[
    {
        "file": "Docket18-315_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CREATED A THREE-WAY CIRCUIT SPLIT\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. ALLOWING RELATORS TO LENGTHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SUBSECTION 3731(b)(2) IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT DEFENDANTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-483_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. If the Court denies review of the Down syndrome protections at issue in this case, lower courts and future litigants would benefit from an accompanying statement clarifying that such policies present a question of first impression under this Court's abortion precedents\nA. To date, 12 federal judges in two circuits have split eight to four on whether this Court's abortion precedents protect the eugenic practice of Down syndrome discrimination abortion\nB. The Court need not answer the underlying constitutional issue to clarify that Down syndrome protections present a question of first impression under this Court's abortion precedents\nII. If the Court grants review, it may uphold Indiana's Down syndrome protections without disturbing the Court's abortion precedents\nA. As Circuit Judges Frank H. Easterbrook, Diane S. Sykes, Amy Coney Barrett, and Michael B. Brennan argue, restrictions on eugenic abortion present a question of first impression under Supreme Court abortion precedents\nB. Arguments developed by University of Georgia Law Professor Randy Beck offer a second path for upholding Down syndrome protections without disturbing the rule of viability set out in Roe and Casey\ni. [MISSING]\nii. Gonzales v. Carhart stands for the proposition that government may lawfully assert different interests than those at stake in Roe and Casey\niii. Together, Roe and Gonzales stand for the proposition that the durational rule of viability need not attach to every government interest in regulating abortion\niv. The government interest in prohibiting eugenic abortion is different from the government interest at stake in Roe and Casey and should not be subject to the same durational rule\nIII. The Court should grant the petition and abandon the viability rule\nA. Professor Beck has identified three situations where this Court limits the weight normally accorded to precedent under the general rule of stare decisis. Each exception applies with full force to reconsideration of the viability rule\ni. The first exception to stare decisis \u2014 Dictum versus holding \u2014 Professor Beck argues that \"the issue of the duration of abortion rights was not before the Court\" in Roe or Casey\nii. The second exception to stare decisis \u2014 Inadequate briefing and argumentation\niii. The third exception to stare decisis \u2014 Inadequate legal justification\nB. The viability rule is unworkable, arbitrary, poorly reasoned, inadequate, and extreme\ni. The viability rule is unworkable as a standard of regulation\nii. The viability rule is arbitrary. It can be influenced by factors such as race, access to treatment facilities, and even altitude\niii. The viability rule is poorly reasoned\niv. The viability rule is inadequate\nv. The viability rule is extreme compared with domestic opinion and international norms",
        "reference": "i. Roe stands for the proposition that different durational rules may attach to different government interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1432_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. Per the statutory text, an order denying CAT relief is outside the scope of Section 1252(a)(2)(C)\n1. AEDPA specifically defined a \"final order of removal\" and an order denying CAT relief does not qualify\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Neither CAT's implementing regulations nor the REAL ID Act subject CAT claims to Section 1252(a)(2)(C)\n4. Appellate jurisdiction does not depend on construing a CAT order as a \"final order of removal.\"\nB. In the event of ambiguity, the presumption in favor of judicial review governs\nC. The government's construction defies essential policies embodied in the INA",
        "reference": "2. The government's effort to escape the statutory definition lacks merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "A. The First Amendment prohibits governmental interference with ecclesiastical appointments\nB. The ministerial exception extends to any employee of a religious organization who performs an important religious function\n1. Hosanna-Tabor recognized a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses' special solicitude for religious functionaries\n2. The ministerial exception applies when an employee's job duties or other facts show that the employee performs an important religious function\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The counterarguments advanced by the court of appeals and respondents lack merit",
        "reference": "C. The ministerial exception bars respondents' employment-discrimination claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "A. Bedrock Criminal-Law Principles Make Consciousness Of Wrongdoing A Presumptively Necessary Ingredient Of A Felony Offense\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Overdeterrence Considerations Support Requiring Mens Rea For The Relevant Facts Separating Lawful From Unlawful Conduct",
        "reference": "B. Mens Rea Requirements Have Particular Importance Where Complex Regulatory Schemes Are Backed By Criminal Penalties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Case Presents An Ideal Opportunity To Resolve These Important Circuit Splits.\nA. Further Percolation Is Unnecessary.\nB. Smagin's Vehicle Arguments Are Unpersuasive.\nC. Smagin's Unpersuasive Defense Of The Decision Below Confirms That Certiorari Is Necessary.",
        "reference": "I. Smagin Cannot Undermine The Splits CMB Monaco Has Identified As To The Case-Dispositive Issue Of RICO Standing.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-7622_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The dual-sovereignty rule requires successive prosecutions undertaken by separate sovereigns\nB. The CFR Courts are federal Article I courts that exercise federal sovereignty\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Practical considerations strongly favor reversal\n1. A rule requiring prosecutions by separate sovereigns would be manageable\n2. A reversal would not threaten public safety\n3. To affirm would create an alarming end run around the Double Jeopardy Clause",
        "reference": "C. Sacrificing tribal defendants' constitutional rights would not honor tribal sovereignty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "CONGRESS HAS REGULATED THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS OF MOTOR CARRIERS AND OWNER-OPERATORS SINCE THE 1950S\nA. Congress and The ICC First Mandated Motor Carrier Control of and Responsibility for Owner-Operators\nB. The Expansion of The Leasing Rules to Address Motor Carrier Exploitation of Owner-Operators\nC. The Provisions in Federal Law For Motor Carrier/Owner-Operator Dispute Resolution\n1. Pre-1995 Enforcement of Owner-Operator Complaints by the ICC\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. The ICC Termination Act Granted a Specific Private Right of Action in Federal Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-857_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "The saving clause in 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) does not apply to petitioner's claim\nA. Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of petitioner's detention\n1. The text of Section 2255(e) focuses on opportunity, not results\na. Section 2255 is inadequate or ineffective only if a sentencing court cannot adjudicate a prisoner's claim\nb. Section 2255 is adequate and effective to challenge a trial court's interpretation of a federal criminal statute\n2. The remainder of Section 2255 resolves any ambiguity\n3. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner's and the government's contrary theories lack merit\n1. Petitioner's outcome-focused theory is textually unsound and logically unbounded\n2. The government's habeas-benchmark theory contravenes AEDPA and rests on arbitrary limiting principles\nC. Petitioner's constitutional concerns are unfounded",
        "reference": "3. An expansive reading of the saving clause would lead to illogical and unadministrable results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. By Preventing Courts from Resolving Disputes Between Utilities and Indian Tribes, the Broad Rule Sought by the Upper Skagit Would Harm the Public Interest\nII. By Barring Use of Eminent Domain to Acquire Rights-of-Way, the Broad Rule Sought by the Upper Skagit Would Harm the Public Interest\nIII. Condemnation Cases Should Be Allowed, Even If Quiet Title Cases Are Barred\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Condemnation of \"Allotment Land\" Should Not Be Foreclosed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1450_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Second Circuit Had Appellate Jurisdiction\nII. 18 U.S.C. section 3231 Does Not Apply to Foreign Sovereigns\nA. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Nothing Since 1789 Counsels a Different Result\nIII. The FSIA Dictates that U.S. Courts Cannot Hear Prosecutions of Foreign Sovereigns\nA. The FSIA Provides Absolute Criminal Immunity\nB. The Contrary Arguments Are Unpersuasive\nIV. This Case Does Not Satisfy the FSIA's Commercial-Activities Exception Even If That Exception Applied",
        "reference": "B. Statutory Context Confirms that the First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Prosecutions of Foreign Sovereigns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief041.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. State legislatures do not act independently of state constitutional constraints when fulfilling their duty under the Elections Clause to enact state laws governing congressional elections.",
        "reference": "I. Judicial review, in itself, does not usurp the role of state legislatures under the Elections Clause, whether it occurs in state or federal court.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. DHS May Not Rescind MPP When Doing So Would Violate Its Mandatory Detention Obligations\nA. Section 1225(b) imposes a mandatory detention obligation on DHS\nB. [MISSING]\n1. DHS must use its contiguous-removal authority if it cannot otherwise fully comply with its detention obligations\n2. DHS cannot parole aliens on a categorical basis to escape its detention obligations\nII. The Fifth Circuit Correctly Determined That the October Memoranda Do Not Prevent Review of the June Termination\nA. The October Memoranda do not prevent review of the June Termination\n1. The October Memoranda do not moot litigation regarding the June Termination\n2. The October Memoranda are not valid administrative action\n3. Any argument that the October Memoranda satisfied the injunction is not properly before the Court\nB. If accepted as a reconsideration of the Secretary's decision to terminate MPP, the October Memoranda are arbitrary and capricious",
        "reference": "B. DHS may not rescind MPP when doing so will cause it to violate section 1225(b)'s detention mandate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Is Properly Presented\nII. This Case Presents A Constitutional Question For This Court, Not Congress\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Respondents' Background, \"Factual\" Arguments Are Overstated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals ignored Congress's decision not to require evidence of impermissible motive.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Second Circuit's error has the potential to impact a growing set of statutory regimes.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-480_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS PETITION IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE TO RESOLVE A DEEP SPLIT ON AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE GOVERNMENT'S MERITS ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT AT THIS STAGE AND WRONG",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Intermediate Businesses Depend On The Personal Jurisdiction Supplied By The Stream-Of-Commerce Rule\nA. Home builders are an important example of how businesses themselves depend on the stream-of-commerce rule\nB. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Stream-Of-Commerce Rule Is Correct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court may review the entirety of a remand order in a case removed under Sections 1442 or 1443\nA. The plain language of Section 1447(d) authorizes full review\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Complete review accords with federal appellate procedure in similar contexts\nD. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy\nII. If this Court addresses the validity of the remand order, the Court should hold that this case belongs in federal court",
        "reference": "B. Complete review corrects important errors without delay or encouraging baseless removal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court lacks jurisdiction because the decision below does not present the Petitioners' or any other federal question\nA. Petitioners did not press their question in the courts below, and the decision below did not pass on it\nB. The decision below rests on adequate and independent state law grounds\nII. The decision below presents no important federal question\nA. The decision below does not create or perpetuate a conflict among other courts\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The decision below is consistent with the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses\nA. Under the Religion Clauses, Montana may offer generally available subsidies to religious education, or no subsidies at all\nB. The decision below cures rather than creates any violation of Equal Protection",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners exaggerate the case's national importance and urgency",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act provide a remedy for use of a plaintiff's U.S. trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause consumer confusion in the United States\nA. Under this Court's modern two-step framework for assessing the territorial reach of federal statutes, application of the Lanham Act provisions at issue here turns on the likelihood of consumer confusion within the United States\n1. Congress is ordinarily presumed to legislate with domestic concerns in mind\n2. The relevant Lanham Act provisions do not clearly manifest a congressional intent that the Act should apply extraterritorially\n3. At step two of the Court's modern framework, the focus of the relevant Lanham Act provisions is consumer confusion\nB. Treating consumer confusion as the focus of the Lanham Act provisions at issue here is consistent with this Court's disposition of Steele\nC. Petitioners' criticisms of the government's position are unsound\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The court of appeals and respondent are mistaken in their broader view of the Lanham Act's application to foreign sales",
        "reference": "D. Treating consumer confusion as the focus of the pertinent Lanham Act provisions accords with fundamental trademark principles and with international agreements to which the United States is a party",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN VOTE-DENIAL CASES SECTION 2 DOES NOT AND CANNOT PREDICATE RELIEF ON THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE ELECTIONS\nII. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2 IS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT AND WOULD LEAVE VOTERS WITHOUT RECOURSE EVEN FOR INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION\nA. [MISSING]\ni. Native Americans Live Prohibitively Far from Border Towns and Government Services\nii. Native Americans Face Racial Discrimination When Voting in Border Towns\nB. Lack of Residential Mail Delivery Leaves Native Americans Vulnerable to Disenfranchisement\ni. Picking Up and Dropping Off Mail Is Harder in Native American Communities\nii. Native Americans Pick Up and Drop Off Ballots for Each Other in Order to Overcome the Burdens Associated with Mail Access\nC. Lack of Fully Functioning Roads, Vehicles, Broadband Internet, and Resources Leaves Native Americans Vulnerable to Disenfranchisement\nIII. DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF NATIVE AMERICANS IS ONGOING AND TARGETED BASED ON RACE\nA. Time, Place, and Manner Rules Can Have a Substantial Impact on Voter Turnout\nB. Native Americans Face Present-Day Racism and Subterfuge from Election Officials\nC. Facially Race-Neutral Laws Are Used to Disenfranchise Native Americans\nD. Disenfranchisement of Native Americans is Pervasive and Repeated",
        "reference": "A. Geographic Isolation Leaves Native Americans Vulnerable to Disenfranchisement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Plain Meaning of Sections 1182 (f) and 1152(a)(1)(A) Yields No Conflict Or Check On The President's Authority To Suspend Entry of Aliens\nA. The text of Section 1182 (f) unambiguously grants the President broad power to suspend entry to any alien or any class of aliens whose entry he finds would be detrimental to the interests of the United States\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Section 1152 (a)(1)(A) bars preferential treatment and discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas, nothing more\nII. The President's Inherent Authority Over Foreign Affairs and National Security Should Resolve Any Legislative Conflict in His Favor\nA. The President has inherent authority over issues involving foreign affairs, which includes the authority to exclude aliens\nB. By utilizing the President's inherent authority coupled with express authorization of Congress, the Proclamation is an example of the President's power at its peak",
        "reference": "B. The statutory framework, legislative history, and prior executive practice all support rather than undermine the plain language of Section 1182 (f)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CFAA, IF ADOPTED, WOULD LIMIT THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CFAA ALMOST ENTIRELY TO THE ACTIONS OF OUTSIDERS, RENDERING IT INEFFECTIVE AGAINST THE OFTEN FAR MORE SIGNIFICANT THREAT POSED BY FAITHLESS INSIDERS TO CONFIDENTIAL COMPUTER SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION\nA. Modern Financial Firms Gather, Create, Maintain, and Rely Upon Massive Amounts of Non-Public Data and Proprietary Programs in the Course of Conducting their Business\nB. Certain Employees and Third Parties Must Be Granted Access to Valuable Proprietary Data and Systems in Order for Those Systems to Operate Properly\nC. Investment Firms Implement Robust Procedures to Secure their Digital Assets\nII. INVESTMENT FIRMS ARE UNDER CONSTANT THREAT OF DATA THEFT BY FAITHLESS INSIDERS\nIII. THE READING OF THE CFAA ADVANCED BY PETITIONER UNDERCUTS THE STATUTE'S EFFECTIVENESS AT PREVENTING CYBER-CRIME AND IS CONTRARY TO THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. An Interpretation of the CFAA Which Excludes All Actions of Those with Legitimate Access to a Computer System Improperly Limits the Statute in a Manner Inconsistent with the Actual Text of the Statute\nC. Concerns that a Broad Interpretation of \"Without Authorization\" under the CFAA Would Require Examination of Defendants' Subjective Motivations Are Not Significant in the Context of Clearly-Communicated, Action-Based Limitations on Authorization\nD. Taking into Consideration Policy and Contract-Based Limitations on Computer System Use in the Context of Employer-Provided Systems Raises No More \"Private Criminal Law\" Concerns than Does Consideration of Technology-Based Controls\nE. Focusing Purely on Technological Access Controls Leads to Plainly Absurd Results",
        "reference": "A. Giving Weight to the Terms of Employment Contracts and Policies Reinforces the Common Understanding that One's Rights Concerning the Property of Another Extend Only as Far as They Are Granted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Since Iskanian, plaintiffs routinely use PAGA to avoid their promises to arbitrate\nIII. The proliferation of PAGA cases harms individuals and businesses\nIV. This Court should reverse",
        "reference": "I. PAGA gives plaintiffs carte blanche to sue businesses for even minor employment violations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-935_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The UK's Evolving Interpretation of Habitual Residence\nA. Habitual residence is not defined by the Hague Conference\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Court of Justice of the European Union cases leading to the modern UK SC approach\nD. The modern UK SC approach\nE. The significance of parental intent in the modern UK SC approach\nII. Other International Perspectives: Australia, New Zealand, and Canada",
        "reference": "B. Ex P Shah \u2014The early approach to habitual residence focusing on parental intent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The current appointment process does not secure the independence of administrative law judges\nA. SEC ALJs operate under institutional pressures to conform to the SEC's wishes\nB. SEC ALJs must follow agency rules, interpretations, and other policies\nC. SEC ALJs do not conduct hearings in an impartial and independent manner\nII. [MISSING]\nA. SEC's ALJs lack prior securities law expertise\nB. A lack of prior expertise makes it harder for ALJs to resist sources of pro-agency bias\nC. Avoiding the Appointments Clause results in less expertise \u2014 not more independence \u2014 for ALJs\nIII. More effective and constitutionally permissible paths exist to securing independent judges in SEC proceedings",
        "reference": "II. Lack of Prior Background or Expertise in Securities Law Renders SEC ALJs Vulnerable to Agency Bias and Influence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-480_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PLAIN TEXT OF THE UNIFORMED-SERVICES EXCEPTION APPLIES TO DUAL STATUS TECHNICIANS\nA. The word \"as\" does not limit the uniformed-services exception to a subset of dual-status technicians' service\nB. There is no other textual basis for excluding dual-status technicians from the uniformed-services exception\nC. Legislative history cannot rescue Respondent's atextual interpretation of the uniformed-services exception\nII. IT IS IRRELEVANT THAT DUAL-STATUS TECHNICIANS ARE CLASSIFIED AS \"CIVILIAN\" EMPLOYEES\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. RESPONDENT'S RULE COULD PROVE DIFFICULT TO ADMINISTER",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief045.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioners' facial challenges to the Schedule B requirement fail\nA. California's requirement is substantially related to the State's regulatory and law enforcement interests\nB. Petitioners failed to demonstrate a significant burden on First Amendment rights\nC. Petitioners' arguments concerning the fit between the requirement and the State's interests are unpersuasive\nIII. Neither petitioner is entitled to an as-applied exemption on this record",
        "reference": "I. Nonpublic reporting requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, not strict scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution does not recognize disparate impact claims, and any congressional recognition of such claims is subject to constitutional limits\nA. Section 2 must be restrained in order to satisfy constitutional standards\nB. The text of Section 2 creates only a results test of limited scope\nC. The Ninth Circuit's application of Section 2's results test fails these standards\n1. [MISSING]\n2. If applicable to vote denial claims, any totality of the circumstances analysis must focus on current conditions\nII. The Ninth Circuit erred in rejecting Arizona's justifications for its generally applicable, race-neutral voting regulations as tenuous\n1. Arizona law's discarding of out-of-precinct ballots provides an equal opportunity to all voters and protects the precinct system\n2. Arizona's law limiting the range of people who may lawfully handle another person's ballot deters vote fraud",
        "reference": "1. Gingles and the 1982 Senate Factors should not be transferred to the vote denial context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Neither the common law nor founding-era history tolerate the warrantless entry of a home based on pursuit of a nonviolent misdemeanant\nA. Citizens' homes have special status under the Fourth Amendment\nB. The exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement are grounded in historical practice\nII. Warrantless pursuit of a nonviolent misdemeanant into the home, without more, is never constitutional\nA. [MISSING]\nB. In circumstances like these, the balance of interests will always favor the private citizen\nIII. At minimum, the court should adopt a reasonableness test over a categorical warrant exception",
        "reference": "A. The right of privacy is highest in the home and the interests of the government are low",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief039.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]",
        "reference": "The Ninth Circuit's Ad Hoc Balancing Test for Protecting Donor Confidentiality Undermines the Categorical Protection for Evidentiary Privileges Recognized in Jaffee",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 5.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5716_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The statutory minimum sentences for petitioners' offenses preclude them from seeking sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)\nA. The \"sentencing ranges\" for petitioners' offenses were statutory minimums that the Commission cannot \"lower\"\nB. The substantial-assistance departures that petitioners received under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) were not \"based on\" the later-amended drug guidelines\n1. A departure under Section 3553(e) is anchored to the statutory minimum\n2. The proper extent of a Section 3553(e) departure depends solely on the appropriate reward for the defendant's substantial assistance\n3. [MISSING]\n4. A below-statutory-minimum guidelines calculation is not a \"sentencing range\" on which a Section 3553(e) departure is \"based\" Section 3582(c)(2) cannot allow petitioners to satisfy the requirements of the statute\nD. Sentence reductions for petitioners would subvert the function of Section 3582(c)(2) by increasing sentencing disparities",
        "reference": "3. The sentencing proceedings in petitioners' cases illustrate the proper procedure for a substantial-assistance departure under Section 3553(e)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Appellees' Injuries Are Traceable to BCRA Section 304 And Redressed by the Judgment Holding Section 304 Unconstitutional\nB. Appellees' Unpaid Loan, whether \"Self-Inflicted\" or Not, Establishes Their Standing\nII. The District Court Correctly Held that the Loan-Repayment Limit Is Unconstitutional\nA. Because the Loan-Repayment Limit Burdens Core Political Speech, It Is Subject to Strict Scrutiny\nB. The Loan-Repayment Limit Fails Even \"Closely-Drawn\" Scrutiny Because It Does Not Further any Anti-Corruption Interest\nC. The Loan-Repayment Limit Is Not Sufficiently Tailored",
        "reference": "I. The District Court Correctly Held that Appellees Have Standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. In seeking to distinguish political speech disclosure law, Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate how the First Amendment protects political speech and do so in ways that can undermine First Amendment rights to political speech\nII. Regarding regulation, i.e., disclosure, of political speech, Buckley does way more than protect against threats, harassment, or reprisals\nIII. The Court distinguishes Track 1 burdens from Track 2 requirements\nIV. Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate tailoring for political speech disclosure law\nV. Citizens United pages 366-71 address/support only Track 2 law, not Track 1 law\nVI. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "VI. Strict scrutiny, not substantial relation exacting scrutiny, applies to some political speech disclosure law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "THIS [MISSING]",
        "reference": "THIS CASE IS THE PRODUCT OF A SUSTAINED EFFORT TO DISABLE PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATION THAT THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's precedent strongly supports the government's reading of Section 314(d)\nC. Precluding review of Section 315(b) determinations furthers the AIA's purposes",
        "reference": "A. The text, structure, and history of the AIA demonstrate that the USPTO's Section 315(b) determinations are not reviewable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1268_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Punitive Damages May Not Be Awarded Retroactively Under section 1605A(c)\nA. The Landgraf Presumption Applies to Punitive Damages Under section 1605A(c)\nB. Neither section 1605A(c) nor section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA Provides a Clear Statement of Retroactive Intent for Punitive Damages\nIII. Punitive Damages May Not Be Awarded Retroactively Under Petitioners' State-Law Claims\nA. The Question Presented Does Not Fairly Include the Retroactivity of Punitive Damages Under Petitioners' State-Law Claims\nB. Foreign-National Family-Member Petitioners Do Not Meet the Jurisdictional Requirements Within section 1605A(a)'s Exception to Immunity or the Elements of section 1605A(c)'s Exclusive Private Right of Action\nC. Foreign-National Family-Member Petitioners Asserting State-Law Claims May Not Recover Punitive Damages for Preenactment Conduct",
        "reference": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1471_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Shamrock Oil Should Not Be Extended To Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants\nA. Nothing in Shamrock Oil Supports Extending Its Rule to Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants\nB. Jackson Identifies No Valid Reason to Extend Shamrock Oil to Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants\nII. Home Depot Was Entitled To Remove This Action Under CAFA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Jackson's Alternative Arguments Provide No Basis for Affirming",
        "reference": "A. The Text, Structure, and Purpose of CAFA Confirm That a Third-Party Counterclaim Defendant Can Remove",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1599_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. Congress Provided Important Procedural Protections Against Undue IRS Intrusion Into Private Records\nB. The Sixth Circuit Gives The IRS Virtually Unlimited Power To Trample Privacy Rights\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The IRS Has Little To Gain By Not Providing Notice Of Summonses To Innocent Third Parties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. MINNESOTA'S PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM IMPLICATES THIS COURT'S EXCESSIVE FINE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE.\nII. CIRCUIT SPLITS ARE SPLIT IN APPLYING THIS COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE.\nA. Lower Courts Are Struggling To Apply the Grossly Disproportional Standard, Resulting in a Circuit Split.\nB. There is A Circuit Split on Whether Civil Penalties Can Violate the Excessive Fines Clause.\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS CASE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY THE SCOPE OF NELSON V. CITY OF NEW YORK.",
        "reference": "C. The Court Should Reaffirm The Historical Importance of the Excessive Fines Clause.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. Many People Exercise their Religion Through Outward Expressions of Faith that Cannot Fairly Be Attributed to their Employers\nII. Banning Overt Expressions of Faith by Public Employees on the Job Would Violate the No Religious Test Clause\nA. The history of the No Religious Test Clause shows that it was designed to prevent the kind of harm at issue here\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Converting protected individual religious expression into regulable government speech imposes a religious test for government employment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION TO INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW OVER A TIME-BAR CHALLENGE UNDER 35 U.S.C. section 315(b) IS APPEALABLE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Director Does Not Have Unfettered Discretion to Institute an IPR, Let Alone One that Is Time Barred\nC. The Agency Would Exceed its Authority by Instituting a Time-Barred Petition, Giving Rise to the Appeal Right\nD. Ultra Vires Agency Action Is Appealable Even Where Congress Limits Appellate Review of the Agency\nII. SECTION 315(b) IS NOT CLOSELY TIED TO THE DECISION TO INSTITUTE IN THE MANNER CONTEMPLATED BY CUOZZO\nIII. APPEAL OF A DETERMINATION THAT AN IPR IS NOT TIME BARRED DOES NOT IMPEDE THE DIRECTOR'S DISCRETION TO DENY INSTITUTION",
        "reference": "A. The Director's Congressionally-Granted Discretion Is Limited to Decisions to Deny Institution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Allowing Class Counsel and the District Court to Redirect Class Members' Remedial Settlement Funds to Non-Parties Favored by Them Raises Serious Due Process Concerns\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of Rule 23(e)(2) Also Raises Significant Article III Case or Controversy Concerns",
        "reference": "I. Interpreting Rule 23(e)(2) to Permit a Binding Settlement that Redirects Class Action Settlement Funds From Class Members to Third Parties (Often Advocacy Groups) Would Raise Serious First Amendment Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE TWO-PARTY PROVISION FURTHERS THE PARTISAN INTERESTS OF DELAWARE'S PREDOMINANT POLITICAL PARTIES, NOT LEGITIMATE OR COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS",
        "reference": "I. THE TWO-PARTY PROVISION VIOLATES LIBERTARIAN PARTY MEMBERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. JUDICIAL PREOCCUPATION WITH VIABILITY LEADS TO ERRONEOUS DECISIONS\nII. THIS COURT'S ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE IS BUILT ON A PAGAN FOUNDATION\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THIS COURT'S DECISIONS HAVE DE FACTO ESTABLISHED PAGANISM AS OUR NATION'S RELIGION\nA. Elevation of the Collective over the Individual\nB. Evicting God from Government Schools\nC. Rewriting the Establishment Clause to Undermine Christianity\nV. THIS COURT'S DECISIONS TO EMBRACE PAGANISM HAVE OPENED THE PEOPLE TO GOD'S RIGHTEOUS TEMPORAL JUDGMENTS",
        "reference": "III. THIS COURT HAS CONSTITUTIONALIZED MORAL ISSUES AND UNDERMINED MORALITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pennsylvania's registration jurisdiction scheme is not based on consent.\nII. Pennsylvania's regime violates basic due process principles.\nA. Mallory's position would expand general jurisdiction by gutting Goodyear and Daimler.\nB. Mallory's position violates the principles behind this Court's modern personal jurisdiction decisions.\n1. Registration jurisdiction harms interstate federalism.\n2. Registration jurisdiction is unfair.\nC. Burnham does not support Mallory.\nIII. Pennsylvania's regime imposes an unconstitutional condition.\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Pennsylvania Fire's reasoning does not support Mallory.\nB. Pennsylvania Fire did not survive International Shoe.\nC. If necessary, the Court should formally overrule Pennsylvania Fire.\nV. Original public meaning does not support Mallory.",
        "reference": "IV. Pennsylvania Fire does not control here.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. The New York Convention does not categorically prohibit the application of domestic law doctrines that allow nonsignatories to compel arbitration\nB. The application of domestic law contract and agency doctrines that allow a nonsignatory to compel arbitration turns on the parties' consent as informed by those domestic laws",
        "reference": "The New York Convention does not categorically prohibit enforcement of an arbitration agreement by a nonsignatory",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-493_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's review is warranted",
        "reference": "A. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-443_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The CCA's decision on remand conflicts with this Court's mandate in Moore I, which provided clear instructions, based on clinical standards, for determining intellectual disability for Eighth Amendment purposes\nA. This Court provided the CCA with a clear mandate regarding the constitutional standard for diagnosing intellectual disability\nB. The CCA's analysis on remand is infected by the same risks of error and nonclinical considerations that led this Court to declare the Briseno framework unconstitutional\ni. The CCA's analysis of intellectual disability continues to impermissibly rely on lay stereotypes\nii. The CCA's analysis continues to overemphasize adaptive strengths\niii. The CCA fails to focus on typical performance and improperly relies on Moore's \"improvements\" in behavior while incarcerated\niv. The CCA continues to improperly require Moore to show that his intellectual and adaptive deficits are related\nC. The CCA's continued reliance on the testimony of Dr. Compton confirms that it has simply repeated the analysis that this Court rejected\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The CCA's refusal to follow the holding in Moore I raises serious rule of law concerns that can be remedied only by this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Trust Deficit\" Justification for the \"Appearance of Corruption\" Model Is Not Supported by Modern Research or Experience\nA. Modern Research Shows an \"Appearance of Corruption\" Does Not Threaten Confidence in Representative Government\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Case Illustrates How It Is Easy to Show an Impermissible \"Appearance of Influence or Access\" But Difficult to Demonstrate a Legitimate \"Appearance of Corruption\"\nII. The Lower Courts Need Guidance on Evaluating An \"Appearance of Corruption:\"",
        "reference": "B. An \"Appearance of Corruption\" Must Be An Appearance of Quid Pro Quo Corruption, Not An \"Appearance of Influence or Access\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE CITY'S CONDUCT VIOLATED THE AUTOMATIC STAY\nIII. THE CITY'S PROPOSED STATUTORY SCHEME DOES NOT FIT COHERENTLY OR HARMONIOUSLY WITH CHAPTER 7 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE",
        "reference": "I. SECTION 542(a) IS MANDATORY AND SELF-EXECUTING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-493_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. This Court's review is warranted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress did not intend open-ended delegations of emergency powers to the executive branch\nA. Congress has recognized that, unless properly checked, emergency powers are subject to abuse\nB. Congress has recognized the need both to delegate and to constrain the use of emergency powers\nII. This Court's construction of emergency statutory delegations, including the HEROES Act, should be guided by the text and history of emergency delegations and separation of powers principles\nA. Courts should weigh several factors to determine whether emergency executive actions exceed what Congress authorized\n1. Is the precipitating situation a qualifying \"emergency\" \u2014 an unforeseen set of circumstances calling for immediate action?\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Does the context of the executive branch's actions suggest the invocation of the emergency is pretextual?\n4. Does the action result in longer-term exercise of power or aggrandizement of power to the executive branch?\nB. Applying a tailored emergency action analysis to the student loan relief plan indicates that it exceeds congressional authorization",
        "reference": "2. How close is the nexus between the emergency and the action taken?",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Questions Here Are Far-Reaching And Of Exceptional Importance\nA. The Ninth Circuit Majority Invalidated Common Election Measures Despite Trial Conclusions Favoring The State\nB. The Appellate Outcome Turned On The Legal Test, Not New Fact Finding\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Respondents Cannot Paper Over The Well-Acknowledged Split\nIII. This Is An Exemplary Vehicle\nA. Respondents Cannot Reasonably Dispute Standing When The Ninth Circuit Made The State Itself A Party To The Appeal\nB. The Discriminatory Intent Holding Is No Hurdle To Review",
        "reference": "C. Amici \u2014Including Public Officials From Over Twenty States In Eight Circuits \u2014Confirm The Questions Are Important And Far-Reaching",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF LENITY SHOULD BE APPLIED RIGOROUSLY TO MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING STATUTES\nA. The Rule of Lenity Helps Avoid the Particularly High Costs of Reading Mandatory Minimums Too Broadly\nB. The Risk of Reading Mandatory Minimums Too Broadly Is Also Particularly High\nII. JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE WITH 18 U.S.C. section 924(e)(1) SUPPORTS APPLYING THE RULE OF LENITY\nA. Entries of Separate Structures on a Single Day or Night Are Not Clearly Multiple Different \"Occasions\"\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Evading or Resisting Arrest Does Not Clearly Involve Multiple Different \"Occasions\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1484_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SUPREME COURT RETAINS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DETERMINATION OF ENTITLEMENTS TO WATER FROM THE MAINSTREAM\nA. The Injunctive Relief Sought by the Proposed Third Amended Complaint Necessarily Entails the Judicial Determination of the Nation's Unquantified Claim to Mainstream Water\nB. Repeated Citation to Administrative Programs Implementing the Law of the River Confirms the Third Amended Complaint's Objective of Attaining a Right to Mainstream Water\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Leads to Both Quantification and Prioritization of the Nation's Unadjudicated Claims to the Mainstream\nD. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Undermines the Unified Approach established by this Court to Allocate the Mainstream's Scarce Water Supplies\nII. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FAILS TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC, CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED DUTY OF THE SECRETARY TO ASSESS, PLAN FOR, PROTECT AND MITIGATE FOR THE NATION'S CLAIMED RIGHT TO THE MAINSTREAM\nA. The 1849 and 1868 Treaties are silent regarding any duty of the Government involving the Nation's claimed Mainstream rights\n1. The 1868 Treaty did not impose a fiduciary duty upon the Government to take the actions described in the Third Amended Complaint\n2. [MISSING]\nB. In the absence of specific direction from Congress, courts lack the power to impose, by judicial fiat, a fiduciary duty based either upon the bare reservation of land or this Court's implied reservation of water doctrine in Winters v. United States\nC. The vague nature of the relief sought, and the lack of specific parameters to determine if the alleged duty has been fulfilled, highlights the need for Congress, rather than the courts, to specifically impose any duty of trust upon the Government\nD. The Government's operation of the Mainstream pursuant to the Law of the River does not establish \"elaborate control\" over the resource within the meaning of Mitchell II and cannot serve as the basis for a duty of trust to the Nation to \"secure\" Mainstream water\nE. The Government's assertion of claims in water adjudications on the Nation's behalf does not demonstrate comprehensive control over the resource; the Nation has the authority to bring its own claims and has done so for decades in state adjudications in Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona",
        "reference": "2. The 1934 Boundary Act, while adding land to the Navajo Reservation in Arizona, did not, and could not, amend the 1868 Treaty or otherwise extend any provisions of the Treaty to the subsequently added land",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. CHANGES IN THE LEGAL BACKDROP SUPPORT ELIMINATION OF THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION",
        "reference": "I. THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY EXCEPTION TO THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE IS AT ODDS WITH THE TEXT, HISTORY, AND STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Without meaningful judicial oversight of proposed cy pres class-action settlements, class members are deprived of their legal claims without due process\nA. Present opt-out mechanisms for class-action participation result in effectively zero participation by class members\nB. Without meaningful class participation, class actions are rife with principal-agent problems and conflicts of interest\nC. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)'s \"rigorous analysis\" provides a bare minimum check on abuses by class counsel\nD. Due Process concerns are heightened when the proposed settlement includes a cy pres component\n1. Class counsel maximize fee awards by using cy pres to inflate settlements\n2. Class counsel can double-dip by choosing cy pres award recipients controlled by or benefitting class counsel\n3. Class counsel can improperly lobby presiding judges by selecting cy pres awards that benefit them\n4. Judges have an incentive to approve cy pres awards that benefit themselves\n5. Class members often get little or no benefit from cy pres settlements\nE. [MISSING]\nII. Use of cy pres awards in class-action settlements compels class members to support speech with which they may disagree, in violation of the First Amendment\nA. Class members are likely to be diverse in their political and social views, while cy pres award recipients are likely to share the views of class counsel, defendants, and the district court\nB. If cy pres funds are at all controlled by defendants, class members will be forced to support the views of those who caused their injury, and may even be compelled to support a repetition of the actions that resulted in that injury",
        "reference": "E. The Court should require the Ninth Circuit to honor its Rule 23 obligations and avoid deprivations of due process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts Have Abandoned the Non-delegation Doctrine, and Significant Law-making Power is Now Concentrated in the Executive Branch\nA. The Modern Intelligible Principle Test Allows the Executive Branch to Make Law and Decide Policy\nB. Although Federal Courts Now Treat the Nondelegation Doctrine as a Dead Letter, Data Show Federal Courts Routinely Enforced Nondelegation For a Century, and State Courts Still Do\nC. Lawmaking by Regulatory Bodies Now Outpaces Lawmaking by Congress, and Over One Million 'Regulatory Restrictions' Impose Over a Trillion Dollars in Annual Costs\nD. Congressional Delegations Have Resulted in Over 300,000 Regulatory Crimes, Criminalizing Everything from Mislabeled Marbles to Misshaped Meatloaf\n1. The abundance of federal criminal law is a recent phenomenon\n2. Examples from the 300,000 regulatory crimes show agencies criminalize harmless, garden-variety private conduct\n3. The targeted prosecution of the Shechter Brothers shows the threat that regulatory criminalization poses to liberty\nII. The Court Should Adopt an Originalist Nondelegation Test Rooted in the Text, Structure, and History of the Constitution's Vesting Clauses\nA. The Constitution Does Not Expressly or Implicitly Authorize Congress to Delegate Away the Exclusively Legislative Power to Regulate Private Conduct\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Constitution does not implicitly authorize Congress to delegate its exclusively legislative powers\nB. Congress May Not Delegate to the Executive the Authority to Establish Generally Applicable Rules Governing Private Conduct\nC. Congress May Not Delegate to the Executive the Authority to Make Law on Important, Complex Subjects\nD. Because the Separation of Powers Exists to Protect Liberty, In Close Cases, the Tie Should Go to Liberty",
        "reference": "1. The Constitution does not expressly authorize Congress to delegate its exclusively legislative powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.87
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The APA Authorizes Courts To \"Set Aside\" Regulations In Their Entirety And To \"Stay\" Their \"Effective Date\" Pending Litigation\nB. Amici's Suggestion That Courts May \"Set Aside\" Regulations Only As To Particular Plaintiffs Defies Text and Precedent\nC. The Government And Amici's Policy Concerns Are For Congress To Consider, Overstated, And Outweighed By Countervailing Concerns\nII. NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS UNDER THE APA ARE CONSTITUTIONAL",
        "reference": "I. THE APA AUTHORIZES UNIVERSAL RELIEF FROM REGULATORY ACTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief041.pdf",
        "text": "I. LIFE, AND THEREFORE PERSONHOOD, BEGINS AT CONCEPTION\nA. Science provides a clear picture as to what occurs at the moment of conception.\nB. Conception creates a new person\nII. LAW, INCLUDING OUR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, EXISTS TO ADVANCE AND PROTECT NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD\u2014ESPECIALLY THE RIGHT TO LIFE\nA. The natural law requires, at a minimum, government protection of innocent human life.\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. PROTECTING HUMAN LIFE FROM THE MOMENT OF CONCEPTION IS PART OF THE GOOD THAT THE LAW MUST ADVANCE",
        "reference": "B. Our Nation was created to animate the natural law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-601_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS JURISDICTIONALLY BARRED FROM INTERVENING BECAUSE HE WAS BOUND BY FINAL JUDGMENT AND FAILED TO TIMELY APPEAL\nA. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction\nB. Appellate Intervention Affords No End-Run Around These Jurisdictional Limits\nII. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING INTERVENTION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Denial of Intervention as Untimely Did Not Interfere With State Sovereign Interests, Which Remain Fully Protected by Rule 60(b)(5)\n1. The decision to deny intervention does not close the courthouse door on the Attorney General\n2. This is a suit against individual officers, not the Commonwealth\nIII. HAVING INDUCED THE DISTRICT COURT TO DISMISS HIM FROM THE SUIT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CANNOT NOW ASSUME A CONTRARY POSITION AS THE PREDICATE FOR INTERVENTION",
        "reference": "A. The Sixth Circuit's Conclusion That the Attorney General's Motion to Intervene Was Untimely Was Not an Abuse of Discretion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS KNEW OF THE LIABILITY EXPOSURE FOR VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATIONS, INCLUDING FNHRA, WHEN THEY ACCEPTED FEDERAL FUNDING\nA. Petitioners accepted the liability risk for violations of FNHRA because it was incredibly lucrative\nB. Petitioners negotiated their liability risk related to violations of federal laws and regulations before they accepted federal funds\nC. Petitioners' business practices result in violations of rights under FNHRA\nII. WITHOUT SECTION 1983 CLAIMS, INDIANA NURSING HOME RESIDENTS LACK ADEQUATE RECOURSE\nA. Nursing home residents require a variety of remedies to address a variety of possible harms\nB. Indiana medical malpractice law does not adequately address nursing home claims\n1. Statute of Limitations distinctions\n2. Procedural hurdles\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Contributory Negligence\nIII. FNHRA'S LIMITED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES DO NOT REDRESS RESIDENT HARM AND ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH INDIVIDUAL ENFORCEMENT UNDER SECTION 1983",
        "reference": "3. Damage caps",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1414_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is not in tension with state court decisions\nIII. The \"Bad Men\" treaty argument was not raised below and should not be addressed here",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit's opinion is consistent with this Court's jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Dormant Commerce Clause Protects All States' Policy Choices on an Equal Basis\nB. The Dormant Commerce Clause Is Essential to Maintaining the Separation of Powers\nC. The Dormant Commerce Clause Protects the Right to Earn a Living\n1. Protectionist state legislation prohibits sale of \"ungraded\" butter\n2. The Dormant Commerce Clause supports challenges to protectionist \"Certificate of Need\" (CON) laws\nII. The Dormant Commerce Clause's Ban on Extraterritorial Regulations Counterbalances States' Moral Crusades",
        "reference": "I. The Constitution's Structure Requires Robust Enforcement of the Dormant Commerce Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Software Encompasses Collaborative, Functional Elements Not Present in Traditional Creative Works Subject to Copyright Protection\nB. A Flexible Fair Use Doctrine Is Essential To Accommodate the Modern Software Development Approach \u2014 As Courts Have Long Recognized\nC. Experience Has Shown That a Flexible Fair Use Doctrine Fosters Innovation in Computer Software\nII. The Federal Circuit's Decision Defies Settled Fair-Use Principles and Misapprehends the Nature of the Computer Industry\nA. The Federal Circuit's Disregard of the Functional Nature of Oracle's Declaring Code and SSOs in the Fair-Use Analysis Defies Precedent and Industry Reality\nB. The Federal Circuit Fundamentally Misunderstood What Constitutes a \"Transformative Use\" of Software\nIII. The Federal Circuit's Rigid, Narrow Approach to Fair Use Threatens the Viability of the Interconnected Software Ecosystem",
        "reference": "I. A Flexible Fair Use Doctrine Is Critical To Balancing the Interests of Copyright Protection and Follow-On Innovation in Software",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Respondents' Equal Protection Claim Challenges a General Policy Decision, Which Should be Reviewed Under the Arlington Heights Framework\nB. Respondents' Claim of Intentional Racial Discrimination Meets the \"Outrageous\" Requirement of AADC\nII. The Lower Courts Correctly Concluded that Respondents Plausibly Alleged an Equal Protection Claim Under Arlington Heights\nA. The Factors Supporting an Inference of Discrimination\nB. The Government Cannot Rely on Ipse Dixit to Defeat an Inference of Discrimination",
        "reference": "I. Respondents' Intentional Racial Discrimination Claim is Cognizable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FDCPA'S LIMITATIONS PERIOD BEGINS TO RUN, AS THE STATUTE PROVIDES, ON \"THE DATE ON WHICH THE VIOLATION OCCURS.\"\nA. The FDCPA's Plain Language Answers the Question Presented\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Adhering to the FDCPA's Text Serves the Purposes of Statutes of Limitations Generally, and of the FDCPA in Particular\nII. PETITIONER'S CONTRARY ARGUMENTS ARE WRONG\nA. Petitioner Cannot Explain the FDCPA's Text\nB. The Default Interpretive Presumption Is Irrelevant in Light of the FDCPA's Plain Language and, in Any Event, Is Not the Discovery Rule\nC. Petitioner's Case-Specific Arguments Speak to Equitable Tolling and, However Labeled, Are Both Outside the Question Presented and Waived",
        "reference": "B. This Court's Precedents Confirm that the FDCPA Means What It Says",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. INTERPRETING THE ACA TO LIMIT AGENCIES' AUTHORITY TO EXPAND RELIEF FROM THE CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE IS IN DEROGATION OF THE CONSTITUTION'S VESTING OF ALL LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN CONGRESS\nA. The ACA Includes No Intelligible Principle to Guide the Agencies in Determining What \"Additional Preventive Care\" They Should Mandate\nB. By Vesting \"All Legislative Powers\" in Congress, the Constitution Ensures that the Same Entity that Imposes a Constraint May also Relax It, but a Bar on Administrative Relief Would Defeat that Key Protection\nC. [MISSING]\nII. INTERPRETING THE ACA TO LIMIT AGENCIES' AUTHORITY TO EXPAND RELIEF FROM THE CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTION'S AND RFRA'S PROTECTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS AMERICANS\nA. The Constitution Secures the Religious Liberty of Americans Both Through the First Amendment and by Vesting \"All Legislative Powers\" in Congress\nB. Congress Adopted RFRA in Part to Counteract the Tendency of Unelected Courts and Administrative Agencies to Devalue Free-Exercise Interests",
        "reference": "C. When Agencies Undertake Lawmaking Functions that Were Vested in Congress, Rules that Reduce the Scope of Regulatory Reach Raise Fewer Self-Governance Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "The Ninth Circuit exceeded its authority by invalidating the security policy in this case\nA. The Ninth Circuit lacked statutory authority for its decision\n1. The district court's orders were not \"final decisions\" immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291\n2. The Ninth Circuit did not have authority to issue a writ of \"supervisory mandamus\"\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Respondents lost their personal interest in the outcome of the litigation when their criminal cases ended\n2. Respondents' claims cannot be saved from mootness by construing their challenges as \"functional class actions\"\n3. The exception to mootness for cases \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\" does not apply to respondents' claims",
        "reference": "B. Respondents' claims had become moot before the Ninth Circuit adjudicated them",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 111 Does Not Clearly Empower EPA To Reorganize American Industry\nII. EPA's New Powers Offend Federalism\nIII. Section 111 Requires Source-Specific Regulation\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. This Case Is Not Moot \u2014 And Petitioners Have Standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court should decline to create an Article III exception that excludes nominal damages awards from ordinary justiciability rules.\nA. Nominal damages redress past constitutional injury.\nB. This Court's decisions confirm that nominal damages' primary purpose is past redress of valuable \u2014even priceless\u2014 rights.\nC. At common law, courts routinely awarded standalone nominal damages solely to redress past injuries.\nD. Nominal damages are not a mere analogue for declaratory relief.\nE. The officials' view of nominal damages contradicts Article III requirements.\nII. The officials' reasons for creating a nominal damages exception to Article III are indefensible.\nA. The majority rule does not require advisory opinions.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The majority rule neither wastes judicial resources nor prolongs cases.\nIII. The officials' rule would leave plaintiffs without a remedy and result in more violations of constitutional rights.",
        "reference": "B. The majority rule does not eliminate the mootness doctrine.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. SMALL BUSINESSES ARE CRITICAL TO THE NATION'S ECONOMY\nII. SMALL BUSINESSES FACE THE SAME FINANCIAL CHALLENGES AS CONSUMERS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Small businesses are harmed by abusive lending practices\nC. Small businesses depend on the integrity of the consumer financial markets because small businesses draw on personal wealth and creditworthiness\nIII. THE CFPB HAS TAKEN ACTIONS TO PROTECT SMALL BUSINESSES AND HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE MORE\nIV. THE CFPB MUST REMAIN STABLE AND POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT TO EFFECTIVELY PROTECT SMALL BUSINESSES",
        "reference": "A. Small businesses, particularly minority- and woman-owned ones, face barriers in accessing credit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Circuits are divided on whether victims of past constitutional violations can recover nominal damages as their sole remedy\nB. The Circuits have long been divided on whether nominal damages are legal or equitable\nII. The Eleventh Circuit's decision threatens the integrity of constitutional protections\nA. Orderly society requires proper vindication of constitutional rights\nB. First Amendment rights are perhaps the worthiest of vindication and yet the Eleventh Circuit's ruling leaves many First Amendment victims remediless\nC. Nominal-damage awards are necessary to ensure scrupulous observance of the Constitution\nD. The Eleventh Circuit's treatment of nominal damages as equitable for mootness purposes but legal for qualified immunity purposes creates a \"heads I win, tails you lose\" government shield against victims of proven constitutional violations",
        "reference": "I. Certiorari is vital to resolve a deep three-way Circuit split that, if left unresolved, will chill First Amendment freedoms and leave governments free to violate the Constitution without consequences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. IF THE CITY DID ITS OWN VETTING OF FOSTER CARE FAMILIES, THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE WOULD REQUIRE THAT SAME-SEX COUPLES BE GIVEN FULL, OPEN, AND EQUAL ACCESS AS FOSTER CARE FAMILY APPLICANTS\nA. Same-sex couples and LGBTQ children are constitutionally entitled to equal treatment, free of disadvantage or stigma\nB. [MISSING]\nII. PHILADELPHIA MAY NOT PERMIT A PRIVATE AGENCY ACTING ON ITS BEHALF TO DISCRIMINATE IN ASSISTING THE CITY WITH FOSTER CARE SERVICES\nA. Providing for the care of children who are vulnerable to abuse or neglect is a critical governmental responsibility of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the City of Philadelphia\nB. When the City delegates part of its foster care process to private agencies, it retains full constitutional responsibility for that process\nC. The harms to same-sex couples and LGBTQ children that would follow from granting CSS and other providers license to discriminate are precisely those against which the Equal Protection Clause is directed",
        "reference": "B. If the City chose to do its own foster care placement, any arrangement that targeted and disadvantaged same-sex couples plainly would be unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Standard Governing Stay Requests\nII. The Lower Courts Did Not Clearly Abuse Their Discretion in Denying a Stay of Execution\nA. Ramirez failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, let alone the required substantial showing\n1. Ramirez's challenge to TDCJ's denial of his verbal-prayer request is unexhausted\n2. Ramirez's claims are unlikely to succeed on their merits\na. The RLUIPA claim\ni. TDCJ's refusal to accommodate Ramirez's requests does not substantially burden his religious exercise\nii. [MISSING]\nb. The Free Exercise claim\nB. The State demonstrated that the balance of the equities weighed heavily in its favor\n1. Delay, opportunism, and a presumption against a stay\n2. The parties' respective interests\na. Pastor Moore's breach of TDCJ's nondisclosure agreement and the parties' reactions thereto\nb. Ramirez's interpretation of Respondents' notice\nc. The real irreparable injury analysis\nIII. The Court Should Deny Ramirez a Stay of Execution",
        "reference": "ii. Ramirez fails to make a strong showing rebutting that TDCJ's policy satisfies the least restrictive means test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Text and Context Require Construing the Hobbs Act More Narrowly than Respondent and the Government's Reading\nB. The Hobbs Act Did Not Provide a Prior, Adequate, and Exclusive Opportunity for Judicial Review of the 2006 Order\nC. Respondent and the Government's Position Cannot Be Squared with Other Agency-Review Statutes\nD. Constitutional Avoidance Principles Favor PDR's Interpretation\nII. THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION OF \"UNSOLICITED ADVERTISEMENT\" IS A NON-BINDING INTERPRETIVE RULE",
        "reference": "I. THE HOBBS ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE TCPA DEFENDANTS FROM OBTAINING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FCC LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. ICWA Exceeds Article I Power\nA. The Court has not recognized a plenary and exclusive power that would permit ICWA\nB. Congress's enumerated powers do not support ICWA\n1. Indian Commerce Clause\n2. Treaty Clause\n3. \"War Powers\"\n4. Territory Clause\nC. Unenumerated powers cannot sustain ICWA\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Texas has standing to vindicate the financial costs it suffers to enforce an unconstitutional law\nB. ICWA's racial classifications are subject to\u2014and fail\u2014strict scrutiny\nC. ICWA's classifications fail even rational-basis review\nIII. ICWA Violates the Anticommandeering Doctrine\nIV. Section 1915(c) Violates the Nondelegation Doctrine",
        "reference": "II. ICWA Violates Equal Protection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no split of authority which can be resolved in this case\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The lower courts uniformly hold that ANCs do not have recognized governing bodies of an Indian Tribe\nC. The current case is not a vehicle for resolving an alleged difference between the Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit\nII. The arguments of Petitioners, the State of Alaska, and the Alaska delegation to Congress, that more money should flow to Alaska than to other states is legally immaterial and factually incorrect",
        "reference": "A. There is no split of authority in the lower courts, and never will be a split of authority in the lower courts, on the interpretation of whether ANCs qualify for funds under Title V of the CARES Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "IV. THE TERRITORY CLAUSE ARGUMENT\nV. LIBERTY AND PROPERTY ARE ENSHRINED IN DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND IN THE RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF PERSONS AND CITIZENS\nVI. [MISSING]\nVII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO\nVIII. THE STATUS OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO\nIX. PUERTO RICO AS A BODY POLITIC \u2014 COMMONWEALTH \u2014 WITH THE TYPICAL AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, CONSISTING OF THE THREE INDEPENDENT DEPARTMENTS \u2014 LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL AND A BILL OF RIGHTS GUARANTEEING LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY",
        "reference": "VI. THE INSULAR CASES OF DOWNES V. BIDWELL AND BALZAC V. PORTO RICO",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-382_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT CORRECTLY FOLLOWED THE MAJORITY VIEW THAT CERCLA SECTION 113(F)(3)(B) DOES NOT REQUIRE A SETTLEMENT TO RESOLVE CERCLA SPECIFIC LIABILITY IN ORDER FOR THE SETTLEMENT TO TRIGGER A CONTRIBUTION ACTION.\nA. A Strict Requirement for CERCLA Specific Language Would Undermine Site-Specific Negotiations and Undo Existing Agreements.\nII. THE DC CIRCUIT ERRED BY FAILING TO APPLY TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW IN INTERPRETING THE 2004 CONSENT DECREE.\nA. After Articulating the Correct Standard, the D.C. Circuit Failed to Properly Apply Traditional Principles of Contract Law When Interpreting the 2004 Consent Decree.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Court's Ruling Is Counter to the Goals of CERCLA and Will Allow Parties Responsible for Pollution to Escape Liability for the Pollution They Caused.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA involves the interplay of both federal and state law\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Where generally applicable principles of state contract law provide for waiver of contract rights regardless of prejudice, the FAA does not superimpose a requirement of prejudice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 111 Does Not Authorize EPA To Restructure the Nation's Electricity Sector\nA. Turning Off Sources Is Not a \"System of Emission Reduction\"\nB. Whether and How To Restructure an Entire Industrial Sector Is a Paradigmatic Major Question\nC. No Respondent Identifies Clear Congressional Authorization for EPA To Restructure Industries\nII. Respondents' Interpretation of Section 111 Brooks No Intelligible Principle Cabining EPA Discretion\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Respondents' Various Justiciability Arguments Are Meritless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. With Lemon put to rest, Title VII's reasonable accommodation/undue hardship balancing test should resemble its ADA cognate.\nA. Title VII's and the ADA's parallel text, history, and purposes make them sister statutes.\nB. Courts may look to already-prevailing interpretations of \"reasonable accommodation\" and \"undue hardship\" from all three branches of government.",
