government's textual arguments are meritless.\n1. Text of section 1182(a)(2).\n2. Surrounding provisions in section 1182(a).\n3. Structure of the INA.\nB. The two-part structure of the stop-time rule demonstrates that Petitioner is correct.\nC. The purpose and history of the stop-time rule reinforce that Petitioner's position is correct.\nII. Alternatively, If An Alien Is Capable Of Being Charged With Inadmissibility, Then The Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\"",
        "reference": "I. An Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible\" If The Immigration Judge Finds That It Renders The Alien Inadmissible.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible\" If The Immigration Judge Finds That It Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Text of section 1182(a)(2).\n2. Surrounding provisions in section 1182(a).\n3. Structure of the INA.\nB. The two-part structure of the stop-time rule demonstrates that Petitioner is correct.\nC. The purpose and history of the stop-time rule reinforce that Petitioner's position is correct.\nII. Alternatively, If An Alien Is Capable Of Being Charged With Inadmissibility, Then The Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\"",
        "reference": "A. The government's textual arguments are meritless.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible\" If The Immigration Judge Finds That It Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\nA. The government's textual arguments are meritless.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Surrounding provisions in section 1182(a).\n3. Structure of the INA.\nB. The two-part structure of the stop-time rule demonstrates that Petitioner is correct.\nC. The purpose and history of the stop-time rule reinforce that Petitioner's position is correct.\nII. Alternatively, If An Alien Is Capable Of Being Charged With Inadmissibility, Then The Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\"",
        "reference": "1. Text of section 1182(a)(2).",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible\" If The Immigration Judge Finds That It Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\nA. The government's textual arguments are meritless.\n1. Text of section 1182(a)(2).\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Structure of the INA.\nB. The two-part structure of the stop-time rule demonstrates that Petitioner is correct.\nC. The purpose and history of the stop-time rule reinforce that Petitioner's position is correct.\nII. Alternatively, If An Alien Is Capable Of Being Charged With Inadmissibility, Then The Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\"",
        "reference": "2. Surrounding provisions in section 1182(a).",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible\" If The Immigration Judge Finds That It Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\nA. The government's textual arguments are meritless.\n1. Text of section 1182(a)(2).\n2. Surrounding provisions in section 1182(a).\n3. [MISSING]\nB. The two-part structure of the stop-time rule demonstrates that Petitioner is correct.\nC. The purpose and history of the stop-time rule reinforce that Petitioner's position is correct.\nII. Alternatively, If An Alien Is Capable Of Being Charged With Inadmissibility, Then The Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\"",
        "reference": "3. Structure of the INA.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible\" If The Immigration Judge Finds That It Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\nA. The government's textual arguments are meritless.\n1. Text of section 1182(a)(2).\n2. Surrounding provisions in section 1182(a).\n3. Structure of the INA.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The purpose and history of the stop-time rule reinforce that Petitioner's position is correct.\nII. Alternatively, If An Alien Is Capable Of Being Charged With Inadmissibility, Then The Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\"",
        "reference": "B. The two-part structure of the stop-time rule demonstrates that Petitioner is correct.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible\" If The Immigration Judge Finds That It Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\nA. The government's textual arguments are meritless.\n1. Text of section 1182(a)(2).\n2. Surrounding provisions in section 1182(a).\n3. Structure of the INA.\nB. The two-part structure of the stop-time rule demonstrates that Petitioner is correct.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Alternatively, If An Alien Is Capable Of Being Charged With Inadmissibility, Then The Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\"",
        "reference": "C. The purpose and history of the stop-time rule reinforce that Petitioner's position is correct.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible\" If The Immigration Judge Finds That It Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\nA. The government's textual arguments are meritless.\n1. Text of section 1182(a)(2).\n2. Surrounding provisions in section 1182(a).\n3. Structure of the INA.\nB. The two-part structure of the stop-time rule demonstrates that Petitioner is correct.\nC. The purpose and history of the stop-time rule reinforce that Petitioner's position is correct.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Alternatively, If An Alien Is Capable Of Being Charged With Inadmissibility, Then The Offense \"Renders The Alien Inadmissible.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "A. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. [MISSING]\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. [MISSING]\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. [MISSING]\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The benefits of the symbiotic relationship between app developers and app platforms\n1. Platforms lower overhead costs that simplify market entry\n2. Platforms give app developers instant access to international markets\n3. Before platforms, app developers struggled to build trust with end users\n4. Platforms strengthen intellectual property protections for app developers\nB. By ignoring the roles of market participants in the App Economy, the Ninth Circuit's Functional Approach of the Direct Sellers Rule implicitly categorizes Petitioner as a reseller of all apps it hosts on its platform\nI. The Ninth Circuit misapplies Illinois Brick and would allow consumers to interject into the platform and app developer business relationship",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit Factually Ignoring the Procompetitive Agency-Sale Relationship App Developers Have with App Stores",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Factually Ignoring the Procompetitive Agency-Sale Relationship App Developers Have with App Stores\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Platforms lower overhead costs that simplify market entry\n2. Platforms give app developers instant access to international markets\n3. Before platforms, app developers struggled to build trust with end users\n4. Platforms strengthen intellectual property protections for app developers\nB. By ignoring the roles of market participants in the App Economy, the Ninth Circuit's Functional Approach of the Direct Sellers Rule implicitly categorizes Petitioner as a reseller of all apps it hosts on its platform\nI. The Ninth Circuit misapplies Illinois Brick and would allow consumers to interject into the platform and app developer business relationship",
        "reference": "A. The benefits of the symbiotic relationship between app developers and app platforms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Factually Ignoring the Procompetitive Agency-Sale Relationship App Developers Have with App Stores\nA. The benefits of the symbiotic relationship between app developers and app platforms\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Platforms give app developers instant access to international markets\n3. Before platforms, app developers struggled to build trust with end users\n4. Platforms strengthen intellectual property protections for app developers\nB. By ignoring the roles of market participants in the App Economy, the Ninth Circuit's Functional Approach of the Direct Sellers Rule implicitly categorizes Petitioner as a reseller of all apps it hosts on its platform\nI. The Ninth Circuit misapplies Illinois Brick and would allow consumers to interject into the platform and app developer business relationship",
        "reference": "1. Platforms lower overhead costs that simplify market entry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Factually Ignoring the Procompetitive Agency-Sale Relationship App Developers Have with App Stores\nA. The benefits of the symbiotic relationship between app developers and app platforms\n1. Platforms lower overhead costs that simplify market entry\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Before platforms, app developers struggled to build trust with end users\n4. Platforms strengthen intellectual property protections for app developers\nB. By ignoring the roles of market participants in the App Economy, the Ninth Circuit's Functional Approach of the Direct Sellers Rule implicitly categorizes Petitioner as a reseller of all apps it hosts on its platform\nI. The Ninth Circuit misapplies Illinois Brick and would allow consumers to interject into the platform and app developer business relationship",
        "reference": "2. Platforms give app developers instant access to international markets",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Factually Ignoring the Procompetitive Agency-Sale Relationship App Developers Have with App Stores\nA. The benefits of the symbiotic relationship between app developers and app platforms\n1. Platforms lower overhead costs that simplify market entry\n2. Platforms give app developers instant access to international markets\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Platforms strengthen intellectual property protections for app developers\nB. By ignoring the roles of market participants in the App Economy, the Ninth Circuit's Functional Approach of the Direct Sellers Rule implicitly categorizes Petitioner as a reseller of all apps it hosts on its platform\nI. The Ninth Circuit misapplies Illinois Brick and would allow consumers to interject into the platform and app developer business relationship",
        "reference": "3. Before platforms, app developers struggled to build trust with end users",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Factually Ignoring the Procompetitive Agency-Sale Relationship App Developers Have with App Stores\nA. The benefits of the symbiotic relationship between app developers and app platforms\n1. Platforms lower overhead costs that simplify market entry\n2. Platforms give app developers instant access to international markets\n3. Before platforms, app developers struggled to build trust with end users\n4. [MISSING]\nB. By ignoring the roles of market participants in the App Economy, the Ninth Circuit's Functional Approach of the Direct Sellers Rule implicitly categorizes Petitioner as a reseller of all apps it hosts on its platform\nI. The Ninth Circuit misapplies Illinois Brick and would allow consumers to interject into the platform and app developer business relationship",
        "reference": "4. Platforms strengthen intellectual property protections for app developers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Factually Ignoring the Procompetitive Agency-Sale Relationship App Developers Have with App Stores\nA. The benefits of the symbiotic relationship between app developers and app platforms\n1. Platforms lower overhead costs that simplify market entry\n2. Platforms give app developers instant access to international markets\n3. Before platforms, app developers struggled to build trust with end users\n4. Platforms strengthen intellectual property protections for app developers\nB. [MISSING]\nI. The Ninth Circuit misapplies Illinois Brick and would allow consumers to interject into the platform and app developer business relationship",
        "reference": "B. By ignoring the roles of market participants in the App Economy, the Ninth Circuit's Functional Approach of the Direct Sellers Rule implicitly categorizes Petitioner as a reseller of all apps it hosts on its platform",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Factually Ignoring the Procompetitive Agency-Sale Relationship App Developers Have with App Stores\nA. The benefits of the symbiotic relationship between app developers and app platforms\n1. Platforms lower overhead costs that simplify market entry\n2. Platforms give app developers instant access to international markets\n3. Before platforms, app developers struggled to build trust with end users\n4. Platforms strengthen intellectual property protections for app developers\nB. By ignoring the roles of market participants in the App Economy, the Ninth Circuit's Functional Approach of the Direct Sellers Rule implicitly categorizes Petitioner as a reseller of all apps it hosts on its platform\nI. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit misapplies Illinois Brick and would allow consumers to interject into the platform and app developer business relationship",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Warhol Conveyed a New Meaning and Message by Visually Altering Goldsmith's Photograph\nC. The Context of the Prince Series Confirms the Artwork's New Meaning and Message",
        "reference": "A. Determining the Meaning and Message of Visual Art Requires Looking Closely and Thinking Contextually",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. Determining the Meaning and Message of Visual Art Requires Looking Closely and Thinking Contextually\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Context of the Prince Series Confirms the Artwork's New Meaning and Message",
        "reference": "B. Warhol Conveyed a New Meaning and Message by Visually Altering Goldsmith's Photograph",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. Determining the Meaning and Message of Visual Art Requires Looking Closely and Thinking Contextually\nB. Warhol Conveyed a New Meaning and Message by Visually Altering Goldsmith's Photograph\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Context of the Prince Series Confirms the Artwork's New Meaning and Message",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts\nII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations\n1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations\n2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\n3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals\nB. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nC. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer\nIII. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "reference": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts\nII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations\n1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations\n2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\n3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals\nB. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nC. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer\nIII. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "reference": "A. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. [MISSING]\nII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations\n1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations\n2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\n3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals\nB. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nC. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer\nIII. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "reference": "B. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations\n1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations\n2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\n3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals\nB. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nC. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer\nIII. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "reference": "II. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts\nII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. [MISSING]\n1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations\n2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\n3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals\nB. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nC. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer\nIII. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "reference": "A. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts\nII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\n3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals\nB. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nC. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer\nIII. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "reference": "1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts\nII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations\n1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals\nB. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nC. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer\nIII. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "reference": "2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts\nII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations\n1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations\n2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\n3. [MISSING]\nB. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nC. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer\nIII. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "reference": "3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts\nII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations\n1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations\n2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\n3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals\nB. [MISSING]\nC. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer\nIII. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "reference": "B. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts\nII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations\n1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations\n2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\n3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals\nB. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "reference": "C. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTENDING ATS LIABILITY TO U.S.-BASED COMPANIES BECAUSE OF THIRD-PARTY OVERSEAS CONDUCT THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY ABROAD\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact U.S.-Based Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter Proactive Efforts\nII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWER PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. The Lack Of Consensus For Extending International Law Status To Corporations Stems In Part From Concerns That Doing So Will Compromise The Sovereignty Of Nations\n1. \"Subjects\" of International Law Typically Possess Powers As Well as Obligations\n2. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\n3. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals\nB. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nC. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. DOMESTIC CORPORATE OVERSIGHT OF OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES CANNOT OVERCOME THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY BAR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-437_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
        "reference": "A. The decision below is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-437_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The decision below is incorrect\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Rise of the Endorsement Test\nB. The Establishment Clause as a Speech-Regulation Defense: Widmar and Lamb's Chapel\nC. The Intersection of Endorsement and the Free-Speech Clause: Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette\nII. THIS CASE PRESENTS NO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS\nA. Pinette Holds That Private Speech in a Known Public Forum Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause\nB. If the Flags in This case are Private Speech, Then the Facts Here are Like Pinette and Present No Establishment Clause Problem",
        "reference": "I. CONCERN ABOUT A POTENTIAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGE CANNOT JUSTIFY EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS SPEECH FROM PUBLIC FORUMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONCERN ABOUT A POTENTIAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGE CANNOT JUSTIFY EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS SPEECH FROM PUBLIC FORUMS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Establishment Clause as a Speech-Regulation Defense: Widmar and Lamb's Chapel\nC. The Intersection of Endorsement and the Free-Speech Clause: Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette\nII. THIS CASE PRESENTS NO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS\nA. Pinette Holds That Private Speech in a Known Public Forum Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause\nB. If the Flags in This case are Private Speech, Then the Facts Here are Like Pinette and Present No Establishment Clause Problem",
        "reference": "A. The Rise of the Endorsement Test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONCERN ABOUT A POTENTIAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGE CANNOT JUSTIFY EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS SPEECH FROM PUBLIC FORUMS\nA. The Rise of the Endorsement Test\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Intersection of Endorsement and the Free-Speech Clause: Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette\nII. THIS CASE PRESENTS NO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS\nA. Pinette Holds That Private Speech in a Known Public Forum Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause\nB. If the Flags in This case are Private Speech, Then the Facts Here are Like Pinette and Present No Establishment Clause Problem",
        "reference": "B. The Establishment Clause as a Speech-Regulation Defense: Widmar and Lamb's Chapel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONCERN ABOUT A POTENTIAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGE CANNOT JUSTIFY EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS SPEECH FROM PUBLIC FORUMS\nA. The Rise of the Endorsement Test\nB. The Establishment Clause as a Speech-Regulation Defense: Widmar and Lamb's Chapel\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THIS CASE PRESENTS NO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS\nA. Pinette Holds That Private Speech in a Known Public Forum Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause\nB. If the Flags in This case are Private Speech, Then the Facts Here are Like Pinette and Present No Establishment Clause Problem",
        "reference": "C. The Intersection of Endorsement and the Free-Speech Clause: Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONCERN ABOUT A POTENTIAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGE CANNOT JUSTIFY EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS SPEECH FROM PUBLIC FORUMS\nA. The Rise of the Endorsement Test\nB. The Establishment Clause as a Speech-Regulation Defense: Widmar and Lamb's Chapel\nC. The Intersection of Endorsement and the Free-Speech Clause: Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Pinette Holds That Private Speech in a Known Public Forum Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause\nB. If the Flags in This case are Private Speech, Then the Facts Here are Like Pinette and Present No Establishment Clause Problem",
        "reference": "II. THIS CASE PRESENTS NO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONCERN ABOUT A POTENTIAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGE CANNOT JUSTIFY EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS SPEECH FROM PUBLIC FORUMS\nA. The Rise of the Endorsement Test\nB. The Establishment Clause as a Speech-Regulation Defense: Widmar and Lamb's Chapel\nC. The Intersection of Endorsement and the Free-Speech Clause: Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette\nII. THIS CASE PRESENTS NO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. If the Flags in This case are Private Speech, Then the Facts Here are Like Pinette and Present No Establishment Clause Problem",
        "reference": "A. Pinette Holds That Private Speech in a Known Public Forum Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONCERN ABOUT A POTENTIAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGE CANNOT JUSTIFY EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS SPEECH FROM PUBLIC FORUMS\nA. The Rise of the Endorsement Test\nB. The Establishment Clause as a Speech-Regulation Defense: Widmar and Lamb's Chapel\nC. The Intersection of Endorsement and the Free-Speech Clause: Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette\nII. THIS CASE PRESENTS NO ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS\nA. Pinette Holds That Private Speech in a Known Public Forum Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. If the Flags in This case are Private Speech, Then the Facts Here are Like Pinette and Present No Establishment Clause Problem",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "A. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "B. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "C. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "II. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "A. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. [MISSING]\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "B. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "C. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "D. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "III. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "A. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "reference": "B. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Is Not Entitled to an Injunction\nA. Ramirez seeks an injunction, not a stay\nB. Ramirez's inequitable conduct forecloses equitable relief\nC. The balance of equities and public interest favor finally enforcing Ramirez's sentence\nII. Ramirez Has Not Exhausted His Claims\nA. Ramirez failed to follow mandatory grievance rules and thereby failed to exhaust his claims\nB. Ramirez failed to complete the grievance process for his touch claim or begin it for his vocalization claim\nC. As TDCJ's grievance process was \"available,\" Ramirez's failure to exhaust is inexcusable\nD. The Court should not exempt Ramirez from the PLRA's exhaustion requirement because he delayed exhausting his grievances\nIII. Ramirez's Claims Fail on the Merits\nA. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his touch claim\nB. Ramirez is unlikely to succeed on his vocalization claim\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Ramirez has not preserved his First Amendment claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Nonjusticiable\nA. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting\nB. There Are No Judicially Discernible or Manageable Standards for Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims\nIII. The District Court's Standards Are Not Judicially Discernible And Manageable\n1. Equal Protection Clause\n2. First Amendment\n3. Sections 2 and 4 of Article I\nIV. The 2016 Map Is Not An Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymander In All Events",
        "reference": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting\nB. There Are No Judicially Discernible or Manageable Standards for Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims\nIII. The District Court's Standards Are Not Judicially Discernible And Manageable\n1. Equal Protection Clause\n2. First Amendment\n3. Sections 2 and 4 of Article I\nIV. The 2016 Map Is Not An Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymander In All Events",
        "reference": "II. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Nonjusticiable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing\nII. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Nonjusticiable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There Are No Judicially Discernible or Manageable Standards for Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims\nIII. The District Court's Standards Are Not Judicially Discernible And Manageable\n1. Equal Protection Clause\n2. First Amendment\n3. Sections 2 and 4 of Article I\nIV. The 2016 Map Is Not An Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymander In All Events",
        "reference": "A. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing\nII. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Nonjusticiable\nA. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The District Court's Standards Are Not Judicially Discernible And Manageable\n1. Equal Protection Clause\n2. First Amendment\n3. Sections 2 and 4 of Article I\nIV. The 2016 Map Is Not An Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymander In All Events",
        "reference": "B. There Are No Judicially Discernible or Manageable Standards for Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing\nII. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Nonjusticiable\nA. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting\nB. There Are No Judicially Discernible or Manageable Standards for Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims\nIII. [MISSING]\n1. Equal Protection Clause\n2. First Amendment\n3. Sections 2 and 4 of Article I\nIV. The 2016 Map Is Not An Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymander In All Events",
        "reference": "III. The District Court's Standards Are Not Judicially Discernible And Manageable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing\nII. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Nonjusticiable\nA. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting\nB. There Are No Judicially Discernible or Manageable Standards for Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims\nIII. The District Court's Standards Are Not Judicially Discernible And Manageable\n1. [MISSING]\n2. First Amendment\n3. Sections 2 and 4 of Article I\nIV. The 2016 Map Is Not An Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymander In All Events",
        "reference": "1. Equal Protection Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing\nII. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Nonjusticiable\nA. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting\nB. There Are No Judicially Discernible or Manageable Standards for Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims\nIII. The District Court's Standards Are Not Judicially Discernible And Manageable\n1. Equal Protection Clause\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Sections 2 and 4 of Article I\nIV. The 2016 Map Is Not An Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymander In All Events",
        "reference": "2. First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing\nII. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Nonjusticiable\nA. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting\nB. There Are No Judicially Discernible or Manageable Standards for Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims\nIII. The District Court's Standards Are Not Judicially Discernible And Manageable\n1. Equal Protection Clause\n2. First Amendment\n3. [MISSING]\nIV. The 2016 Map Is Not An Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymander In All Events",
        "reference": "3. Sections 2 and 4 of Article I",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing\nII. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Nonjusticiable\nA. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting\nB. There Are No Judicially Discernible or Manageable Standards for Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims\nIII. The District Court's Standards Are Not Judicially Discernible And Manageable\n1. Equal Protection Clause\n2. First Amendment\n3. Sections 2 and 4 of Article I\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The 2016 Map Is Not An Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymander In All Events",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Tidal Waters\nB. The \"Navigable Waters of the United States\" or The Daniel Ball Waters\nC. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters\nD. Navigable in Fact Waterbodies\nE. The Agencies' Regulatory Definition of \"Waters of the United States\" or The \"(a)(1)\" Waters\nII. THE TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE THE DANIEL BALL WATERS\nA. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy Equate the Traditional Navigable Waters With The Daniel Ball Waters\nB. The Agencies Incorrectly Interpret The Term Traditional Navigable Waters\nIII. THE EPA HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT PRIEST LAKE IS A \"NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES\"",
        "reference": "I. THERE ARE VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERBODIES THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERBODIES THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The \"Navigable Waters of the United States\" or The Daniel Ball Waters\nC. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters\nD. Navigable in Fact Waterbodies\nE. The Agencies' Regulatory Definition of \"Waters of the United States\" or The \"(a)(1)\" Waters\nII. THE TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE THE DANIEL BALL WATERS\nA. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy Equate the Traditional Navigable Waters With The Daniel Ball Waters\nB. The Agencies Incorrectly Interpret The Term Traditional Navigable Waters\nIII. THE EPA HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT PRIEST LAKE IS A \"NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES\"",
        "reference": "A. Tidal Waters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERBODIES THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS\nA. Tidal Waters\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters\nD. Navigable in Fact Waterbodies\nE. The Agencies' Regulatory Definition of \"Waters of the United States\" or The \"(a)(1)\" Waters\nII. THE TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE THE DANIEL BALL WATERS\nA. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy Equate the Traditional Navigable Waters With The Daniel Ball Waters\nB. The Agencies Incorrectly Interpret The Term Traditional Navigable Waters\nIII. THE EPA HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT PRIEST LAKE IS A \"NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES\"",
        "reference": "B. The \"Navigable Waters of the United States\" or The Daniel Ball Waters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERBODIES THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS\nA. Tidal Waters\nB. The \"Navigable Waters of the United States\" or The Daniel Ball Waters\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Navigable in Fact Waterbodies\nE. The Agencies' Regulatory Definition of \"Waters of the United States\" or The \"(a)(1)\" Waters\nII. THE TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE THE DANIEL BALL WATERS\nA. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy Equate the Traditional Navigable Waters With The Daniel Ball Waters\nB. The Agencies Incorrectly Interpret The Term Traditional Navigable Waters\nIII. THE EPA HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT PRIEST LAKE IS A \"NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES\"",
        "reference": "C. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERBODIES THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS\nA. Tidal Waters\nB. The \"Navigable Waters of the United States\" or The Daniel Ball Waters\nC. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Agencies' Regulatory Definition of \"Waters of the United States\" or The \"(a)(1)\" Waters\nII. THE TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE THE DANIEL BALL WATERS\nA. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy Equate the Traditional Navigable Waters With The Daniel Ball Waters\nB. The Agencies Incorrectly Interpret The Term Traditional Navigable Waters\nIII. THE EPA HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT PRIEST LAKE IS A \"NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES\"",
        "reference": "D. Navigable in Fact Waterbodies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERBODIES THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS\nA. Tidal Waters\nB. The \"Navigable Waters of the United States\" or The Daniel Ball Waters\nC. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters\nD. Navigable in Fact Waterbodies\nE. [MISSING]\nII. THE TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE THE DANIEL BALL WATERS\nA. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy Equate the Traditional Navigable Waters With The Daniel Ball Waters\nB. The Agencies Incorrectly Interpret The Term Traditional Navigable Waters\nIII. THE EPA HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT PRIEST LAKE IS A \"NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES\"",
        "reference": "E. The Agencies' Regulatory Definition of \"Waters of the United States\" or The \"(a)(1)\" Waters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE VARIOUS TYPES OF WATERBODIES THAT THE COURT COULD CONSIDER TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS\nA. Tidal Waters\nB. The \"Navigable Waters of the United States\" or The Daniel Ball Waters\nC. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters\nD. Navigable in Fact Waterbodies\nE. The Agencies' Regulatory Definition of \"Waters of the United States\" or The \"(a)(1)\" Waters\nII. [MISSING]\nA. In Rapanos, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy Equate the Traditional Navigable Waters With The Daniel Ball Waters\nB. The Agencies Incorrectly Interpret The Term Traditional Navigable Waters\nIII. THE EPA HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT PRIEST LAKE IS A \"NAVIGABLE WATER OF THE UNITED STATES\"",
        "reference": "II. THE TRADITIONAL NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE THE DANIEL BALL WATERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. [MISSING]\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "B. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. [MISSING]\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "C. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "II. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "A. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. [MISSING]\nC. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "reference": "B. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nA. The ESA Requires Designated Areas To Be Habitable\n1. Statutory Text Limits Designations To Habitat\n2. The Term \"Critical Habitat\" Requires Habitability\n3. Section 3(5)(C) Cements The Habitability Requirement\n4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability\n5. The Statutory Structure Shows That Critical Habitat Must Be Habitable\n6. Legislative History Reflects A Habitability Requirement\n7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Erroneous Ruling Vastly Expands The ESA\n1. The Ruling Below Perversely Makes It Easier To Designate Unoccupied Areas Than Occupied Habitat\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation Has No Limiting Principles\nC. The ESA Offers Better Ways To Achieve Conservation\nII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nA. Courts May Review Exclusion Decisions Under ESA Section 4(b)(2)\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Justifications For Prohibiting Judicial Review Are Erroneous\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. FWS Abused Its Discretion In Refusing To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A Consumer Does Not Suffer An Article III Injury When A Consumer Reporting Agency Maintains An Undisclosed Error Sitting In That Consumer's File\nB. The \"Judgment Of Congress,\" As Embodied In Section 1681e(b), Does Not Elevate Errors In Consumer Files To Article III Injury Status\nII. Adopting The Ninth Circuit's Contrary Approach Of Allowing Article III Standing For Non-Disseminated Errors In Consumer Files Would Harm Consumers, Companies, And The Economy",