        "reference": "I. Hardison was haunted by Lemon.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. EDWARDS' CLAIMS FAIL UNDER AEDPA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Edwards Cannot Show a Violation of Clearly Established Federal Law\nII. INDEPENDENT STATE LAW GROUNDS SUPPORT THE DENIAL OF RELIEF\nIII. PETITIONER WAS DENIED A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY BY THE FIFTH CIRCUIT",
        "reference": "A. The Petition Makes No Attempt to Address AEDPA's Requirements for Federal Habeas Relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Prejudice Should Be Presumed When An Attorney Disregards His Client's Instruction To Appeal Following An Appeal Waiver\nA. By Failing To Appeal, An Attorney Forfeits A Proceeding To Which The Defendant Was Entitled\nB. An Attorney's Refusal To File An Appeal Requested By His Client Usurps A Decision Committed To The Client Alone\nC. It Would Be Profoundly Unfair To Make A Defendant's Right To Appeal Dependent On His Ability To Articulate A Viable Issue For Appeal\nII. Denying A Presumption Of Prejudice Would Be Inefficient And Unworkable\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Even Under The Other Side's Rules, Mr. Garza Is Entitled To Have His Appeal Reinstated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Missouri's Claimed Injury is Not Cognizable Because It Relies on Speculative and Uncertain Harms to MOHELA\nA. Missouri Cannot Derive Standing From Prospective Harm to MOHELA Because MOHELA is Separate From the State\n1. The Text and History of MOHELA's Enabling Act Establish That MOHELA is Independent of the State for Standing Purposes\n2. MOHELA's Response to the Secretary's Plan Further Points to the Authority's Independence\nB. Missouri's Claimed Injury Through the Long-Dormant Lewis and Clark Discovery Fund is Also Not Cognizable\nC. Missouri's \"Arm of the State\" Argument Incorrectly Conflates Sovereign Immunity and Standing\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Any Future Loss in Tax Revenue is Too General and Contingent on a Weak Causal Chain to Confer Standing on the Other States\nB. Any Professed Injury Based on the FFEL Program is Also Speculative",
        "reference": "II. The Other Respondent States Do Not Demonstrate a Significant Risk of Economic Harm Arising From the Secretary's Debt Discharge Plan",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises but not on-premises signs violates the First Amendment\nA. Petitioner's distinction between on-premises and off-premises signs is content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny\n1. Under Reed, petitioner's distinction between on-premises and off-premises signs is content-based because it applies based on the communicative content of the signs\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Applying strict scrutiny is consistent with this Court's pre-Reed precedents\nB. Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises but not on-premises signs fails strict scrutiny\nC. Applying strict scrutiny to petitioner's digitization ban will not invalidate every other regulation distinguishing between on-premises and off-premises signs\n1. Many localities have effective and precise sign regulations that do not draw content-based distinctions\n2. Courts can analyze sign regulations with content-based distinctions under strict scrutiny without watering down the standard\nD. Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises but not on-premises signs also fails intermediate scrutiny\nE. Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises signs is unconstitutional as applied and facially",
        "reference": "2. Petitioner's attempts to limit and distinguish Reed should be rejected",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-200_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 11 Is Not Limited To Registered Shares\nA. Section 11 Applies To Any Security Whose Sale Is Permitted Only Because Of The Filing Of The Challenged Registration Statement\n1. The Difference Between The Parties' Interpretation Of \"Such Security\" Is Narrow\n2. The Ninth Circuit's Reading Better Comports With The Act's Text\n3. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Better Fits The Statute's Design And Purposes\n4. Petitioners' Reading Leads To Arbitrary, Bizarre Results Congress Could Not Have Intended\nB. Petitioners' Contrary Arguments Lack Merit\n1. Petitioners' Textual Arguments Fail\n2. Congress Did Not Make Up For Section 11's Strict Standards By Giving It Limited Reach And Random Application\n3. The '34 Act Did Not Alter The Meaning Or Scope Of The '33 Act's Civil Liability Provisions\n4. Petitioners' Reliance On Barnes Is Misplaced\n5. The SEC Has Never Endorsed Petitioners' Position\n6. Petitioners' Policy Objections Are Irrelevant And Unpersuasive\n7. [MISSING]\nII. Section 12 Is Not Limited To Registered Shares\nIII. If The Court Holds That Section 11 Or 12 Is Limited To Registered Shares, It Should Remand To Allow Further Consideration Of The Standards For Pleading And Proving Statutory Standing",
        "reference": "7. The Untenable Consequences Of Petitioners' Interpretation Are Not The Result Of Modern, Unforeseen Developments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1672_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 3583(K) VIOLATES THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT BY ALTERING THE STATUTORY RANGE OF REIMPRISONMENT ON THE BASIS OF POST-CONVICTION JUDICIAL FACT FINDING\nA. Section 3583(k) is distinct from the system of supervised release the Court considered in Johnson\nB. Under a straightforward application of Apprendi, section 3583(k) is an unconstitutional invasion of the jury trial right\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Section 3583(k) imposes severe penalties on the basis of the limited procedural protections available in a revocation proceeding\n3. Section 3583(k) is a historical outlier and distinct from prior systems of parole and probation\n4. Section 3583(k) encourages further erosion of the role of the jury trial right\nII. THE PROPER REMEDY FOR section 3583(K)'S CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IS TO HOLD THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE UNENFORCEABLE",
        "reference": "1. Section 3583(k) acts as a mandatory sentencing enhancement, increasing both the minimum and maximum term of reimprisonment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Offense \"Renders\" An Alien \"Inadmissible\" If It Triggers The Alien's Adjudication Of Inadmissibility\nA. Overview of parties' positions\nB. An offense \"renders\" an alien \"inadmissible\" or \"removable\" if it triggers the adjudication of inadmissibility or removability\n1. The plain meaning of \"render,\" \"the alien,\" and \"inadmissible\" support Petitioner's interpretation\n2. Petitioner's interpretation makes sense in context, while the government's does not\n3. The two-part structure of the stop-time rule demonstrates that Petitioner's interpretation is correct\n4. The canon of consistent usage supports Petitioner's interpretation\n5. Statutory history provides further support for Petitioner's interpretation\nC. The BIA's Jurado Decision Does Not Warrant Chevron Deference\nII. Alternatively, An Offense \"Renders\" An Alien \"Inadmissible\" If It Could Trigger An Adjudication Of Inadmissibility At The Alien's Removal Hearing\nA. Overview of parties' positions\nB. An alien cannot be rendered \"inadmissible\" if it is legally impossible for him to be charged with inadmissibility\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The government's understanding of an alien's \"status\" is wrong\n3. The government's position conflicts with surrounding provisions\nC. The BIA is not entitled to Chevron deference",
        "reference": "1. Petitioner's alternative view is more consistent with the text than the government's",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-935_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REVIEWING THE DISTRICT COURT'S HABITUAL-RESIDENCE DETERMINATION FOR CLEAR ERROR\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Longstanding Appellate Practice Supports De Novo Review\nC. Appellate Courts' Institutional Advantages Support De Novo Review\nD. The Sixth Circuit's Reasoning In Applying Clear-Error Review Is Not Persuasive\nII. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SHARED PARENTAL INTENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WHERE THE PARENTS ARE NOT ACTUALLY IN AGREEMENT\nA. Text And Context Support An Actual-Agreement Requirement\nB. Requiring Actual Agreement Accords With The Convention's Objects And Purposes\n1. An Actual-Agreement Requirement Facilitates Prompt Resolution Of Return Petitions\n2. An Actual-Agreement Requirement Protects Infants And Prevents Forum-Shopping\n3. An Actual-Agreement Requirement Is Essential To Protect Children Born Into Domestic Violence\nC. Requiring Actual Agreement Accords With The Decisions Of Courts In Other Contracting States\nIII. A.M.T. WAS NOT HABITUALLY RESIDENT IN ITALY UNDER ANY STANDARD OF REVIEW OR HABITUAL-RESIDENCE TEST",
        "reference": "A. The Statutorily Recognized Need For Uniform Interpretation Of The Convention Supports De Novo Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1270_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 363(m) does not impose a jurisdictional limitation on appellate review of sale or lease orders\nA. Statutory limitations on relief are not jurisdictional unless Congress has clearly made them so\nB. Congress did not clearly indicate that Section 363(m) is jurisdictional\nC. The arguments to the contrary lack merit\n1. The court of appeals have not offered a convincing rationale for deeming Section 363(m) jurisdictional\n2. [MISSING]\nD. Because Section 363(m) is not jurisdictional, the court of appeals erroneously failed to consider petitioner's waiver and judicial-estoppel arguments\nII. The court of appeals applied the wrong standard in assessing whether the appellate relief petitioner sought is barred by Section 363(m)",
        "reference": "2. Respondent's arguments also fail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The First Circuit's fact-bound holding that the jury was deprived of relevant mitigating evidence does not warrant review.\nA. The First Circuit's decision does not warrant review.\nB. The First Circuit correctly determined that excluding the Waltham evidence was prejudicial error.\nC. The First Circuit correctly held that the government failed to prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nIII. The First Circuit's application of its long-established voir dire rule does not merit review.\nA. The decision below does not warrant review.\nB. The decision below falls well within the courts of appeals' broad leeway to apply supervisory rules.",
        "reference": "I. This Court should deny certiorari.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no need for \"prompt intervention\" by this Court\nII. Petitioners' merits arguments provide no reason for review\nA. Reviewability\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The motion to dismiss",
        "reference": "B. The preliminary injunction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FAA exempts the employment contracts of airline employees who load and unload cargo\nA. Airline employees are a \"class of workers engaged in commerce\" in the same way as seamen and railroad employees\nB. Even if the relevant class is cargo loaders, they are \"engaged in commerce.\"\n1. When the FAA was enacted, it was well established that cargo loaders are engaged in commerce\n2. [MISSING]\nC. The purpose and historical context of the exemption confirm that airline cargo loaders are exempt\nD. Ms. Saxon is a cargo loader whose contract of employment is exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act\nII. Southwest's contrary interpretation has no basis in the statute\nA. Neither railroad employees nor seamen were defined by border-crossing\nB. The phrase \"engaged in commerce\" has never meant physically crossing state lines\nIII. Southwest's policy arguments offer no valid basis to depart from the text",
        "reference": "2. The more recent usage of the phrase \"engaged in commerce\" as a term of art also encompasses cargo loaders",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal public policy should govern the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses\nA. Federal policy has historically governed maritime choice-of-law clauses\n1. Before Wilburn Boat, maritime contracts were governed exclusively by federal law\n2. After Wilburn Boat, federal policy still governs choice-of-law clauses\n3. [MISSING]\nB. Congressional judgments support applying federal policy\nC. Applying state policies to override choice-of-law clauses would undermine the core values of maritime law\nII. The choice-of-law clause here is enforceable",
        "reference": "3. The decision below departs from the historical consensus",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Public Officials Who Use Social Media to Invoke the Pretense of Authority and to Serve Governmental Functions Can Act \"Under Color of\" Law\nA. The State-Action Inquiry Is Ill-Suited to a Rigid Test\nB. \"Under Color of Law\" Includes Conduct Under Pretense of Law\nC. Identifying State Action Often Requires Consideration of Appearance and Function\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Arguments for Limiting the State-Action Inquiry to Duty or Authority Are Unpersuasive\nIII. Freed's Facebook Activity Constituted State Action",
        "reference": "D. Appearance and Function Help Determine When a Public Official's Social Media Use Is State Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decennial drawing of single-member congressional districts occurs pursuant to federal regulations enacted by Congress.\nA. The statutory phrase \"by law\" includes state courts.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. When Congress enacted 2 U.S.C. section 2c, members of Congress understood that state courts and state constitutions could bind state legislatures under a federal law enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause.\nII. Section 2c is a constitutional exercise of Congress's power.\nA. This Court's precedents recognize Congress's power under the Elections Clause to direct states to comply with state law.\nB. Section 2c is less intrusive than other exercises of power that this Court has deemed appropriate under the Elections Clause.\nIII. The North Carolina legislature recognized that it was bound by the state constitution as interpreted by the state supreme court when it drew its congressional maps.",
        "reference": "B. The statutory phrase \"by law\" includes state constitutions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "In [MISSING]\nA. State and federal appellate decisions on same-sex marriage consistently treated sex and sexual orientation classifications as distinct\nB. This Court has also treated the categories of sex and sexual orientation as distinct",
        "reference": "In the context of the same-sex marriage litigation, this Court, and lower state and federal courts, have had occasion to hold that discrimination against gays and lesbians is a form of sex discrimination but have consistently treated these classifications as distinct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "A. Businesses, like Craft Breweries, that Depend on Clean Water Rely on the CWA's Regulatory Status Quo\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The County and EPA Vastly Overstate the Consequences of the Court Failing to Adopt Their Statutory Interpretation, While Vastly Understating the Negative Consequences of the Interpretation They Urge\nD. The \"Clear Statement\" Rule Invoked by the County Does Not Apply",
        "reference": "B. Regulators and Courts Have Generally Agreed on the CWA's Application to Groundwater: When There Is Clear Evidence of a CWA Violation, Transmission Through Groundwater Does Not Provide an Immunity, Even Though the CWA Does Not Generally Regulate Pollution into Groundwater",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-7622_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A violation of tribal law and a violation of federal law are categorically not the \"same offence\" under the Double Jeopardy Clause\nA. A transgression against tribal law is not the \"same offence\" as a transgression against federal law\n1. An \"offence\" is the transgression of a specific sovereign's law\n2. Indian tribes and the United States are distinct sovereigns\n3. Because petitioner's conduct transgressed each sovereign's law, he committed two \"offences\" and is subject to prosecution and punishment for each\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Petitioner's forum-focused approach cannot be squared with the text or history of the Double Jeopardy Clause\n2. Petitioner's forum-focused approach lacks support in this Court's decisions\nC. Petitioner's attempted application of his forum-focused approach to this case draws unsupported distinctions and illustrates its general impracticality\n1. The Courts of Indian Offenses exercise tribal authority\n2. Petitioner's forum-focused approach would be unworkable\nD. Petitioner's approach would derogate the sovereignty and impair the public safety of tribal communities lacking a standalone judicial branch",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's approach, which focuses on the forum for prosecution rather than the ultimate authority to punish, is unsound",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Courts Should Emphasize Uniform Analysis of Repression of Expression with Emphasis on the Purpose of Freedom of Expression\nII. Education, Not Repression, Fosters Confidence\nIII. Labels and Names Are Dangerous Things\nIV. To the Freedom of Speech, the Judiciary May Be the Most Dangerous Branch\nV. [MISSING]\nVI. The Constitution Requires Proof of a Clear and Present Danger\nVII. The 1776 Declaration Constituted the U.S. and Declared the Nation's Constitution\nVIII. The Constitution Protects People from Each Other",
        "reference": "V. Government Must Prove Each Fact Material to Showing Clear and Present Danger Before Punishing Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Scholarly critics of the founders' choice to empower state legislatures misread the text, history, and precedent.\nA. Text\nB. History\nC. Precedent\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Honoring the founders' choice will not underempower other state actors.\nB. Honoring the founders' choice will not overempower federal courts.",
        "reference": "II. Critics' fears that honoring the founders' choice will \"wreak havoc\" on elections are overblown.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Repudiate Hardison's Non-Textual Interpretation of \"Undue Hardship.\"\nA. The More-Than-De-Minimis Standard Is Dictum and Finds No Refuge In Stare Decisis\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Hardison is also ineligible for the super-stare decisis presumption\n2. Congress is not responsible for fixing Hardison's antonymous definition of undue hardship",
        "reference": "B. Hardison Is Not True Precedent Because the More-than-De-Minimis Standard Is Unmoored from the Statutory Text and Was Adopted without a Minimally Plausible Ratio Decidendi",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Answer to the Question Presented Cannot Be Intuited. It Requires Facts\nA. Any \"Commonsense\" Assessment of the Merits of this Case Must Look to Statistically Grounded Empirical Realities\nB. The Empirics of this Case Cannot Be Intuited, in Part Because They Vary Across Locations. This Case Thus Cannot Be Resolved by a Nationwide Rule of Law\nII. When the Party Bearing the Burden of Proof \u2014here, the State \u2014Presents Zero Evidence to Support an Inherently Factual Claim, that Party Cannot Prevail\nIII. The State Could Have Won This Case Had It Simply Presented Readily Obtainable Evidence Specific to the Location Where the Stop Occurred\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Other Modes of Readily Available Evidence Could Also Have Supported the State's Claim",
        "reference": "A. The Dashboard Computers and Electronic Citations Regularly Employed in Traffic Enforcement Can Provide All the Data Needed to Answer the Question Presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-58_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Texas Has Brought This Action As Part Of An Intentional Strategy Of Shopping For Its Preferred Judges To Enjoin Federal Action Nationwide\nA. [MISSING]\nB. No Readily Apparent Alternative Explanation Explains Texas's Conduct.\nC. Texas's Judge Shopping Cannot Be Justified By Comparing Texas's Conduct To That of Other States.\nII. The Court Should Consider Texas's Judge Shopping In Evaluating Texas's Entitlement To Seek Equitable Relief Against The United States.\nIII. The Court Should Consider Texas's Judge Shopping In Evaluating Whether Equitable Relief Is Appropriate.",
        "reference": "A. Texas Abuses The Orders Assigning Divisional Casework To Virtually Ensure Judges Appointed During Democratic Presidencies Do Not Hear Texas's Cases.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The INA does not bar the States' APA claims\nB. The INA does not bar the States' equitable claims\nII. Although not present here, true jurisdictional bars are not subject to forfeiture\nA. If section 1252(f)(1) were jurisdictional here, the APA bar would not be forfeitable\nB. If section 1252(f)(1) were jurisdictional here, any challenge to review in equity would be forfeited\nIII. Like the District Court, this Court has jurisdiction over the merits",
        "reference": "I. section 1252(f)(1) does not impose any jurisdictional or remedial limits for these plaintiffs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THIS INTERLOCUTORY STATE-COURT DECISION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Case Does Not Fit Any Exception To Section 1257's Finality Rule\nII. LANDOWNERS DO NOT \"CHALLENGE\" AN EPA-ORDERED REMEDIATION\nA. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With No Decision Applying Section 113(h)\nB. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Was Correct\nC. This Petition Is A Poor Vehicle For Addressing Section 113(h)'s Scope\nIII. LANDOWNERS NEED NOT SECURE EPA APPROVAL BEFORE CLEANING THEIR PROPERTIES\nA. The Montana Supreme Court's Conclusion That Landowners Are Not Section 122(e)(6) \"Potentially Responsible Parties\" Conflicts With No Other Decision\nB. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Was Correct\nC. Remaining State-Law Questions Render This Petition A Poor Vehicle For Addressing Section 122(e)(6)'s Scope\nIV. CERCLA DOES NOT OTHERWISE PREEMPT LANDOWNERS' RESTORATION-DAMAGES REQUEST\nA. Consistent With Other Appellate Courts, The Montana Supreme Court Recognized Conflicting State-Law Remedies May Be Preempted\nB. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Was Correct\nV. ANY REVIEW SHOULD AWAIT FINAL JUDGMENT",
        "reference": "A. ARCO Improperly Seeks Review Of A Non-Final State-Court Decision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE'S TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND PURPOSE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE HARDSHIP EXEMPTION IS AVAILABLE \"AT ANY TIME\" A SMALL REFINERY EXPERIENCES DISPROPORTIONATE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP\nA. The Term \"Extension\" Does Not Limit The Hardship Exemption To Small Refineries That Have Been Exempt Continuously\n1. The term \"extension,\" standing alone, has multiple possible meanings\n2. [MISSING]\n3. In the alternative, the temporal meaning of \"extension\" does not require continuity\nB. The Surrounding Terms And Statutory Structure Confirm That Congress Did Not Impose A Continuity Requirement\n1. \"At any time\"\n2. \"A small refinery\"\n3. \"For the reason of disproportionate economic hardship\"\nC. The Tenth Circuit's Continuity Requirement Is Inconsistent With Congress's Purpose For Both The Hardship Exemption And The RFS\nII. EPA'S REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF THE HARDSHIP EXEMPTION IS ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE",
        "reference": "2. The \"make available\" meaning comports with the statutory text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Has Misinterpreted Federal Statutes and the Constitution to Significantly Undermine Congress's Protection of Trademark and Trade Dress Rights.\nA. The Heightened Burden the Ninth Circuit Applied Under the Lanham Act Has No Basis in the Statutory Text or the Constitution.\nB. The Ninth Circuit Erred in Transforming the TDRA's \"Noncommercial Use\" Exception to Authorize Commercial Use of a Mark.\nII. Trademark Law Provides Critical Protection for Consumers and Companies Alike.\nA. Trademarks Inform Consumers and Protect Their Health and Safety.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Trademarks Allow Companies to Protect Their Brands.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Employment Division v. Smith Does Not Do Justice to the Framers' Vision of Religious Liberty\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Parental Rights Are Unalienable Natural Rights\nB. This Court Has Recognized Parents' Fundamental Liberty Interests in the Care, Custody, and Control of Their Children\n1. Education and Religion\n2. Adoption\n3. Foster Care\nC. Parents Have a Constitutional Right to Choose a Foster Care Agency that Will Place Their Children with Foster Parents Who Share Their Basic Values\nIII. The Court Should Not Usurp the Function of Deciding What Beliefs Are or Are Not Central to One's Religion",
        "reference": "II. Biological Parents Have a Liberty Interest in Their Children's Foster Care",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "The Due Process Clause does not prohibit a state from taxing a trust with beneficiaries in that state\nA. The two-part test in Quill governs the due-process analysis here\nB. Under the Due Process Clause, a trust beneficiary's contacts with a state justify taxing her trust\n1. For due-process purposes, a trust is an abstraction, not a distinct legal entity\n2. [MISSING]\n3. A trust beneficiary is a constituent of a trust \u2014 indeed, the most important constituent\n4. The benefits and protections that states give a trust beneficiary justify taxing her trust\nC. Ms. Kaestner's residency in North Carolina justifies the state's exercise of tax jurisdiction over her trust\n1. Ms. Kaestner's North Carolina residency satisfies the first element of Quill\n2. North Carolina's limited tax satisfies the second element of Quill\nII. The Due Process Clause does not mandate the tax shelter that the Trust seeks here\nA. This case presents an opportunity for the Court to reject a judicially created tax shelter\nB. The Trust has actively sought to exploit the tax shelter at issue",
        "reference": "2. The contacts that count for due-process purposes are the contacts of a trust's constituents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents lack Article III standing\nA. The States lack standing\nB. Brown and Taylor lack standing\nII. The Secretary's plan is lawful\nA. The HEROES Act authorizes the plan\n1. The plain text of the HEROES Act authorizes the plan\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Respondents' remaining statutory arguments lack merit\n4. The major questions doctrine provides no reason to depart from the statutory text\nB. The plan is reasonable and reasonably explained\nC. The Secretary's action was procedurally proper",
        "reference": "2. Respondents' attempt to exclude discharge as a form of HEROES Act relief contradicts the Act's text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Trails Act Expressly Preserves the Jurisdiction of Federal Agencies Over Federal Lands Through Which a National Trail Passes\nB. Comparison to Other Laws Confirms That the Trails Act Does Not Divest Federal Agencies of Jurisdiction Over Federal Lands Through Which a Trail Passes\nC. Congress and Federal Agencies Have Consistently Agreed That the Trails Act Leaves Preexisting Jurisdiction Over Federal Lands Undisturbed\nII. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Converting The Entirety Of The Appalachian Trail Into Park System Lands Is Wrong At Every Turn\nA. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Cannot Be Squared With the MLA, the Trails Act, or the Park Service Act\nB. The Fourth Circuit's Interpretation Produces Results That Congress Plainly Did Not Intend\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Frustrates Congress' Policy Judgments",
        "reference": "I. The Forest Service Has Jurisdiction Over, And The Power Under The MLA To Grant Rights-Of-Way To Cross, Forest System Lands Through Which A National Trail Passes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. SPEECH ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES MUST BE PROTECTED WITH PARTICULAR VIGOR\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. NOMINAL DAMAGES SERVE TO VINDICATE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS MINORITIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Board's Initial Determination That the Section 315(b) Time Bar Does Not Preclude Inter Partes Review Should Be Reviewable as Part of the Final Written Decision\nA. Section 314(d) should not shield Board action that contravenes its statutory authority\nB. Judicial review is warranted to correct Board errors\nC. Congress did not intend to insulate the Board's determination of its own statutory authority from judicial review\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Permitting Appeal of Section 315(b) Determinations Would Not Undermine Any Policy Underlying the AIA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Barring faith-based schools from participation in scholarship programs perpetuates discrimination by ignoring the historical connection between religious persecution and the makeup of today's private school sector\nII. Excluding faith-based schools from participation in religiously neutral school choice programs hampers these programs' ability to achieve the secular purposes of raising student achievement, improving life outcomes, and providing benefits to both students and society as a whole\nA. ACE's third-party evaluation of its programs shows significant improvement for students, including students attending religious schools, across a variety of metrics\nB. Scholarship programs can positively impact more than one generation at a time through an educational and social \"ripple effect.\"\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Empirical research on parental choice programs corroborates their effectiveness at achieving secular purposes related to improved academic achievement, higher educational attainment, and life outcomes\nIII. Withholding a generally available public benefit solely on the basis of religion violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Montana's exclusion of religious schools from its public scholarship program is a \"clear infringement on free exercise.\"\nB. Locke does not justify Montana's categorical exclusion of religious schools .. 25",
        "reference": "C. The success of K-12 scholarship students provides widespread and significant benefits to society as a whole",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS ORIGINALLY UNDERSTOOD, THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTED THE RIGHT OF THE RELIGIOUS TO SPEAK AND TO REMAIN SILENT.\nA. Religious liberty was profoundly important to the Founding Generation; religious convictions were understood to receive greater deference than mere personal opinion.\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS \u2014 ESPECIALLY ITS DEMANDING APPLICATION OF THE LEAST-RESTRICTIVE MEANS TEST \u2014 DEMONSTRATE AGREEMENT WITH THE FOUNDING GENERATION'S ROBUST RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTIONS.\nIII. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION CANNOT BE SQUARED EITHER WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S RICH HISTORY OR THIS COURT'S PROTECTION OF BELIEVERS' FREE SPEECH RIGHTS.",
        "reference": "B. The Founding Generation's understanding of religious liberty encompassed protection for believers from compelled speech that violates firmly held religious beliefs.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The public interest in donor disclosure identified in the election context is also important outside the election context\nB. The exacting scrutiny described in the Court's election cases applies in the same way to non-election cases\nC. Examples of nonprofits' activities demonstrate the public's compelling need for disclosure",
        "reference": "I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS VINDICATED BY THE IDENTIFICATION OF LARGE DONORS TO CHARITABLE ENTITIES THAT TAKE POSITIONS ON ISSUES OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's rule nullifies key Fourth Amendment purposes\nII. Petitioner's rule advances key Fourth Amendment purposes, as shown by how it best protects family privacy\nA. The Fourth Amendment helps hold officials accountable for mishandling child-welfare investigations\n1. Officials often do not obtain valid consent from parents\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The Fourth Amendment protects parents and children\n1. Most child-welfare investigations uncover no wrongdoing\n2. Unjust child-welfare investigations can harm parents and children\nC. Petitioner's rule best ensures that the Fourth Amendment protects vulnerable parents and children",
        "reference": "2. Officials often assert exigent circumstances when none exist",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 2 Does Not Authorize Vote Dilution Claims.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Any Other Interpretation Would Create a Statute that Exceeds Congress's Authority Under the Fifteenth Amendment.\nII. Gingles' Framework for Vote Dilution Claims is Unworkable.\nIII. Requiring Race-Conscious Redistricting Violates the Fourteenth Amendment.",
        "reference": "A. Redistricting Decisions Are Not Covered by Section 2's Text.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1484_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1395hh(a)(2) did not require notice-and-comment here\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Respondents' position would substantially undermine the agency's ability to administer the Medicare Program",
        "reference": "II. Section 1395hh(a)(4) did not independently require notice-and-comment rulemaking here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari Is Unwarranted Because EPA Is Reconsidering Its Approach to Regulating CO2 Emissions from Power Plants and Petitioners Face No Present Obligations.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. None of Petitioners' Arguments Justify Immediate Review.\nII. Certiorari Is Unwarranted Because the Decision Below Was Correct.\nA. The Court of Appeals Correctly Rejected the ACE Rule's Reading of an Atextual Restriction into Section 111.\nB. The Statutory Dispute Here Does Not Implicate the Major-Questions Doctrine.\nC. Westmoreland's Argument Based on Section 112 Does Not Merit This Court's Review.",
        "reference": "A. EPA's Ongoing Rulemaking Process Makes This Case an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle for Reviewing the Questions Presented.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in holding that Section 1225 compels the Executive Branch to reinstate MPP\nA. Congress did not compel the Executive Branch to send noncitizens into a foreign territory whenever immigration detention capacity is insufficient\nB. DHS's longstanding immigration detention and release practices are consistent with statutory requirements\n1. Respondents' reading of the detention authority in Section 1225(b)(2)(A) contradicts Castle Rock\n2. Respondents misdescribe the INA's bond and parole authorities\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ministerial exception does not require a rigid formula that elevates an employee's formal title over his actual religious functions\nII. A narrowed ministerial exception would jeopardize the ability of Catholic universities to follow church authority and preserve their religious identity\nA. To preserve its religious identity, a Catholic university must comply with far-reaching principles and norms established by the Roman Catholic Church\nB. Catholic university presidents play a crucial role in preserving the religious identities of their schools\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Despite their religious functions, Catholic university presidents would likely fall beyond the scope of a narrowed ministerial exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1143_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. The FAA's text and context establish that Vaden's \"look-through\" approach does not apply to motions under Sections 9 and 10\nB. Longstanding jurisdictional rules and procedural norms further promote the FAA's plain-text reading\nC. Respondents' other jurisdictional theories are legally and logically baseless\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The FAA's purpose and history are consistent with reading Sections 9 and 10 to mean what they say",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1915(a)'s classifications are racial, not political\nII. Section 1915(a) cannot withstand strict scrutiny\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1915(a) is not narrowly tailored",
        "reference": "A. Section 1915(a) serves no compelling government interest",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Dormant Commerce Clause Safeguards Against Tariff-Like Protectionist State Regulations.\nA. Tariffs And Tariff-like Protectionist Measures Are The Paradigmatic Dormant Commerce Clause Violations.\nB. In Applying The Dormant Commerce Clause To Facially Neutral State Regulations, The Court Has Focused On Whether The State's Regulatory Scheme Generates Tariff-Like Effects.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. A Proper Reading Of The Court's Past Precedents Suggests That Facially-Neutral State Laws With Ancillary Effects on Out-of-State Commerce Should Be Invalidated If They Give Rise To Protectionist, Tariff-Like Effects.\nB. This Reading Of Baldwin, Brown-Forman, And Healy Aligns With The Common Sense Realities Of Our Federal System.\nC. Proposition 12 Is Not Comparable To The Laws Struck Down In Baldwin, Brown-Forman, And Healy.",
        "reference": "II. The Court's Decisions In Baldwin, Brown-Forman, And Healy Struck Down Tariff-Like Protectionist Measures Bearing No Resemblance To Proposition 12.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONAL BASIS TEST HINDERS CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF THE FEDERAL TERRORIST WATCHLIST",
        "reference": "I. EXACTING SCRUTINY REQUIRES GOVERNMENTS TO DEMONSTRATE A COMPELLING INTEREST AND NARROW TAILORING WHEN COLLECTING ASSOCIATIONAL INFORMATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIRD-PARTY ADMINISTRATORS, SUCH AS PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS, PROVIDE CRITICAL SERVICES TO ERISA PLANS\nA. ERISA Encourages Employers Voluntarily to Establish Health Benefit Plans Subject to a Uniform Set of Requirements\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Pharmacy Benefit Managers Administer Some of the Most Expensive ERISA Health Benefits for Employers: Prescription-Drug Benefits\nD. The Roles of Employers and Health-Insurance Providers on the One Hand, and PBMs on the Other, Are Inextricably Intertwined in Administering a Typical Drug Claim\nII. ARKANSAS'S LAW AND LAWS LIKE IT IN OTHER STATES SUBSTANTIALLY HAMPER THE ADMINISTRATION OF ERISA PLANS\nA. Act 900 Increases ERISA-Plan Costs by Interfering with the Administration of the Employer Sponsor's Defined Benefits\nB. Act 900 Prevents the Uniform Application of ERISA-Plan Benefits\nC. Act 900 Impacts ERISA-Plan Design\nD. Upholding Act 900 May Threaten the Efficient Use of Other TPAs\nIII. ERISA PREEMPTS ACT 900\nA. ERISA Preemption Extends to the Agents of ERISA Plans No Less Than to the Plans Themselves\nB. There Is No Presumption Against Preemption under ERISA's Express Preemption Provision\nC. Act 900 Makes a \"Reference to\" ERISA Plans",
        "reference": "B. Third-Party Administrators Are Commonly Relied Upon to Administer ERISA Plans",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government-debt exception does not violate the First Amendment\nA. The government-debt exception is not content-based\n1. The applicability of the government-debt exception turns on the economic activity in which the caller is engaged\n2. Acceptance of the court of appeals' approach would cast doubt on many laws that regulate discrete spheres of economic activity\nB. The government-debt exception satisfies First Amendment scrutiny\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The government-debt exception satisfies intermediate scrutiny\nII. If the Court holds that the government-debt exception violates the First Amendment, the Court should sever that provision from the rest of the TCPA\nA. The government-debt exception is severable from the remainder of the TCPA\nB. Respondents' contrary arguments lack merit",
        "reference": "1. The calls that are covered by the government-debt exception serve the important interest in protecting the federal fisc, and they place less significant burdens on consumer privacy than do most calls subject to the automated-call restriction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. After Daimler, courts overwhelmingly agree that consent-by-registration is unconstitutional.\nII. The decision below is correct.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. If the Court is inclined to review this issue, this case is a better vehicle than Cooper.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "REQUIRING THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT TO APPLY CURRENT LAW IN ITS COLLATERAL INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF PETITIONER'S 1993 STATE SENTENCES OR REQUIRING RESENTENCING TO CORRECT THE EDDINGS ERROR WOULD UNNECESSARILY DISTURB THE PRINCIPLES OF FINALITY AND COMITY\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Requiring application of current law violates the principles of finality\n2. Requiring resentencing to correct Eddings error violates the principles of finality\nB. Comity and federalism require federal courts to allow state courts to adjudicate state law issues\nC. The costs of perpetual litigation",
        "reference": "A. Central to the criminal justice system is respect for finality",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONER DILIGENTLY PURSUED HIS RELIGIOUS EXERCISE ACCOMMODATION AND EXHAUSTED AVAILABLE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES AS TDCJ SHIFTED SPIRITUAL ADVISOR RULES TO EXCLUDE MORE RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR FROM THE EXECUTION CHAMBER\nA. TDCJ Employees Incrementally Unveiled New Piecemeal Restrictions On Religious Exercise That Appear Nowhere In The April 2021 Execution Protocols, Announcing Them Only Through Informal Communications With Petitioner And His Counsel\nB. The PLRA Poses No Obstacle To Petitioner's Claims\nII. UNABLE TO SATISFY RLUIPA, THE STATE REWRITES THE STATUTE TO FLIP ITS BURDEN ONTO PETITIONER\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE COURT SHOULD REMAND RATHER THAN CONDUCT A \"FIRST VIEW\" OF NEW AND UNTESTED EVIDENCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The right-to-control theory of wire fraud was the sole theory of conviction\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Indictment\n2. Order sustaining the indictment\n3. Government letters confirming the theory of prosecution\n4. Arguments and rulings limiting the scope of the defense\n5. Jury instructions\n6. Summation\n7. Appeal\nB. The government's new fraudulent-inducement theory was not charged, tried, or accepted by the jury here\n1. The indictment did not charge a \"scheme for obtaining money or property\"\n2. The government insisted its theory was only the right-to-control fraud\nII. Defendants are entitled to acquittal",
        "reference": "A. This case was charged and tried on the now-disavowed right-to-control theory",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.77
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE UNITED STATES IS CORRECT THAT THE COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT REVIEW TO OVERRULE ITS PRECEDENTS\nIII. THE UNITED STATES IS CORRECT THAT THIS CASE IS A FLAWED VEHICLE",
        "reference": "I. THE UNITED STATES IS CORRECT THAT SFFA SEEKS TO RELITIGATE THE CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF TWO LOWER COURTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. PETITIONER'S FIRST-SALE RULE WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HARMFUL FOR LOCAL RETAILERS AND OTHER SMALL BUSINESSES",
        "reference": "I. PETITIONER'S CAUSATION RULE WOULD SHIFT LITIGATION EXPOSURE AND LIABILITY FROM LARGE MANUFACTURERS THAT ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR PRODUCT DEFECTS TO LOCAL BUSINESSES THAT ARE NOT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-281_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The House has not demonstrated that it represents the Commonwealth as a matter of state law\nB. The House lacks a cognizable institutional interest in the location of district lines\nII. The district court applied an improper legal standard for racial predominance\nA. Racial predominance is a demanding standard\nB. The district court did not apply a sufficiently demanding predominance standard\n1. The district court placed too much weight on a statewide racial threshold\n2. The district court failed to assess race as part of a holistic analysis of each district as a whole\n3. The district court failed to perform an independent analysis of racial predominance in each district\nC. The Court should remand for application of the correct predominance standard",
        "reference": "I. The House lacks standing to appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULE OF LAW REQUIRES LOWER COURTS TO ADHERE TO PRECEDENT, IN PRINCIPLE AND IN PRACTICE\nA. Stare Decisis Is Central To Our Legal System And Sustaining Respect For The Judiciary\nB. The Rule of Law Also Requires Faithful Adherence To The Structural Components of Our Legal System\nII. WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH DIRECTLY CONTROLS THIS CASE\nA. The Fifth Circuit Erred In Finding Cognizable Benefits\n1. The Legal Analysis\n2. The Factual Analysis\nB. The Burdens of Act 620\n1. The Legal Analysis\n2. The Factual Analysis\na. [MISSING]\nb. Doe 3",
        "reference": "a. Doe 2",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Rule 51 makes clear that a defendant need not object after the imposition of a sentence longer than he advocated to preserve a claim that his sentence is substantively unreasonable\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Substantive reasonableness is a standard of appellate review, not a freestanding claim\nB. Post-sentencing objections to the length of a sentence are unnecessary to facilitate efficient and informed decision-making",
        "reference": "II. The Fifth Circuit's reasons for imposing a post-sentencing objection requirement do not withstand scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ORDINANCE ON ITS FACE UNQUESTIONABLY CONSTITUTES A \"TAKING\" OF PETITIONER'S PROPERTY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ordinance violates the Takings Clause by disturbing Petitioner's occupancy without adequate provision for just compensation\nC. The Ordinance is so oppressive that the Township should have been required to exercise the power of eminent domain\nD. Williamson County's exhaustion requirement has created a tangled web that ensnares aggrieved landowners and allows the government to evade its Fifth Amendment responsibility to compensate them\nII. WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S SECOND PRONG CONFLICTS WITH DECADES OF THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT AND RENDERS THE TAKINGS CLAUSE INFERIOR TO OTHER PROVISIONS IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS\nA. Congressional intent to guarantee a federal forum for the vindication of federal constitutional rights is evident in section 1983 and predecessor statutes dating back to the Civil Rights Act of 1871\nB. The state exhaustion requirement creates an unwarranted inequality between the Fifth Amendment and parallel provisions of the Bill of Rights\nC. Federal courts routinely adjudicate violations of other constitutional rights, including those that implicate land use, with no state exhaustion requirement",
        "reference": "A. The \"mere enactment\" of the Ordinance is a \"taking\" of Petitioner's property that mandates \"just compensation.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. The Appointments Clause Protects the Liberty of American Citizens, Regardless of Where They Live\n1. The Appointments Clause Protects Liberty\n2. The Appointments Clause Protects Institutional Concerns as well as Liberty\nB. The Board Members Are Officers of the United States, not Officers of the Puerto Rico Territorial Government\n1. The Practical Reality of Federal Control and Supervision Shows the Board Members Are Officers of the United States\n2. The Source of the United States and the Board's Preferred Test \u2014 Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) \u2014 Is Inapposite\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY PROSPECTIVELY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is a prohibition on facilitating or soliciting unlawful conduct, not a ban on speech\nB. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is not unconstitutionally overbroad\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Respondent's fallback arguments are not properly before the Court and lack merit in any event",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State of Mississippi has a Compelling Interest in Unborn Life\nII. Viability is a Poor Marker for Gaging the State's Interest in Unborn Life\nIII. This Court Should Overrule Roe and Casey, Jettison the Viability Standard, and Allow the State to Further its Interest in Unborn Life\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Mississippi's 15-Week Prohibition Relying on Medical Markers of Life is Warranted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs Failed To Allege That Facebook Or YouTube Aided And Abetted The Act Of International Terrorism That Caused Their Injuries\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Complaint Fails to Allege That Facebook or YouTube Knowingly and Substantially Assisted the Reina Attack\nC. The Ninth Circuit Improperly Conflated the Act of International Terrorism and the Organization That Perpetrated It\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Lax Conception Of \"Knowingly Providing Substantial Assistance\" Cannot Be Reconciled With The Statutory Text Or The Common-Law Principles It Incorporates\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Stark Departures From Traditional Aiding-And-Abetting Principles Produce Untenable Consequences\nIV. Faithful Interpretation And Application Of The ATA Suffices To Resolve Both This Case And Google v. Gonzalez",
        "reference": "A. Section 2333(d)(2) Imposes Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Only If a Defendant Knowingly and Substantially Assisted the Act of International Terrorism That Injured the Plaintiff",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. EXTREME PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS SUCH AS NORTH CAROLINA'S AND MARYLAND'S ARE RARE, JUDICIALLY MANAGEABLE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS\nA. The North Carolina And Maryland Maps Are Unquestionably Extreme Partisan Gerrymanders\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Extreme Partisan Gerrymanders Are Deeply Anti-Democratic And Offend Basic Constitutional Principles\nD. North Carolina's And Maryland's Extreme Partisan Gerrymanders Violate Those Constitutional Principles\nE. Appellants' Contentions That Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Non-Jus ticiable Lack Merit\nII. STRAIGHTFORWARD FACTORS CAN HELP COURTS DETECT EXTREME PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS\nIII. INVALIDATING EXTREME PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS WILL ENHANCE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE COURTS AND OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT",
        "reference": "B. Extreme Partisan Gerrymanders Are Relatively Rare",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The States' Petition Raises Important and Timely Questions\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Consequences of the D.C. Circuit's Ruling Are Significant",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government's attempt to minimize the case's importance is unsuccessful\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The government's defense of the Ninth Circuit's remand decision misses the mark",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Invoking third-party standing here improperly shifts legislative authority to courts\nII. This Court would have to seize legislative power to grant facial relief because it is indisputable that the challenged statute has thousands of lawful applications\nA. Under the large fraction test, Plaintiffs must prove that the statute is unlawful nearly all of the time\nB. Legislatures alone have authority to change the statutory rights for people who have no legal claim\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. After Gill v. Whitford, Plaintiffs lack standing to seek facial relief under the large fraction test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTORY TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND PURPOSE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT A \"PERSON\" UNDER THE AIA REVIEW PROVISIONS\nA. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here\nB. Under This Court's Precedent, \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government, Unless There Is an Affirmative, Contrary Showing by Congress, Which Is Absent Here\n1. There Is an Interpretive Presumption Against \"Person\" Including the Government\n2. There Is No Affirmative Showing by Congress to Overcome the Presumption That the Government Is Not a \"Person\" in the AIA Review Provisions\nC. There Is No Exception for the U.S. Postal Service\nII. AIA REVIEWS ARE PREDICATED ON STATUTORY ESTOPPEL NOT APPLICABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT, SUPPORTING EXCLUSION OF THE GOVERNMENT FROM PURSUING SUCH REVIEWS\nA. The Estoppel Effect of AIA Reviews Is Central to the Structure and Purpose of the Reviews\nB. Reading \"Person\" to Include the Government Would Allow It to Pursue Duplicative Patent Challenges, Contrary to the Structure and Purpose of AIA Reviews\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Principles of Equitable Estoppel Offer No Justification for the Government's Counter-Textual Interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Rule That Best Promotes the Strength and Stability of the Trademark System Will Benefit the U.S. Economy and the Bankruptcy System\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Significance of Trademark Licenses to the U.S. Economy\nII. The Sunbeam Rule Best Promotes the Strength and Stability of the Trademark System\nA. The Sunbeam Rule Furthers the Interests of Trademark Licensors, Licensees, and Consumers\nB. The Sunbeam Rule is Consistent with the Lanham Act's Quality Control Obligations\nC. The Sunbeam Rule is Consistent with the Text and Purpose of the Bankruptcy Code\nD. The Force of the Sunbeam Rule is Shown by the Other Courts That Have Followed It",
        "reference": "A. The Law of Trademarks and Trademark Licensing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATE LAW PROTECTIONS FOR CHILDREN IN THE WOMB ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES\nA. The Text of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Its Interpretation by the Executive Branch Do Not Exclude Children in the Womb from the Legal Protections Afforded by the Covenant\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Other State Parties to the Covenant Do Not Exclude Children in the Womb from the Protections of the Covenant\nII. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW DOES NOT ESTABLISH A RIGHT TO ABORTION BY CUSTOM\nA. International Consensus is Against an International Right to Abortion\nB. When International Human Rights Mechanisms Promote Abortion as a Human Right, They Are Acting Ultra Vires and Cannot Create New Obligations\nIII. THE COURT HAS THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO CLARIFY WHETHER THE MISSISSIPPI GESTATIONAL AGE ACT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES\nA. Pursuant to Its Constitutional Authority, the Court May Declare Its Interpretation of Article 6 of the Covenant\nB. The Court Should Define U.S. Human Rights Obligations to Prevent Interference by International Human Rights Mechanisms and Foreign Powers in U.S. Domestic Abortion Debates\nC. The Court Should Define the Legal Status of Children in the Womb Pursuant to U.S. Treaty Obligations to Promote a Consistent Approach to Fundamental Human Rights by the Executive Branch",
        "reference": "B. The Travaux Preparatoires of the Covenant Affirm a Wide Agreement Among the Covenant's Framers That Children in the Womb Were Not Excluded from Its Protections",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS THE RUCHO COURT RECOGNIZED, THE FFDA IS A PROPER LIMITATION ON THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE'S REDISTRICTING AUTHORITY WHICH FLORIDA'S STATE COURTS MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY ENFORCE.\nA. For Decades, Gerrymandering by Both Democrats and Republicans Diluted Floridians' Votes.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Federal and State Courts Have Repeatedly Upheld the FFDA Against Elections Clause Challenges.\nD. The FFDA Is Constitutional Under The Elections Clause.\nII. LIKE THE FLORIDA COURTS, NORTH CAROLINA'S COURTS MAY LAWFULLY REVIEW CONGRESSIONAL MAPS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.\nA. The North Carolina Supreme Court's Actions At Issue Were Authorized By The State's Voters And Its Legislature.\nB. Petitioners' Argument That The Provisions At Issue Are Too \"Open-Ended\" Lacks Any Basis And Is Unworkable.",
        "reference": "B. In a Vivid Example of Citizen Democracy, Floridians Enacted the FFDA.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1606_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. Petitioner obtained a final decision within the meaning of Section 405(g)\n1. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement under Section 405(g)\n2. Judicial review is available under Section 405(g) regardless of whether the Appeals Council addresses the merits\nB. Section 405(g)'s \"after a hearing\" requirement is satisfied in this case\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The district court may address the merits of petitioner's claim if it overrules or excuses petitioner's failure to exhaust\nE. A holding in favor of petitioner would have a very modest impact on the federal courts' caseload",
        "reference": "C. Chevron deference does not apply in these circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief043.pdf",
        "text": "I. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS FURTHER THE PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Anti-Discrimination Laws Promote Religious Liberties\nII. A RULING FOR PETITIONERS WOULD UNDERMINE RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES\nA. Free Speech is Incidental to the Right Petitioners Actually Seek to Protect\nB. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere\nC. Petitioners' Proposed Exception to CADA Could Result in Impermissible Discrimination Against Individuals Because of Their Religion\nIII. APPLICATION OF CADA ON THE PRESENT FACTS IS NOT A FREE SPEECH CLAUSE VIOLATION\nA. CADA Regulates Conduct, Not Speech\nB. CADA Should Be Subject to Intermediate Scrutiny At Most, But Survives Any Level of Scrutiny",
        "reference": "A. Anti-Discrimination Laws Like CADA Are a Legal Tradition in This Country",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ICWA IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF CALIFORNIA'S JUVENILE DEPENDENCY SCHEME AND IS VITAL TO PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY'S INDIAN CHILDREN\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE ICWA'S DEFINITION OF \"INDIAN CHILD\" AND ITS CHILD PLACEMENT PREFERENCES ARE POLITICAL DESIGNATIONS AND PROMOTE SELF-GOVERNANCE BY SOVEREIGN TRIBAL NATIONS",
        "reference": "II. THE HISTORY OF RELOCATION CONTRIBUTED TO THE ICWA'S NECESSITY, AND THEREFORE, THE PURPOSE OF THE ICWA WOULD BE DEFEATED IF IT WERE LIMITED TO INDIAN CHILDREN ON OR NEAR INDIAN LANDS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Byrd May Challenge The Search As Unlawful Because He Had A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In The Rental Car\nA. Byrd had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car because he had possession and control of the car with the renter's permission\n1. Possession and control over a closed space establishes a reasonable expectation of privacy\n2. Byrd had sole possession and control over the rental car when the troopers searched it\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Authorized-Driver Provision Did Not And Should Not Render Byrd's Expectation Of Privacy In The Locked Trunk Of The Rental Car Objectively Unreasonable\nA. Byrd's reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car did not depend on compliance with the authorized-driver provision\n1. The terms of private agreements generally do not negate otherwise objectively reasonable expectations of privacy\n2. Authorized-driver provisions have nothing to do with reasonable expectations of privacy in rental cars\n3. Breach of a rental agreement does not terminate one's reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car\nB. Basing the scope of the Fourth Amendment on rental agreements creates incentives to stop rental cars and engage in suspicionless searches\nC. Basing the scope of the Fourth Amendment on rental agreements would fail to provide clear guidance to officers in the field\nIII. The Third Circuit Also Erred In Suggesting That Byrd Had No Constitutionally Protected Property Interest In The Car",
        "reference": "B. Byrd's expectation of privacy in the rental car is all the more reasonable because his fiance rented it and allowed him to use it",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1712_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A plan beneficiary has standing to assert claims on behalf of the plan for injuries to the plan\nB. A breach of fiduciary duty, standing alone, constitutes a cognizable injury to a plan beneficiary\nC. A material increase in the risk of monetary loss is a cognizable injury\nII. Beneficiaries of overfunded ERISA defined benefit plans who allege breach of fiduciary duty may sue under Section 502(a)(2)\nIII. Beneficiaries of overfunded ERISA defined benefit plans who allege a breach of fiduciary duty may sue under Section 502(a)(3)",
        "reference": "I. Beneficiaries of an overfunded ERISA defined benefit plan who allege a breach of fiduciary duty have Article III standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ADAMS HAS STANDING TO PURSUE THIS ACTION\nA. Adams Suffers an Injury-in-Fact as He is Denied the Ability to Apply for a Judgeship Due to His Lack of Membership in a Major Political Party\n1. Categorical Exclusion from Government Employment and the Chilling Effect on the Exercise of First Amendment Rights Constitute Injury-in-Fact\n2. Adams Did Not Have to Make a Futile Application for a Judgeship to Have Standing\n3. Petitioner Failed to Establish that Adams Acted Dishonestly in Bringing his Complaint\nB. The Provisions Are the Direct Cause of the Injury\nC. A Decision from this Court Will Redress the Injury\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. POLITICAL AFFILIATION IS NOT REASONABLY RELATED TO EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE AS A JUDGE\nA. Judges Are Not \"Policymakers\" in the Elrod/Branti Sense\nB. People of All Political Viewpoints Can Serve Effectively as Judges\n1. Election Judges are Not Comparable to Courtroom Judges\n2. The Decisions of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits Do Not Conflict with the Third Circuit\nIII. THE PROVISIONS DO NOT SERVE A COMPELLING STATE INTEREST AND ARE NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO SERVE SUCH INTEREST\nA. Strict Scrutiny is the Proper Standard of Review as the Provisions Cause a Severe Infringement of Adams' Associational Rights Under the First Amendment\nB. The Challenged Provisions Do Not Support a State Interest\nC. Petitioner Has Not Shown That There Are No Less Restrictive Alternatives\nIV. AFFIRMANCE WILL NOT IMPERIL INDEPENDENT AND OTHER COMMISSIONS\nV. THE POLITICAL BALANCE PROVISION CANNOT BE SEVERED FROM THE MAJOR PARTY PROVISION",
        "reference": "II. APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO QUALIFICATIONS FOR STATE COURT JUDGES DOES NOT VIOLATE PRINCIPLES OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.63
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Constitutional Provisions Constrain States' Exercise Of Legislative Power Under The Elections Clause\nA. This Court's Precedents Uphold The Applicability Of State Constitutions\nB. Petitioners' Independent State Legislature Theory Would Upset Established Precedent\nC. [MISSING]\nII. States Have Legitimate Reliance Interests In Their Constitutional Provisions That Provide Checks And Balances\nA. The Independent State Legislature Theory Will Impede States' Efforts To Eliminate Partisan Gerrymanders\nB. Many States Rely On Independent Commissions To Address Gerrymandering",
        "reference": "C. Stare Decisis Should Compel This Court To Reject Petitioners' Invitation To Overrule Well-Established Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 3 Must Be Strictly Construed\nA. Strict construction is warranted because Section 3 is penal\ni. Section 3 is penal\nii. Penal provisions are strictly construed in favor of individuals\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Section 3 Is Not Applicable To Trump\nA. Section 3 does not cover the President of the United States\nB. Trump did not engage in an insurrection or rebellion",
        "reference": "B. Strict construction is necessary to avoid interfering with Trump's First Amendment rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-826_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Brecht cannot always subsume AEDPA/Chapman, as even Davenport concedes\nB. Review under Brecht is independent and does not involve any level of deference\nC. Unlike AEDPA, Brecht does not require a habeas petitioner to prove anything\nII. Even under Davenport's approach, the Sixth Circuit should have applied AEDPA/Chapman\nIII. Davenport has not shown that the state court's harmlessness determination was an unreasonable application of Chapman\nA. The Michigan Court of Appeals' opinion was the last reasoned decision\nB. The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable\nC. The Michigan Supreme Court's decision was not objectively unreasonable",