        "reference": "I. Having An Error Sitting In One's Consumer File, Undisclosed To A Third Party, Does Not Impose An Article III Injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Having An Error Sitting In One's Consumer File, Undisclosed To A Third Party, Does Not Impose An Article III Injury\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The \"Judgment Of Congress,\" As Embodied In Section 1681e(b), Does Not Elevate Errors In Consumer Files To Article III Injury Status\nII. Adopting The Ninth Circuit's Contrary Approach Of Allowing Article III Standing For Non-Disseminated Errors In Consumer Files Would Harm Consumers, Companies, And The Economy",
        "reference": "A. A Consumer Does Not Suffer An Article III Injury When A Consumer Reporting Agency Maintains An Undisclosed Error Sitting In That Consumer's File",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Having An Error Sitting In One's Consumer File, Undisclosed To A Third Party, Does Not Impose An Article III Injury\nA. A Consumer Does Not Suffer An Article III Injury When A Consumer Reporting Agency Maintains An Undisclosed Error Sitting In That Consumer's File\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Adopting The Ninth Circuit's Contrary Approach Of Allowing Article III Standing For Non-Disseminated Errors In Consumer Files Would Harm Consumers, Companies, And The Economy",
        "reference": "B. The \"Judgment Of Congress,\" As Embodied In Section 1681e(b), Does Not Elevate Errors In Consumer Files To Article III Injury Status",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Having An Error Sitting In One's Consumer File, Undisclosed To A Third Party, Does Not Impose An Article III Injury\nA. A Consumer Does Not Suffer An Article III Injury When A Consumer Reporting Agency Maintains An Undisclosed Error Sitting In That Consumer's File\nB. The \"Judgment Of Congress,\" As Embodied In Section 1681e(b), Does Not Elevate Errors In Consumer Files To Article III Injury Status\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Adopting The Ninth Circuit's Contrary Approach Of Allowing Article III Standing For Non-Disseminated Errors In Consumer Files Would Harm Consumers, Companies, And The Economy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-921_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. This case raises procedural issues, but they do not preclude granting the petition\nC. This Court should not allow the decision of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court to stand",
        "reference": "A. The decision below was incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-921_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The decision below was incorrect\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Court should not allow the decision of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court to stand",
        "reference": "B. This case raises procedural issues, but they do not preclude granting the petition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-921_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The decision below was incorrect\nB. This case raises procedural issues, but they do not preclude granting the petition\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This Court should not allow the decision of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court to stand",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. SECTION 1 DOES NOT EXEMPT INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENTS FROM THE FAA",
        "reference": "I. APPLICABILITY OF THE SECTION 1 EXEMPTION HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO AN ARBITRATOR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. APPLICABILITY OF THE SECTION 1 EXEMPTION HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO AN ARBITRATOR\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. SECTION 1 DOES NOT EXEMPT INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENTS FROM THE FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Oak's case is a quintessential example of traditional restitutionary relief granted under the banner of \"disgorgement\"\nC. Restitution is an ancient equitable remedy that should be preserved in securities cases\n1. Ordering the return of wrongfully obtained property is at the very core of a court's equitable powers\n2. A federal court's inherent power to order equity exists independent of its power to order statutorily authorized remedies\n3. The Court should limit its holding to the facts of this case and not prejudge courts' authority to order truly equitable relief in securities cases",
        "reference": "A. Courts in securities cases often order funds \"disgorged\" from wrongdoers to be paid over to victims as restitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. Courts in securities cases often order funds \"disgorged\" from wrongdoers to be paid over to victims as restitution\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Restitution is an ancient equitable remedy that should be preserved in securities cases\n1. Ordering the return of wrongfully obtained property is at the very core of a court's equitable powers\n2. A federal court's inherent power to order equity exists independent of its power to order statutorily authorized remedies\n3. The Court should limit its holding to the facts of this case and not prejudge courts' authority to order truly equitable relief in securities cases",
        "reference": "B. Oak's case is a quintessential example of traditional restitutionary relief granted under the banner of \"disgorgement\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. Courts in securities cases often order funds \"disgorged\" from wrongdoers to be paid over to victims as restitution\nB. Oak's case is a quintessential example of traditional restitutionary relief granted under the banner of \"disgorgement\"\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Ordering the return of wrongfully obtained property is at the very core of a court's equitable powers\n2. A federal court's inherent power to order equity exists independent of its power to order statutorily authorized remedies\n3. The Court should limit its holding to the facts of this case and not prejudge courts' authority to order truly equitable relief in securities cases",
        "reference": "C. Restitution is an ancient equitable remedy that should be preserved in securities cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. Courts in securities cases often order funds \"disgorged\" from wrongdoers to be paid over to victims as restitution\nB. Oak's case is a quintessential example of traditional restitutionary relief granted under the banner of \"disgorgement\"\nC. Restitution is an ancient equitable remedy that should be preserved in securities cases\n1. [MISSING]\n2. A federal court's inherent power to order equity exists independent of its power to order statutorily authorized remedies\n3. The Court should limit its holding to the facts of this case and not prejudge courts' authority to order truly equitable relief in securities cases",
        "reference": "1. Ordering the return of wrongfully obtained property is at the very core of a court's equitable powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. Courts in securities cases often order funds \"disgorged\" from wrongdoers to be paid over to victims as restitution\nB. Oak's case is a quintessential example of traditional restitutionary relief granted under the banner of \"disgorgement\"\nC. Restitution is an ancient equitable remedy that should be preserved in securities cases\n1. Ordering the return of wrongfully obtained property is at the very core of a court's equitable powers\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Court should limit its holding to the facts of this case and not prejudge courts' authority to order truly equitable relief in securities cases",
        "reference": "2. A federal court's inherent power to order equity exists independent of its power to order statutorily authorized remedies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. Courts in securities cases often order funds \"disgorged\" from wrongdoers to be paid over to victims as restitution\nB. Oak's case is a quintessential example of traditional restitutionary relief granted under the banner of \"disgorgement\"\nC. Restitution is an ancient equitable remedy that should be preserved in securities cases\n1. Ordering the return of wrongfully obtained property is at the very core of a court's equitable powers\n2. A federal court's inherent power to order equity exists independent of its power to order statutorily authorized remedies\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. The Court should limit its holding to the facts of this case and not prejudge courts' authority to order truly equitable relief in securities cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The historical record before 1791 provides no material evidence indicating that the right to bear arms did not include the right to carry concealed arms\nB. Under the text, structure, and nature of the Second Amendment, the government may not prohibit carrying concealed weapons if doing so would cut off his right to bear arms altogether\nC. Application: New York Violated the Second Amendment by Cutting off Petitioners' Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense\nII. Time, Place, and Manner Precedents from First Amendment Cases Would Require Reversal if Applied Here",
        "reference": "I. The Constitution Forbids a State from Cutting Off a Person's Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense, and Therefore Laws Like New York's Concealed Carry Law Can Be Unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution Forbids a State from Cutting Off a Person's Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense, and Therefore Laws Like New York's Concealed Carry Law Can Be Unconstitutional\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Under the text, structure, and nature of the Second Amendment, the government may not prohibit carrying concealed weapons if doing so would cut off his right to bear arms altogether\nC. Application: New York Violated the Second Amendment by Cutting off Petitioners' Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense\nII. Time, Place, and Manner Precedents from First Amendment Cases Would Require Reversal if Applied Here",
        "reference": "A. The historical record before 1791 provides no material evidence indicating that the right to bear arms did not include the right to carry concealed arms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution Forbids a State from Cutting Off a Person's Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense, and Therefore Laws Like New York's Concealed Carry Law Can Be Unconstitutional\nA. The historical record before 1791 provides no material evidence indicating that the right to bear arms did not include the right to carry concealed arms\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Application: New York Violated the Second Amendment by Cutting off Petitioners' Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense\nII. Time, Place, and Manner Precedents from First Amendment Cases Would Require Reversal if Applied Here",
        "reference": "B. Under the text, structure, and nature of the Second Amendment, the government may not prohibit carrying concealed weapons if doing so would cut off his right to bear arms altogether",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution Forbids a State from Cutting Off a Person's Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense, and Therefore Laws Like New York's Concealed Carry Law Can Be Unconstitutional\nA. The historical record before 1791 provides no material evidence indicating that the right to bear arms did not include the right to carry concealed arms\nB. Under the text, structure, and nature of the Second Amendment, the government may not prohibit carrying concealed weapons if doing so would cut off his right to bear arms altogether\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Time, Place, and Manner Precedents from First Amendment Cases Would Require Reversal if Applied Here",
        "reference": "C. Application: New York Violated the Second Amendment by Cutting off Petitioners' Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution Forbids a State from Cutting Off a Person's Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense, and Therefore Laws Like New York's Concealed Carry Law Can Be Unconstitutional\nA. The historical record before 1791 provides no material evidence indicating that the right to bear arms did not include the right to carry concealed arms\nB. Under the text, structure, and nature of the Second Amendment, the government may not prohibit carrying concealed weapons if doing so would cut off his right to bear arms altogether\nC. Application: New York Violated the Second Amendment by Cutting off Petitioners' Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Time, Place, and Manner Precedents from First Amendment Cases Would Require Reversal if Applied Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.\nB. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.\n1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.\n2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.\n3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "reference": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.\n1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.\n2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.\n3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.\n1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.\n2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.\n3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "reference": "B. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.\nB. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.\n1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.\n2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.\n3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "reference": "II. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.\nB. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.\n1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.\n2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.\n3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "reference": "A. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.\nB. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.\n1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.\n2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.\n3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "reference": "B. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.\nB. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.\n2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.\n3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "reference": "C. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.\nB. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.\n3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "reference": "1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.\nB. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.\n1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "reference": "2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.\nB. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.\n1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.\n2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.\n3. [MISSING]\nIII. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "reference": "3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The importance of granting certiorari in this case\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with decisions of this Court and of other circuits about religious speech in public school settings.\nB. Confused and perplexed about what manner of religious expression is permitted at public school athletic events, students and school personnel across the nation are looking to this Court for guidance.\nII. The Bremerton School District wrongfully refused to accommodate Coach Kennedy's free exercise of religion.\nA. Coach Kennedy properly and timely requested an accommodation.\nB. The Bremerton School District had a duty to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious expression unless it could demonstrate that such accommodation would create an \"undue hardship\" on the conduct of school business.\nC. The Establishment Clause is not a valid basis for refusing to accommodate Coach Kennedy's religious exercise.\n1. Even if Coach Kennedy's prayer is government speech, the Establishment Clause does not prohibit it.\n2. But Coach Kennedy's prayer is not government speech.\n3. The Ninth Circuit erred in its use and misuse of the endorsement test.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Refusing to allow Coach Kennedy to pray while allowing other forms of expression is censorship of religion and discrimination against religion.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE MEANING OF ITS PLAIN TEXT\nIII. THE PLAIN TEXT COVERS INDIRECT POINT-SOURCE POLLUTION, REGARDLESS OF THE APPLICABILITY OF ANY CLEAR-STATEMENT RULE",
        "reference": "I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S PLAIN TEXT PROHIBITS ANY ADDITION OF ANY POLLUTANT TO NAVIGABLE WATERS FROM ANY POINT SOURCE WITHOUT A PERMIT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE POINT SOURCE DELIVERS THE POLLUTANT DIRECTLY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S PLAIN TEXT PROHIBITS ANY ADDITION OF ANY POLLUTANT TO NAVIGABLE WATERS FROM ANY POINT SOURCE WITHOUT A PERMIT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE POINT SOURCE DELIVERS THE POLLUTANT DIRECTLY\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE PLAIN TEXT COVERS INDIRECT POINT-SOURCE POLLUTION, REGARDLESS OF THE APPLICABILITY OF ANY CLEAR-STATEMENT RULE",
        "reference": "II. THE STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE MEANING OF ITS PLAIN TEXT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S PLAIN TEXT PROHIBITS ANY ADDITION OF ANY POLLUTANT TO NAVIGABLE WATERS FROM ANY POINT SOURCE WITHOUT A PERMIT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE POINT SOURCE DELIVERS THE POLLUTANT DIRECTLY\nII. THE STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE MEANING OF ITS PLAIN TEXT\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE PLAIN TEXT COVERS INDIRECT POINT-SOURCE POLLUTION, REGARDLESS OF THE APPLICABILITY OF ANY CLEAR-STATEMENT RULE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress enacted the TCPA to combat aggressive telemarketing\nB. Compliance with the auto-dialer prohibition, as originally intended, was straightforward\nC. TCPA litigation has expanded to attack ordinary customer communications\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Expansive Interpretation Makes TCPA Compliance Unpredictable and Inordinately Expensive\nIII. The Definition of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Must Be Read Narrowly To Avoid Violating The First Amendment",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Has Stretched the Auto-Dialer Prohibition Far Beyond Its Original Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Has Stretched the Auto-Dialer Prohibition Far Beyond Its Original Purpose\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Compliance with the auto-dialer prohibition, as originally intended, was straightforward\nC. TCPA litigation has expanded to attack ordinary customer communications\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Expansive Interpretation Makes TCPA Compliance Unpredictable and Inordinately Expensive\nIII. The Definition of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Must Be Read Narrowly To Avoid Violating The First Amendment",
        "reference": "A. Congress enacted the TCPA to combat aggressive telemarketing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Has Stretched the Auto-Dialer Prohibition Far Beyond Its Original Purpose\nA. Congress enacted the TCPA to combat aggressive telemarketing\nB. [MISSING]\nC. TCPA litigation has expanded to attack ordinary customer communications\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Expansive Interpretation Makes TCPA Compliance Unpredictable and Inordinately Expensive\nIII. The Definition of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Must Be Read Narrowly To Avoid Violating The First Amendment",
        "reference": "B. Compliance with the auto-dialer prohibition, as originally intended, was straightforward",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Has Stretched the Auto-Dialer Prohibition Far Beyond Its Original Purpose\nA. Congress enacted the TCPA to combat aggressive telemarketing\nB. Compliance with the auto-dialer prohibition, as originally intended, was straightforward\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Expansive Interpretation Makes TCPA Compliance Unpredictable and Inordinately Expensive\nIII. The Definition of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Must Be Read Narrowly To Avoid Violating The First Amendment",
        "reference": "C. TCPA litigation has expanded to attack ordinary customer communications",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Has Stretched the Auto-Dialer Prohibition Far Beyond Its Original Purpose\nA. Congress enacted the TCPA to combat aggressive telemarketing\nB. Compliance with the auto-dialer prohibition, as originally intended, was straightforward\nC. TCPA litigation has expanded to attack ordinary customer communications\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Definition of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Must Be Read Narrowly To Avoid Violating The First Amendment",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit's Expansive Interpretation Makes TCPA Compliance Unpredictable and Inordinately Expensive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Has Stretched the Auto-Dialer Prohibition Far Beyond Its Original Purpose\nA. Congress enacted the TCPA to combat aggressive telemarketing\nB. Compliance with the auto-dialer prohibition, as originally intended, was straightforward\nC. TCPA litigation has expanded to attack ordinary customer communications\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Expansive Interpretation Makes TCPA Compliance Unpredictable and Inordinately Expensive\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Definition of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Must Be Read Narrowly To Avoid Violating The First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. This important and recurring question warrants review in this case\nC. The decision below is incorrect",
        "reference": "A. There is a clear and intractable conflict",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. There is a clear and intractable conflict\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The decision below is incorrect",
        "reference": "B. This important and recurring question warrants review in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-334_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. There is a clear and intractable conflict\nB. This important and recurring question warrants review in this case\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The decision below is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Respondent's alternative theory that no significant likelihood of removal exists is flawed\nC. Neither the Third Circuit's bond-hearing regime nor respondent's alternative theory is necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
        "reference": "A. Respondent's defense of the Third Circuit's bond-hearing regime is unpersuasive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondent's defense of the Third Circuit's bond-hearing regime is unpersuasive\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Neither the Third Circuit's bond-hearing regime nor respondent's alternative theory is necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
        "reference": "B. Respondent's alternative theory that no significant likelihood of removal exists is flawed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondent's defense of the Third Circuit's bond-hearing regime is unpersuasive\nB. Respondent's alternative theory that no significant likelihood of removal exists is flawed\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Neither the Third Circuit's bond-hearing regime nor respondent's alternative theory is necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The practical effect of the Second Circuit's decision will be a chill on new expression\nA. Its reasoning will not be confined to only the Warhol work\ni. It chills expression by foreclosing works with new meanings if they build on a previous work\nii. It chills expression by expanding the power of a copyright holder to foreclose later works beyond what the copyright statute allows\niii. It denies this new expression for generations\nB. Tempering the power of a copyright holder with strong protection for fair use does not harm expression",
        "reference": "I. Law that suppresses expression is not Constitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Law that suppresses expression is not Constitutional\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Its reasoning will not be confined to only the Warhol work\ni. It chills expression by foreclosing works with new meanings if they build on a previous work\nii. It chills expression by expanding the power of a copyright holder to foreclose later works beyond what the copyright statute allows\niii. It denies this new expression for generations\nB. Tempering the power of a copyright holder with strong protection for fair use does not harm expression",
        "reference": "II. The practical effect of the Second Circuit's decision will be a chill on new expression",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Law that suppresses expression is not Constitutional\nII. The practical effect of the Second Circuit's decision will be a chill on new expression\nA. [MISSING]\ni. It chills expression by foreclosing works with new meanings if they build on a previous work\nii. It chills expression by expanding the power of a copyright holder to foreclose later works beyond what the copyright statute allows\niii. It denies this new expression for generations\nB. Tempering the power of a copyright holder with strong protection for fair use does not harm expression",
        "reference": "A. Its reasoning will not be confined to only the Warhol work",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Law that suppresses expression is not Constitutional\nII. The practical effect of the Second Circuit's decision will be a chill on new expression\nA. Its reasoning will not be confined to only the Warhol work\ni. [MISSING]\nii. It chills expression by expanding the power of a copyright holder to foreclose later works beyond what the copyright statute allows\niii. It denies this new expression for generations\nB. Tempering the power of a copyright holder with strong protection for fair use does not harm expression",
        "reference": "i. It chills expression by foreclosing works with new meanings if they build on a previous work",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Law that suppresses expression is not Constitutional\nII. The practical effect of the Second Circuit's decision will be a chill on new expression\nA. Its reasoning will not be confined to only the Warhol work\ni. It chills expression by foreclosing works with new meanings if they build on a previous work\nii. [MISSING]\niii. It denies this new expression for generations\nB. Tempering the power of a copyright holder with strong protection for fair use does not harm expression",
        "reference": "ii. It chills expression by expanding the power of a copyright holder to foreclose later works beyond what the copyright statute allows",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Law that suppresses expression is not Constitutional\nII. The practical effect of the Second Circuit's decision will be a chill on new expression\nA. Its reasoning will not be confined to only the Warhol work\ni. It chills expression by foreclosing works with new meanings if they build on a previous work\nii. It chills expression by expanding the power of a copyright holder to foreclose later works beyond what the copyright statute allows\niii. [MISSING]\nB. Tempering the power of a copyright holder with strong protection for fair use does not harm expression",
        "reference": "iii. It denies this new expression for generations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Law that suppresses expression is not Constitutional\nII. The practical effect of the Second Circuit's decision will be a chill on new expression\nA. Its reasoning will not be confined to only the Warhol work\ni. It chills expression by foreclosing works with new meanings if they build on a previous work\nii. It chills expression by expanding the power of a copyright holder to foreclose later works beyond what the copyright statute allows\niii. It denies this new expression for generations\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Tempering the power of a copyright holder with strong protection for fair use does not harm expression",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Availability Of Alternative Remedies Is A Central Question In The Bivens Analysis\nB. There Are No Alternative Remedies Here\n1. FTCA remedies are unavailable here\n2. State tort remedies are also unavailable here by operation of the Westfall Act\nII. \"SPECIAL FACTORS\" DO NOT COUNSEL AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF BIVENS TO CASES LIKE THIS\nA. Extending Bivens Here Is Consistent With This Court's Approach In Abbasi\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed\nIII. THE LOGIC OF BIVENS APPLIES WITH THE UTMOST FORCE HERE",
        "reference": "I. PETITIONERS HAVE NO OTHER LEGAL REMEDY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS HAVE NO OTHER LEGAL REMEDY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There Are No Alternative Remedies Here\n1. FTCA remedies are unavailable here\n2. State tort remedies are also unavailable here by operation of the Westfall Act\nII. \"SPECIAL FACTORS\" DO NOT COUNSEL AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF BIVENS TO CASES LIKE THIS\nA. Extending Bivens Here Is Consistent With This Court's Approach In Abbasi\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed\nIII. THE LOGIC OF BIVENS APPLIES WITH THE UTMOST FORCE HERE",
        "reference": "A. The Availability Of Alternative Remedies Is A Central Question In The Bivens Analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS HAVE NO OTHER LEGAL REMEDY\nA. The Availability Of Alternative Remedies Is A Central Question In The Bivens Analysis\nB. [MISSING]\n1. FTCA remedies are unavailable here\n2. State tort remedies are also unavailable here by operation of the Westfall Act\nII. \"SPECIAL FACTORS\" DO NOT COUNSEL AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF BIVENS TO CASES LIKE THIS\nA. Extending Bivens Here Is Consistent With This Court's Approach In Abbasi\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed\nIII. THE LOGIC OF BIVENS APPLIES WITH THE UTMOST FORCE HERE",
        "reference": "B. There Are No Alternative Remedies Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS HAVE NO OTHER LEGAL REMEDY\nA. The Availability Of Alternative Remedies Is A Central Question In The Bivens Analysis\nB. There Are No Alternative Remedies Here\n1. [MISSING]\n2. State tort remedies are also unavailable here by operation of the Westfall Act\nII. \"SPECIAL FACTORS\" DO NOT COUNSEL AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF BIVENS TO CASES LIKE THIS\nA. Extending Bivens Here Is Consistent With This Court's Approach In Abbasi\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed\nIII. THE LOGIC OF BIVENS APPLIES WITH THE UTMOST FORCE HERE",
        "reference": "1. FTCA remedies are unavailable here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS HAVE NO OTHER LEGAL REMEDY\nA. The Availability Of Alternative Remedies Is A Central Question In The Bivens Analysis\nB. There Are No Alternative Remedies Here\n1. FTCA remedies are unavailable here\n2. [MISSING]\nII. \"SPECIAL FACTORS\" DO NOT COUNSEL AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF BIVENS TO CASES LIKE THIS\nA. Extending Bivens Here Is Consistent With This Court's Approach In Abbasi\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed\nIII. THE LOGIC OF BIVENS APPLIES WITH THE UTMOST FORCE HERE",
        "reference": "2. State tort remedies are also unavailable here by operation of the Westfall Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS HAVE NO OTHER LEGAL REMEDY\nA. The Availability Of Alternative Remedies Is A Central Question In The Bivens Analysis\nB. There Are No Alternative Remedies Here\n1. FTCA remedies are unavailable here\n2. State tort remedies are also unavailable here by operation of the Westfall Act\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Extending Bivens Here Is Consistent With This Court's Approach In Abbasi\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed\nIII. THE LOGIC OF BIVENS APPLIES WITH THE UTMOST FORCE HERE",
        "reference": "II. \"SPECIAL FACTORS\" DO NOT COUNSEL AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF BIVENS TO CASES LIKE THIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS HAVE NO OTHER LEGAL REMEDY\nA. The Availability Of Alternative Remedies Is A Central Question In The Bivens Analysis\nB. There Are No Alternative Remedies Here\n1. FTCA remedies are unavailable here\n2. State tort remedies are also unavailable here by operation of the Westfall Act\nII. \"SPECIAL FACTORS\" DO NOT COUNSEL AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF BIVENS TO CASES LIKE THIS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed\nIII. THE LOGIC OF BIVENS APPLIES WITH THE UTMOST FORCE HERE",
        "reference": "A. Extending Bivens Here Is Consistent With This Court's Approach In Abbasi",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS HAVE NO OTHER LEGAL REMEDY\nA. The Availability Of Alternative Remedies Is A Central Question In The Bivens Analysis\nB. There Are No Alternative Remedies Here\n1. FTCA remedies are unavailable here\n2. State tort remedies are also unavailable here by operation of the Westfall Act\nII. \"SPECIAL FACTORS\" DO NOT COUNSEL AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF BIVENS TO CASES LIKE THIS\nA. Extending Bivens Here Is Consistent With This Court's Approach In Abbasi\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THE LOGIC OF BIVENS APPLIES WITH THE UTMOST FORCE HERE",
        "reference": "B. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS HAVE NO OTHER LEGAL REMEDY\nA. The Availability Of Alternative Remedies Is A Central Question In The Bivens Analysis\nB. There Are No Alternative Remedies Here\n1. FTCA remedies are unavailable here\n2. State tort remedies are also unavailable here by operation of the Westfall Act\nII. \"SPECIAL FACTORS\" DO NOT COUNSEL AGAINST THE EXTENSION OF BIVENS TO CASES LIKE THIS\nA. Extending Bivens Here Is Consistent With This Court's Approach In Abbasi\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Special Factors Analysis Was Flawed\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE LOGIC OF BIVENS APPLIES WITH THE UTMOST FORCE HERE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit departed from this Court's precedent\nB. The decision below also conflicts with every other appeals court that has decided this issue\nC. The conflict should be resolved in this case\nD. The Ninth Circuit erred below\nII. The expansion of federal permitting is akin to that in UARG\nIII. The fair notice ruling directly contravenes this Court's precedent",
        "reference": "I. The Court should grant review to resolve the conflict over the CWA's line between point and nonpoint source pollution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant review to resolve the conflict over the CWA's line between point and nonpoint source pollution\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The decision below also conflicts with every other appeals court that has decided this issue\nC. The conflict should be resolved in this case\nD. The Ninth Circuit erred below\nII. The expansion of federal permitting is akin to that in UARG\nIII. The fair notice ruling directly contravenes this Court's precedent",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit departed from this Court's precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant review to resolve the conflict over the CWA's line between point and nonpoint source pollution\nA. The Ninth Circuit departed from this Court's precedent\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The conflict should be resolved in this case\nD. The Ninth Circuit erred below\nII. The expansion of federal permitting is akin to that in UARG\nIII. The fair notice ruling directly contravenes this Court's precedent",
        "reference": "B. The decision below also conflicts with every other appeals court that has decided this issue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant review to resolve the conflict over the CWA's line between point and nonpoint source pollution\nA. The Ninth Circuit departed from this Court's precedent\nB. The decision below also conflicts with every other appeals court that has decided this issue\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Ninth Circuit erred below\nII. The expansion of federal permitting is akin to that in UARG\nIII. The fair notice ruling directly contravenes this Court's precedent",
        "reference": "C. The conflict should be resolved in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant review to resolve the conflict over the CWA's line between point and nonpoint source pollution\nA. The Ninth Circuit departed from this Court's precedent\nB. The decision below also conflicts with every other appeals court that has decided this issue\nC. The conflict should be resolved in this case\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The expansion of federal permitting is akin to that in UARG\nIII. The fair notice ruling directly contravenes this Court's precedent",
        "reference": "D. The Ninth Circuit erred below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant review to resolve the conflict over the CWA's line between point and nonpoint source pollution\nA. The Ninth Circuit departed from this Court's precedent\nB. The decision below also conflicts with every other appeals court that has decided this issue\nC. The conflict should be resolved in this case\nD. The Ninth Circuit erred below\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The fair notice ruling directly contravenes this Court's precedent",
        "reference": "II. The expansion of federal permitting is akin to that in UARG",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant review to resolve the conflict over the CWA's line between point and nonpoint source pollution\nA. The Ninth Circuit departed from this Court's precedent\nB. The decision below also conflicts with every other appeals court that has decided this issue\nC. The conflict should be resolved in this case\nD. The Ninth Circuit erred below\nII. The expansion of federal permitting is akin to that in UARG\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The fair notice ruling directly contravenes this Court's precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Explicitly Overrule the Lemon Test, Which Elevates Intent Over Substance and Results in Judicial Micromanagement of Political Affairs\nIII. Even Under the Discredited Lemon Test, the Fourth Circuit's Analysis is Flawed\nA. The Fourth Circuit's Inquiry is Based On Irrelevant and Unreliable Evidence\nB. The Fourth Circuit Engaged in Impermissible Psychoanalysis of the President's Heart of Hearts\nC. The Fourth Circuit Failed to Give Any Deference to the Government's Express National Security Purpose",
        "reference": "I. This Court Should Evaluate First Amendment Compliance Based On a Historical Understanding of What It Means to Institute an \"Establishment of Religion.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Evaluate First Amendment Compliance Based On a Historical Understanding of What It Means to Institute an \"Establishment of Religion.\"\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Even Under the Discredited Lemon Test, the Fourth Circuit's Analysis is Flawed\nA. The Fourth Circuit's Inquiry is Based On Irrelevant and Unreliable Evidence\nB. The Fourth Circuit Engaged in Impermissible Psychoanalysis of the President's Heart of Hearts\nC. The Fourth Circuit Failed to Give Any Deference to the Government's Express National Security Purpose",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Explicitly Overrule the Lemon Test, Which Elevates Intent Over Substance and Results in Judicial Micromanagement of Political Affairs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Evaluate First Amendment Compliance Based On a Historical Understanding of What It Means to Institute an \"Establishment of Religion.\"\nII. The Court Should Explicitly Overrule the Lemon Test, Which Elevates Intent Over Substance and Results in Judicial Micromanagement of Political Affairs\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Fourth Circuit's Inquiry is Based On Irrelevant and Unreliable Evidence\nB. The Fourth Circuit Engaged in Impermissible Psychoanalysis of the President's Heart of Hearts\nC. The Fourth Circuit Failed to Give Any Deference to the Government's Express National Security Purpose",
        "reference": "III. Even Under the Discredited Lemon Test, the Fourth Circuit's Analysis is Flawed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Evaluate First Amendment Compliance Based On a Historical Understanding of What It Means to Institute an \"Establishment of Religion.\"\nII. The Court Should Explicitly Overrule the Lemon Test, Which Elevates Intent Over Substance and Results in Judicial Micromanagement of Political Affairs\nIII. Even Under the Discredited Lemon Test, the Fourth Circuit's Analysis is Flawed\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Fourth Circuit Engaged in Impermissible Psychoanalysis of the President's Heart of Hearts\nC. The Fourth Circuit Failed to Give Any Deference to the Government's Express National Security Purpose",
        "reference": "A. The Fourth Circuit's Inquiry is Based On Irrelevant and Unreliable Evidence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Evaluate First Amendment Compliance Based On a Historical Understanding of What It Means to Institute an \"Establishment of Religion.\"\nII. The Court Should Explicitly Overrule the Lemon Test, Which Elevates Intent Over Substance and Results in Judicial Micromanagement of Political Affairs\nIII. Even Under the Discredited Lemon Test, the Fourth Circuit's Analysis is Flawed\nA. The Fourth Circuit's Inquiry is Based On Irrelevant and Unreliable Evidence\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Fourth Circuit Failed to Give Any Deference to the Government's Express National Security Purpose",
        "reference": "B. The Fourth Circuit Engaged in Impermissible Psychoanalysis of the President's Heart of Hearts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Evaluate First Amendment Compliance Based On a Historical Understanding of What It Means to Institute an \"Establishment of Religion.\"\nII. The Court Should Explicitly Overrule the Lemon Test, Which Elevates Intent Over Substance and Results in Judicial Micromanagement of Political Affairs\nIII. Even Under the Discredited Lemon Test, the Fourth Circuit's Analysis is Flawed\nA. The Fourth Circuit's Inquiry is Based On Irrelevant and Unreliable Evidence\nB. The Fourth Circuit Engaged in Impermissible Psychoanalysis of the President's Heart of Hearts\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Fourth Circuit Failed to Give Any Deference to the Government's Express National Security Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Remedial Issue Warrants Review",
        "reference": "A. The Constitutional Issue Warrants Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Constitutional Issue Warrants Review\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Remedial Issue Warrants Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Review is warranted because the Federal Circuit misread this Court's precedent and ignored the express enactment by Congress of the AIA",
        "reference": "I. Review is warranted because the Federal Circuit's decision calls into question countless issued or pending patents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Review is warranted because the Federal Circuit's decision calls into question countless issued or pending patents\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Review is warranted because the Federal Circuit misread this Court's precedent and ignored the express enactment by Congress of the AIA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "A. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. [MISSING]\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "B. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "C. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. [MISSING]\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "II. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. [MISSING]\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "A. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. [MISSING]\nB. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "reference": "2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the cross-border transportation of goods or people, unlike ramp-agent supervisors\nA. Section 1 covers classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\n1. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\n2. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people across borders\n3. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees likewise show that \"workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participate directly in the foreign or interstate transportation of goods or people\nB. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed\nC. Ramp-agent supervisors, who transport nothing and cross no borders, are not exempt from the FAA\nII. The court of appeals' and Saxon's arguments for construing section 1 broadly lack merit\nA. There is no textually sound reason for interpreting \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" broadly\n1. FELA does not inform the meaning of the FAA\n2. Outdated Commerce Clause cases do not inform the meaning of the FAA, either\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Speculation that Congress intended to give section 1 a broad reach undermines the text and attributes illogical motives to Congress",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Chevron deference has serious consequences for the regulated public that reach beyond this case",
        "reference": "I. Chevron deference violates the Constitution's separation of powers requirement and should be overruled",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron deference violates the Constitution's separation of powers requirement and should be overruled\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Chevron deference has serious consequences for the regulated public that reach beyond this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. None Of The Notices That Are Required For A Colorado Public Trustee Foreclosure Are A Direct Or Indirect Demand For Payment\n1. The Colorado Pre-Foreclosure Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\n2. The Notice Of Election And Demand For Sale Is Not A Demand For Payment\n3. The Rule 120 Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\nC. Foreclosure Is A Matter Of State Law\nD. Public Policy Favors Non-Judicial Foreclosure",
        "reference": "A. The Plain Language Of FDCPA Supports The Conclusion That Non-Judicial Foreclosure Is Not Debt Collection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Plain Language Of FDCPA Supports The Conclusion That Non-Judicial Foreclosure Is Not Debt Collection\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Colorado Pre-Foreclosure Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\n2. The Notice Of Election And Demand For Sale Is Not A Demand For Payment\n3. The Rule 120 Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\nC. Foreclosure Is A Matter Of State Law\nD. Public Policy Favors Non-Judicial Foreclosure",
        "reference": "B. None Of The Notices That Are Required For A Colorado Public Trustee Foreclosure Are A Direct Or Indirect Demand For Payment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Plain Language Of FDCPA Supports The Conclusion That Non-Judicial Foreclosure Is Not Debt Collection\nB. None Of The Notices That Are Required For A Colorado Public Trustee Foreclosure Are A Direct Or Indirect Demand For Payment\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Notice Of Election And Demand For Sale Is Not A Demand For Payment\n3. The Rule 120 Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\nC. Foreclosure Is A Matter Of State Law\nD. Public Policy Favors Non-Judicial Foreclosure",
        "reference": "1. The Colorado Pre-Foreclosure Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Plain Language Of FDCPA Supports The Conclusion That Non-Judicial Foreclosure Is Not Debt Collection\nB. None Of The Notices That Are Required For A Colorado Public Trustee Foreclosure Are A Direct Or Indirect Demand For Payment\n1. The Colorado Pre-Foreclosure Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Rule 120 Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\nC. Foreclosure Is A Matter Of State Law\nD. Public Policy Favors Non-Judicial Foreclosure",
        "reference": "2. The Notice Of Election And Demand For Sale Is Not A Demand For Payment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Plain Language Of FDCPA Supports The Conclusion That Non-Judicial Foreclosure Is Not Debt Collection\nB. None Of The Notices That Are Required For A Colorado Public Trustee Foreclosure Are A Direct Or Indirect Demand For Payment\n1. The Colorado Pre-Foreclosure Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\n2. The Notice Of Election And Demand For Sale Is Not A Demand For Payment\n3. [MISSING]\nC. Foreclosure Is A Matter Of State Law\nD. Public Policy Favors Non-Judicial Foreclosure",
        "reference": "3. The Rule 120 Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Plain Language Of FDCPA Supports The Conclusion That Non-Judicial Foreclosure Is Not Debt Collection\nB. None Of The Notices That Are Required For A Colorado Public Trustee Foreclosure Are A Direct Or Indirect Demand For Payment\n1. The Colorado Pre-Foreclosure Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\n2. The Notice Of Election And Demand For Sale Is Not A Demand For Payment\n3. The Rule 120 Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Public Policy Favors Non-Judicial Foreclosure",
        "reference": "C. Foreclosure Is A Matter Of State Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Plain Language Of FDCPA Supports The Conclusion That Non-Judicial Foreclosure Is Not Debt Collection\nB. None Of The Notices That Are Required For A Colorado Public Trustee Foreclosure Are A Direct Or Indirect Demand For Payment\n1. The Colorado Pre-Foreclosure Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\n2. The Notice Of Election And Demand For Sale Is Not A Demand For Payment\n3. The Rule 120 Notice Is Not A Demand For Payment\nC. Foreclosure Is A Matter Of State Law\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Public Policy Favors Non-Judicial Foreclosure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Certiorari Was Granted in Williamson County to Determine Whether Compensation Is Required for a Temporary Regulatory Taking\nB. The Amicus Brief for the United States Argued \u2014for the First Time at Any Stage of the Litigation \u2014That the Case Should Have Been Dismissed Because Hamilton Bank Had Not Sought Just Compensation Through State Procedures Before Suing in Federal Court\nC. Ultimately, the Williamson County Majority Crafted a New Ripeness Doctrine Out of Whole Cloth, Based Largely on Behind-the-Scenes Debate and Negotiations Within the Court Itself\nII. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON NO PREEXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE\nA. The Williamson County Court Struggled Futilely to Find Some Doctrinal Anchor for Its Newly Minted Ripeness Requirement\nB. In a Second Flawed Analogy, Williamson County Misconstrued the State Judiciary as the Functional Equivalent of the Court of Federal Claims\nC. At Bottom, the State Litigation Requirement Rested On an Implicit Non Sequitur\nIII. BECAUSE WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S NEW \"RIPENESS\" RULE RESTED ON NO PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, ADDITIONAL FACETS OF THE RULE HAVE BEEN ADDED HAPHAZARDLY OVER TIME, AS THE COURT DISCOVERED THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASES\nIV. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT SPRING FROM FEDERALISM CONCERNS",
        "reference": "I. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT SPRANG INTO EXISTENCE EX NIHILO BEFORE THIS COURT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRIOR BRIEFING OR ARGUMENT IN ANY LOWER COURT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT SPRANG INTO EXISTENCE EX NIHILO BEFORE THIS COURT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRIOR BRIEFING OR ARGUMENT IN ANY LOWER COURT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Amicus Brief for the United States Argued \u2014for the First Time at Any Stage of the Litigation \u2014That the Case Should Have Been Dismissed Because Hamilton Bank Had Not Sought Just Compensation Through State Procedures Before Suing in Federal Court\nC. Ultimately, the Williamson County Majority Crafted a New Ripeness Doctrine Out of Whole Cloth, Based Largely on Behind-the-Scenes Debate and Negotiations Within the Court Itself\nII. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON NO PREEXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE\nA. The Williamson County Court Struggled Futilely to Find Some Doctrinal Anchor for Its Newly Minted Ripeness Requirement\nB. In a Second Flawed Analogy, Williamson County Misconstrued the State Judiciary as the Functional Equivalent of the Court of Federal Claims\nC. At Bottom, the State Litigation Requirement Rested On an Implicit Non Sequitur\nIII. BECAUSE WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S NEW \"RIPENESS\" RULE RESTED ON NO PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, ADDITIONAL FACETS OF THE RULE HAVE BEEN ADDED HAPHAZARDLY OVER TIME, AS THE COURT DISCOVERED THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASES\nIV. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT SPRING FROM FEDERALISM CONCERNS",
        "reference": "A. Certiorari Was Granted in Williamson County to Determine Whether Compensation Is Required for a Temporary Regulatory Taking",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT SPRANG INTO EXISTENCE EX NIHILO BEFORE THIS COURT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRIOR BRIEFING OR ARGUMENT IN ANY LOWER COURT\nA. Certiorari Was Granted in Williamson County to Determine Whether Compensation Is Required for a Temporary Regulatory Taking\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Ultimately, the Williamson County Majority Crafted a New Ripeness Doctrine Out of Whole Cloth, Based Largely on Behind-the-Scenes Debate and Negotiations Within the Court Itself\nII. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON NO PREEXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE\nA. The Williamson County Court Struggled Futilely to Find Some Doctrinal Anchor for Its Newly Minted Ripeness Requirement\nB. In a Second Flawed Analogy, Williamson County Misconstrued the State Judiciary as the Functional Equivalent of the Court of Federal Claims\nC. At Bottom, the State Litigation Requirement Rested On an Implicit Non Sequitur\nIII. BECAUSE WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S NEW \"RIPENESS\" RULE RESTED ON NO PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, ADDITIONAL FACETS OF THE RULE HAVE BEEN ADDED HAPHAZARDLY OVER TIME, AS THE COURT DISCOVERED THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASES\nIV. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT SPRING FROM FEDERALISM CONCERNS",
        "reference": "B. The Amicus Brief for the United States Argued \u2014for the First Time at Any Stage of the Litigation \u2014That the Case Should Have Been Dismissed Because Hamilton Bank Had Not Sought Just Compensation Through State Procedures Before Suing in Federal Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT SPRANG INTO EXISTENCE EX NIHILO BEFORE THIS COURT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRIOR BRIEFING OR ARGUMENT IN ANY LOWER COURT\nA. Certiorari Was Granted in Williamson County to Determine Whether Compensation Is Required for a Temporary Regulatory Taking\nB. The Amicus Brief for the United States Argued \u2014for the First Time at Any Stage of the Litigation \u2014That the Case Should Have Been Dismissed Because Hamilton Bank Had Not Sought Just Compensation Through State Procedures Before Suing in Federal Court\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON NO PREEXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE\nA. The Williamson County Court Struggled Futilely to Find Some Doctrinal Anchor for Its Newly Minted Ripeness Requirement\nB. In a Second Flawed Analogy, Williamson County Misconstrued the State Judiciary as the Functional Equivalent of the Court of Federal Claims\nC. At Bottom, the State Litigation Requirement Rested On an Implicit Non Sequitur\nIII. BECAUSE WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S NEW \"RIPENESS\" RULE RESTED ON NO PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, ADDITIONAL FACETS OF THE RULE HAVE BEEN ADDED HAPHAZARDLY OVER TIME, AS THE COURT DISCOVERED THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASES\nIV. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT SPRING FROM FEDERALISM CONCERNS",
        "reference": "C. Ultimately, the Williamson County Majority Crafted a New Ripeness Doctrine Out of Whole Cloth, Based Largely on Behind-the-Scenes Debate and Negotiations Within the Court Itself",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT SPRANG INTO EXISTENCE EX NIHILO BEFORE THIS COURT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRIOR BRIEFING OR ARGUMENT IN ANY LOWER COURT\nA. Certiorari Was Granted in Williamson County to Determine Whether Compensation Is Required for a Temporary Regulatory Taking\nB. The Amicus Brief for the United States Argued \u2014for the First Time at Any Stage of the Litigation \u2014That the Case Should Have Been Dismissed Because Hamilton Bank Had Not Sought Just Compensation Through State Procedures Before Suing in Federal Court\nC. Ultimately, the Williamson County Majority Crafted a New Ripeness Doctrine Out of Whole Cloth, Based Largely on Behind-the-Scenes Debate and Negotiations Within the Court Itself\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Williamson County Court Struggled Futilely to Find Some Doctrinal Anchor for Its Newly Minted Ripeness Requirement\nB. In a Second Flawed Analogy, Williamson County Misconstrued the State Judiciary as the Functional Equivalent of the Court of Federal Claims\nC. At Bottom, the State Litigation Requirement Rested On an Implicit Non Sequitur\nIII. BECAUSE WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S NEW \"RIPENESS\" RULE RESTED ON NO PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, ADDITIONAL FACETS OF THE RULE HAVE BEEN ADDED HAPHAZARDLY OVER TIME, AS THE COURT DISCOVERED THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASES\nIV. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT SPRING FROM FEDERALISM CONCERNS",
        "reference": "II. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON NO PREEXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT SPRANG INTO EXISTENCE EX NIHILO BEFORE THIS COURT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRIOR BRIEFING OR ARGUMENT IN ANY LOWER COURT\nA. Certiorari Was Granted in Williamson County to Determine Whether Compensation Is Required for a Temporary Regulatory Taking\nB. The Amicus Brief for the United States Argued \u2014for the First Time at Any Stage of the Litigation \u2014That the Case Should Have Been Dismissed Because Hamilton Bank Had Not Sought Just Compensation Through State Procedures Before Suing in Federal Court\nC. Ultimately, the Williamson County Majority Crafted a New Ripeness Doctrine Out of Whole Cloth, Based Largely on Behind-the-Scenes Debate and Negotiations Within the Court Itself\nII. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON NO PREEXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. In a Second Flawed Analogy, Williamson County Misconstrued the State Judiciary as the Functional Equivalent of the Court of Federal Claims\nC. At Bottom, the State Litigation Requirement Rested On an Implicit Non Sequitur\nIII. BECAUSE WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S NEW \"RIPENESS\" RULE RESTED ON NO PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, ADDITIONAL FACETS OF THE RULE HAVE BEEN ADDED HAPHAZARDLY OVER TIME, AS THE COURT DISCOVERED THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASES\nIV. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT SPRING FROM FEDERALISM CONCERNS",
        "reference": "A. The Williamson County Court Struggled Futilely to Find Some Doctrinal Anchor for Its Newly Minted Ripeness Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT SPRANG INTO EXISTENCE EX NIHILO BEFORE THIS COURT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRIOR BRIEFING OR ARGUMENT IN ANY LOWER COURT\nA. Certiorari Was Granted in Williamson County to Determine Whether Compensation Is Required for a Temporary Regulatory Taking\nB. The Amicus Brief for the United States Argued \u2014for the First Time at Any Stage of the Litigation \u2014That the Case Should Have Been Dismissed Because Hamilton Bank Had Not Sought Just Compensation Through State Procedures Before Suing in Federal Court\nC. Ultimately, the Williamson County Majority Crafted a New Ripeness Doctrine Out of Whole Cloth, Based Largely on Behind-the-Scenes Debate and Negotiations Within the Court Itself\nII. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON NO PREEXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE\nA. The Williamson County Court Struggled Futilely to Find Some Doctrinal Anchor for Its Newly Minted Ripeness Requirement\nB. [MISSING]\nC. At Bottom, the State Litigation Requirement Rested On an Implicit Non Sequitur\nIII. BECAUSE WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S NEW \"RIPENESS\" RULE RESTED ON NO PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, ADDITIONAL FACETS OF THE RULE HAVE BEEN ADDED HAPHAZARDLY OVER TIME, AS THE COURT DISCOVERED THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASES\nIV. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT SPRING FROM FEDERALISM CONCERNS",
        "reference": "B. In a Second Flawed Analogy, Williamson County Misconstrued the State Judiciary as the Functional Equivalent of the Court of Federal Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT SPRANG INTO EXISTENCE EX NIHILO BEFORE THIS COURT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRIOR BRIEFING OR ARGUMENT IN ANY LOWER COURT\nA. Certiorari Was Granted in Williamson County to Determine Whether Compensation Is Required for a Temporary Regulatory Taking\nB. The Amicus Brief for the United States Argued \u2014for the First Time at Any Stage of the Litigation \u2014That the Case Should Have Been Dismissed Because Hamilton Bank Had Not Sought Just Compensation Through State Procedures Before Suing in Federal Court\nC. Ultimately, the Williamson County Majority Crafted a New Ripeness Doctrine Out of Whole Cloth, Based Largely on Behind-the-Scenes Debate and Negotiations Within the Court Itself\nII. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON NO PREEXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE\nA. The Williamson County Court Struggled Futilely to Find Some Doctrinal Anchor for Its Newly Minted Ripeness Requirement\nB. In a Second Flawed Analogy, Williamson County Misconstrued the State Judiciary as the Functional Equivalent of the Court of Federal Claims\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. BECAUSE WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S NEW \"RIPENESS\" RULE RESTED ON NO PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, ADDITIONAL FACETS OF THE RULE HAVE BEEN ADDED HAPHAZARDLY OVER TIME, AS THE COURT DISCOVERED THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASES\nIV. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT SPRING FROM FEDERALISM CONCERNS",
        "reference": "C. At Bottom, the State Litigation Requirement Rested On an Implicit Non Sequitur",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT SPRANG INTO EXISTENCE EX NIHILO BEFORE THIS COURT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRIOR BRIEFING OR ARGUMENT IN ANY LOWER COURT\nA. Certiorari Was Granted in Williamson County to Determine Whether Compensation Is Required for a Temporary Regulatory Taking\nB. The Amicus Brief for the United States Argued \u2014for the First Time at Any Stage of the Litigation \u2014That the Case Should Have Been Dismissed Because Hamilton Bank Had Not Sought Just Compensation Through State Procedures Before Suing in Federal Court\nC. Ultimately, the Williamson County Majority Crafted a New Ripeness Doctrine Out of Whole Cloth, Based Largely on Behind-the-Scenes Debate and Negotiations Within the Court Itself\nII. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON NO PREEXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE\nA. The Williamson County Court Struggled Futilely to Find Some Doctrinal Anchor for Its Newly Minted Ripeness Requirement\nB. In a Second Flawed Analogy, Williamson County Misconstrued the State Judiciary as the Functional Equivalent of the Court of Federal Claims\nC. At Bottom, the State Litigation Requirement Rested On an Implicit Non Sequitur\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT SPRING FROM FEDERALISM CONCERNS",
        "reference": "III. BECAUSE WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S NEW \"RIPENESS\" RULE RESTED ON NO PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, ADDITIONAL FACETS OF THE RULE HAVE BEEN ADDED HAPHAZARDLY OVER TIME, AS THE COURT DISCOVERED THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT SPRANG INTO EXISTENCE EX NIHILO BEFORE THIS COURT, WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRIOR BRIEFING OR ARGUMENT IN ANY LOWER COURT\nA. Certiorari Was Granted in Williamson County to Determine Whether Compensation Is Required for a Temporary Regulatory Taking\nB. The Amicus Brief for the United States Argued \u2014for the First Time at Any Stage of the Litigation \u2014That the Case Should Have Been Dismissed Because Hamilton Bank Had Not Sought Just Compensation Through State Procedures Before Suing in Federal Court\nC. Ultimately, the Williamson County Majority Crafted a New Ripeness Doctrine Out of Whole Cloth, Based Largely on Behind-the-Scenes Debate and Negotiations Within the Court Itself\nII. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT WAS BASED ON NO PREEXISTING LEGAL PRINCIPLE OR DOCTRINE\nA. The Williamson County Court Struggled Futilely to Find Some Doctrinal Anchor for Its Newly Minted Ripeness Requirement\nB. In a Second Flawed Analogy, Williamson County Misconstrued the State Judiciary as the Functional Equivalent of the Court of Federal Claims\nC. At Bottom, the State Litigation Requirement Rested On an Implicit Non Sequitur\nIII. BECAUSE WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S NEW \"RIPENESS\" RULE RESTED ON NO PRE-EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE, ADDITIONAL FACETS OF THE RULE HAVE BEEN ADDED HAPHAZARDLY OVER TIME, AS THE COURT DISCOVERED THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF PARTICULAR CASES\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. THE STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT DID NOT SPRING FROM FEDERALISM CONCERNS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The equal-protection analysis should focus on the people whose rights are at stake rather than political jurisdictions\nB. Local conditions in Puerto Rico illustrate a dire need for extending SSI to otherwise qualifying Puerto Rico residents, not withholding it\nC. Puerto Rico's \"unique tax status\" does not justify denying SSI to its residents\nD. The cost of providing needy Puerto Rico residents with SSI does not rationally support denying them SSI\nII. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
        "reference": "I. There is no rational basis for denying respondent and other Puerto Rico residents equal participation in the SSI program",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no rational basis for denying respondent and other Puerto Rico residents equal participation in the SSI program\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Local conditions in Puerto Rico illustrate a dire need for extending SSI to otherwise qualifying Puerto Rico residents, not withholding it\nC. Puerto Rico's \"unique tax status\" does not justify denying SSI to its residents\nD. The cost of providing needy Puerto Rico residents with SSI does not rationally support denying them SSI\nII. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
        "reference": "A. The equal-protection analysis should focus on the people whose rights are at stake rather than political jurisdictions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no rational basis for denying respondent and other Puerto Rico residents equal participation in the SSI program\nA. The equal-protection analysis should focus on the people whose rights are at stake rather than political jurisdictions\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Puerto Rico's \"unique tax status\" does not justify denying SSI to its residents\nD. The cost of providing needy Puerto Rico residents with SSI does not rationally support denying them SSI\nII. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
        "reference": "B. Local conditions in Puerto Rico illustrate a dire need for extending SSI to otherwise qualifying Puerto Rico residents, not withholding it",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no rational basis for denying respondent and other Puerto Rico residents equal participation in the SSI program\nA. The equal-protection analysis should focus on the people whose rights are at stake rather than political jurisdictions\nB. Local conditions in Puerto Rico illustrate a dire need for extending SSI to otherwise qualifying Puerto Rico residents, not withholding it\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The cost of providing needy Puerto Rico residents with SSI does not rationally support denying them SSI\nII. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
        "reference": "C. Puerto Rico's \"unique tax status\" does not justify denying SSI to its residents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no rational basis for denying respondent and other Puerto Rico residents equal participation in the SSI program\nA. The equal-protection analysis should focus on the people whose rights are at stake rather than political jurisdictions\nB. Local conditions in Puerto Rico illustrate a dire need for extending SSI to otherwise qualifying Puerto Rico residents, not withholding it\nC. Puerto Rico's \"unique tax status\" does not justify denying SSI to its residents\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
        "reference": "D. The cost of providing needy Puerto Rico residents with SSI does not rationally support denying them SSI",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no rational basis for denying respondent and other Puerto Rico residents equal participation in the SSI program\nA. The equal-protection analysis should focus on the people whose rights are at stake rather than political jurisdictions\nB. Local conditions in Puerto Rico illustrate a dire need for extending SSI to otherwise qualifying Puerto Rico residents, not withholding it\nC. Puerto Rico's \"unique tax status\" does not justify denying SSI to its residents\nD. The cost of providing needy Puerto Rico residents with SSI does not rationally support denying them SSI\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARIZONA DEMONSTRATES A CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING ACCESS TO VOTING RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATION\nA. The En Banc Majority Based Its Section 2 Analysis On The Actions Of Bygone Eras\nB. Arizona's Modern History Demonstrates A Continued Effort To Expand Voting Access While Ensuring Election Integrity\nC. Arizona's Actions To Increase Access To The Franchise Of Voting Have Worked\nIII. ARIZONA'S PRECINCT-BASED VOTING SYSTEM AND PROHIBITION ON UNLIMITED THIRD-PARTY BALLOT HARVESTING ARE STRONGLY JUSTIFIED\nA. Arizona's Interests In Its Out-Of-Precinct Policy\nB. Arizona's Interests In Its Limits On Ballot Harvesting\nIV. LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF COURTS' SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTIONS OF A SINGLE LEGISLATOR\nV. IF ARIZONA'S NEUTRAL AND REASONABLE ELECTION REGULATIONS ARE \"DISCRIMINATORY,\" NEARLY ALL STATE ELECTION LAWS ARE IN DANGER",
        "reference": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The En Banc Majority Based Its Section 2 Analysis On The Actions Of Bygone Eras\nB. Arizona's Modern History Demonstrates A Continued Effort To Expand Voting Access While Ensuring Election Integrity\nC. Arizona's Actions To Increase Access To The Franchise Of Voting Have Worked\nIII. ARIZONA'S PRECINCT-BASED VOTING SYSTEM AND PROHIBITION ON UNLIMITED THIRD-PARTY BALLOT HARVESTING ARE STRONGLY JUSTIFIED\nA. Arizona's Interests In Its Out-Of-Precinct Policy\nB. Arizona's Interests In Its Limits On Ballot Harvesting\nIV. LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF COURTS' SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTIONS OF A SINGLE LEGISLATOR\nV. IF ARIZONA'S NEUTRAL AND REASONABLE ELECTION REGULATIONS ARE \"DISCRIMINATORY,\" NEARLY ALL STATE ELECTION LAWS ARE IN DANGER",
        "reference": "II. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARIZONA DEMONSTRATES A CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING ACCESS TO VOTING RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED\nII. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARIZONA DEMONSTRATES A CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING ACCESS TO VOTING RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Arizona's Modern History Demonstrates A Continued Effort To Expand Voting Access While Ensuring Election Integrity\nC. Arizona's Actions To Increase Access To The Franchise Of Voting Have Worked\nIII. ARIZONA'S PRECINCT-BASED VOTING SYSTEM AND PROHIBITION ON UNLIMITED THIRD-PARTY BALLOT HARVESTING ARE STRONGLY JUSTIFIED\nA. Arizona's Interests In Its Out-Of-Precinct Policy\nB. Arizona's Interests In Its Limits On Ballot Harvesting\nIV. LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF COURTS' SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTIONS OF A SINGLE LEGISLATOR\nV. IF ARIZONA'S NEUTRAL AND REASONABLE ELECTION REGULATIONS ARE \"DISCRIMINATORY,\" NEARLY ALL STATE ELECTION LAWS ARE IN DANGER",
        "reference": "A. The En Banc Majority Based Its Section 2 Analysis On The Actions Of Bygone Eras",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED\nII. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARIZONA DEMONSTRATES A CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING ACCESS TO VOTING RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATION\nA. The En Banc Majority Based Its Section 2 Analysis On The Actions Of Bygone Eras\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Arizona's Actions To Increase Access To The Franchise Of Voting Have Worked\nIII. ARIZONA'S PRECINCT-BASED VOTING SYSTEM AND PROHIBITION ON UNLIMITED THIRD-PARTY BALLOT HARVESTING ARE STRONGLY JUSTIFIED\nA. Arizona's Interests In Its Out-Of-Precinct Policy\nB. Arizona's Interests In Its Limits On Ballot Harvesting\nIV. LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF COURTS' SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTIONS OF A SINGLE LEGISLATOR\nV. IF ARIZONA'S NEUTRAL AND REASONABLE ELECTION REGULATIONS ARE \"DISCRIMINATORY,\" NEARLY ALL STATE ELECTION LAWS ARE IN DANGER",
        "reference": "B. Arizona's Modern History Demonstrates A Continued Effort To Expand Voting Access While Ensuring Election Integrity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED\nII. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARIZONA DEMONSTRATES A CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING ACCESS TO VOTING RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATION\nA. The En Banc Majority Based Its Section 2 Analysis On The Actions Of Bygone Eras\nB. Arizona's Modern History Demonstrates A Continued Effort To Expand Voting Access While Ensuring Election Integrity\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. ARIZONA'S PRECINCT-BASED VOTING SYSTEM AND PROHIBITION ON UNLIMITED THIRD-PARTY BALLOT HARVESTING ARE STRONGLY JUSTIFIED\nA. Arizona's Interests In Its Out-Of-Precinct Policy\nB. Arizona's Interests In Its Limits On Ballot Harvesting\nIV. LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF COURTS' SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTIONS OF A SINGLE LEGISLATOR\nV. IF ARIZONA'S NEUTRAL AND REASONABLE ELECTION REGULATIONS ARE \"DISCRIMINATORY,\" NEARLY ALL STATE ELECTION LAWS ARE IN DANGER",
        "reference": "C. Arizona's Actions To Increase Access To The Franchise Of Voting Have Worked",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED\nII. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARIZONA DEMONSTRATES A CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING ACCESS TO VOTING RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATION\nA. The En Banc Majority Based Its Section 2 Analysis On The Actions Of Bygone Eras\nB. Arizona's Modern History Demonstrates A Continued Effort To Expand Voting Access While Ensuring Election Integrity\nC. Arizona's Actions To Increase Access To The Franchise Of Voting Have Worked\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Arizona's Interests In Its Out-Of-Precinct Policy\nB. Arizona's Interests In Its Limits On Ballot Harvesting\nIV. LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF COURTS' SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTIONS OF A SINGLE LEGISLATOR\nV. IF ARIZONA'S NEUTRAL AND REASONABLE ELECTION REGULATIONS ARE \"DISCRIMINATORY,\" NEARLY ALL STATE ELECTION LAWS ARE IN DANGER",
        "reference": "III. ARIZONA'S PRECINCT-BASED VOTING SYSTEM AND PROHIBITION ON UNLIMITED THIRD-PARTY BALLOT HARVESTING ARE STRONGLY JUSTIFIED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED\nII. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARIZONA DEMONSTRATES A CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING ACCESS TO VOTING RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATION\nA. The En Banc Majority Based Its Section 2 Analysis On The Actions Of Bygone Eras\nB. Arizona's Modern History Demonstrates A Continued Effort To Expand Voting Access While Ensuring Election Integrity\nC. Arizona's Actions To Increase Access To The Franchise Of Voting Have Worked\nIII. ARIZONA'S PRECINCT-BASED VOTING SYSTEM AND PROHIBITION ON UNLIMITED THIRD-PARTY BALLOT HARVESTING ARE STRONGLY JUSTIFIED\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Arizona's Interests In Its Limits On Ballot Harvesting\nIV. LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF COURTS' SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTIONS OF A SINGLE LEGISLATOR\nV. IF ARIZONA'S NEUTRAL AND REASONABLE ELECTION REGULATIONS ARE \"DISCRIMINATORY,\" NEARLY ALL STATE ELECTION LAWS ARE IN DANGER",