        "reference": "I. Brecht and AEDPA/Chapman are distinct standards, and both must be applied before habeas relief is granted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. This Court Reviews Executive Action For Compliance With Congress's Dictates Even If National Security Is At Issue\nB. Respondents' Separation From Their Families As A Result Of The Proclamation Suffices For Standing Under The Establishment Clause\nII. THE GOVERNMENT'S READING OF THE INA CLASHES WITH THE STATUTE'S BAR ON NATIONAL-ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION AND RAISES SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS\nA. The Government's Interpretation Of Section 1182(f) Conflicts With The INA's Bar On National-Origin Discrimination In Immigration\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS COURT NEED NOT LIMIT ITS ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INQUIRY TO THE PROCLAMATION'S ASSERTED PURPOSE\nIV. THE PROPER SCOPE OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR THE ALLEGED STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IS A MATTER OF EQUITABLE DISCRETION",
        "reference": "B. The Government's Reading of Section 1182(f) Raises Grave Constitutional Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PANEL'S LENIENT EXTRATERRITORIALITY TEST CONFLICTS WITH THE TESTS OF ITS SISTER CIRCUITS AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS INHERENT IN EVERY ATS CASE LOOM LARGE HERE",
        "reference": "II. COURTS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER A PLAINTIFF MAY RAISE AN ATS CLAIM AGAINST A DOMESTIC CORPORATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since the Founding, the Nation's military has benefitted from free religious expression among the chaplaincy and soldiers\nA. The chaplaincy has a storied history in the American military\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Free religious expression is also vital to non-chaplain servicemembers\nII. The Ninth Circuit's decision should be reversed\nA. The decision below could create confusion as to when military chaplains are engaging in protected speech\nB. The decision below could create confusion about whether \u2014 and, if so, under what circumstances \u2014 the government \"endorses\" religious speech that it fails to censor",
        "reference": "B. The chaplaincy is critical to today's military, and free religious expression is critical to the chaplaincy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Circuit Splits Are Real\nB. The Sixth Circuit's Erroneous Decision Will Prevent Children With Disabilities From Vindicating Their Rights\nII. THE COURT SHOULD ALSO REVIEW THE SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED\nIII. CUMMINGS IS NO BARRIER TO REVIEW",
        "reference": "I. THE COURT SHOULD CONFIRM SECTION 1415(l)'S FUTILITY EXCEPTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent Identifies No Vehicle Issue That Would Prevent The Court From Reconsidering Hardison's More-Than-De-Minimis Test\nA. [MISSING]\nB. As Judge Hardiman's dissent demonstrates, Groff would have a strong possibility of prevailing under a proper undue-hardship standard\nC. Whether federal employees could assert a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is irrelevant to the question presented\nII. The Second Question Presented Also Warrants This Court's Review",
        "reference": "A. Respondent's proposed alternative ground for affirmance creates no vehicle issue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pain is a Widespread and Consequential Public Health Problem, and Care for Patients with Pain is a Primary Duty of Healthcare Providers.\nA. There is no single standard of care for treating pain, and views on opioid prescribing are in flux.\nB. Changing views of opioid prescribing and fear of criminal prosecution under the CSA combine to deter providers from exercising good medical judgment.\nC. Overdeterrence has had predictable and significant negative downstream effects on patients.\ni. Providers are refusing to treat patients with pain.\nii. Patients are being subjected to practices that risk their health and safety.\nII. To Obtain a Conviction Under Section 841(a), the Government Must Prove That a Physician Knowingly or Intentionally Acted Without a Legitimate Medical Purpose in the Usual Course of His Own Practice.\nA. The statutory and regulatory text mandate that violations be knowing or intentional, and accord with the presumption of scienter.\nB. The objective elements of the regulations should be read as consistent with the subjective mens rea requirement, so that together they separate good actors from bad actors.\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Jury instructions must clearly require the subjective mental states of knowledge or intention.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's Linchpin Argument That \"The Alleged Practical Difficulties Of [Sales Tax] Collection Have Now Vanished\" Is Unfounded\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. If Quill Were Abrogated, A Stronger Test Than \"Economic Nexus\" Would Be Warranted To Preserve Meaning To The Dormant Commerce Clause\nIV. In Light Of The Severe Burden On Interstate Commerce That Would Result If Quill Were Abrogated, State Authority To Enforce Its Tax Laws Against Remote Sellers Should Not Be Further Extended To Local Jurisdictions\nV. Were The Court To Abrogate Or Change The Quill Rule To Permit States To Have Taxing Jurisdiction Over Remote Sellers, Any New Rule Should Be Limited To States That Adopt A Simple Tax Collection System",
        "reference": "II. Quill Continues To Remain Important As A Bright-Line Standard To Balance Interests In Commerce Among The States And The Federal Government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief045.pdf",
        "text": "I. School Segregation and Educational Inequality Persist.\nA. De Facto Segregation has been Growing in Elementary and Secondary Schools.\nB. One Result of Such Segregation is Persistent Educational Inequality.\nC. Unequal Educational Opportunities Contribute to Continuing Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gaps.\nII. Because of Racial Isolation and Educational Inequality, Race-Neutral Higher Education Admissions Procedures Are Often Inadequate to Produce Diverse College and University Enrollments.\nA. Traditional Measures of College Readiness Do Not Fairly Reflect the Academic Promise of Many Minority Students, Particularly Many African American and Hispanic Students.\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. There Also Continues to Be a Need for Narrowly Tailored Race-Conscious Student Assignment Measures at the Elementary and Secondary Level.",
        "reference": "B. Many Colleges and Universities Effectively Use Narrowly Tailored Race-Conscious Admissions Policies to Create Diverse Enrollments to Benefit All Students.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Not Address the Constitutionality of State Laws Whose Extraterritorial Effect is Legal Rather Than Practical",
        "reference": "I. Proposition 12 Violates the Commerce Clause Because It Controls Out-of-State Commerce by Practical Effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-8255_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "THE ACCUSED'S EXPRESS DECISION WHETHER TO CONCEDE GUILT IS PROTECTED BY THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS\nA. Failure To Heed A Client's Decision To Maintain His Innocence Violates Fundamental Rights\n1. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right to Plead Not Guilty\n2. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right Regarding Testimony on One's Own Behalf\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Making Concessions Can Be a Sound Trial Strategy\n2. Regardless of Potential Strategic Advantages, Defense Lawyers May Not Override a Client's Express Desire to Maintain Innocence\n3. Permitting Defense Lawyers to Override a Client's Express Desire to Maintain Innocence Undermines the Attorney-Client Relationship\nC. Defense Lawyers Have Strategic Options Beyond Conceding Guilt",
        "reference": "B. A Defense Lawyer's Trial Strategy May Not Override A Client's Express Decision To Maintain Innocence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "THE PEACE CROSS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Peace Cross Is Constitutional\n1. The purpose and objective meaning of the Peace Cross are secular\n2. The Peace Cross fits within an undisputed tradition of displaying crosses as symbols of sacrifice and military valor\n3. Invalidating the Peace Cross would sow division and threaten hundreds of other monuments\nC. The Court Should Not Revisit Its Longstanding Precedents Or Apply Lemon Here",
        "reference": "A. The Establishment Clause Does Not Categorically Prohibit Displaying A Cross As A Symbol Of Sacrifice And Loss",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-530_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Transfers Of Corporate Stock Are Not \"Money Remuneration\" Under The RRTA.\nA. Stock Is Not A Generally Accepted Medium Of Exchange And Thus Is Not \"Money\"\nB. The Exemptions Do Not Change The Plain Meaning Of \"Money Remuneration\" And Are Not Surplusage\nC. Giving \"Money Remuneration\" Its Plain Meaning Respects The Textual Differences With FICA, And Is Consistent With The RRTA's History And Purpose\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The IRS Regulation Does Not Support The Government And Does Not Deserve Deference",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTION ESTABLISHED A GOVERNMENT OF SEPARATED POWERS TO PROTECT INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Appointments Clause Was Intended To Limit Both Executive and Legislative Power\nB. The Appointments Clause Was Also Intended To Limit the Diffusion of the Appointment Power To Protect the Governed and Increase Accountability\nIII. THIS CASE SHOWS THE DANGER OF UNACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT AND THE GROWING THREAT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE\nA. The SEC's ALJs Exercise \"Significant Authority\" and, Therefore, They Are Inferior Officers Subject to the Appointments Clause\nB. This Court Should Reconsider Its \"Significant Authority\" Test, Which Is Inconsistent with the Constitution and This Court's Early Jurisprudence\n1. The Expanding Administrative State Requires Accountability\n2. An Employee Need Not Exercise \"Significant\" Authority To Be an \"Officer\" Under the Appointments Clause\n3. Buckley's \"Significant Authority\" Standard Was Not Well Considered\n4. Buckley Can Be Read Consistently with the Court's Early Case-Law",
        "reference": "II. WITHOUT STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY ARE THREATENED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Compelling pro-life pregnancy centers to speak government-created messages violates the Free Speech Clause\nA. Speech discussing the issue of abortion from a pro-life viewpoint receives full First Amendment protection\nB. The Act compels Petitioners to speak the government's message\nC. The Act impermissibly regulates speech based on content and therefore deserves strict scrutiny\nD. The Act regulates speech based on viewpoint, the most egregious form of speech regulation\n1. The Act targets speakers with a viewpoint the State disfavors\n2. [MISSING]\nII. No Standard Less Than Strict Scrutiny Applies to This Content-Based and Viewpoint-Targeted Compelled Speech\nA. The Act does not regulate commercial speech\nB. The Act does not regulate \"professional speech.\"\nC. There is no \"abortion exception\" to the First Amendment\nIII. The Act Cannot Survive Constitutional Review\nA. No compelling state interest justifies the Act\nB. The Act is not narrowly tailored to achieve any asserted interest\nC. The Court should adopt a per se rule that viewpoint discrimination against private speech is unconstitutional\nD. The Act fails any level of scrutiny",
        "reference": "2. The Act promotes the government's viewpoint while suppressing Petitioners' opposing viewpoint",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1164_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is a circuit split on an important question of law\nII. The Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is not one of the rare jurisdictional statutes of limitations\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The District Court's holding that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is jurisdictional caused it to apply an improper standard of review",
        "reference": "III. This Court has never held that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is jurisdictional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. Self-Executing Force of Section 3\nB. History of Section 3\nC. The Purpose of Section 3\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Operative Topic of Section 3",
        "reference": "D. Enforcement of Section 3",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1155_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A court of appeals may not presume that testimony is credible and true based solely on the absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The court of appeals improperly presumed that respondents' testimony was true\nC. A court may not presume that an applicant's testimony is credible merely because the Board failed to make an express adverse credibility finding\nII. At minimum, the Dai court erred in refusing to remand the case to the agency for further consideration",
        "reference": "A. A court may not presume that an applicant's testimony is true based on the absence of an express adverse credibility finding",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1484_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. The jurisdictional question is the cornerstone issue in this case\n2. The jurisdictional question must be resolved by this Court\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. The breach of trust question must be resolved by this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Preferences Given to Legacies, Dean's Interest List Students, and the Children of Faculty Have Little to Do with the Attributes of Applicants\nB. Athletes Are Also Recruited by Harvard for Reasons Other than Their Individual Characteristics\nII. Harvard's Focus On ALDC Preferences Undermines True Diversity",
        "reference": "I. Harvard's ALDC Preferences Display A Lack Of Focus On The Individual Characteristics Of Students",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-439_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. NANCE'S CLAIM SOUNDS IN section 1983, NOT HABEAS.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. RESPONDENTS' RULE WILL CLOSE THE COURTHOUSE DOORS TO THE VERY CLAIM THIS COURT UNANIMOUSLY PRESERVED IN BUCKLEW.",
        "reference": "II. IF NANCE'S CLAIM SOUNDS IN HABEAS, IT IS NOT SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit's use of Rogers as a threshold test places an improper heightened burden on the trademark owner\nB. This Court should reject Rogers as a threshold test and instead adopt the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits' adherence to the plain language of the Lanham Act\nII. UPHOLDING THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION WILL ACCENTUATE A THREAT OF INJURY TO THE PUBLIC AND NEGATIVELY IMPACT THE CONSUMER PROTECTION GOALS OF THE LANHAM ACT",
        "reference": "I. THE TRADITIONAL LANHAM ACT LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION ANALYSIS IS APPLICABLE TO A HUMOROUS USE OF ANOTHER'S MARK IN A COMMERCIAL CONTEXT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FTC Act Does Not Impliedly Strip The District Court Of Jurisdiction Over Axon's Structural Constitutional Claims\nA. Plain Text and the Thunder Basin Factors Support Jurisdiction Here\nB. Neither Constitutional Avoidance nor Judicial Economy Justifies Abstention\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Timely Judicial Review Of Claims Like Axon's Is A Critical Bulwark For Preserving Individual Liberty",
        "reference": "II. Nothing In The APA Or The FTC Act Precludes Axon's Right To Equitable Relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reject Claims That the Free Exercise Clause Contains or Even Suggests a Broad Constitutional Right to Abortion.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Some religious proponents of a constitutional right to abortion do not seek individual accommodations; instead, they suggest a novel concept of religious liberty that allows religious adherents to veto laws that they consider religiously objectionable and to entirely prevent the state from pursuing its chosen policy.\nC. This Court should reject the novel concept of religious liberty put forward by proponents of a constitutional right to abortion because adopting that approach would undermine existing Free Exercise rights.\ni. Presented with the consequences of completely invalidating laws that burden any religious adherent's faith, courts might refrain from even considering granting relief in all but the most extreme of cases.\nii. Even assuming that courts did not take a step as drastic as further narrowing the scope of the Free Exercise Clause, adopting a religious-veto view in place of a religious-accommodation view would make the calculus that courts undertake when determining whether to grant relief to religious objectors less favorable to such objectors.\niii. The current accommodation-based approach effectively balances between two important governmental interests: protecting religious exercise and allowing the state to pursue otherwise legitimate interests with minimal interference.",
        "reference": "A. Religious liberty protections help religious adherents flourish by allowing them to exercise their faith while fully participating in public life.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "The statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim seeking damages for the initiation of criminal proceedings based on fabricated evidence does not begin to run until those proceedings are terminated in the criminal defendant's favor\nI. The statute of limitations on a Section 1983 claim seeking damages for the initiation of criminal proceedings based on fabricated evidence begins to run when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action\nII. A Section 1983 plaintiff seeking damages for the initiation of criminal proceedings based on fabricated evidence does not have a complete and present cause of action until those proceedings terminate in his favor\nA. [MISSING]\nC. The Court should adopt the favorable-termination requirement as an element of the constitutional tort\nIII. On remand, petitioner's claim likely should be dismissed on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity",
        "reference": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1215_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TEXT POINTS TOWARD A RULE LIMITED TO STATEMENTS ABOUT A DEBTOR'S OVERALL FINANCIAL STATUS\nA. \"Respecting\" Also Is Used To Describe The Subject Of A Statement\nB. Context Refutes Appling's Expansive Interpretation Here\nII. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 523(a)(2)(A) CONFIRM THAT CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND TO EXCUSE ALL ORAL LIES RELATED TO FINANCES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Statutory History And \"Honest Debtor\" Rule Confirm That Congress Intended Only A Narrow Exception\nC. Appling's Remaining Attempts To Distort The History And Purpose Of Section 523(a)(2) Fail",
        "reference": "A. The \"Related To\" Rule Creates An Implausibly Large Exception That Even Appling And His Amici Do Not Defend",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ORDINARY TOOLS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ESTABLISH THAT MERE ACCESS TO INFORMATION IN PLAN DISCLOSURES DOES NOT SUFFICE TO CONFER \"ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE\" OF FIDUCIARY BREACHES ON PLAN PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The legislative history of Section 413(2) confirms the meaning of the plain text\nII. ERISA'S PURPOSES TO MAKE FIDUCIARIES RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING PLAN INVESTMENTS AND TO REMOVE JURISDICTIONAL BARRIERS AND PROVIDE READY ACCESS TO THE COURTS WOULD BE ILL-SERVED BY PETITIONERS' COUNTER-TEXTUAL READING OF SECTION 413(2)",
        "reference": "A. The text of Section 413(2) plainly requires more than constructive knowledge",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Harvard Uses the Diversity Interest Recognized in Grutter to Justify Its Discrimination Against Asian Americans in Admissions Just as It Previously Used the \"Character and Fitness\" Rationale to Discriminate Against Jews\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Today, Harvard discriminates against Asian-American applicants, who, like the Jewish applicants of the 1920s and 1930s, are meeting Harvard's admissions standards in increasingly high numbers\nII. Harvard Employs the Same Subjective Methods in the Admissions Process to Intentionally Discriminate Against Asian-American Applicants That It Used to Intentionally Discriminate Against Jews\nA. Harvard used various methods in the admissions process to detect the stereotypical characteristics of Jews with the intention of reducing the admissions of Jewish applicants\nB. Today, Harvard's \"personal rating\" in the admissions process is used to evaluate Asian-American applicants based on prejudicial assumptions and stereotypical characteristics with the intention of reducing the admissions of Asian-Americans",
        "reference": "A. During the 1920s, Harvard revised its admissions policy for the sole purpose of reducing the number of Jewish students",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Tingley's \"speech is conduct\" rule conflicts with NIFLA and impermissibly empowers governments to regulate disfavored speech just by labeling that speech as conduct.",
        "reference": "I. SB 5722 imposes a content-based restriction on government-disfavored speech, severely limiting the rights of professionals to speak and the rights of their patients to receive professional advice.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief061.pdf",
        "text": "I. PRE-VIABILITY PROHIBITIONS ON ABORTION ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL WHERE THEY RESULT IN ONEROUS OUT-OF-STATE TRAVEL TO OBTAIN CARE.\nA. The Court has consistently affirmed that having to travel long distances to receive abortions, and the costs associated with such travel, are substantial obstacles to abortion access.\nB. The Court has also long held that the number of women burdened by a restriction is central to assessing its constitutionality.\nII. PRE-VIABILITY PROHIBITIONS ON ABORTION WILL RESULT IN SHARP INCREASES IN TRAVEL DISTANCES FOR A LARGE FRACTION OF WOMEN.\nA. Increased abortion restrictions do not lower demand but instead force women to travel out-of-state to obtain care.\nB. Abortion limits adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic foreshadow the increased interstate travel that will result from pre-viability bans.\nC. Sharp increases in travel distances will result from widespread adoption of pre-viability bans.\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. TRAVELING OUT OF STATE FOR ABORTIONS IMPOSES SEVERE FINANCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND MEDICAL BURDENS, WHICH DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECT WOMEN OF COLOR AND THOSE LIVING IN POVERTY.\nA. Many women seeking abortions outside their home state experience serious financial hardship.\nB. Traveling out of state to obtain abortions has significant psychological effects that should not be overlooked.\nC. Forcing women to travel out of state to obtain abortions can undermine their medical decision-making abilities and subject them to needless medical risks for otherwise safe procedures.\nD. Women living in poverty and women of color disproportionately shoulder burdens arising from out-of-state abortions.",
        "reference": "D. Increased demand in states with continued abortion access will require some women to travel even farther to obtain timely abortions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Remains Justiciable\nII. \"Confidential\" Has A Well-Established Plain Meaning That Does Not Require Showing Competitive Harm\nA. No common-law \"term of art\" supports respondent's proposed competitive-harm test\nB. \"Confidential\" has an unambiguous plain meaning that lacks any harm element\nC. Congress has not ratified National Parks\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. If Any Competitive-Harm Test Survives, Respondent Presents No Meaningful Objections To FMI's Proposed Reformation",
        "reference": "D. Giving \"confidential\" its plain meaning advances FOIA's purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. General History of School Choice in Michigan\nII. Particulars Involving the Detroit Public Schools\nA. Detroit Public Schools' Performance on National Assessment of Educational Progress\nB. Significant Education-Related Events in Detroit\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Exercise of School Choice by Detroit Residents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TCPA'S CELLPHONE-CALL BAN VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT\nA. The Cellphone-Call Ban Is Content-Based\nB. The Cellphone-Call Ban Fails Strict Scrutiny\nC. The Cellphone-Call Ban Would Also Fail Intermediate Scrutiny\nII. THE CELLPHONE-CALL BAN MUST BE STRUCK DOWN\nA. Unconstitutional Speech Restrictions Must Be Invalidated\n1. Striking Down Exceptions Does Not Remedy The First Amendment Injury\n2. [MISSING]\n3. This Court Uniformly Invalidates Speech Restrictions, Not Exceptions\n4. The Government's Contrary Arguments Lack Merit\nB. As Rewritten By The Fourth Circuit, The Cellphone-Call Ban Still Violates The First Amendment",
        "reference": "2. Striking Down Exceptions Undermines Core Constitutional Values",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Draft's Allowing States to Offer No Exception for the Mother's Life, Is Reminiscent of Some Recorded Auschwitz Experiences\nB. Other Material Omissions: The Draft Not Only Seriously Evades, It Even Misleads Outright, Such as with Leges Henrici Primi\nC. A Court Assumption That the Constitution Is Silent on Abortion, May Be Erroneous\nD. \"The Court Can Do What It Wants\" \u2014 But It Has to Be Thoughtful and Considerate to All Americans' Rights and Dignities\nII. THE COURT COULD ALSO LOSE CREDIBILITY BY ALLOWING CAMERAS AT COURT PROCEEDINGS; OR, \"HOLLYWOOD AT 1 FIRST STREET NE?\"\nIII. PETITIONERS' \"EXPRESSIVE\" OR \"ARTISTIC\" SPEECH \u2014 NOT TO MENTION AMICAE/I'S OR JUSTICES' SPEECH \u2014 MAY DESERVE SERIOUS FREEDOM\nIV. THE LACK OF A WEDDING CAKE MAY AID PETITIONERS\nV. IS A LOWER COURT'S IDEA OF \"MONOPOLY\" CORRECT? OR, THE CURIOUS CASE OF CATIE COURTESAN\nVI. BOSTOCK MAY NOT HAMPER PETITIONERS' FREEDOM OF SPEECH\nVII. PETITIONERS' CLAIMS MAY ALLOW A BUSINESS TO DISCRIMINATE RACIALLY \u2014 SO PETITIONERS MAY WANT TO NARROW OR CAREFULLY FRAME THEIR CLAIMS\nVIII. ON DENIAL OF SERVICES TO \"RELIGIOUS NAZI\" OR INTERFAITH MARRIAGES, ETC.; AND \"STATUS VERSUS CONDUCT\" ISSUES\nIX. IF GRANTED RELIEF, PETITIONERS SHOULD RECEIVE REASONABLY NARROW RELIEF, SO AS NOT NEEDLESSLY TO HURT MEMBERS OF ANY VULNERABLE MINORITIES OR OTHER PERSONS\nX. ONE FAIR SOLUTION COULD INVOLVE FINING PETITIONERS FOR THEIR BURDEN ON SAME-SEX COUPLES, BUT WITHOUT FORCING FUTURE COMPLIANCE OR THREATENING SHUTDOWN OR JAIL TIME",
        "reference": "I. THE DRAFT MAY GROSSLY REDUCE THE COURT'S CREDIBILITY, DUE TO MATERIAL AND/OR MISLEADING OMISSIONS, ETC. RE MORE ISSUES THAN JUST ABORTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-565_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOES NOT EXCLUDE OR DISFAVOR LOCAL LEGISLATIVE PRAYER\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Opinion Below Conflicts With The Respect This Court Affords Local Officials\nII. THE DIVIDED DECISIONS BELOW LEAVE MUNICIPALITIES NO GOOD OPTIONS FOR COMPLYING WITH THE CONSTITUTION\n1. Chaplain\n2. Chaplain-by-Committee\n3. Religious Balancing\n4. Silence",
        "reference": "A. The Opinion Below Misperceives The Nature Of Local Public Service And Prayer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A waiver of representative actions is a waiver of substantive rights",
        "reference": "I. A wide variety of representative actions, including PAGA actions, are fully compatible with traditional, bilateral arbitration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Integrity of the Immigration System Requires \u2014 as Reflected by the Passage of Numerous Laws by Congress \u2014 Meaningful Enforcement Outcomes for Aliens Who Violate Our Immigration Laws\nII. MPP Provided Numerous Benefits Related to the Systemic Integrity of the Immigration System: Not Only Reducing the Flow of New Illegal Aliens into the United States, But Also Enabling DHS to Provide Meaningful Enforcement Consequences for Aliens Apprehended at the Southwest Border\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The DHS Fiscal Year 2020 Enforcement Lifecycle Report Makes It Abundantly Clear: DHS Removes Those Aliens it Detains, and it Does Not Remove Those Aliens it Releases Into the United States\nB. Monthly Reports Submitted to the District Court Below Document DHS Releasing Over 750,000 Aliens into the United States Over the Last 13 Months\nC. Additional Data Demonstrate That DHS Will Not Remove the Overwhelming Majority of Aliens Released into the United States\nIV. By Failing to Consider MPP's Benefits and Its Ability to Apply Meaningful Enforcement Consequences, DHS Acted Arbitrary and Capriciously by Terminating MPP.",
        "reference": "III. Additional Statistics Highlight the Extent of MPP's Substantial Benefits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Notes on Change in Amicus Practice: or, the Soft Statism of Reducing Amicus Briefs to 8000 Words\nII. Nonaccountability for Crimes Makes the President a One-Man \"Deep State\", Which Is Un-American\nIII. The Passive Wording of Article II, Section 3, Clause 5 Helps Show the President Is Not the Sole Wielder of Executive Power, but Is More of a Conduit, and Even Potential Target, of Such Power\nIV. The Executive Branch Is Not Even a Fully Self-Ruling Branch, Seeing, e.g., Other Branches' Choosing or Including Executive Officers\nV. The \"President Is a Rapist\" Scenario: or, Making the President a Protected Predator Is a Bad Idea\nVI. [MISSING]\nVII. One Alternative: If Necessary, the President Could Be Investigated without Being Incarcerated, or Even Indicted\nVIII. Respondent Needlessly Cedes That Trial/Prison Would Violate Article II, When That May Not Be True at All\nIX. Citizens United and the Scenario of a President Hillary Clinton Who Avoids Criminal Process for 8 Years\nX. The Corruptive \"Ring of Invisibility\" That the Court Should Not Give to Criminal Presidents\nXI. A Biblical View of Allowing a Chief Executive to Run Amok\nXII. The Current Presidency Is a Particularly Bad Time to Loosen the Reins on the Chief Executive, Due to That Official's Lack of Recognition of His Proper Boundaries",
        "reference": "VI. The President Should Be Subject to States' Criminal Process, but Not to an Excessive or Needless Extent. (With Examples)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court should grant review of the second question presented regardless of whatever action it takes on the first and third questions presented.",
        "reference": "I. Petitioners and the United States agree that this Court should review the circuit split on the appropriate standard of deference owed to foreign sovereign legal statements.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1495_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. The Self-Incrimination Clause's text, interpreted in light of its purpose, focuses on the use of a defendant's statements to determine guilt or punishment\nB. This Court's decisions confirm that incrimination prohibited by the Self-Incrimination Clause focuses on the use of a statement at the guilt or penalty phase of a criminal trial\nC. Historical practice supports the conclusion that the Self-Incrimination Clause does not extend to uses of a statement in pretrial proceedings where guilt and punishment are not adjudicated\nD. Extending the Self-Incrimination Clause to pretrial proceedings would have adverse consequences for the criminal process\nE. The use of respondent's statements at a probable cause hearing did not constitute incrimination prohibited by the Self-Incrimination Clause",
        "reference": "The use of respondent's statements at a pretrial probable cause hearing did not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Read in Context, \"System\" Means a Technological System and Related Processes, Practices, Equipment, etc.\nIII. For Years Before the Clean Power Plan Was Issued, EPA Acknowledged that section 7411(d) Deals Solely with At-the-Source Technological Systems of Emissions Reduction\nIV. Nowhere in the Clean Air Act does Congress Delegate the Greatly Enlarged Powers Claimed by EPA in the Clean Power Plan",
        "reference": "I. Congress Has Clearly Expressed its Intent that \"Any Measures\" States Take to Control Pollution Be Applied \"At [the] Source\" of the Pollution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITIES EXIST IN THE PATENTS GRANTED TO MINORITY INVENTORS\nA. Significant Gaps Persist In The Number African-American, Hispanic, And Female Inventors\nB. Congress Sought To Promote Innovation For Minority Small Inventors .. 8\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. MAINTAINING LEGISLATIVE REVIEW OF THE APJS PROTECTS SMALL INVENTORS FROM UNFAIR REVIEW\nA. The Court Should Affirm That APJs Are Principal Officers Because Of The Lack Of Review By A Principal Officer\nB. Severing The Civil Service Protections Of APJs Is Unconstitutional And Increases Political Pressure\nC. Judicial Independence Is Crucial To Protect The Interests Of Small Inventors",
        "reference": "II. CONGRESS INTENDED TO PROTECT SMALL INVENTORS DURING THE POST-GRANT REVIEW PROCEEDINGS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioners' Contrary Arguments In This Court Present No Basis For Certiorari",
        "reference": "I. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied This Court's Precedents To Hold That The Committee's Subpoena Is Valid And Enforceable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief055.pdf",
        "text": "I. Universities Have A Compelling Interest In Attaining The Educational Benefits Of Racial Diversity\nA. Research And Experience Confirm That Racial Diversity Has Compelling Educational Benefits\nB. Consideration Of Race As One Of Many Factors Is Necessary To Evaluate Candidates As Individuals\nII. [MISSING]\nA. U-M Has Undertaken Extensive Race-Neutral Efforts To Promote Diversity\nB. U-M's Sustained Race-Neutral Initiatives Have Not Achieved Racial Diversity In Enrollments",
        "reference": "II. Despite Extraordinary Efforts, U-M's Race-Neutral Recruiting And Admissions Initiatives Have Failed To Yield Racial Diversity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This subpoena is barred by the President's immunity\nA. The District Attorney acknowledges that immunity can extend to process targeting unofficial acts\nB. This category of process interferes with the President's official duties\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Constitution strikes the balance in favor of immunity\nII. The District Attorney lacks a heightened need for these documents\nIII. The judgment should not be affirmed even under the District Attorney's case-specific approach",
        "reference": "C. Clinton and Nixon do not require a different result",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-761_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Case's Interlocutory Posture Would Make It a Poor Vehicle in Which to Consider Whether an Inmate Has a First Amendment Right to Use \"Threatening\" or \"Abusive\" Language in a Grievance\nB. This Case's Underdeveloped Record Would Make It a Poor Vehicle in Which to Assess the Constitutionality of Restrictions on \"Threatening, Abusive, and Irrelevant\" Language in Prison Grievances\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Court of Appeals' Decision Regarding Qualified Immunity Does Not Warrant This Court's Review\nE. Amici's Additional Concerns Do Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "reference": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Neither Contrary to This Court's Precedent Nor an Outlier Among the Circuits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-315_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. HARVARD TPS RECIPIENTS HAVE DEEP ROOTS IN THEIR COMMUNITIES, AND SUPPORT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THEIR FAMILIES, THEIR LOCAL ECONOMIES, AND THE NATION\nA. Harvard University Is Dependent on Many TPS Recipients to Provide Critical Support Across the University\nB. Harvard TPS Recipients Have Children and Spouses, Many of Whom Are U.S. Citizens, That Are Dependent on Their Remaining in the Country\nC. Harvard TPS Recipients Contribute Significantly to Local, State, and Federal Economies Through Their Taxes and Spending Power, and Could Contribute Even More If They Became Permanent Residents\nII. HARVARD TPS RECIPIENTS NEED A SAFE AND ACCESSIBLE PATHWAY TO PERMANENT RESIDENCY\nA. The Temporary Nature of TPS Presents Undue Financial and Emotional Costs for Harvard TPS Recipients\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Eligible TPS Recipients Should Not Be Required to Disrupt Their Lives and Return to Unsafe Conditions in Their Countries of Origin to Obtain Permanent Residency",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The October Memorandum is final agency action.\nII. The court of appeals' reasons for declining to recognize the October Memorandum as final agency action lack merit.\nA. The court of appeals erred by regarding the October Memorandum as a further explanation for the June Memorandum, rather than as a new agency action.\nB. The reopening doctrine does not apply when the agency takes action to effectuate a policy change.\nC. The court of appeals was incorrect that the October Memorandum had no legal effect.\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. The court of appeals' approach would make agencies less responsive to the courts and the public.",
        "reference": "D. DHS was not required to abandon its appeal of the district court's injunction before issuing the October Memorandum.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PRESIDENT'S BROAD REMOVAL POWER IS REVEALED IN, AND CONFIRMED BY, ENGLISH HISTORY, THE TEXT AND STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND OVER A CENTURY OF UNBROKEN PRACTICE AFTER THE FOUNDING\nA. English History\nB. The Constitution\nC. Early American Practice\nD. Myers\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Humphrey's Executor\nB. Later Developments\nC. The CFPB",
        "reference": "II. THE COURT ERRED, IN MODERN TIMES, BY UNDERMINING THE PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL POWER",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The disputed U.S. House district lines for Alabama do not result in abridgement of the right to vote on account of race\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT REGARDING HOW TO ASSESS PETITIONERS' FREE EXERCISE CLAIM\nII. THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THIS CASE MAKES IT AN INAPPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT'S INTERVENTION\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT FAITHFULLY APPLIED THIS COURT'S \"UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS\" PRECEDENTS",
        "reference": "III. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE TO REEXAMINE SMITH BECAUSE EVEN UNDER PRE-SMITH LAW, THE CITY'S REQUIREMENT THAT CONTRACTORS CARRYING OUT A GOVERNMENT PROGRAM ABIDE BY THE TERMS OF THE PROGRAM WOULD BE VALID",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Person Who Possesses And Controls A Car, With The Renter's Permission, Has A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy In The Car's Locked Trunk.\nA. The proper standard looks to possession, control, and the renter's permission.\nB. Policy considerations do not support deviation from a standard based on possession and control.\n1. The possession-and-control test is necessary to avoid incentivizing suspicionless searches and to provide clear guidance.\n2. Rental companies' commercial interests are protected by contract law.\n3. [MISSING]\nII. Byrd May Also Challenge The Search Because He Had A Property Interest In The Rental Car.\nA. As a bailee, Byrd had the right to exclude strangers from the car.\nB. Byrd possessed the car and retained the right to exclude strangers from the car.",
        "reference": "3. Potential tort or contract liability does not render a driver's expectation of privacy unreasonable.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "A. Plaintiffs Do Not Plausibly Allege That Disclosure Of Their Particular Searches Inflicted Article III Injury.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress In The SCA Did Not Elevate Every Search Term Disclosure To An Actionable Intangible Harm.\nD. Plaintiffs' State Common-Law Claims Do Not Confer Standing.\n1. Breach of contract.\n2. Quasi-contract.",
        "reference": "B. Every Disclosure Of A Communication Or Private Information Has Not Historically Been \u2014And Is Not Today\u2014Automatically Actionable In Court.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Clarify the Definition of the \"Creativity\" Needed Under Feist to Provide an Objective Test Based on the Author Having Had Available Multiple Variations of Expression from Which an Intellectual Choice Was Made\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Court Should Adopt the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test to Separate Ideas from Expressions in a Computer Program\nB. Guidance is Needed from the Court on What Matters are Properly Filtered out of the Expression Within a Computer Program\n1. Proper Filtering Recognizes the Expressive Nature of Computer Programs\n2. Proper Filtering Does Not Establish Improper Barriers to Protecting Programming Expressions",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Interpret the Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 17 U.S.C. section 102(b), so that the Expressive Nature of Computer Software Remains Protected by Copyright",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. USERRA's powerful remedies are critical to the Armed Forces' ability to recruit, retain, and boost morale among servicemembers\nA. Veterans returning from war deserve ensured reemployment and protection from discrimination.\nB. USERRA provides important reemployment rights and protections from discrimination\n1. USERRA's reemployment rights\n2. USERRA's antidiscrimination protection\n3. USERRA's right of action and remedies\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The ADA does not protect state employees against disability discrimination\nB. Tort law does not provide remedies for injured servicemembers\nC. The Ex parte Young doctrine does not provide servicemembers with an adequate alternative to an USERRA cause of action\nD. State laws both diverge widely and often provide little relief.",
        "reference": "II. USERRA provides servicemembers remedies where other sources of law do not",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Incoherence in the Lower Courts' Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Will Continue Until Lemon is Overruled.\nA. No plausible reading of American Legion supports the notion that Lemon is applicable in any context.\nB. Lemon Must Be Overruled Because the Lower Courts Continually Resurrect It Despite this Court's Clear Repudiation of It.\nII. Stare Decisis Does Not Support Retention of Lemon.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Lemon Is Unworkable.\nC. Subsequent Legal Developments Have Undermined Lemon.\nD. No Reliance Interests Justify Retention of Lemon.\nIII. As One of Lemon's Progeny, Santa Fe Should Be Formally Abandoned.\nA. Santa Fe's Endorsement Test Analysis is Ahistorical.\nB. Santa Fe's Coercion Analysis is Ahistorical.",
        "reference": "A. Lemon is Egregiously Wrong and Poorly Reasoned.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Rebuts the General Presumption Against Extraterritorial Applications of United States Law (Page 3)\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-441_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The Appropriate Remedy is a Full Refund of All Unconstitutional Fees\nA. There is no workable, constitutionally permissible level-down remedy available here\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The appropriate remedy is a level-up refund of unconstitutional fees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Article 13 b: The English Approach to the Exception to Return\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Ameliorative Measures Under the Hague Convention and Within Europe Under Brussels II Revised\nIV. Undertakings as Protective Measures\nV. Effectiveness and Enforceability of Protective Measures",
        "reference": "II. The International Approach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. On the Merits, the Subpoena Should Be Quashed Because of the Plausible Risk It Will Cause Serious Distraction and Diversion From Presidential Duties\nIII. The Subpoena Should Be Quashed Also Because State and Local Authorities May Not Issue Process Which Impairs The President's Ability to Perform His Official Duties",
        "reference": "I. This Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Petition Raises Extremely Important Issues of Presidential Immunity Which Repeatedly Have Warranted Review in This Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PURELY SPECULATIVE INJURIES TO THE INTERVENOR STATES DO NOT JUSTIFY THEIR INTERVENTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Any Future Flow of Federal Funds To The States Is Contingent Upon Further Federal Legislation Enacted by Future Houses, Future Senates and Future Presidents\nII. AS IMPROPER INTERVENORS IN THE DISTRICT COURT, THE INTERVENOR STATES DID NOT BECOME \"PARTIES\" THAT COULD APPEAL TO THE FIFTH CIRCUIT OR THIS COURT\nIII. THE HOUSE'S INTERVENTION IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THE HOUSE SUFFERED NO INSTITUTIONAL INJURY, ITS MEMBERS SUFFERED NO INDIVIDUAL INJURIES, AND APPELLATE INTERVENTION IS NOT CONTEMPLATED BY THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE",
        "reference": "A. The State Intervenors' Allegations Expressed Their Wishes, Not Actual Injuries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Doctrine of International Comity in U.S. Law\nII. Respondents' Proposed Test Would Materially Alter the Doctrine of International Comity\nIII. U.S. Courts Have Applied the Comity Balancing Test in a Diverse Array of Cases Involving Foreign Law\nA. Cases Involving Questions of Foreign Sovereign Immunity\nB. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention\nC. Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Discovery Requests Made Under 28 U.S.C. section 1782",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Nothing in the New York Convention or its implementing legislation conflicts with application of the Carlisle doctrine. 13\nA. The Carlisle doctrine is not \"in conflict\" with the New York Convention\n1. The text of Article II does not preclude the application of the Carlisle doctrine\n2. The drafting history demonstrates that the Convention was not meant to limit international arbitrations to the parties that have formally signed the contract containing the arbitration clause\n3. The New York Convention's commercially flexible purpose does not support the lower court's rigid rule\n4. The lower court's rule is inconsistent with the post-ratification understanding of other signatory states\na. Statutory Practice\nb. Judicial Decisions\nB. The Carlisle doctrine is not \"in conflict\" with Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act\nC. The Case Should Be Remanded for Further Proceedings",
        "reference": "I. Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act permits a non-signatory to enforce an arbitration agreement against a signatory if the applicable law so allows. 8",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1011_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 288a OF THE IOIA ESTABLISHES A SUBSTANTIVE RULE OF VIRTUALLY ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY\nA. When The IOIA Was Enacted, Federal Common Law Accorded Foreign States Virtually Absolute Immunity\nB. The IOIA Adopts For International Organizations The Common-Law Rule Of Virtually Absolute Immunity That Applied To Foreign States In 1945\n1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity\n2. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 288a(b) establishes a fixed rule of virtually absolute immunity\n3. Petitioners' remaining textual arguments lack merit\nC. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Confirms That International Organizational Immunity Is Not Subject To Later Alterations In Foreign-State Immunity\nII. EXECUTIVE BRANCH PRACTICE DEMONSTRATES THAT SECTION 288a ESTABLISHED A FIXED RULE OF VIRTUALLY ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY\nIII. SUBJECTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY WOULD THREATEN THEIR ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THEIR MISSIONS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Subjecting IFC And Other International Organizations To Suit Under The FSIA Will Impede Their Ability To Perform Their Missions\nC. Other Legal Doctrines Cannot Be Counted On To Eliminate These Risks To The Missions Of International Organizations",
        "reference": "A. Applying The Restrictive Theory Of Sovereign Immunity To International Organizations Would Defeat The Purposes For Which These Organizations Receive Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1362_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The text of the FLSA's overtime exemption for automobile dealership salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics does not exempt service advisors\nA. The subjects of the exemption are only \"any salesman, partsman, or mechanic,\" not service advisors\nB. The verb phrase \"engaged in selling or servicing\" does not expand \"servicing\" beyond performing automotive manual labor\nC. The adverb \"primarily\" narrows the verb phrase, limiting it to employees whose essential or chief task is either selling automobiles or servicing them, not advising customers\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The exemption as a whole does not cover service advisors\nII. The structure and enactment history of the exemption confirm that it does not cover service advisors\nA. The subject \"salesman\" naturally pairs only with the gerund \"selling,\" not \"servicing\"\nB. By amending and re-enacting the statutory text in 1974, Congress evinced its understanding that \"salesman\" does not pair with \"servicing\"\nC. Congress, by expressly including \"partsman,\" did not implicitly add \"service advisor\" to the statute\nIII. The FLSA's purposes and policies confirm that the statute protects service advisors\nA. Congress limited the exemption to salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics because of their irregular hours and locations\nB. Stretching the exemption beyond salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics to \"core sales and service employees,\" those \"integral to the servicing process,\" or entire sales and service departments would disrupt settled industry practices",
        "reference": "D. The objects of the verb phrase include only \"automobiles, trucks, or farm implements,\" not automobile services",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Use Of Prescription Drugs In Executions Is Inconsistent With The Premises Underlying FDA Review Of Such Drugs\nA. The Prescription Drugs Used For Lethal Injection Have Not Been Designed, Tested, Or Approved To Carry Out Executions\nB. Facilitating Death Through Lethal Injection Is Not A Medically Accepted Off-Label Use Of Prescription Medicines\nC. [MISSING]\nII. As Members Of The Medical Community, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Believe That Their Products Should Be Used Only To Treat And Heal Patients",
        "reference": "C. Diverting Drugs From Patient Treatment For Use In Executions Has Unintended Negative Consequences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. INJURY-IN-FACT STANDING IS CRITICAL TO THE SEPARATION OF POWERS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Article III's Injury-In-Fact Requirement For Standing Is Grounded In Separation-Of-Powers Concerns\nII. PERMITTING FEDERAL COURTS TO ADJUDICATE CLAIMS BY CLASS MEMBERS WHO LACK A CONCRETE INJURY VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS\nA. Claims By Uninjured Class Members Are Neither Cases Nor Controversies\nB. The Decision Below Contravenes Article II's Requirement That The President Take Care That The Laws Are Faithfully Executed\nIII. THE SAME STANDING RULES APPLY TO ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS AND NAMED CLASS MEMBERS",
        "reference": "A. The Constitution Demands A Clear Separation Of Powers Among The Three Branches Of Government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief051.pdf",
        "text": "I. Women Are Not Treated \"Unequally\" Simply Because Men Do Not Bear Children\nII. Fetuses When Aborted Are Treated as Slave Property, in Violation of the Thirteenth Amendment\nA. Revising the Common Law to Treat Children as Property of the Mother\nB. Providing for No Violation of Law for an Owner's Killing of a Slave\nC. Treating Slaves as Partial Persons for Purposes of Representation\nD. Adjudicating Slaves to Be Property Under the Constitution\nE. Stripping Slaves of Legal Privileges, Including the Right to Testify\nF. [MISSING]\nG. The Thirteenth Amendment's Prohibition Sweeps More Broadly Than the Fourteenth's Protections",
        "reference": "F. Prohibiting Slavery and Its Application to Abortion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-984_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Helix Did Not Pay Hewitt \"On a Salary Basis\"\nA. The Text and Structure of section 541.602 Foreclose Helix's Claim to Exemption\nB. Helix's Position Contradicts the Department of Labor's Longstanding Interpretation of the Salary-Basis Requirement\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The HCE Regulation Did Not Exempt Helix From the Salary-Basis Test But Rather Expressly Required It To Meet It\nA. The Text and Structure of the Regulations Foreclose Helix's Position\nB. Petitioners' Textual and Structural Arguments Are Unsound\nC. Petitioners' Position Conflicts With the Purpose of the Salary-Basis and HCE Regulations\nIII. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation of section 541.604(b) Is Consistent With the Statute\nIV. Helix and Amici's Policy Arguments Are Irrelevant and Unsound",
        "reference": "C. The Preamble to the 2004 Regulations and section 541.604(b) Confirm That Helix Did Not Pay Hewitt \"On a Salary Basis\" Within the Meaning of Section 541.602(a)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FAA Requires Enforcement Of The Parties' Agreement To Arbitrate Bilaterally By Expressly Agreeing To Forgo Collective Proceedings, Including PAGA Actions\nA. The FAA Requires Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements According to Their Terms, Especially When Those Terms Preserve Bilateral Arbitration\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The FAA Applies To PAGA Claims\nII. The Iskanian Rule Has Effectively Nullified Concepcion And Epic In California",
        "reference": "B. The Iskanian Rule Is Preempted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Partisan Gerrymandering Has Become A Tool For Powerful Interests To Distort The Democratic Process\nA. Vieth Opened The Door To Extreme Partisan Gerrymandering\nB. Dark Money Fuels Partisan Gerrymandering On Both Sides Of The Aisle\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Curb The Rise Of Partisan Gerrymandering By Affirming The District Court Decisions",
        "reference": "C. Partisan Gerrymandering Produces Uncompetitive And Unrepresentative Districts That Have A Corrosive Effect On Our Democracy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Agency's Action Violates The Statute\nIII. Chevron Deference Does Not Justify The Agency's Action",
        "reference": "I. Section 1395l(t)(12) Does Not Preclude Judicial Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. ICWA is a valid exercise of Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs\nA. Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs\n1. Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs derives explicitly from the Constitution's text\n2. Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs is grounded in the Constitution's structure\n3. History confirms Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs\nB. ICWA falls squarely within Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs\nC. Plaintiffs' counterarguments lack merit\n1. Congress's power is not limited to regulating trade\n2. Congress's power is not limited to regulating tribes\n3. Congress's power within a State is not limited to regulating on tribal lands\n4. Congress's power is not subject to a domestic relations exception\n5. State court proceedings are not immune from Congress's power\nII. ICWA's minimum federal standards do not violate the anticommandeering doctrine\nA. ICWA's minimum federal standards for removal do not violate the anticommandeering doctrine\n1. Section 1912 directly regulates the removal of Indian children from their families\n2. Section 1912 does not commandeer state agencies or judges\nB. ICWA's placement preferences do not violate the anticommandeering doctrine\n1. ICWA's placement preferences directly regulate the placement of Indian children\n2. ICWA's placement preferences do not commandeer state agencies or judges\nC. ICWA's recordkeeping provisions do not violate the anticommandeering doctrine\nIII. Plaintiffs' equal-protection challenge should be rejected\nA. Plaintiffs' equal-protection challenge is not justiciable\n1. Texas lacks parens patriae standing to sue the federal government\n2. The individual plaintiffs cannot satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement\nB. The challenged ICWA provisions satisfy equal-protection principles\n1. Statutory classifications designed to fulfill Congress's unique obligations to Indians are not suspect and are subject to rational basis review\n2. The classifications in the challenged ICWA provisions are subject to rational-basis review\n3. The challenged ICWA provisions are rationally related to their objectives\nIV. Texas's nondelegation challenge should be rejected\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1915(c) does not violate nondelegation principles",
        "reference": "A. Texas lacks Article III standing to bring its nondelegation challenge",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.48
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-565_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE LEGAL QUESTION OF WHETHER, DEPENDING ON THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PERMITS LEGISLATOR-LED PRAYER\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REACHED THE CORRECT RESULT",
        "reference": "II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION FAITHFULLY APPLIED THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The Near-Unanimous Weight of Appellate Authority Holds That Section 1447(d) Prohibits Appellate Review of Any Ground for Federal Jurisdiction Other than 42 U.S.C. section 1442 or 1443.\n2. The Few Cases That Have Diverged from the Near-Universal Construction of Section 1447(d) Are of Limited Precedential Value.\nB. The Prevailing View of Section 1447(d), Applied by the Fourth Circuit, Correctly Interprets the Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction from Orders Granting Remand for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction.\n1. The Plain Text and History of Section 1447(d) Demonstrate Congressional Intent to Carve Out a Narrow Exception from the Statutory Bar Against Appellate Review of Remand Orders.\n2. Applying this Court's Construction of 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b) to the Materially Different Context of Section 1447(d) Would Lead to Absurd Results.",
        "reference": "A. The Purported Split of Authority Is Insubstantial and Does Not Merit Certiorari Review.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT MANDATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SINGLE-WORD \"VIEWPOINTS\"\nII. DENIAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DOES NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY CHILL SPEECH\nIII. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (AND IF NECESSARY, EQUAL PROTECTION) STANDARDS ARE SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT UNFAIR APPLICATION OF 15 U.S.C. section 1052\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. IF NECESSARY, THE COURT SHOULD OVERRULE MATAL V. TAM",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. Courts play a critical role in setting the bounds for executive invocations of \"national security\"\nB. The United States' asserted state interest is illegitimate and does not justify dismissal\n1. The Ninth Circuit correctly viewed the government's asserted national security interest with a \"skeptical eye\"\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The United States' position is anti-democratic, promotes impunity, and erodes respect for human rights and the rule of law",
        "reference": "2. The United States' invocation of the privilege compounds ongoing violations against Mr. Husayn",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Territoriality Is A Fundamental Principle Of Intellectual-Property Law In The United Kingdom\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Territoriality Principle Remains Fundamental Post-Brexit",
        "reference": "II. European Union Law Applicable In The United Kingdom Confirms The Territorial Nature Of Trademark Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE REYNOLDS DOCTRINE PRECLUDES BLIND DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH\nA. Under Reynolds, Courts Must Subject Blanket Invocations of the State Secrets Privilege to Independent Judicial Scrutiny\nB. The Court of Appeals Correctly Held that, Under Reynolds, the District Court Must Scrutinize the Government's Privilege Claim More Closely Before Taking the Drastic Step of Quashing Respondents' Subpoenas\nII. BLANKET PRIVILEGE INVOCATIONS, WITHOUT MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT, IMPEDE THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE\nA. The Individual Stories of Members of Peaceful Tomorrows\n1. Colleen Kelly\n2. Terry Rockefeller\n3. Jessica and Leila Murphy\n4. [MISSING]\n5. Nancy Meyer\n6. Phyllis Rodriguez\n7. Adele Welty\nB. The Experience of Members of Peaceful Tomorrows with the State Secrets Privilege at the 9/11 Proceedings Demonstrates the Need for Judicial Scrutiny",
        "reference": "4. Valerie Lucznikowska",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.46
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Jurisdiction\nII. The Court Should Decide These Important Questions Now\nIII. The Decision Creates Three Splits\nA. The Conflict Over a CERCLA \"Challenge\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Conflict Over CERCLA Preemption",
        "reference": "B. The Conflict Over the Definition of \"PRP\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. TITLE X'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION ON THE PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL POWER CANNOT BE SEVERED\nA. Section 5491(c)(3) Is Not Severable Because Severance Would Result In An Agency That Congress Never Would Have Created\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Severance Of The Removal Restriction Would Not Solve The Constitutional Defects Stemming From The CFPB's Funding Outside Of The Congressional Appropriations Process\nD. Severance Would Not Resolve The Remedial Questions In Pending Enforcement Actions Filed By The CFPB",
        "reference": "B. Severance Is Not A Remedy Within The Article III Power In Any Event",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Black Americans are Disproportionately Likely to Need Protections Against Unsupported Criminal Charges\nA. Black Americans are More Likely to Face Infirm Legal Charges That are Dismissed Before Trial\nB. Unexplained Dismissals May Disproportionately Affect Black Arrestees\nIII. The Rule Below Leaves Those Subject to the Most Egregious Charges Without Remedy\nA. Lanning Leaves Prosecutors with Exclusive Control Over the Remedies for Unconstitutional Policing, Leading to Inconsistent and Absurd Outcomes\nB. Lanning Leaves Egregious Police Misconduct Unremedied",
        "reference": "I. Section 1983 Serves as an Important Check on Unconstitutional Seizures Made Pursuant to Legal Process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1432_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "Section 1252(a)(2)(C) precludes judicial review of any factual challenge by a criminal alien to the denial of withholding or deferral of removal under the regulations implementing the United States' obligations under the Convention Against Torture\nA. The criminal-alien jurisdictional bar limits judicial review of CAT claims in removal proceedings\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Convention and its implementing provisions confirm that judicial review of CAT claims is subject to the jurisdictional limitations in Section 1252(a)(2)(C)\n3. The REAL ID Act further confirms that Section 1252(a)(2)(C) limits judicial review of CAT claims\nB. Petitioner's contrary interpretation of the statute is unsound\nC. The alternative jurisdictional theories adopted by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits are incorrect",
        "reference": "1. The statutory provisions limiting judicial review of a \"final order of removal\" also limit review of the denial of CAT claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9572_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RIGHTS TO SERVE ON \u2014 AND BE TRIED BY \u2014 AN IMPARTIAL, FAIRLY CONSTITUTED JURY, ARE INTEGRAL TO FULL AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP\nII. THROUGH DETERMINED EVASION, RECALCITRANT STATES HAVE SUBORDINATED THE RIGHTS TO SERVE ON AND BE TRIED BY FAIRLY CONSTITUTED JURIES TO ANTI-BLACK DISCRIMINATION\nA. Reconstruction's Collapse Engendered Immediate Denial of the Jury-Trial Right\nB. The States Innovated to Elude This Court's Decisions Combatting Post-Reconstruction Jury-Service Suppression\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. WINONA AND THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF DENYING AFRICAN AMERICANS EQUAL RIGHTS\nIV. DOUG EVANS HAS A HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATING AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICAN JURORS, AND THAT PATTERN OF DISCRIMINATION HAS PERSISTED THROUGHOUT MR. FLOWERS' TRIALS\nA. Mr. Evans' Office Strikes African American Jurors at a Much Higher Rate Than White Jurors\nB. Doug Evans' Actions Throughout the Six Curtis Flowers Trials Reveal an Intent to Remove as Many African-American Jurors as Possible",