        "reference": "A. Arizona's Interests In Its Out-Of-Precinct Policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED\nII. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARIZONA DEMONSTRATES A CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING ACCESS TO VOTING RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATION\nA. The En Banc Majority Based Its Section 2 Analysis On The Actions Of Bygone Eras\nB. Arizona's Modern History Demonstrates A Continued Effort To Expand Voting Access While Ensuring Election Integrity\nC. Arizona's Actions To Increase Access To The Franchise Of Voting Have Worked\nIII. ARIZONA'S PRECINCT-BASED VOTING SYSTEM AND PROHIBITION ON UNLIMITED THIRD-PARTY BALLOT HARVESTING ARE STRONGLY JUSTIFIED\nA. Arizona's Interests In Its Out-Of-Precinct Policy\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF COURTS' SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTIONS OF A SINGLE LEGISLATOR\nV. IF ARIZONA'S NEUTRAL AND REASONABLE ELECTION REGULATIONS ARE \"DISCRIMINATORY,\" NEARLY ALL STATE ELECTION LAWS ARE IN DANGER",
        "reference": "B. Arizona's Interests In Its Limits On Ballot Harvesting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED\nII. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARIZONA DEMONSTRATES A CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING ACCESS TO VOTING RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATION\nA. The En Banc Majority Based Its Section 2 Analysis On The Actions Of Bygone Eras\nB. Arizona's Modern History Demonstrates A Continued Effort To Expand Voting Access While Ensuring Election Integrity\nC. Arizona's Actions To Increase Access To The Franchise Of Voting Have Worked\nIII. ARIZONA'S PRECINCT-BASED VOTING SYSTEM AND PROHIBITION ON UNLIMITED THIRD-PARTY BALLOT HARVESTING ARE STRONGLY JUSTIFIED\nA. Arizona's Interests In Its Out-Of-Precinct Policy\nB. Arizona's Interests In Its Limits On Ballot Harvesting\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. IF ARIZONA'S NEUTRAL AND REASONABLE ELECTION REGULATIONS ARE \"DISCRIMINATORY,\" NEARLY ALL STATE ELECTION LAWS ARE IN DANGER",
        "reference": "IV. LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF COURTS' SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTIONS OF A SINGLE LEGISLATOR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SCOPE OF ANY VRA ANALYSIS NECESSARILY MUST BE TEMPORALLY LIMITED\nII. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN ARIZONA DEMONSTRATES A CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING ACCESS TO VOTING RATHER THAN DISCRIMINATION\nA. The En Banc Majority Based Its Section 2 Analysis On The Actions Of Bygone Eras\nB. Arizona's Modern History Demonstrates A Continued Effort To Expand Voting Access While Ensuring Election Integrity\nC. Arizona's Actions To Increase Access To The Franchise Of Voting Have Worked\nIII. ARIZONA'S PRECINCT-BASED VOTING SYSTEM AND PROHIBITION ON UNLIMITED THIRD-PARTY BALLOT HARVESTING ARE STRONGLY JUSTIFIED\nA. Arizona's Interests In Its Out-Of-Precinct Policy\nB. Arizona's Interests In Its Limits On Ballot Harvesting\nIV. LEGISLATION SHOULD NOT BE INVALIDATED BECAUSE OF COURTS' SUBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTIONS OF A SINGLE LEGISLATOR\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. IF ARIZONA'S NEUTRAL AND REASONABLE ELECTION REGULATIONS ARE \"DISCRIMINATORY,\" NEARLY ALL STATE ELECTION LAWS ARE IN DANGER",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "This [MISSING]",
        "reference": "This Court Should Accept This Case To Reaffirm That Public Employers May Not Use Expansive General Characterizations Of Public Employee Job Responsibilities As A Basis For Abrogating Their First Amendment Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1158_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Lobbying Is Deeply Rooted In Our History And Constitutional Tradition\nB. Lobbying Is Heavily Regulated At The Federal, State, And Local Levels\nII. The Margiotta Rule Raises Serious Constitutional Concerns And Should Be Rejected\nA. Margiotta Raises Substantial Due Process And First Amendment Concerns\nB. The Court Should Replace Margiotta With A Clear, Predictable Standard",
        "reference": "I. Lobbying Is Constitutionally Protected, Socially Useful, And Highly Regulated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1158_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Lobbying Is Constitutionally Protected, Socially Useful, And Highly Regulated\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Lobbying Is Heavily Regulated At The Federal, State, And Local Levels\nII. The Margiotta Rule Raises Serious Constitutional Concerns And Should Be Rejected\nA. Margiotta Raises Substantial Due Process And First Amendment Concerns\nB. The Court Should Replace Margiotta With A Clear, Predictable Standard",
        "reference": "A. Lobbying Is Deeply Rooted In Our History And Constitutional Tradition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1158_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Lobbying Is Constitutionally Protected, Socially Useful, And Highly Regulated\nA. Lobbying Is Deeply Rooted In Our History And Constitutional Tradition\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Margiotta Rule Raises Serious Constitutional Concerns And Should Be Rejected\nA. Margiotta Raises Substantial Due Process And First Amendment Concerns\nB. The Court Should Replace Margiotta With A Clear, Predictable Standard",
        "reference": "B. Lobbying Is Heavily Regulated At The Federal, State, And Local Levels",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1158_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Lobbying Is Constitutionally Protected, Socially Useful, And Highly Regulated\nA. Lobbying Is Deeply Rooted In Our History And Constitutional Tradition\nB. Lobbying Is Heavily Regulated At The Federal, State, And Local Levels\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Margiotta Raises Substantial Due Process And First Amendment Concerns\nB. The Court Should Replace Margiotta With A Clear, Predictable Standard",
        "reference": "II. The Margiotta Rule Raises Serious Constitutional Concerns And Should Be Rejected",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1158_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Lobbying Is Constitutionally Protected, Socially Useful, And Highly Regulated\nA. Lobbying Is Deeply Rooted In Our History And Constitutional Tradition\nB. Lobbying Is Heavily Regulated At The Federal, State, And Local Levels\nII. The Margiotta Rule Raises Serious Constitutional Concerns And Should Be Rejected\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court Should Replace Margiotta With A Clear, Predictable Standard",
        "reference": "A. Margiotta Raises Substantial Due Process And First Amendment Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1158_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Lobbying Is Constitutionally Protected, Socially Useful, And Highly Regulated\nA. Lobbying Is Deeply Rooted In Our History And Constitutional Tradition\nB. Lobbying Is Heavily Regulated At The Federal, State, And Local Levels\nII. The Margiotta Rule Raises Serious Constitutional Concerns And Should Be Rejected\nA. Margiotta Raises Substantial Due Process And First Amendment Concerns\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Court Should Replace Margiotta With A Clear, Predictable Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. EPA's proposed rulemaking in no way undercuts the need for this Court's review\nIII. EPA's attack on the Rapanos plurality's wetland test is no reason to deny review\nIV. The Sacketts' petition is the right vehicle",
        "reference": "I. The conflicts among the lower courts about how to apply Rapanos support this Court's review of the Sacketts' case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The conflicts among the lower courts about how to apply Rapanos support this Court's review of the Sacketts' case\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. EPA's attack on the Rapanos plurality's wetland test is no reason to deny review\nIV. The Sacketts' petition is the right vehicle",
        "reference": "II. EPA's proposed rulemaking in no way undercuts the need for this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The conflicts among the lower courts about how to apply Rapanos support this Court's review of the Sacketts' case\nII. EPA's proposed rulemaking in no way undercuts the need for this Court's review\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Sacketts' petition is the right vehicle",
        "reference": "III. EPA's attack on the Rapanos plurality's wetland test is no reason to deny review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The conflicts among the lower courts about how to apply Rapanos support this Court's review of the Sacketts' case\nII. EPA's proposed rulemaking in no way undercuts the need for this Court's review\nIII. EPA's attack on the Rapanos plurality's wetland test is no reason to deny review\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Sacketts' petition is the right vehicle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]",
        "reference": "The Williamson County State Litigation Requirement Is Inconsistent With The Text And History of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Violations Of An Individual's Constitutional Rights Are Actionable Injuries\nB. The Change Of An Unconstitutional Policy Does Not Obviate Causation For Past Violations Of Constitutional Rights\nC. Nominal Damages Provide Judicial Redress For Past Violations Of Rights\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS RULE WOULD FRUSTRATE THE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS",
        "reference": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Change Of An Unconstitutional Policy Does Not Obviate Causation For Past Violations Of Constitutional Rights\nC. Nominal Damages Provide Judicial Redress For Past Violations Of Rights\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS RULE WOULD FRUSTRATE THE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS",
        "reference": "A. Violations Of An Individual's Constitutional Rights Are Actionable Injuries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY\nA. Violations Of An Individual's Constitutional Rights Are Actionable Injuries\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Nominal Damages Provide Judicial Redress For Past Violations Of Rights\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS RULE WOULD FRUSTRATE THE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS",
        "reference": "B. The Change Of An Unconstitutional Policy Does Not Obviate Causation For Past Violations Of Constitutional Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY\nA. Violations Of An Individual's Constitutional Rights Are Actionable Injuries\nB. The Change Of An Unconstitutional Policy Does Not Obviate Causation For Past Violations Of Constitutional Rights\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS RULE WOULD FRUSTRATE THE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS",
        "reference": "C. Nominal Damages Provide Judicial Redress For Past Violations Of Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. A CLAIM FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES FOR A PAST VIOLATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRESENTS A JUSTICIABLE CASE OR CONTROVERSY\nA. Violations Of An Individual's Constitutional Rights Are Actionable Injuries\nB. The Change Of An Unconstitutional Policy Does Not Obviate Causation For Past Violations Of Constitutional Rights\nC. Nominal Damages Provide Judicial Redress For Past Violations Of Rights\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS RULE WOULD FRUSTRATE THE ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. [MISSING]\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. [MISSING]\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. [MISSING]\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. [MISSING]\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. [MISSING]\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. [MISSING]\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "a. The Circuit Split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. [MISSING]\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "b. Preemptive Replies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. [MISSING]\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. [MISSING]\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "a. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. [MISSING]\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "b. The TVA Mishandles Burr",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. [MISSING]\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "i. Question-Begging & Dicta",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. [MISSING]\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "ii. Mishandling Burr",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. [MISSING]\n9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "reference": "iii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit\n2. The TVA Is Expressly Excluded from the FTCA\n3. This Court's Correct Suability Test: Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\n4. The Decisive Effect of Meyer\n5. The Eleventh Circuit Reversed Key Underlying Principles\n6. The Eleventh Circuit Thwarted Statutes and Abraded Separation of Powers\n7. The Circuit Split and Preemptive Replies\na. The Circuit Split\nb. Preemptive Replies\n8. The TVA Made No Showing Under Burr\u2014Loeffler\u2014Meyer\na. The TVA Did Not Try to Satisfy Burr\nb. The TVA Mishandles Burr\ni. Question-Begging & Dicta\nii. Mishandling Burr\niii. The TVA's Innate-Limitation Argument\u2014and Its Errors\n9. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "9. Congress Has \"Absolute\" Power to Shape Sovereign Immunity\u2014The TVA Thus Asks This Court to Violate Separation of Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The State's argument that McElrath is procedurally barred from raising the double jeopardy argument is wrong and contrary to the Georgia Supreme Court's decision.\nC. The issue presented is critically important and likely to recur.",
        "reference": "A. The decision below directly violates this Court's controlling precedents regarding the Double Jeopardy Clause.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The decision below directly violates this Court's controlling precedents regarding the Double Jeopardy Clause.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The issue presented is critically important and likely to recur.",
        "reference": "B. The State's argument that McElrath is procedurally barred from raising the double jeopardy argument is wrong and contrary to the Georgia Supreme Court's decision.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The decision below directly violates this Court's controlling precedents regarding the Double Jeopardy Clause.\nB. The State's argument that McElrath is procedurally barred from raising the double jeopardy argument is wrong and contrary to the Georgia Supreme Court's decision.\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The issue presented is critically important and likely to recur.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. LIKE INDIVIDUALS, SMALL BUSINESSES ARE PLAGUED BY UNWANTED ROBOCALLS\nIII. THE PURPOSE OF THE TCPA IS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM THE NUISANCE OF ROBOCALLS\nIV. THE TCPA MUST BE INTERPRETED IN A WAY THAT GIVES EFFECT TO ITS PURPOSE OF PROTECTING CONSUMERS, INCLUDING SMALL BUSINESSES",
        "reference": "I. SMALL BUSINESSES ARE CRITICAL TO THE NATION'S ECONOMY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. SMALL BUSINESSES ARE CRITICAL TO THE NATION'S ECONOMY\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE PURPOSE OF THE TCPA IS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM THE NUISANCE OF ROBOCALLS\nIV. THE TCPA MUST BE INTERPRETED IN A WAY THAT GIVES EFFECT TO ITS PURPOSE OF PROTECTING CONSUMERS, INCLUDING SMALL BUSINESSES",
        "reference": "II. LIKE INDIVIDUALS, SMALL BUSINESSES ARE PLAGUED BY UNWANTED ROBOCALLS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. SMALL BUSINESSES ARE CRITICAL TO THE NATION'S ECONOMY\nII. LIKE INDIVIDUALS, SMALL BUSINESSES ARE PLAGUED BY UNWANTED ROBOCALLS\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THE TCPA MUST BE INTERPRETED IN A WAY THAT GIVES EFFECT TO ITS PURPOSE OF PROTECTING CONSUMERS, INCLUDING SMALL BUSINESSES",
        "reference": "III. THE PURPOSE OF THE TCPA IS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM THE NUISANCE OF ROBOCALLS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. SMALL BUSINESSES ARE CRITICAL TO THE NATION'S ECONOMY\nII. LIKE INDIVIDUALS, SMALL BUSINESSES ARE PLAGUED BY UNWANTED ROBOCALLS\nIII. THE PURPOSE OF THE TCPA IS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM THE NUISANCE OF ROBOCALLS\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. THE TCPA MUST BE INTERPRETED IN A WAY THAT GIVES EFFECT TO ITS PURPOSE OF PROTECTING CONSUMERS, INCLUDING SMALL BUSINESSES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Privy Council Review of Colonial Law Early State Constitutions\nB. The Case of the Prisoners and Judicial Review in the States before the Constitutional Convention\nII. Petitioners' Interpretation of the Elections Clause Is Inconsistent with the History of Judicial Review\nA. Because Judicial Review Was Established at the Time of the Founding, the Framers Would Not Have Eliminated It Without Using Clear Language\nB. The Elections Clause Does Not Limit or Narrow the Traditional Power of Judicial Review\nC. A Statute Authorizing State Courts to Impose Interim Plans Does Not Offend the Elections Clause",
        "reference": "I. State Legislatures Have Always Exercised Delegated Lawmaking Authority, Subject to Review under State Constitutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Legislatures Have Always Exercised Delegated Lawmaking Authority, Subject to Review under State Constitutions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Case of the Prisoners and Judicial Review in the States before the Constitutional Convention\nII. Petitioners' Interpretation of the Elections Clause Is Inconsistent with the History of Judicial Review\nA. Because Judicial Review Was Established at the Time of the Founding, the Framers Would Not Have Eliminated It Without Using Clear Language\nB. The Elections Clause Does Not Limit or Narrow the Traditional Power of Judicial Review\nC. A Statute Authorizing State Courts to Impose Interim Plans Does Not Offend the Elections Clause",
        "reference": "A. Privy Council Review of Colonial Law Early State Constitutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Legislatures Have Always Exercised Delegated Lawmaking Authority, Subject to Review under State Constitutions\nA. Privy Council Review of Colonial Law Early State Constitutions\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioners' Interpretation of the Elections Clause Is Inconsistent with the History of Judicial Review\nA. Because Judicial Review Was Established at the Time of the Founding, the Framers Would Not Have Eliminated It Without Using Clear Language\nB. The Elections Clause Does Not Limit or Narrow the Traditional Power of Judicial Review\nC. A Statute Authorizing State Courts to Impose Interim Plans Does Not Offend the Elections Clause",
        "reference": "B. The Case of the Prisoners and Judicial Review in the States before the Constitutional Convention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Legislatures Have Always Exercised Delegated Lawmaking Authority, Subject to Review under State Constitutions\nA. Privy Council Review of Colonial Law Early State Constitutions\nB. The Case of the Prisoners and Judicial Review in the States before the Constitutional Convention\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Because Judicial Review Was Established at the Time of the Founding, the Framers Would Not Have Eliminated It Without Using Clear Language\nB. The Elections Clause Does Not Limit or Narrow the Traditional Power of Judicial Review\nC. A Statute Authorizing State Courts to Impose Interim Plans Does Not Offend the Elections Clause",
        "reference": "II. Petitioners' Interpretation of the Elections Clause Is Inconsistent with the History of Judicial Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Legislatures Have Always Exercised Delegated Lawmaking Authority, Subject to Review under State Constitutions\nA. Privy Council Review of Colonial Law Early State Constitutions\nB. The Case of the Prisoners and Judicial Review in the States before the Constitutional Convention\nII. Petitioners' Interpretation of the Elections Clause Is Inconsistent with the History of Judicial Review\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Elections Clause Does Not Limit or Narrow the Traditional Power of Judicial Review\nC. A Statute Authorizing State Courts to Impose Interim Plans Does Not Offend the Elections Clause",
        "reference": "A. Because Judicial Review Was Established at the Time of the Founding, the Framers Would Not Have Eliminated It Without Using Clear Language",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Legislatures Have Always Exercised Delegated Lawmaking Authority, Subject to Review under State Constitutions\nA. Privy Council Review of Colonial Law Early State Constitutions\nB. The Case of the Prisoners and Judicial Review in the States before the Constitutional Convention\nII. Petitioners' Interpretation of the Elections Clause Is Inconsistent with the History of Judicial Review\nA. Because Judicial Review Was Established at the Time of the Founding, the Framers Would Not Have Eliminated It Without Using Clear Language\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A Statute Authorizing State Courts to Impose Interim Plans Does Not Offend the Elections Clause",
        "reference": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Limit or Narrow the Traditional Power of Judicial Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Legislatures Have Always Exercised Delegated Lawmaking Authority, Subject to Review under State Constitutions\nA. Privy Council Review of Colonial Law Early State Constitutions\nB. The Case of the Prisoners and Judicial Review in the States before the Constitutional Convention\nII. Petitioners' Interpretation of the Elections Clause Is Inconsistent with the History of Judicial Review\nA. Because Judicial Review Was Established at the Time of the Founding, the Framers Would Not Have Eliminated It Without Using Clear Language\nB. The Elections Clause Does Not Limit or Narrow the Traditional Power of Judicial Review\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. A Statute Authorizing State Courts to Impose Interim Plans Does Not Offend the Elections Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "A. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. [MISSING]\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "B. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. [MISSING]\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "II. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "A. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "B. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. [MISSING]\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. [MISSING]\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "III. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "A. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. [MISSING]\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "B. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. [MISSING]\nD. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "reference": "C. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This canon of constitutional avoidance applies here\nA. Exempting illegal aliens from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment\nB. Congress may lack the authority to preempt the States' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws\nII. IRCA does not expressly preempt these prosecutions\nA. As a threshold issue, rejection of a presumption against preemption in express-preemption cases requires this Court to clarify whether other, related statutory construction tools continue to apply\nB. Based on traditional tools of statutory construction, IRCA does not expressly preempt Kansas law\n1. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with this Court's Whiting decision\n2. The plain language of section 1324a(b)(5) does not preempt these prosecutions\n3. If the clear-statement rule applies, it precludes interpreting section 1324a(b)(5) to preempt State\u2014or federal\u2014laws based on I-9 information obtained from other sources\nIII. IRCA does not impliedly preempt these prosecutions\nA. The presumption against preemption continues in implied-preemption cases\nB. IRCA does not field preempt these prosecutions\nC. IRCA does not conflict preempt these prosecutions\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. This Court should resolve the tension between Whiting and Arizona by confining Arizona to sanctions directly related to unauthorized employment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1606_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 405(g) authorizes judicial review of the Appeals Council's conclusion that a claimant failed to exhaust administrative remedies\nB. The court of appeals' reasons for refusing judicial review are not persuasive",
        "reference": "I. A Social Security Appeals Council order dismissing a request for review as untimely is judicially reviewable under 42 U.S.C. 405(g)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1606_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Social Security Appeals Council order dismissing a request for review as untimely is judicially reviewable under 42 U.S.C. 405(g)\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The court of appeals' reasons for refusing judicial review are not persuasive",
        "reference": "A. Section 405(g) authorizes judicial review of the Appeals Council's conclusion that a claimant failed to exhaust administrative remedies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1606_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Social Security Appeals Council order dismissing a request for review as untimely is judicially reviewable under 42 U.S.C. 405(g)\nA. Section 405(g) authorizes judicial review of the Appeals Council's conclusion that a claimant failed to exhaust administrative remedies\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The court of appeals' reasons for refusing judicial review are not persuasive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Government Created a Watchlist to Investigate Journalists, Lawyers, and Activists for Possible Violations of section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)\nB. Individuals on the Watchlist Were Targeted Based on Their Political Opinions and Protected Speech\n1. Kaji Dousa\n2. Ariana Drehsler\n3. Nicole Ramos, Nora Phillips, and Erika Pinheiro\n4. David Abud and Jeff Valenzuela\nII. Punishing Inducement or Encouragement for Financial Gain Still Captures a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech",
        "reference": "I. The Government Has Repeatedly and Systematically Used section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to Target Journalists, Lawyers, and Others for Their Protected Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Has Repeatedly and Systematically Used section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to Target Journalists, Lawyers, and Others for Their Protected Speech\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Individuals on the Watchlist Were Targeted Based on Their Political Opinions and Protected Speech\n1. Kaji Dousa\n2. Ariana Drehsler\n3. Nicole Ramos, Nora Phillips, and Erika Pinheiro\n4. David Abud and Jeff Valenzuela\nII. Punishing Inducement or Encouragement for Financial Gain Still Captures a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech",
        "reference": "A. The Government Created a Watchlist to Investigate Journalists, Lawyers, and Activists for Possible Violations of section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Has Repeatedly and Systematically Used section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to Target Journalists, Lawyers, and Others for Their Protected Speech\nA. The Government Created a Watchlist to Investigate Journalists, Lawyers, and Activists for Possible Violations of section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Kaji Dousa\n2. Ariana Drehsler\n3. Nicole Ramos, Nora Phillips, and Erika Pinheiro\n4. David Abud and Jeff Valenzuela\nII. Punishing Inducement or Encouragement for Financial Gain Still Captures a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech",
        "reference": "B. Individuals on the Watchlist Were Targeted Based on Their Political Opinions and Protected Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Has Repeatedly and Systematically Used section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to Target Journalists, Lawyers, and Others for Their Protected Speech\nA. The Government Created a Watchlist to Investigate Journalists, Lawyers, and Activists for Possible Violations of section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)\nB. Individuals on the Watchlist Were Targeted Based on Their Political Opinions and Protected Speech\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Ariana Drehsler\n3. Nicole Ramos, Nora Phillips, and Erika Pinheiro\n4. David Abud and Jeff Valenzuela\nII. Punishing Inducement or Encouragement for Financial Gain Still Captures a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech",
        "reference": "1. Kaji Dousa",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Has Repeatedly and Systematically Used section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to Target Journalists, Lawyers, and Others for Their Protected Speech\nA. The Government Created a Watchlist to Investigate Journalists, Lawyers, and Activists for Possible Violations of section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)\nB. Individuals on the Watchlist Were Targeted Based on Their Political Opinions and Protected Speech\n1. Kaji Dousa\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Nicole Ramos, Nora Phillips, and Erika Pinheiro\n4. David Abud and Jeff Valenzuela\nII. Punishing Inducement or Encouragement for Financial Gain Still Captures a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech",
        "reference": "2. Ariana Drehsler",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Has Repeatedly and Systematically Used section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to Target Journalists, Lawyers, and Others for Their Protected Speech\nA. The Government Created a Watchlist to Investigate Journalists, Lawyers, and Activists for Possible Violations of section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)\nB. Individuals on the Watchlist Were Targeted Based on Their Political Opinions and Protected Speech\n1. Kaji Dousa\n2. Ariana Drehsler\n3. [MISSING]\n4. David Abud and Jeff Valenzuela\nII. Punishing Inducement or Encouragement for Financial Gain Still Captures a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech",
        "reference": "3. Nicole Ramos, Nora Phillips, and Erika Pinheiro",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Has Repeatedly and Systematically Used section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to Target Journalists, Lawyers, and Others for Their Protected Speech\nA. The Government Created a Watchlist to Investigate Journalists, Lawyers, and Activists for Possible Violations of section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)\nB. Individuals on the Watchlist Were Targeted Based on Their Political Opinions and Protected Speech\n1. Kaji Dousa\n2. Ariana Drehsler\n3. Nicole Ramos, Nora Phillips, and Erika Pinheiro\n4. [MISSING]\nII. Punishing Inducement or Encouragement for Financial Gain Still Captures a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech",
        "reference": "4. David Abud and Jeff Valenzuela",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Has Repeatedly and Systematically Used section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to Target Journalists, Lawyers, and Others for Their Protected Speech\nA. The Government Created a Watchlist to Investigate Journalists, Lawyers, and Activists for Possible Violations of section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)\nB. Individuals on the Watchlist Were Targeted Based on Their Political Opinions and Protected Speech\n1. Kaji Dousa\n2. Ariana Drehsler\n3. Nicole Ramos, Nora Phillips, and Erika Pinheiro\n4. David Abud and Jeff Valenzuela\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Punishing Inducement or Encouragement for Financial Gain Still Captures a Substantial Amount of Protected Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief049.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. New York's Restrictive Carry Regime Violates The Second Amendment",
        "reference": "I. Text, History, And Tradition Confirm That The Second Amendment Guarantees A Right To Carry Handguns Outside The Home For Self-Defense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief049.pdf",
        "text": "I. Text, History, And Tradition Confirm That The Second Amendment Guarantees A Right To Carry Handguns Outside The Home For Self-Defense\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. New York's Restrictive Carry Regime Violates The Second Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court's Review Is Necessary Because Neither The California Courts Nor The Ninth Circuit Will Correct The Iskanian Rule\nA. The FAA forbids California from refusing to enforce bilateral arbitration agreements with respect to representative PAGA claims\nB. Iskanian's attempt to shield PAGA claims from the FAA conflicts with this Court's precedents",
        "reference": "I. The Preemption Question Is Exceptionally Important And Impacts Countless Arbitration Agreements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Preemption Question Is Exceptionally Important And Impacts Countless Arbitration Agreements\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The FAA forbids California from refusing to enforce bilateral arbitration agreements with respect to representative PAGA claims\nB. Iskanian's attempt to shield PAGA claims from the FAA conflicts with this Court's precedents",
        "reference": "II. This Court's Review Is Necessary Because Neither The California Courts Nor The Ninth Circuit Will Correct The Iskanian Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Preemption Question Is Exceptionally Important And Impacts Countless Arbitration Agreements\nII. This Court's Review Is Necessary Because Neither The California Courts Nor The Ninth Circuit Will Correct The Iskanian Rule\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Iskanian's attempt to shield PAGA claims from the FAA conflicts with this Court's precedents",
        "reference": "A. The FAA forbids California from refusing to enforce bilateral arbitration agreements with respect to representative PAGA claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Preemption Question Is Exceptionally Important And Impacts Countless Arbitration Agreements\nII. This Court's Review Is Necessary Because Neither The California Courts Nor The Ninth Circuit Will Correct The Iskanian Rule\nA. The FAA forbids California from refusing to enforce bilateral arbitration agreements with respect to representative PAGA claims\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Iskanian's attempt to shield PAGA claims from the FAA conflicts with this Court's precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. CONGRESS CHANGED THE BURDEN OF PROOF BASED ON AN EXTENSIVE FACTUAL RECORD",
        "reference": "I. A BURDEN OF PROOF STANDARD REFLECTS A THOUGHTFUL ALLOCATION OF RISK IN LIGHT OF SOCIETAL INTERESTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A BURDEN OF PROOF STANDARD REFLECTS A THOUGHTFUL ALLOCATION OF RISK IN LIGHT OF SOCIETAL INTERESTS\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. CONGRESS CHANGED THE BURDEN OF PROOF BASED ON AN EXTENSIVE FACTUAL RECORD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. As an original matter, Pennsylvania Fire was correctly decided\nIII. The continuing validity of Pennsylvania's registration requirement is a matter of dormant commerce, not due process\nIV. The Court should vacate the judgment and leave the dormant commerce issues for remand",
        "reference": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The continuing validity of Pennsylvania's registration requirement is a matter of dormant commerce, not due process\nIV. The Court should vacate the judgment and leave the dormant commerce issues for remand",
        "reference": "II. As an original matter, Pennsylvania Fire was correctly decided",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents\nII. As an original matter, Pennsylvania Fire was correctly decided\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Court should vacate the judgment and leave the dormant commerce issues for remand",
        "reference": "III. The continuing validity of Pennsylvania's registration requirement is a matter of dormant commerce, not due process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Consent to jurisdiction under a registration statute is effective under Pennsylvania Fire and the Court's recent precedents\nII. As an original matter, Pennsylvania Fire was correctly decided\nIII. The continuing validity of Pennsylvania's registration requirement is a matter of dormant commerce, not due process\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Court should vacate the judgment and leave the dormant commerce issues for remand",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Barring claims for retaliatory arrest where probable cause exists would severely chill First Amendment activity\n1. A categorical probable-cause bar would prevent courts from identifying the true motive behind government retaliation\n2. A categorical probable-cause bar would unduly chill First Amendment activity\nC. Retaliatory arrests are a greater threat to First Amendment activity than retaliatory prosecutions",
        "reference": "A. The question presented implicates important First Amendment values",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The question presented implicates important First Amendment values\nB. [MISSING]\n1. A categorical probable-cause bar would prevent courts from identifying the true motive behind government retaliation\n2. A categorical probable-cause bar would unduly chill First Amendment activity\nC. Retaliatory arrests are a greater threat to First Amendment activity than retaliatory prosecutions",
        "reference": "B. Barring claims for retaliatory arrest where probable cause exists would severely chill First Amendment activity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The question presented implicates important First Amendment values\nB. Barring claims for retaliatory arrest where probable cause exists would severely chill First Amendment activity\n1. [MISSING]\n2. A categorical probable-cause bar would unduly chill First Amendment activity\nC. Retaliatory arrests are a greater threat to First Amendment activity than retaliatory prosecutions",
        "reference": "1. A categorical probable-cause bar would prevent courts from identifying the true motive behind government retaliation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The question presented implicates important First Amendment values\nB. Barring claims for retaliatory arrest where probable cause exists would severely chill First Amendment activity\n1. A categorical probable-cause bar would prevent courts from identifying the true motive behind government retaliation\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Retaliatory arrests are a greater threat to First Amendment activity than retaliatory prosecutions",