        "reference": "C. Jury Discrimination Remains Common After Batson",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. ACE scholarships have a track record of producing positive results for students and families\nB. Scholarship programs positively impact more than one generation at a time\nC. The success of ACE scholars provides widespread benefit to society as a whole\nII. Categorical exclusion of religious education providers from generally available tax credit programs violates the U.S. Constitution\nA. Exclusion of religious actors, even in the education field, violates the U.S. Constitution\nB. Government programs of general public benefit need not exclude religious actors to comply with the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "I. Educational choice creates widespread and long-lasting public benefits without regard to the religious identity of participating schools",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. BACKGROUND\n1. The development of fiscal autonomy in Puerto Rico\n2. The exclusion of Puerto Rico in the adoption of SSI\nII. TO DENY VAELLO-MADERO SSI PAYMENTS BECAUSE OF HOW PUERTO RICO CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEDERAL TREASURY HAS NO RATIONAL BASIS\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE RESIDENTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, AS U.S. CITIZENS IN AN AUTONOMOUS REGION OF THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT VOTING REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS, MUST BE SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY ANALYSIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE PROHIBITS BOTH CENSORSHIP AND COMPELLED SPEECH\nII. ARTISTIC EXPRESSION IS PURE SPEECH THAT GREATLY SHAPED CULTURES\nA. Artistic Expression Is Pure Speech\nB. Artistic Expression Can Evoke Emotions, Be A Catalyst For Change, And Lay Bare One's Inner Thoughts And Desires\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. CADA IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICTS AND COMPELS PROTECTED SPEECH ON THE BASIS OF CONTENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "Property [MISSING]",
        "reference": "Property rights cannot be subordinated to the right to organize when unions have reasonable alternative means of communication",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-23_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Rule of Lenity does not apply in these circumstances",
        "reference": "I. The Court should defer to the Board's interpretation of offenses relating to obstruction of justice.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Former President is not within the jurisdictional scope of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Section 3's Offense Element Requires Congressional Legislation",
        "reference": "II. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is Not Judicially Enforceable Without Implementing Legislation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. Named Plaintiffs Have Standing To Assert SCA Claims\nA. Google and the Government Disregard Centuries of Judicial Practice\nB. Modern Privacy Torts, If Relevant, Contradict Google's and the Government's Position\nC. Congress's Judgment Is Consistent with History\nD. The Government's and Google's Remaining Arguments Lack Merit\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Four Further Claims Independently Establish Injury-In-Fact",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. AUSTRALIA'S REGULATION OF THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY HAS HARMED CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION\nA. Australian Consumers Have Experienced Significant Costs That Are Likely to Continue\nB. The RBA's Regulations Are Harmful to Competition and Incompatible with Free-Market Principles\nII. THE ARA ERRONEOUSLY CLAIMS THAT THE ELIMINATION OF ANTI-STEERING RULES ALONE DIRECTLY CAUSED CERTAIN ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Ascribing Positive Economic Effects and Technological Innovation to the Elimination of Anti-Steering Rules is Facile and Misleading\nIII. THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRIES IN AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT",
        "reference": "A. Eliminating Anti-Steering Rules Was Only One Part of Australia's Comprehensive Regulation of the Credit Card Industry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The decision below is correct\nC. The petition does not present an important question warranting further review in this case",
        "reference": "A. The decision below does not create a square circuit conflict",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Idea of the Right to Exclude has Ancient Roots\nB. The Ancient Idea of the Right to Exclude Others from One's Private Property is Considered Fundamental in Modern Takings Jurisprudence\nII. REQUIRING PETITIONERS TO GRANT UNIONS ACCESS TO THEIR PROPERTY ON THE UNION'S TERMS \"EVISCERATES\" THEIR RIGHT TO EXCLUDE",
        "reference": "I. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE THE GOVERNMENT FROM ONE'S PRIVATE PROPERTY IS FUNDAMENTAL AND LONG ESTABLISHED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5410_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A RULE THAT TREATS \"RECKLESSNESS\" OFFENSES AS ACCA PREDICATE CRIMES FRUSTRATES THE ACT'S CENTRAL PURPOSE\nA. ACCA TARGETS \"PURPOSEFUL, VIOLENT\" CRIMES COMMITTED BY \"THE VERY WORST OFFENDERS\"\nB. TREATING RECKLESSNESS OFFENSES AS ACCA PREDICATES WOULD PRODUCE ANOMALOUS AND UNJUST RESULTS AT ODDS WITH ACCA'S PURPOSE\nII. PRIOR TO VOISINE, FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS GENERALLY EXCLUDED RECKLESSNESS OFFENSES FROM ACCA'S FORCE CLAUSE\nA. FOLLOWING ACCA'S ADOPTION, MULTIPLE COURTS OF APPEALS CONCLUDED THAT RECKLESSNESS CRIMES WERE NOT PREDICATE OFFENSES\nB. [MISSING]\nC. VOISINE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BECAUSE IT INVOLVED A STATUTE WITH DIFFERENT TEXT AND A DIFFERENT PURPOSE FROM ACCA",
        "reference": "B. AFTER LEOCAL, THE CIRCUIT COURTS UNANIMOUSLY HELD THAT ACCA'S FORCE CLAUSE (AND OTHERS LIKE IT) DO NOT COVER RECKLESSNESS OFFENSES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Assignor estoppel should be confined to its historical role in ensuring equity in assignments of patent rights\nA. [MISSING]\nB. More recent legal developments have not abolished assignor estoppel\nC. Properly limited, the doctrine of assignor estoppel balances competing policies of fair dealing and robust competition\nII. The court of appeals' analysis of assignor estoppel in this case was inadequate",
        "reference": "A. This Court has recognized that assignor estoppel is a narrow equitable doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Coal miners and widows applying for black lung benefits typically endure years-long delays due to a backlog before ALJs\nIII. If ALJs are found to be \"officers of the United States,\" retroactive application of this decision will worsen the existing backlog of black lung cases\nIV. If a technical violation of the Appointments Clause exists, the Court should not apply its decision retroactively because doing so would cause injustice and hardship to individuals who have relied on ALJ decisions\nA. Historically, the Court has rejected retroactive application of its decisions when doing so would impair important government programs\nB. If the Court finds a constitutional violation, the Court should apply its decision nonretroactively or appropriately limit retroactive application to protect those who otherwise would be harmed",
        "reference": "I. Rates of black lung disease, an incurable condition that affects coal miners, are on the rise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1155_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The agency's decision denying Dai's asylum and withholding applications is not supported by substantial evidence\nA. In applying substantial-evidence review, a court of appeals cannot deny a petition based on an adverse credibility finding that the agency never made\nB. [MISSING]\nII. On the record and posture of this case, the court of appeals was not required to remand",
        "reference": "B. To the extent this Court conducts its own substantial-evidence review, it should hold that substantial evidence does not support the agency's decision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico shares the same reliance interests of the states of Louisiana and Oregon in the finality of its judgments in criminal cases\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The rule established in Ramos is neither a substantive rule nor a \"watershed\" procedural rule, and is therefore not retroactive to criminal cases on collateral review\nIV. The reliance interests of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico favor a decision that the rule established in Ramos is not retroactive to cases on collateral review",
        "reference": "II. The holding of this Court in Ramos established a new rule of criminal procedure and therefore does not have retroactive effect on criminal cases in collateral review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "Title [MISSING]\nA. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute discrimination because of sex\n1. \"Sex\" does not mean \"sexual orientation\"\n2. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not involve treating members of one sex less favorably than similarly situated members of the other\nB. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute prohibited sex stereotyping\nC. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute improper associational discrimination\nD. Congress has ratified the settled understanding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual orientation",
        "reference": "Title VII does not prohibit discrimination because of sexual orientation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-315_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The False Claims Act's statute of limitations applies equally to every plaintiff\nA. Section 3731(b) unambiguously applies to all suits to redress fraud against the United States\n1. Respondent's interpretation is the only one consistent with the statutory text\n2. This Court's decision in Graham does not support petitioners' interpretation; it does the opposite\n3. Petitioners' interpretation is not compelled by any \"default rule\" of statutory interpretation\nB. Respondent's interpretation is most consistent with the purposes of the False Claims Act and the 1986 Amendments\n1. Respondent's interpretation would protect the government's interests and conserve public resources\n2. Petitioners' legislative history citations are unpersuasive\n3. Respondent's reading creates no practical difficulties\nII. A qui tam relator is not \"the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances.\"\nA. The plain text of the statute forecloses petitioners' alternative argument\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' interpretation leads to absurd results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-248_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Proposed Intervenor Must Overcome a Presumption of Adequacy When It Shares an Interest with an Existing Party and State Law Cannot Relieve That Burden\nA. An Intervenor Must Have a Significantly Protectable Interest, Which May Be Defined by State Statute\nB. [MISSING]\nC. An Intervenor Must Overcome a Presumption of Adequacy When It Shares an Interest with an Existing Party\nD. State Law Has No Bearing on the Adequacy Analysis\nII. The Proper Standard of Review for a District Court's Adequacy Determination Is Abuse of Discretion\nA. Petitioners Waived Any Argument That Adequacy Is Reviewed De Novo\nB. Adequacy Is Appropriately Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion\nIII. State Respondents Take No Position on Intervention but Are Adequately Defending the State's Interests\nA. The Presumption of Adequacy Applies\nB. State Respondents Are Adequately Defending S.B. 824 in This Case\nC. Petitioners Cannot Intervene to Represent the Entire State",
        "reference": "B. An Intervenor Bears the Burden of Establishing That Representation of Its Interests May Be Inadequate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The ESA Prohibits Designation Of Unit 1 As Critical Habitat\nIII. The Service's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Critical Habitat Designation Is Subject To Judicial Review\nIV. This Court Has Article III Jurisdiction.",
        "reference": "I. The Administrative Record Demonstrates That Unit 1 Is Not Habitable.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Application of Current Section 2 Jurisprudence Leads to Diverging and Confusing Views Among District and Circuit Courts\nA. The Legal Standard\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Under The Ninth Circuit's Section 2 Analysis, Virtually Any Election Law or Regulation Could be Struck Down as a Violation of Section 2\nA. Statistics Can Be Misleading\nIII. Courts Should Not Be Involved In Statistical Comparisons of Policy Choices of State Legislatures\nIV. A \"Safe Harbor\" Approach to Facially Neutral Election Laws and Regulations Is Needed With Section 2 Claims",
        "reference": "B. Examples of Judicial Confusion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Common Law and the Nineteenth Century Abortion Statutes Refute the Right to Abortion Announced in Roe\nA. The Common Law Refutes Roe's Abortion Right\n1. The English Commentators\n2. English Common Law Cases\n3. American Colonial Cases\nB. Nineteenth Century Statutes\n1. [MISSING]\n2. American Statutes\nII. Casey's Viability Line is Unsupported\nIII. Doe's Health Definition Undermines States' Interest in Protecting Unborn Life\nIV. Legal History and the Constitution Support the Personhood of the Unborn Child\nA. The Personhood of the Unborn Can Be Inferred from Criminality of Abortion\nB. The Text and History of the Constitution Support Personhood\n1. The Term \"Person\" in the Constitution\n2. Public Meaning of \"Person\"\n3. Natural Law Includes all Natural Persons as Legal Persons\n4. The Purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment Was to Uphold Natural Rights\nV. Roe's Rejection of the Hippocratic Oath Has Led to the Ethical Degradation of the Medical Profession\nVI. The Private Right of Action Created by S.B. 8 Is a Valid Exercise of State Power and of Individual Responsibility",
        "reference": "1. The Offences against the Person Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.21
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Corpus linguistics is as much art as it is science.\nB. Corpus linguistics risks amplifying the elite and the newsworthy.\nII. Corpus Linguistics Is No Substitute for Traditional Tools of Constitutional Analysis, Especially in a Case Involving Fundamental Rights\nIII. \"Proper Cause\" Requirements Are at Odds With the Second Amendment's Text, History, and Tradition",
        "reference": "I. Corpus Linguistics Cannot Fully Reveal the Second Amendment's Scope",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. SEC ALJs ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\nA. SEC ALJs Are Officers Under The Buckley Standard\nB. Amicus's Attempt To Rewrite Buckley\n1. Amicus's Test Conflicts With Precedent\n2. Amicus's Test Conflicts With The Constitution\n3. SEC ALJs Are Officers Even Under Amicus's Test\nC. The SEC Should Be Accountable For The Appointment Of Its ALJs\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION REQUIRES A MEANINGFUL REMEDY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-826_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT CONFLICT\nIII. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR CONSIDERING THE QUESTION PRESENTED\nA. The Issue Raised In The Petition Is Not Presented In This Case, And Resolving It Would Make No Difference To The Outcome\nB. The State's Arguments That This Is An \"Ideal Vehicle\" Misrepresent Both The State Court And Sixth Circuit Decisions",
        "reference": "I. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAITHFULLY APPLIED AYALA, WHICH CONFIRMS THAT COURTS NEED NOT FORMALLY APPLY BOTH BRECHT AND AEDPA/CHAPMAN",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The unprecedented rise in the collection and use of sensitive personal information puts consumers at increased risk of suffering significant harms\nII. Robust recognition of the harms caused by the mishandling of personal information is consistent with this Court's Article III jurisprudence\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The outcome of this case will have serious implications for the recognition of harms caused by the unprecedented rise in the collection and use of sensitive user data\nV. Rule 23 provides an essential tool that enables classes of consumers to vindicate their legally protected interests",
        "reference": "III. The class members here have established Article III standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE ARE TWO PATIENTS THAT MUST BE CARED FOR IN MODERN OBSTETRICAL PRACTICE, AND IT IS RARE THAT AN ABORTION WOULD BE NEEDED TO MANAGE A PREGNANCY SUCCESSFULLY\nII. CLAIMS THAT ELECTIVE ABORTIONS MUST BE ALLOWED BECAUSE ABORTION IS STATISTICALLY SAFER THAN CHILDBIRTH SHOULD BE REJECTED\nA. The Risk of Dying from Abortion or Childbirth Is Negligible\nB. Although Abortion Is a Medical Procedure, It Is Rarely a Medical Decision\nC. Discussing Maternal Mortality Rates in Relation to Elective Abortion Has No Practical Relevance\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Women Were Not Dying in Large Numbers From Illegal Abortion Prior To Roe\nB. Reduction in Maternal Mortality Was Primarily Due to the Advent of Antibiotics and Blood Transfusions, Improvements in the Administration of Anesthesia, and Other Medical Advances In Caring for Pregnant Women",
        "reference": "III. AN OVERTURN OF ROE WOULD NOT LIKELY INCREASE MATERNAL MORTALITY BECAUSE ROE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REDUCTION IN MATERNAL MORTALITY FROM ABORTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Is The Proper Institution To Address This Complex Issue\nII. The State's Challenge To Quill Is Non-Justiciable\nA. The Court Lacks The Power To Offer Opinions On Assumed Or Speculative Facts\nB. There Is No Factual Record Concerning The Quill Issue\nC. The Dormant Commerce Clause Necessitates A Fact-Intensive Review\nD. This Court's Role As An Appellate Tribunal Requires Factfinding In The Lower Court\nIII. Principles Of Stare Decisis Strongly Weigh Against Granting The Petition\nA. Retailers Have Continued To Rely On Quill\nB. Quill Has Not Been Undermined By Later Decisions\nC. Quill Was Not Badly Reasoned\nD. The Physical Presence Standard Is Not \"Unworkable\"\nE. Changed Circumstances Do Not Warrant Overturning Quill\n1. Multistate Sales Tax Collection Remains Burdensome\n2. Market Data Indicates That State Estimates Of Uncollected Use Tax Are Grossly Inflated And That Remote Sales Tax Collection Is Increasing\n3. The State's Economic Policy Arguments Are Refuted By Other Sources\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. Developments In Other States Further Counsel Denial Of The Petition\nA. The States Have Tools To Increase Consumer Use Tax Collection\nB. Quill Challenges In Other States Are Focused On Developments Concerning Electronic Commerce",
        "reference": "IV. The Petition Ignores The Issue Of Retroactive Liability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.84
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Conflict with Fishing Vessel Is Real\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Rejection of Equitable Defenses in Treaty Cases Creates a Real Conflict\nIV. The Injunction is Irreconcilable with This Court's Precedent",
        "reference": "I. Respondents Mischaracterize the Ninth Circuit's Opinion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Question is Whether the Committees Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Issue the Subpoenas\nII. Revisiting the Facts is Key: The Committees Sought To Investigate or Discover Allegations of Criminal Misconduct Against Specific Persons or Entities\nIII. The Founders Decided Against Giving Congress the Broad Power Parliament Had to Investigate an Accused\nA. Parliament's \"Impeachment Power\" Was the Power to Investigate Any Criminal Accusations Against Any Individual\nB. Parliament Used Specific Jurisdiction for \"Impeachment\" Investigations\nC. Impeachment was a \"High Privilege\" of the House of Commons\nD. The Founders Narrowed the Meaning of the Term \"Impeachment\" for Americans, Limiting it to Civil Officers of the United States\nE. The Founders Gave the Power to Investigate Specific Accusations of Criminal Misconduct to the Executive Branch and the Power to Resolve Legal Questions to the Judicial Branch\nF. [MISSING]\nG. The Founders Embraced Impeachment as a \"High Privilege\" of the House of Representatives\nH. Citizens Retain Their Constitutional Rights to Object to Congressional Investigations and to Request Judicial Redress\nIV. The House Rules Do Not Authorize General \"Oversight\" Investigations of an Accused or These Subpoenas\nA. The Text of the Rules Do Not Provide Jurisdiction\nB. Traditional Notions of \"Oversight\" Do Not Support Jurisdiction\n1. Historically \"Oversight Jurisdiction\" Has Meant Jurisdiction to Investigate Matters of General Applicability\n2. Prior to the Constitution, the Independent States Conceived the Role of Standing Committees as Involving Matters of General Applicability\n3. Congress Has Never a Standing Committee on Impeachment Nor One Devoted to Investigations of Specific Criminal Misconduct Against Accused Persons\nC. Federal Judges are Not an Exception to the Rule Requiring Specific Jurisdiction\nD. Specific Jurisdiction Has Been the Norm for Investigations of Criminal Accusations Against Individuals Not Subject to Impeachment\nE. Nonjurisdictional Action Cannot Be a Basis for Jurisdiction and Committees Cannot Expand Jurisdiction Given\nV. Congress Cannot Retroactively Establish Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the Constitution",
        "reference": "F. The Founders Set Forth Specific Protections for the Criminally Accused",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.52
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-8255_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS THE AUTONOMY OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS\nA. Defendants have the right to make fundamental decisions about their defense and decide upon the purpose of representation by counsel\nB. Defendant autonomy, not ineffective assistance of counsel, is the best framework for understanding a defendant's right to make fundamental decisions in his case\nII. OVERRULING A DEFENDANT'S DECISION TO DENY GUILT VIOLATES DEFENDANT AUTONOMY\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. FAILURE TO PROTECT DEFENDANT AUTONOMY WILL UNDERMINE THE INTEGRITY OF THE ENTIRE JUDICIAL PROCESS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\na. Any Competent Attorney Would Recognize The Implications of These Broad-Ranging Subpoenas and Would Demand The Client's Immediate and Ongoing Attention \u2014 Confirming Their Serious and Ongoing Distraction\nb. The Virtually Limitless Scope of the Present Subpoenas Distinguishes Them From the Narrow and Discrete Incursions This Court Has Permitted Into the Presidential Sphere\nc. The Rationales Employed by the Second and D.C. Circuits are Misplaced\nd. This Court Has Recognized the Need for Complete Presidential Immunity To Prevent the Type of Distraction These Subpoenas Portend\ne. The Present Subpoenas Violate the Spirit of Article II and Undermine a Significant Aspect of the 2016 Presidential Election\nf. The Issue Raised by the Petitions is Not a Partisan or Political Issue, But an Institutional Issue Upon Which the Integrity of the Presidential Office Depends\nII. In 19-635, The Subpoena Should Be Quashed Also Because State and Local Authorities May Not Issue Process Which Impairs The President's Ability to Perform His Official Duties",
        "reference": "I. The Subpoenas Should Be Quashed Because of the Plausible Risk They Will Cause Serious Distraction and Diversion From Presidential Duties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The FAA's text, structure, and history confirm that Congress did not create an automatic stay for Section 16(a) appeals.\nB. Background rules of federal law establish that stays pending appeal are discretionary.\nC. Arbitrability and the merits are separate aspects of a case.\nD. The special rules applicable to interlocutory appeals involving constitutional immunity from suit do not apply to arbitrability appeals.\nII. The traditional discretionary test applies in Section 16(a) appeals, and it works well for this context.",
        "reference": "I. There is no legal basis for imposing an automatic stay on the whole case when a party files a Section 16(a) appeal.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1042_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW DEEPENS THE CONFLICT OVER RRTA TAXATION OF LOST WAGES\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO ADDRESS THE EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT ISSUE",
        "reference": "II. RESPONDENT'S FAULTY ARGUMENTS ON THE MERITS CONFIRM THAT REVIEW IS WARRANTED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Disclosure Requirements Must Be Closely Drawn To Further A Sufficiently Important Government Interest\nA. The Freedom Of Association Is Crucial To Preserve Minority Viewpoints, And It Is Susceptible To Attack From Both The Government and Private Actors\nB. Compelled Disclosure Requirements Are Subject To Exacting Scrutiny\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The California Attorney General's Disclosure Requirement Fails Each Prong of Exacting Scrutiny\nA. The Attorney General's Disclosure Requirement Does Not Further A Sufficiently Important State Interest\nB. The Attorney General's Disclosure Requirement Is Not Tailored To Avoid Unnecessarily Burdening Associational Freedoms\nIII. The Fatal Constitutional Flaws In The California Attorney General's Compelled Disclosure Regime Render It Meaningfully Distinct From The IRS's Schedule B Requirement\nA. The IRS's Schedule B Requirement May Satisfy The First Amendment\nB. The California Attorney General's Disclosure Requirement Is Dissimilar On Every Point",
        "reference": "C. The Ninth Circuit Misapplied This Court's Exacting Scrutiny Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION WOULD PRECLUDE STATE COURT REVIEW OF ALL DISTRICTING AND FEDERAL ELECTION CONDUCT LAWS\nII. THIS CASE CANNOT BE RESOLVED BASED SOLELY ON ELECTION CLAUSE. INTERPRETATION LIKEWISE NEEDS TO AVOID HARM TO THE FUNDAMENTAL 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO VOTE AND HAVE VOTE COUNTED\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. HARMS FROM PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION",
        "reference": "III. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION DISREGARDS FRAMERS' DEEP COMMITMENT TO WRITTEN CONSTITUTIONS AS SUPERIOR TO LEGISLATURES' ENACTMENTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1442_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Does Not Require Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Issue Exhaustion for Constitutional Claims Raises Due Process Concerns",
        "reference": "II. Under Article III, Litigants Should Not Be Required to Raise Constitutional Claims Before Agency Judges",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO RAISE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF NON-PARTY PATIENTS\nA. Plaintiffs Cannot Invoke Their Procedural Due Process Claim As The Basis For Standing To Represent Their Patients\nB. Plaintiffs Must Satisfy The Demanding Kowalski Test To Establish Third-Party Standing\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Plaintiffs have not established a close relationship with absent third-party patients\n2. Plaintiffs' patients are not hindered from suing on their own behalf\nII. THE COURT CAN AND SHOULD ADDRESS WHETHER PLAINTIFFS HAVE THIRD-PARTY STANDING\nA. Limitations On Third-Party Standing Are Non-Waivable\nB. Regardless Of Whether It May Be Waived, The Issue Of Third-Party Standing Is Fully Preserved For This Court's Review",
        "reference": "C. Plaintiffs Do Not Satisfy The Prerequisites For Third-Party Standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nI. The home and curtilage receive core Fourth Amendment protection\nA. Property principles require a warrant for intrusions to search\nB. Violating reasonable expectations of privacy requires a warrant\nII. This Court has long recognized that the automobile exception has limits based on the location of the vehicle\nIII. The rationales for the automobile exception do not support extending it to the curtilage\nA. Ready mobility does not justify a warrantless search in the home and curtilage\nB. Pervasive regulation does not diminish reasonable expectations of privacy in the home and curtilage\nC. Warrants and exigency cover legitimate needs for searches in curtilage\nIV. The automobile exception cannot justify the search of Mr. Collins' covered motorcycle\nA. The motorcycle was in the curtilage\nB. No implied license authorized the officer's acts\nC. The intrusion also violated reasonable expectations of privacy",
        "reference": "The automobile exception does not authorize a warrantless search of a vehicle within the curtilage of a home",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should consider empirical evidence derived from corpus linguistics to inform its decision on the meaning of the Appointments Clause\nII. Empirical evidence from the Founding era shows that \"Officers of the United States\" was not a legal term of art\nIII. Empirical evidence derived from corpus linguistics demonstrates that the original public meaning of \"officer\" would have encompassed an ALJ\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Empirical evidence derived from corpus linguistics demonstrates that the ordinary meaning of a public \"officer\" today includes ALJs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. None of the Purposes of Punishment Embraced by American Criminal Law Justifies Punishing People Who Lack Moral Capacity\nB. The Insanity Defense Historically Has Protected from Criminal Punishment Individuals Who Lack Moral Culpability\nII. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AS KANSAS HAS DONE, ALLOWS PEOPLE WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY TO BE IMPRISONED AND EXECUTED",
        "reference": "I. PRINCIPLED RATIONALES FOR PUNISHMENT DO NOT JUSTIFY CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDIVIDUALS WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-7622_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\n2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
        "reference": "1. The Double Jeopardy Clause allows successive prosecutions by different governments only if each of them exercises sovereignty in two different aspects",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-8369_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 1915(g)'s text and context indicate that any dismissal for failure to state a claim is a strike\n1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice\n2. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1915(g)'s history confirms that any dismissal for failure to state a claim is a strike\nC. Section 1915(g)'s purposes further confirm that any dismissal for failure to state a claim is a strike\nD. Section 1915(g)'s treatment of a dismissal without prejudice as a strike does not raise constitutional concerns",
        "reference": "2. Related PLRA provisions use the same language to refer to dismissals both with and without prejudice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-826_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A FEDERAL HABEAS COURT MAY ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 2254(d)(1)'S LIMITATIONS BY APPLYING BRECHT WITHOUT SEPARATE, FORMAL APPLICATION OF AEDPA/CHAPMAN\nA. A Federal Habeas Court Need Not Formally Apply AEDPA/Chapman Where Its Finding Of Actual Prejudice Under Brecht Complies With AEDPA's Limitations On Legal And Factual Materials\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Brecht's actual prejudice test imposes a higher barrier to habeas relief than that imposed by the unreasonable-application clause of Section 2254(d)(1)\n2. The State And Its Amici Misunderstand The Relationship Between Brecht And AEDPA/Chapman\nC. Separate, Formal Application Of AEDPA/Chapman Is Necessary Only Where The Brecht Analysis Does Not Comply With AEDPA's Limitations On Factual And Legal Materials\nII. THE COURT OF APPEALS' ANALYSIS COMPLIED WITH SECTION 2254(d)(1)'S LIMITATIONS\nA. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Impermissibly Rely On Circuit Precedent, Social-Science Research, Or Dicta\nB. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Ignore The State Court's Rationale\nC. The Court Of Appeals Did Not Rely On Evidence Outside The State-Court Record Or Arguments Not Previously Presented To The State Court\nIII. SEPARATE, FORMAL APPLICATION OF AEDPA CONFIRMS THE COURT OF APPEALS' DETERMINATION\nA. The Michigan Supreme Court Decision Was Contrary To Clearly Established Federal Law As Determined By This Court\n1. The Michigan Supreme Court decision was contrary to Deck and Chapman\n2. The Michigan Supreme Court issued the last reasoned decision\nB. The Michigan Court Of Appeals Decision Was Contrary To And Involved An Unreasonable Application Of Federal Law As Established By This Court",
        "reference": "B. A Finding Of Actual Prejudice Under Brecht Means That A State Court's Determination That An Error Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt Is Objectively Unreasonable Under AEDPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-441_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Serious Consequences to Amicus Resulting from the 2017 Increase in Quarterly Fees, When Contrasted With the Absence of Any Increase in the Quarterly Fees in Bankruptcy Administrator Districts, Demonstrates That The 2017 Increase in the Quarterly Fees Violated the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Amicus Concurs With Petitioner's Arguments and Will Not Repeat Them Here; The Facts of Amicus' Case Demonstrate That 28 U.S.C. section 1930(a)(6) is a Law on the Subject of Bankruptcy for Purposes of the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause",
        "reference": "B. A Holding That the Increase in Quarterly Fees Violates the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause Will Permit the Courts to Avoid Deciding an \"As Applied\" Challenge to This Same Law on Due Process Grounds and on Equal Protection Grounds",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-489_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. There is a clear and intractable conflict\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This case is a perfect vehicle\nD. The decision below is incorrect",
        "reference": "B. The question presented is important and recurring",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. State law, not the Double Jeopardy Clause, defines the rules for when a jury has reached a valid verdict\nA. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial only where there has been a final determination of guilt\nB. States have authority to decide the requirements for a jury to issue a final determination regarding guilt\nII. Georgia's \"repugnant verdicts\" rule, which addresses when a jury has reached a valid verdict, is constitutional\nA. Georgia has reasonably determined that a valid verdict cannot be based on affirmative, contradictory \"findings\"\nB. This Court's cases on \"inconsistent verdicts\" do not undermine Georgia's rule because they say nothing about juries affirmatively contradicting themselves via special findings\nIII. Because the jury did not reach a verdict, McElrath's jeopardy never ended, retrial is appropriate, and this Court should affirm\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A decision for McElrath would undermine both state sovereignty and criminal defendants' rights in Georgia",
        "reference": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court correctly held that McElrath can be retried",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Government Schools Are Hostile to Student Religious Speech that Disagrees with Contemporary Elite Views on Social Issues\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Expanding the State's Power to Punish Student Speech that Occurs Outside the School Environment Will Open the Door for School Officials to Punish Speech with which They Disagree\nA. The school's effort to punish off-campus speech exceeds its authority\nB. The speech at issue did not rise to the level of a material and substantial disruption",
        "reference": "II. Tinker Provides the Appropriate Balance Between Government Power and Student Religious Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. DELAWARE'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FURTHER COMPELLING INTERESTS BEYOND THOSE CONSIDERED BY THE THIRD CIRCUIT\nA. Delaware Has Compelling Interests in Preserving Public Confidence and Avoiding Single Party Entrenchment in Its Judiciary\nB. Delaware's Partisan Balance Requirements Successfully Further Those Compelling Interests\n1. Delaware's partisan balance requirements have limited the risk and perception of cronyism and partisan dealmaking in judicial appointments\n2. Delaware's partisan balance requirements promote public confidence in judicial integrity by discouraging the politicization of judicial appointments\n3. Delaware's partisan balance requirements limit governors' discretion to entrench a single political party on the state's judiciary and limit political gamesmanship\n4. The \"other major party\" provision furthers these state interests by enforcing the spirit of Delaware's bare majority requirement\nC. The Third Circuit's Application of Elrod-Branti Ignored the Structural Nature of Delaware's Partisan Balance Requirements and Distinctions Between Judicial and Executive Branch Appointments",
        "reference": "I. DELAWARE'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDICIAL SELECTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION TO DO JUSTICE IS BROAD AND KALEIDOSCOPIC\n1. Historic Underpinnings of Prosecutorial Discretion\n2. [MISSING]\nII. ELIMINATING THE \"INDICATIONS OF INNOCENCE\" RULE WOULD DENY THE REALITY OF PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICE AND MAY NEGATIVELY IMPACT THE CAUSE OF JUSTICE\n1. The Realities of New York Criminal Practice\n2. Negative Impact on the Cause of Justice",
        "reference": "2. How Prosecutors \"Do Justice\" through Dismissals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Reality Of PAGA Litigation: The State Of California Receives Little In PAGA Penalties, But Plaintiffs' Counsel Use PAGA As A Club To Bludgeon Class-Based Settlements That This Court's Arbitration Cases Forbid\nA. Almost All Of CELC's Members Have Been Subjected To Multiple PAGA Actions As A Result Of The Iskanian Rule\nB. Plaintiffs Bank On PAGA Claims Not Being Arbitrable On An Individual Basis And Not Being Removable In Filing PAGA Actions Instead Of Class Actions\nC. Trivial Violations Can Lead To Millions In Penalties\nD. Millions In Potential Penalties Compel Settlements\nE. PAGA Lacks Meaningful Standing Requirements\nII. Iskanian Incorrectly Held This Court's Arbitration Precedents Are Inapplicable To A PAGA Action Because It Is A Type Of Qui Tam Claim\nA. The FAA Enforces Agreements Providing For Individual Arbitration \"Pretty Absolutely.\"\nB. Contrary To The Holding In Waffle House, Iskanian Held That A PAGA Action Is A Type Of State Qui Tam Action That \"Lies Outside The FAA's Coverage.\"\nC. The Ninth Circuit Explained That PAGA Actions Are Not Like Qui Tam Actions Under Federal Law\nD. Regardless Of Whether It Is A Qui Tam Action, Because PAGA Is A State Action, It Is Not Outside The FAA\nIII. A PAGA Action, Filed In The Face Of An Arbitration Agreement, Frustrates The FAA's Objectives As Much As Or More Than A Class Action\nA. Regardless Of How Laudable A State Law Might Be, It Is Preempted If It Interferes With The Fundamental Attributes Of Arbitration\nB. [MISSING]\nC. In Williams, The California Supreme Court Noted The Similarities Between Class And PAGA Representative Actions, Which Require Procedures That Individual, Bilateral Arbitrations Avoid\nD. Both Class And PAGA Actions Greatly Increase The Risks To Defendants Compared To Individual, Bilateral Arbitrations\nE. Iskanian Notwithstanding, PAGA Claims Can Be Arbitrated On An Individual Basis",
        "reference": "B. Both Class And PAGA Actions Lack Informality, Making Them Slower, More Costly, And More Likely To Generate Procedural Morass Than Individual, Bilateral Arbitrations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.41
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS ON THE EXISTENCE AND TERMS OF THE TREATY DO NOT TRANSFORM THE AD HOC ARBITRATION PANEL INTO A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL.\"\nIII. RESPONDENT'S ATTEMPT TO HARMONIZE ITS CONSTRUCTION OF section 1782 WITH THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT FAILS",
        "reference": "I. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE AD HOC ARBITRATION PANEL CONSTITUTES A \"FOREIGN OR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" UNDER section 1782",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-857_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congressional rollbacks of post-Founding extensions of habeas corpus present no substantial constitutional doubt\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The Watkins Rule\n2. Red Herrings\nB. Original Understanding Versus Living Constitution\nII. The parties and supporting amici ask this Court to add a nonsensical amendment to the statute, one Congress would have no reason to enact",
        "reference": "A. The Original Understanding",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 523(a)(2)(A) Does Not Saddle Individual Debtors with Others' Fraud\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Text Bars Imputation\nC. Context Rules Out Imputation\nD. Imputation Would Upend Bankruptcy\nE. There Is No Forfeiture or Waiver\nII. Contrary Interpretations Fail",
        "reference": "A. The Text Does Not Clearly Foreclose Discharge",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' Expansive Reading of the Elections Clause Will Turn Commonplace State Judicial and Administrative Interpretation of State Election Laws into a Flood of Federal Lawsuits, Burdening Federal Courts, and Particularly This Court.\nA. Ambiguities and Gaps are Ubiquitous in State Election Laws, and State and Local Election Administrators and State Courts Routinely Interpret and Implement Such Laws.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Flood of New Federal Lawsuits Will Place Special Burdens on This Court's Docket for Emergency Election-Related Motions.\nII. Petitioners' Expansive Interpretation of the Elections Clause Will Undermine Voter Confidence in Elections and in the Judiciary, Potentially Paving the Way for Election Subversion.\nA. Petitioners' Expansive Interpretation Will Harm Voter Confidence in the Legitimacy of the U.S. Election System.\nB. Petitioners' Expansive Interpretation Will Harm Public Confidence in the Judiciary.\nC. Petitioners' Expansive Interpretation May Pave the Way for Election Subversion.",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' Expansive Reading of the Elections Clause Would Open the Floodgates to Federal Lawsuits, Exacerbating Record Election Litigation Rates.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Need For The Access Regulation Is Even Greater Today Than When The Regulation Was First Adopted\nII. The Access Regulation Does Not Constitute A Per Se Taking Of Petitioners' Property\nA. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement\nB. Petitioners' analysis ignores background principles of California property law\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners' analysis fails to account for numerous other restrictions on the bare right to exclude",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNCONSTRAINED DISCRETION TO AWARD COSTS UNDER 17 U.S.C. section 505 UNDERMINES THE COPYRIGHT ACT'S INCENTIVES TO REGISTER WORKS\nA. Section 412 of the Copyright Act encourages prompt registration\nB. Awards of non-taxable costs undermine the incentives of section 412 to promote timely registration\nC. Congress has long recognized the importance of registration for copyright owners and users\nII. TITLE 28 CONSTRAINTS ARE NEEDED TO REMOVE UNCERTAINTY FROM section 505 COST AWARDS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Different courts award different types of non-taxable costs\nC. The Ninth Circuit decision will increase variability in cost awards",
        "reference": "A. No clear criteria exist for awarding non-taxable costs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section Three Can Only Be Enforced As Provided For By Congress.\nB. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Historical Practice.",
        "reference": "I. Section Three Of The Fourteenth Amendment Is Not A Self-Executing Authority To Be Used Offensively Against Candidates for Federal Office.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Defendant Failed to Present his Contention that the New York Door-Opening Doctrine is Constitutionally Infirm\nII. New York's Door-Opening Doctrine is in Full Accord with the Petitioner's Right of Confrontation\nA. A criminal defendant may act in a manner inconsistent with preserving his constitutional rights; the right of confrontation is no different\n1. A criminal defendant's constitutional rights cannot be used to undercut the integrity of the trial process\n2. States can develop limited procedural rules to deter misleading impressions\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. If the Trial Court Erred in Admitting Morris's Plea Allocution, the Error was Harmless",
        "reference": "B. New York's door-opening rule is constitutional and was properly applied",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government bears the burden to establish its need for this information, subject to strict scrutiny\nII. Harassment is an unfortunate reality in today's highly polarized politics\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Experience shows government cannot be trusted to keep sensitive data confidential",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE WELL-DOCUMENTED HISTORY OF section 1152(A)(1)(A) DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PROCLAMATION IS UNLAWFUL\nA. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) Bars the President from Using His Power Under section 1182(f) to Discriminate Based on Nationality\nB. [MISSING]\nII. UNLIKE THE PROCLAMATION, PRIOR U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICIES SHOW LEGITIMATE REASONS FOR GIVING PREFERENCE TO CERTAIN GROUPS\nIII. JUDICIAL REVIEW RESPECTS OUR CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND LIMITS ON PRESIDENTIAL POWER",
        "reference": "B. The History of U.S. Immigration Law Shows that section 1152(a)(1)(A) Is a Carveout to section 1182(f)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. OUR NATION'S HISTORY AND TRADITIONS SHOULD INFORM THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ENUMERATED RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS.\nII. THE FOUNDING ERA IS THE RELEVANT TIME PERIOD FOR DETERMINING THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT.\nA. This Court should look to founding-era history and practices, rather than later periods, to deduce the original public meaning of the right.\nB. The Constitution's original public meaning and founding-era practices lead to the proper answer even for 'close calls.'\nIII. UNDER A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS CONSISTENT WITH HELLER, PUBLIC PLACES WERE NOT UNDERSTOOD TO BE \"SENSITIVE PLACES\" WHERE ARMS COULD NOT BE CARRIED.\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. BECAUSE INDIVIDUALS HAVE A RIGHT TO CARRY ARMS IN PUBLIC, THE \"SENSITIVE PLACES\" DOCTRINE CANNOT SWALLOW THE RULE.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-493_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fifth Circuit's Decision Was Correct and Should Be Summarily Affirmed\nA. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law\nB. The Tribe's refusal to obey the Fifth Circuit's ruling does not make it \"unworkable.\"\nC. Congress has confirmed the Fifth Circuit's rule by acquiescing to it\nII. In the Alternative, the Court Should Deny Review\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This case does not present a division of authority on a question of national importance\nC. This is the wrong forum to address the Pueblo's complaints about the economic impact of the Restoration Act",
        "reference": "A. This is a poor vehicle to consider any lingering questions about the scope of Cabazon Band",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals' constitutional holding does not warrant this Court's review\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The court of appeals' remedial holding does not warrant this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 5.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. iPHONE OWNERS CAN SEEK DAMAGES BECAUSE THEY PURCHASE APPS DIRECTLY FROM APPLE\nA. Plaintiffs Who Purchase Directly From An Antitrust Violator Can Seek Damages From That Violator\nB. iPhone Owners Purchase Apps Directly From Apple And Suffer Damages Caused By Apple\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Apple fails to show that the owners do not directly purchase the monopolized product\nII. THE POLICY CONCERNS THAT UNDERLIE ILLINOIS BRICK SUPPORT THE iPHONE OWNERS' RIGHT TO SEEK DAMAGES\nA. The iPhone Owners' Action Does Not Threaten Overlapping Or Duplicative Recovery\nB. The iPhone Owners' Action Is Consistent With The Proper Role Of Effective Private Enforcement",
        "reference": "1. iPhone owners purchase apps directly from Apple and are directly harmed by its anti-competitive conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-483_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. CERTIORARI IS NOT WARRANTED TO REVIEW THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EMBRYONIC AND FETAL TISSUE DISPOSAL STATUTE\nA. No circuit split justifies this Court's review\nB. This case presents a poor vehicle for considering the constitutionality of a tissue disposal law\nC. Certiorari is not warranted because the decision below is correct\nII. [MISSING]\nA. There is no circuit split or unsettled question of law justifying review by this Court\nB. Certiorari is not warranted because the decision below was correct",
        "reference": "II. CERTIORARI IS NOT WARRANTED TO REVIEW THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INDIANA'S PRE-VIABILITY ABORTION BAN",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. ERISA does not preempt Act 900's regulation of drug reimbursement rates\nA. Act 900 is basic rate regulation\nB. [MISSING]\nII. ERISA does not preempt Act 900's enforcement mechanisms\nA. Act 900's enforcement mechanisms are necessary incidents to its rate regulation\nB. Act 900's enforcement mechanisms do not regulate central matters of plan administration\nC. PCMA's arguments about uniformity and burden are overstated and irrelevant\nIII. ERISA does not preempt Act 900's decline-to-dispense provision\nIV. Act 900 does not refer to ERISA plans",
        "reference": "B. Act 900 does not regulate the \"payment of benefits\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1442_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Under the reasoning of Sims v. Apfel, a Social Security claimant need not exhaust particular issues before an administrative law judge\nB. The Court should not otherwise require a Social Security claimant to exhaust issues before an administrative law judge\nC. Petitioners' Appointments Clause challenges would be exempt from any rule that requires a Social Security claimant to exhaust issues before an administrative law judge\nII. The Court should excuse petitioners' failure to raise their Appointments Clause challenges before their administrative law judges",
        "reference": "I. A Social Security claimant need not exhaust an Appointments Clause challenge before the administrative law judge whose appointment is being challenged",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. The School District Was Constitutionally Entitled To Exclude Kennedy's Demonstrative Quiet Prayer As An Apparent Routine Element Of Its Football Event\nA. The School District Was Entitled To Control All Communicative Facets Of Its Football Event\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Retention Of Kennedy's Demonstrative Quiet Prayer In The School's Football Game Event Would Have Violated The Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "B. Kennedy's Demonstrative Quiet Prayer Effectively Would Be A Permanent Coda To Each Scheduled Football Game Event, And Thus The School District, In Exercise Of Its Editorial Judgment, Could Excise It",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Allowing government officials to moot nominal damages claims for constitutional violations through subsequent amendments impermissibly chills free expression at public universities and in the public sphere generally.\nIII. The government should not be permitted to moot a standalone nominal damages claim by amending an unconstitutional policy for the same reasons that such a change does not moot an overbreadth challenge under Massachusetts v. Oakes.",
        "reference": "I. Carey and Farrar establish that a standalone nominal damages claim avoids mootness because nominal damages alter the legal relationship between the parties and protect absolute rights, like freedom of speech, for the benefit of society.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED HEIGHTENED FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION TO A CLAIMED TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT BY AN ORDINARY COMMERCIAL PRODUCT BECAUSE IT ALLEGEDLY CONTAINED SOME EXPRESSION\nA. The Rogers Test Was Originated to Provide Heightened First Amendment Protection Only to Artistically Expressive Works Such as Movies, Books, and Art\nB. The Ninth Circuit Overbroadly Defined an \"Expressive Work\" as Any Product that Contains Any Expression\nC. No Other Circuit Has Applied Rogers to Ordinary Commercial Products, Even if They Contain Some Expression\nD. Traditional Trademark Law Already Provides Protections for First Amendment-Protected Expression Incorporated Into Ordinary Commercial Products\nII. THIS CASE PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT A LEGAL ERROR AND TO CLARIFY WHEN THE ROGERS \"EXPRESSIVE WORK\" TEST APPLIES\nA. Providing a Definition of an \"Expressive Work\" Under Rogers Will Lead to Greater Certainty in Applying Trademark Law\nIII. AN \"EXPRESSIVE WORK\" IS ONE IN WHICH EXPRESSION IS INEXTRICABLE FROM THE PRODUCT\nIV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DILUTION ANALYSIS DISREGARDS THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF 15 U.S.C. section 1125(c)(3) AND THIS COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE ON NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH\nA. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Apply or Consider the TDRA's Parody Exception\nB. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Apply the Bolger Test for Determining Noncommercial Speech\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Resort to Constitutional Principles, Rather than Traditional Trademark Principles, Was Unnecessary to Resolve this Dispute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. Kennedy spoke as a government employee.\nII. Regardless of whether Kennedy's speech was government speech, on these facts the District could regulate it.\nA. The District had adequate justification to restrict even citizen speech.\n1. The District expressed and acted on multiple valid reasons for limiting Kennedy's midfield speech.\n2. Kennedy's interests in praying on the 50-yard line with students do not outweigh the District's interests.\n3. A disclaimer would not solve the problems that Kennedy's midfield religious speech created.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. On any legal standard, the District's actions were lawful.\n1. If the Court were to jettison Pickering, at most intermediate scrutiny should apply.\n2. The District's actions satisfy any level of scrutiny.",
        "reference": "B. Pickering appropriately weighs the competing interests when a government employee engages in religious speech at work.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Separation of Powers Is the Key Structural Protection of Individual Liberty in the Federal Constitution\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The 'Intelligible Principle' Doctrine Has Failed To Limit Delegations of Legislative Power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-857_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eighth Circuit Erred By Not Allowing Petitioner To File For Habeas Relief Under 28 U.S.C. section 2255(e)'s Saving clause\nA. The Eighth Circuit's Strained Reading Of section 2255(e) Contravenes The Subsection's Plain Language And Arbitrarily Divorces Remedy From Substance\nB. Providing Saving-Clause Relief For Statutory Claims Does Not \"Work An End Run Around\" section 2255(h)'s Authorization Of Successive Petitions For New But Retroactive Rules Of Constitutional Law Decided By This Court\nC. The Eighth Circuit's Reading Makes section 2255(e)'s Saving Clause Essentially Superfluous\nII. The Eighth Circuit's Interpretation Of The Saving Clause Raises Serious Constitutional Concerns\nA. The Eighth Circuit's Reading Violates The Suspension Clause\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Eighth Circuit's Reading Raises Serious Fifth Amendment Due Process Concerns\nD. The Eighth Circuit's Reading Permits Sustention Of Cruel And Unusual Punishment",
        "reference": "B. The Eighth Circuit's Reading Violates Separation of Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-334_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "District courts that tax appellate costs under Rule 39(e) have discretion to reduce or eliminate particular items of such costs\nA. Rule 39(e)'s text reflects discretionary authority\nB. Section 1920's cost-taxing authority, which Rule 39(e) incorporates, is discretionary\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The court of appeals does not tax costs under Rule 39\n2. Rule 39's cost-taxing proceedings begin after the appellate panel's role under Rule 39(a) is complete\n3. The district court is best equipped to tax Rule 39(e) costs\nD. The court of appeals' contrary analysis is incorrect",
        "reference": "C. Rule 39's broader context confirms that the district court, not the court of appeals, has discretion to tax Rule 39(e) expenses as costs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lemon Test Is Unmoored from the Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause\nA. The Religion Clause was added to the Constitution to ensure that the federal government would not interfere with the individual freedom of religion\nB. [MISSING]\nII. This Court Should Use this Case to Announce a New Test for Reviewing Establishment Clause Claims Based on Legal Coercion",
        "reference": "B. The founders' understanding of the Religion Clauses as a protection for individual religious liberty is reflected in the practices of the three branches of government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Never Articulated A Principled Basis For The Narrow-Construction Canon\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Narrow-Construction Canon Is Especially Pernicious As Applied To Unambiguous Statutes Like Exemption 4\nIV. The Court Should Reconsider The Narrow-Construction Canon In This Case Because The Narrow-Construction Canon Has A Significant Impact In Lower Courts",
        "reference": "II. There Is No Basis For The Narrow-Construction Canon",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "THE COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO CLARIFY THAT ITS DECISIONS DEPLOYING THE EQUITY OF THE STATUTE ARE DEFUNCT\nA. The Lower Courts' Expansion Of section 13(b) Is, In Effect, An Exercise Of The Equity Of The Statute\nB. The Equity Of The Statute Is A Relic Of The Middle Ages That Has No Place In Our System Of Government\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This Court's Old Decisions Applying The Equity Of The Statute Are Obsolete \u2014 But They Continue To Cause Mischief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Constitutional Convention and Ratification\nII. Districting in the First Congressional Election\nIII. Congressional Implementation of Single-Member Districting Over Time\nA. The Twenty-Seventh Congress\nB. The Thirty-First Congress\nC. The Thirty-Seventh, Forty-Second, Forty-Seventh, Fifty-First, and Fifty-Sixth Congresses\nD. The Sixty-Second Congress\nE. [MISSING]\nF. The Ninetieth Congress",
        "reference": "E. The Seventieth, Seventy-First, Seventy-Sixth and Seventy-Seventh Congresses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1077_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CIRCUIT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE SEC'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER ENGAGED IN AN UNLAWFUL SECURITIES SCHEME\nA. Insider Trading Is Scheme Liability Predicated Upon Misrepresentations or Omissions\nB. Liability under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c) is Predicated on Whether the Defendant's Conduct was Deceptive or Manipulative\nC. Petitioner's Conduct was Deceptive\nD. The Circuit Court's Opinion Is Consistent with Central Bank and Janus\nII. THE COMMISSION WAS CORRECT THAT PETITIONER WAS A \"MAKER\" UNDER JANUS\nIII. THE SAME ANALYSIS HEREIN APPLIES UNDER SECTION 17(A) OF THE SECURITIES ACT\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. SIFMA AND THE CHAMBER'S HYPERBOLIC CLAIMS ARE MERITLESS",
        "reference": "IV. THE SEC IS NOT ACTING IN BAD FAITH",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "Under 18 U.S.C. 2703, the government may require a U.S. service provider to disclose any electronic communications within its control\nA. This case involves a domestic application of Section 2703\n1. This Court's decisions require a provision-specific \"focus\" analysis\n2. Section 2703 focuses on the disclosure of electronic communications in the United States\n3. Even if Section 2703 focuses on privacy, any invasion of privacy occurs in the United States\nB. Congress enacted Section 2703 against the background principle that subpoena recipients must produce all records within their control\nC. Microsoft's contrary theory would be both impractical and detrimental to law enforcement\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Enforcement of Section 2703 respects the United States' international obligations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. A claim for nominal damages does not prevent mootness if intervening events have eliminated any threat of recurring or future injury to the plaintiff's legal rights or interests.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Nominal damages can redress continuing or threatened injuries to legal rights or interests, but not past injuries.\nC. Historical practice confirms that nominal damages serve as meaningful redress only for continuing or threatened injuries to a plaintiff's legal rights or interests.\nD. When, as here, intervening events end any alleged continuing injury or threat to a plaintiff's legal rights, a claim for nominal damages becomes moot.\nII. Creating a nominal-damages exception to Article III for constitutional violations is both unwise and unnecessary.\nA. Allowing nominal damages to \"redress\" purely past injuries would all but eliminate the mootness doctrine.\nB. Existing remedies prevent and compensate injuries caused by constitutional violations.",
        "reference": "A. A case becomes moot if the court can no longer grant personal and tangible relief likely to redress the plaintiff's injury.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the FCA, the government may dismiss a qui tam action after declining to intervene during the seal period\nA. Regardless of whether the government intervenes during the seal period, it has a right to dismiss an action\nB. Petitioner's contrary arguments are incorrect\n1. The FCA does not require the government to intervene before dismissing an action\na. The FCA's text does not make intervention a prerequisite to the government's dismissal of a qui tam suit\nb. The FCA's structure does not support an intervention requirement\nc. [MISSING]\n2. Even if the FCA required the government to intervene before dismissing an action, the government satisfied that requirement here by intervening after the seal period expired\na. After declining to intervene during the seal period, the government may intervene at a later date and dismiss the action\nb. The FCA's text, history, and purposes do not support petitioner's contrary view\nII. The government's decision to dismiss a qui tam action is subject to constitutional, but not statutory, constraints\nA. The FCA does not restrict the government's discretion to dismiss qui tam suits, but the dismissal decision is subject to constitutional constraints\nB. Neither the Constitution nor the FCA supports adoption of the Ninth Circuit's Sequoia Orange framework\nC. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) has no application here\nIII. The court of appeals' judgment should be affirmed",
        "reference": "c. The purpose of intervention is not implicated when the government seeks dismissal of a qui tam suit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DEFERENCE STANDARD IS CORRECT AND CONSISTENT WITH RULE 44.1\nA. The Second Circuit's limited holding is consistent with this Court's controlling precedent and Rule 44.1\nB. International comity principles counsel a strong standard of deference for foreign sovereigns\nC. Deference is particularly appropriate in this case because it implicates a conflict between sharply divergent economic and trade regimes properly reserved for resolution by the political branches\nII. THE MINISTRY'S CONSTRUCTION OF CHINESE LAW WAS CORRECT\nA. China's construction of its regulatory system was logical and coherent\nB. China's representations to the WTO are entirely consistent with its position in this case\nC. The WTO Raw Materials proceedings confirm the appropriateness of deference to the Ministry in this case .. 41\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. REGARDLESS OF THE LEVEL OF DEFERENCE, THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED",
        "reference": "III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN APPROACH AND OUTCOME",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1782 does not authorize judicial assistance to obtain discovery for use in an arbitration, before a nongovernmental adjudicator, to which the parties consent\nA. A \"foreign or international tribunal\" under Section 1782 is a governmental adjudicator that exercises authority on behalf of one or more nation-states\n1. The statutory phrasing and context show that \"foreign or international tribunal\" refers to a governmental adjudicator\n2. The statutory history confirms that Section 1782 encompasses only governmental adjudicators\nB. An arbitration before a nongovernmental adjudicator to which parties consent, whether in a contract or a treaty, is not a \"proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal\" within the meaning of Section 1782\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Section 1782 does not encompass an investor-state arbitration before a nongovernmental arbitral panel\nII. The Sixth and Second Circuits' contrary interpretations are unsound",
        "reference": "1. Section 1782 does not encompass private commercial arbitration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. At the time of the Founding, the Phrase \"officer of the United States\" Included the President\nA. Corpus Linguistics Evidence Demonstrates that \"officer of the United States\" Was Not a Term of Art at the Founding\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Additional context about the original meaning of \"officer of the United States\" in the 1789 Constitution\n1. Appointments Clause\n2. Impeachment Clause\n3. The Presidential Oath and the Article VI Oath\n4. Commission Clause\nII. At the time of the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, \"officers of the United States\" Included Elected Officials Such as the President\nA. State Officers Included Elected Officials\nB. Evidence from the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment\nIII. Evidence that the President is an \"officer of the United States\" for Purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment\nA. Evidence from the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment\nB. Evidence from the Impeachment Trial of Andrew Johnson\nC. Evidence from President Andrew Johnson's Appointment Proclamations\nD. Evidence from the Amnesty Proclamations of Presidents Lincoln and Johnson",