        "reference": "2. A categorical probable-cause bar would unduly chill First Amendment activity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The question presented implicates important First Amendment values\nB. Barring claims for retaliatory arrest where probable cause exists would severely chill First Amendment activity\n1. A categorical probable-cause bar would prevent courts from identifying the true motive behind government retaliation\n2. A categorical probable-cause bar would unduly chill First Amendment activity\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Retaliatory arrests are a greater threat to First Amendment activity than retaliatory prosecutions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. History and Tradition Show the Religion Clauses Were Designed to Prohibit Coercion and Promote Free Exercise\n1. At the Founding, Coercion Constituted an Essential Element of Religious Establishment\n2. Disestablishment in the States Involved Removing Coercive Laws and Allowing Freedom of Conscience\n3. Congressional Debates Over the Religion Clauses Focused on Coercion\n4. The Conduct of the Framers and Subsequent Traditions Confirm That Non-Coercive Religious Expression Does Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns\nB. This Court's Precedent Supports This Complementary Understanding of the Religion Clauses\nII. PRIVATE PRAYER BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nIII. FAILURE TO READ THE RELIGION CLAUSES TO COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER THREATENS IMPORTANT CIVIC TRADITIONS",
        "reference": "I. THE COMPLEMENTARY RELIGION CLAUSES BOTH PROHIBIT COERCION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COMPLEMENTARY RELIGION CLAUSES BOTH PROHIBIT COERCION\nA. [MISSING]\n1. At the Founding, Coercion Constituted an Essential Element of Religious Establishment\n2. Disestablishment in the States Involved Removing Coercive Laws and Allowing Freedom of Conscience\n3. Congressional Debates Over the Religion Clauses Focused on Coercion\n4. The Conduct of the Framers and Subsequent Traditions Confirm That Non-Coercive Religious Expression Does Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns\nB. This Court's Precedent Supports This Complementary Understanding of the Religion Clauses\nII. PRIVATE PRAYER BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nIII. FAILURE TO READ THE RELIGION CLAUSES TO COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER THREATENS IMPORTANT CIVIC TRADITIONS",
        "reference": "A. History and Tradition Show the Religion Clauses Were Designed to Prohibit Coercion and Promote Free Exercise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COMPLEMENTARY RELIGION CLAUSES BOTH PROHIBIT COERCION\nA. History and Tradition Show the Religion Clauses Were Designed to Prohibit Coercion and Promote Free Exercise\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Disestablishment in the States Involved Removing Coercive Laws and Allowing Freedom of Conscience\n3. Congressional Debates Over the Religion Clauses Focused on Coercion\n4. The Conduct of the Framers and Subsequent Traditions Confirm That Non-Coercive Religious Expression Does Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns\nB. This Court's Precedent Supports This Complementary Understanding of the Religion Clauses\nII. PRIVATE PRAYER BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nIII. FAILURE TO READ THE RELIGION CLAUSES TO COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER THREATENS IMPORTANT CIVIC TRADITIONS",
        "reference": "1. At the Founding, Coercion Constituted an Essential Element of Religious Establishment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COMPLEMENTARY RELIGION CLAUSES BOTH PROHIBIT COERCION\nA. History and Tradition Show the Religion Clauses Were Designed to Prohibit Coercion and Promote Free Exercise\n1. At the Founding, Coercion Constituted an Essential Element of Religious Establishment\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Congressional Debates Over the Religion Clauses Focused on Coercion\n4. The Conduct of the Framers and Subsequent Traditions Confirm That Non-Coercive Religious Expression Does Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns\nB. This Court's Precedent Supports This Complementary Understanding of the Religion Clauses\nII. PRIVATE PRAYER BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nIII. FAILURE TO READ THE RELIGION CLAUSES TO COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER THREATENS IMPORTANT CIVIC TRADITIONS",
        "reference": "2. Disestablishment in the States Involved Removing Coercive Laws and Allowing Freedom of Conscience",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COMPLEMENTARY RELIGION CLAUSES BOTH PROHIBIT COERCION\nA. History and Tradition Show the Religion Clauses Were Designed to Prohibit Coercion and Promote Free Exercise\n1. At the Founding, Coercion Constituted an Essential Element of Religious Establishment\n2. Disestablishment in the States Involved Removing Coercive Laws and Allowing Freedom of Conscience\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The Conduct of the Framers and Subsequent Traditions Confirm That Non-Coercive Religious Expression Does Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns\nB. This Court's Precedent Supports This Complementary Understanding of the Religion Clauses\nII. PRIVATE PRAYER BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nIII. FAILURE TO READ THE RELIGION CLAUSES TO COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER THREATENS IMPORTANT CIVIC TRADITIONS",
        "reference": "3. Congressional Debates Over the Religion Clauses Focused on Coercion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COMPLEMENTARY RELIGION CLAUSES BOTH PROHIBIT COERCION\nA. History and Tradition Show the Religion Clauses Were Designed to Prohibit Coercion and Promote Free Exercise\n1. At the Founding, Coercion Constituted an Essential Element of Religious Establishment\n2. Disestablishment in the States Involved Removing Coercive Laws and Allowing Freedom of Conscience\n3. Congressional Debates Over the Religion Clauses Focused on Coercion\n4. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's Precedent Supports This Complementary Understanding of the Religion Clauses\nII. PRIVATE PRAYER BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nIII. FAILURE TO READ THE RELIGION CLAUSES TO COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER THREATENS IMPORTANT CIVIC TRADITIONS",
        "reference": "4. The Conduct of the Framers and Subsequent Traditions Confirm That Non-Coercive Religious Expression Does Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COMPLEMENTARY RELIGION CLAUSES BOTH PROHIBIT COERCION\nA. History and Tradition Show the Religion Clauses Were Designed to Prohibit Coercion and Promote Free Exercise\n1. At the Founding, Coercion Constituted an Essential Element of Religious Establishment\n2. Disestablishment in the States Involved Removing Coercive Laws and Allowing Freedom of Conscience\n3. Congressional Debates Over the Religion Clauses Focused on Coercion\n4. The Conduct of the Framers and Subsequent Traditions Confirm That Non-Coercive Religious Expression Does Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns\nB. [MISSING]\nII. PRIVATE PRAYER BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nIII. FAILURE TO READ THE RELIGION CLAUSES TO COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER THREATENS IMPORTANT CIVIC TRADITIONS",
        "reference": "B. This Court's Precedent Supports This Complementary Understanding of the Religion Clauses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COMPLEMENTARY RELIGION CLAUSES BOTH PROHIBIT COERCION\nA. History and Tradition Show the Religion Clauses Were Designed to Prohibit Coercion and Promote Free Exercise\n1. At the Founding, Coercion Constituted an Essential Element of Religious Establishment\n2. Disestablishment in the States Involved Removing Coercive Laws and Allowing Freedom of Conscience\n3. Congressional Debates Over the Religion Clauses Focused on Coercion\n4. The Conduct of the Framers and Subsequent Traditions Confirm That Non-Coercive Religious Expression Does Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns\nB. This Court's Precedent Supports This Complementary Understanding of the Religion Clauses\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. FAILURE TO READ THE RELIGION CLAUSES TO COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER THREATENS IMPORTANT CIVIC TRADITIONS",
        "reference": "II. PRIVATE PRAYER BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COMPLEMENTARY RELIGION CLAUSES BOTH PROHIBIT COERCION\nA. History and Tradition Show the Religion Clauses Were Designed to Prohibit Coercion and Promote Free Exercise\n1. At the Founding, Coercion Constituted an Essential Element of Religious Establishment\n2. Disestablishment in the States Involved Removing Coercive Laws and Allowing Freedom of Conscience\n3. Congressional Debates Over the Religion Clauses Focused on Coercion\n4. The Conduct of the Framers and Subsequent Traditions Confirm That Non-Coercive Religious Expression Does Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns\nB. This Court's Precedent Supports This Complementary Understanding of the Religion Clauses\nII. PRIVATE PRAYER BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. FAILURE TO READ THE RELIGION CLAUSES TO COMPLEMENT ONE ANOTHER THREATENS IMPORTANT CIVIC TRADITIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Gill Test Is So Uncertain That Even Its Proponents Cannot Agree On How It Should Apply To Maryland's Map\nB. Appellants' \"More Than De Minimis\" Test Is Also Impermissibly Vague\nII. Nevertheless, Appellants' First Amendment-Based Approach Has Some Advantages Over The Symmetry-Based Test Urged In Gill\nA. Appellants' Test Does Not Rest Upon An Unprecedented Statewide Standing Theory\nB. Appellants' Test Does Not Require Constitutionalizing The \"Partisan Symmetry\" Concept\nC. Appellants' Test Avoids A Statewide \"Hypothetical State Of Affairs\" Inquiry\nD. Appellants' Test Is Not Systematically Biased In Favor Of One Political Party",
        "reference": "I. The Tests Proposed In This Case And In Gill Are Not \"Limited And Precise\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tests Proposed In This Case And In Gill Are Not \"Limited And Precise\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Appellants' \"More Than De Minimis\" Test Is Also Impermissibly Vague\nII. Nevertheless, Appellants' First Amendment-Based Approach Has Some Advantages Over The Symmetry-Based Test Urged In Gill\nA. Appellants' Test Does Not Rest Upon An Unprecedented Statewide Standing Theory\nB. Appellants' Test Does Not Require Constitutionalizing The \"Partisan Symmetry\" Concept\nC. Appellants' Test Avoids A Statewide \"Hypothetical State Of Affairs\" Inquiry\nD. Appellants' Test Is Not Systematically Biased In Favor Of One Political Party",
        "reference": "A. The Gill Test Is So Uncertain That Even Its Proponents Cannot Agree On How It Should Apply To Maryland's Map",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tests Proposed In This Case And In Gill Are Not \"Limited And Precise\"\nA. The Gill Test Is So Uncertain That Even Its Proponents Cannot Agree On How It Should Apply To Maryland's Map\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Nevertheless, Appellants' First Amendment-Based Approach Has Some Advantages Over The Symmetry-Based Test Urged In Gill\nA. Appellants' Test Does Not Rest Upon An Unprecedented Statewide Standing Theory\nB. Appellants' Test Does Not Require Constitutionalizing The \"Partisan Symmetry\" Concept\nC. Appellants' Test Avoids A Statewide \"Hypothetical State Of Affairs\" Inquiry\nD. Appellants' Test Is Not Systematically Biased In Favor Of One Political Party",
        "reference": "B. Appellants' \"More Than De Minimis\" Test Is Also Impermissibly Vague",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tests Proposed In This Case And In Gill Are Not \"Limited And Precise\"\nA. The Gill Test Is So Uncertain That Even Its Proponents Cannot Agree On How It Should Apply To Maryland's Map\nB. Appellants' \"More Than De Minimis\" Test Is Also Impermissibly Vague\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Appellants' Test Does Not Rest Upon An Unprecedented Statewide Standing Theory\nB. Appellants' Test Does Not Require Constitutionalizing The \"Partisan Symmetry\" Concept\nC. Appellants' Test Avoids A Statewide \"Hypothetical State Of Affairs\" Inquiry\nD. Appellants' Test Is Not Systematically Biased In Favor Of One Political Party",
        "reference": "II. Nevertheless, Appellants' First Amendment-Based Approach Has Some Advantages Over The Symmetry-Based Test Urged In Gill",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tests Proposed In This Case And In Gill Are Not \"Limited And Precise\"\nA. The Gill Test Is So Uncertain That Even Its Proponents Cannot Agree On How It Should Apply To Maryland's Map\nB. Appellants' \"More Than De Minimis\" Test Is Also Impermissibly Vague\nII. Nevertheless, Appellants' First Amendment-Based Approach Has Some Advantages Over The Symmetry-Based Test Urged In Gill\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Appellants' Test Does Not Require Constitutionalizing The \"Partisan Symmetry\" Concept\nC. Appellants' Test Avoids A Statewide \"Hypothetical State Of Affairs\" Inquiry\nD. Appellants' Test Is Not Systematically Biased In Favor Of One Political Party",
        "reference": "A. Appellants' Test Does Not Rest Upon An Unprecedented Statewide Standing Theory",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tests Proposed In This Case And In Gill Are Not \"Limited And Precise\"\nA. The Gill Test Is So Uncertain That Even Its Proponents Cannot Agree On How It Should Apply To Maryland's Map\nB. Appellants' \"More Than De Minimis\" Test Is Also Impermissibly Vague\nII. Nevertheless, Appellants' First Amendment-Based Approach Has Some Advantages Over The Symmetry-Based Test Urged In Gill\nA. Appellants' Test Does Not Rest Upon An Unprecedented Statewide Standing Theory\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Appellants' Test Avoids A Statewide \"Hypothetical State Of Affairs\" Inquiry\nD. Appellants' Test Is Not Systematically Biased In Favor Of One Political Party",
        "reference": "B. Appellants' Test Does Not Require Constitutionalizing The \"Partisan Symmetry\" Concept",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tests Proposed In This Case And In Gill Are Not \"Limited And Precise\"\nA. The Gill Test Is So Uncertain That Even Its Proponents Cannot Agree On How It Should Apply To Maryland's Map\nB. Appellants' \"More Than De Minimis\" Test Is Also Impermissibly Vague\nII. Nevertheless, Appellants' First Amendment-Based Approach Has Some Advantages Over The Symmetry-Based Test Urged In Gill\nA. Appellants' Test Does Not Rest Upon An Unprecedented Statewide Standing Theory\nB. Appellants' Test Does Not Require Constitutionalizing The \"Partisan Symmetry\" Concept\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Appellants' Test Is Not Systematically Biased In Favor Of One Political Party",
        "reference": "C. Appellants' Test Avoids A Statewide \"Hypothetical State Of Affairs\" Inquiry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tests Proposed In This Case And In Gill Are Not \"Limited And Precise\"\nA. The Gill Test Is So Uncertain That Even Its Proponents Cannot Agree On How It Should Apply To Maryland's Map\nB. Appellants' \"More Than De Minimis\" Test Is Also Impermissibly Vague\nII. Nevertheless, Appellants' First Amendment-Based Approach Has Some Advantages Over The Symmetry-Based Test Urged In Gill\nA. Appellants' Test Does Not Rest Upon An Unprecedented Statewide Standing Theory\nB. Appellants' Test Does Not Require Constitutionalizing The \"Partisan Symmetry\" Concept\nC. Appellants' Test Avoids A Statewide \"Hypothetical State Of Affairs\" Inquiry\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Appellants' Test Is Not Systematically Biased In Favor Of One Political Party",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Exhaustion Is Unnecessary When The Plaintiff Seeks Only Money Damages\nB. Sturgis's Policy Arguments Fail\nII. CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES DO NOT NEED TO REJECT SETTLEMENTS TO PRESERVE NON-IDEA CLAIMS\nA. Settlement Counts As Exhaustion Under The IDEA\nB. Miguel's IDEA Settlement Rendered Further Exhaustion Futile\n1. Section 1415(l) Incorporates The IDEA's Preexisting Futility Exception\n2. Settlement Triggers The Futility Exception\nC. Sturgis's Rule Would Undermine The Speedy Provision Of FAPE Relief And Nullify Victim Rights Under Non-IDEA Statutes",
        "reference": "I. SECTION 1415(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION IF THE PLAINTIFF IS \"SEEKING\" ONLY NON-IDEA \"RELIEF\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1415(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION IF THE PLAINTIFF IS \"SEEKING\" ONLY NON-IDEA \"RELIEF\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Sturgis's Policy Arguments Fail\nII. CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES DO NOT NEED TO REJECT SETTLEMENTS TO PRESERVE NON-IDEA CLAIMS\nA. Settlement Counts As Exhaustion Under The IDEA\nB. Miguel's IDEA Settlement Rendered Further Exhaustion Futile\n1. Section 1415(l) Incorporates The IDEA's Preexisting Futility Exception\n2. Settlement Triggers The Futility Exception\nC. Sturgis's Rule Would Undermine The Speedy Provision Of FAPE Relief And Nullify Victim Rights Under Non-IDEA Statutes",
        "reference": "A. Exhaustion Is Unnecessary When The Plaintiff Seeks Only Money Damages",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1415(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION IF THE PLAINTIFF IS \"SEEKING\" ONLY NON-IDEA \"RELIEF\"\nA. Exhaustion Is Unnecessary When The Plaintiff Seeks Only Money Damages\nB. [MISSING]\nII. CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES DO NOT NEED TO REJECT SETTLEMENTS TO PRESERVE NON-IDEA CLAIMS\nA. Settlement Counts As Exhaustion Under The IDEA\nB. Miguel's IDEA Settlement Rendered Further Exhaustion Futile\n1. Section 1415(l) Incorporates The IDEA's Preexisting Futility Exception\n2. Settlement Triggers The Futility Exception\nC. Sturgis's Rule Would Undermine The Speedy Provision Of FAPE Relief And Nullify Victim Rights Under Non-IDEA Statutes",
        "reference": "B. Sturgis's Policy Arguments Fail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1415(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION IF THE PLAINTIFF IS \"SEEKING\" ONLY NON-IDEA \"RELIEF\"\nA. Exhaustion Is Unnecessary When The Plaintiff Seeks Only Money Damages\nB. Sturgis's Policy Arguments Fail\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Settlement Counts As Exhaustion Under The IDEA\nB. Miguel's IDEA Settlement Rendered Further Exhaustion Futile\n1. Section 1415(l) Incorporates The IDEA's Preexisting Futility Exception\n2. Settlement Triggers The Futility Exception\nC. Sturgis's Rule Would Undermine The Speedy Provision Of FAPE Relief And Nullify Victim Rights Under Non-IDEA Statutes",
        "reference": "II. CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES DO NOT NEED TO REJECT SETTLEMENTS TO PRESERVE NON-IDEA CLAIMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1415(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION IF THE PLAINTIFF IS \"SEEKING\" ONLY NON-IDEA \"RELIEF\"\nA. Exhaustion Is Unnecessary When The Plaintiff Seeks Only Money Damages\nB. Sturgis's Policy Arguments Fail\nII. CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES DO NOT NEED TO REJECT SETTLEMENTS TO PRESERVE NON-IDEA CLAIMS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Miguel's IDEA Settlement Rendered Further Exhaustion Futile\n1. Section 1415(l) Incorporates The IDEA's Preexisting Futility Exception\n2. Settlement Triggers The Futility Exception\nC. Sturgis's Rule Would Undermine The Speedy Provision Of FAPE Relief And Nullify Victim Rights Under Non-IDEA Statutes",
        "reference": "A. Settlement Counts As Exhaustion Under The IDEA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1415(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION IF THE PLAINTIFF IS \"SEEKING\" ONLY NON-IDEA \"RELIEF\"\nA. Exhaustion Is Unnecessary When The Plaintiff Seeks Only Money Damages\nB. Sturgis's Policy Arguments Fail\nII. CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES DO NOT NEED TO REJECT SETTLEMENTS TO PRESERVE NON-IDEA CLAIMS\nA. Settlement Counts As Exhaustion Under The IDEA\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Section 1415(l) Incorporates The IDEA's Preexisting Futility Exception\n2. Settlement Triggers The Futility Exception\nC. Sturgis's Rule Would Undermine The Speedy Provision Of FAPE Relief And Nullify Victim Rights Under Non-IDEA Statutes",
        "reference": "B. Miguel's IDEA Settlement Rendered Further Exhaustion Futile",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1415(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION IF THE PLAINTIFF IS \"SEEKING\" ONLY NON-IDEA \"RELIEF\"\nA. Exhaustion Is Unnecessary When The Plaintiff Seeks Only Money Damages\nB. Sturgis's Policy Arguments Fail\nII. CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES DO NOT NEED TO REJECT SETTLEMENTS TO PRESERVE NON-IDEA CLAIMS\nA. Settlement Counts As Exhaustion Under The IDEA\nB. Miguel's IDEA Settlement Rendered Further Exhaustion Futile\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Settlement Triggers The Futility Exception\nC. Sturgis's Rule Would Undermine The Speedy Provision Of FAPE Relief And Nullify Victim Rights Under Non-IDEA Statutes",
        "reference": "1. Section 1415(l) Incorporates The IDEA's Preexisting Futility Exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1415(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION IF THE PLAINTIFF IS \"SEEKING\" ONLY NON-IDEA \"RELIEF\"\nA. Exhaustion Is Unnecessary When The Plaintiff Seeks Only Money Damages\nB. Sturgis's Policy Arguments Fail\nII. CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES DO NOT NEED TO REJECT SETTLEMENTS TO PRESERVE NON-IDEA CLAIMS\nA. Settlement Counts As Exhaustion Under The IDEA\nB. Miguel's IDEA Settlement Rendered Further Exhaustion Futile\n1. Section 1415(l) Incorporates The IDEA's Preexisting Futility Exception\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Sturgis's Rule Would Undermine The Speedy Provision Of FAPE Relief And Nullify Victim Rights Under Non-IDEA Statutes",
        "reference": "2. Settlement Triggers The Futility Exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1415(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION IF THE PLAINTIFF IS \"SEEKING\" ONLY NON-IDEA \"RELIEF\"\nA. Exhaustion Is Unnecessary When The Plaintiff Seeks Only Money Damages\nB. Sturgis's Policy Arguments Fail\nII. CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES DO NOT NEED TO REJECT SETTLEMENTS TO PRESERVE NON-IDEA CLAIMS\nA. Settlement Counts As Exhaustion Under The IDEA\nB. Miguel's IDEA Settlement Rendered Further Exhaustion Futile\n1. Section 1415(l) Incorporates The IDEA's Preexisting Futility Exception\n2. Settlement Triggers The Futility Exception\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Sturgis's Rule Would Undermine The Speedy Provision Of FAPE Relief And Nullify Victim Rights Under Non-IDEA Statutes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander\nB. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Are Race-Neutral and Satisfy Alabama's Redistricting Criteria\nC. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Include Two Opportunity Districts\nII. Constitutional Avoidance Favors Remand for Consideration of the Plaintiffs' Racial Gerrymandering Claim\nIII. The Appellants' Fundamental Premise \u2014 That the 2021 Plan Is Race-Neutral \u2014 Is Incorrect",
        "reference": "I. Alabama's Legislature Rejected a Race-Neutral Plan in Favor of a Racial Gerrymander",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Alabama's Legislature Rejected a Race-Neutral Plan in Favor of a Racial Gerrymander\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Are Race-Neutral and Satisfy Alabama's Redistricting Criteria\nC. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Include Two Opportunity Districts\nII. Constitutional Avoidance Favors Remand for Consideration of the Plaintiffs' Racial Gerrymandering Claim\nIII. The Appellants' Fundamental Premise \u2014 That the 2021 Plan Is Race-Neutral \u2014 Is Incorrect",
        "reference": "A. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Alabama's Legislature Rejected a Race-Neutral Plan in Favor of a Racial Gerrymander\nA. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Include Two Opportunity Districts\nII. Constitutional Avoidance Favors Remand for Consideration of the Plaintiffs' Racial Gerrymandering Claim\nIII. The Appellants' Fundamental Premise \u2014 That the 2021 Plan Is Race-Neutral \u2014 Is Incorrect",
        "reference": "B. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Are Race-Neutral and Satisfy Alabama's Redistricting Criteria",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Alabama's Legislature Rejected a Race-Neutral Plan in Favor of a Racial Gerrymander\nA. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander\nB. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Are Race-Neutral and Satisfy Alabama's Redistricting Criteria\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Constitutional Avoidance Favors Remand for Consideration of the Plaintiffs' Racial Gerrymandering Claim\nIII. The Appellants' Fundamental Premise \u2014 That the 2021 Plan Is Race-Neutral \u2014 Is Incorrect",
        "reference": "C. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Include Two Opportunity Districts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Alabama's Legislature Rejected a Race-Neutral Plan in Favor of a Racial Gerrymander\nA. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander\nB. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Are Race-Neutral and Satisfy Alabama's Redistricting Criteria\nC. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Include Two Opportunity Districts\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Appellants' Fundamental Premise \u2014 That the 2021 Plan Is Race-Neutral \u2014 Is Incorrect",
        "reference": "II. Constitutional Avoidance Favors Remand for Consideration of the Plaintiffs' Racial Gerrymandering Claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Alabama's Legislature Rejected a Race-Neutral Plan in Favor of a Racial Gerrymander\nA. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander\nB. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Are Race-Neutral and Satisfy Alabama's Redistricting Criteria\nC. The Whole County Plan and Its Alternatives Include Two Opportunity Districts\nII. Constitutional Avoidance Favors Remand for Consideration of the Plaintiffs' Racial Gerrymandering Claim\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Appellants' Fundamental Premise \u2014 That the 2021 Plan Is Race-Neutral \u2014 Is Incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Extraterritoriality Principle Preserves State Sovereignty.\nIII. The Extraterritoriality Principle Preserves Both a National Economy and Our Federalist System of Government.\nIV. Other Constitutional Doctrines Reinforce the Importance of the Extraterritoriality Principle to Preserving State Sovereignty and Federalism.",
        "reference": "I. The Extraterritoriality Principle's Central Concern Is Direct Regulation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Extraterritoriality Principle's Central Concern Is Direct Regulation.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Extraterritoriality Principle Preserves Both a National Economy and Our Federalist System of Government.\nIV. Other Constitutional Doctrines Reinforce the Importance of the Extraterritoriality Principle to Preserving State Sovereignty and Federalism.",
        "reference": "II. The Extraterritoriality Principle Preserves State Sovereignty.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Extraterritoriality Principle's Central Concern Is Direct Regulation.\nII. The Extraterritoriality Principle Preserves State Sovereignty.\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Other Constitutional Doctrines Reinforce the Importance of the Extraterritoriality Principle to Preserving State Sovereignty and Federalism.",
        "reference": "III. The Extraterritoriality Principle Preserves Both a National Economy and Our Federalist System of Government.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Extraterritoriality Principle's Central Concern Is Direct Regulation.\nII. The Extraterritoriality Principle Preserves State Sovereignty.\nIII. The Extraterritoriality Principle Preserves Both a National Economy and Our Federalist System of Government.\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Other Constitutional Doctrines Reinforce the Importance of the Extraterritoriality Principle to Preserving State Sovereignty and Federalism.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Strict Scrutiny Is Required to Prevent the Government from Favoring Speech That Benefits Its Own Interests\nB. The Government-Debt Exception to the TCPA's Automated Call Ban Favors Speech That Benefits the Government Based on Content\nII. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION DOES NOT SATISFY STRICT FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY\nA. There Is No Compelling Government Interest for the Government-Debt Exemption\nB. Elevating Private Speech That Aids Government Policy Goals While Restricting All Other Speech Is Not Narrowly Tailored",
        "reference": "I. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION TO THE TCPA'S AUTOMATED CALL BAN IS CONTENT-BASED UNDER ANY \"COMMONSENSE MEANING\" OF THE TERM",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION TO THE TCPA'S AUTOMATED CALL BAN IS CONTENT-BASED UNDER ANY \"COMMONSENSE MEANING\" OF THE TERM\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Government-Debt Exception to the TCPA's Automated Call Ban Favors Speech That Benefits the Government Based on Content\nII. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION DOES NOT SATISFY STRICT FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY\nA. There Is No Compelling Government Interest for the Government-Debt Exemption\nB. Elevating Private Speech That Aids Government Policy Goals While Restricting All Other Speech Is Not Narrowly Tailored",
        "reference": "A. Strict Scrutiny Is Required to Prevent the Government from Favoring Speech That Benefits Its Own Interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION TO THE TCPA'S AUTOMATED CALL BAN IS CONTENT-BASED UNDER ANY \"COMMONSENSE MEANING\" OF THE TERM\nA. Strict Scrutiny Is Required to Prevent the Government from Favoring Speech That Benefits Its Own Interests\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION DOES NOT SATISFY STRICT FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY\nA. There Is No Compelling Government Interest for the Government-Debt Exemption\nB. Elevating Private Speech That Aids Government Policy Goals While Restricting All Other Speech Is Not Narrowly Tailored",
        "reference": "B. The Government-Debt Exception to the TCPA's Automated Call Ban Favors Speech That Benefits the Government Based on Content",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION TO THE TCPA'S AUTOMATED CALL BAN IS CONTENT-BASED UNDER ANY \"COMMONSENSE MEANING\" OF THE TERM\nA. Strict Scrutiny Is Required to Prevent the Government from Favoring Speech That Benefits Its Own Interests\nB. The Government-Debt Exception to the TCPA's Automated Call Ban Favors Speech That Benefits the Government Based on Content\nII. [MISSING]\nA. There Is No Compelling Government Interest for the Government-Debt Exemption\nB. Elevating Private Speech That Aids Government Policy Goals While Restricting All Other Speech Is Not Narrowly Tailored",
        "reference": "II. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION DOES NOT SATISFY STRICT FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION TO THE TCPA'S AUTOMATED CALL BAN IS CONTENT-BASED UNDER ANY \"COMMONSENSE MEANING\" OF THE TERM\nA. Strict Scrutiny Is Required to Prevent the Government from Favoring Speech That Benefits Its Own Interests\nB. The Government-Debt Exception to the TCPA's Automated Call Ban Favors Speech That Benefits the Government Based on Content\nII. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION DOES NOT SATISFY STRICT FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Elevating Private Speech That Aids Government Policy Goals While Restricting All Other Speech Is Not Narrowly Tailored",
        "reference": "A. There Is No Compelling Government Interest for the Government-Debt Exemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION TO THE TCPA'S AUTOMATED CALL BAN IS CONTENT-BASED UNDER ANY \"COMMONSENSE MEANING\" OF THE TERM\nA. Strict Scrutiny Is Required to Prevent the Government from Favoring Speech That Benefits Its Own Interests\nB. The Government-Debt Exception to the TCPA's Automated Call Ban Favors Speech That Benefits the Government Based on Content\nII. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION DOES NOT SATISFY STRICT FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY\nA. There Is No Compelling Government Interest for the Government-Debt Exemption\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Elevating Private Speech That Aids Government Policy Goals While Restricting All Other Speech Is Not Narrowly Tailored",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW\nA. Copyright is Created through Fixation in a Tangible Medium, Not Copyright Office Grant\nB. The Procedural Barriers to Patent Protection are Higher than Copyright\nC. The Copyright Office's Opinion on Registrability is Not Binding on Courts\nIII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS' ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS\nA. The Application Approach Ensures that Authors May Seek the Injunctive Relief that is Critical to Copyright Litigation\nB. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations\nC. The Application Approach Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing of Infringement Claims that Occurs Under the Certificate Approach\nIV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES WORKS",
        "reference": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Copyright is Created through Fixation in a Tangible Medium, Not Copyright Office Grant\nB. The Procedural Barriers to Patent Protection are Higher than Copyright\nC. The Copyright Office's Opinion on Registrability is Not Binding on Courts\nIII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS' ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS\nA. The Application Approach Ensures that Authors May Seek the Injunctive Relief that is Critical to Copyright Litigation\nB. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations\nC. The Application Approach Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing of Infringement Claims that Occurs Under the Certificate Approach\nIV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES WORKS",
        "reference": "II. THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT\nII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Procedural Barriers to Patent Protection are Higher than Copyright\nC. The Copyright Office's Opinion on Registrability is Not Binding on Courts\nIII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS' ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS\nA. The Application Approach Ensures that Authors May Seek the Injunctive Relief that is Critical to Copyright Litigation\nB. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations\nC. The Application Approach Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing of Infringement Claims that Occurs Under the Certificate Approach\nIV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES WORKS",
        "reference": "A. Copyright is Created through Fixation in a Tangible Medium, Not Copyright Office Grant",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT\nII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW\nA. Copyright is Created through Fixation in a Tangible Medium, Not Copyright Office Grant\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Copyright Office's Opinion on Registrability is Not Binding on Courts\nIII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS' ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS\nA. The Application Approach Ensures that Authors May Seek the Injunctive Relief that is Critical to Copyright Litigation\nB. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations\nC. The Application Approach Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing of Infringement Claims that Occurs Under the Certificate Approach\nIV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES WORKS",
        "reference": "B. The Procedural Barriers to Patent Protection are Higher than Copyright",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT\nII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW\nA. Copyright is Created through Fixation in a Tangible Medium, Not Copyright Office Grant\nB. The Procedural Barriers to Patent Protection are Higher than Copyright\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS' ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS\nA. The Application Approach Ensures that Authors May Seek the Injunctive Relief that is Critical to Copyright Litigation\nB. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations\nC. The Application Approach Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing of Infringement Claims that Occurs Under the Certificate Approach\nIV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES WORKS",
        "reference": "C. The Copyright Office's Opinion on Registrability is Not Binding on Courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT\nII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW\nA. Copyright is Created through Fixation in a Tangible Medium, Not Copyright Office Grant\nB. The Procedural Barriers to Patent Protection are Higher than Copyright\nC. The Copyright Office's Opinion on Registrability is Not Binding on Courts\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Application Approach Ensures that Authors May Seek the Injunctive Relief that is Critical to Copyright Litigation\nB. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations\nC. The Application Approach Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing of Infringement Claims that Occurs Under the Certificate Approach\nIV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES WORKS",
        "reference": "III. THE APPLICATION APPROACH SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS' ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT\nII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW\nA. Copyright is Created through Fixation in a Tangible Medium, Not Copyright Office Grant\nB. The Procedural Barriers to Patent Protection are Higher than Copyright\nC. The Copyright Office's Opinion on Registrability is Not Binding on Courts\nIII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS' ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations\nC. The Application Approach Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing of Infringement Claims that Occurs Under the Certificate Approach\nIV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES WORKS",
        "reference": "A. The Application Approach Ensures that Authors May Seek the Injunctive Relief that is Critical to Copyright Litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT\nII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW\nA. Copyright is Created through Fixation in a Tangible Medium, Not Copyright Office Grant\nB. The Procedural Barriers to Patent Protection are Higher than Copyright\nC. The Copyright Office's Opinion on Registrability is Not Binding on Courts\nIII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS' ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS\nA. The Application Approach Ensures that Authors May Seek the Injunctive Relief that is Critical to Copyright Litigation\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Application Approach Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing of Infringement Claims that Occurs Under the Certificate Approach\nIV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES WORKS",