        "reference": "B. The Text of the Constitution Repeatedly Identifies the Presidency as an \"Office\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Rule 1 and Its Application of Article X section 6 of the Montana Constitution Are Contrary to the Founders' View of Religious Liberty\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Article X section 6 of the Montana Constitution Violates the Free Exercise Clause Because It Places a Substantial Burden on Religion\nIV. The Holding of Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer Forbids This Kind of Religious Discrimination\nV. Blaine Amendments Violate the Equal Protection Clause, Since They Disadvantage Religion",
        "reference": "II. Blaine Amendments Like Article X section 6 Were Created with an Animus Against Roman Catholicism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1435_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. MINN. STAT. section 211B.11(1) BROADLY BANS ALL POLITICALLY EXPRESSIVE APPAREL\nA. First Amendment Principles\n1. Forum Analysis\n2. Content-Based and Political Speech Restrictions Are Subject to Strict Scrutiny\n3. Facial Challenges Under the Overbreadth Doctrine\nB. Minn. Stat. section 211B.11(1) Bans a Vast Amount of Peaceful, Passive, Protected Speech\n1. Section 211B.11(1) Burdens an Astounding Amount of Protected Political Speech\n2. [MISSING]\nII. NO CONCEIVABLE INTEREST SUPPORTS A BAN ON ALL \"POLITICAL\" APPAREL\nA. The State's Interest in Fair and Orderly Elections Cannot Justify a Total Political Apparel Ban\nB. The Statute's Vague Prohibition Invites Expansive Enforcement and Viewpoint Discrimination\nC. Burson Does Not Support the Statute\nD. The Statute Has No Legitimate Sweep or Is Substantially Overbroad\nIII. NO POSSIBLE NARROWING CONSTRUCTION CAN SAVE THE STATUTE",
        "reference": "2. The Provision Threatens Other Forms of Protected Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Effect of the Decision of the Third Circuit Is Limited to the State of Delaware and Does Not Need to Be Settled by This Court\nA. The \"Major Political Party\" Provision\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioner Merely Seeks Correction of a Purported Misapplication of a Properly Stated Rule of Law\nIII. There Is No Genuine Circuit Split\nIV. This Court Does Not Grant Petitions for Certiorari to Review the Application of State Law\nV. Petitioner Has Failed to Establish That the Political Balance Provision Advances a Vital Government Interest and That it Is Narrowly Tailored to Serve That Interest\nA. Exacting Scrutiny Applies\nB. A State's Interest in Sovereignty Must Yield to the First Amendment\nC. Nothing in the Record Justifies the Assertion That the Political Balance Results in a Superior Judiciary\nD. Political Balance in the Court Does Not Promote Public Confidence in the Judicial System\nE. Deciding Cases Does Not Involve Creating or Implementing Executive Policy\nF. Petitioner Made No Effort to Show That the Political Balance Provision Was Narrowly Tailored So That It Was the Least Restrictive Way to Protect Any Vital Interests",
        "reference": "B. The \"Political Balance\" Provision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.31
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Trails Act Does Not Transfer Land Between Agencies\nA. The Statutory Text Belies the Fourth Circuit's Interpretation\nB. Respondents Cannot Defend the Inevitable Consequences of the Fourth Circuit's Interpretation\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. This Case Is Exceptionally Important And Warrants Review Now",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-530_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The RRTA's definition of taxable \"compensation\" encompasses an employer's provision of publicly traded stock\n1. The phrase \"any form of money remuneration\" encompasses an employer's provision of publicly traded stock\n2. [MISSING]\nB. Historical practice supports the court of appeals' conclusion that an employer's provision of stock to its employees falls within the RRTA's definition of taxable \"compensation\"\n1. Congress's use of the term \"money remuneration\" before the enactment of the RRTA demonstrates an understanding that the term reaches non-cash benefits\n2. Agency interpretations that have been ratified by Congress reflect the understanding that RRTA \"compensation\" includes stock\nC. Treating an employer's provision of publicly traded stock as taxable \"compensation\" furthers the RRTA's objectives\nD. Deference principles support treating stock as taxable \"compensation\" under the RRTA",
        "reference": "2. The exclusions contained in the RRTA's definition of \"compensation\" reinforce the conclusion that \"any form of money remuneration\" includes publicly traded stock",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. LAND USE CLAIMANTS OFTEN SEEK CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES OTHER THAN JUST COMPENSATION\nA. Government Action Against Land Use Claimants Often Implicates Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and Equal Protection Rights\nB. The Court's Takings Cases Recognize a Distinction Between Takings Claims and Other Constitutional Claims\nII. THIS COURT NEVER INTENDED FOR WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S STATE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT TO SERVE AS A BLANKET RULE FOR ALL LAND USE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS\nA. It is Textually Clear That Williamson County Should Not be Applied to Due Process and Equal Protection Claims\nB. Despite no Precedential Basis, Courts Continue to Apply Williamson County to Other Constitutional Claims\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. LINGLE v. CHEVRON IS THIS COURT'S CLEAREST EXPRESSION THAT DUE PROCESS AND TAKINGS CLAIMS ARE DISTINCT, YET COURTS CONTINUE TO RELY ON WILLIAMSON COUNTY TO SUBSUME DUE PROCESS CLAIMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"Results In\" Requires a Showing of Contributory Cause\nII. \"On Account Of\" Prompts But-For Causation and Analysis of the Senate Factors\nA. \"On Account Of\" Requires But-For Causation\nB. Section 2's But-For Causation Follows the \"Totality of Circumstances\" Approach\nC. The \"Totality of Circumstances\" Includes Historical and Nongovernmental Discrimination\nD. The Prevailing Section 2 Test Correctly Applies a But-For and Totality Standard\nIII. Section 2's Robust Causation Requirements Affirm its Constitutional Grounding\nA. Section 2 is Appropriate Enforcement Legislation\nB. Section 2 Advances Equal Protection Principles by Reducing Racial Divisiveness\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Section 2 Offers Due Regard to the State's Legitimate Interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Gingles 1 requires an illustrative map that is consistent with constitutional consideration of race\nA. Gingles 1 identifies the potential of racial vote dilution and nothing more\nB. The Equal Protection Clause does not apply to illustrative maps offered to satisfy Gingles 1\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Illustrative Gingles 1 maps are not the same as a remedial map\nB. Appellants manufacture limits on their remedial authority\nC. Alabama has numerous remedial options. 21\nD. The presented illustrative maps are not racial gerrymanders\nE. Appellants' arguments overlook alternative Section 2 remedies",
        "reference": "II. The flexible remedies available for Section 2 violations relieve Appellants' equal protection concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE DOES NOT APPLY FOR ELECTED TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE",
        "reference": "A. THE PROPERTY CLAUSE DOES NOT TRUMP THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Indiana Diverts Medicaid Money Generated By Nursing Homes to Unrelated Projects\nA. Medicaid is a Partnership Between the Federal Government and the States\nB. The Use of Nursing Homes to Maximize Medicaid Revenue is Widespread\nC. Indiana Leverages Medicaid Loopholes for Nursing Homes to Maximize Revenue\nD. Indiana's Nursing Homes Provide Substandard Care\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Nursing Home Residents Must be Permitted To Bring Claims Under Section 1983 to Vindicate Their Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1432_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. REVOCATION\u2014ON-DIVORCE STATUTES ARE A VALID EXERCISE OF STATES' SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY OVER DIVORCE.\nII. STATUTES AFFECTING THE DONATIVE COMPONENT OF A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY DO NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE.\nIII. REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE STATUTES DO NOT IMPAIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS; RATHER, THEY CONSTRUE DIVORCE AS AN EXERCISE OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS.\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. The Paperwork Obligation to Re-Designate an Ex-Spouse is Not a Substantial Impairment.\nB. Revocation-on-divorce Statutes Do Not Interfere with Policyholder Obligations.\nV. REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE STATUTES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER BLAISDELL.\nA. Blaisdell Should Not Be Overruled\nB. Under Blaisdell, Minnesota's Statute is Constitutional",
        "reference": "IV. REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE STATUTES DO NOT \"SUBSTANTIALLY\" IMPAIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The TCPA's Prohibition on ATDS Calls Is Unconstitutional\nB. The Proper Remedy Is to Invalidate the TCPA's Speech-Restricting Prohibition on ATDS Calls, Not to Rewrite It to Abridge Even More Speech\nII. The Statutory ATDS Question Is Closely Related, Has Divided The Circuits, And The Ninth Circuit's Outlier Interpretation Exacerbates The Constitutional Problems",
        "reference": "I. The TCPA's Prohibition On ATDS Calls Is Unconstitutional And The Prohibition Must Be Struck Down, Not Expanded To Abridge Even More Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-200_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES\nA. Section 11 Requires Plaintiffs to Prove They Bought Registered Shares\nB. Section 12(a)(2) Requires Plaintiffs to Prove They Bought Registered Shares\nC. Context, Structure, and History Confirm the Meaning of Sections 11 and 12(a)(2)\nII. RESPONDENT'S POLICY CONCERNS ARE IRRELEVANT AND OVERSTATED\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE OTHER ISSUES RESPONDENT AND AMICI IDENTIFY ARE NOT PROPERLY PRESENTED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Amendment protects religious groups' ability to control who performs important religious functions.\nA. The ministerial exception analysis focuses on function over form.\nB. The ministerial exception does not include a \"lay teacher\" exclusion or a \"co-religionist requirement.\"\nC. The ministerial exception's focus on function over form is administrable.\nII. Respondents' lawsuits are barred by the ministerial exception.\nA. Respondents performed important religious functions.\nB. Respondents bore religious titles and had religious training.\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The schools did not need a religious reason.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Guidance the Government Seeks Cannot be Provided Without Answering the Second Question Presented\nIII. Neither Respondent Nor the United States Would Be Prejudiced by Granting the Second Question Presented",
        "reference": "I. The Westfall Act Has Been Part of This Case Since This Court Added the Bivens Question in Hern\u00e1ndez I",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMPLETE APPELLATE REVIEW IMPROVES JUDICIAL DECISIONS WITHOUT ENCOURAGING DELAY OR BASELESS REMOVALS.\nII. COMPLETE REVIEW MATCHES FEDERAL APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN SIMILAR CONTEXTS.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. COMPLETE REVIEW OF REMAND ORDERS IS IMPORTANT TO THE NATION'S BUSINESS COMMUNITY.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Recent Jurisdiction-Stripping Precedent Breaks With Historical Practice\nB. Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional and Ultra Vires Challenges to Administrative Enforcement Actions\nC. Case Law Does Not Bar the Courthouse Doors\nII. Exhaustion Before the FTC is Futile For Axon\nIII. FTC's Unconstitutional Structure Threatens Individual Liberty\nIV. Axon's Petition Provides an Ideal Vehicle to Repudiate Humphrey's Executor",
        "reference": "I. The FTC Act Does Not Impliedly Strip Jurisdiction Over Axon's Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the government speech doctrine, the flags temporarily displayed on the City's third flagpole are private, not government, speech\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The private flags on the City's third flagpole are private expression that falls outside the Court's government speech doctrine\nII. This Court's forum analysis serves as another limiting principle on the government speech doctrine and reinforces that the private flags are private speech",
        "reference": "A. Summum and Walker identify several factors that serve to limit the scope of the government speech doctrine and to prevent the government from discriminating against views it dislikes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Colonel Alexander Hamilton's Greatest Battle: No Attainders in America\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Are Bills of Attainder Prohibited by our Constitution, Or Are They \"Only Slightly Modified?\"",
        "reference": "II. \"Our Age of Attainder [and Trump Derangement Syndrome]\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 1.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1184_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TESTIMONY OF A VOCATIONAL EXPERT CANNOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF OTHER WORK WHEN THE EXPERT REFUSES TO PROVIDE THE DATA UPON WHICH HER TESTIMONY IS BASED\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Government Provides No Persuasive Justification For Why The Testimony Of A Vocational Expert Constitutes Substantial Evidence, When The Expert Refuses To Provide Her Underlying Data\nII. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S REJECTION OF UNSUPPORTED VOCATIONAL EXPERT TESTIMONY ENFORCES THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD; IT DOES NOT IMPOSE A PROCEDURAL RULE\nA. Rejecting The Agency's Reliance On A Vocational Expert's Unsupported Testimony Vindicates A Substantive Standard, Not A Procedural Requirement\nB. This Court Has Long Recognized That Content Of An Agency's Record Can Be Assessed While Considering The \"Procedures\" Used To Compile That Record\nIII. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RULE IS PRACTICAL AND EFFICIENT",
        "reference": "A. Substantial Evidence Demands More Than Bottom-Line Conclusions For Which The Expert Refuses To Provide Support",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-437_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. PREDICATING CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON A PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER THAT IS VOID AB INITIO IS AT ODDS WITH OUR LEGAL TRADITIONS AND WOULD RAISE GRAVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS.\nA. The Court Has Expressly \u2014 And Correctly \u2014 Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THIS COURT CAN AND SHOULD READ SECTION 1326 TO FORECLOSE CRIMINAL LIABILITY HERE.\nA. A Section 1326 Prosecution Cannot Be Premised On An Indisputably Ultra Vires And Void Removal Order.\nB. Palomar-Santiago Satisfies Section 1326(d)'s Requirements.\nC. Any Ambiguity In Section 1326 Must Be Resolved In Palomar-Santiago's Favor.",
        "reference": "B. The Court Has Studiously Avoided Holding That The Substantive Invalidity Of A Prior Sanction Is Irrelevant In Litigation, Even When A Litigant Would Ordinarily Need To Satisfy Procedural Requirements To Challenge The Sanction.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Varied interpretations of this Court's nominal damages and mootness cases have created an entrenched three-way circuit split regarding whether nominal damages preserve an otherwise moot claim, resulting in inconsistent protection of constitutional rights across the country.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Interpreting the same Supreme Court cases, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits take nominal damages to avoid mootness only if the government actually enforces the regulation against the plaintiffs.\nC. The Eleventh Circuit distinguishes this Court's nominal damages cases and contends that standalone nominal damages claims do not present a live case or controversy.\nD. The uncertainty surrounding the proper interpretation of Carey and Farrar has engendered confusion in other circuits as well.\nII. The Eleventh Circuit's novel rule chills protected expression at public universities and precludes civil rights litigants from securing the individual and societal benefits identified in Carey.",
        "reference": "A. Drawing on Carey, Farrar, and Stachura, the majority holds that nominal damages preclude mootness to protect absolute rights, thereby benefiting individual plaintiffs and society-at-large.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT'S DECISION SHALL CLARIFY THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR ALL ALJs ACROSS A WIDE RANGE OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES, THEREBY CABINING EXECUTIVE POWER\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE COURT'S DECISION SHALL END THE INTERNECINE CIRCUIT CONFLICT OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR SEC ALJs",
        "reference": "II. THE COURT MUST ASSURE THAT FREE ENTERPRISE FUND IS CORRECTLY APPLIED BY THE LOWER COURTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Decision Below Is Wrong\nB. The Circuits Are Deeply Divided on This Important and Recurring Question\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Government Mischaracterizes the Petition and Offers No Persuasive Ground to Deny Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The TCPA does not violate the First Amendment\nA. The TCPA's scheme for regulating automated calls to cell phones is not content-based\n1. The government-debt exception is limited to calls made to conduct a particular economic activity\n2. The government-debt exception is not constitutionally distinguishable from many other statutes that regulate communications made in the course of particular economic activities\n3. The other TCPA provisions that respondents invoke are not content-based\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The government-debt exception to the TCPA's automated-call restriction satisfies intermediate scrutiny\n2. The court of appeals' focus on the constitutionality of the government-debt exception followed logically from its rationale for finding a First Amendment violation\nC. The TCPA's automated-call restriction does not violate the First Amendment\n1. The TCPA's automated-call restriction satisfies intermediate scrutiny\n2. Respondents' contrary arguments lack merit\n3. Even if strict scrutiny applies, the automated-call restriction satisfies it\nII. If this Court concludes that the current statutory scheme violates the First Amendment, severing the government-debt exception is the appropriate remedy\nA. Severing the government-debt exception would fully remedy the First Amendment violation the court of appeals found\nB. Additional considerations support the court of appeals' choice of remedy for the constitutional violation it found\nC. Severing the government-debt exception is consistent with other constitutional values",
        "reference": "B. The government-debt exception does not violate the First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision of the First Circuit is Consistent With Decisions of This Court, Other Circuit Courts of Appeals, and State Courts of Last Resort\nA. The Decision of the First Circuit is Faithful to This Court's Fourth Amendment Decisions\nB. There is no Split \u2014 Circuit Courts and State Courts of Last Resort Routinely Allow Officers to Enter Private Property in Order to Protect Citizens From Harm\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The First Circuit's Proper Extension of Cady to the Caniglias' Tense, Emotional Circumstances Requires no Further Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. EPA Wrongly Arrogated to Itself Congress's Exclusive Power to Regulate Important Subjects\nA. EPA Uses Section 111(d) to Transform the Nation's Electricity System\nB. The Panel Majority Mistakenly Blessed EPA's Section 111(d) Power Grab.\nII. Administrative Agencies Increasingly Attempt to Stand in Congress's Shoes\nIII. Under the Constitution, Important Subjects May Only Be Regulated by Congress\nA. The Separation of Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Power Protects Liberty\nB. Laws Restricting Liberty Must Be Enacted by the People's Representatives\nC. The Constitution Bars Congress from Transferring Its Legislative Power\nD. Line-Drawing Questions Should Not Deter Enforcement of the Separation of Powers\nIV. This Court Should Jettison the \"Intelligible Principle\" Test\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. Common Objections to Enforcement of the Separation of Powers Lack Merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\n1. Current FCC Rules\n2. Methodology\n3. Case Studies\nII. LOCAL NEWS, REVENUES, AND RELATIONSHIP TO COMMUNITY NEEDS",
        "reference": "I. MEDIA ACTION CENTER SURVEY OF LOCAL MARKET NETWORK AFFILIATE DUOPOLIES AND CONTENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Content questioning is a vital tool for ensuring a fair trial in high-publicity cases\nA. [MISSING]\nB. As ABA policy has long recognized, content questioning is a vital tool for identifying biased jurors in high-publicity trials\nC. Content questioning is particularly important in the modern media landscape\nD. Content questioning promotes trial fairness for all parties\nII. This case exemplifies the type of high-publicity criminal trial in which content questioning should be used",
        "reference": "A. Identifying biased jurors is critical to preserving the right to a fair trial in high-publicity cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. Contrary to the Purpose and Intent of 42 U.S.C. section 1983, Williamson County Leaves Enforcement and Protection of the Fifth Amendment to States and Creates an Unnecessary Procedural Morass\nB. The Potential Harms of Williamson County Are Not \"Potential\" in Ohio and Other States That Do Not Recognize a Claim for Inverse Condemnation\nC. Williamson County Has a Particularly Devastating Impact on Ohio Farmers\n1. [MISSING]\n2. State ex rel. Coles v. Granville\nD. There Is No Plausible Basis for Applying a Ripeness Requirement to Fifth Amendment Takings Claims Alone",
        "reference": "1. State ex rel. Doner v. Zody",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1519_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "Section 3663A(b)(4) does not authorize restitution of the victim's attorneys' fees\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The word \"expenses,\" without any reference to attorneys' fees, does not encompass attorneys' fees",
        "reference": "A. The statutory phrase \"child care, transportation, and other expenses\" does not encompass attorneys' fees, which are completely different in nature and magnitude from expenses for child care and transportation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-565_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SAFE-BERTH CLAUSE IS NOT A WARRANTY\nA. The Safe-Berth Clause Does Not Provide For Liability Regardless Of Fault\nB. Custom Is Relevant To Maritime Contract Interpretation But, Like The Circuits And Treatises, It Is Divided\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Warranty Interpretation Conflicts With Atkins\nB. The Warranty Interpretation Lacks A Sound Legal Foundation\nIII. MARITIME COMMERCE IS BEST SERVED BY INTERPRETING SAFE-BERTH CLAUSES AS IMPOSING AT MOST A DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE ON CHARTERERS",
        "reference": "II. THE WARRANTY APPROACH IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT AND LACKS A SOUND LEGAL FOUNDATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1059_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Founders Empowered the Public to Protect the Public Sphere Against Corruption, Including Through the Jury Box\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Court Should Act With Modesty and Humility When It Addresses the Rules of Political Engagement. This Court Lacks Direct Experience With the Political Process. The Jury Should Remain Referees of Corruption, Consistent with the Founders' Vision. Further Limiting the Legal Understanding of Corruption Will Degrade the Health of the Public Sphere",
        "reference": "II. The Supreme Court Has Dramatically Narrowed the Definition of Corruption, Preventing the Public from Holding Its Elected Officials Accountable. The Court's Recent Jurisprudence Narrows the Reach of Criminal-Corruption Statutes and Thus Limits Accountability Through the Jury Box. The Court Has Also Narrowed the Definition of \"Corruption\" in Election Laws, Which Limits Accountability Through the Ballot Box",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND\nII. THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING EXCEPTION DOES NOT EXTEND TO HOMES\nA. This Court's Precedents Exclude Homes from the Community Caretaking Exception\nB. The Exception Should Continue To Exclude Homes\n1. Trespass on a home without a warrant is unreasonable per se\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Privacy Interests Are at Their Zenith in the Home\nIII. THE COMMUNITY CARETAKER EXCEPTION IS UNWORKABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HOME BECAUSE IT PLACES NO FIXED LIMITS ON THE DISCRETION OF OFFICERS IN THE FIELD\nA. Obtaining a Warrant Must Be Impracticable for a Warrantless Home Search To Be Reasonable\nB. The Community Caretaker Exception Does Not Place Sufficient Limits On Officer Discretion To Guard Against Arbitrary Intrusions on the Privacy of the Home",
        "reference": "2. A noninvestigatory search of the home does not relegate it to a lesser degree of scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Anti-Injunction Act's text favors CIC\nA. Under Direct Marketing, CIC's suit does not have the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax\nB. The IRS's contrary arguments all mischaracterize CIC's suit\n1. CIC is not challenging the tax penalties themselves\n2. CIC is not challenging a regulatory tax\n3. CIC is not seeking an advance judicial determination of its tax liability\nII. The Anti-Injunction Act's purposes favor CIC\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fifteenth Amendment Enfranchised Men Nationwide Regardless Of Race Or Color and Is An Independent Source of Congressional Authority\nA. Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress Never Imposed Suffrage Qualifications On The States\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Congress Can Enact A Discriminatory-Effects Standard Pursuant To Its Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority\nA. The Reconstruction Congress Conferred Itself Broad Enforcement Authority Under the Reconstruction Amendments\nB. Boerne's Congruence and Proportionality Test Should Not Be Extended to the Fifteenth Amendment\nC. Neither Northwest Austin nor Shelby County Extended Boerne to the Fifteenth Amendment\n1. Shelby County's Equal Sovereignty Principle Is Distinct From Boerne's Congruence and Proportionality Test\n2. Shelby County's Equal Sovereignty Principle Does Not Apply to Nationwide Statutes\nIII. The Fifteenth Amendment's Protections Apply To All Races",
        "reference": "B. The Reconstruction Framers Deliberately Chose a Constitutional Amendment Over a Statutory Solution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Elimination of the Physical Presence Rule Would Significantly Increase the Number of Audits by State Authorities",
        "reference": "I. Small Businesses Engaged in Interstate Commerce Are Vulnerable to the Cost of Additional Audits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Many Religious Denominations Hold Sincere Religious Beliefs About Marriage and Gender Identity\nII. Expanding Protected Classes in Title VII Will Hinder Religious Ministries' Ability to Work Together in Communities that Share a Common Set of Religious Beliefs\nIII. Interpreting Title VII's Religious Employer Exemption to Protect Religious Ministries' Ability to Make Employment Decisions Based on Their Religious Precepts Is Correct and Necessary to Protect Religious Freedom\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Clarifying that Religious Employers Remain Free to Operate in Communities of Faith Would Help Prevent a Flood of Constitutional Issues and Entanglements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the NGA authorizes petitioner to condemn respondents' property\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The text, structure, history, and purpose of Section 717f(h) amply demonstrate that certificate holders are authorized to condemn State-owned property\nB. Principles of state sovereign immunity do not require a different",
        "reference": "II. The NGA authorizes a pipeline company to condemn State-owned property that FERC has determined is necessary for the construction of an interstate pipeline",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Has Expressed a Clear Preference for ESOPs and Acknowledged That Such Plans Are Unique\nII. [MISSING]\nA. ERISA Accommodates the Conflicting Duties of Insider Fiduciaries\nB. The Law of Trusts Likewise Permits an Insider Fiduciary to Act in Dual Roles\nC. Petitioners Properly Executed Their Dual Roles\nIII. The Court Should Take This Opportunity to Clearly Define the Elements of an ESOP Stock-Drop Claim Against Insider Fiduciaries",
        "reference": "II. The Existing Legal Framework Already Accommodates the Conflicting Duties of Insider Fiduciaries, and Petitioners Properly Discharged Their Duties Within This Framework",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The district court violated the Eighth Amendment and the Federal Death Penalty Act by excluding critical mitigating evidence.\nA. The Eighth Amendment and the FDPA entitle a defendant to present any mitigating evidence that would support a sentence less than death.\nB. The evidence that Tamerlan committed jihad in Waltham was highly probative and reliable.\n1. The defense's central mitigation theory was that Dzhokhar was less culpable because he acted under Tamerlan's violent, radicalizing influence and leadership.\n2. The Waltham evidence was highly probative of Dzhokhar's lesser culpability.\n3. The Waltham evidence was more than reliable enough to go to the jurors.\nC. The exclusion of the Waltham evidence violated the Eighth Amendment and the FDPA.\nD. The district court's error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nII. The district court failed to determine whether prospective jurors were biased by pretrial publicity.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The district court failed to elicit what seated jurors remembered hearing about the case, thereby violating Patriarca and committing reversible error.",
        "reference": "A. The Patriarca rule is a reasonable supervisory rule.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.45
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. VIP's Bad Spaniels parody is a work of artistic expression and noncommercial speech\nA. VIP does not use \"Bad Spaniels\" or other elements of its design as a trademark or designation of source.\nB. The Bad Spaniels toy is a parody of both Jack Daniel's cultivated self-image and the fun pet owners have with their dogs.\nC. It makes no difference that the message is carried by a \"utilitarian product\" sold for profit\nII. The Court should preserve the long-standing Rogers test\nA. The Lanham Act does not specify a particular test or balance of public interests.\nB. The multifactor test works well in ordinary commercial contexts, but it is ill suited to expressive works.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Multifactor tests offer little opportunity for early termination of litigation.\n3. Multifactor tests are contorted in the parody context.\n4. Confusion surveys are unreliable tools in the parody setting.\nC. The Rogers test strikes an appropriate balance\n1. The \"artistic relevance\" prong\n2. The \"explicitly misleading\" prong\nIII. Liability for dilution by tarnishment should not be stretched to the unconstitutional extremes proposed by JDPI.\nA. Dilution by tarnishment raises serious First Amendment concerns, particularly when applied to parody.\nB. The Court should interpret the noncommercial-use exclusion consistent with its commercial-speech doctrine.\nC. The parody fair-use exclusion applies with full force.",
        "reference": "1. Multifactor tests are indeterminate and unpredictable.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. PRESERVING THE VITALITY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IS CENTRAL TO THE MEANING AND PURPOSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT\na. The Key Role Of The First Amendment In Safeguarding Democratic Governance By Protecting Political Speech And Association Has Been Recognized Since The Founding Era\nb. Political Expression And Association Are At The Core Of First Amendment Protections: The First Amendment Most Strongly Protects Speech That Is Integral To A Healthful Democracy\nc. Partisan Gerrymandering Injures First Amendment Freedoms By Placing Political Parties At An Enduring Electoral Disadvantage\nII. NORTH CAROLINA'S POLITICAL HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THE THREAT THAT PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING POSES TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS\na. The Reconstruction and Post-Reconstruction Eras\nb. The Republican-Populist Upheaval\nc. Disfranchisement And Democratic Party Dominance\nd. Gerrymandering In The Twentieth And Twenty-First Centuries: A Bipartisan Means of Entrenchment\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT REQUIRES STRICT SCRUTINY IN CASES OF SEVERE POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1059_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Kelly and Baroni committed property fraud by faking a traffic study to divert agency resources\nA. The statutory definition of fraud is satisfied by proof that the defendant obtained property by means of a material falsehood\nB. Defendants' conduct satisfies each of the requirements for wire fraud\nC. Defendants were not convicted for concealing a political motive for an action that they were otherwise authorized to undertake\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that defendants commandeered Port Authority resources by faking a traffic study\na. Sufficient evidence shows that Baroni lacked authority to realign the lanes without faking a traffic study\nb. Sufficient evidence shows that no traffic study existed\nD. Defendants offer no sound legal basis for exempting their conduct from the fraud statutes\nII. Affirming Kelly's and Baroni's convictions would not suggest that routine political conduct is federal fraud",
        "reference": "1. The lie found by the jury was about the existence of a traffic study, not Kelly's and Baroni's motives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' proposed version of the independent state legislature theory would unsettle established election practices\nA. Adoption of the version of the ISL theory advanced by Petitioners would upend settled law governing federal elections and make the actual rules and procedures governing federal elections unclear, potentially for years\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The doubt created by the uncertainty related to the content of federal and state election law would lead to an explosion in strategic election season litigation\u2014particularly litigation in federal courts\nII. Petitioners' theory would create confusion and uncertainty in our election system at a time when the system can least afford it",
        "reference": "B. The independent state legislature theory urged by petitioners would also create voter confusion in state elections",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court should not call into doubt the legitimacy of Chevron deference\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. An appropriately defined view of Auer and Seminole Rock comports with congressional intent and the judicial role",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. The expanded exemptions are lawful\nA. The ACA authorizes the expanded exemptions\nB. The expanded religious exemption is proper under RFRA\n1. RFRA requires the expanded religious exemption\n2. RFRA at the very least authorizes the expanded religious exemption\n3. The government need not impose burdens on religious objectors to benefit third parties\nII. The final rules are procedurally valid\nA. The final rules are procedurally valid regardless of whether the interim rules were\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. At a minimum, this Court should vacate the nationwide injunction",
        "reference": "B. The interim rules were also procedurally valid",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-601_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Sixth Circuit profoundly erred\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Respondents' vehicle problems are imagined",
        "reference": "II. The decision below plainly split with the Ninth Circuit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1498_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Origins And Continuing Authority Of The Treaty-Interpretation Canons\nB. The Treaty-Interpretation Canons Apply When Deciding Whether A Treaty Exempts Members Of A Tribe From Complying With State Law, Including Off-Reservation State Taxes\nC. The Washington Supreme Court Correctly Applied The Treaty-Interpretation Canons",
        "reference": "I. THIS COURT MUST DETERMINE THE 1855 TREATY'S MEANING USING RULES THIS COURT HAS APPLIED FOR CENTURIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. Schools must be able to respond effectively to off-campus speech, particularly threats of violence and harassment, that can cause substantial disruptions to the school environment\nB. This Court's Tinker standard is not limited to on-campus speech, and the Third Circuit's rejection of Tinker for off-campus speech is unworkable\nC. Proper application of the Tinker standard allows schools to prevent disruption without unduly burdening the free speech of students\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. This Court may affirm the decision below on alternate grounds or remand to the Third Circuit for a proper application of the Tinker standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-565_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "THE [MISSING]\nA. Respondents Concede That The Courts Of Appeals Are Hopelessly Divided On The Question Presented\nB. The Circuit Split Warrants This Court's Review\nC. Respondents' Merits Arguments Do Not Provide A Basis For Denying Review",
        "reference": "THE COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION OF A SAFE BERTH PROVISION IN A CHARTER CONTRACT CEMENTS AN ACKNOWLEDGED CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY THAT THE PROVISION IMPOSES UPON THE CHARTERER",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1436_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1252(d) is not jurisdictional.\nA. The text lacks a clear statement that Section 1252(d)(1) is jurisdictional.\nB. Exhaustion requirements are paradigmatic nonjurisdictional claims-processing rules.\nC. Congress did not codify a jurisdictional interpretation of Section 1252(d)(1).\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. A motion to reconsider is not a remedy \"available as of right.\"",
        "reference": "II. Section 1252(d)(1) does not contain an issue-exhaustion requirement.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Lost Profits May Be Recovered for Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. section 271(f), Including Foreign Lost Profits, When the Patentee Proves the Acts of Domestic Infringement Caused the Foreign Lost Profits\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Construing section 284 to Categorically Exclude Lost Foreign Profits Undermines the Policy Established by section 271(f)\n1. Section 271(f) was Enacted to Extend Patent Protection Covering United States Exports\n2. The Federal Circuit's Ruling Has Singular Impact Where Patented Inventions Are Used on the High Seas\nII. The Federal Circuit Erred by Applying an Unduly Rigid Rule Barring Recovery of Lost Profits Resulting from Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. section 271(f) on the Sole Basis That Extraterritorial Activity Is Involved\nA. Correct Application of the Court's Precedent Permits the Use of International Activity to Show Damages from Infringement Under section 271(f)\nB. The Federal Circuit Arrived at Its Erroneous Decision Using Flawed Logic and by Ignoring Binding Precedent",
        "reference": "A. Section 284 Embodies the Longstanding Principle of Full Compensation for an Injury Caused by Unlawful Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Academic freedom is \"a special concern of the First Amendment\" \u2014 and it requires breathing room.\nA. This Court has long recognized the importance of protecting academic freedom.\nB. In Garcetti, this Court recognized its public-employee speech exception to the First Amendment can imperil academic freedom of public university faculty.\nC. Four Circuits have declined to apply Garcetti's exception to public-faculty speech that implicates academic freedom.\nII. If the Ninth Circuit's ruling is allowed to stand, amicus FIRE's experience demonstrates that public university faculty will be censored.\nA. Restrictions on grade-school speech risk misapplication to higher education.\nB. Amicus FIRE's experience demonstrates that faculty members face punishment for controversial or challenging classroom expression, properly protected by academic freedom.\nIII. Public university faculty must be able to vindicate their rights by exposing censorship to public scrutiny.\nA. The Ninth Circuit dangerously suggested that a vigorous public defense of First Amendment rights may justify discipline.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. In defending public university faculty, amicus FIRE relies on public attention to vindicate speech rights.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5639_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Unexplained Sentencing Decisions Undermine The Fair And Efficient Administration Of Federal Criminal Law\nA. Reasoned Sentencing Decisions Enable Meaningful Appellate Review\nB. Reasoned Sentencing Decisions Provide Important Information to the Sentencing Commission\nC. Reasoned Sentencing Decisions Promote Transparency, Fairness, and Public Trust in the Criminal Justice System",
        "reference": "I. Amendment 782 Reflects the Commission's Unanimous View that the Guidelines Should Provide Shorter Sentences for Drug Offenses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' plea for an exemption from the Sherman Act contravenes every relevant precedent of this Court\nA. Petitioners' position defies the plain language of the Sherman Act, which contains no exemption for the NCAA\nB. This Court's precedents provide no basis for a presumption that requires upholding \"amateurism\" restraints on the pleadings\n1. Board of Regents confirms that NCAA rules are subject to the fact-intensive rule of reason\n2. [MISSING]\n3. This Court's joint venture cases do not apply and point to the rule of reason in any event\nII. The decisions below correctly applied the rule of reason\nA. The courts below did not make Petitioners' step-2 burden heavier by requiring separate proof for \"each type of rule.\"\nB. The courts below did not invent a new, narrower definition of amateurism; Petitioners failed to prove a broader one\nC. The courts did not collapse steps 2 and 3 or require Petitioners to prove they were using the \"least restrictive alternative.\"\nD. The injunction does not reflect \"judicial micromanagement.\"\nIII. Applying the rule of reason to the NCAA promotes the policies underlying the Sherman Act",
        "reference": "2. The \"quick look\" doctrine is about invalidating restraints, not upholding them as lawful per se",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decision below is entirely consistent with this Court's precedents\nII. The decision below does not implicate any conflict among the Courts of Appeals\nIII. The decision below faithfully applied the rule of reason framework\nIV. The decision below turns on fact-bound conclusions after a lengthy bench trial\nV. The decision below has no implications for joint ventures\nVI. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "VI. The ongoing legislative efforts in this area make this case particularly unsuitable for review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fifth Amendment Provides Only Two Lawful Means by Which a Person may be Deprived of Property by the State\nA. Appropriation of Property Without Due Process or Just Compensation Violates the Fifth Amendment\nB. A Taking is Limited to the Property Right Compensated \u2014 and No More\nII. The Holding in Kelo Needs Guardrails to Clarify that a Benefit to a Defined Class of Private Parties is Not a Public Use\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Without Strict Adherence to Both Elements, the Takings Clause Becomes a Nullity, Allowing Government to Take Property for Private Use Without Compensation\nIII. Pruneyard Undermines Constitutional Rights and Should be Reconsidered",
        "reference": "A. Public Use \u2014 What is it?",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The History of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures Demonstrates that that Right Has Its Highest and Most Urgent Application in the Home\nA. The Fourth Amendment Has Its Roots in the Legal and Political Backlash Against the Crown's Inspection of Private Homes in the Period Leading to the American Revolution\n1. The Wilkes Cases\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Paxton's Case\nB. In Its Original Context, the Fourth Amendment Was Meant Principally To Protect the Sanctity and Privacy of American Homes\nC. This Court's Precedents Confirm that the Fourth Amendment's Highest Purpose Is To Defend the Sanctity of the Home\nII. The Sanctity of the Home Also Plays a Central Role in Safeguarding Many of Our Other Fundamental Constitutional Freedoms\nA. The Right to Armed Self-Defense \u2014the Central Component of the Second Amendment \u2014Applies with Full Force Within the Home\nB. Throughout History, the Shared Importance of the Home to Both the Right to Self-Defense and the Right Against Unreasonable Searches Has Informed the Scope of Both Protections\nC. The Sanctity of the Home Also Forms the Foundation of Several Other Constitutional Protections\nD. The Scope of the Protection Afforded the Home in the Context of Armed Self-Defense Extends to Locations Adjacent to the Home, Such as the One at Issue in This Case",
        "reference": "2. Entick v. Carrington",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit Erred in Holding That Kennedy's Silent, Private Prayer Was the School District's Government Speech\nA. Government Speech Is Defined by Government Control over the Message\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Grant the Petition and Bring Clarity to the Jurisprudence Regarding the Intersection of Government Speech and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses\nA. The Concurring Opinion in This Case Highlights the Judiciary's Lingering Confusion Concerning the Intersection of Government Speech and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses\nB. Lingering Confusion Concerning the Intersection of Government Speech and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses Disserves Both Governmental Entities and Their Employees",
        "reference": "B. Because Kennedy's Prayer Was Neither Controlled, Coerced, Nor Even Suggested by the District, His Prayer Was His Own Personal Speech, Not the District's",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Solicitation may be criminally punished as \"integral to criminal conduct\" only if it consists of solicitation of crime\nII. Solicitation of suicide, if it can be punished, can only be punished under strict scrutiny\nIII. Speech seeking to engage in a criminal transaction can be criminalized even when the transaction is criminal only for one side\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The \"speech integral to criminal conduct\" exception needs to be properly cabined",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Regulators Play an Essential Role in Enforcing the Securities Laws\nB. The Remedy of Disgorgement Plays a Pivotal Role in Regulators' Ability to Deter Fraud and Bring Wrongdoers to Justice\nC. The Remedy of Disgorgement Fulfills the Vital Need to Compensate Victims",
        "reference": "I. DISGORGEMENT IS CRITICAL TO REGULATORS' ABILITY TO ENFORCE SECURITIES LAWS AND PROVIDE RECOMPENSE TO DEFRAUDED INVESTORS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "WILLFULNESS IS NOT REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 1117(A) TO AWARD INFRINGERS' PROFITS FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 1125(A)\nA. The Statutory Text and Structure Compel the Conclusion That Willfulness Is Not Required\n1. The Text of Section 1117(a) Does Not Require a Showing of Willfulness\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Federal Circuit's Textual Arguments Lack Merit\nB. The Phrase \"Principles of Equity\" Does Not Justify a Willfulness Requirement\n1. A Willfulness Requirement Is Inconsistent with Basic Equitable Principles\n2. Background Principles Do Not Trump the Text of the Lanham Act\n3. Background Principles Did Not Uniformly Require Willfulness\na. The accounting remedy did not require willfulness\nb. The trademark context did not require willfulness\nc. The unfair competition context did not require willfulness\nC. A Willfulness Requirement Conflicts with the Lanham Act's Purposes and with Other Intellectual-Property Contexts",
        "reference": "2. The Broader Structure of the Lanham Act Confirms the Plain-Text Interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.31
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-846_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS INTERPRETED BELOW, RULE 32.1(g) IS NOT ADEQUATE OR INDEPENDENT BECAUSE IT CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL LAW\nA. Federal Law Requires The Application Of Settled Rules On Collateral Review\nB. Arizona's Refusal To Follow Federal Law Cannot Be Defended As An Adequate And Independent State-Law Ground\nC. This Court Has Rejected The Theory That State Court Decisions Refusing To Adhere To Federal Retroactivity Are Adequate And Independent\nII. AS INTERPRETED BELOW, RULE 32.1(g) IS NOT A PERMISSIBLE PROCEDURAL OR JURISDICTIONAL RULE BECAUSE IT DISCRIMINATES AGAINST FEDERAL LAW\nA. Rule 32.1(g) Is Not A Neutral Procedural Rule\nB. Rule 32.1(g) Is Not A Neutral Jurisdictional Rule\nIII. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT'S NOVEL INTERPRETATION OF RULE 32.1(g) IS NOT FIRMLY ESTABLISHED OR REGULARLY FOLLOWED\nA. Under Three Decades Of Arizona Law, Rule 32.1(g) Permits Review Where An Appellate Court Overrules Prior Precedent\nB. The Arizona Supreme Court's Novel Interpretation Of Rule 32.1(g) Is Not A Barrier To This Court's Review\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. This Court May Review State-Court Decisions That Are Interwoven With Federal Law\nB. The Arizona Supreme Court's Interpretation of Rule 32.1(g) Is Interwoven With Federal Law\nV. FEDERAL HABEAS CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR STATE POSTCONVICTION REVIEW IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE\nA. Cruz Did Not Default His Federal Claim For Purposes Of Federal Habeas Review\nB. Federal Habeas Is Not An Appropriate Substitute For A State Corrective Process",
        "reference": "IV. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF RULE 32.1(g) IS INTERWOVEN WITH FEDERAL LAW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1077_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The SEC Does Not Dispute that the Circuits Are Split on the Question of Whether an Inadequate Claim for Misstatement Liability Can Be Repackaged as a Scheme Claim\nII. The Decisions that Petitioner Cites Reflecting the Majority Position Do Not Involve Different Conduct than the Conduct at Issue Here\nIII. Federal Court Holdings in Private Lawsuits Regarding the Elements of Antifraud Claims Also Apply to SEC Enforcement Actions\nIV. The Commission Relies Primarily on Case Law that Predates the Janus Decision\nV. The SEC's Arguments Concerning the PSLRA Are Not Relevant\nVI. Scheme Liability Was Not Presented as a Theory of Liability in Lorenzo's Administrative Proceeding\nVII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "VII. The Question Presented is Critically Important and Properly Presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Limiting the Scope of the Inflation-Maintenance Theory Will Have Important Public Policy Benefits\nIII. The Court Need Not Address Whether the Inflation-Maintenance Theory Is Viable Under the Federal Securities Laws",
        "reference": "I. An Analysis of Price Impact Under an Inflation-Maintenance Theory Must Consider the Substance of the Alleged Misstatements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Circuit Split Is Real and Significant\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Freed Fails to Rehabilitate the Erroneous Decision Below",
        "reference": "II. This Is an Ideal Case for Addressing the Question Presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. IRCA Does Not Expressly Preempt Respondents' Prosecutions\nA. IRCA's plain language limits only how the I-9 form itself and the information on or attached to it can be used\nB. The context of section 1324a(b)(5) and the structure of IRCA confirm that Congress was focused on limiting the use of the I-9 form itself and the information on or attached to it\nC. The Kansas Supreme Court's view of section 1324a(b)(5) would lead to absurd results, disrupt federal-state cooperation, and upend the federal-state balance\nII. IRCA Does Not Impliedly Preempt Respondents' Prosecutions\nA. Respondents' prosecutions are not field preempted\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Congress has not occupied the fields Respondents have identified\n3. Even if Congress has occupied the fields Respondents suggest, the State's prosecution of Respondents does not fall within those fields\nB. Respondents' prosecutions are not conflict preempted",
        "reference": "1. Congress does not occupy the field of identity theft",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. REVIEW IS ESSENTIAL BECAUSE THERE IS A CLEAR SPLIT OF AUTHORITY ON A FUNDAMENTAL AND CRITICAL QUESTION\nA. Respondents Completely Distort the Decision Below\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THIS CASE RAISES A CRITICAL ISSUE OF IMPORTANT PUBLIC CONCERN",
        "reference": "B. Respondents Attempt To Obscure the Clear Circuit Split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1067_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Respondents misunderstand the statute's context, which confirms that district courts have this discretion\nC. The legislative history shows that Congress rejected respondents' view of the statute\nD. Respondents misconceive the purpose of the PLRA, which is best served by discretion regarding the apportionment of fees",
        "reference": "A. The text of the statute explicitly gives the district court discretion to apply any portion of the judgment up to 25 percent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE IS ABOUT WHETHER CFAA LIABILITY EXTENDS TO VIOLATING VERBAL LIMITS ON COMPUTER USE (SOMETIMES CALLED \"CONTRACT-BASED\" RESTRICTIONS)\nII. [MISSING]\na. Existing Trespass Norms Do Not Extend to Contract-Based Violations\nb. Extending CFAA Liability to Contract-Based Violations Would Lead to Astonishing Results or Require Judicial Creation of a New Statute\nIII. THE DIFFICULTY OF DISTINGUISHING ACCESS WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM EXCEEDING AUTHORIZED ACCESS COUNSELS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER'S INTERPRETATION\nIV. THE CAUTIONARY TALE OF UNITED STATES V. DREW SHOWS THAT THE RISK OF ABUSE IS NOT JUST HYPOTHETICAL\nV. UNDERSTANDING THE INSIDER PROBLEM IN COMPUTER CRIME LAW HELPS EXPLAIN WHY THE GOVERNMENT IS STRETCHING THE CFAA IN THIS CASE \u2014 AND WHY CONGRESS, NOT THE COURTS, HAS THE SOLUTION",
        "reference": "II. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE CONTRACT-BASED THEORY OF CFAA LIABILITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-7505_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The lower court's decision is consistent with Ford and Panetti\nA. Madison can rationally understand his punishment\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Eighth Amendment allows a State to punish a murderer whose mental disability leaves him without memory of his commission of the capital offense\nA. The common law supports the punishment of murderers who cannot remember committing a crime\nB. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice\nC. The State has valid penological interests in punishing a murderer who cannot remember committing a crime\nIII. Madison's proposed extension of Ford and Panetti will lead to false claims, manipulation, and abuse",
        "reference": "B. Madison's arguments for reversal are unpersuasive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-248_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' reading of the state statutes would violate the North Carolina Constitution\nA. Petitioners' approach is foreclosed by North Carolina Supreme Court precedent\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Attorney General's constitutional role cannot be performed by two of the General Assembly's 170 members\n2. The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. State does not support Petitioners' approach\n3. The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Thornburg does not support Petitioners' approach",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' suggestion that the Attorney General's role is statutory and can be performed by two legislators is mistaken",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-979_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTORY TEXT AND STRUCTURE \u2014 AND APPLICABLE CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION \u2014 MAKE CLEAR THAT SUBSECTION 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) DOES NOT BAR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NON-DISCRETIONARY ELIGIBILITY DECISIONS\nA. The Phrase \"Judgment Regarding the Granting of Relief\" In Subsection 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) Refers Only To The Ultimate Judgment Whether To Grant Discretionary Relief, Not To Precursor Eligibility Determinations\nB. At A Minimum, Subsection 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) Preserves Review Of First-Step Eligibility Decisions That Do Not Involve The Exercise Of Discretion Specified In The Statute\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Subsection (B)(i)'s Text Does Not Support The Eleventh Circuit's Ruling\nB. The Broader Statutory Structure Does Not Support The Eleventh Circuit's Ruling\nC. The Eleventh Circuit's Position Violates Applicable Canons Of Construction",
        "reference": "II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S CONTRARY REASONING IS UNPERSUASIVE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MONTANA AND OKLAHOMA TAX-CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS PRESENT THE SAME LEGAL ISSUES\nA. THE MONTANA AND OKLAHOMA TAX-CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS ARE NEARLY IDENTICAL IN STRUCTURE\nB. THE MONTANA AND OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTIONS HAVE SIMILAR PROVISIONS LIMITING STATE AID OR SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS COURT CAN LIFT THE WEIGHT OF UNJUSTIFIABLE LEGAL UNCERTAINTY AND OBSTRUCTIONIST LITIGATION BURDENING NEUTRAL AND GENERALLY AVAILABLE STUDENT AID PROGRAMS BY HOLDING IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR STATES TO EXCLUDE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS FROM THESE PROGRAMS",
        "reference": "II. WHILE THE OKLAHOMA SUPREME COURT HAS RIGHTLY HELD THAT THE PROGRAMS THAT ARE BOTH NEUTRAL WITH REGARD TO RELIGION AND DISTRIBUTE FUNDS BASED ON INDEPENDENT PRIVATE CHOICES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE BENEFIT CLAUSE, THE PRECEDENT CONTAINS DICTA THAT COULD PUT THE OKLAHOMA ACT IN LEGAL JEOPARDY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY CLASSES OF WORKERS WHO TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS ARE COVERED BY FAA section 1\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THERE IS NO PRINCIPLED WAY TO APPLY FAA section 1 TO THOSE WHO DO NOT TRANSPORT GOODS ACROSS BORDERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court should review the court of appeals' holding that the Ministry's amicus brief conclusively established the content of Chinese law\nA. A foreign government's characterization of its own law is entitled to substantial weight, but it is not conclusive\nB. The court of appeals erred by treating the Ministry's amicus brief as conclusive and disregarding other relevant materials\nC. The court of appeals' error warrants further review\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Petitioners' contention that courts may not dismiss Sherman Act claims based on international comity does not warrant this Court's review",
        "reference": "II. This Court should deny review of petitioners' contention that the court of appeals erred by reviewing the denial of respondents' motion to dismiss",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Interlocutory Posture of this Case, Where the Remedy Is Undecided, Raises a Strong Presumption Against Granting Review\nII. Petitioners Provide No Reason to Depart from the Court's Settled Practice of Denying Review in Interlocutory Matters\nA. This Court does not need to review the Fifth Circuit's standing decision\nB. The constitutionality of the individual mandate is not certworthy at this time\nC. The question of severability is not ripe for review\nIII. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Also Do Not Justify Review\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. No. 19-841 Should Be Denied Because the U.S. House Lacks Standing Under Bethune-Hill",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-315_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 3731(b)(2) APPLIES ONLY IN SUITS BROUGHT BY THE UNITED STATES OR IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES INTERVENES\nA. The Text, Context, And Statutory Antecedents Of Section 3731(b)(2) Establish That It Applies Only To Suits In Which The United States Is A Party\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Eleventh Circuit's Interpretation Of Section 3731(b)(2) Would Lead To Counterintuitive Results\nD. The Legislative History Confirms That Section 3731(b)(2) Is Only Available In Suits In Which The United States Is A Party\nII. IF SECTION 3731(b)(2) APPLIES WHERE THE UNITED STATES IS NOT A PARTY, THEN RELATORS ARE \"OFFICIAL [S] OF THE UNITED STATES\" WHO MUST SUE WITHIN THREE YEARS OF DISCOVERING THE FRAUD",
        "reference": "B. Default Limitations Rules Support Restricting Section 3731(b)(2) To Suits In Which The United States Is A Party",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Decision Below Is Erroneous\nC. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important And Warrants The Court's Review In This Case",
        "reference": "A. Mr. Saada Acknowledges That A Conflict Exists Among The Federal Courts Of Appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "The scandalous-marks provision in 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) is facially constitutional under the First Amendment\nA. This Court's decision in Tam is limited to trademark-registration criteria that discriminate based on viewpoint\nB. Because the scandalous-marks provision is a viewpoint-neutral condition on a government benefit whose availability necessarily turns on the content of an applicant's speech, the court of appeals erred in subjecting that provision to strict scrutiny\n1. The scandalous-marks provision does not restrict speech, but simply imposes a condition on the availability of a government benefit\n2. Administration of the federal trademark-registration program inherently and necessarily requires the government to draw distinctions based on the content of applicants' marks\n3. The scandalous-marks provision is viewpoint-neutral\nC. [MISSING]\n1. A ban on registration of scandalous marks is a longstanding and reasonable means of vindicating legitimate government interests\n2. The scandalous-marks provision does not subject respondent or similarly situated persons to any adverse legal consequences outside the trademark-registration program\nD. The court of appeals' contrary reasoning is erroneous\n1. The court of appeals erred in treating the scandalous-marks provision as a restriction on speech\n2. The court of appeals erred in treating as irrelevant this Court's decisions involving government-established subsidies and forums\n3. A decision sustaining the scandalous-marks provision against respondent's First Amendment challenge would have no necessary implications for the constitutionality of analogous limits on copyright registration\n4. The court of appeals' concern that the scandalous-marks provision has been applied inconsistently provides no basis for invalidating that provision",
        "reference": "C. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably related to legitimate government interests and does not reach outside the federal trademark-registration program",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Government attempts to mask coercion using third parties are common\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Coercion laundering cannot save Illinois's scheme",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Stare decisis does not shield unworkable and unpredictable precedents, like Casey, from reconsideration\nA. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that stare decisis is never absolute\nB. Precedents that have proven historically unworkable are not entitled to stare decisis\nC. Precedents likely to continue producing unpredictable results in the future are not entitled to stare decisis\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Casey's undue burden standard departed from past precedent and was recognized early on as unworkable\nB. Casey's undue burden test has proven unworkable in operation\nC. Casey's undue burden test, in whatever form it persists, will continue to produce unpredictable results\nD. The balance of stare decisis considerations weighs in favor of overruling Casey",
        "reference": "II. The Casey undue burden test is unworkable and unpredictable, and not entitled to stare decisis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Foreign States' Sovereign Interests\nB. Foreign States' Public Policy\nC. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality\nD. The Bar On Expanding Private Rights Of Action From The Bench\nII. CIVIL RICO IS UNIQUELY PRONE TO ABUSE, AND DILUTING THE FOREIGN-INJURY BAR WOULD MAKE MATTERS WORSE",
        "reference": "I. THIS LAWSUIT BRINGS ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT ACCOMPANY THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. LAW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Status Quo Creates Intolerable Inconsistency Across Jurisdictions\nII. Additional Delay May Frustrate Effective Review Of The Iskanian Rule\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Iskanian Rule Is Plainly Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government's State-Secrets Concerns Are Speculative and Premature\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Case Is Not the Proper Vehicle for Reexamining the Law",
        "reference": "II. The Lower Court Correctly Applied Settled Precedent, and the Petition Presents Nothing More Than a Call for Error Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Lower Courts Are \"Baffled and Divided\" By Rapanos; This Court Should Reexamine That Decision and Clarify the Law\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Decision Below Is Wrong Because The \"Significant Nexus\" Test It Uses Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-565_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Circuits Are Intractably Split Regarding The Constitutional Significance Of Legislators Offering Legislative Prayers\nA. The Circuits Are Split On Whether Faith-Specific Prayers By Legislators Fit Within The Nation's Traditions\nB. The Circuits Are Split On Whether Faith-Specific Prayer By Legislators Coerces Nonparticipants\nII. Respondents' Merits Arguments Only Confirm That This Court's Review Is Warranted\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Resolving The Conflict Over The Constitutionality Of Legislative Prayer By Legislators Is Exceedingly Important",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege the knowledge and substantial assistance required for aiding-and-abetting liability:\nA. JASTA and Halberstam require knowing and substantial assistance\nB. The knowing-and-substantial assistance requirement takes on particular importance where the theory of liability rests on the defendant's routine business activities or inaction\nC. Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that defendants knowingly provided substantial assistance to the Reina attack\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATA focuses on the \"act of international terrorism\" itself\nB. A plaintiff need not necessarily show that the defendant knew about or provided aid specific to the particular terrorist attack that injured the victim",
        "reference": "II. JASTA's aiding-and-abetting standard focuses on the act that injured the plaintiff, but does not necessarily require that the defendant knew about or specifically aided that act:",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1268_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The court of appeals' erroneous vacatur of the punitive damages awards warrants this Court's review",
        "reference": "I. The court of appeals' discretionary decision to evaluate the merits of a non-jurisdictional argument does not warrant review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Proclamation violates the First Amendment's Religion Clauses",
        "reference": "A. The Proclamation violates the separation of powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Kaestner Is Not Part of a Conflict Among the Courts of Different States\nA. The North Carolina Supreme Court's Decision Is Based on a Unique Set of Facts\nB. No Court Has Held that a Beneficiary's Presence Is Sufficient to Tax the Undistributed Income of a Foreign Trust\n1. The Fielding and Mercantile-Safe Deposit Courts Found Taxation of a Foreign Trust Violates the Due Process Clause Despite the In-State Presence of a Beneficiary and Grantor\n2. Three Lower Courts Found that Taxation of a Trust Violates the Due Process Clause Despite the In-State Presence of the Grantor\n3. The Remaining Three Cases from California, Connecticut, and Missouri Reject Due Process Challenges But the Taxpayers All Have Connections to the Taxing State that Do Not Exist Here\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Case Presents a Unique Fact Pattern that Has Never Been Challenged\nB. There Are Only Four States with Similar Statutes that Could Possibly Have a Similar Case and None Have Decided this Issue\nC. This Case Is Limited to the Due Process Clause and Would Likely Return on Commerce Clause Grounds If the Department Was Successful\nD. This Case Does Not Present Issues of Federalism or an Opportunity to \"Modernize\" Trust Law\nIII. All of the North Carolina Courts Correctly Decided that the State's Tax Was Unconstitutional as Applied to the Kaestner Trust",
        "reference": "II. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Addressing Constitutional Implications of State Taxation of Out-of-State Trusts and Would Have Limited Precedential Value",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE ELIMINATED\nA. Assignor Estoppel Contradicts The Patent Act's Text\nB. Neither Stare Decisis Nor Any Presumption That Congress Silently Adopted Assignor Estoppel Supports The Doctrine\n1. Assignor Estoppel Was Not Settled By Formica Or A Consensus In 1952\n2. Congress Did Not Incorporate Assignor Estoppel Into The Patent Act\n3. Stare Decisis Does Not Support Assignor Estoppel\nC. [MISSING]\nII. IF ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL SURVIVES, IT SHOULD BE CONSTRAINED",
        "reference": "C. Assignor Estoppel Is Contrary To Patent Policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Major Questions Doctrine Should Apply Whenever An Agency, Wielding Authority The Constitution Vests In Congress, Sets Policy That We Would Normally Expect Congress Itself To Establish.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Major Questions Doctrine Applies To The Department's Action Here Because We Would Normally Expect Congress To Decide Whether To Spend $500 Billion On A Blanket Loan Forgiveness Program.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Not Grant Certiorari\nA. The OCCA's Holding Does Not Warrant Review.\nB. The Decision Below Is Correct.\nC. Certiorari Is Unwarranted Because This Issue Is Not Outcome-Determinative.\nII. This Court Should Not Grant Certiorari To Consider Overruling McGirt.\nA. This Case Does Not Present Oklahoma's Question Presented.\nB. Oklahoma's Request To Overrule McGirt Does Not Warrant Certiorari.\n1. Oklahoma's Petition Asks This Court To Usurp Congress's Role.\n2. Oklahoma's Claims About McGirt's Consequences Wither Upon Scrutiny.\ni. The OCCA Has Limited McGirt's Backwards-Looking Effects.\nii. [MISSING]\niii. Oklahoma's Claims About Civil Consequences Are Filled With Misdirection And Have No Place In This Criminal Case.",
        "reference": "ii. There Is No Crisis On Going-Forward Criminal Jurisdiction, Which Congress Can Address.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 523(a)(2)(A) bars discharge of any debt for money obtained by actual fraud, including actual fraud of an agent for which the debtor is vicariously liable\nA. The text makes dischargeability depend on whether the debtor is liable for money obtained via actual fraud\nB. The text unambiguously covers \"any\" such debt, without an exception based on whether the debt is grounded in vicarious liability\nC. Strang confirms that lack of intent or knowledge is no defense when one partner is vicariously liable for obtaining money via another partner's actual fraud\nD. Congress has ratified Strang, not abrogated it\nE. Context confirms the text means what it says\nF. The text embodies sound policy\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner has abandoned the \"knew or should have known\" rule she pressed below and waived and forfeited the rule she now advocates\nB. Petitioner's new rule fails on the merits\n1. Petitioner's clear-statement rule is irrelevant and backwards\n2. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s text confounds petitioner\n3. Petitioner cannot distinguish Strang\n4. Petitioner's arguments about context are misplaced\n5. Petitioner's policy arguments are unsound and could not justify ignoring the text and Strang",
        "reference": "II. Petitioner's counterarguments lack merit and confirm the court of appeals was correct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. HOT PURSUIT OF A SUSPECTED MISDEMEANANT JUSTIFIES WARRANTLESS ENTRY\nA. This Court Has Held that Hot Pursuit Categorically Justifies Warrantless Entry, Without Distinguishing Between Felonies and Misdemeanors\nB. The Hot Pursuit Rule Reflects a Balance of Strong Government Interests in Acting Swiftly with Diminished Interests in Personal Privacy\n1. The government has strong interests in swiftly apprehending fleeing suspects\n2. A fleeing suspect has significantly diminished privacy interests\nC. The Hot Pursuit Exception Has Common-Law Roots\nII. A CASE-BY-CASE RULE CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH PRECEDENT, HISTORY, OR GOOD POLICY\nA. Many Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement\u2014Including for Hot Pursuit\u2014Operate Categorically\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Case-specific interest-balancing is inappropriate in hot pursuit cases\n3. The common law recognized categorical justifications, including hot pursuit, for warrantless entry of a home\nB. The Hot Pursuit Exception Is Not Limited to Felonies\n1. There is no precedential basis for a felony/misdemeanor distinction in the hot pursuit context\n2. Interest-balancing does not support a misdemeanor limitation\n3. The felony/misdemeanor line is unworkable and arbitrary\n4. The common law does not support limiting the hot pursuit exception to felonies\nC. Lange's and California's Policy Arguments Lack Merit\n1. Limiting the hot pursuit exception would hinder effective policing\n2. A categorical hot pursuit rule will not contribute to police abuse\nIII. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT BELOW EVEN UNDER A CASE-SPECIFIC APPROACH",
        "reference": "1. This Court's decisions establish that the hot pursuit exception, like several other warrant-requirement exceptions, is categorical",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The NGA Delegates The Federal Eminent Domain Power As To State Property\nII. The Third Circuit's Contrary View Ignores Text To Avoid Perceived Constitutional Difficulties That Do Not Exist\nA. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power\nB. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Decision Below Threatens To Disrupt The Development Of Energy Infrastructure",
        "reference": "III. The Jurisdictional Dispute Underscores The Anomalous Nature Of New Jersey's Objection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-438_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "ARGUMENT\nI. The Government's View Is Inconsistent With This Court's Cases And The First Principles Of The Categorical Approach.\nA. The least-acts-criminalized presumption governs all aspects of the categorical approach and leaves no work for a burden of proof to do.\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Government's Arguments Regarding Practical Difficulties Lack Merit.",
        "reference": "B. The government's argument flouts the first principles of the categorical approach.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Geneva College got the substantial burden question wrong because the Third Circuit failed to \"objectively assess\" \"how the regulatory measure actually works.\"\nA. Under ERISA, the accommodation must commandeer an objecting ministry's existing health plan\nB. Under ERISA, the accommodation must force an objecting ministry to trigger its TPA's duty to deliver contraceptive services\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Instead of reviewing ERISA, the Third Circuit accepted the agencies' claims and adopted other circuits'",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 2 prohibits redistricting practices that dilute minority voting strength\nB. The district courts' findings of vote dilution were not clearly erroneous\n1. This Court owes substantial deference to the district courts' findings\n2. Plaintiffs' illustrative plans contain a second, reasonably compact majority-Black district\n3. Under the totality of circumstances, HB1 results in unequal access to the political process\nII. The Court should not rewrite section 2 or reverse its longstanding precedents\nA. The Court should not rewrite section 2 to add an intent requirement\nB. The Court should not exempt single-member redistricting plans from section 2\nIII. This Court's longstanding section 2 precedent does not violate the Equal Protection Clause\nIV. Section 2's prohibition of vote dilution falls within Congress's authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments",
        "reference": "I. HB1 violates section 2 of the VRA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Robust Due Process Requirements This Court Has Articulated In The Specific Judicial Jurisdiction Context Provide An Appropriate Analogy In Assessing A State's Authority To Tax A Nonresident\nA. The Court Has Framed The Due Process Limits On State Authority Somewhat Differently In Different Contexts\nB. Precedent And First Principles Demonstrate The Relevance In The Tax Context Of Decisions Applying The Due Process Standard For Specific Judicial Jurisdiction\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Settled Due Process Principles Prohibit A State From Taxing Undistributed Income Of A Nonresident Trust Based Solely On The Forum Residence Of A Contingent Beneficiary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Place of Injury in the Present Case, for Purposes of the RICO Statute's Scope of Application, Is California.\nII. Petitioners' Assertion That the Court Should Apply the Conflict of Laws Principles Existing When RICO Was Enacted in 1970 Is Untenable.\nIII. Were the Second Restatement To Be Consulted in Finding the Place of Injury Under RICO, that Place Would Be California, and the Injury Would Be Domestic.\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. The RICO Statute Contains No Carve-Out for Claims Arising in an Arbitration Context.\nVI. Allowing Award Creditors Access to Civil RICO as an Enforcement Tool Is Entirely Consistent with the New York Convention and Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards Generally.\nVII. Petitioners' Alleged Pattern of Conduct Defeats the Purposes of the Convention and Seriously Jeopardizes Its Efficacy.",
        "reference": "IV. Treating the Plaintiff's Domicile as the Place of Injury in RICO Cases Would in Any Event Lead to Absurd and Untenable Results.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-8332_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THIS CASE SQUARELY PRESENTS THE IMPORTANT ISSUE OF WHETHER ABANDONING THE SWORD-SHIELD RULE FOR METHOD-OF-EXECUTION CLAIMS VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE",
        "reference": "I. PETITIONERS PRESENTED AND THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT DECIDED THE QUESTION PRESENTED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. All Tools of Statutory Construction Confirm That Section 14(e)'s First Clause Sounds In Negligence\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Legislative History and Purpose of the Williams Act Support a Negligence Standard for Section 14(e)'s First Clause\nC. A Negligence Standard for Section 14(e) Maintains Parity Between Standards Governing Tender Offers and Proxy Solicitations\nII. This Court Should Not Overturn Settled Precedents Upholding an Implied Private Right of Action Under Section 14(e)\nA. This Court Should Decline to Reach a Question Expressly Disclaimed, and Not Passed Upon, Below\nB. Based on this Court's Precedent, Congress Reasonably Would Have Expected Its Enactment of Section 14(e) to Confer a Private Remedy\nC. The Existence of an Implied Private Right in Section 14(e) Is Entrenched and this Court Should Not Now Overturn It\nD. Allowing a Negligence-Based Private Right Under Section 14(e) Furthers the Statute's Purpose and Is Sound Public Policy",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit's Close Reading of Section 14(e)'s First Clause Is Correct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9572_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The Decision Of The Mississippi Supreme Court On The Issue Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Is Consistent With This Court's Holding In Batson And Is Thus Not A Decision Which Is Clearly Erroneous\nA. The Mississippi Supreme Court Committed No Error In Its Application Of Batson To Petitioner's Claims Of Racial Discrimination In Jury Selection\nB. The Lack Of Any Inferential Proof Of Racial Animus In This Case Is Distinct From That Found In Both Miller-El And Foster\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Mississippi Supreme Court's Holding Regarding The Trial Court's Comparative Analysis Of Petitioner's Batson Claims Does Not Constitute Error",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Little Sisters of the Poor have standing\nA. The Little Sisters have appellate standing. 14\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Conversely, the plaintiff States lack standing. And their inability to identify a single individual plaintiff who is harmed by the exemptions shows there is no compelling reason to force employers to violate their consciences\nIII. The agencies had statutory authority to issue the moral and religious exemptions, which are legally permissible (if not required) and not arbitrary or capricious\nA. The final regulations are within the agencies' gap-filling authority\nB. The agencies' conscience exemptions are not arbitrary or capricious",
        "reference": "B. The Little Sisters also have derivative standing as intervenors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1414_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The question presented is significant",
        "reference": "A. The decision below is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Race of an Applicant Can Never Be a Legitimate Concern\nA. The idea that an individual's race communicates something relevant about him is contrary to our founding principles.\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Categorizations by Race or Ethnicity Have No Lawful Purpose in University Admissions",
        "reference": "B. Grutter has reached its expiration date and should be overruled.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The Free Exercise Clause generally prohibits the denial of benefits on the basis of religious status\n2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status\nB. The contrary arguments lack merit",
        "reference": "A. Montana's no-aid provision violates the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1259_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Miller holds only that a sentencer must have discretion in sentencing juvenile homicide offenders and does not require particular procedures for exercising that discretion\nA. Miller addressed \"sentencing schemes\" and did not further impose juvenile sentencing guidelines\nB. Miller does not require \"magic words\" in sentencing\nII. Montgomery, a case on collateral review, could not have announced a new rule requiring a formal factfinding of \"permanent incorrigibility\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court could adopt formal factfinding requirements in this case, but those requirements would be inapplicable to cases pending on collateral review",
        "reference": "A. This Court does not announce new rules in cases involving final sentences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Properly Understood, the Constitution's Assignment of Authority to the \"Legislature of the State\" Is Not An Assignment to Legislative Authority of the State, as Prior Decisions of this Court Have Suggested.\nIII. At the Very Least, Hildebrant, Smiley, and Arizona Should be Cabined to the Methods for Lawmaking Contained in State Constitutions, Not to Substantive Constraints Contained Therein.",
        "reference": "I. The Power Conferred on the State \"Legislatures\" by the Elections Clause, Like That Conferred by the Electors Clause, Is Plenary.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1566_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FSIA REQUIRES APPLICATION OF STATE CONFLICTS RULES TO CLAIMS ARISING UNDER STATE LAW\nA. The FSIA forbids the creation of a separate body of federal conflicts rules for suits against foreign states\nB. Respondent's federal common law theory is refuted by the text of the Act\nC. The fact that a defendant is an instrumentality of a foreign state is not relevant to choice of law\nII. THE DECISION BELOW VESTING STOLEN PROPERTY IN RESPONDENT IS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS ENDORSED BY BOTH SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Forty-four nations have agreed to promote settlement of claims to Nazi-Confiscated art on the merits and Congress has repeatedly endorsed that policy\nC. Prescription of the Painting would be contrary to California public policy",
        "reference": "A. International trade in stolen cultural property is illicit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "What We Now Call Home Equity Was Recognized As Property In English Law At The Time The Constitution Was Written\nI. In Fairness and Justice, the Courts of Equity Sought to Protect Vulnerable Debtors from Forfeits and Penalties\nII. The Courts of Equity Expanded the Debtor Mortgagor's Rights While Limiting the Rights of the Creditor Mortgagee in the Landed Security\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Courts of Equity Recognized the Debtor's Equity of Redemption As Property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. PLAINTIFFS IMPERMISSIBLY SEEK TO APPLY THE ATS EXTRATERRITORIALLY\nA. The ATS Is Not Extraterritorial\nB. The ATS's Focus Is The Place Of Injury\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Plaintiffs' Policy-Oriented Arguments Are Wrong\nII. THIS COURT CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT CREATE AN ATS CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS\nA. Domestic Corporate Liability Flunks Sosa Step One\nB. Domestic Corporate Liability Flunks Sosa Step Two",
        "reference": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy Any Reasonable Focus Inquiry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Economics of Local Television.\nB. Gray's Business Strategy.\nC. The FCC's Duopoly Rule.\nII. The Court Should Grant The Petitions Because The Third Circuit's Decision Creates Uncertainty For Businesses Like Gray's And Forestalls Further Improvements To Local News Production In Small And Mid-Sized Markets.",
        "reference": "I. Gray's Business Model Is To Improve And Expand Local News Coverage Through Increased Investment Allowed By Economies of Scale.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1263_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's and the United States' arguments align\nII. Florida rejects Ahlborn's whole-text method\nIII. The amici's \"whole-text\" arguments contravene principles of textualism\nIV. An isolated reading of section 1396k(a)(1)(A) fails to account for the \"anchor\" third-party liability provision\nV. A State may not seek reimbursement from a bigger pool under section 1396k than under section 1396a(a)(25)(H)\nVI. Florida's section 1396a(a)(25)(H) arguments lack merit\nA. Florida's attempt to match its broad reading of section 1396k to section 1396a(a)(25)(H) makes no sense\nB. [MISSING]\nVII. Even if Florida's isolated reading of section 1396k were permissible, it is flawed\nA. Section 1396k(a)'s introductory clause limits third-party payments to those for \"medical care owed under the State plan.\"\nB. Section 1396k(a)'s cooperation clause addresses care available under the plan\nC. Section 1396k(a)'s paternity clause does not undermine Petitioner's and the United States' reading\nD. Section 1396k(b)'s remainder clause is not superfluous\n1. The remainder clause does work in non-tort settings involving health insurers\n2. The remainder clause does work in tort settings where the collateral source rule applies\nE. Section 1396a(a)(45) is inconsequential\nVIII. Florida misstates insurance law\nIX. The presumption against preemption is inapplicable\nX. Petitioner's whole-text interpretation of the Medicaid statutes has no dire financial consequences",
        "reference": "B. Florida's argument that section 1396a(a)(25)(H) \"most naturally applies\" to insurers contravenes the provision's text and rests on mistaken premises",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE IMMORAL/SCANDALOUS CLAUSES ARE FACIALLY INVALID\nA. The Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Regulate Viewpoint\n1. Brunetti's Mark Was Refused Because It Was Offensive\n2. Refusals Under the Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Are Always Based Upon the Degree of Offensiveness\na. The Test for Refusal Is Offensiveness\nb. The Government Is Regulating Offensiveness\n3. Immoral/Scandalous Refusals Are Based Upon Viewpoint\nB. There Is No \"Mode of Expression\" Exception to Viewpoint Regulation\nC. The Government Conceded that the Clauses Regulate Content. Strict Scrutiny Accordingly Is Required\nD. The Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Do Not Survive Any Level of Scrutiny\nII. THE IMMORAL/SCANDALOUS CLAUSES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO REDUCED SCRUTINY\nA. Trademark Registration Is a Registration System\nB. The Lanham Act Does Not Create a Forum\nC. Government Association Is Not a Basis for Lesser Scrutiny\nD. Trademark Registration Is Not a Government Subsidy\nE. No Government Program Exception Applies\nF. The Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Do More Than \"Deny Benefits of Federal Trademark Registration\"; They Unconstitutionally Burden Speech\nG. Commercial Speech Is No Exception to the Free Speech Clause\nIII. THE IMMORAL/SCANDALOUS CLAUSES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE\nA. This Court Has for Good Reason Expressed Concern About the Vagueness of Section 2(a)\nB. The Government Cannot Agree What the Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Cover\n1. Department of Commerce Interpretation: Vulgar, Lacking in Taste\n2. Department of Justice Interpretation: Profanity, Excretory, Sexual\n3. The Clauses Are Not Readily Susceptible to the Department of Justice's Interpretation\nC. The Clauses Are Inconsistently Applied\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Excessive Discretion Given to Government Employees\nF. The Scandalous Clause Is Over-Inclusive\nG. The Lack of a Definition of the Offended Population Compounds the Vagueness\nH. The PTO's Lack of a Clear Evidentiary Standard Adds to Vagueness\nIV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT'S RULING ON THE IMMORAL/SCANDALOUS CLAUSES\nA. Implications if the Clauses Are Held Unconstitutional\nB. Implications if the Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Were Constitutional\nV. THE COURT SHOULD RETURN TO THE COMMON LAW RULE AND DISAVOW THE MARKS RULE\nA. Under the Common Law, Only Majority Opinions are Precedential\nB. The Marks Rule Is Logically Flawed\n1. If Four Votes Are Not Enough, Then Fewer Votes Must Be Weaker\n2. Explicit Disagreement Is Converted into Implied Agreement by Marks\nC. The Marks Rule Is Anti-Majoritarian\nD. The Marks Rule Is Not a Rule Because It Does Not Provide Answers\nE. Stare Decisis Does Not Prevent Marks from Being Overruled\n1. The Marks Rule Was Not Based on Precedent\n2. The Marks Rule Was Dicta\nF. This Court Does Not Consider the Marks Rule to Be Binding\n1. Third Time Is a Charm: if the Marks Rule Is Unhelpful, the Court Should Explicitly Reject It\n2. The Court Should Return to the Common Law Rule of Dual-Majority",
        "reference": "D. Immoral Is Not Capable of Being Defined Without the Government Taking Sides",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.59
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-654_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW DOES NOT PRESENT A LEGAL ISSUE WORTHY OF THIS COURT'S REVIEW\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. VACATUR IS NOT WARRANTED\nIV. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL",
        "reference": "II. MS. DOE'S CLAIMS REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF PREGNANT MINORS ARE NOT MOOT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. TRADITIONAL TORT LAW PRINCIPLES DO NOT SUPPORT IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY FOR HARMS CAUSED BY THIRD PARTIES\nII. A DUTY TO WARN OF RISKS IN OTHERS' PRODUCTS IS UNSOUND POLICY\nA. A DUTY RULE WOULD LEAD TO A FLOOD OF NEW ASBESTOS CASES, UNDULY PRESSURE REMAINING DEFENDANTS, AND FUEL THE SEARCH FOR \"SOLVENT BYSTANDERS\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. THE DUTY WOULD BE ENDLESS AND UNPREDICTABLE\nD. OVER-WARNING COULD UNDERMINE CONSUMER SAFETY\nE. A DUTY WOULD NOT PREVENT FUTURE HARM\nIII. ASBESTOS TRUSTS PROVIDE AN ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR HARMS CAUSED BY BANKRUPT FORMER ASBESTOS PRODUCERS",
        "reference": "B. NON-ASBESTOS MARITIME TORT CASES WILL INCREASE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Businesses Will Be Free to Choose If and How They Comply With Proposition 12, and Petitioners' Claims of Forced Compliance Are False",
        "reference": "I. Animal Welfare Is A Long-Recognized Legitimate State Interest, and California Is Permitted to Regulate What Products Are Sold Within Its Borders",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Binding Deference Standard Conflicts with the Discretion and Responsibility Courts Have to Reach an Accurate Determination of Foreign Law Under Rule 44.1\nA. Rule 44.1 Protects Courts' Substantial Discretion to Reach an Independent and Accurate Determination of Foreign Law\nB. The Court of Appeals' Binding Deference Standard is Incompatible with Rule 44.1 and U.S. Courts' Discretion to Reach an Independent and Accurate Determination of Foreign Law\nII. There Is No Legal Basis for Requiring the Application of Binding Deference\nA. This Court's Precedents Do Not Support the Application of a \"Conclusive\" Deference Standard Under Rule 44.1\nB. International Comity Does Not Support a Standard of Binding Deference to a Foreign Government's Legal Statements\nIII. Analogous Deference Doctrines Counsel Against Application of \"Binding\" Deference to Foreign Sovereign Legal Statements\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Level of Deference Granted to State Entities Counsels Against Binding Deference to Foreign Governments\nIV. The Court of Appeals' Judgment Should Be Reversed",
        "reference": "A. Principles of Chevron Deference Do Not Support a Rule of Binding Deference",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-437_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Government's Use of Removal Orders in section 1326 Prosecutions Raises Serious Due Process Concerns\n1. Administrative Adjudications Do Not Typically Result in Preclusion\n2. A Prior Administrative Adjudication Is Not Typically an Element of a Criminal Offense\n3. [MISSING]\nB. In Light of these Due Process Concerns, the Court Should Excuse Respondent's Failure to Exhaust\n1. There Is No Other Opportunity for Meaningful Judicial Review\n2. The Failure to Exhaust Should Be Excused",
        "reference": "3. The Government's Approach Inappropriately Treats an Administrative Adjudication Like a Predicate Conviction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. A law \"results in\" vote \"denial or abridgment\" under section 2 only when it causes a substantial disparity in opportunities for members of a protected class to participate in the political process and affect electoral outcomes\nA. Section 2's text requires a vote-denial plaintiff to establish that a challenged law causes a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect their preferred candidates\nB. Construing section 2 to invalidate state laws that do not cause a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to achieve their preferred electoral outcomes raises serious constitutional concerns\nC. The Ninth Circuit's standard misreads section 2's text, invites constitutional concerns, and improperly elevates the Gingles factors\nII. Arizona's out-of-precinct and ballot-collection policies do not violate section 2\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Plaintiffs failed to prove a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect representatives of their choice\n2. Plaintiffs failed to show that the out-of-precinct policy caused any disparity\n3. The Ninth Circuit's analysis of the Gingles factors was erroneous\nB. The ballot-collection law does not violate section 2\n1. Plaintiffs did not prove that the ballot-collection law disparately affected minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect representatives of their choice\n2. Plaintiffs did not prove that the ballot-collection law caused the (nonexistent) disparity\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's holding that the Arizona Legislature intentionally discriminated against racial minorities is legal error\nA. The cat's-paw theory cannot impute intent among co-equal, independent actors such as legislators\nB. The Ninth Circuit's view that election-integrity measures betray racial animus unless they respond to in-state malfeasance conflicts with Crawford\nC. The Ninth Circuit's analysis exceeds the scope of clear-error review",
        "reference": "A. Arizona's out-of-precinct policy does not violate section 2",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Allowing discriminatory admissions was premised largely on enriching schools academically by admitting students with different viewpoints\nB. Grutter's premise has failed, as today's university campus lacks viewpoint diversity\nC. The use of race in admissions can no longer be justified, and the Court should end its experiment to the contrary",
        "reference": "I. The use of race in admissions has not achieved the promised \"robust exchange of ideas,\" and cannot serve as a compelling interest capable of overcoming the right to equal protection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Legal Background\nII. The Second Circuit's opinion conflicts with McNally\nIII. The right-to-control theory is an end-run around McNally, section 1346, and Skilling\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The right-to-control theory is now a way around section 1346 and Skilling",
        "reference": "A. The right-to-control theory originated as a way around McNally",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The canon of constitutional avoidance compels this Court to resolve these issues on non-constitutional grounds\nB. The Committees lack the authority to subpoena these presidential records\n1. The Committees lack authority for the subpoenas under House rules\n2. The House lacks authority for these subpoenas under the Constitution\nII. Impeachment is the only process that a sitting president can face on criminal allegations\nA. The House's implied subpoena power cannot displace the Constitution's express impeachment provisions\nB. The President is immune from the Vance subpoena and proceedings\nIII. The congressional subpoenas lack any legitimate legislative purpose\nA. The Committees' claims of a legislative purpose for the subpoenas is pretextual\nB. The lack of historical precedent should guide this Court to reject these intrabranch disputes as political questions",
        "reference": "I. The legislative subpoenas are outside the Committees' power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT SHOULD ADHERE TO HOSANNA-TABOR 'S MULTI-FACTOR TEST FOR DETERMINING MINISTERIAL STATUS\nA. Hosanna-Tabor Establishes A Multi-Factor Test\nB. The Schools' Request To Focus On Whether The Employee Performs \"Important Religious Functions\" Is Flawed On Every Level\nII. LAY TEACHERS SUCH AS BIEL AND MORRISSEY-BERRU ARE NOT \"MINISTERS.\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Limited Religious Functions Respondents Performed Did Not Transform Them Into Ministers\nIII. THE SCOPE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS TO MAKE RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS",
        "reference": "A. None Of The Formal Hosanna-Tabor Factors Is Satisfied Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. ANCs Are \"Indian Tribes\" Under ISDEAA And The CARES Act\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Ousting ANCs From ISDEAA And The CARES Act Would Have Devastating Consequences For Alaska And Its Natives",
        "reference": "II. ANCs Have \"Tribal Governments\" Under The CARES Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\na. This Is Confirmed By The Origins And Premises Of Catholic Education\nb. Our Lady Of Guadalupe And Ms. Morrissey-Berru Manifest The Catholic Educational Mission\nII. The Ninth Circuit's (and EEOC's) Reasoning Requires Every Catholic School To Justify Its Theology And Organization Before Civil Courts",
        "reference": "I. Catholic Schools \u2014 And Their Teachers \u2014 Are At The Core Of The Catholic Church's Ministry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's Review Is Urgently Needed To Curb The Ninth Circuit's Impermissibly Lax Application Of Rule 23\nA. The Decision Below Makes Rule 23(a)(3)'s Typicality Requirement Toothless And Easily Manipulated\nB. The Decision Below Is Emblematic Of The Ninth Circuit's Broader Failures To Rigorously Enforce The Requirements For Class Certification\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit's Lax Approach To Class Certification Harms Businesses And The Judicial System",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CIRCUIT CONFLICT IS UNDENIABLE\nII. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT THE DECISION BELOW IS CONSISTENT WITH BOARD OF REGENTS AND AMERICAN NEEDLE DISREGARDS CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THOSE CASES\nIII. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION ARE BASELESS\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. THE POSSIBILITY OF LEGISLATION IS NO REASON TO DENY REVIEW",
        "reference": "IV. THE DENIAL OF CERTIORARI IN O'BRIEN IS IRRELEVANT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT WAS INTENDED TO GUARANTEE IMPORTANT RIGHTS TO ALL PEOPLE AND TO ACT AS A GUARD AGAINST STATES ABUSING THOSE RIGHTS\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD MORE CLOSELY ALIGN ITS PAST INCORPORATION CASES WITH THE HISTORY ANIMATING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "II. THE FRAMERS WOULD HAVE INTENDED FOR THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO APPLY TO THE STATES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief054.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is No Justification for Overruling Casey and Roe.\nA. The Viability Line is the \"Central Principle\" of Casey and Roe.\nB. None of the State's Arguments Provides a Basis for Overruling the Viability Line.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Viability Line Is Clear and Has Proven Enduringly Workable.\n3. No Factual Changes Support Abandoning the Viability Line.\n4. The Right to Decide Whether to Continue a Pregnancy Before Viability Remains Critical to Women's Equal Participation in Society.\nII. The State Offers No Alternative to the Viability Line that Could Sustain a Stable Right to Abortion.\nA. \"Any Level of Scrutiny\"\nB. \"Undue Burden.\"",
        "reference": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-8709_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Allowing The Government To Introduce New Evidence On Plain Error Review Is Inconsistent With That Review's Purpose\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Allowing The Government To Introduce New Evidence On Plain Error Review Violates Defendants' Due Process And Jury Rights\nB. Expanding The Scope Of Review Also Deprives The Defendant Of The Opportunity To Refute An Element Never Presented To The Jury",
        "reference": "II. The Constitution Demands The Government Not Be Permitted To Introduce New Evidence Against A Defendant On Plain Error Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "Section 1782 Does Not Apply To Private Commercial Arbitrations\nA. The Ordinary Meaning Of \"Foreign Or International Tribunal\" Does Not Encompass Private Arbitration Panels\n1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"\n2. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not An \"International Tribunal\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. History Confirms That Section 1782 Does Not Authorize Discovery For Use In Private Commercial Arbitrations\n1. Congress And The Rules Commission Always Understood Section 1782 And Its Predecessors To Allow Assistance To Government-Created Adjudicative Bodies\n2. The 1964 Congress Would Not Have Favored Foreign Private Arbitration Over Domestic Arbitration Covered By The FAA\n3. Congress's Pre-1970 Skepticism Of Foreign Private Arbitration Would Have Made It Highly Unlikely To Grant Discovery Assistance To Such Arbitration\n4. Legislation And Judicial Decisions Postdating The 1964 Act Reinforce This Understanding\nD. Extending Section 1782 To Private Arbitrations Would Burden U.S. Courts, Harm U.S. Companies, And Undermine Arbitration Petitioners Here Should Prevail Regardless Of The Outcome In AlixPartners",
        "reference": "B. The Broader Statutory Context Confirms That Section 1782 Does Not Cover Private Arbitrations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1442_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. Under the reasoning of Sims v. Apfel, a Social Security claimant need not exhaust particular issues before an administrative law judge\nB. The Court should not otherwise require a Social Security claimant to exhaust issues before an administrative law judge\nC. Petitioners' Appointments Clause challenges would be exempt from any rule that requires a Social Security claimant to exhaust issues before an administrative law judge\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The Court should excuse petitioners' failure to raise their Appointments Clause challenges before their administrative law judges",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNDER THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, THE CFPB VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS\nA. The Constitution's Structure Demands that the President have the Power to Control Executive Officers\n1. Separation of Powers and Political Accountability are Fundamental to our Constitutional Structure\n2. The President's Power to Remove Executive Officers is an Essential Link Between the Government and the People and a Key Separation of Powers Principle\nB. \"Independent\" Agencies such as the CFPB are Structured to Evade the Separation of Powers and Accountability\nC. Under This Court's Removal Precedents, the CFPB is Unconstitutionally Structured\n1. Myers and Free Enterprise Control\n2. Humphrey's Executor and its progeny do not save the CFPB\nII. IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT ITS PRECEDENTS DO NOT INVALIDATE THE CFPB'S STRUCTURE, THE COURT SHOULD RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. If the CFPB survives the Court's precedents, then stare decisis cannot save Humphrey's Executor\nIII. 12 U.S.C. section 5491( C)(3) CANNOT BE SEVERED FROM THE DODD-FRANK ACT\nA. Application of the severability doctrine depends on Congress' intent\nB. Congress intended independence from Presidential oversight and control to be an indispensable feature of the CFPB",
        "reference": "A. Humphrey's Executor and its progeny have allowed Congress to experiment with various forms of \"independent\" agencies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Our Nation Has A Long, Rich History and Tradition \u2014 Continuing To The Present Day \u2014 Of Using Crosses To Memorialize The Fallen\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Crosses That Memorialize The Fallen Are Not Constitutionally Suspect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Proclamation's Purpose Must Be Evaluated Based on Its Text\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Proclamation Does Not Have an Impermissible Purpose Even Considering All of the Extratextual Evidence",
        "reference": "II. It Is Impermissible to Consult Campaign and Other Unofficial Statements to Determine the Proclamation's Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Court's Precedents Dictate That Specific Jurisdiction Exists Only Where The Defendant's Forum Contacts Give Rise To The Plaintiff's Claims\nB. A Causal Requirement Is Most Consistent With The Principles Underlying The Due-Process Limitations On State Courts\nII. THE LOWER COURTS' NON-CAUSAL TEST DEPARTS FROM PRECEDENT AND PRINCIPLE\nA. The Courts Below Sidestepped This Court's Precedents To Find Relatedness, In Its Broadest Sense, Sufficient For Specific Jurisdiction\nB. Respondents' Policy Arguments Provide No Reason To Depart From Precedent\nIII. FORD'S FORUM CONTACTS DID NOT CAUSE RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS",
        "reference": "I. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION REQUIRES A CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT'S FORUM CONTACTS AND THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Any factors used to determine whether a \"nexus\" exists must be clear and capable of application at the time of the private individual's interaction with the social media account in question\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A standard that requires lengthy litigation and extensive discovery further stymies individuals' ability to protect their First Amendment rights\nII. Judicial analysis of whether an official was acting \"under color of\" state law should be post-by-post, not account-by-account\nA. Examination of whether an official was acting \"under color of\" state law must focus on the action of creating the purported public forum at issue\nB. Courts err by focusing the \"under color of state law\" analysis on the management of the account as a whole\nIII. To preserve individuals' freedom of speech, courts must apply a clear standard that limits the ability of government actors to benefit from imprecision and that can be applied without conducting extensive discovery\nA. The nexus test should be applied in a matter that, to the extent possible, avoids lengthy litigation that delays the restoration of plaintiffs' freedom of speech\nB. The application of the nexus test to social media should not enable government officials to avoid their constitutional obligations by intentionally mingling private and official content on a single page\nC. The Court should apply the nexus test in a manner that encourages officials to take appropriate care when conducting government business on social media",
        "reference": "A. Each of the circuit courts' conflicting applications of the nexus test are unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. TDCJ'S PROHIBITION AGAINST AUDIBLE PRAYER AND LAYING ON HANDS DURING PETITIONER'S EXECUTION VIOLATES RLUIPA\nA. RLUIPA's Protections Are Broad\nB. Forbidding Pastor Moore From Audibly Praying And Laying Hands On Petitioner During His Execution Imposes A Substantial Burden On Petitioner's Sincere Religious Beliefs\nII. TDCJ'S BLANKET PROHIBITION AGAINST AUDIBLE PRAYER AND PHYSICAL CONTACT IS NOT THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS OF FURTHERING A COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST\nA. The State Has No Compelling Interest In Prohibiting Pastor Moore's Audible Prayer And His Laying Hands On Petitioner In The Execution Chamber\nB. TDCJ Cannot Satisfy RLUIPA's Requirement That It Demonstrate That Forbidding In-Chamber Audible Prayer And Contact Between Spiritual Advisors And Condemned Inmates Is The Least Restrictive Means Of Furthering Its Security Interests During Executions\nC. TDCJ's Past Practices, Execution Policies Elsewhere, And Common Sense Demonstrate That Texas Has Less Restrictive Means Of Furthering Any Security Interests Regarding Executions\n1. Texas has allowed both laying on of hands and audible prayer during executions\n2. Other jurisdictions permit laying on of hands and audible prayer in the execution chamber\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Through Grievances And Litigation, Petitioner Has Consistently Challenged TDCJ's Refusal To Allow Pastor Moore To Lay Hands On Petitioner And Audibly Pray During Petitioner's Execution\nB. TDCJ Has Played Fast And Loose, Implementing Quick Policy Changes To Evade Religious-Liberty Accommodations That RLUIPA Requires\nIV. IF THE STATE PERSISTS IN REFUSING PETITIONER'S REQUESTS FOR CORE RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE EXECUTION CHAMBER, THIS COURT SHOULD TEMPORARILY ENJOIN THE STATE FROM EXECUTING PETITIONER IN A MANNER THAT VIOLATES RLUIPA AND REMAND FOR PROCEEDINGS ON A PERMANENT INJUNCTION THAT REQUIRES THE STATE TO ACCOMMODATE PETITIONER'S SINCERELY HELD RELIGIOUS BELIEFS",
        "reference": "III. PETITIONER SATISFIED PLRA EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Rejection's effect on petitioner's exclusive distribution rights is not within the question presented, and its effect on petitioner's expired trademark license is a moot issue\nA. The effect of rejection on petitioner's exclusive distribution rights under the Agreement is outside the question on which the Court granted review\nB. If the Court agrees that petitioner's exclusive distribution rights claim is not within the question presented, the case is moot\nII. A rejected contract is unenforceable against the debtor's estate, and no remedy other than a pre-petition damages claim is available, unless an express exception applies\nA. Under Section 365's plain text, executory contracts are unenforceable against the debtor's estate unless assumed and, if rejected, give rise only to a pre-petition damages claim\n1. Once a bankruptcy petition is filed, an executory contract is unenforceable against the estate unless assumed\n2. A non-debtor's sole remedy for a rejected contract is a pre-petition claim for damages\nB. Congress's adoption of statutory exceptions allowing enforcement of limited rights in certain circumstances confirms that, outside those exceptions, rejection renders the contract entirely unenforceable\n1. Express statutory exceptions allow contracting parties to elect particular statutory remedies instead of the general rule\n2. Legislative amendments confirm that rejection forecloses the counterparty's ability to enforce the contract, except as a pre-petition claim\n3. Where Congress adopts a specific list of exceptions, courts cannot add to the list, or construe the general rule to render the exceptions superfluous\nC. Recognizing that rejection precludes a contract's enforcement against the estate as an administrative claim furthers the Code's purposes\nD. Petitioner's counter-arguments fail\n1. Petitioner's \"property interest\" theory is unsupported\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The repeated references of petitioner and its amici to \"avoidance,\" \"revocation,\" and \"rescission\" are red herrings\n4. The Code does not authorize an \"equitable\" case-by-case approach\n5. There is no consensus supporting Sunbeam\nIII. Neither petitioner's non-exclusive trademark license nor its exclusive distribution rights under the rejected Agreement is enforceable as an administrative claim\nA. Petitioner's trademark license under the rejected Agreement is not enforceable as an administrative claim against the estate\n1. Background legal principles and the Agreement's terms make clear petitioner has no property interest in the mark\n2. Petitioner's trademark license under the Agreement was not merely a \"negative covenant\"\n3. Petitioner's rule would severely damage trademark owners' ability to reorganize\nB. Petitioner's exclusive distribution rights under the rejected Agreement are not enforceable as an administrative claim against the estate",
        "reference": "2. The proffered distinction between \"negative covenants\" and \"affirmative obligations\" also fails",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. Compelled disclosures of an organization's contributors imposed as a regulatory requirement generally must satisfy narrow tailoring\n2. The court of appeals incorrectly declined to require narrow tailoring here\n3. The compelled disclosures here are not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest\nB. The decision below warrants this Court's review",
        "reference": "A. The decision below is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "IN [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IN RESTORING THE STATES' AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT ABORTION, SUBJECT TO THE RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, THE STATES CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO ALLOW ABORTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FOR REASONS OF THE PREGNANT WOMAN'S MENTAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, OR FOR UNDEFINED REASONS OF \"HEALTH,\" BECAUSE TO IMPOSE SUCH A REQUIREMENT WOULD EFFECTIVELY MANDATE ABORTION ON DEMAND.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Petitioners' decision to terminate the Migrant Protection Protocols was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act",
        "reference": "I. The Executive Branch's authority and discretion in immigration do not allow it to ignore congressional mandates for the detention and parole of aliens",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. A BRIEF HISTORICAL LOOK AT STANDING\nA. Article III Standing\nB. Prudential Standing\nII. SINGLETON V. WULFF MUST BE CLARIFIED AND CASES ERRONEOUSLY RELYING ON ASSUMED THIRD-PARTY STANDING SHOULD BE VACATED\nA. Singleton's Holding Did Not Create a Vehicle for Assumed Third-Party Standing Nor a Categorical Exception\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Misapplication and Failure to Apply Singleton\n2. The Harm Resulting from Assumed Third Party Standing\nC. Petitioners Do Not Satisfy the Singleton Test for Third-Party Standing\nIII. PETITIONERS OFFER NO EVIDENCE THAT PRUDENTIAL STANDING MUST BE WAIVED IN ANY FEDERAL CIRCUIT, THEREFORE THE COURT CAN CONSIDER THE ISSUE",
        "reference": "B. The Effects of the Erroneous Application of Singleton Are Widespread and Appalling",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1094_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. LAMBERT'S APPEAL WAS LATE\nA. Lambert Did Not Make an Oral Motion\nB. Rule 59(e) is Irrelevant\nC. The District Court Did Not Restart the Rule 23(f) Deadline\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW VIOLATES FED. R. APP. P. 26\nIV. THE DECISION BELOW IS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT\nV. NUTRACEUTICAL DID NOT WAIVE OR FORFEIT THE QUESTION PRESENTED",
        "reference": "II. THERE IS AN ACKNOWLEDGED SPLIT OF AUTHORITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Plain Text Of section 271(f) And section 284 Makes Clear That WesternGeco Can Recover For The Lost Profits Caused By ION's Infringement Under section 271(f)\nII. The Decision Below Misunderstands And Misapplies The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality And Impermissibly Narrows The Relief Available Under section 284 For Infringement Under section 271(f)\nA. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Is Inapplicable Here Because section 271(f) Prohibits Domestic Infringement and There Is No Question Here About the Scope of Foreign Conduct or Foreign Copying That Triggers Liability Under section 271(f)\nB. Even if the Presumption Applied, the Plain Text and Evident Intent of section 271(f) Would Satisfy It\nC. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Has No Application to Available Damages for Conduct Congress Plainly Intended to Make Unlawful\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Principles of Proximate Cause and Related Doctrines Can Sensibly Limit Damages Without Flouting Congress' Intent in Enacting section 271(f)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 111 Does Not Vest EPA With Industry-Transforming, State-Displacing Power\nA. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Tackle the Major Questions Inherent in Restructuring Full Industries\nB. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles\nII. Section 111's Text and Context Require Source-Specific Regulation\nA. Section 111(a)(1) Reveals A Source-Specific Focus\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The CAA As A Whole Confirms Section 111(d)'s Limited Scope\nIII. The Court Should Construe Section 111 To Avoid Substantial Non-Delegation Questions",
        "reference": "B. Other Parts Of Section 111 Confirm EPA's \"Inside-the-Fenceline\" Power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The decision below contravenes this Court's prior decisions and perpetuates a conflict among the courts of appeals\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The questions presented are exceptionally important and warrant the Court's review in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-442_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's Suit Is Not Barred By Rooker-Feldman, The Eleventh Amendment, or Standing Defects\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Eleventh Amendment Does Not Bar Petitioner's Claim.\nC. Petitioner Has Standing To Bring This Suit.",
        "reference": "A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Does Not Bar Petitioner's Claim.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
        "reference": "I. The word \"discriminate\" in section 1514A refers to an employer's differential treatment of an employee.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Delaware's Regulation of Politics Is Appropriately Tailored to Its Overwhelming Sovereign Interests and Justifies a Comparatively Small Burden on the Plaintiff's First Amendment Rights\nA. A State's Compelling Interest in Controlling Its Judicial-Appointment Process Necessitates a Comparatively Deferential Standard of Scrutiny\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Delaware's Interests Are Compelling and the Means Tailored\n2. Party Membership Is the Best Available Proxy for Achieving These Compelling Ends\nC. The First Amendment Interests at Issue Are Comparatively Weak\nD. Upholding Article IV, Section 3 Will Not Impact Other Applications of First Amendment Doctrine; Striking It Down Will Raise a Host of New Questions\nII. The Plaintiff Cannot Show Injury Where He May Obtain an Appointment, or Redressability Where a Favorable Ruling Would Allow Him Still To Be Rejected for Purely Political Reasons",
        "reference": "B. Delaware Has Tailored Its Regulation to Its Overriding Sovereign Interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Adams failed to establish Article III standing\nA. Plaintiffs must establish injury in fact\nB. Adams does not have standing to challenge the bare majority provision\nC. Adams' standing to challenge the major party provision rests on a self-serving statement contradicted by the rest of the record\nII. The Delaware Constitution's partisan balance provisions for state court judges do not violate the First Amendment\nA. [MISSING]\nB. State judges exercise discretion and judgment in interpreting legal texts and developing the common law, and thus are \"policymakers\" under Elrod-Branti\n1. State judges generally exercise substantial policymaking authority\n2. The Third Circuit's definition turns the Elrod-Branti principle on its head\n3. Delaware judges' responsibilities for developing the common law plainly call for \"policymaking.\"\nC. Gregory v. Ashcroft confirms the States' broad constitutional authority to structure their governments and set party affiliation requirements for state judges\n1. Gregory requires applying a \"less exacting\" standard to state laws that establish judicial qualifications\n2. The Third Circuit's \"least restrictive alternative\" test is incompatible with both Branti and Gregory\nD. Even if Delaware's political balance rules must satisfy heightened First Amendment scrutiny, they are narrowly tailored to ensuring a politically balanced judiciary\nIII. The court's severability ruling is plainly incorrect and should be reversed\nA. Federal courts may not use severability as an excuse for striking down state laws that do not injure the plaintiff\nB. Under the federal or state severability tests, the bare majority provision is indisputably severable",
        "reference": "A. Under the Elrod-Branti line of decisions, partisan affiliation is an appropriate requirement for state officials who exercise significant legal-political authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.65
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-565_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "The safe berth clause is a warranty of safety, not merely a promise to exercise due diligence in selecting a port or berth\nA. By its plain terms, the safe berth clause warrants a safe berth, not merely due diligence\nB. Longstanding judicial and arbitral interpretations confirm that the safe berth clause should be given its plain meaning\n1. For many years, both this Court and the Second Circuit have interpreted the safe berth clause as an assurance or warranty of safety\n2. English courts have likewise interpreted the safe berth clause to impose a warranty\n3. [MISSING]\nC. Policy considerations support the longstanding warranty interpretation of the safe berth clause\n1. To the extent policy is relevant, sound policy supports the prevailing interpretation of the safe berth clause\n2. Tort principles have no relevance to the parties' contractual agreement\n3. Interpreting the safe berth clause according to its plain terms and longstanding industry custom produces a fair result",
        "reference": "3. Arbitral decisions confirm that the safe berth clause functions as a warranty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents Fail To Justify The Third Circuit's Elevation Of Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis Congress Specifically Required\nA. Section 202(h) Requires The FCC To Consider Competition, Not Minority And Female Ownership\nB. The Reconsideration Order Fully Complied With Section 202(h)\nC. Chenery Is No Bar To This Court's Reliance On Statutory Grounds\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The FCC Has Never Bound Itself To Consider Minority And Female Ownership In Section 202(h) Reviews\nB. The FCC Adequately Considered Minority And Female Ownership\nIII. Respondents Fail To Justify The Third Circuit's Remedy And Retention Of Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "II. Respondents Fail To Justify The Third Circuit's Judgment Based On Administrative Law Principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Uncompensated Expropriation of Equity Interests and Corresponding Surplus or Excess Funds Violates the Takings Clause\nA. An Equity Interest is a Cognizable Property Interest Subject to the Takings Clause\nB. The Expropriation of an Equity Interest without Just Compensation Violates the Takings Clause.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Expropriation of Excess Funds Is a Fine per the Eighth Amendment.\nB. The Difference Between the Sum of All Taxes, Interests and Fees, and the Value of Excess Funds Is Grossly Disproportionate and Excessive.\nIII. The Government Has No Legitimate Interest in Collecting Funds in Excess of Taxes, Interests and Fees and Doing so Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.",
        "reference": "II. Forfeiture of Surplus or Excess funds, Beyond all Taxes, Interests and Fees, Is an Excessive Fine in Violation of the Eighth Amendment.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Copyright Clause codifies the founding-era understanding of copyright law.\nII. Holding Warhol's work at issue here to be \"transformative\" would expand the fair use doctrine beyond anything previously known and effectively negate copyright's ability to protect the fundamental civil right to the fruits of one's labors.",
        "reference": "I. The fair use doctrine must be interpreted in a manner that upholds the Copyright Clause's textual empowering of Congress to protect the fundamental civil right to the fruit of one's labor.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE BROADLY PERMITS SUITS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS AND DOES NOT IMMUNIZE DOMESTIC CORPORATE DEFENDANTS\nA. THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE DEMONSTRATE THAT DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS MAY BE SUED UNDER THE STATUTE\nB. JESNER DOES NOT FORECLOSE DOMESTIC CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THERE IS NO CORPORATE EXCEPTION TO FUNDAMENTAL INTERNATIONAL NORMS",
        "reference": "II. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE ALLOWS FOR CORPORATE LIABILITY CONSISTENT WITH LONGSTANDING PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ACE Rule Relied on an Erroneous Interpretation of Section 7411.\nA. The Text and Structure of Section 7411 Do Not Support the ACE Rule's Narrow Interpretation of \"Best System of Emission Reduction.\"\nB. The ACE Rule's Statutory Interpretation Improperly Constrained the States' Compliance Choices.\nC. The ACE Rule's \"To and At the Source\" Interpretation Is Not Necessary to Ensure Appropriate Limitations on EPA's Regulatory Authority.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. EPA's Consideration of Measures Beyond Those That Can Be Implemented \"To and At\" a Particular Source Does Not Implicate Any Major Question.\nB. Section 7411 Does Not Raise Non-Delegation Concerns.",
        "reference": "II. This Case Does Not Present Concerns About Major Questions or Non-Delegation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-8255_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. MCCOY IS BOUND BY HIS COUNSEL'S DECISION TO CONCEDE HE COMMITTED THE ACTUS REUS OF THE CHARGED CRIMES\nA. A defendant gives up his autonomy to control strategic and tactical trial decisions by retaining, or acceding to the appointment of counsel\nB. [MISSING]\nC. English's decision to concede that McCoy killed the victims, over his objection, did not violate McCoy's Sixth Amendment rights\n1. In most cases, counsel may not concede guilt over the defendant's objection\n2. In the rare case\u2014such as this one\u2014where only a concession strategy might spare the defendant's life, the Sixth Amendment does not categorically bar its use over the defendant's objection\nII. STRICKLAND IS THE PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING MCCOY'S CLAIM OF ERROR",
        "reference": "B. The strategy of conceding elements of the crime and focusing on the weakest elements is not among the trial decisions for which a client's express consent is required",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS' FOCUS ON THE THREE TYPES OF SCIENTER SUPPORTING FCA LIABILITY IS A RED HERRING\nII. [MISSING]\nA. FCA Penalties Trigger Heightened Due-Process Protections\nB. Petitioners' Interpretation Of The FCA Flouts These Heightened Due-Process Protections",
        "reference": "II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL-DOUBT CANON RESOLVES ANY QUESTION ABOUT SAFECO'S APPLICABILITY TO FCA CLAIMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FCC's orders are arbitrary and capricious under bedrock administrative law principles governing judicial review of agency action.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Court should not fashion a more deferential APA standard of review for the FCC's decision to relax its ownership rules.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court's Racial Gerrymandering Cases Provide the Mechanism by Which This Partisan Gerrymander Can Be Remedied",
        "reference": "I. The Partisan Gerrymandering of the Sixth District Violates Article I, section 2",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. An award of compensatory damages for the breach of Title VI or related civil rights statutes may include compensation for emotional distress\nA. Federal-funding recipients are on notice that they may be subject to compensatory damages for emotional distress because that remedy is traditionally available in suits for the breach of a contract protecting nonpecuniary interests\nB. For at least three decades, courts and the federal government have recognized that federal-funding recipients are subject to compensatory damages for emotional distress\nC. Congress has ratified the availability of compensatory damages awards, which are necessarily limited by the harm the plaintiff has pleaded and proved\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The arguments to the contrary lack merit",