        "reference": "B. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT\nII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW\nA. Copyright is Created through Fixation in a Tangible Medium, Not Copyright Office Grant\nB. The Procedural Barriers to Patent Protection are Higher than Copyright\nC. The Copyright Office's Opinion on Registrability is Not Binding on Courts\nIII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS' ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS\nA. The Application Approach Ensures that Authors May Seek the Injunctive Relief that is Critical to Copyright Litigation\nB. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations\nC. [MISSING]\nIV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES WORKS",
        "reference": "C. The Application Approach Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing of Infringement Claims that Occurs Under the Certificate Approach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPLICATION APPROACH IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT\nII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH BETTER REFLECTS THE UNIQUE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF COPYRIGHT LAW AS OPPOSED TO PATENT LAW\nA. Copyright is Created through Fixation in a Tangible Medium, Not Copyright Office Grant\nB. The Procedural Barriers to Patent Protection are Higher than Copyright\nC. The Copyright Office's Opinion on Registrability is Not Binding on Courts\nIII. THE APPLICATION APPROACH SAFEGUARDS AUTHORS' ABILITIES TO EFFECTIVELY RESOLVE INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS\nA. The Application Approach Ensures that Authors May Seek the Injunctive Relief that is Critical to Copyright Litigation\nB. The Application Approach Better Accounts for Copyright Infringement's Short Statute of Limitations\nC. The Application Approach Eliminates the Wasteful Re-Filing of Infringement Claims that Occurs Under the Certificate Approach\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. THE APPLICATION APPROACH MINIMIZES PREJUDICE TO AUTHORS OF UNITED STATES WORKS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Congress Has Accorded Copyright Protection to Functional Works Since 1790\nIII. If a Work Becomes a Standard Form of Expression, Copyright Law Does Not Deny Protection Via Copyrightability or a Fair Use Defense",
        "reference": "I. Nothing Has Changed Since CONTU Addressed Many of the Issues Before This Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. Nothing Has Changed Since CONTU Addressed Many of the Issues Before This Court\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. If a Work Becomes a Standard Form of Expression, Copyright Law Does Not Deny Protection Via Copyrightability or a Fair Use Defense",
        "reference": "II. Congress Has Accorded Copyright Protection to Functional Works Since 1790",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. Nothing Has Changed Since CONTU Addressed Many of the Issues Before This Court\nII. Congress Has Accorded Copyright Protection to Functional Works Since 1790\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. If a Work Becomes a Standard Form of Expression, Copyright Law Does Not Deny Protection Via Copyrightability or a Fair Use Defense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances\nB. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant\nC. This Court should not create a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception to its case-by-case exigency inquiry\nD. Hayden and Santana do not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would violate the common-law protections the Fourth Amendment was adopted to preserve\nIII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would unjustifiably impose severe burdens on core Fourth Amendment rights\nA. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests\nB. A categorical exception is not needed for effective policing\nC. A categorical exception would impose severe Fourth Amendment harms",
        "reference": "I. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would contradict this Court's precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would contradict this Court's precedents\nA. [MISSING]\nB. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant\nC. This Court should not create a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception to its case-by-case exigency inquiry\nD. Hayden and Santana do not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would violate the common-law protections the Fourth Amendment was adopted to preserve\nIII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would unjustifiably impose severe burdens on core Fourth Amendment rights\nA. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests\nB. A categorical exception is not needed for effective policing\nC. A categorical exception would impose severe Fourth Amendment harms",
        "reference": "A. The Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would contradict this Court's precedents\nA. The Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Court should not create a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception to its case-by-case exigency inquiry\nD. Hayden and Santana do not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would violate the common-law protections the Fourth Amendment was adopted to preserve\nIII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would unjustifiably impose severe burdens on core Fourth Amendment rights\nA. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests\nB. A categorical exception is not needed for effective policing\nC. A categorical exception would impose severe Fourth Amendment harms",
        "reference": "B. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would contradict this Court's precedents\nA. The Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances\nB. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Hayden and Santana do not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would violate the common-law protections the Fourth Amendment was adopted to preserve\nIII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would unjustifiably impose severe burdens on core Fourth Amendment rights\nA. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests\nB. A categorical exception is not needed for effective policing\nC. A categorical exception would impose severe Fourth Amendment harms",
        "reference": "C. This Court should not create a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception to its case-by-case exigency inquiry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would contradict this Court's precedents\nA. The Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances\nB. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant\nC. This Court should not create a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception to its case-by-case exigency inquiry\nD. [MISSING]\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would violate the common-law protections the Fourth Amendment was adopted to preserve\nIII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would unjustifiably impose severe burdens on core Fourth Amendment rights\nA. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests\nB. A categorical exception is not needed for effective policing\nC. A categorical exception would impose severe Fourth Amendment harms",
        "reference": "D. Hayden and Santana do not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would contradict this Court's precedents\nA. The Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances\nB. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant\nC. This Court should not create a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception to its case-by-case exigency inquiry\nD. Hayden and Santana do not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would unjustifiably impose severe burdens on core Fourth Amendment rights\nA. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests\nB. A categorical exception is not needed for effective policing\nC. A categorical exception would impose severe Fourth Amendment harms",
        "reference": "II. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would violate the common-law protections the Fourth Amendment was adopted to preserve",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would contradict this Court's precedents\nA. The Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances\nB. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant\nC. This Court should not create a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception to its case-by-case exigency inquiry\nD. Hayden and Santana do not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would violate the common-law protections the Fourth Amendment was adopted to preserve\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests\nB. A categorical exception is not needed for effective policing\nC. A categorical exception would impose severe Fourth Amendment harms",
        "reference": "III. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would unjustifiably impose severe burdens on core Fourth Amendment rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would contradict this Court's precedents\nA. The Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances\nB. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant\nC. This Court should not create a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception to its case-by-case exigency inquiry\nD. Hayden and Santana do not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would violate the common-law protections the Fourth Amendment was adopted to preserve\nIII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would unjustifiably impose severe burdens on core Fourth Amendment rights\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A categorical exception is not needed for effective policing\nC. A categorical exception would impose severe Fourth Amendment harms",
        "reference": "A. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would contradict this Court's precedents\nA. The Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances\nB. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant\nC. This Court should not create a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception to its case-by-case exigency inquiry\nD. Hayden and Santana do not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would violate the common-law protections the Fourth Amendment was adopted to preserve\nIII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would unjustifiably impose severe burdens on core Fourth Amendment rights\nA. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A categorical exception would impose severe Fourth Amendment harms",
        "reference": "B. A categorical exception is not needed for effective policing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would contradict this Court's precedents\nA. The Fourth Amendment forbids warrantless home entries absent consent or exigent circumstances\nB. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant\nC. This Court should not create a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception to its case-by-case exigency inquiry\nD. Hayden and Santana do not support a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception\nII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would violate the common-law protections the Fourth Amendment was adopted to preserve\nIII. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception would unjustifiably impose severe burdens on core Fourth Amendment rights\nA. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests\nB. A categorical exception is not needed for effective policing\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. A categorical exception would impose severe Fourth Amendment harms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. SECTION 145 DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES\nA. The American Rule Governs Absent \"Clear\" and \"Explicit\" Congressional Intent to Deviate From It\nB. No Reading of \"All the Expenses of the Proceeding\" Supports Shifting of Attorneys' Fees\nC. The Mandatory Nature of Section 145 Weighs Against the PTO's Interpretation of the Statute\nD. The PTO's Funding and Historical Interpretation of Section 145 Evidence a Lack of Explicit Congressional Authorization of Fee-Shifting\nE. The Fourth Circuit Erred in its Shammas Decision",
        "reference": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The American Rule Governs Absent \"Clear\" and \"Explicit\" Congressional Intent to Deviate From It\nB. No Reading of \"All the Expenses of the Proceeding\" Supports Shifting of Attorneys' Fees\nC. The Mandatory Nature of Section 145 Weighs Against the PTO's Interpretation of the Statute\nD. The PTO's Funding and Historical Interpretation of Section 145 Evidence a Lack of Explicit Congressional Authorization of Fee-Shifting\nE. The Fourth Circuit Erred in its Shammas Decision",
        "reference": "II. SECTION 145 DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS\nII. SECTION 145 DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. No Reading of \"All the Expenses of the Proceeding\" Supports Shifting of Attorneys' Fees\nC. The Mandatory Nature of Section 145 Weighs Against the PTO's Interpretation of the Statute\nD. The PTO's Funding and Historical Interpretation of Section 145 Evidence a Lack of Explicit Congressional Authorization of Fee-Shifting\nE. The Fourth Circuit Erred in its Shammas Decision",
        "reference": "A. The American Rule Governs Absent \"Clear\" and \"Explicit\" Congressional Intent to Deviate From It",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS\nII. SECTION 145 DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES\nA. The American Rule Governs Absent \"Clear\" and \"Explicit\" Congressional Intent to Deviate From It\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Mandatory Nature of Section 145 Weighs Against the PTO's Interpretation of the Statute\nD. The PTO's Funding and Historical Interpretation of Section 145 Evidence a Lack of Explicit Congressional Authorization of Fee-Shifting\nE. The Fourth Circuit Erred in its Shammas Decision",
        "reference": "B. No Reading of \"All the Expenses of the Proceeding\" Supports Shifting of Attorneys' Fees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS\nII. SECTION 145 DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES\nA. The American Rule Governs Absent \"Clear\" and \"Explicit\" Congressional Intent to Deviate From It\nB. No Reading of \"All the Expenses of the Proceeding\" Supports Shifting of Attorneys' Fees\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The PTO's Funding and Historical Interpretation of Section 145 Evidence a Lack of Explicit Congressional Authorization of Fee-Shifting\nE. The Fourth Circuit Erred in its Shammas Decision",
        "reference": "C. The Mandatory Nature of Section 145 Weighs Against the PTO's Interpretation of the Statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS\nII. SECTION 145 DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES\nA. The American Rule Governs Absent \"Clear\" and \"Explicit\" Congressional Intent to Deviate From It\nB. No Reading of \"All the Expenses of the Proceeding\" Supports Shifting of Attorneys' Fees\nC. The Mandatory Nature of Section 145 Weighs Against the PTO's Interpretation of the Statute\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Fourth Circuit Erred in its Shammas Decision",
        "reference": "D. The PTO's Funding and Historical Interpretation of Section 145 Evidence a Lack of Explicit Congressional Authorization of Fee-Shifting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS\nII. SECTION 145 DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES\nA. The American Rule Governs Absent \"Clear\" and \"Explicit\" Congressional Intent to Deviate From It\nB. No Reading of \"All the Expenses of the Proceeding\" Supports Shifting of Attorneys' Fees\nC. The Mandatory Nature of Section 145 Weighs Against the PTO's Interpretation of the Statute\nD. The PTO's Funding and Historical Interpretation of Section 145 Evidence a Lack of Explicit Congressional Authorization of Fee-Shifting\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. The Fourth Circuit Erred in its Shammas Decision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF THE HEROES ACT VIOLATES ART. I OF THE CONSTITUTION\nA. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Vesting Clause\nB. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Appropriations Clause\nIII. PETITIONERS' EXTENSION OF THE PAYMENT-AND-INTEREST PAUSE REINFORCES THE ILLEGALITY OF THEIR RELIANCE ON THE HEROES ACT IN THIS CASE\nA. Petitioners Misrepresent the HEROES Act's Role in the Payment-and-Interest Pause\nB. Extensions of the Payment-and-Interest Pause also Trample the Vesting and Appropriations Clauses",
        "reference": "I. STATES HAVE STANDING BECAUSE THE LOAN CANCELLATION PROGRAM INJURES THEM IN THEIR CAPACITY AS PSLF EMPLOYERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATES HAVE STANDING BECAUSE THE LOAN CANCELLATION PROGRAM INJURES THEM IN THEIR CAPACITY AS PSLF EMPLOYERS\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Vesting Clause\nB. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Appropriations Clause\nIII. PETITIONERS' EXTENSION OF THE PAYMENT-AND-INTEREST PAUSE REINFORCES THE ILLEGALITY OF THEIR RELIANCE ON THE HEROES ACT IN THIS CASE\nA. Petitioners Misrepresent the HEROES Act's Role in the Payment-and-Interest Pause\nB. Extensions of the Payment-and-Interest Pause also Trample the Vesting and Appropriations Clauses",
        "reference": "II. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF THE HEROES ACT VIOLATES ART. I OF THE CONSTITUTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATES HAVE STANDING BECAUSE THE LOAN CANCELLATION PROGRAM INJURES THEM IN THEIR CAPACITY AS PSLF EMPLOYERS\nII. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF THE HEROES ACT VIOLATES ART. I OF THE CONSTITUTION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Appropriations Clause\nIII. PETITIONERS' EXTENSION OF THE PAYMENT-AND-INTEREST PAUSE REINFORCES THE ILLEGALITY OF THEIR RELIANCE ON THE HEROES ACT IN THIS CASE\nA. Petitioners Misrepresent the HEROES Act's Role in the Payment-and-Interest Pause\nB. Extensions of the Payment-and-Interest Pause also Trample the Vesting and Appropriations Clauses",
        "reference": "A. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Vesting Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATES HAVE STANDING BECAUSE THE LOAN CANCELLATION PROGRAM INJURES THEM IN THEIR CAPACITY AS PSLF EMPLOYERS\nII. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF THE HEROES ACT VIOLATES ART. I OF THE CONSTITUTION\nA. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Vesting Clause\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. PETITIONERS' EXTENSION OF THE PAYMENT-AND-INTEREST PAUSE REINFORCES THE ILLEGALITY OF THEIR RELIANCE ON THE HEROES ACT IN THIS CASE\nA. Petitioners Misrepresent the HEROES Act's Role in the Payment-and-Interest Pause\nB. Extensions of the Payment-and-Interest Pause also Trample the Vesting and Appropriations Clauses",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Appropriations Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATES HAVE STANDING BECAUSE THE LOAN CANCELLATION PROGRAM INJURES THEM IN THEIR CAPACITY AS PSLF EMPLOYERS\nII. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF THE HEROES ACT VIOLATES ART. I OF THE CONSTITUTION\nA. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Vesting Clause\nB. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Appropriations Clause\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioners Misrepresent the HEROES Act's Role in the Payment-and-Interest Pause\nB. Extensions of the Payment-and-Interest Pause also Trample the Vesting and Appropriations Clauses",
        "reference": "III. PETITIONERS' EXTENSION OF THE PAYMENT-AND-INTEREST PAUSE REINFORCES THE ILLEGALITY OF THEIR RELIANCE ON THE HEROES ACT IN THIS CASE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATES HAVE STANDING BECAUSE THE LOAN CANCELLATION PROGRAM INJURES THEM IN THEIR CAPACITY AS PSLF EMPLOYERS\nII. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF THE HEROES ACT VIOLATES ART. I OF THE CONSTITUTION\nA. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Vesting Clause\nB. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Appropriations Clause\nIII. PETITIONERS' EXTENSION OF THE PAYMENT-AND-INTEREST PAUSE REINFORCES THE ILLEGALITY OF THEIR RELIANCE ON THE HEROES ACT IN THIS CASE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Extensions of the Payment-and-Interest Pause also Trample the Vesting and Appropriations Clauses",
        "reference": "A. Petitioners Misrepresent the HEROES Act's Role in the Payment-and-Interest Pause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATES HAVE STANDING BECAUSE THE LOAN CANCELLATION PROGRAM INJURES THEM IN THEIR CAPACITY AS PSLF EMPLOYERS\nII. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF THE HEROES ACT VIOLATES ART. I OF THE CONSTITUTION\nA. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Vesting Clause\nB. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Appropriations Clause\nIII. PETITIONERS' EXTENSION OF THE PAYMENT-AND-INTEREST PAUSE REINFORCES THE ILLEGALITY OF THEIR RELIANCE ON THE HEROES ACT IN THIS CASE\nA. Petitioners Misrepresent the HEROES Act's Role in the Payment-and-Interest Pause\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Extensions of the Payment-and-Interest Pause also Trample the Vesting and Appropriations Clauses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel\nB. Consensus Among The Lower Courts Weighs In Favor Of Assignor Estoppel\nII. ABROGATING ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL WOULD UPSET SETTLED EXPECTATIONS\nIII. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL HAS BUILT-IN SAFEGUARDS\nIV. ATTACKS ON CONTINUATION PRACTICE ARE MISGUIDED",
        "reference": "I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PATENT ACT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PATENT ACT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Consensus Among The Lower Courts Weighs In Favor Of Assignor Estoppel\nII. ABROGATING ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL WOULD UPSET SETTLED EXPECTATIONS\nIII. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL HAS BUILT-IN SAFEGUARDS\nIV. ATTACKS ON CONTINUATION PRACTICE ARE MISGUIDED",
        "reference": "A. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PATENT ACT\nA. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel\nB. [MISSING]\nII. ABROGATING ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL WOULD UPSET SETTLED EXPECTATIONS\nIII. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL HAS BUILT-IN SAFEGUARDS\nIV. ATTACKS ON CONTINUATION PRACTICE ARE MISGUIDED",
        "reference": "B. Consensus Among The Lower Courts Weighs In Favor Of Assignor Estoppel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PATENT ACT\nA. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel\nB. Consensus Among The Lower Courts Weighs In Favor Of Assignor Estoppel\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL HAS BUILT-IN SAFEGUARDS\nIV. ATTACKS ON CONTINUATION PRACTICE ARE MISGUIDED",
        "reference": "II. ABROGATING ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL WOULD UPSET SETTLED EXPECTATIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PATENT ACT\nA. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel\nB. Consensus Among The Lower Courts Weighs In Favor Of Assignor Estoppel\nII. ABROGATING ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL WOULD UPSET SETTLED EXPECTATIONS\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. ATTACKS ON CONTINUATION PRACTICE ARE MISGUIDED",
        "reference": "III. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL HAS BUILT-IN SAFEGUARDS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PATENT ACT\nA. The Patent Act's Text Does Not Preclude Assignor Estoppel\nB. Consensus Among The Lower Courts Weighs In Favor Of Assignor Estoppel\nII. ABROGATING ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL WOULD UPSET SETTLED EXPECTATIONS\nIII. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL HAS BUILT-IN SAFEGUARDS\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. ATTACKS ON CONTINUATION PRACTICE ARE MISGUIDED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9467_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. White does not have a valid IQ score as a basis for a determination of intellectual disability\nB. Hall v. Florida did not invalidate the statutory score threshold\nC. Courts are not obligated to apply the Flynn Effect\nD. White has not made a prima facie showing of adaptive deficits\nE. White's DNA was legally seized",
        "reference": "I. The Supreme Court of Kentucky correctly upheld the trial court's findings regarding intellectual disability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9467_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Supreme Court of Kentucky correctly upheld the trial court's findings regarding intellectual disability\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Hall v. Florida did not invalidate the statutory score threshold\nC. Courts are not obligated to apply the Flynn Effect\nD. White has not made a prima facie showing of adaptive deficits\nE. White's DNA was legally seized",
        "reference": "A. White does not have a valid IQ score as a basis for a determination of intellectual disability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9467_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Supreme Court of Kentucky correctly upheld the trial court's findings regarding intellectual disability\nA. White does not have a valid IQ score as a basis for a determination of intellectual disability\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Courts are not obligated to apply the Flynn Effect\nD. White has not made a prima facie showing of adaptive deficits\nE. White's DNA was legally seized",
        "reference": "B. Hall v. Florida did not invalidate the statutory score threshold",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9467_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Supreme Court of Kentucky correctly upheld the trial court's findings regarding intellectual disability\nA. White does not have a valid IQ score as a basis for a determination of intellectual disability\nB. Hall v. Florida did not invalidate the statutory score threshold\nC. [MISSING]\nD. White has not made a prima facie showing of adaptive deficits\nE. White's DNA was legally seized",
        "reference": "C. Courts are not obligated to apply the Flynn Effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9467_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Supreme Court of Kentucky correctly upheld the trial court's findings regarding intellectual disability\nA. White does not have a valid IQ score as a basis for a determination of intellectual disability\nB. Hall v. Florida did not invalidate the statutory score threshold\nC. Courts are not obligated to apply the Flynn Effect\nD. [MISSING]\nE. White's DNA was legally seized",
        "reference": "D. White has not made a prima facie showing of adaptive deficits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9467_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Supreme Court of Kentucky correctly upheld the trial court's findings regarding intellectual disability\nA. White does not have a valid IQ score as a basis for a determination of intellectual disability\nB. Hall v. Florida did not invalidate the statutory score threshold\nC. Courts are not obligated to apply the Flynn Effect\nD. White has not made a prima facie showing of adaptive deficits\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. White's DNA was legally seized",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The historical development of the equity of redemption supports traditional Takings Clause protection for the totality of an owner's rights, not the introduction of a new and unique protection for surplus after failure to redeem\n1. The equity of redemption protects the totality of a mortgagor's ownership rights, not a separate right to surplus\n2. Courts did not ban \"strict foreclosure\" to protect surplus \u2014 it was abandoned by creditors' lawyers seeking clear titles and deficiency judgments\nB. With a proper understanding of the equity of redemption's relationship with surplus, the authorities cited by Petitioner and NELF establish that the totality of an owner's rights, not surplus, is the protected property interest\nII. Regardless of whether the equity of redemption constrains government mortgagees, it does not constrain Minnesota from determining the processes for and consequences of property tax collection\nA. Equitable title is not property for eminent domain purposes in Minnesota\nB. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus\nC. Subjecting tax collection in Minnesota to a requirement of repaying surplus in full would be a ruinous federal overreach",
        "reference": "I. Surplus is distinct from the equity of redemption, and it is not a unique property interest protected by the Takings Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Surplus is distinct from the equity of redemption, and it is not a unique property interest protected by the Takings Clause\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The equity of redemption protects the totality of a mortgagor's ownership rights, not a separate right to surplus\n2. Courts did not ban \"strict foreclosure\" to protect surplus \u2014 it was abandoned by creditors' lawyers seeking clear titles and deficiency judgments\nB. With a proper understanding of the equity of redemption's relationship with surplus, the authorities cited by Petitioner and NELF establish that the totality of an owner's rights, not surplus, is the protected property interest\nII. Regardless of whether the equity of redemption constrains government mortgagees, it does not constrain Minnesota from determining the processes for and consequences of property tax collection\nA. Equitable title is not property for eminent domain purposes in Minnesota\nB. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus\nC. Subjecting tax collection in Minnesota to a requirement of repaying surplus in full would be a ruinous federal overreach",
        "reference": "A. The historical development of the equity of redemption supports traditional Takings Clause protection for the totality of an owner's rights, not the introduction of a new and unique protection for surplus after failure to redeem",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Surplus is distinct from the equity of redemption, and it is not a unique property interest protected by the Takings Clause\nA. The historical development of the equity of redemption supports traditional Takings Clause protection for the totality of an owner's rights, not the introduction of a new and unique protection for surplus after failure to redeem\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Courts did not ban \"strict foreclosure\" to protect surplus \u2014 it was abandoned by creditors' lawyers seeking clear titles and deficiency judgments\nB. With a proper understanding of the equity of redemption's relationship with surplus, the authorities cited by Petitioner and NELF establish that the totality of an owner's rights, not surplus, is the protected property interest\nII. Regardless of whether the equity of redemption constrains government mortgagees, it does not constrain Minnesota from determining the processes for and consequences of property tax collection\nA. Equitable title is not property for eminent domain purposes in Minnesota\nB. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus\nC. Subjecting tax collection in Minnesota to a requirement of repaying surplus in full would be a ruinous federal overreach",
        "reference": "1. The equity of redemption protects the totality of a mortgagor's ownership rights, not a separate right to surplus",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Surplus is distinct from the equity of redemption, and it is not a unique property interest protected by the Takings Clause\nA. The historical development of the equity of redemption supports traditional Takings Clause protection for the totality of an owner's rights, not the introduction of a new and unique protection for surplus after failure to redeem\n1. The equity of redemption protects the totality of a mortgagor's ownership rights, not a separate right to surplus\n2. [MISSING]\nB. With a proper understanding of the equity of redemption's relationship with surplus, the authorities cited by Petitioner and NELF establish that the totality of an owner's rights, not surplus, is the protected property interest\nII. Regardless of whether the equity of redemption constrains government mortgagees, it does not constrain Minnesota from determining the processes for and consequences of property tax collection\nA. Equitable title is not property for eminent domain purposes in Minnesota\nB. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus\nC. Subjecting tax collection in Minnesota to a requirement of repaying surplus in full would be a ruinous federal overreach",
        "reference": "2. Courts did not ban \"strict foreclosure\" to protect surplus \u2014 it was abandoned by creditors' lawyers seeking clear titles and deficiency judgments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Surplus is distinct from the equity of redemption, and it is not a unique property interest protected by the Takings Clause\nA. The historical development of the equity of redemption supports traditional Takings Clause protection for the totality of an owner's rights, not the introduction of a new and unique protection for surplus after failure to redeem\n1. The equity of redemption protects the totality of a mortgagor's ownership rights, not a separate right to surplus\n2. Courts did not ban \"strict foreclosure\" to protect surplus \u2014 it was abandoned by creditors' lawyers seeking clear titles and deficiency judgments\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Regardless of whether the equity of redemption constrains government mortgagees, it does not constrain Minnesota from determining the processes for and consequences of property tax collection\nA. Equitable title is not property for eminent domain purposes in Minnesota\nB. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus\nC. Subjecting tax collection in Minnesota to a requirement of repaying surplus in full would be a ruinous federal overreach",
        "reference": "B. With a proper understanding of the equity of redemption's relationship with surplus, the authorities cited by Petitioner and NELF establish that the totality of an owner's rights, not surplus, is the protected property interest",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Surplus is distinct from the equity of redemption, and it is not a unique property interest protected by the Takings Clause\nA. The historical development of the equity of redemption supports traditional Takings Clause protection for the totality of an owner's rights, not the introduction of a new and unique protection for surplus after failure to redeem\n1. The equity of redemption protects the totality of a mortgagor's ownership rights, not a separate right to surplus\n2. Courts did not ban \"strict foreclosure\" to protect surplus \u2014 it was abandoned by creditors' lawyers seeking clear titles and deficiency judgments\nB. With a proper understanding of the equity of redemption's relationship with surplus, the authorities cited by Petitioner and NELF establish that the totality of an owner's rights, not surplus, is the protected property interest\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Equitable title is not property for eminent domain purposes in Minnesota\nB. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus\nC. Subjecting tax collection in Minnesota to a requirement of repaying surplus in full would be a ruinous federal overreach",
        "reference": "II. Regardless of whether the equity of redemption constrains government mortgagees, it does not constrain Minnesota from determining the processes for and consequences of property tax collection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Surplus is distinct from the equity of redemption, and it is not a unique property interest protected by the Takings Clause\nA. The historical development of the equity of redemption supports traditional Takings Clause protection for the totality of an owner's rights, not the introduction of a new and unique protection for surplus after failure to redeem\n1. The equity of redemption protects the totality of a mortgagor's ownership rights, not a separate right to surplus\n2. Courts did not ban \"strict foreclosure\" to protect surplus \u2014 it was abandoned by creditors' lawyers seeking clear titles and deficiency judgments\nB. With a proper understanding of the equity of redemption's relationship with surplus, the authorities cited by Petitioner and NELF establish that the totality of an owner's rights, not surplus, is the protected property interest\nII. Regardless of whether the equity of redemption constrains government mortgagees, it does not constrain Minnesota from determining the processes for and consequences of property tax collection\nA. [MISSING]\nB. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus\nC. Subjecting tax collection in Minnesota to a requirement of repaying surplus in full would be a ruinous federal overreach",
        "reference": "A. Equitable title is not property for eminent domain purposes in Minnesota",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Surplus is distinct from the equity of redemption, and it is not a unique property interest protected by the Takings Clause\nA. The historical development of the equity of redemption supports traditional Takings Clause protection for the totality of an owner's rights, not the introduction of a new and unique protection for surplus after failure to redeem\n1. The equity of redemption protects the totality of a mortgagor's ownership rights, not a separate right to surplus\n2. Courts did not ban \"strict foreclosure\" to protect surplus \u2014 it was abandoned by creditors' lawyers seeking clear titles and deficiency judgments\nB. With a proper understanding of the equity of redemption's relationship with surplus, the authorities cited by Petitioner and NELF establish that the totality of an owner's rights, not surplus, is the protected property interest\nII. Regardless of whether the equity of redemption constrains government mortgagees, it does not constrain Minnesota from determining the processes for and consequences of property tax collection\nA. Equitable title is not property for eminent domain purposes in Minnesota\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Subjecting tax collection in Minnesota to a requirement of repaying surplus in full would be a ruinous federal overreach",