        "reference": "D. Precluding compensation for emotional distress would prevent courts from awarding the relief necessary to make good a breach of the nondiscrimination conditions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. CALIFORNIA'S PROHIBITION ON AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE ON A BILATERAL, NOT REPRESENTATIVE, BASIS IS FUNDAMENTALLY AT ODDS WITH THE FAA\nA. Iskanian Invalidated \"Representative\"-Action Waivers On State Policy Grounds\nB. California's Rule Prohibiting Employees From Agreeing Not To Assert Violations Against Other Employees Is Preempted\n1. California's rule precluding waiver of the right to seek PAGA penalties on behalf of other employees frustrates the purposes and objectives of the FAA\n2. California's rule precluding waiver of the right to seek PAGA penalties on behalf of other employees is not a generally applicable contract defense.\nC. Respondent's Attempt To Characterize PAGA Claims As Qui Tam Actions Is Both Irrelevant And Wrong\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. EMPLOYERS (AND EMPLOYEES) ARE HARMED WHEN THEY CANNOT AGREE TO STREAMLINED ARBITRATION PROCEDURES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tenth Circuit's ruling would be particularly problematic for Jewish artisans who object to speaking certain messages\nII. The government lacks a compelling interest to enforce its public accommodations law against a closely-knit firm in which the artisans share the same religious objections to speaking\nA. Federal law exempts closely-held entities from discrimination laws\nB. State law exempts closely-held entities from anti-discrimination laws\nC. Hobby Lobby acknowledged that the government's compelling interest can be undermined by broad exemptions\nD. \"What does 'compelling' mean\"?\nE. Wedding-related cases are brought by close-knit artisanal companies with a handful of employees that share the same religious beliefs\nF. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "F. The government does not always have a compelling interest to enforce public accommodations laws in First Amendment cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-8709_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The court of appeals correctly denied plain-error relief on petitioner's unpreserved claim after assessing the record as a whole\nA. Relief on an unpreserved claim of error is a matter of case-specific discretion\nB. The entire record is relevant to whether a court should award case-specific discretionary relief on plain-error review following conviction at trial\n1. A reviewing court may look to the whole record to assess whether an error affected a defendant's substantial rights\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Review of the whole record is particularly appropriate in this case, where petitioner's strategic decision precluded introduction of relevant evidence at trial\nC. Petitioner's arguments for restricting the plain-error inquiry to the trial record lack merit\nD. The court of appeals correctly declined to grant plain-error relief in this case",
        "reference": "2. A reviewing court may likewise look to the whole record to assess whether an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT A COERCION ANALYSIS FOR PASSIVE DISPLAYS OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS\nA. Establishment Clause Analysis Should Focus On Coercion, Consistent With Historical Practices And Understandings\nB. The Endorsement Test Poses Particular Risks For Religious Minorities\n1. The \"reasonable observer\" framework threatens religious minorities\n2. Minority religious communities rely on governmental accommodation and acknowledgment\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE ENDORSEMENT TEST DISTORTS STANDING ANALYSIS IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE LITIGATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Nominal Damages Are Retrospective Relief For A Plaintiff Whose Constitutional Rights Have Been Violated But Did Not Or Cannot Prove The Extent Of The Injury\nII. A Nominal-Damages Claim for Retrospective Relief Cannot Become Moot Due To A Prospective Change In Law Or Policy\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This Court's Review is Needed to Correct the Eleventh Circuit's Outlier, Entrenched Holding on this Important Question of Constitutional Remedies.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE IS IN LINE WITH THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE PURPOSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.\nA. States Enacting Laws Like California's were a Primary Driver of Adopting the Constitution.\nB. Multiple Constitutional Provisions Protect Interstate Commerce.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. PIKE V. BRUCE CHURCH PROVIDES A JUDICIALLY-WORKABLE FRAMEWORK FOR ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION'S COMMERCE PROTECTIONS.\nIII. CALIFORNIA'S LAW OUTLAYS THE COST OF COMPLIANCE BEYOND ITS BORDERS FOR NEGLIGIBLE BENEFIT.",
        "reference": "C. Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine Reflects Some of the Earliest Jurisprudence of Founding Era, in Place for 193 Years.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-382_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 113(f)(3)(B) DOES NOT REACH NON-CERCLA SETTLEMENTS\nA. The United States' Interpretation Subverts Both Text and Context\nB. The United States' Interpretation Upsets Traditional Contribution Principles\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The United States' Focus on Guam's Section 107(a) Claim Is a Red Herring\nII. SECTION 113(f)(3)(B) DOES NOT REACH SETTLEMENTS THAT DISCLAIM ANY DETERMINATION OF LIABILITY AND PRESERVE FUTURE LIABILITY\nA. The United States' Position Contravenes The Statutory Text\nB. The United States' Position Rewrites The 2004 CWA Consent Decree\nIII. THE UNITED STATES' POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE UNFOUNDED",
        "reference": "C. The United States' Interpretation Upends Other Federal and State Laws",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Rescission Of DACA Is Reviewable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Nielsen Memorandum Does Not Alter The Reviewability Analysis\nII. The Rescission Of DACA Was Arbitrary And Capricious\nA. The Rescission Of DACA Was Not Adequately Explained\n1. The Duke Memorandum Fails To Adequately Explain The Rescission\n2. The Nielsen Memorandum Does Not Cure The Defects In The Duke Memorandum\n3. The Agency Failed To Give Adequate Consideration To Reliance Interests\nB. DACA Is Lawful\n1. DACA Is A Lawful Exercise Of Authority Conferred By The INA\n2. The Government's Arguments That DACA Is Unlawful Lack Merit\n3. \"Litigation Risk\" Is Not A Valid, Independent Basis For Rescinding DACA\nC. This Court Should Not Rule For The Government Without A Complete Administrative Record, Particularly Given The Evidence Of Pretext\n1. The Administrative Record Is Incomplete\n2. There Is Evidence That DHS's Explanation Is Pretextual",
        "reference": "A. Acting Secretary Duke's Decision Is Reviewable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Federal law does not preempt a State's authority to prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country\n1. The General Crimes Act\n2. Public Law 280\nC. A State's exercise of prosecutorial authority over non-Indians within Indian country does not interfere with tribal or federal interests",
        "reference": "A. Absent federal preemption, a State has authority to prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Proposition 12 Unconstitutionally Regulates Commerce Occurring Wholly Outside California\nA. The Extraterritoriality Doctrine Serves Fundamental Purposes At The Heart Of The Constitutional Design\n1. The extraterritoriality doctrine preserves interstate commerce\n2. The extraterritoriality doctrine safeguards State sovereignty\n3. The extraterritoriality doctrine safeguards nationwide markets\n4. The extraterritoriality doctrine is a necessary check on one State placing the burdens of achieving its policy goals on the citizens of other States\nB. Proposition 12 Violates The Extraterritoriality Doctrine\nII. Proposition 12 Is Unconstitutional Because It Governs Extraterritorial Activity Beyond California's Police Powers\nA. A Law That Applies Extraterritorially But Has No Local Benefits Violates The Commerce Clause\nB. Proposition 12 Bears No Relation To California's Internal Health And Safety\nIII. Petitioners State A Claim Under Pike\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court Of Appeals Erroneously Narrowed The Scope Of Pike At The Pleading Stage",
        "reference": "A. Proposition 12 Imposes A Substantial Burden On National Pork Production And Any Local Benefits Are Illusory",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. Review Is Unwarranted Because There Is No Circuit Split and the Case Is in an Interlocutory Posture\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Correct and Consistent with This Court's Decisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' challenge to the court of appeals' enablement holding does not warrant further review",
        "reference": "A. Petitioners' argument that enablement is a jury question does not warrant further review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS HAS LONG RECOGNIZED A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIAN TRIBES\nII. THE CARES ACT WAS INTENDED TO FURTHER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIAN TRIBES\nA. American Indian and Alaska Native Peoples Have Been Disproportionately Harmed By The COVID-19 Pandemic\nB. The Text Of Title V Makes Clear That It Was Intended To Assist Governmental Entities, Rather Than For-Profit Corporations\nC. The Exclusion Of ANCs Also Best Aligns With Congressional Intent\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Subsequent Legislation Has Eliminated Any Ambiguity As To Congress's Intent To Provide Relief Only To Federally Recognized Tribes Under Title V Of The CARES Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. Determining meaning or message cannot be done consistently\nB. Visual art warrants a simple test focused on the statutory language of purpose and character\n1. The Foundation's analysis would gut protection for photographs\nC. Focus on the purpose and character of works of visual art rather than meaning or message supports free expression",
        "reference": "A. Lower courts' focus on the meaning or message since Campbell has created analytical chaos for visual art",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1519_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "The MVRA required petitioner to pay restitution for GE Capital's investigatory and legal expenses caused by his fraud\nA. GE Capital's investigatory and legal expenses entitled it to restitution as a \"victim\" of petitioner's fraud\nB. GE Capital's investigatory and legal expenses are recoverable in restitution under 18 U.S.C. 3663A (b)(4)\n1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The MVRA does not categorically deny restitution for attorney's fees and other professional fees\n4. The rule of lenity does not support petitioner's requested limitations on restitution\nC. The district court's restitution order is independently supported by 18 U.S.C. 3663A (b)(1)",
        "reference": "2. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it attended Dry Van's bankruptcy proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-281_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal\nII. Race Did Not Predominate When The Legislature Preserved The State's Pre-Existing Majority-Minority Districts\nA. The District Court's Predominance Analysis Was Fatally Flawed from the Start\nB. District-Specific Evidence\n1. Richmond (HD69, HD70, HD71, HD74)\n2. North Hampton Roads (HD92, HD95)\n3. South Hampton Roads (HD77, HD80, HD89, HD90)\n4. Southside Virginia (HD63)\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Courts Cannot Ask Too Much of States Pursuing Their Compelling Interest in VRA Compliance\nB. The Use of Race in Drawing the Challenged Districts Was Narrowly Tailored to Prevent Retrogression\nC. The Majority's Strict Scrutiny Analysis Was Legally and Factually Unfounded",
        "reference": "III. Each Of The Challenged Districts Would Satisfy Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Minnesota's seizure of Tyler's home without paying for her equitable interest in the home violates the Takings Clause.\nA. Anglo-American law has long forbidden the government from seizing more property than is required to satisfy a tax debt.\nB. Under those longstanding rules, Hennepin County violated the Takings Clause.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. This Court may also hold that the seizure was an Excessive Fine.\nIII. Upholding Minnesota's rule would encourage the government to improperly interfere with vital private property rights.\nA. The decision below not only hurts homeowners, but damages property and business interests generally.\nB. The government should not be able to fund itself via windfalls taken from parties who are innocent or lack the wherewithal to fight City Hall.",
        "reference": "C. Neither Nelson v. City of New York nor the County's title shell game warrants a different result.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. Legislative and Regulatory History of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act Demonstrates Increasing Efforts to Protect Residents' Rights, Including by Private Enforcement\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Regulatory Battle over Residents' Rights\n3. The Institute of Medicine's Report and Recommendations: A Clear Appeal to Congress to Protect Residents' Individual Rights\n4. Enactment of FNHRA: Protection of Private Enforcement Via the Construction Clause\nB. Congress Intended for FNHRA to Be Privately Enforceable by Residents. Enforcement of \"Bill of Rights\" Provisions Remains Critical",
        "reference": "1. Early Efforts to Address Standards of Care: Insufficient Enforcement Authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Genus Claims Are Critically Important To Meaningful Patent Protection For Life Sciences Inventions.\nII. Genus Claims Do Not Preempt The Progress Of Science And The Useful Arts \u2013 They Encourage Downstream Innovation.\nIII. The Rationale Behind Enablement Supports The Traditional \"Undue Experimentation\" Test.\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Courts Should Not Devise Domain-Specific Patentability Rules \u2013 That Is Congress's Role.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The History of the HEROES Act Confirms That It Authorizes Action as Broad as Its Text Indicates",
        "reference": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-108_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. AT THE TIME OF THEIR COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS' OFFENSES WERE SUBJECT TO A FIVE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS\nA. An Offense is \"Punishable by Death\" if the Death Penalty is Both an Authorized and a Legally Available Punishment\n1. The Ordinary Meaning of \"Offense Punishable by Death\" is that Death May Be Imposed as a Punishment\n2. The Context in Which the \"Offense Punishable by Death\" Language Was Adopted Reinforces its Plain Meaning\n3. The 1986 Amendment Did Not \"Incorporate\" the Government's Interpretation into Article 43(a)\n4. Any Ambiguity in Article 43(a) Should Be Resolved in Favor of Respondents\n5. The Legislative History of the 1986 Amendment is Not to the Contrary\nB. The Eighth Amendment Bars Imposition of the Death Penalty for Adult Rape\nC. Article 55 of the UCMJ Bars Imposition of the Death Penalty for Adult Rape\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Congress Did Not \"Expressly Prescribe[]\" that the 2006 Amendment to Article 43(a) Applies Retroactively\nB. \"Normal Rules of Construction\" Reinforce that the 2006 Amendment to Article 43(a) is Only Prospective\nC. Application of the 2006 Amendment to Respondent Briggs Would Produce an Impermissible \"Retroactive Effect\"",
        "reference": "II. THE 2006 AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 43(a) DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO RESPONDENT BRIGGS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.15
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-200_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUITS\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE PETITION PRESENTS AN EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT QUESTION",
        "reference": "II. THE DECISION BELOW ALSO CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S DECISIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. ACT 900 HAS AN IMPERMISSIBLE CONNECTION WITH ERISA PLANS\nA. Act 900 Regulates Central Matters Of Plan Administration\nB. Act 900 Interferes With Nationally Uniform Plan Administration\nC. Permitting Act 900 To Stand Would Impose The Exact Burdens And Inefficiencies ERISA Was Meant To Prevent\nII. ARKANSAS'S COUNTERARGUMENTS ARE UNPERSUASIVE\nA. Act 900 Regulates The Administration Of Benefits On Behalf Of Plans, Not Rates Charged By Pharmacies\n1. Act 900 is not rate regulation\n2. State regulation of plan administration is preempted even where the state law is incident to permissible rate regulation\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The United States' Attempt To Distinguish ERISA Plans From Their Third-Party Administrators Should Be Rejected\nIII. ACT 900 REFERS TO ERISA PLANS",
        "reference": "B. No Artificial Line Between \"Reimbursement\" And \"Claims Processing\" Supports Act 900",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The right to exclude is fundamental to property rights\nB. PruneYard is at odds with the right to exclude\nC. In light of that history, it is appropriate to overrule PruneYard here\nII. At a minimum, the Court should not extend PruneYard any further",
        "reference": "I. PruneYard is at odds with the right to exclude and should be overruled",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Mandated Compelled Speech Which Is Antithetical to the Central Mission of Pregnancy Centers, which is to Help Pregnant Mothers Keep and Maintain their Constitutionally Protected Relationship with their Children, Violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, Applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment\nA. The Nature of the Decision Faced by the Pregnant Mother\n1. The Pregnant Mother's Fundamental Right to Continue and Maintain her Relationship with her Child\n2. The Social Question and the Nature of the Services of the Pregnancy Centers\nB. The Nature of the Abortion Procedure: Termination of the Mother's Constitutionally Protected Relationship with Her Child by Terminating the Life of the Child\nC. [MISSING]\nD. State Mandated Disclosures Imposed upon Physicians in Connection with Proposed Medical Treatment, Including Abortion Procedures, Are Subject to Simple Rational Basis Scrutiny, So That it Is Sufficient That the Disclosure Is True, Non-misleading and Relevant to the Patient's Decision\nE. California's Statute Which Compels the Pregnancy Centers to Advise Pregnant Mothers of Information about How to Obtain an Abortion Is Antithetical to the Central Mission and Purpose of the Pregnancy Centers and the Reasons Why the Pregnant Mothers Seek Their Help. The Statute Violates the Free Speech Rights of the Pregnancy Center, Their Personnel and Those of the Mothers Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment\n1. The Act Is Content-Based on its Face, and Therefore Subject to Strict Scrutiny\n2. The Act Targets a Specific Class Based upon the Message That Class Conveys \u2014One Intended to Help Mothers Keep Their Children \u2014Making It a Content-based Regulation Subject to Strict Scrutiny\n3. The Act Is Subject to Strict Scrutiny as a Viewpoint Discriminatory Law Because the Legislative Record Reveals the Animus Which Motivated the Bill's Enactment\n4. The Act Does Not Advance Any Legitimate State Interest, and So Fails to Meet Any Standard of Constitutional Scrutiny",
        "reference": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6819_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Whether Teague's Analysis Determines The Retroactivity Of Pena-Rodriguez And Whether Pena-Rodriguez Has Retroactive Application To This Case Are Important Questions Of Federal Law Regarding Which Reasonable Jurists Could Debate And Which Merit Consideration By This Court.\nA. Respondent's Assumption That Teague's Analysis Governs The Retroactivity Question Here Ignores The Fact That Teague, By Definition, Applies To New Constitutional Rules Of Criminal Procedure \u2014 That Is Rules That \"Are Designed To Enhance The Accuracy Of A Conviction Or Sentence By Regulating 'The Manner Of Determining The Defendant's Culpability'\" \u2014 A Definition That Does Not Encompass The Rule Announced In Pena-Rodriguez.\nB. Respondent's Dismissal Of Question One As Mere \"Error Correction\" Ignores The Important Role AEDPA Has Assigned To This Court To Determine the Retroactivity of Its Rulings.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Mr. Tharpe's Racist-Juror Claim Is Not Procedurally Defaulted.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. To The Extent That The TPCA Sweeps Beyond Congress' Laudable Goal Of Stopping Telemarketing And Scam Calls, It Creates An Unconstitutional Morass\nA. The TCPA Unconstitutionally Favors Speech About Federal Government Debt Over Speech About Other Debt\nB. Under The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Of The TCPA, The Statute Unconstitutionally Turns Every Smartphone Into A Banned ATDS\nC. [MISSING]\nII. This Court Should Invalidate The TCPA's Application To Non-Telemarketing, Non-Scam Speech, Such As Private-Debt-Collection And Political Speech",
        "reference": "C. The TCPA Unconstitutionally Gives The FCC Broad Authority To Decide What Other Speech The Law Will Privilege",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Hardison Has Prevented America from Fully Realizing Title VII's Promise of a Workplace Free of Needless Discrimination",
        "reference": "I. Working-Class People Brought More Than 80% of Religious Accommodation Cases Since 2000",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner plausibly alleges that respondents engaged in a compensable taking by obtaining absolute title to property more valuable than her tax debt\nA. The government's collection of delinquent taxes and associated interest, penalties, and costs does not constitute a taking\nB. Tax-collection authority did not entitle respondents to take absolute title to property more valuable than petitioner's tax debt\nC. Historical practice indicates that taking absolute title to property more valuable than a tax debt requires compensation\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. This Court's decisions support the same",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-493_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "The Restoration Act prohibits gaming on petitioner's reservation only if Texas prohibits all such gaming in the State\nA. Section 105(f) generally makes applicable on petitioner's reservation state criminal laws that \"prohibit\" conduct but does not grant state civil or criminal \"regulatory\" jurisdiction\nB. Section 107 incorporates Cabazon's framework by barring gaming activities \"prohibited\" by state law and precluding state civil or criminal \"regulatory\" jurisdiction\n1. [MISSING]\na. Section 107(a)\nb. Section 107(b)\nc. Section 107(c)\n2. Section 107's drafting history confirms that Section 107 incorporates Cabazon's framework\n3. The Indian canon resolves any ambiguity in favor of the Tribe\nC. Correctly construed, Section 107 is consistent with IGRA's regulation of gaming in Indian country",
        "reference": "1. Section 107's text incorporates Cabazon's framework",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Medicare Act Does Not Preclude this Court's Review\nB. The Court Should Grant Certiorari to Enforce Critical Limits on Chevron Deference\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Question Presented Is Critically Important to Safety-Net Providers, Underserved Communities, and the Proper Administration of the Medicare Program",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1650_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 404 of the First Step Act leaves consideration of developments unrelated to the Fair Sentencing Act to the district court's discretion\nA. Section 404 motions operate as a limited exception to the general rule of finality in criminal sentencing and do not require a plenary resentencing\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The text, context, and purpose of Section 404 all refute a mandatory approach\n2. Petitioner provides no sound reason for mandatory incorporation of the Section 3553(a) factors in the context of a Section 404 motion\n3. A mandatory approach would produce unwarranted sentencing disparities\nC. Section 404 permits consideration of postsentencing developments in the district court's discretion\nII. The judgment below should be affirmed",
        "reference": "B. Section 404 does not mandate a resentencing that incorporates legal or factual changes unrelated to the Fair Sentencing Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISIONS CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND FIVE OTHER CIRCUITS\nA. This Court Has Held That But-For Causation Is The Default Rule For Federal Discrimination Laws\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decisions Below Conflict With The Decisions Of At Least Five Other Circuits\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S NEW MIXED-MOTIVE STANDARD FOR SECTION 1981 CLAIMS WILL DISRUPT EMPLOYMENT LAW AND IMPOSE SUBSTANTIAL BURDENS AND COSTS ON BUSINESSES\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Mixed-Motive Causation Standard For Section 1981 Will Disrupt Employment Discrimination Law\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Mixed-Motive Standard Will Punish And Deter Legitimate Employment Actions, Disrupt Workplaces, And Impose Unwarranted Costs And Reputational Harms On Businesses",
        "reference": "B. Nothing In The Text Or History Of Section 1981 Evidences Any Intent To Depart From The Default Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "a. Governing fiduciaries following reasonable practice include only suitable investment options on a plan's investment menu and engage in careful comparison shopping and negotiation\nb. [MISSING]\nc. Awareness of the risks of class action litigation encourages governing fiduciaries and their advisers to take special care in performing their duties",
        "reference": "b. At the pleading stage, participants cannot reasonably know details concerning the processes and due diligence that the governing fiduciaries employed (or failed to employ) in reaching their decisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Presented Does Not Warrant This Court's Review\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Question Presented Is of Insufficient Importance to Warrant Certiorari\nC. This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Presented\nII. The Second Question Presented Does Not Warrant This Court's Review\nA. The Federal Circuit Did Not \"Create[] a Special Test\" for Enablement of Functional Genus Claims\nB. The Question Presented Is of Insufficient Importance to Warrant Certiorari, and this Case Is a Poor Vehicle",
        "reference": "A. The Federal Circuit's Treatment of Enablement Is Consistent With This Court's Precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's litigation choices make this case a particularly poor vehicle after Cummings\nII. The government concedes that the second question presented is not certworthy\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. This case does not implicate any circuit split over whether section 1415(l) contains some kind of a futility exception\nB. There is no certworthy circuit split over whether section 1415(l) excuses exhaustion when plaintiffs settle their IDEA claims\nC. The futility question does not warrant this Court's intervention\nD. The Sixth Circuit's decision is correct",
        "reference": "III. Review is not warranted to address whether section 1415(l) includes a futility exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Reverse The District Court And Clarify The Requirements For An Illustrative District To Be \"Reasonably Configured\" To Satisfy Gingles' First Precondition\nA. The Fourteenth Amendment Circumscribes The Use Of Race In Redistricting\nB. Section 2 Of The Voting Rights Act Sometimes Compels The Use Of Race In Redistricting To Ensure Districts Are \"Equally Open\" To All Voters\nC. The District Court's Decision Creates Further Confusion And Litigation Risk In An Already Challenging Redistricting Environment\nII. The Court Should Affirm That A \"Reasonably Configured\" District Is One That Comports With Traditional Districting Principles\nA. Judging The Compactness Of A Minority Population Requires In-Depth Analysis Of Traditional Districting Principles\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The District Court's Use Of Mathematical Measurements Of District Compactness To Evaluate Plaintiffs' Illustrative Benchmark Districts Illustrates The Limitations Of Those Metrics",
        "reference": "B. The \"Compactness\" Inquiry Should Incorporate The Notion That A District Is A Recognizable Representational Unit Of Geography",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court's Review Would Not Be \"Premature\"",
        "reference": "I. The United States Agrees With Petitioner on Every Material Issue In This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1471_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Holding of Shamrock Oil Is Limited to the Removal Authority of an Original Plaintiff\nB. The Text of Section 1441(a) Gives Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants the Right to Remove\nC. The History and Purposes of General Removal Provisions Confirm That Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants Have the Right to Remove Under Section 1441(a)\nII. The Class Action Fairness Act Of 2005 Independently Authorizes A Third-Party Class-Action Counterclaim Defendant To Remove A Qualifying Class Action\nA. The Text of Section 1453(b) Confirms That a Third-Party Defendant to a Class-Action Counterclaim Can Remove\nB. Preventing Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants from Removing Class Actions Under Section 1453(b) Significantly Undermines the Purpose of CAFA",
        "reference": "I. This Court's Holding In Shamrock Oil That An Original Plaintiff Cannot Remove A Counterclaim Against It Should Not Apply To Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-96_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico disclaim sovereign immunity against actions seeking disclosure of government records.\nIII. PROMESA neither explicitly nor impliedly confers sovereign immunity on the Oversight Board.",
        "reference": "I. The sovereign immunity at issue is that of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A federal agency is a \"person\" who may file a petition for post-issuance review of a patent under the AIA\nA. The text and structure of the Patent Act demonstrate that a federal agency is a \"person\" who may petition for post-issuance review\nB. The history of federal agencies' participation in the patent system confirms that a federal agency is a \"person\" who may petition for post-issuance review\nC. Authorizing federal agencies to petition for post-issuance review is consistent with Congress's purposes in enacting the AIA\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Circuit Split\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Do Not Justify Review And Are Misguided Anyway",
        "reference": "II. The Decision Below Is Correct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. BECAUSE THE CHALLENGED RULES ARE REASONABLY RELATED TO DEFINING NCAA SPORTS, THEY SHOULD BE REVIEWED DEFERENTIALLY AND UPHELD WITHOUT \"DETAILED ANALYSIS\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Board Of Regents Teaches That The NCAA's Amateurism Rules Define The Joint Venture's Procompetitive Activity\nC. This Court And Others Have Adhered To The Principles Articulated In Board Of Regents\nD. The Rules Challenged Here Define The Amateur Character Of College Sports And Thus Should Be Upheld Without \"Detailed Analysis\"\nE. Abbreviated Deferential Rule-Of-Reason Analysis Is Further Warranted Because The NCAA Regulates Intercollegiate Athletics As Part Of Its Member Schools' Educational Mission\nII. EVEN UNDER FULL RULE-OF-REASON ANALYSIS, THE CHALLENGED RULES ARE VALID; THE NINTH CIRCUIT INVALIDATED THEM ONLY BY COMMITTING GRAVE ERRORS\nA. The Court Of Appeals Badly Misapplied The Rule Of Reason\n1. The Ninth Circuit impermissibly redefined a central feature of the NCAA's procompetitive product\n2. The Ninth Circuit wrongly required the NCAA to prove that \"each type of challenged rule\" has procompetitive benefits\nB. The Challenged Rules Are Valid Because They Have Procompetitive Effects And No Alternative Would Be Virtually As Effective At Maintaining The True Distinction Between College And Professional Sports\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW WILL LEAD TO ENDLESS ANTITRUST CHALLENGES",
        "reference": "A. Restraints Reasonably Related To Defining A Joint Venture's Procompetitive Product Should Be Reviewed Deferentially And Upheld Without Detailed Rule-Of-Reason Analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1498_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. Longstanding rules of Indian law control here and forbid adding unwritten rights to treaties\n2. Cases interpreting the \"right of taking fish\" create no right to transport goods without taxation of those goods\n3. The district court's findings in Yakama Indian Nation create no right to transport goods without taxation of those goods\n4. Transporting goods in the \"ceded area\" does not make them exempt from tax\nB. Washington's Fuel Tax Does Not Tax Travel by Public Highway\n1. Washington's statutes tax fuel possession, not highway travel, and are not preempted\n2. Characterizing Washington's tax as an \"import\" tax does not turn it into a tax on highway travel\nC. The Fiscal and Regulatory Concerns of the State and Its Amici Are Real\n1. Ruling for Cougar Den would imperil many state taxes\n2. Cougar Den's reading threatens state regulations as well",
        "reference": "A. The Yakama Treaty Creates No Right to Transport Goods Without Taxation of Those Goods",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTORILY DERIVED GINGLES FRAMEWORK IMPOSES OBJECTIVE CRITERIA THAT BAR DISCRIMINATION WITHOUT REQUIRING PROPORTIONALITY\nA. The Preconditions Require Proof that a Reasonably Compact Majority-Minority District Can Be Drawn and that Racial Polarization Causes Minorities' Electoral Losses\nB. The Totality-of-Circumstances Inquiry Requires Proof of Factors That Are Indicative of Unconstitutional Discrimination\nII. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS ON THE GINGLES PRECONDITIONS AND TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES ESTABLISH THAT HB1 VIOLATES SECTION 2\nA. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding Plaintiffs Satisfied the Gingles Preconditions\n1. It Was Not Clear Error to Find Plaintiffs' Illustrative Plans Satisfied Gingles 1\n2. It Was Not Clear Error to Find Plaintiffs Satisfied Gingles 2 and 3\nB. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding the Totality of Circumstances Indicated that Alabama's Electoral Processes are \"Not Equally Open\" to Black Voters\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Court Should Respect Statutory Stare Decisis\nB. The Gingles 1 Inquiry, Which Requires Some Race Consciousness, Raises No Constitutional Concerns\nC. The District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding No Racial Predominance in Plaintiffs' Illustrative Districts\nD. Defendants Misrepresent the Record in Contending that Simulations Show Race Predominated in Plaintiffs' Illustrative Plans\nE. Even if Race Predominated in Plaintiffs' Plans, the District Court Did Not Clearly Err in Finding that Those Plans Would Survive Strict Scrutiny\nF. Defendants' Proposal that section 2 Be Interpreted to Require a Showing that the State's Map Is Only Explainable By Race Is Contrary to the Statute's Text\nIV. SECTION 2 APPLIES TO SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTING PLANS AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION\nA. Section 2's Text Compels its Application to Single-Member Redistricting Plans\nB. Section 2's Application to Single-Member Districts Is Consistent with the Constitution",
        "reference": "III. DEFENDANTS' OBJECTIONS ARE CONTRARY TO SECTION 2'S TEXT AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOREST SERVICE LACKS AUTHORITY TO GRANT A PIPELINE RIGHT-OF-WAY BECAUSE THE APPALACHIAN TRAIL IS LAND IN THE NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM\nA. Plain Statutory Text Places the Trail in the Park System and Precludes Agency Approval of Oil-and-Gas Pipelines\nB. Statutory History Confirms That the Appalachian Trail Is in the Park System and Carved out of the Leasing Act\n1. The 1970 General Authorities Act\n2. The 1973 Leasing Act Amendments\nC. A Half-Century of Agency Interpretation Acknowledges That the Appalachian Trail Is \"in the National Park System\"\nII. PETITIONERS CANNOT SEPARATE THE \"TRAIL\" FROM THE FEDERAL \"LANDS\" DEDICATED TO THE TRAIL\nA. Common Usage, Statutory Text, and Agency Practice Confirm That the Trail Is an Area of Land\n1. The Word \"Trail\" Ordinarily Refers to an Area of Land\n2. The Trails Act and the Organic Act Confirm That the Park Service Administers the Trail as an Area of Land\nB. Neither the 1983 Trails Act Amendments nor the 1911 Weeks Act Excludes the Trail from the Park System\n1. The 1983 Amendments Do Not Affect the Park Service's Administration of the Trail\n2. The Weeks Act Does Not Affect the Park Service's Administration of the Trail\nC. Petitioners' Other Statutory Arguments Fall Short\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Blue Ridge Parkway Acts Confirm the Trail Is Land in the Park System\nD. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Are Irrelevant and Unfounded",
        "reference": "1. The Rivers Act Does Not Support Petitioners' Reading of the Trails Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief043.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Jurisdiction.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Constitution Assigns State Legislatures the Exclusive Duty to Regulate the Time, Place, and Manner of Congressional Elections.\nB. History Confirms that States Cannot Circumscribe Elections Clause Authority.\nC. This Court's Precedent Is in Accord.\nD. Respondents' Policy Arguments Are Unpersuasive.\nIII. Neither Federal nor State Law Vests the North Carolina Courts with Authority To Impose Substantive State-Constitutional Limits on the Authority Assigned State Legislatures by the Elections Clause.\nA. No State Law Justified the Actions of the State Courts Below.\nB. Congress Has Not Vested State Courts with the Authority To Regulate the Time, Place, and Manner of Federal Elections.",
        "reference": "II. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow States To Circumscribe the Legislative Power To Regulate Federal Elections.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-534_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. ONLY PETITIONERS' CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE CAN EXPLAIN WHY SUBSECTION 1610(G) SUBJECTS \"PROPERTY OF A FOREIGN STATE\" TO EXECUTION\nA. Iran And The Government Cannot Read Subsection 1610(g) Without Deleting The Phrase, \"Property Of A Foreign State\"\nB. The University's Attempt To Explain Subsection 1610(g)'s Reference To \"Property Of A Foreign State\" Backfires\nII. RESPONDENTS' ASSERTION THAT SUBSECTIONS 1610(A)(7) AND (B)(3) ARE SUPERFLUOUS IS BASED UPON A FUNDAMENTAL MISUNDERSTANDING OF SECTIONS 1605A AND 1610\nIII. THE RESPONDENTS ATTEMPT TO FORCE MEANING INTO THEIR PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION BY MISCONSTRUING THE PHRASE \"AS PROVIDED IN THIS SECTION\"\nA. The Respondents And The Government Distort The Meaning Of Subsection 1610(g) By Omitting Terms That Are Central To Its Meaning\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. AN EXPANSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF SUBSECTION 1610(G) IS CONSISTENT WITH THE RESTRICTIVE THEORY OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND WOULD NOT VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW\nV. EXECUTION OF TERRORISM JUDGMENTS AGAINST THE PERSEPOLIS COLLECTION ASSETS IS NOT FORECLOSED UNDER ANY PRINCIPLE OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR OTHER FEDERAL LAW",
        "reference": "B. The Respondents And The Government Cannot Reconcile Their Own Reading Of The Phrase \"As Provided In This Section\" With Their Construction Of Subsection 1610(g)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Assignor Estoppel Should Remain a Defense in Appropriate Circumstances\nII. The Estoppel Should Not Apply Where the Assignor Has Represented Nothing with Regard to The Issued Claims\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. There is No \"Split\" Between District Courts and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board Proceedings\nV. The Risks Associated with Abolishing Assignor Estoppel and Disrupting Stare Decisis are Potentially Far Reaching",
        "reference": "III. The Policy and Legal Benefits of Assignor Estoppel Support Keeping the Doctrine, Unlike Licensee Estoppel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-935_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Determination of a Child's Habitual Residence Must Occur in Every Case Involving Implementation of the Hague Convention\nA. The Hague Convention Aims to Prevent Future International Child Abductions\nB. The Means To Achieving the Convention's Objective of Preventing Wrongful Removal or Retention is Ensuring that the Child Remains or is Returned to His Habitual Residence, which is a Purely Factual Determination\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The Majority Rule Examines Shared Parental Intent and A Child's Acclimatization to the New Country\n2. The Minority Rule\na. The Minority Rule Prioritizes the Acclimatization Standard\nb. The Minority Rule Looks to Shared Parental Intent Second\n3. Both the Majority and Minority Rules Inadequately Provide for a Method to Determine the \"Habitual Residence\" of a Young Child\n4. Both the Majority and Minority Rules Fail to Account for Cases Without Parental Shared Intent\nII. The Phrase \"Habitual Residence\" Must Be Consistent with the Dictionary Definitions of the Terms \"Residence\" and \"Habitual\"\nA. Why \"Habitual Residence\" Must be Defined\nB. The Sixth Circuit's Definition of Habitual Residence Must Be Adopted To Ensure that the Hague Convention Will Apply in Every Wrongful Removal Case of a Child Under the Convention",
        "reference": "C. The Factors Employed by the Ten Circuits of the Courts of Appeals Allow for the Possibility of an Abducted or Wrongly Retained Child to have no Habitual Residence thereby Undermining the Very Protections the Convention was Created to Achieve",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Introduction\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Department's Loan Forgiveness Program violates the Appropriations Clause and the Property Clause by spending money and disposing of property belonging to the United States Treasury without congressional approval\nA. Congress did not appropriate any funds for the Loan Forgiveness Program\nB. Only Congress can dispose of the student loan accounts receivable owned by the Treasury\nIV. The Secretary's invocation of the HEROES Act without an express directive from the President in accordance with the National Emergencies Act exceeds the Secretary's statutory authority\nV. The term national emergency in the HEROES Act must be read in light of the surrounding language of the Act and the Act's legislative purpose. Because the HEROES Act relates to military operations and military personnel, COVID-19 is not a national emergency under the HEROES Act",
        "reference": "II. Student Loan Borrowers are contractually bound to repay their loans \u2014 in full \u2014 by the terms of their Master Promissory Notes and the Code of Federal Regulations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The FTC's Antitrust Authority Confirms That Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Monetary Relief",
        "reference": "I. The FTC Has Increasingly Wielded Section 13(b) To Obtain Monetary Relief In Antitrust Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Does Not Apply to Voter Dilution Claims\nA. Section 2 Applies Only to Practices That Affect Minorities' Access to the Ballot Box\nB. Applying Section 2 to Voter Dilution Claims Violates the Constitution, Requires the Court to Make Political Choices, and Deepens Racial Divides\nII. Gingles Should Be Overruled\nA. The Issues with Gingles\nB. Gingles Was Wrongly Decided\nC. The Court's Duty Is to Choose the Law Over Stare Decisis\nD. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Alabama Has Changed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS APPLIED BY THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT, ART. X, SECTION 6 OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION VIOLATES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION\nA. The Tax Credit Program Is Not Prohibited by the Establishment Clause\nB. Montana's Denial of Tax Credit Benefits Falls Outside the \"Play in the Joints\" Between the Free Exercise and Equal Protection Clauses\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. CHOICE PROGRAMS ALLEVIATE, NOT EXACERBATE, RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief039.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNDER FUNDAMENTAL COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, GOOGLE DIRECTLY INFRINGES ORACLE'S EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN THE JAVA CODE\nII. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT GOOGLE'S MERGER ARGUMENT\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT GOOGLE'S FAIR USE ARGUMENT\nA. Google's Use is Not Transformative\nB. The Federal Circuit Reached The Correct Conclusion Under The Statutory Factors\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Amicus Takes No View With Respect to the Federal Circuit's Weighing of the Second Factor\n3. The Federal Circuit Correctly Determined That the Third Factor Does Not Favor Google\n4. The Federal Circuit Correctly Weighed the Fourth Factor\n5. The Federal Circuit Correctly Balanced the Statutory Factors\nIV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REVERSED THE JURY AS TO FAIR USE",
        "reference": "1. The Federal Circuit Correctly Weighed the First Factor",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. FWS Considered Ancillary and Unquantified Benefits in the Critical Habitat Designation\nII. Ancillary Benefits Must Be Given Due Consideration Under the Endangered Species Act, Executive Orders, and Best Practices for Cost-Benefit Analysis\nA. Petitioner and Its Supporters Wrongly Disparage Ancillary Benefits\nB. The Endangered Species Act Requires Consideration of All Benefits \u2014 Direct and Ancillary\nC. Executive Orders and Guidelines Require Federal Agencies to Consider Ancillary Benefits in Regulatory Impact Analyses\nD. For Over Twenty-Five Years, Under Administrations of Both Parties, FWS Has Consistently Assessed the Ancillary Benefits of Critical Habitat Designations\nE. It Would Be Arbitrary to Treat Ancillary Benefits Differently Than Indirect Costs\nF. [MISSING]\nIII. Unquantified Benefits Also Must Be Given Due Consideration Under Executive Orders and Best Practices for Cost-Benefit Analysis",
        "reference": "F. Courts Require Agencies to Account for the Indirect Consequences of Regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Application of Chevron Deference Infringes The Separation of Powers\nA. Deference Infringes on Legislative Power\nB. Deference Infringes on Judicial Power\nIII. Deference to Agencies Harms Individual Liberty",
        "reference": "I. The D.C. Circuit's Cursory Statutory Analysis Was Improper",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Kansas Supreme Court erred in concluding that Section 1324a(b)(5) expressly preempts the State's prosecution of respondents\nB. [MISSING]\nC. If the Court grants review, it should add a question presented on implied preemption",
        "reference": "B. This Court's review is warranted on the first question presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression\nII. This Court's \"True Threats\" Precedents Require a Specific Intent to Threaten\nIII. Requiring a Specific-Intent Standard Optimally Balances Safeguarding Protected Expression and Addressing the Harms Caused By True Threats\nA. Protecting our \"profound national commitment\" to uninhibited debate requires a specific-intent standard\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The specific-intent standard meaningfully addresses the harms of true threats",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim that Thompson pleaded and pursued through trial does not exist\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Assuming a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim exists, it requires proof that the prosecution ended in a way indicating the charges lacked merit\nA. The common law defining the application of the favorable termination element was not well settled in 1871\nB. Modern jurisprudence supports the indications-of-innocence standard\nC. Sound policy considerations support the indications-of-innocence standard",
        "reference": "II. A Fourth Amendment claim focused on a post-arraignment seizure may not even implicate the question presented, and is precluded by the jury's verdict in any event",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Increasing Criminalization of Conduct and Federalization of Criminal Law \u2014 Exacerbated by the Widespread Blanket Criminalization of Federal Administrative Regulations \u2014 Magnify the Need to Enforce the Constitutional Limits on Delegation\nB. Delegations of the Legislative Power to Make Criminal Laws Must Provide Constraints More Meaningful Than An \"Intelligible Principle.\"\nC. An \"Intelligible Principle\" Must Do More Than Identify the Subject Matter for Delegated Lawmaking\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The Delegation Here Cannot Be Sustained Under Any Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL COURTS LACK SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO HEAR RESPONDENTS' STATUTORY CLAIMS\nA. Respondents Lack A Cause Of Action Under The INA\nB. The President's Proclamation Does Not Exceed His Broad Power To Exclude Classes Of Aliens\nC. The Federal Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction Over Respondents' Statutory Claims Under The APA\nII. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT FOR THEIR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIM LEADS TO MANY ABSURD CONSEQUENCES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Respondents' Reasoning Pits The First Amendment Against Itself\nC. Respondents' Reasoning Implies That What Is Constitutional For One President Is Unconstitutional For Another\nD. Respondents' Reasoning Would Put The United States At The Mercy Of Foreign Threats",
        "reference": "A. Private Litigants Could Enjoin President Trump's War Against The Islamic State",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Catholic schools \u2014 staffed primarily by lay teachers \u2014 have a transformative impact on inner-city communities\nIII. A functional approach to the ministerial exception protects Catholic schools' ability to further the Church's principal mission",
        "reference": "I. Lay teachers in Catholic schools play a critical role in transmitting the Catholic faith to the next generation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Threat of TCPA Litigation Hampers Needed Communications, Harms Credit Union Members, and Will Only Get Worse if a Broad Definition of ATDS Is Adopted.\nA. The structure and role of credit unions require a wide range of informational communications.\nB. The threat of TCPA liability chills communications from credit unions to their members.\nC. Curtailed or delayed communications harm credit union members.\nII. Congress Did Not Intend an ATDS to Include Equipment that Dials from Lists.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Systems that autodialed stored lists of numbers were pervasive in 1991, and Congress chose to exclude them.\nC. Reliance on the ATDS definition's inclusion of storage capability and the TCPA's consent exception does not justify a broad interpretation of ATDS.\nIII. Interpreting the ATDS Definition Broadly Will Not Enhance Consumer Protection.",
        "reference": "A. Limiting the ATDS definition to equipment with a random or sequential number generator is consistent with the TCPA's history and structure.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. DETERMINING WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES REQUIRES EXAMINATION OF THE PARTICULAR STATUTORY SCHEME UNDER WHICH THEY OPERATE\nA. Administrative Law Judges Are Officers of the United States Only If They Have Authority to Issue Final Decisions\nB. Examination of the NLRA and Its Legislative History Illustrates the Type of Case-by-Case Analysis Needed to Determine If Administrative Law Judges Are Officers of the United States\nC. [MISSING]\nII. BECAUSE THE SEC HAS DISCRETION NOT TO USE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AND TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF THEIR AUTHORITY, THE JUDGES' STATUTORY JUST CAUSE PROTECTION CREATES NO SEPARATION OF POWERS PROBLEM UNDER FREE ENTERPRISE FUND",
        "reference": "C. The SEC Administrative Law Judges Are Not Officers of the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Monetary Relief\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Equity Courts' Ancillary Jurisdiction Does Not Expand section 13(b)'s Scope\n1. Equity's Power To Award \"Complete Relief\" Cannot Expand the Commission's section 13(b) Authority\n2. Early Patent and Copyright Cases Do Not Support Expanding section 13(b)\nC. The Commission's Reading of section 13(b) Defies the FTC Act's Structure and History\nD. Precedent Requires Adhering to section 13(b)'s Text\nE. Policy Arguments Are Properly Addressed to Congress\nII. The Monetary Award Here Is Improper Even If section 13(b) Authorizes Equitable Monetary Remedies",
        "reference": "A. The Term \"Permanent Injunction\" Does Not Encompass Retrospective Monetary Relief Like Restitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-493_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. By Incorporating The Public Law 280 Jurisdictional Regime Into The Restoration Act, Congress Adopted The Cabazon Band Framework\nB. The Text, Structure, And History Of Section 107 Confirm That Congress Incorporated The Cabazon Band Framework\nC. Interpretive Presumptions Compel Resolution Of Any Ambiguity In Favor Of The Tribes' Interpretation\nD. Ysleta I Misread The Restoration Act\nII. UNDER THE CABAZON BAND FRAMEWORK, TEXAS LACKS AUTHORITY TO REGULATE BINGO ON THE TRIBES' RESERVATIONS",
        "reference": "I. THE RESTORATION ACT INCORPORATES CABAZON BAND AND PROHIBITS THE TRIBES FROM CONDUCTING ONLY THOSE GAMING ACTIVITIES THAT TEXAS FLATLY PROHIBITS RATHER THAN MERELY REGULATES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1442_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A decision in petitioners' favor will not lead to a flood of new claims or threaten the workability of the Social Security disability system\nA. There is a limited universe of cases with potential Lucia claims and only a relative handful are still in the judicial system\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Pragmatic considerations explain why Appointments Clause challenges did not materialize in significant numbers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Religious Autonomy Principle Requires the Judiciary to Defer to Religious Organizations' Determinations about Which Employees Serve as \"Ministers\"\nII. This Court Has Held in Many Other Contexts that Judicial Deference Is an Essential Means of Safeguarding Institutional Autonomy\nA. Judicial Deference in Other First Amendment Cases\nB. Judicial Deference in Cases Where Institutional Autonomy Derives from Other Constitutional Principles\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Other Cases Holding that Judicial Deference Is Appropriate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Court Has Consistently Recognized The Central Importance Of The Lack Of Alternative Remedies In The Bivens Analysis\nB. There Is A Need For Further Guidance On How To Weigh The Total Lack Of Alternative Remedies In The Bivens Analysis\nC. The Fifth Circuit's Decision Is In Tension With This Court's Prior Decisions \u2014 And Exemplifies The Need For Clarity\nII. THIS CASE IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE FOR CLARIFYING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A LACK OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES\nA. FTCA Remedies Are Unavailable Here\nB. State Tort Remedies Are Also Unavailable Here By Operation Of The Westfall Act",
        "reference": "I. THE LACK OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES IS AN IMPORTANT, STANDALONE CONSIDERATION IN THE OVERALL BIVENS ANALYSIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Montana Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the term \"challenges\" in CERCLA Section 113(h) is erroneous but does not now warrant this Court's review\nC. The Montana Supreme Court's decision on CERCLA Section 122(e)(6) is erroneous but does not warrant this Court's review\nD. The Montana Supreme Court's preemption analysis is flawed, but the issue does not warrant this Court's immediate review",
        "reference": "A. The current interlocutory posture of this case creates a jurisdictional question and counsels against review at this time",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "The Board of Veterans' Appeals did not commit clear and unmistakable error when it denied petitioner's disability-benefits claim in 1977\nA. Clear and unmistakable error under 38 U.S.C. 7111 does not occur when a final Board decision complies with a regulation that the Board is required by statute to apply\n1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow\n2. Under the VA's current regulations implementing Sections 5109A and 7111, the term \"clear and unmistakable error\" does not encompass the Board's faithful application of a regulation that was later found to be invalid\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The broader statutory context and practical considerations counsel against expanding collateral review in the manner that petitioner suggests\n5. Petitioner's reliance on Social Security practices and the veterans canon is misplaced\nB. Petitioner has not established that the outcome of the 1977 Board proceedings would have been different but for the Board's asserted error",
        "reference": "3. Section 7111 incorporates the preexisting regulatory understanding of \"clear and unmistakable error\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA HAS DERIVED FROM THE COMMON LAW THE SAME CATEGORICAL RULE AS THE COURT BELOW\nA. Nearly Thirty Years Ago, The Supreme Court Of Canada Adopted A Categorical Exception To The Warrant Requirement For All Cases Of Hot Pursuit\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE DEMONSTRATES THAT A CATEGORICAL RULE IS READILY ADMINISTRABLE AND ADEQUATELY PROTECTS PRIVACY INTERESTS",
        "reference": "B. Canada And The United States Share The Historical Common Law From Which The Supreme Court Of Canada Derived The Categorical Macooh Hot Pursuit Exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Dudenhoeffer Confirmed That Congress Intended To Subject ESOP Fiduciaries To The Same Duty Of Prudence As All Other ERISA Fiduciaries\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Petitioners' Proposed Frameworks For Evaluating Duty-of-Prudence Claims Contravene Dudenhoeffer And The Plain Language Of ERISA\nA. Petitioners' proposal that ERISA fiduciaries are not required to use information learned in their corporate capacity in their fiduciary decision-making has no basis in the law\nB. Petitioners' proposal of maximum deference for ESOP fiduciaries would invalidate Dudenhoeffer and Congressional intent in ERISA\nIV. The Government's Proposed Framework Abandons ERISA's Duty Of Prudence For ESOP Fiduciaries",
        "reference": "II. The Second Circuit Narrowly Applied Dudenhoeffer's Pleading Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1650_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. REQUIRING DISTRICT COURTS TO CONSIDER INTERVENING FACTUAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS FITS WITH OTHER SENTENCING PROCEDURES\nA. Considering Intervening Legal And Factual Developments Furthers Congress's Sentencing Goals\nB. Congress Has Recognized Courts' Ability To Consider Intervening Legal And Factual Developments\nC. The Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure Recognize That District Courts Can Consider Intervening Developments\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Many Inmates Convert In Prison\nB. An Inmate's Religious Journey Is Relevant To The Section 3553(a) Factors",
        "reference": "II. RELIGIOUS CONVERSIONS ARE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR THAT COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER DURING RESENTENCING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. TITLE VII CONCERNS DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN\nA. This Court's Jurisprudence is Clear that Title VII's Prohibition on Discrimination Because of Sex Refers to the Biological Reality of Male or Female\nB. The Elements of a Claim of Discrimination Require an Employee to Prove Discriminatory Treatment Between Men and Women\n1. A Prima Facie Case of Discrimination Under Title VII Requires A Complaining Employee To Demonstrate that the Employee's Sex was a Motivating Factor in the Employment Decision by Showing that Similarly Situated Members of the Opposite Sex were Treated More Favorably\n2. To Establish a Prima Facie Case, the Employee Must Generally Identify a Similarly Situated Comparator of the Opposite Sex to Create an Inference of Discrimination\nC. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity are not Proxies for Discrimination Because of Sex\n1. Men and Women are treated the same when sexual orientation and/or gender identity, including transgender status, is considered\n2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Applied the Wrong Comparison\nII. SEXUAL STEREOTYPING SHOULD NOT BE AN INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR A CLAIM UNDER TITLE VII ABSENT EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF WOMEN COMPARED TO MEN\nA. The Notion of Sex Stereotyping is a Vague Standard that should be Rejected\nB. Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity are not Sex Stereotypes that Create Discriminatory Treatment between Men and Women\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. ANY CHANGE TO THE SCOPE OF TITLE VII TO INCLUDE SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND/OR GENDER IDENTITY SHOULD COME FROM CONGRESS AND NOT THE COURTS\nA. The Courts have Consistently Held that Title VII does not Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Companies such as Hackney Properly Relied on Those Holdings When Establishing Policies, Including Policies Regarding Spousal Health Benefits\nB. The Court Should Hold that Title VII's Limitations on Discrimination Because of Sex Do Not Extend to Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity Because to Change the Application of the Statute by Judicial Fiat More than 55 Years After the Statute was Enacted Would Unfairly Prejudice Companies such as Hackney and Deprive Them of Due Process",
        "reference": "C. Applying a Standard Based on Sex Stereotyping would Require a Court to Second Guess Every Employment Decision to Determine if it was Tainted by a Sex Stereotype",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.87
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-587_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ADEA's Text, Context, And Statutory History Establish That section 630(b)'s 20-Employee Minimum Exempts Small Political Subdivisions\nA. Section 630(b)'s first sentence defines \"employer\" expansively to include political subdivisions, but only those with at least 20 employees\n1. Statutory text and context establish that the word \"person\" includes political subdivisions\n2. Statutory history confirms that the term \"person\" has always included political subdivisions\n3. The Ninth Circuit ignored the first sentence of section 630(b)\nB. Section 630(b)'s second sentence merely clarifies what is included in the first sentence's definition, without adding new categories of employers\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Like the agent clause, the governmental clause clarifies the scope of section 630(b)'s first sentence by specifying which public entities it includes in its coverage\n3. Statutory history confirms that the function of section 630(b)'s second sentence has always been to clarify the scope of the first\nC. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of applying the minimum-employee requirement\nII. Applying The ADEA's Employee Minimum To Political Subdivisions Best Achieves Congress's Stated Purpose And Aligns The ADEA With Other Antidiscrimination Statutes\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Rule Threatens The Survival Of Small Political Subdivisions",
        "reference": "1. The agent clause clarifies the scope of section 630(b)'s first sentence without adding a new category of employer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. REASON AND AMPLE EVIDENCE SHOW THE PRESIDENT TO BE AN \"OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES\"\nA. The Presidency Is Obviously a Federal Office Not Just of, But Also Under, the United States. And, Related Ineligibility-Clause Issues\nB. The Appointments, Commissions, and Impeachment Clauses of Article II\nC. Article II Mentioned Explicitly That One Could Be an Officer And Also Act as President\nII. PETITIONER PREVIOUSLY CONCEDED IN FEDERAL COURT THAT HE WAS AN OFFICER OF THE UNITED STATES\nA. An Officer of the United States for Purposes of 28 U.S.C. section 1442(a)(1) Can Also Be an Officer of the U.S. under Section 3\nB. Petitioner, a Confessed Federal Officer, Has Conceded That Just Because the President Is Voted into Office, That Doesn't Prevent Him from Being an Officer of the United States. And, the Mandamus Act Has Been Used to Call a President \"Officer of the U.S.\"\nIII. ARTICLE VI DOESN'T STIPULATE EXACT LANGUAGE FOR OATHS TO SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTION; AND THE PRESIDENT'S OATH IS LIKE THAT OF OTHER OFFICERS OF THE U.S., BUT EVEN STRONGER\nIV. SECTION 3 MAY HOLD PETITIONER LIABLE, IN A SELF-EXECUTING WAY, EVEN IF HE DIDN'T PERSONALLY BEAR ARMS, AND REGARDLESS OF WORD-ORDER IN THE SECTION\nV. THIS CASE IS RIPE, ESPECIALLY SINCE TRUMP CAN ASK CONGRESS FOR A PARDON RIGHT NOW INSTEAD OF AFTER THE ELECTION\nA. Trump Can Ask Congress for a Pardon Right Now, And Can Admit He Is an Insurrectionist\nB. If Trump Doesn't Ask Congress for a Pardon Right Now, Would It Be Fair for Him to Do So After the Election?\nC. Letting Trump Wait Until After the Election to Ask for a Pardon, Would Put Him in a Position to Physically Threaten Congresspersons if They Don't Pardon Him \u2014 And He Has a History\nD. \"The Case of Chuckie Peanut\": a Hypothetical, Showing the Absurdity of Waiting Until Post-Election to Resolve Issues\nE. One Can Reasonably Predict Things Like Turning 35 by Inauguration Day, Versus the Uncertainty of Getting a Section 3 Pardon\nVI. DEMOCRACY DOES NOT REQUIRE PUTTING ENEMIES OF DEMOCRACY ON THE BALLOT; IT MIGHT REQUIRE KEEPING THEM OFF\nVII. TRUMP'S JANUARY 6 SPEECH HELPS PROVE HE HAD THE MALICE TO BE AN INSURRECTIONIST, EVEN IF HE DIDN'T SAY, \"HEY, I'M REVOLTING! INSURRECTION!!\nA. Some Damning Speech-Excerpts\nB. Trump's Not Saying Per Se That He Was Trying to Overthrow the Government, Is Not a Defense\nVIII. PETITIONER'S PERSONAL CONDUCT AND WORDS BEFORE AND AFTER JANUARY 6 SUPPORT HIS BEING AN INSURRECTIONIST\nIX. ARGUENDO, SHOULD THE COURT FIND PETITIONER INELIGIBLE TO BE ON ANY, AND ALL, STATES' BALLOTS?\nX. MANAGEABLE JUDICIAL AND STATE STANDARDS LIKELY EXIST FOR JUDGING IF SOMEONE SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE BALLOT\nA. De Minimis Issues re Section 3; Not Every Incident May Be \"Insurrection\"\nB. New Mexico's Couy Griffin Section 3 Case Shows Precedent for January 6-Related Removal from Office\nXI. REASONS FOR NOT SUPPORTING EITHER PARTY HERE \u2014 EVEN IF AMICUS' REASONING HURTS PETITIONER'S CASE\nXII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "XII. THE COURT SHOULD NEUTRALLY EDUCATE THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE MEANING OF ITS OPINION: VICTORY FOR ONE SIDE IS NOT A POLITICAL ENDORSEMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.96