        "reference": "B. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Surplus is distinct from the equity of redemption, and it is not a unique property interest protected by the Takings Clause\nA. The historical development of the equity of redemption supports traditional Takings Clause protection for the totality of an owner's rights, not the introduction of a new and unique protection for surplus after failure to redeem\n1. The equity of redemption protects the totality of a mortgagor's ownership rights, not a separate right to surplus\n2. Courts did not ban \"strict foreclosure\" to protect surplus \u2014 it was abandoned by creditors' lawyers seeking clear titles and deficiency judgments\nB. With a proper understanding of the equity of redemption's relationship with surplus, the authorities cited by Petitioner and NELF establish that the totality of an owner's rights, not surplus, is the protected property interest\nII. Regardless of whether the equity of redemption constrains government mortgagees, it does not constrain Minnesota from determining the processes for and consequences of property tax collection\nA. Equitable title is not property for eminent domain purposes in Minnesota\nB. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Subjecting tax collection in Minnesota to a requirement of repaying surplus in full would be a ruinous federal overreach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Practical Experience Has Shown That The Lower Courts Have Struggled To Conduct The Analysis Required By Intel\nB. These Practical Difficulties Have Led Some Lower Courts To Dilute The Intel Factors\nII. The Court Should Clarify The Intel Factors And Strengthen The Procedure For Evaluating Section 1782 Requests\nA. This Court Should Require Applicants To Provide Notice To All Parties And All Tribunals Where Discovery Would Be Used\nB. This Court Should Clarify That An Applicant Bears The Burden Of Establishing That Their Request Satisfies The Intel Factors\nC. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned\nIII. Clarifying The Intel Factors Is Preferable To Adopting An Illusory Distinction Between \"Private\" Commercial Arbitration And Investor-State Arbitration",
        "reference": "I. As Section 1782's Use Has Surged, Lower Courts Have Struggled To Apply Intel's Discretionary Factors In A Meaningful Fashion Across All Applications, Including Those For Use In Arbitral Tribunals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. As Section 1782's Use Has Surged, Lower Courts Have Struggled To Apply Intel's Discretionary Factors In A Meaningful Fashion Across All Applications, Including Those For Use In Arbitral Tribunals\nA. [MISSING]\nB. These Practical Difficulties Have Led Some Lower Courts To Dilute The Intel Factors\nII. The Court Should Clarify The Intel Factors And Strengthen The Procedure For Evaluating Section 1782 Requests\nA. This Court Should Require Applicants To Provide Notice To All Parties And All Tribunals Where Discovery Would Be Used\nB. This Court Should Clarify That An Applicant Bears The Burden Of Establishing That Their Request Satisfies The Intel Factors\nC. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned\nIII. Clarifying The Intel Factors Is Preferable To Adopting An Illusory Distinction Between \"Private\" Commercial Arbitration And Investor-State Arbitration",
        "reference": "A. Practical Experience Has Shown That The Lower Courts Have Struggled To Conduct The Analysis Required By Intel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. As Section 1782's Use Has Surged, Lower Courts Have Struggled To Apply Intel's Discretionary Factors In A Meaningful Fashion Across All Applications, Including Those For Use In Arbitral Tribunals\nA. Practical Experience Has Shown That The Lower Courts Have Struggled To Conduct The Analysis Required By Intel\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Clarify The Intel Factors And Strengthen The Procedure For Evaluating Section 1782 Requests\nA. This Court Should Require Applicants To Provide Notice To All Parties And All Tribunals Where Discovery Would Be Used\nB. This Court Should Clarify That An Applicant Bears The Burden Of Establishing That Their Request Satisfies The Intel Factors\nC. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned\nIII. Clarifying The Intel Factors Is Preferable To Adopting An Illusory Distinction Between \"Private\" Commercial Arbitration And Investor-State Arbitration",
        "reference": "B. These Practical Difficulties Have Led Some Lower Courts To Dilute The Intel Factors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. As Section 1782's Use Has Surged, Lower Courts Have Struggled To Apply Intel's Discretionary Factors In A Meaningful Fashion Across All Applications, Including Those For Use In Arbitral Tribunals\nA. Practical Experience Has Shown That The Lower Courts Have Struggled To Conduct The Analysis Required By Intel\nB. These Practical Difficulties Have Led Some Lower Courts To Dilute The Intel Factors\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court Should Require Applicants To Provide Notice To All Parties And All Tribunals Where Discovery Would Be Used\nB. This Court Should Clarify That An Applicant Bears The Burden Of Establishing That Their Request Satisfies The Intel Factors\nC. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned\nIII. Clarifying The Intel Factors Is Preferable To Adopting An Illusory Distinction Between \"Private\" Commercial Arbitration And Investor-State Arbitration",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Clarify The Intel Factors And Strengthen The Procedure For Evaluating Section 1782 Requests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. As Section 1782's Use Has Surged, Lower Courts Have Struggled To Apply Intel's Discretionary Factors In A Meaningful Fashion Across All Applications, Including Those For Use In Arbitral Tribunals\nA. Practical Experience Has Shown That The Lower Courts Have Struggled To Conduct The Analysis Required By Intel\nB. These Practical Difficulties Have Led Some Lower Courts To Dilute The Intel Factors\nII. The Court Should Clarify The Intel Factors And Strengthen The Procedure For Evaluating Section 1782 Requests\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court Should Clarify That An Applicant Bears The Burden Of Establishing That Their Request Satisfies The Intel Factors\nC. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned\nIII. Clarifying The Intel Factors Is Preferable To Adopting An Illusory Distinction Between \"Private\" Commercial Arbitration And Investor-State Arbitration",
        "reference": "A. This Court Should Require Applicants To Provide Notice To All Parties And All Tribunals Where Discovery Would Be Used",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. As Section 1782's Use Has Surged, Lower Courts Have Struggled To Apply Intel's Discretionary Factors In A Meaningful Fashion Across All Applications, Including Those For Use In Arbitral Tribunals\nA. Practical Experience Has Shown That The Lower Courts Have Struggled To Conduct The Analysis Required By Intel\nB. These Practical Difficulties Have Led Some Lower Courts To Dilute The Intel Factors\nII. The Court Should Clarify The Intel Factors And Strengthen The Procedure For Evaluating Section 1782 Requests\nA. This Court Should Require Applicants To Provide Notice To All Parties And All Tribunals Where Discovery Would Be Used\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned\nIII. Clarifying The Intel Factors Is Preferable To Adopting An Illusory Distinction Between \"Private\" Commercial Arbitration And Investor-State Arbitration",
        "reference": "B. This Court Should Clarify That An Applicant Bears The Burden Of Establishing That Their Request Satisfies The Intel Factors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. As Section 1782's Use Has Surged, Lower Courts Have Struggled To Apply Intel's Discretionary Factors In A Meaningful Fashion Across All Applications, Including Those For Use In Arbitral Tribunals\nA. Practical Experience Has Shown That The Lower Courts Have Struggled To Conduct The Analysis Required By Intel\nB. These Practical Difficulties Have Led Some Lower Courts To Dilute The Intel Factors\nII. The Court Should Clarify The Intel Factors And Strengthen The Procedure For Evaluating Section 1782 Requests\nA. This Court Should Require Applicants To Provide Notice To All Parties And All Tribunals Where Discovery Would Be Used\nB. This Court Should Clarify That An Applicant Bears The Burden Of Establishing That Their Request Satisfies The Intel Factors\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. Clarifying The Intel Factors Is Preferable To Adopting An Illusory Distinction Between \"Private\" Commercial Arbitration And Investor-State Arbitration",
        "reference": "C. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. As Section 1782's Use Has Surged, Lower Courts Have Struggled To Apply Intel's Discretionary Factors In A Meaningful Fashion Across All Applications, Including Those For Use In Arbitral Tribunals\nA. Practical Experience Has Shown That The Lower Courts Have Struggled To Conduct The Analysis Required By Intel\nB. These Practical Difficulties Have Led Some Lower Courts To Dilute The Intel Factors\nII. The Court Should Clarify The Intel Factors And Strengthen The Procedure For Evaluating Section 1782 Requests\nA. This Court Should Require Applicants To Provide Notice To All Parties And All Tribunals Where Discovery Would Be Used\nB. This Court Should Clarify That An Applicant Bears The Burden Of Establishing That Their Request Satisfies The Intel Factors\nC. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Clarifying The Intel Factors Is Preferable To Adopting An Illusory Distinction Between \"Private\" Commercial Arbitration And Investor-State Arbitration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The district court's extensive jury-selection procedures appropriately and effectively ensured an impartial jury\n1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity\n2. The district court's voir dire procedures here were appropriately tailored to produce an impartial jury\nB. The court of appeals erred in relying on a novel, inflexible, and unsupported voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nII. The court of appeals erred in alternatively vacating respondent's capital sentences based on his brother's alleged involvement in different unsolved crimes\nA. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the Waltham evidence\nB. Any error in the district court's handling of the Waltham issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt",
        "reference": "I. The court of appeals erred in applying an inflexible voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in applying an inflexible voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nA. [MISSING]\n1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity\n2. The district court's voir dire procedures here were appropriately tailored to produce an impartial jury\nB. The court of appeals erred in relying on a novel, inflexible, and unsupported voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nII. The court of appeals erred in alternatively vacating respondent's capital sentences based on his brother's alleged involvement in different unsolved crimes\nA. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the Waltham evidence\nB. Any error in the district court's handling of the Waltham issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt",
        "reference": "A. The district court's extensive jury-selection procedures appropriately and effectively ensured an impartial jury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in applying an inflexible voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nA. The district court's extensive jury-selection procedures appropriately and effectively ensured an impartial jury\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The district court's voir dire procedures here were appropriately tailored to produce an impartial jury\nB. The court of appeals erred in relying on a novel, inflexible, and unsupported voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nII. The court of appeals erred in alternatively vacating respondent's capital sentences based on his brother's alleged involvement in different unsolved crimes\nA. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the Waltham evidence\nB. Any error in the district court's handling of the Waltham issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt",
        "reference": "1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in applying an inflexible voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nA. The district court's extensive jury-selection procedures appropriately and effectively ensured an impartial jury\n1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The court of appeals erred in relying on a novel, inflexible, and unsupported voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nII. The court of appeals erred in alternatively vacating respondent's capital sentences based on his brother's alleged involvement in different unsolved crimes\nA. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the Waltham evidence\nB. Any error in the district court's handling of the Waltham issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt",
        "reference": "2. The district court's voir dire procedures here were appropriately tailored to produce an impartial jury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in applying an inflexible voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nA. The district court's extensive jury-selection procedures appropriately and effectively ensured an impartial jury\n1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity\n2. The district court's voir dire procedures here were appropriately tailored to produce an impartial jury\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The court of appeals erred in alternatively vacating respondent's capital sentences based on his brother's alleged involvement in different unsolved crimes\nA. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the Waltham evidence\nB. Any error in the district court's handling of the Waltham issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt",
        "reference": "B. The court of appeals erred in relying on a novel, inflexible, and unsupported voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in applying an inflexible voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nA. The district court's extensive jury-selection procedures appropriately and effectively ensured an impartial jury\n1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity\n2. The district court's voir dire procedures here were appropriately tailored to produce an impartial jury\nB. The court of appeals erred in relying on a novel, inflexible, and unsupported voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the Waltham evidence\nB. Any error in the district court's handling of the Waltham issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt",
        "reference": "II. The court of appeals erred in alternatively vacating respondent's capital sentences based on his brother's alleged involvement in different unsolved crimes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in applying an inflexible voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nA. The district court's extensive jury-selection procedures appropriately and effectively ensured an impartial jury\n1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity\n2. The district court's voir dire procedures here were appropriately tailored to produce an impartial jury\nB. The court of appeals erred in relying on a novel, inflexible, and unsupported voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nII. The court of appeals erred in alternatively vacating respondent's capital sentences based on his brother's alleged involvement in different unsolved crimes\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Any error in the district court's handling of the Waltham issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt",
        "reference": "A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the Waltham evidence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in applying an inflexible voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nA. The district court's extensive jury-selection procedures appropriately and effectively ensured an impartial jury\n1. A juror can be impartial even if he or she has seen, and formed opinions based on, pretrial publicity\n2. The district court's voir dire procedures here were appropriately tailored to produce an impartial jury\nB. The court of appeals erred in relying on a novel, inflexible, and unsupported voir dire rule to invalidate respondent's capital sentences\nII. The court of appeals erred in alternatively vacating respondent's capital sentences based on his brother's alleged involvement in different unsolved crimes\nA. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit the Waltham evidence\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Any error in the district court's handling of the Waltham issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Continuous Access Is Not Required for Per Se Treatment\nB. The Access Regulation Takes an Access Easement Across Petitioners' Property\nC. The Board Misunderstands the \"Narrow\" Nature of the Per Se Rule\nII. Petitioners' Rule Protects the Right to Exclude\nIII. Petitioners' Rule Would Not Imperil the NLRA or Government Inspections",
        "reference": "I. The Taking of a Discrete Property Interest Triggers Per Se Treatment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Taking of a Discrete Property Interest Triggers Per Se Treatment\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Access Regulation Takes an Access Easement Across Petitioners' Property\nC. The Board Misunderstands the \"Narrow\" Nature of the Per Se Rule\nII. Petitioners' Rule Protects the Right to Exclude\nIII. Petitioners' Rule Would Not Imperil the NLRA or Government Inspections",
        "reference": "A. Continuous Access Is Not Required for Per Se Treatment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Taking of a Discrete Property Interest Triggers Per Se Treatment\nA. Continuous Access Is Not Required for Per Se Treatment\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Board Misunderstands the \"Narrow\" Nature of the Per Se Rule\nII. Petitioners' Rule Protects the Right to Exclude\nIII. Petitioners' Rule Would Not Imperil the NLRA or Government Inspections",
        "reference": "B. The Access Regulation Takes an Access Easement Across Petitioners' Property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Taking of a Discrete Property Interest Triggers Per Se Treatment\nA. Continuous Access Is Not Required for Per Se Treatment\nB. The Access Regulation Takes an Access Easement Across Petitioners' Property\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioners' Rule Protects the Right to Exclude\nIII. Petitioners' Rule Would Not Imperil the NLRA or Government Inspections",
        "reference": "C. The Board Misunderstands the \"Narrow\" Nature of the Per Se Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Taking of a Discrete Property Interest Triggers Per Se Treatment\nA. Continuous Access Is Not Required for Per Se Treatment\nB. The Access Regulation Takes an Access Easement Across Petitioners' Property\nC. The Board Misunderstands the \"Narrow\" Nature of the Per Se Rule\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Petitioners' Rule Would Not Imperil the NLRA or Government Inspections",
        "reference": "II. Petitioners' Rule Protects the Right to Exclude",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Taking of a Discrete Property Interest Triggers Per Se Treatment\nA. Continuous Access Is Not Required for Per Se Treatment\nB. The Access Regulation Takes an Access Easement Across Petitioners' Property\nC. The Board Misunderstands the \"Narrow\" Nature of the Per Se Rule\nII. Petitioners' Rule Protects the Right to Exclude\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Petitioners' Rule Would Not Imperil the NLRA or Government Inspections",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Katz-Based Doctrines Should Be Reexamined in Light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines When Those Doctrines Undermine the Trespass Test's Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Protection\nII. Neither United States v. Jones Nor Florida v. Jardines Signal That the Automobile Exception \u2014a Per Se, Katz-Based Warrant Exception \u2014Can Trump the Fourth Amendment's Traditional Baseline of Protection Under the Trespass Test\nA. The Automobile Exception Evolves, After Katz, into a Per Se Warrant Exception\nIII. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage\nA. An Area That Is \"Open to the Public\" Can Receive Fourth Amendment Protection as Part of a Home's Curtilage\nB. The Trespass Basis of Fourth Amendment Protection Was Violated by the Officer's Detour from the Direct Path to the Front Door and Physical Search of Petitioner's Tarp-Covered Motorcycle\n1. The Officer's Warrantless Investigation of Petitioner's Motorcycle Is Not Saved by New York v. Class, United States v. Jacobsen, or the Plain View Doctrine",
        "reference": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation\nA. [MISSING]\nII. Neither United States v. Jones Nor Florida v. Jardines Signal That the Automobile Exception \u2014a Per Se, Katz-Based Warrant Exception \u2014Can Trump the Fourth Amendment's Traditional Baseline of Protection Under the Trespass Test\nA. The Automobile Exception Evolves, After Katz, into a Per Se Warrant Exception\nIII. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage\nA. An Area That Is \"Open to the Public\" Can Receive Fourth Amendment Protection as Part of a Home's Curtilage\nB. The Trespass Basis of Fourth Amendment Protection Was Violated by the Officer's Detour from the Direct Path to the Front Door and Physical Search of Petitioner's Tarp-Covered Motorcycle\n1. The Officer's Warrantless Investigation of Petitioner's Motorcycle Is Not Saved by New York v. Class, United States v. Jacobsen, or the Plain View Doctrine",
        "reference": "A. Katz-Based Doctrines Should Be Reexamined in Light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines When Those Doctrines Undermine the Trespass Test's Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Protection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation\nA. Katz-Based Doctrines Should Be Reexamined in Light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines When Those Doctrines Undermine the Trespass Test's Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Protection\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Automobile Exception Evolves, After Katz, into a Per Se Warrant Exception\nIII. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage\nA. An Area That Is \"Open to the Public\" Can Receive Fourth Amendment Protection as Part of a Home's Curtilage\nB. The Trespass Basis of Fourth Amendment Protection Was Violated by the Officer's Detour from the Direct Path to the Front Door and Physical Search of Petitioner's Tarp-Covered Motorcycle\n1. The Officer's Warrantless Investigation of Petitioner's Motorcycle Is Not Saved by New York v. Class, United States v. Jacobsen, or the Plain View Doctrine",
        "reference": "II. Neither United States v. Jones Nor Florida v. Jardines Signal That the Automobile Exception \u2014a Per Se, Katz-Based Warrant Exception \u2014Can Trump the Fourth Amendment's Traditional Baseline of Protection Under the Trespass Test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation\nA. Katz-Based Doctrines Should Be Reexamined in Light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines When Those Doctrines Undermine the Trespass Test's Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Protection\nII. Neither United States v. Jones Nor Florida v. Jardines Signal That the Automobile Exception \u2014a Per Se, Katz-Based Warrant Exception \u2014Can Trump the Fourth Amendment's Traditional Baseline of Protection Under the Trespass Test\nA. [MISSING]\nIII. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage\nA. An Area That Is \"Open to the Public\" Can Receive Fourth Amendment Protection as Part of a Home's Curtilage\nB. The Trespass Basis of Fourth Amendment Protection Was Violated by the Officer's Detour from the Direct Path to the Front Door and Physical Search of Petitioner's Tarp-Covered Motorcycle\n1. The Officer's Warrantless Investigation of Petitioner's Motorcycle Is Not Saved by New York v. Class, United States v. Jacobsen, or the Plain View Doctrine",
        "reference": "A. The Automobile Exception Evolves, After Katz, into a Per Se Warrant Exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation\nA. Katz-Based Doctrines Should Be Reexamined in Light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines When Those Doctrines Undermine the Trespass Test's Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Protection\nII. Neither United States v. Jones Nor Florida v. Jardines Signal That the Automobile Exception \u2014a Per Se, Katz-Based Warrant Exception \u2014Can Trump the Fourth Amendment's Traditional Baseline of Protection Under the Trespass Test\nA. The Automobile Exception Evolves, After Katz, into a Per Se Warrant Exception\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. An Area That Is \"Open to the Public\" Can Receive Fourth Amendment Protection as Part of a Home's Curtilage\nB. The Trespass Basis of Fourth Amendment Protection Was Violated by the Officer's Detour from the Direct Path to the Front Door and Physical Search of Petitioner's Tarp-Covered Motorcycle\n1. The Officer's Warrantless Investigation of Petitioner's Motorcycle Is Not Saved by New York v. Class, United States v. Jacobsen, or the Plain View Doctrine",
        "reference": "III. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation\nA. Katz-Based Doctrines Should Be Reexamined in Light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines When Those Doctrines Undermine the Trespass Test's Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Protection\nII. Neither United States v. Jones Nor Florida v. Jardines Signal That the Automobile Exception \u2014a Per Se, Katz-Based Warrant Exception \u2014Can Trump the Fourth Amendment's Traditional Baseline of Protection Under the Trespass Test\nA. The Automobile Exception Evolves, After Katz, into a Per Se Warrant Exception\nIII. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Trespass Basis of Fourth Amendment Protection Was Violated by the Officer's Detour from the Direct Path to the Front Door and Physical Search of Petitioner's Tarp-Covered Motorcycle\n1. The Officer's Warrantless Investigation of Petitioner's Motorcycle Is Not Saved by New York v. Class, United States v. Jacobsen, or the Plain View Doctrine",
        "reference": "A. An Area That Is \"Open to the Public\" Can Receive Fourth Amendment Protection as Part of a Home's Curtilage",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation\nA. Katz-Based Doctrines Should Be Reexamined in Light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines When Those Doctrines Undermine the Trespass Test's Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Protection\nII. Neither United States v. Jones Nor Florida v. Jardines Signal That the Automobile Exception \u2014a Per Se, Katz-Based Warrant Exception \u2014Can Trump the Fourth Amendment's Traditional Baseline of Protection Under the Trespass Test\nA. The Automobile Exception Evolves, After Katz, into a Per Se Warrant Exception\nIII. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage\nA. An Area That Is \"Open to the Public\" Can Receive Fourth Amendment Protection as Part of a Home's Curtilage\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Officer's Warrantless Investigation of Petitioner's Motorcycle Is Not Saved by New York v. Class, United States v. Jacobsen, or the Plain View Doctrine",
        "reference": "B. The Trespass Basis of Fourth Amendment Protection Was Violated by the Officer's Detour from the Direct Path to the Front Door and Physical Search of Petitioner's Tarp-Covered Motorcycle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation\nA. Katz-Based Doctrines Should Be Reexamined in Light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines When Those Doctrines Undermine the Trespass Test's Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Protection\nII. Neither United States v. Jones Nor Florida v. Jardines Signal That the Automobile Exception \u2014a Per Se, Katz-Based Warrant Exception \u2014Can Trump the Fourth Amendment's Traditional Baseline of Protection Under the Trespass Test\nA. The Automobile Exception Evolves, After Katz, into a Per Se Warrant Exception\nIII. The Automobile Exception Does Not Automatically Apply to the Search of an Unattended Vehicle Parked Within a Home's Curtilage\nA. An Area That Is \"Open to the Public\" Can Receive Fourth Amendment Protection as Part of a Home's Curtilage\nB. The Trespass Basis of Fourth Amendment Protection Was Violated by the Officer's Detour from the Direct Path to the Front Door and Physical Search of Petitioner's Tarp-Covered Motorcycle\n1. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "1. The Officer's Warrantless Investigation of Petitioner's Motorcycle Is Not Saved by New York v. Class, United States v. Jacobsen, or the Plain View Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents\n1. The PTO Often Issues Invalid Patents\n2. Congress Established Inter Partes Review to Weed Out Invalid Patents Quickly and Efficiently\nB. Eliminating Invalid Patents Is Necessary to Permit Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\n1. The Availability Of Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Saves Money and Provides Greater Patient Access to Critical Medicines\n2. Invalid Patents Can Block More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nII. Administrative Patent Judges Are Not Principal Officers, But to The Extent The Court Concludes Otherwise, It Should Reject Arthrex's Request to Eliminate IPR Indefinitely",
        "reference": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents, Which In Turn Enables Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents, Which In Turn Enables Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The PTO Often Issues Invalid Patents\n2. Congress Established Inter Partes Review to Weed Out Invalid Patents Quickly and Efficiently\nB. Eliminating Invalid Patents Is Necessary to Permit Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\n1. The Availability Of Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Saves Money and Provides Greater Patient Access to Critical Medicines\n2. Invalid Patents Can Block More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nII. Administrative Patent Judges Are Not Principal Officers, But to The Extent The Court Concludes Otherwise, It Should Reject Arthrex's Request to Eliminate IPR Indefinitely",
        "reference": "A. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents, Which In Turn Enables Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nA. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Congress Established Inter Partes Review to Weed Out Invalid Patents Quickly and Efficiently\nB. Eliminating Invalid Patents Is Necessary to Permit Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\n1. The Availability Of Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Saves Money and Provides Greater Patient Access to Critical Medicines\n2. Invalid Patents Can Block More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nII. Administrative Patent Judges Are Not Principal Officers, But to The Extent The Court Concludes Otherwise, It Should Reject Arthrex's Request to Eliminate IPR Indefinitely",
        "reference": "1. The PTO Often Issues Invalid Patents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents, Which In Turn Enables Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nA. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents\n1. The PTO Often Issues Invalid Patents\n2. [MISSING]\nB. Eliminating Invalid Patents Is Necessary to Permit Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\n1. The Availability Of Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Saves Money and Provides Greater Patient Access to Critical Medicines\n2. Invalid Patents Can Block More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nII. Administrative Patent Judges Are Not Principal Officers, But to The Extent The Court Concludes Otherwise, It Should Reject Arthrex's Request to Eliminate IPR Indefinitely",
        "reference": "2. Congress Established Inter Partes Review to Weed Out Invalid Patents Quickly and Efficiently",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents, Which In Turn Enables Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nA. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents\n1. The PTO Often Issues Invalid Patents\n2. Congress Established Inter Partes Review to Weed Out Invalid Patents Quickly and Efficiently\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Availability Of Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Saves Money and Provides Greater Patient Access to Critical Medicines\n2. Invalid Patents Can Block More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nII. Administrative Patent Judges Are Not Principal Officers, But to The Extent The Court Concludes Otherwise, It Should Reject Arthrex's Request to Eliminate IPR Indefinitely",
        "reference": "B. Eliminating Invalid Patents Is Necessary to Permit Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents, Which In Turn Enables Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nA. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents\n1. The PTO Often Issues Invalid Patents\n2. Congress Established Inter Partes Review to Weed Out Invalid Patents Quickly and Efficiently\nB. Eliminating Invalid Patents Is Necessary to Permit Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Invalid Patents Can Block More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nII. Administrative Patent Judges Are Not Principal Officers, But to The Extent The Court Concludes Otherwise, It Should Reject Arthrex's Request to Eliminate IPR Indefinitely",
        "reference": "1. The Availability Of Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Saves Money and Provides Greater Patient Access to Critical Medicines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents, Which In Turn Enables Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nA. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents\n1. The PTO Often Issues Invalid Patents\n2. Congress Established Inter Partes Review to Weed Out Invalid Patents Quickly and Efficiently\nB. Eliminating Invalid Patents Is Necessary to Permit Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\n1. The Availability Of Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Saves Money and Provides Greater Patient Access to Critical Medicines\n2. [MISSING]\nII. Administrative Patent Judges Are Not Principal Officers, But to The Extent The Court Concludes Otherwise, It Should Reject Arthrex's Request to Eliminate IPR Indefinitely",
        "reference": "2. Invalid Patents Can Block More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents, Which In Turn Enables Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nA. Inter Partes Review Is Essential to Eliminating Invalid Patents\n1. The PTO Often Issues Invalid Patents\n2. Congress Established Inter Partes Review to Weed Out Invalid Patents Quickly and Efficiently\nB. Eliminating Invalid Patents Is Necessary to Permit Patient Access to More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\n1. The Availability Of Generic and Biosimilar Medicines Saves Money and Provides Greater Patient Access to Critical Medicines\n2. Invalid Patents Can Block More Affordable Generic and Biosimilar Medicines\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Administrative Patent Judges Are Not Principal Officers, But to The Extent The Court Concludes Otherwise, It Should Reject Arthrex's Request to Eliminate IPR Indefinitely",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Cockrum Is More Instructive Here Than English Or Duke",
        "reference": "I. Texans Have Enjoyed A Right To Bear Arms Since The Founding Of Their Republic",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Texans Have Enjoyed A Right To Bear Arms Since The Founding Of Their Republic\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Cockrum Is More Instructive Here Than English Or Duke",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance Test To Assess the Genericness of All Marks, Including Domain Names\nB. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All Types of Marks Furthers the Act's Aims\nC. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence\nD. BOOKING.COM is Descriptive, Not Generic, and Under the Primary-Significance Test\nII. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A CONTRARY RESULT\nA. The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government's Per Se Rule\nB. The Government's Per Se Rule Would Strip Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and Confer No Competitive Benefits",
        "reference": "I. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT BAR GENERIC .COM TRADEMARKS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT BAR GENERIC .COM TRADEMARKS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All Types of Marks Furthers the Act's Aims\nC. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence\nD. BOOKING.COM is Descriptive, Not Generic, and Under the Primary-Significance Test\nII. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A CONTRARY RESULT\nA. The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government's Per Se Rule\nB. The Government's Per Se Rule Would Strip Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and Confer No Competitive Benefits",
        "reference": "A. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance Test To Assess the Genericness of All Marks, Including Domain Names",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT BAR GENERIC .COM TRADEMARKS\nA. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance Test To Assess the Genericness of All Marks, Including Domain Names\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence\nD. BOOKING.COM is Descriptive, Not Generic, and Under the Primary-Significance Test\nII. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A CONTRARY RESULT\nA. The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government's Per Se Rule\nB. The Government's Per Se Rule Would Strip Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and Confer No Competitive Benefits",
        "reference": "B. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All Types of Marks Furthers the Act's Aims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT BAR GENERIC .COM TRADEMARKS\nA. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance Test To Assess the Genericness of All Marks, Including Domain Names\nB. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All Types of Marks Furthers the Act's Aims\nC. [MISSING]\nD. BOOKING.COM is Descriptive, Not Generic, and Under the Primary-Significance Test\nII. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A CONTRARY RESULT\nA. The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government's Per Se Rule\nB. The Government's Per Se Rule Would Strip Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and Confer No Competitive Benefits",
        "reference": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT BAR GENERIC .COM TRADEMARKS\nA. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance Test To Assess the Genericness of All Marks, Including Domain Names\nB. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All Types of Marks Furthers the Act's Aims\nC. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence\nD. [MISSING]\nII. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A CONTRARY RESULT\nA. The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government's Per Se Rule\nB. The Government's Per Se Rule Would Strip Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and Confer No Competitive Benefits",
        "reference": "D. BOOKING.COM is Descriptive, Not Generic, and Under the Primary-Significance Test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT BAR GENERIC .COM TRADEMARKS\nA. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance Test To Assess the Genericness of All Marks, Including Domain Names\nB. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All Types of Marks Furthers the Act's Aims\nC. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence\nD. BOOKING.COM is Descriptive, Not Generic, and Under the Primary-Significance Test\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government's Per Se Rule\nB. The Government's Per Se Rule Would Strip Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and Confer No Competitive Benefits",
        "reference": "II. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A CONTRARY RESULT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT BAR GENERIC .COM TRADEMARKS\nA. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance Test To Assess the Genericness of All Marks, Including Domain Names\nB. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All Types of Marks Furthers the Act's Aims\nC. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence\nD. BOOKING.COM is Descriptive, Not Generic, and Under the Primary-Significance Test\nII. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A CONTRARY RESULT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Government's Per Se Rule Would Strip Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and Confer No Competitive Benefits",
        "reference": "A. The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government's Per Se Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT BAR GENERIC .COM TRADEMARKS\nA. The Act Mandates the Primary-Significance Test To Assess the Genericness of All Marks, Including Domain Names\nB. Applying the Primary-Significance Test to All Types of Marks Furthers the Act's Aims\nC. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence\nD. BOOKING.COM is Descriptive, Not Generic, and Under the Primary-Significance Test\nII. GOODYEAR DOES NOT COMPEL A CONTRARY RESULT\nA. The Lanham Act Repudiated the Government's Per Se Rule\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Government's Per Se Rule Would Strip Countless Marks of Trademark Protection and Confer No Competitive Benefits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The AIA's legislative history does not contain indicia that Congress intended \"person\" to include the government\nA. The AIA's estoppel provisions do not extend to the government\nB. Interpreting \"person\" to include the government thwarts Congress's careful balance of providing an efficient forum for challenging patent validity while avoiding abusive, repetitive validity attacks\n1. Prior to the AIA, Congress relied on estoppel to avoid repetitive attacks on patent validity\n2. Consistent with earlier legislative acts, Congress preserved estoppel in the AIA's post-grant proceedings as an important check on abusive litigation\nIII. There is no per se rule against estopping the government\nIV. The government's other patent rights do not overcome the presumption that \"person\" excludes the government",
        "reference": "I. In the AIA, as elsewhere, the ordinary meaning of \"person\" excludes the government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. In the AIA, as elsewhere, the ordinary meaning of \"person\" excludes the government\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The AIA's estoppel provisions do not extend to the government\nB. Interpreting \"person\" to include the government thwarts Congress's careful balance of providing an efficient forum for challenging patent validity while avoiding abusive, repetitive validity attacks\n1. Prior to the AIA, Congress relied on estoppel to avoid repetitive attacks on patent validity\n2. Consistent with earlier legislative acts, Congress preserved estoppel in the AIA's post-grant proceedings as an important check on abusive litigation\nIII. There is no per se rule against estopping the government\nIV. The government's other patent rights do not overcome the presumption that \"person\" excludes the government",
        "reference": "II. The AIA's legislative history does not contain indicia that Congress intended \"person\" to include the government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. In the AIA, as elsewhere, the ordinary meaning of \"person\" excludes the government\nII. The AIA's legislative history does not contain indicia that Congress intended \"person\" to include the government\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Interpreting \"person\" to include the government thwarts Congress's careful balance of providing an efficient forum for challenging patent validity while avoiding abusive, repetitive validity attacks\n1. Prior to the AIA, Congress relied on estoppel to avoid repetitive attacks on patent validity\n2. Consistent with earlier legislative acts, Congress preserved estoppel in the AIA's post-grant proceedings as an important check on abusive litigation\nIII. There is no per se rule against estopping the government\nIV. The government's other patent rights do not overcome the presumption that \"person\" excludes the government",
        "reference": "A. The AIA's estoppel provisions do not extend to the government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. In the AIA, as elsewhere, the ordinary meaning of \"person\" excludes the government\nII. The AIA's legislative history does not contain indicia that Congress intended \"person\" to include the government\nA. The AIA's estoppel provisions do not extend to the government\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Prior to the AIA, Congress relied on estoppel to avoid repetitive attacks on patent validity\n2. Consistent with earlier legislative acts, Congress preserved estoppel in the AIA's post-grant proceedings as an important check on abusive litigation\nIII. There is no per se rule against estopping the government\nIV. The government's other patent rights do not overcome the presumption that \"person\" excludes the government",
        "reference": "B. Interpreting \"person\" to include the government thwarts Congress's careful balance of providing an efficient forum for challenging patent validity while avoiding abusive, repetitive validity attacks",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. In the AIA, as elsewhere, the ordinary meaning of \"person\" excludes the government\nII. The AIA's legislative history does not contain indicia that Congress intended \"person\" to include the government\nA. The AIA's estoppel provisions do not extend to the government\nB. Interpreting \"person\" to include the government thwarts Congress's careful balance of providing an efficient forum for challenging patent validity while avoiding abusive, repetitive validity attacks\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Consistent with earlier legislative acts, Congress preserved estoppel in the AIA's post-grant proceedings as an important check on abusive litigation\nIII. There is no per se rule against estopping the government\nIV. The government's other patent rights do not overcome the presumption that \"person\" excludes the government",
        "reference": "1. Prior to the AIA, Congress relied on estoppel to avoid repetitive attacks on patent validity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. In the AIA, as elsewhere, the ordinary meaning of \"person\" excludes the government\nII. The AIA's legislative history does not contain indicia that Congress intended \"person\" to include the government\nA. The AIA's estoppel provisions do not extend to the government\nB. Interpreting \"person\" to include the government thwarts Congress's careful balance of providing an efficient forum for challenging patent validity while avoiding abusive, repetitive validity attacks\n1. Prior to the AIA, Congress relied on estoppel to avoid repetitive attacks on patent validity\n2. [MISSING]\nIII. There is no per se rule against estopping the government\nIV. The government's other patent rights do not overcome the presumption that \"person\" excludes the government",
        "reference": "2. Consistent with earlier legislative acts, Congress preserved estoppel in the AIA's post-grant proceedings as an important check on abusive litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. In the AIA, as elsewhere, the ordinary meaning of \"person\" excludes the government\nII. The AIA's legislative history does not contain indicia that Congress intended \"person\" to include the government\nA. The AIA's estoppel provisions do not extend to the government\nB. Interpreting \"person\" to include the government thwarts Congress's careful balance of providing an efficient forum for challenging patent validity while avoiding abusive, repetitive validity attacks\n1. Prior to the AIA, Congress relied on estoppel to avoid repetitive attacks on patent validity\n2. Consistent with earlier legislative acts, Congress preserved estoppel in the AIA's post-grant proceedings as an important check on abusive litigation\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The government's other patent rights do not overcome the presumption that \"person\" excludes the government",
        "reference": "III. There is no per se rule against estopping the government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. In the AIA, as elsewhere, the ordinary meaning of \"person\" excludes the government\nII. The AIA's legislative history does not contain indicia that Congress intended \"person\" to include the government\nA. The AIA's estoppel provisions do not extend to the government\nB. Interpreting \"person\" to include the government thwarts Congress's careful balance of providing an efficient forum for challenging patent validity while avoiding abusive, repetitive validity attacks\n1. Prior to the AIA, Congress relied on estoppel to avoid repetitive attacks on patent validity\n2. Consistent with earlier legislative acts, Congress preserved estoppel in the AIA's post-grant proceedings as an important check on abusive litigation\nIII. There is no per se rule against estopping the government\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The government's other patent rights do not overcome the presumption that \"person\" excludes the government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most\nB. Members of minority faiths such as Judaism are the most likely to suffer under Smith because they adhere to relatively unknown religious practices that government officials might incidentally burden\nC. Smith's unduly narrow understanding of religious liberty harms real people, and its assumptions regarding the difficulties of administering religious exemptions have proven unfounded\nD. The original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause requires robust protection of religious minorities\nII. If This Court Chooses Not to Reconsider Smith, it Should Still Reverse the Decision Below Which Misapplied Smith by Unduly Restricting the Ways in Which a Religious Adherent Could Prove That a Law is Not Generally Applicable\nIII. The Court Below Erred by Allowing the City to Second-Guess CSS's Understanding of its own Faith\nA. Religious objectors are entitled to have government decision makers give their sincere religious objections full and fair consideration\nB. Allowing Government Decisionmakers to Substitute Their Understandings for Those of Religious Objectors is Particularly Dangerous to Jews because Judaism Contains a Unique Diversity of Acceptable Beliefs and Practices",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Reconsider Employment Division v. Smith and Fully Restore Religious Minorities' Right to the Free Exercise of Religion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reconsider Employment Division v. Smith and Fully Restore Religious Minorities' Right to the Free Exercise of Religion\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Members of minority faiths such as Judaism are the most likely to suffer under Smith because they adhere to relatively unknown religious practices that government officials might incidentally burden\nC. Smith's unduly narrow understanding of religious liberty harms real people, and its assumptions regarding the difficulties of administering religious exemptions have proven unfounded\nD. The original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause requires robust protection of religious minorities\nII. If This Court Chooses Not to Reconsider Smith, it Should Still Reverse the Decision Below Which Misapplied Smith by Unduly Restricting the Ways in Which a Religious Adherent Could Prove That a Law is Not Generally Applicable\nIII. The Court Below Erred by Allowing the City to Second-Guess CSS's Understanding of its own Faith\nA. Religious objectors are entitled to have government decision makers give their sincere religious objections full and fair consideration\nB. Allowing Government Decisionmakers to Substitute Their Understandings for Those of Religious Objectors is Particularly Dangerous to Jews because Judaism Contains a Unique Diversity of Acceptable Beliefs and Practices",
        "reference": "A. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reconsider Employment Division v. Smith and Fully Restore Religious Minorities' Right to the Free Exercise of Religion\nA. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Smith's unduly narrow understanding of religious liberty harms real people, and its assumptions regarding the difficulties of administering religious exemptions have proven unfounded\nD. The original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause requires robust protection of religious minorities\nII. If This Court Chooses Not to Reconsider Smith, it Should Still Reverse the Decision Below Which Misapplied Smith by Unduly Restricting the Ways in Which a Religious Adherent Could Prove That a Law is Not Generally Applicable\nIII. The Court Below Erred by Allowing the City to Second-Guess CSS's Understanding of its own Faith\nA. Religious objectors are entitled to have government decision makers give their sincere religious objections full and fair consideration\nB. Allowing Government Decisionmakers to Substitute Their Understandings for Those of Religious Objectors is Particularly Dangerous to Jews because Judaism Contains a Unique Diversity of Acceptable Beliefs and Practices",
        "reference": "B. Members of minority faiths such as Judaism are the most likely to suffer under Smith because they adhere to relatively unknown religious practices that government officials might incidentally burden",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reconsider Employment Division v. Smith and Fully Restore Religious Minorities' Right to the Free Exercise of Religion\nA. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most\nB. Members of minority faiths such as Judaism are the most likely to suffer under Smith because they adhere to relatively unknown religious practices that government officials might incidentally burden\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause requires robust protection of religious minorities\nII. If This Court Chooses Not to Reconsider Smith, it Should Still Reverse the Decision Below Which Misapplied Smith by Unduly Restricting the Ways in Which a Religious Adherent Could Prove That a Law is Not Generally Applicable\nIII. The Court Below Erred by Allowing the City to Second-Guess CSS's Understanding of its own Faith\nA. Religious objectors are entitled to have government decision makers give their sincere religious objections full and fair consideration\nB. Allowing Government Decisionmakers to Substitute Their Understandings for Those of Religious Objectors is Particularly Dangerous to Jews because Judaism Contains a Unique Diversity of Acceptable Beliefs and Practices",
        "reference": "C. Smith's unduly narrow understanding of religious liberty harms real people, and its assumptions regarding the difficulties of administering religious exemptions have proven unfounded",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reconsider Employment Division v. Smith and Fully Restore Religious Minorities' Right to the Free Exercise of Religion\nA. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most\nB. Members of minority faiths such as Judaism are the most likely to suffer under Smith because they adhere to relatively unknown religious practices that government officials might incidentally burden\nC. Smith's unduly narrow understanding of religious liberty harms real people, and its assumptions regarding the difficulties of administering religious exemptions have proven unfounded\nD. [MISSING]\nII. If This Court Chooses Not to Reconsider Smith, it Should Still Reverse the Decision Below Which Misapplied Smith by Unduly Restricting the Ways in Which a Religious Adherent Could Prove That a Law is Not Generally Applicable\nIII. The Court Below Erred by Allowing the City to Second-Guess CSS's Understanding of its own Faith\nA. Religious objectors are entitled to have government decision makers give their sincere religious objections full and fair consideration\nB. Allowing Government Decisionmakers to Substitute Their Understandings for Those of Religious Objectors is Particularly Dangerous to Jews because Judaism Contains a Unique Diversity of Acceptable Beliefs and Practices",
        "reference": "D. The original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause requires robust protection of religious minorities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reconsider Employment Division v. Smith and Fully Restore Religious Minorities' Right to the Free Exercise of Religion\nA. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most\nB. Members of minority faiths such as Judaism are the most likely to suffer under Smith because they adhere to relatively unknown religious practices that government officials might incidentally burden\nC. Smith's unduly narrow understanding of religious liberty harms real people, and its assumptions regarding the difficulties of administering religious exemptions have proven unfounded\nD. The original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause requires robust protection of religious minorities\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Court Below Erred by Allowing the City to Second-Guess CSS's Understanding of its own Faith\nA. Religious objectors are entitled to have government decision makers give their sincere religious objections full and fair consideration\nB. Allowing Government Decisionmakers to Substitute Their Understandings for Those of Religious Objectors is Particularly Dangerous to Jews because Judaism Contains a Unique Diversity of Acceptable Beliefs and Practices",
        "reference": "II. If This Court Chooses Not to Reconsider Smith, it Should Still Reverse the Decision Below Which Misapplied Smith by Unduly Restricting the Ways in Which a Religious Adherent Could Prove That a Law is Not Generally Applicable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reconsider Employment Division v. Smith and Fully Restore Religious Minorities' Right to the Free Exercise of Religion\nA. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most\nB. Members of minority faiths such as Judaism are the most likely to suffer under Smith because they adhere to relatively unknown religious practices that government officials might incidentally burden\nC. Smith's unduly narrow understanding of religious liberty harms real people, and its assumptions regarding the difficulties of administering religious exemptions have proven unfounded\nD. The original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause requires robust protection of religious minorities\nII. If This Court Chooses Not to Reconsider Smith, it Should Still Reverse the Decision Below Which Misapplied Smith by Unduly Restricting the Ways in Which a Religious Adherent Could Prove That a Law is Not Generally Applicable\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Religious objectors are entitled to have government decision makers give their sincere religious objections full and fair consideration\nB. Allowing Government Decisionmakers to Substitute Their Understandings for Those of Religious Objectors is Particularly Dangerous to Jews because Judaism Contains a Unique Diversity of Acceptable Beliefs and Practices",
        "reference": "III. The Court Below Erred by Allowing the City to Second-Guess CSS's Understanding of its own Faith",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reconsider Employment Division v. Smith and Fully Restore Religious Minorities' Right to the Free Exercise of Religion\nA. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most\nB. Members of minority faiths such as Judaism are the most likely to suffer under Smith because they adhere to relatively unknown religious practices that government officials might incidentally burden\nC. Smith's unduly narrow understanding of religious liberty harms real people, and its assumptions regarding the difficulties of administering religious exemptions have proven unfounded\nD. The original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause requires robust protection of religious minorities\nII. If This Court Chooses Not to Reconsider Smith, it Should Still Reverse the Decision Below Which Misapplied Smith by Unduly Restricting the Ways in Which a Religious Adherent Could Prove That a Law is Not Generally Applicable\nIII. The Court Below Erred by Allowing the City to Second-Guess CSS's Understanding of its own Faith\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Allowing Government Decisionmakers to Substitute Their Understandings for Those of Religious Objectors is Particularly Dangerous to Jews because Judaism Contains a Unique Diversity of Acceptable Beliefs and Practices",
        "reference": "A. Religious objectors are entitled to have government decision makers give their sincere religious objections full and fair consideration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reconsider Employment Division v. Smith and Fully Restore Religious Minorities' Right to the Free Exercise of Religion\nA. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most\nB. Members of minority faiths such as Judaism are the most likely to suffer under Smith because they adhere to relatively unknown religious practices that government officials might incidentally burden\nC. Smith's unduly narrow understanding of religious liberty harms real people, and its assumptions regarding the difficulties of administering religious exemptions have proven unfounded\nD. The original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause requires robust protection of religious minorities\nII. If This Court Chooses Not to Reconsider Smith, it Should Still Reverse the Decision Below Which Misapplied Smith by Unduly Restricting the Ways in Which a Religious Adherent Could Prove That a Law is Not Generally Applicable\nIII. The Court Below Erred by Allowing the City to Second-Guess CSS's Understanding of its own Faith\nA. Religious objectors are entitled to have government decision makers give their sincere religious objections full and fair consideration\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Allowing Government Decisionmakers to Substitute Their Understandings for Those of Religious Objectors is Particularly Dangerous to Jews because Judaism Contains a Unique Diversity of Acceptable Beliefs and Practices",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. QUESTION TWO SHOULD BE GRANTED\nIII. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO RESOLVE BOTH QUESTIONS PRESENTED",
        "reference": "I. QUESTION ONE SHOULD BE GRANTED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. QUESTION ONE SHOULD BE GRANTED\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO RESOLVE BOTH QUESTIONS PRESENTED",
        "reference": "II. QUESTION TWO SHOULD BE GRANTED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. QUESTION ONE SHOULD BE GRANTED\nII. QUESTION TWO SHOULD BE GRANTED\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO RESOLVE BOTH QUESTIONS PRESENTED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Rural Alaskans depend on Alaska's lands, waters, and resources for many of their transportation, economic, and social needs\nB. Alaska's sovereign right to regulate, use, and manage its lands and waters is instrumental to Alaska's statehood and ANILCA's purpose\nC. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights\nII. The Ninth Circuit's contortion of the federal reserved water rights doctrine threatens Alaska's political and economic sovereignty\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand disregards this Court's direction to construe ANILCA to protect Alaska's sovereignty and respect its uniqueness\nB. The Ninth Circuit's redefinition of the federal reserved water rights doctrine disregards this Court's precedents and tramples on state sovereignty\n1. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's water rights jurisprudence\n2. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's clear statement cases\nC. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
        "reference": "I. Certiorari is warranted because the Ninth Circuit's decision contravenes ANILCA Section 103's assurances that Alaska would retain its sovereign right to manage its lands and waters and because it imposes exceptional hardships on Alaskans",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is warranted because the Ninth Circuit's decision contravenes ANILCA Section 103's assurances that Alaska would retain its sovereign right to manage its lands and waters and because it imposes exceptional hardships on Alaskans\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Alaska's sovereign right to regulate, use, and manage its lands and waters is instrumental to Alaska's statehood and ANILCA's purpose\nC. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights\nII. The Ninth Circuit's contortion of the federal reserved water rights doctrine threatens Alaska's political and economic sovereignty\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand disregards this Court's direction to construe ANILCA to protect Alaska's sovereignty and respect its uniqueness\nB. The Ninth Circuit's redefinition of the federal reserved water rights doctrine disregards this Court's precedents and tramples on state sovereignty\n1. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's water rights jurisprudence\n2. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's clear statement cases\nC. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
        "reference": "A. Rural Alaskans depend on Alaska's lands, waters, and resources for many of their transportation, economic, and social needs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is warranted because the Ninth Circuit's decision contravenes ANILCA Section 103's assurances that Alaska would retain its sovereign right to manage its lands and waters and because it imposes exceptional hardships on Alaskans\nA. Rural Alaskans depend on Alaska's lands, waters, and resources for many of their transportation, economic, and social needs\nB. [MISSING]\nC. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights\nII. The Ninth Circuit's contortion of the federal reserved water rights doctrine threatens Alaska's political and economic sovereignty\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand disregards this Court's direction to construe ANILCA to protect Alaska's sovereignty and respect its uniqueness\nB. The Ninth Circuit's redefinition of the federal reserved water rights doctrine disregards this Court's precedents and tramples on state sovereignty\n1. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's water rights jurisprudence\n2. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's clear statement cases\nC. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
        "reference": "B. Alaska's sovereign right to regulate, use, and manage its lands and waters is instrumental to Alaska's statehood and ANILCA's purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is warranted because the Ninth Circuit's decision contravenes ANILCA Section 103's assurances that Alaska would retain its sovereign right to manage its lands and waters and because it imposes exceptional hardships on Alaskans\nA. Rural Alaskans depend on Alaska's lands, waters, and resources for many of their transportation, economic, and social needs\nB. Alaska's sovereign right to regulate, use, and manage its lands and waters is instrumental to Alaska's statehood and ANILCA's purpose\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's contortion of the federal reserved water rights doctrine threatens Alaska's political and economic sovereignty\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand disregards this Court's direction to construe ANILCA to protect Alaska's sovereignty and respect its uniqueness\nB. The Ninth Circuit's redefinition of the federal reserved water rights doctrine disregards this Court's precedents and tramples on state sovereignty\n1. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's water rights jurisprudence\n2. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's clear statement cases\nC. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
        "reference": "C. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is warranted because the Ninth Circuit's decision contravenes ANILCA Section 103's assurances that Alaska would retain its sovereign right to manage its lands and waters and because it imposes exceptional hardships on Alaskans\nA. Rural Alaskans depend on Alaska's lands, waters, and resources for many of their transportation, economic, and social needs\nB. Alaska's sovereign right to regulate, use, and manage its lands and waters is instrumental to Alaska's statehood and ANILCA's purpose\nC. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand disregards this Court's direction to construe ANILCA to protect Alaska's sovereignty and respect its uniqueness\nB. The Ninth Circuit's redefinition of the federal reserved water rights doctrine disregards this Court's precedents and tramples on state sovereignty\n1. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's water rights jurisprudence\n2. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's clear statement cases\nC. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit's contortion of the federal reserved water rights doctrine threatens Alaska's political and economic sovereignty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is warranted because the Ninth Circuit's decision contravenes ANILCA Section 103's assurances that Alaska would retain its sovereign right to manage its lands and waters and because it imposes exceptional hardships on Alaskans\nA. Rural Alaskans depend on Alaska's lands, waters, and resources for many of their transportation, economic, and social needs\nB. Alaska's sovereign right to regulate, use, and manage its lands and waters is instrumental to Alaska's statehood and ANILCA's purpose\nC. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights\nII. The Ninth Circuit's contortion of the federal reserved water rights doctrine threatens Alaska's political and economic sovereignty\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit's redefinition of the federal reserved water rights doctrine disregards this Court's precedents and tramples on state sovereignty\n1. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's water rights jurisprudence\n2. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's clear statement cases\nC. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand disregards this Court's direction to construe ANILCA to protect Alaska's sovereignty and respect its uniqueness",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is warranted because the Ninth Circuit's decision contravenes ANILCA Section 103's assurances that Alaska would retain its sovereign right to manage its lands and waters and because it imposes exceptional hardships on Alaskans\nA. Rural Alaskans depend on Alaska's lands, waters, and resources for many of their transportation, economic, and social needs\nB. Alaska's sovereign right to regulate, use, and manage its lands and waters is instrumental to Alaska's statehood and ANILCA's purpose\nC. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights\nII. The Ninth Circuit's contortion of the federal reserved water rights doctrine threatens Alaska's political and economic sovereignty\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand disregards this Court's direction to construe ANILCA to protect Alaska's sovereignty and respect its uniqueness\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's water rights jurisprudence\n2. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's clear statement cases\nC. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit's redefinition of the federal reserved water rights doctrine disregards this Court's precedents and tramples on state sovereignty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is warranted because the Ninth Circuit's decision contravenes ANILCA Section 103's assurances that Alaska would retain its sovereign right to manage its lands and waters and because it imposes exceptional hardships on Alaskans\nA. Rural Alaskans depend on Alaska's lands, waters, and resources for many of their transportation, economic, and social needs\nB. Alaska's sovereign right to regulate, use, and manage its lands and waters is instrumental to Alaska's statehood and ANILCA's purpose\nC. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights\nII. The Ninth Circuit's contortion of the federal reserved water rights doctrine threatens Alaska's political and economic sovereignty\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand disregards this Court's direction to construe ANILCA to protect Alaska's sovereignty and respect its uniqueness\nB. The Ninth Circuit's redefinition of the federal reserved water rights doctrine disregards this Court's precedents and tramples on state sovereignty\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's clear statement cases\nC. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
        "reference": "1. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's water rights jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is warranted because the Ninth Circuit's decision contravenes ANILCA Section 103's assurances that Alaska would retain its sovereign right to manage its lands and waters and because it imposes exceptional hardships on Alaskans\nA. Rural Alaskans depend on Alaska's lands, waters, and resources for many of their transportation, economic, and social needs\nB. Alaska's sovereign right to regulate, use, and manage its lands and waters is instrumental to Alaska's statehood and ANILCA's purpose\nC. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights\nII. The Ninth Circuit's contortion of the federal reserved water rights doctrine threatens Alaska's political and economic sovereignty\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand disregards this Court's direction to construe ANILCA to protect Alaska's sovereignty and respect its uniqueness\nB. The Ninth Circuit's redefinition of the federal reserved water rights doctrine disregards this Court's precedents and tramples on state sovereignty\n1. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's water rights jurisprudence\n2. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
        "reference": "2. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's clear statement cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is warranted because the Ninth Circuit's decision contravenes ANILCA Section 103's assurances that Alaska would retain its sovereign right to manage its lands and waters and because it imposes exceptional hardships on Alaskans\nA. Rural Alaskans depend on Alaska's lands, waters, and resources for many of their transportation, economic, and social needs\nB. Alaska's sovereign right to regulate, use, and manage its lands and waters is instrumental to Alaska's statehood and ANILCA's purpose\nC. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights\nII. The Ninth Circuit's contortion of the federal reserved water rights doctrine threatens Alaska's political and economic sovereignty\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision on remand disregards this Court's direction to construe ANILCA to protect Alaska's sovereignty and respect its uniqueness\nB. The Ninth Circuit's redefinition of the federal reserved water rights doctrine disregards this Court's precedents and tramples on state sovereignty\n1. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's water rights jurisprudence\n2. The Ninth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's clear statement cases\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1263_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Physician life care planning grew out of a medical field and continues to be used outside of personal injury litigation",
        "reference": "I. Physician life care planning is a practice guided by specific, relevant, reliable, and peer-reviewed methods, as well as ethical guidelines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1263_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Physician life care planning is a practice guided by specific, relevant, reliable, and peer-reviewed methods, as well as ethical guidelines\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Physician life care planning grew out of a medical field and continues to be used outside of personal injury litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below Flouts the Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration, Negates the Advantages of Arbitration for Employers and Employees, and Creates Serious Due Process Problems that Force Defendants into an Untenable Position",
        "reference": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Decision Below Flouts the Federal Policy in Favor of Arbitration, Negates the Advantages of Arbitration for Employers and Employees, and Creates Serious Due Process Problems that Force Defendants into an Untenable Position",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Statutory ATDS Question Has Deeply Divided The Circuits, And The Circuit Split Has Only Grown More Entrenched",
        "reference": "I. This Court's Resolution Of AAPC Confirms The Need To Resolve The Circuit Split On The Statutory ATDS Question",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's Resolution Of AAPC Confirms The Need To Resolve The Circuit Split On The Statutory ATDS Question\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Statutory ATDS Question Has Deeply Divided The Circuits, And The Circuit Split Has Only Grown More Entrenched",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "A. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "B. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "C. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. [MISSING]\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "D. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. [MISSING]\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "E. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. [MISSING]\n2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN SUPPORT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE RULING\nA. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the Oversight Board members are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nB. Congress is bound by separation of powers principles even when acting pursuant to Article IV of the United States Constitution\nC. The Oversight Board members meet the criteria of \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause\n1. The Oversight Board members occupy a continuing position\n2. The Oversight Board members exercise significant authority pursuant to PROMESA\n3. The Oversight Board members exercise their authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\nD. The court of appeals ruling does not render the territorial governments unconstitutional\nE. The Oversight Board members are not Territorial Officers\n1. The Oversight Board's impact on Interstate Commerce and thus, its implications nationwide\n2. [MISSING]\nF. The Insular Cases are unconstitutional and should not be the foundation to reverse the court of appeals' ruling on the Appointments Clause\nII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CHALLENGE STATEMENT\nA. The court of appeals misconstrued the de facto officer doctrine\nB. The de facto officer doctrine and the requirement of good faith\nC. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nD. The remedy requested does not invalidate PROMESA and it is necessary to avoid serious violations to the separation of powers doctrine",
        "reference": "2. PROMESA's legislative record demonstrates its implications nationwide",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    }
]