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief053.pdf",
        "text": "I. Stare Decisis Does Not Support Upholding Roe v. Wade Because Abortion Is Not Necessary for Women Unexpectedly Pregnant to Achieve Economic and Social Equality.\nII. Many Women Have Achieved Economic and Social Equality in Spite of the Harms Caused by Legalized Abortion.\nA. \"Anna\"\nB. \"Kelly\" and \"Rosemary\"\nC. \"Joan\" and \"Maria\"\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Hardships Suffered by Other Mothers Who Choose Or Are Pushed Toward Abortion Further Undermine the Casey Plurality's Conclusion.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-9526_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The United States and the Creek Nation Established a Reservation by Treaty\nA. Text\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Creek Allotment Act Preserved the Nation's Reservation\nA. Text\nB. Surrounding History\nC. Hitchcock and Buster\nIII. Congress Deliberately Preserved the Creek Nation and Its Reservation in the Five Tribes Act\nA. Text\nB. Surrounding History and Missouri Railway\nIV. Statehood Did Not Eradicate the Reservation Boundaries\nA. Text\nB. Surrounding History\nC. The United States' Criminal Transfer Argument Lacks Textual Basis\nV. The Nation's Post-Statehood Presence and Exercise of Governmental Power Confirm the Continued Existence of Its Reservation\nA. The Muzzling of the Nation's Government in the Immediate Post-Statehood Period Does Not Connote Disestablishment\nB. Present-Day Governance and Demographic Presence\nVI. The State's Exaggerated Arguments About Consequences Provide No Support for Disestablishment\nA. Criminal Consequences\nB. Civil Consequences\nC. The State Ignores the Detrimental Effects that Disestablishment Would Have on Reservation Governance",
        "reference": "B. Surrounding History",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. Petitioner may recover all lost profits proximately caused by respondent's domestic infringement, including profits it would have earned by performing surveys on the high seas\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This case is a suitable vehicle for resolving the question presented",
        "reference": "B. The question presented is important and recurring",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Enjoining the execution of a state court judgment raises concerns similar to Younger v. Harris and warrants a similar rule of restraint\nA. Application of Younger to execution cases\nB. The Younger requirements as applied to this case\n1. Great injury\n2. Existence of state remedies\nC. The posture of the case",
        "reference": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-441_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The 2017 Act's quarterly fee increase violates the Bankruptcy Clause's uniformity requirement\nA. The 2017 Act is deficient under any plausible definition of \"uniformity\"\nB. The government's attempt to excuse the Act's obvious lack of uniformity is unavailing\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The 2017 Act is also impermissibly non-uniform because Congress's dual system itself is impermissibly non-uniform",
        "reference": "C. The proper remedy is a full refund of fees \u2014 prospective relief cannot redress a past constitutional monetary injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Rogers and Its Progeny Help Ensure Trademark Law Does Not Unduly Intrude on Protected Speech\nA. The Lanham Act Is Subject to First Amendment Scrutiny\nB. The First Amendment Protects Facetious Speech, Including Parodies\nC. The First Amendment Protects Facetious Speech Involving Trademarks\nII. The Rogers Test Is a Vital Safeguard for Political Expression\nA. Trademarks Are a Key Element in Modern Political Activism\nB. Rogers Strikes the Right Balance Between Trademark Rights and Constitutional Rights\nC. The Rogers Test Offers Essential Practical Protections\n1. The Rogers Test Increases Predictability\n2. The Rogers Test Decreases Litigation Costs\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The Rogers Test Should Not Have a Non-Commerciality Requirement or Hinge on the Expressive Medium",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Circuit Split Warrants Review\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decision Below Was Incorrect",
        "reference": "II. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle For Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This case presents a certworthy circuit split\nA. The courts of appeals disagree about the scope of section 1's residual clause\n1. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits require workers to transport goods or passengers across borders to fall within the section 1 exemption\n2. In the First and Ninth Circuits, workers who personally participate in transportation, even only on an intrastate leg, may fall within the exemption\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The Seventh Circuit here has diverged from these precedents, and expressly from Eastus\nB. This case is an excellent vehicle because it would have come out differently in the other courts of appeals\n1. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits would have found that Respondent is not a transportation worker because she merely handles cargo\n2. Respondent's case would also have come out differently under the First, Third, and Ninth Circuits' tests\nC. Only this Court can resolve the conflict\nII. This Court's intervention is critical, because the disagreement creates costly confusion and disruption nationwide, especially in the commercial aviation industry",
        "reference": "3. In the Third Circuit, the exemption covers transportation workers who cross state lines or supervise those who do",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. Only One Court Of Appeals Has Considered The Questions Presented\nB. The Decision Below Is Preliminary And Interlocutory And Would Not Present The Full Dispute\nC. There Is No Urgent Need For This Court's Review\nD. [MISSING]\n1. The Court Of Appeals Properly Affirmed The District Court's Reviewability Determination\n2. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Affirmed The Preliminary Injunction",
        "reference": "D. The Government's Merits Arguments Do Not Justify Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Parties' Disagreement on the Merits Underscores the Need for This Court's Review\nII. The Panel Decision Created a Clear Circuit Split on the Question Presented\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This Case Presents a Clean Vehicle To Resolve the Question Presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1042_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "Taxable \"compensation\" under the RRTA includes money remuneration paid as part of the employer-employee relationship, not simply payments for active service\nA. RRTA \"compensation\" includes money remuneration paid as part of the employer-employee relationship\n1. Under this Court's decisions, remuneration \"paid to an employee for services rendered to one or more employers\" includes remuneration for time not spent in active service\n2. The statutory context confirms that the RRTA's definition of \"compensation\" extends beyond payments for active service and encompasses pay for time lost\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The income-tax exclusion for \"payments on account of personal physical injuries\" does not apply to RRTA taxation\nB. The Treasury Department's longstanding construction of RRTA \"compensation\" is reasonable and warrants deference",
        "reference": "3. The RRTA's history bolsters the most natural interpretation of the statutory text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-8255_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Counsel May Not Override A Client's Decision Whether Or Not To Admit Guilt\nB. The Louisiana Supreme Court Erred In Concluding That English's Admission Of McCoy's Guilt Was Required By \u2014Or Consistent With\u2014His Ethical Obligations\nC. English's Admission Of McCoy's Guilt Over McCoy's Objection Requires A New Trial\nII. BY ADMITTING MCCOY'S GUILT, COUNSEL RENDERED CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL",
        "reference": "I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO PERMIT ENGLISH TO ADMIT GUILT OVER MCCOY'S EXPRESS OBJECTION VIOLATED MCCOY'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. Torres and Rosario Resolve This Case\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Respondent Offers No Sound Reason To Reconsider Torres And Rosario",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Government Action is a Prerequisite to the Existence of a \"Public Forum\"; There Can Thus Be No State Action Without Some Significant Governmental Connection to the Operation or Use of the Forum\nII. Internet Users are Best Served by the Availability of Both Unmoderated and Moderated Platforms\nA. In Praise of Unmoderated Platforms\nB. Moderated Platforms Are Also Valuable\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The First Amendment Protects Internet Hosts' Right to Curate Their Platforms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-863_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED AT CHEVRON STEP 1 BY FAILING TO APPLY THE TRADITIONAL TOOLS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.\nA. The Text, Structure, And History Of The Stop-Time Rule Resolve This Case In Petitioner's Favor.\nB. At Chevron Step 1, Courts Must Apply All The Traditional Tools Of Statutory Interpretation.\nC. The Sixth Circuit Erred By Ignoring The History Of Notices To Appear.\nD. In Immigration Cases, Circuit Courts Have Made A Habit Of Failing To Apply The Scrutiny This Court's Cases Demand At Chevron Step 1.\nE. The Sixth Circuit Also Erred By Failing To Apply, At Chevron Step 1, The Rule That Ambiguities In Deportation Laws Must Be Construed In Favor Of Immigrants.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Under Judulang, Deference Is Due At Chevron Step 2 Only If The BIA's Interpretation Reasonably Accounts For Relevant Considerations.\nB. The Interpretations Of The Sixth Circuit And The BIA Failed To Reasonably Account For Relevant Considerations.\n1. The Deportation Canon Is, At Minimum, A Relevant Consideration The BIA And The Sixth Circuit Were Required To Weigh.\n2. Neither The BIA Nor The Sixth Circuit Adequately Considered The \"Purposes And Concerns Of The Immigration Laws.\"\ni. The BIA And Sixth Circuit Ignored The Importance Of Providing All Necessary Information In A Single \"Notice To Appear.\"\nii. The BIA And The Sixth Circuit Ignored The Humanitarian Purpose Of Cancellation.\niii. Administrative Convenience Cannot Justify The Failure Of The Sixth Circuit And The BIA To Account For These Purposes.\nC. Neither The Sixth Circuit Nor The BIA Considered That The BIA's Interpretation Violates The Governing Regulations.",
        "reference": "II. AT CHEVRON STEP 2, THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ERRED BY DEFERRING TO THE BIA.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1042_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RRTA'S DEFINITION OF TAXABLE COMPENSATION INCLUDES PAY FOR TIME LOST\nA. The Statutory Text\nB. The Statutory Context\nC. The Statutory History\nD. The Longstanding IRS Regulations Are Consistent With The Statutory Text, Context, and History\nII. THERE IS NO EXEMPTION IN THE RRTA FOR LOST WAGES DUE TO A PERSONAL INJURY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Analogy To FICA Taxes Does Not Apply",
        "reference": "A. Congress Did Not Identify Section 104 As An Exclusion From The RRTA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1712_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners have alleged that their employee benefit plan has suffered a cognizable injury\nII. Congress has authorized petitioners to bring a civil action on behalf of the plan to seek redress for the financial injury caused by respondents' alleged misconduct\nIII. Article III permits Congress to authorize plan participants to conduct litigation in federal court to vindicate the interests of injured employee benefit plans\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The right of participants of overfunded defined-benefit plans to seek redress for the plan's financial injuries is consistent with Article III",
        "reference": "A. This Court has recognized that federal courts may adjudicate representative suits based on injuries suffered by the person or entity represented by the plaintiff",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Grant Review to Rule Whether Any State Interest Can Be Sufficient to Compel an Individual to Publish the Sentiments of Another Private Party.",
        "reference": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under Marsh v. Chambers, the public display of the cross is sanctioned by the First Amendment because of an uninterrupted tradition of cross displays that predates the First Amendment\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Colonists\nC. The Americans of the 1800's\nII. The Constitution does not forbid recognition of Christianity's foundational influence upon American history, law, and culture\nIII. The Fourth Circuit neglected the special significance of the cross for military personnel\nA. The Fourth Circuit's limited depiction of the crosses at Arlington National Cemetery is misleading\nB. Military medals demonstrate that the cross is closely associated with the military\nIV. The National Mall is based on a grid of a Latin cross\nV. In City of Pensacola v. Kondrat'yev, a case currently before this Court, the lower court judges said they were bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent but urged this Court to overturn that precedent\nVI. The Court should respect the memory of deceased veterans and the rights and sensibilities of their families and descendants",
        "reference": "A. The Explorers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket15-1439_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioners' Reading Follows From And Gives Effect To The Clause's Text\n1. Petitioners' interpretation is the best reading of the clause's text\n2. Respondents' and the United States' reading would render the clause a nullity\nB. Petitioners' Reading Comports With SLUSA's Structure\nC. Petitioners' Reading Accords With SLUSA's Purposes\nD. Background Principles Do Not Warrant A Different Interpretation\nII. IF THIS COURT REJECTS PETITIONERS' READING, IT SHOULD ADOPT THE UNITED STATES'",
        "reference": "I. PETITIONERS' READING IS THE ONLY ONE COMPATIBLE WITH SLUSA'S TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND PURPOSES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Background\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. If an Administrative Agency is Entitled to Judicial Deference When Imposing Regulation, then it Follows that an Agency Should Also be Accorded Deference When Removing Regulation\nIV. When Congress Provides a Statutory Backstop, the Courts Should Accord Deference to Administrative Agencies' Deregulatory Efforts\nV. The Consequences of Overly Strict Judicial Review",
        "reference": "II. To Determine Whether an Administrative Agency Engages in Arbitrary and Capricious Decisionmaking, a Reviewing Court Must Focus on the Clear Text of the Statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-315_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 31 U.S.C. section 3731(b) AFFIRMS THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING\nII. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE 10-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICY DECISIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN AMENDING THE FCA AFTER 1986 TO EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN THE RIGHTS OF RELATORS TO BRING CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER THE FCA\nIII. THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS IN THE CHAMBER AMICI BRIEF IS FLAWED AND CANNOT BE RELIED UPON\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. THE FIRST TO FILE PROVISION RENDERS THE CHAMBER AMICI'S ARGUMENTS IRRELEVANT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Historical Context: Congress Began to Grapple with Post-Abolition Apportionment\nB. The Thirty-Ninth Congress Considered \u2014And Rejected \u2014Language That Would Have Limited The Basis of Apportionment To Voters or Citizens\n1. Competing Approaches Emerged Early In The Thirty-Ninth Congress\n2. The Joint Committee On Reconstruction Proposed A Penalty-Based Approach\n3. The House Approved The Joint Committee's Penalty-Based Approach\n4. The Senate Rejected The Committee Proposal, But Laid The Groundwork For Resolution\n5. The Joint Committee Embraced The Grimes/Broomall Approach, Leading To Ratification By Congress\nII. The Deliberations Of The Thirty-Ninth Congress Confirm That The President Cannot Unilaterally Exclude Illegal Aliens From The Apportionment Basis",
        "reference": "I. Congress Intended The Apportionment Basis To Include All Persons In Each State, Including Undocumented Persons",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief048.pdf",
        "text": "I. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS SHOULD NEVER BE COMPELLED\nII. THIS IS A CAMPAIGN FINANCE CASE CLOAKED IN CHARITY LAW CLOTHING\nA. Tampering with Charity Law Is Dangerous for the Public, Taxpayers, and the Work of Charitable Nonprofits\nB. The Charity System Requires the Public's Trust\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. DETERRENCE PLAYS A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN PREVENTING FRAUD AND ROOTING OUT BAD ACTORS MASQUERADING AS CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS\nA. Dual State and Federal Oversight of Charitable Nonprofits\nB. The Federal Government Has Been Underperforming Its Oversight Duties\nC. Consequently, State Regulators Have Had to Do More to Protect the Public",
        "reference": "C. The Public's Trust in the Charity System Requires Deterrence of Fraud",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Fossil-fuel companies have acted under the direction of federal officers to provide essential military supplies.\nB. Standard Oil operated the Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve \"in the employ\" of the United States Navy.\nC. Companies must act under the direction of federal officers to carry out the federal policy of oil and natural-gas production on the Outer Continental Shelf.\nII. Claims concerning interstate emissions are removable because they arise under federal common law.",
        "reference": "I. The oil and natural-gas industry has a long history of working at the behest of the federal government and \"acting under\" federal officers.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CROW TRIBE'S OFF-RESERVATION HUNTING RIGHT IS CLEARLY RESERVED IN THE FORT LARAMIE TREATIES\nII. THE CROW TRIBE'S OFF-RESERVATION HUNTING RIGHT CONTINUES IN FORCE TODAY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress Has Not Abrogated the Tribe's Off-Reservation Hunting Right\nC. The Tribe's Treaty Right is Entirely Consistent with Wyoming Statehood\nD. The Bighorn National Forest is Unoccupied, and is Subject to the Tribe's Off-Reservation Hunting Right\nIII. TRIBAL OFF-RESERVATION HUNTING RIGHTS ARE NOT IMPLIEDLY ABROGATED AND HAVE CONTINUING VIABILITY\nA. The Tribe and the United States Recognize that the Tribe's Treaty Right Continues in the Bighorn National Forest\nB. State Courts, Except for Wyoming's, Respect the Continuing Applicability of Off-Reservation Treaty Hunting Rights",
        "reference": "A. The Treaty Conditions Continue to this Day",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1150_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. LITIGANTS MAY NOT APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM A JUDGMENT THAT RESOLVES SOME BUT NOT ALL CLAIMS IN A CASE CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES\nA. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims\nB. A Case Consolidated For All Purposes Should Be Treated No Differently Than Other Cases Involving Multiple Claims\nC. A Judgment Resolving Some But Not All Claims In A Case Consolidated For All Purposes Lacks The Hallmarks Of A Final Judgment\nD. Permitting Parties To Appeal Partial Judgments As Of Right Would Undermine The Purposes Of The Final Judgment Rule\nII. THREE SAFETY VALVES ENABLE PARTIES TO OBTAIN DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF PARTIAL JUDGMENTS WHERE APPROPRIATE\nA. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus\nB. There Is No Established Or Workable Means Of Making Exceptions To Petitioner's Rule\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. PETITIONER'S APPEAL IS PREMATURE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate States' immunity from suit\nB. Torres's argument depends on a view of Katz that this Court has rejected\nC. The Army and Navy Clauses did not waive state sovereign immunity\nII. This Is Not a Good Vehicle to Resolve Whether Congress May Abrogate State Immunity Under Its \"War Powers.\"\nA. DPS remains immune under Texas law\nB. Questions remain about whether USERRA unlawfully commandeers state courts and discriminates against States\nIII. There Is No Need for This Court's Intercession",
        "reference": "I. Allen v. Cooper Confirms That USERRA Did Not Validly Abrogate DPS's Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari Should Be Denied because the Fifth Circuit's Characterization of Banister's Postjudgment Motion As a Successive section 2254 Petition Adheres to This Court's Decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby\nA. Section 2244 of the AEDPA was enacted, in part, to restrict petitioners like Banister from relitigating claims the district court has already rejected on the merits\nB. Gonzalez prohibits Banister from disguising his successive habeas petition as a postjudgment motion\nC. There is no remarkable difference between a Rule 59(e) motion and a Rule 60(b) motion in section 2244 analysis\nD. [MISSING]\nE. A minority of circuits have misinterpreted the holding of Gonzalez\nF. A majority of circuits interpret Gonzalez in the manner the Fifth Circuit did below\nII. Certiorari Should Be Denied Because the Decision Below is Fully Consistent with the Court's Holding in Castro v. United States",
        "reference": "D. The Fifth Circuit's determination that Banister's Rule 59(e) motion was successive is jurisdictional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. No conflict exists over the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' reasoning.\nII. The question presented is not important enough to warrant the Court's review.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Estoppel does not apply to Outokumpu's claims, so a decision on the question presented will not be determinative.\nB. GE Energy inadequately presented and belatedly raised its equitable-estoppel arguments in the lower courts.\nIV. The decision below is correct, is based on a plain reading of the Convention, and does not warrant this Court's attention.",
        "reference": "III. This case is a poor vehicle to consider the question presented.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "THE DECISION BELOW UNDERMINES THE NARROW NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE AND BROAD AGENCY DEFERENCE RULES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. By Adding Confusion, Expense, and Unpredictability to the Regulatory Process, Judicial Adventures in Policymaking Undermine the Delegation-Plus-Deference Framework\nC. Courts that Obstruct Valid Agency Action Create a Ground for Expanding the Non-Delegation Doctrine and Narrowing the Agency Deference Rules",
        "reference": "A. The Narrow Non-Delegation Doctrine and Broad Agency Deference Rules are Meant to Help Agencies Regulate a Complex Society",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PRIMA FACIE CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE SHOWING HARM TO BOTH SIDES OF A TWO-SIDED PLATFORM\nA. An \"Overall Harm\" Requirement Is Not Legally Supportable\nB. An \"Overall Harm\" Requirement Is Not Supported by a Danger of \"False Positives\"\nC. Other Considerations Do Not Warrant Raising Plaintiffs' Burden of Production\nII. A RELEVANT MARKET MAY COMPRISE ONE SIDE OF A TWO-SIDED PLATFORM\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Case Law Supports Applying Standard Market-Definition Rules to Two-Sided Platforms\nIII. RAISING THE BURDEN ON PLAINTIFFS TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE WOULD HARM COMPETITION",
        "reference": "A. The Interdependence of Markets Does Not Warrant Abandoning Fundamental Legal and Economic Principles Governing Market Definition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Hague Convention does not require consideration of ameliorative measures\n1. The text of the Hague Convention and ICARA does not require consideration of ameliorative measures\n2. The mandatory consideration of ameliorative measures is inconsistent with the Hague Convention's purposes\n3. The mandatory consideration of ameliorative measures is inconsistent with the Hague Convention's negotiation and drafting history\n4. The mandatory consideration of ameliorative measures is inconsistent with the views of the State Department\n5. [MISSING]\nB. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
        "reference": "5. The practices of other signatories confirm that the Convention does not mandate consideration of ameliorative measures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENTS FAIL TO REFUTE THE EXISTENCE OF A CIRCUIT SPLIT WARRANTING REVIEW\nII. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. RESPONDENTS RAISE NO VEHICLE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD HINDER THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-315_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Statutory Text Establishes That TPS Recipients Are Considered \"Inspected and Admitted\"\nB. The Government's Defense of the Third Circuit's Reasoning Lacks Merit\nC. The Government's Interpretation Is Implausibly Narrow and Atextual, and Ignores Contemporaneous Legislation\nII. The History and Purpose of the TPS Statute Confirm Petitioners' Interpretation\nIII. The Government's Interpretation Is Not Entitled to Deference",
        "reference": "I. TPS Recipients Are Considered \"Inspected and Admitted\" for Purposes of Adjusting Status Under Section 1255",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-196_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE \"STANDING ALONE\" RULE FAILS TO COMPORT WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT.\nII. THE \"STANDING ALONE\" RULE ALLOWS PROSECUTORS TO USE A CONFESSION AS THE SAME \"ACCUSATORY FINGER\" THAT BRUTON AND ITS PROGENY DISALLOW.\nA. The \"Standing Alone\" Rule Is Often Applied.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. An Out-of-Court Accomplice Confession Is An Especially Prejudicial Form Of Hearsay Incrimination.\nIII. THE \"CONTEXT\" RULE ADOPTED IN OTHER CIRCUITS CAN BE APPLIED WITHOUT FEAR OF IMPAIRING THE FAIR AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.",
        "reference": "B. The \"Standing Alone\" Rule Results In Prejudice To Defendants.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1566_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's Reading of Section 1606 Is Insupportable\nII. The Adoption of 28 U.S.C. section 1330 as Part of the FSIA Confirms That State Choice of Law Rules Must Be Applied\nA. The History of Diversity Jurisdiction and Adoption of the FSIA Supports Application of State Choice of Law Rules\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Respondent Disregards Fundamental Principles Underlying Erie, and Ignores Klaxon\nIV. Respondent's Claim That the Rules of Decision Act Applies Only in Diversity Cases Is Insupportable\nV. Respondent's Conjecture About Hypothetical Forum Shopping Is Unfounded\nVI. Respondent Has Failed to Show that Adoption of Federal Common Law Is Necessary to Ensure \"Uniformity\" or to Avoid Conflict with Federal Interests or Foreign Relations\nVII. Respondent's New Constitutional Objections to the Application of California Law Are Not Properly Before the Court",
        "reference": "B. Respondent's Reliance on Federal Question Jurisdiction Is Unavailing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The text of the Anti-Injunction Act does not cover CIC's suit\nA. Under Direct Marketing, the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar preenforcement challenges to tax-reporting requirements\nB. [MISSING]\nC. CIC's suit was not brought for the \"purpose\" of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax\nII. Barring CIC's suit undermines the APA without furthering any goal of the Anti-Injunction Act\nIII. Constitutional avoidance counsels in favor of CIC's interpretation",
        "reference": "B. Preenforcement challenges to tax-reporting requirements are not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, even when one penalty for noncompliance is a tax",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Bucklew Could Have Brought This Claim Sooner\nII. Bucklew Has Not Established Likelihood of Success on the Merits\nA. Bucklew's discovery argument is unpreserved and meritless\nB. Bucklew will not lie fully supine, so a critical factual predicate of his claim fails\nC. Bucklew failed to present evidence concerning how long the \"twilight stage\" might last\nD. The Eighth Circuit correctly determined that the record lacks quantifiable evidence to compare nitrogen-induced hypoxia to lethal injection\nE. Bucklew's claim rests on evidence provided by an expert witness who lacks credibility\nF. Bucklew is likely to lose on procedural grounds\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Reviewing Any of the Questions Presented Would Be Unwarranted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Williamson County Court's Reliance On Monsanto's Nonjudicial \"Process\" Does Not Support A Role For Courts In Ripening Takings Claims\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
        "reference": "II. The Williamson County Court Failed To Adhere To Its Own Distinction Between Final Decision-Making That Ripens A Claim And Remedial Court Proceedings That Resolve A Claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs have been filing PAGA claims in large numbers to avoid the arbitration agreements they signed\nII. These PAGA cases harm individuals and businesses throughout the country\nIII. California's rule barring arbitration waivers for PAGA actions is a transparent attempt to disfavor arbitration\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. This Court should grant review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1042_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "TIME-LOST FELA PAYMENTS ARE COMPENSATION UNDER THE RRTA AND ARE SUBJECT TO RRTA PAYROLL TAXES\nA. Railroad Workers Who Are Injured on the Job May Collect Damages for Lost Wages Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court Below Was Wrong When it Held That FELA Time-Lost Awards Are Not Subject to RRTA Taxes, as Were Other Lower Courts Which Reached the Same Result Using A Different Rationale\nD. Railroad Employees' RRA Benefits are Enhanced By Their Receipt of Pay for Time Lost and Therefore Railroad Retirement Taxes Must Be Paid on Time-Lost Awards",
        "reference": "B. Railroad Employees are Eligible for Railroad Retirement Benefits Which are Funded by Payroll Taxes Levied on Their Compensation Under the RRTA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text, Context, and Structure of Section 1447(d) Limit Appellate Review of Removal Grounds to Those Enumerated in the Exception Clause.\nA. The Exception Clause of Section 1447(d) Authorizes Appellate Review Only to the Extent Remand Was Denied on an Enumerated Removal Ground.\nB. This Case Was Not Removed \"Pursuant to\" Section 1442 or 1443.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Limiting Review Under the Exception Clause to Section 1442 and 1443 Removal Grounds Best Advances the Purposes of Section 1447(d).\nIV. The Court Should Not Reach Petitioners' \"Arising-Under\" Jurisdiction Arguments.\nA. Petitioners Have Not Preserved Their \"Arising-Under\" Jurisdiction Arguments.\nB. Petitioners Mischaracterize Respondent's State-Law Claims and Federal Law.",
        "reference": "II. In 2011, Congress Ratified Five Decades of Unanimous Judicial Authority that Construed the Exception Clause as Authorizing Review Only of Its Enumerated Removal Grounds.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEC MAY NOT SEEK DISGORGEMENT IN FEDERAL COURT BECAUSE CONGRESS HAS NOT AUTHORIZED IT\nA. Congress Authorized the SEC To Seek a Range of Enumerated Remedies, Not Including Disgorgement in Civil Proceedings\nB. Under Kokesh, the Government's Argument That Disgorgement Is a Form of Equitable Relief Fails\n1. Penalties are not available at equity\n2. Kokesh establishes that this disgorgement remedy is a penalty\n3. The SEC's disgorgement remedy is not traditionally available equitable relief\n4. [MISSING]\nC. No Other Statutory Provisions Indicate That Congress Authorized Disgorgement\nII. THE SEC IS WELL EQUIPPED TO REGULATE FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT WITHOUT SEEKING PUNITIVE DISGORGEMENT IN FEDERAL COURT\nA. The SEC Can Seek Disgorgement in Administrative Proceedings\nB. In Federal Court, the SEC May Seek Penalties Equal to the Defendant's \"Pecuniary Gain\"",
        "reference": "4. The SEC's disgorgement remedy is not an injunction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT WAS REQUIRED TO APPLY CURRENT LAW WHEN WEIGHING THE MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING EVIDENCE IN MCKINNEY'S CASE\nA. The Arizona Supreme Court Applied Federal Law To Determine Whether McKinney's Case Is Final\nB. Finality Is A Question Of Federal Law\nC. As A Matter Of Federal Law, The Arizona Supreme Court Reopened Direct Review, Requiring It To Remand McKinney's Case For Resentencing By A Jury\nD. [MISSING]\nII. THE PROPER REMEDY FOR EDDINGS ERROR IS RESENTENCING IN THE TRIAL COURT\nA. The State's Discussion Of Harmless Error Review Is Irrelevant To This Case\nB. The Ninth Circuit Properly Held That Both The State Trial Court And The Arizona Supreme Court Committed Eddings Error\nC. This Court Has Repeatedly Held That The Proper Remedy For Eddings Errors Is Resentencing",
        "reference": "D. The State's Approach To Finality Undermines The Rule Of Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-542_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Receipt of mail-in ballots after Election Day is not only not contrary to federal law, it is often a remedy chosen by federal courts to protect at least one species of absentee ballot",
        "reference": "I. The method of selecting presidential electors chosen by the General Assembly allows for the type of emergency relief which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. SEC ALJs ARE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS BECAUSE OF THEIR DISCRETION AND POWER\nA. ALJs Have Duties and Powers Similar to Other Positions That the Court Has Held to Be Offices\nB. SEC ALJs Fit Legal Precedents and Historical Definitions of Officers\nII. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES' PROTECTION FROM REMOVAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. SEC ALJs Are Not Democratically Accountable, Because Their Removal Involves Two Layers of Protection\nC. Even Officers in Quasi-Judicial Roles Like ALJs Must Be Removable by the President",
        "reference": "A. ALJs Must Be Removable by the President to Ensure Democratic Accountability for Executive Officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-459_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Text Is Unambiguous\nB. Traditional Interpretive Tools Confirm The Statute's Plain Meaning\nII. The BIA's Interpretation Is Unreasonable",
        "reference": "I. \"Notice To Appear Under Section 1229(a)\" Unambiguously Means Notice That Satisfies Section 1229(a)'s Definition Of A \"Notice To Appear\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The CWA's plain language prohibits the County's unpermitted addition of pollutants from disposal wells to the Pacific\nA. The County's \"addition\" of pollutants \"to\" navigable waters comes \"from\" a point source\nB. The Act's terms apply to indirect discharges from point sources that traceably and foreseeably reach navigable waters\nC. The CWA's provisions concerning disposal of pollutants in wells underscore the Act's application to the Lahaina Facility\nD. The statute's background and context support its application to indirect discharges\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The County and EPA propose atextual exceptions to the statute\nB. The County's textual arguments are erroneous\n1. \"Conveyance\"\n2. \"From\"\n3. \"Any point source\"\n4. \"Into\"\nC. The CWA's structure and history do not support the County's and EPA's limiting constructions\n1. Congress did not foreclose regulation of indirect point-source pollution when it declined to regulate nonpoint-source pollution\n2. The CWA does not categorically exclude discharges to navigable waters through groundwater\nIII. CWA regulation of discharges to surface water via groundwater complements groundwater-protection statutes\nIV. Applying the CWA to the County's wells would not transform the Act's scope, but failing to apply it would thwart its objectives and create opportunities for evasion",
        "reference": "II. The CWA's language and structure contradict the County's and EPA's readings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1606_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner Is Entitled To Judicial Review Of The Appeals Council's Decision\nA. The Appeals Council's Rejection Of The Claim On Untimeliness Grounds Is A \"Final Decision\" Within The Meaning Of Section 405(g)\n1. The plain meaning of the term \"final decision\" encompasses rejection of an appeal on untimeliness grounds\n2. The presumption favoring judicial review supports reviewability of the Appeals Council's decision\n3. This Court's decision in Sanders is wholly inapposite\n4. The agency's regulation cannot override the statutory text\n5. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner Has Satisfied The Other Prerequisites For Judicial Review",
        "reference": "5. Practical considerations favor judicial review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's Claims Based On The Alleged Fabrication Of Evidence Are Time-Barred To The Extent They State A Constitutional Violation At All\nA. Even If Claims Of \"Malicious Prosecution\" And \"Fabrication Of Evidence\" Are Cognizable Under section 1983, Those Claims Are Barred In This Case\nB. When Claims Relating To The Indictment Are Properly Characterized Under The Constitution, They Are Barred, To The Extent They Exist At All\n1. Any Claim That Petitioner Was Indicted Without Probable Cause, Which Would Arise Under The Fourth Amendment, Is Barred By Absolute Immunity\n2. [MISSING]\n3. When Claims Relating To The Alleged Use Of Fabricated Evidence At Trial Are Properly Characterized Under The Constitution, They Are Barred, To The Extent They Exist At All\nII. Petitioner's Remaining Arguments Are Erroneous And Should Be Rejected\nA. Heck And Preiser Are Irrelevant\n1. Heck Does Not Apply Here Because Petitioner Was Never Convicted\n2. Petitioner's Newly-Minted Argument Under Preiser Is Foreclosed By Wallace\nB. Petitioner's Claim Is Not Timely Under The Continuing Violation Doctrine\n1. The Continuing Violation Doctrine Does Not Apply To Petitioner's Claim\n2. Even If The Continuing Violation Doctrine Did Apply, Petitioner's Claim Would Still Not Be Timely\na. Even Where The Continuing Violation Doctrine Applies, The Violation Must Extend Within The Limitation Period\nb. Petitioner Cannot Identify Any Violation In Connection With His Indictment Or Trial That Would Give Him A Timely Claim Under The Continuing Violation Doctrine\nC. Policy Considerations Favor Starting The Limitations Period Once The Claimant Learns That Fabricated Evidence Has Been Used To Deprive The Claimant of Liberty",
        "reference": "2. Petitioner's \"Fabrication Of Evidence\" Claim, As It Pertains To The Grand Jury Proceedings, If It Asserts A Constitutional Claim At All, Is A Substantive Due Process Claim Barred By The Statute Of Limitations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Inviolability Provisions of the Vienna Convention Are Critical to Diplomacy and Foreign Relations\nII. The Second Circuit's Decision Misinterprets U.S. Law and Violates the Vienna Convention, Creating a Host of Practical Problems for Foreign States\nA. The Decision Below Stands in Direct Conflict With the Text of the Vienna Convention and 28 U.S.C. section 1608(a)(3)\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Second Circuit's Decision Will Lead To Confusion, Conflict, and Delay",
        "reference": "B. Vienna Convention Signatories, Including The United States, Agree That Inviolability Forbids Service on a State Through an Embassy or Other Mission",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-7622_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "After prosecuting petitioner in a CFR Court, the United States was barred from prosecuting him a second time in an Article III court for an offense subsuming the same elements\nA. The dual-sovereignty doctrine does not apply under these circumstances\n1. The dual-sovereignty doctrine does not apply when successive prosecutions are undertaken by a single sovereign\n2. Petitioner's successive prosecutions were undertaken by a single sovereign\nB. The decision below is indefensible\n1. The decision below finds no support in founding-era common law\n2. Prosecutions in the CFR Courts are federal, regardless of the substantive law applied\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. The decision below does not further the purposes underlying the dual-sovereignty doctrine and leads to troubling results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief039.pdf",
        "text": "A. There Is No Conventional Right to Abortion\ni. The ECHR Never Excluded Unborn Children from the Scope of the European Convention\nii. There is an International Duty to Prevent Abortion\niii. Abortion Cannot be a \"Fundamental Right\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. There are Special Issues Caused by Abortion \"On Demand\" and Late-term Abortion\ni. Abortion Based on an Unborn Child's Gestational Age is Arbitrary and Assigns Worth to a Human Based on Their Stage of Development\nii. Abortion Causes Pain to an Unborn Child\niii. Abortion Advances the Practice of Sex-Selection\niv. Abortion Advances Eugenic Practices",
        "reference": "B. If States Legalize Abortion, They Must Respect Competing Rights and Interests Guaranteed by the ECHR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. PERMISSIVE STANDARDS FOR RETALIATION CLAIMS DRAIN AGENCY, JUDICIAL, AND EMPLOYER RESOURCES\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Section 42121(a) Prohibits Discrimination Because Of Protected Activity, Which Requires Retaliatory Intent\nB. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
        "reference": "II. AN AIR-21 RETALIATION CLAIM REQUIRES PROOF OF RETALIATORY INTENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Correct Statutory Interpretation Must Consider The Legislative Purpose And The \"Sense Of Congress\" Provisions\nII. The Federal Circuit's Ruling Incorrectly Overlooked The Explicit Legislative Purpose Of The America Invents Act A. Abrogating Non-Disclosing Sales and Uses as Prior Art is Consistent with Congress's Stated \"Harmonization\" Goal\n1. Europe\n2. China\n3. Republic of Korea\n4. Japan\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Abrogating Non-Disclosing Sales and Uses as Prior Art is Consistent with Congress's Stated Goal of Achieving Greater Certainty Regarding the Scope of Patent Protection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-897_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. Section 1226 governs detention before the INA authorizes removal; Section 1231 governs detention after\n2. While a withholding claim is pending, the INA does not authorize removal\n3. The government's focus on third-country removal is misplaced\n4. Respondents' construction is consistent with the reinstatement statute's text and placement\n5. Zadvydas does not aid the government\nB. Congress did not craft the INA to routinely yield constitutional violations\nC. The government's reading defies the legitimate purposes of civil detention\nD. No regulation warrants deference",
        "reference": "A. Section 1226 governs detention during withholding-only proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This right to privacy of all associations is protected by strict scrutiny on the government\nIII. A presumption of privacy can be reconciled with the government's compelling needs for information as outlined in other lines of doctrine\nIV. Adopting a more generous reading of Buckley and Socialist Workers '74 would be a mistake",
        "reference": "I. The First Amendment's guarantees for free association protect all organizations, whether or not they are controversial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "Respondent's convictions under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i) are constitutionally valid\nA. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases\nB. The text, context, and history of Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) illustrate that it is a conventional prohibition on soliciting or facilitating illegality\n1. The terms \"encourage\" and \"induce\" in a criminal law refer to facilitation and solicitation\n2. Statutory history and context confirm that Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) targets facilitation and solicitation\n3. [MISSING]\na. The court of appeals disregarded the established meanings of \"encourage\" and \"induce\"\nb. The court of appeals wrongly construed the statute to prohibit abstract advocacy\nc. The court of appeals flouted the canon of constitutional avoidance\nC. Respondent's crime of conviction is not substantially overbroad\n1. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) covers substantial amounts of non-speech conduct and plays an important role in the statutory scheme\n2. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s application to speech involved in facilitating or soliciting unlawful activity presents no First Amendment concerns\n3. The Ninth Circuit's overbreadth analysis was flawed\n4. As-applied challenges, not facial overbreadth claims, are the appropriate way to address any constitutional concerns with the prohibition",
        "reference": "3. The court of appeals' contrary reading of the statute is unsound",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief049.pdf",
        "text": "I. CALIFORNIA FAILS TO REFUTE THE NEED FOR NARROW TAILORING\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Campaign-Finance Precedents Do Not Alter The Analysis\nII. CALIFORNIA FAILS TO DEFEND THE FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ITS DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT\nA. California's Disclosure Demand Is Not Narrowly Tailored\n1. California's Disclosure Demand Is Not \"Limited\"\n2. California Virtually Never Uses Schedule Bs To Investigate Wrongdoing\n3. California Has Narrower Alternatives\nB. California's Disclosure Demand Significantly Burdens First Amendment Rights\n1. California Did Not Rectify Its Pervasive Confidentiality Lapses\n2. California's Disclosure Demand Burdens All Charities\n3. California's Arguments About The IRS And FTB Are Inapposite\nIII. CALIFORNIA CANNOT REFUTE THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF ITS DISCLOSURE DEMAND AS APPLIED TO AFPF",
        "reference": "A. At Any Level Of Heightened Scrutiny, Narrow Tailoring Is Required",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.46
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FORCED AGREEMENT EXACTED BY A STATE'S CORPORATE REGISTRATION STATUTE IS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID CONSENT\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. CONSENT BY REGISTRATION WOULD TURN THE CLOCK BACK TO THE PRE-DAIMLER ERA AND LEAD TO NEGATIVE RESULTS FOR COURTS AND LITIGANTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Reynolds itself reveals why blind deference to the Government is a recipe for disaster.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Ruling that District Courts should attempt to \"disentangle\" privileged information from non-privileged information is a time tested and safe method to balance competing interests.",
        "reference": "II. The growth in state secrets assertions threatens Americans' civil liberties.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. ABUNDANT AND INEXPENSIVE NATURAL GAS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. TO MITIGATE CLIMATE CHANGE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. PIPELINES ARE ESSENTIAL TO ALLOW NATURAL GAS TO REACH MARKETS",
        "reference": "II. THE U.S. ROLE AS A NET EXPORTER OF NATURAL GAS IMPROVES THE PROSPECTS FOR GLOBAL MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO DETERMINE THE ACCRUAL OF PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM WAS PROPER\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. PLAINTIFF'S section 1983 DUE PROCESS CLAIM IS NOT A CONTINUING TORT\nIV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPLIES THE TRADITIONAL ACCRUAL RULE WITH RESPECT TO section 1983 \"BRADY\" CLAIMS\nV. PETITIONER'S section 1983 DUE PROCESS FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM WAS SUBSUMED IN HIS section 1983 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM WHICH WAS DISMISSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT FROM WHICH NO APPEAL WAS TAKEN",
        "reference": "II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ACCRUAL RULE WILL NOT PREJUDICE A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Case Presents An Ideal Vehicle\nIII. Further Percolation Is Unnecessary",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Deepens The Acknowledged Split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "There Is No Circuit Conflict on the Legal Standard for when a Cy Pres Provision Is Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate\nII. This Case Does Not Provide a Proper Vehicle to Consider the Inclusion of Cy Pres Provisions in Settlement Agreements\nA. The Petition Presents a Fact-Bound Question of No Significance Beyond the Settlement of this Litigation\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Settlement Does Not Allow the Court to Address the Concerns Identified by Chief Justice Roberts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act provide a remedy for a foreign defendant's use of a plaintiff's U.S. trademark abroad only if that use is likely to cause confusion in the United States\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This case is a suitable vehicle for clarifying the Lanham Act's geographic scope",
        "reference": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Plain Text Of The Expropriation Exception Provides Jurisdiction Where Property Is Taken In Violation Of The International Law Of Genocide\nB. Petitioners' And The Solicitor General's Policy Arguments Do Not Overcome The Expropriation Exception's Text\nII. Takings From Victims Of A Genocide Are Never \"Domestic Takings\" Because The Victims Of A Genocide Cease To Be Nationals Of The Genocidal State",
        "reference": "I. Property Taken In Violation Of The International Law Of Genocide Is \"Taken In Violation Of International Law\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. An invention is \"on sale\" within the meaning of Section 102(a)(1) only when a sale or offer for sale makes the invention available to the public\nA. The text of Section 102(a)(1) provides that an invention is \"on sale\" only when it is available to the public\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The AIA's legislative history supports the conclusion that a sale or offer for sale must make an invention \"available to the public\" in order to trigger Section 102(a)(1)'s on-sale bar\nII. The agreements at issue in this case did not make the invention \"available to the public\" within the meaning of Section 102(a)(1) and therefore did not trigger the on-sale bar\nA. An invention is \"on sale\" within the meaning of Section 102(a)(1) only when a product embodying the invention can be purchased by its expected ultimate customers\nB. Public disclosure of the existence of the April 2001 agreements did not trigger the Section 102(a)(1) bar\nC. Petitioner's agreements with MGI did not make products embodying the 0.25 mg dose of palonosetron available to the public",
        "reference": "B. Treating the on-sale bar as limited to sales and offers that make an invention \"available to the public\" is consistent with the balance that the patent laws have traditionally struck",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "KANSAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT DEPUTY MEHRER HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO SEIZE GLOVER\nI. [MISSING]\nA. Reasonable Suspicion Must Be Assessed in Light of the Totality of Circumstances\nB. Kansas Did Not Establish That It Is Reasonable to Infer That an Unlicensed Driver Is Driving His Car\nII. The Balance Of Government And Private Interests Does Not Support Kansas's Proposed Bright-Line Rule\nA. The Government's Law-Enforcement Interest in This Category of Seizures Does Not Justify Its Reliance on an Unsupported and Unparticularized Inference\nB. Roving Traffic Stops Impose a Serious Burden on Individuals' Freedom",
        "reference": "I. The Isolated Fact That A Car On The Road Is Owned By An Unlicensed Driver Does Not Establish Reasonable Suspicion That The Driver Is Engaged In Illegal Activity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9276_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Is Wrong That the Right Asserted Is Not the Right Announced in Johnson and Made Retroactive in Welch\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Circuit Conflict Will Not Resolve Itself Without This Court's Intervention, and the Issue is of Extraordinary Importance\nIV. The PROTECT Act is Irrelevant",
        "reference": "II. The Government's Defense of the Panel Majority's Decision is Unpersuasive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Right-To-Control.\" Theory Illustrates the Perils of Overcriminalization\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. This Court Has Not Hesitated To Correct Overcriminalization",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Scope of the Exigent Circumstances Doctrine\nII. The Scope of the Emergency Aid Doctrine\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Non-Bodily Harms Such as Nuisances\nB. Non-Imminent Threats of Bodily Harm\nIV. The Community Caretaking Doctrine Should Not be Extended From Vehicles to Homes",
        "reference": "III. The Scope of a Possible Community Caretaking Doctrine for Warrantless Home Entries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit's interpretation of section 202(h) likely renders it unconstitutional\nA. The Third Circuit's reading of section 202(h) likely violates the First Amendment\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Third Circuit's reading of section 202(h) likely violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection principle",
        "reference": "B. The Third Circuit's reading of section 202(h) likely violates the nondelegation doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-565_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT PLACES THE GREATEST, AND ULTIMATE, LIABILITY ON THE PARTY LEAST CAPABLE OF AVOIDING THE LOSS\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT PLACES THE GREATEST, AND ULTIMATE, LIABILITY ON THE PARTY LEAST CAPABLE OF INSURING AGAINST THE LOSS\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. CONTRACTING AROUND THE THIRD CIRCUIT RULE IS NOT COST FREE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Innovation in Today's Computer Industry Depends on Collaborative Development and Seamless Interoperability\u2014Both of Which Require Reuse of Functional Code\nA. Innovation in the Modern Computer Industry Relies on Collaborative Development\nB. Interoperability Is a Key Component of Technological Innovation Today\nC. Reuse of Functional Software Code, Including APIs, Is Critical To Promoting Collaborative Development and Interoperability\nII. Courts Have Long Applied a Flexible Fair Use Doctrine To Address Software's Unique Nature\nA. Software's Collaborative and Functional Elements Distinguish It from Traditional Creative Works Subject to Copyright Protection\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Experience Has Shown That a Flexible Fair Use Doctrine Fosters Innovation in Computer Software\nIII. The Federal Circuit's Decision Defies Settled Fair-Use Principles and Misapprehends the Collaborative Nature of the Computer Industry\nA. The Federal Circuit's Disregard of the Functional Nature of Oracle's Declaring Code and SSOs in the Fair-Use Analysis Defies Precedent and Industry Reality\nB. The Federal Circuit Fundamentally Misunderstood What Constitutes a \"Transformative Use\" of Software\nIV. The Federal Circuit's Rigid Approach to Fair Use Threatens the Viability of the Interconnected Software Ecosystem",
        "reference": "B. A Flexible Fair Use Doctrine Is Essential To Promoting Collaboration and Interoperability in Modern Software Development\u2014As Courts Have Long Recognized",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners Lack Article III Standing to Assert Their Claims Against Defendant Clarkston\nA. Judges and clerks are not proper parties in actions challenging the constitutionality of a state statute because there is no justiciable case or controversy\nB. Ms. Clarkston does not \"enforce\" the Heartbeat Law\nC. Petitioners further failed to satisfy Article III because they lacked an imminent, non-speculative injury-in-fact\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioners' Suit Against Defendant Clarkston Does Not Fit Within the Ex parte Young Exception to Sovereign Immunity\nA. The Eleventh Amendment does not permit suits against state officials to challenge laws creating private causes of action\nB. The act of docketing or hearing a case brought under S.B. 8 is not an illegal act \"stripping\" Ms. Clarkston of her governmental authority",
        "reference": "D. Petitioners also lack standing to sue Ms. Clarkston because of a lack of causation and redressability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's decisions are erroneous\nA. Courts should not extend protections against indefinite detentions to every detention\nB. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas\nII. This bond-hearing issue is important and recurring\nA. Immigration requires uniformity\nB. A bond-hearing requirement undercuts federal policies\nC. The six-month trigger for a bond hearing is improper during a health pandemic\nIII. These cases present an ideal vehicle for resolving the issue of bond hearings under section 1231\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The issues presented are purely legal",
        "reference": "A. A decision in Guzman Chavez will not moot these cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "Argument\nI. Williamson County was decided correctly\nA. A taking of property for public use is constitutional if the owner may file an inverse condemnation suit to recover just compensation\nB. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution\nII. Williamson County controls this case\nA. This Court's precedent mandates dismissal of petitioner's Section 1983 claim\nB. Petitioner did not plead a simple claim for just compensation in federal court, and she could not have done so\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Congress has declined to grant a federal remedy to property owners whose constitutional rights have not been violated\nB. Claims alleging takings by local governments are best suited for resolution by state courts",
        "reference": "III. This Court should adhere to Williamson County",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SPLIT IS SHALLOW AND TENUOUS\nII. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS UNIMPORTANT GIVEN THE AVAILABILITY OF EQUITABLE TOLLING\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-441_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals' decision is correct\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Executive Cannot Act in a Law Enforcement Capacity, or Engage in Surveillance, Without Congressional Authorization\nII. The Legislature Did Not Authorize the Executive Action Here\nIII. It Is Not the Role of Courts to Supply Authority in the Absence of Legislative Authorization\nA. It is not this Court's role to predict what Congress would want\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Legislative authorization of law enforcement activity \u2014 as in the current case \u2014 requires the sort of nuanced regulation that the courts cannot provide",
        "reference": "B. The executive is successful at getting the attention of Congress on policing and surveillance issues",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Humorous\" Use of Another's Mark to Sell Utilitarian Products Is Subject to the Lanham Act's Likelihood-of-Confusion Standard for Trademark Infringement Claims\nA. The Statutory Elements for Infringement Liability Already Strike an Appropriate Balance with First Amendment Interests\nB. The Rogers Framework Does Not Apply to Commercial Uses of Misleading Marks on Utilitarian Products\n1. Rogers Protects Noncommercial Speech Independently Conveyed by Artistic Works\n2. Trademark Parodies Used to Identify and Promote Utilitarian Products Are Commercial Speech Beyond Rogers' Scope\nII. The \"Humorous\" Use of Another's Mark to Sell Utilitarian Products Does Not Qualify as a \"Noncommercial Use\" under the TDRA\nA. The TDRA's \"Noncommercial\" Use Exclusion Should Be Read Contextually with the TDRA's Separate \"Fair Use\" Exclusion\nB. Trademark Parodies Used to Identify and Promote the Sale of Utilitarian Products Are Not \"Noncommercial\" under the TDRA\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Lanham Act's Liability Standards Establish a Balanced Playing Field for Disputes Involving \"Humorous\" or Parodic uses of Others' Marks to Sell Utilitarian Products",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1672_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's reimprisonment under 18 U.S.C. 3583(k) was constitutionally valid\nA. The jury-trial right does not apply to the revocation of respondent's supervised release and his resulting reimprisonment\nB. Respondent's reimprisonment under Section 3583(k) was indistinguishable from undisputedly constitutional reimprisonment under Section 3583(e)(3)\n1. Reimprisonment under Section 3583(k), like reimprisonment under Section 3583(e), is authorized by the jury's verdict\n2. Section 3583(k) is not an \"enhancement\" of Section 3583(e)\nC. Section 3583(k) did not punish respondent for a new criminal offense\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Respondent's speculation about hypothetical excessive reimprisonment does not support facial invalidation of Section 3583(k)'s revocation provisions\nII. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
        "reference": "1. Respondent's reimprisonment under Section 3583(k) was tied to his original crime",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-587_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ADEA's Text, Context, And Statutory History Establish That section 630(b)'s 20-Employee Minimum Exempts Small Political Subdivisions\nA. Section 630(b)'s first sentence defines \"employer\" expansively to include political subdivisions, but only those with at least 20 employees\nB. The second sentence clarifies what is included in the first sentence's definition, without adding new categories of employers\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Applying The ADEA's Employee Minimum To Political Subdivisions Best Harmonizes The ADEA With Congress's Purpose And Other Antidiscrimination Statutes\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Rule Threatens The Survival Of Small Political Subdivisions",
        "reference": "C. Two interpretive principles resolve any ambiguity in favor of applying the minimum-employee requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals erred in upholding a local grand jury subpoena for a President's personal records without requiring, at a minimum, a heightened showing of need\n1. Article II and the Supremacy Clause protect the Presidency from interference by the States\n2. A state grand jury subpoena for the President's personal records raises serious concerns of interference with the Presidency\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The court of appeals' reasons for rejecting a heightened standard are flawed\n5. The District Attorney has not established that he has satisfied the applicable constitutional standard\nB. The court of appeals' decision warrants this Court's review",
        "reference": "3. A state grand jury subpoena for the President's personal records must, at a minimum, satisfy a heightened standard of need",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Clean Power Plan's costs, which Petitioners wildly overstate, are not a workable criterion for Application of the Major Questions Doctrine\nB. Petitioners' focus on legislative failures under the Major Questions Doctrine disregards this Court's clear precedent and does not meaningfully differentiate the Clean Power Plan\nC. Public salience is a problematic consideration under the Major Questions Doctrine, as evidenced by Petitioners' various unworkable indicators\nII. EPA's past reliance on flexible compliance mechanisms, including generation shifting, under administrations of both parties, belies Petitioners' claims that the Clean Power Plan's novelty triggers the Major Questions Doctrine\nA. EPA has previously set the stringency of Section 111(d) standards based on the use of generation shifting and emissions trading\nB. EPA has previously set the stringency of standards under other Clean Air Act provisions based on generation shifting and emissions trading\nIII. Section 111(d) is not an afterthought, as Petitioners claim in their Major Questions analysis, but a key component of the Clean Air Act's comprehensive approach to regulating pollution",
        "reference": "I. The Factors that Petitioners Deem Indicative of a Major Question Are Unworkable and Fail to Distinguish the Clean Power Plan from Many Other Regulations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-290_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO WARN CLAIM IS PREEMPTED BECAUSE FEDERAL LAW PROHIBITED MERCK FROM PROVIDING A STRONGER WARNING\nA. [MISSING]\nB. None of Levine's Case-Specific Barriers to Preemption Apply Here\nII. NO PRESUMPTION AGAINST PRE-EMPTION APPLIES HERE",
        "reference": "A. The Third Circuit's Holding Flouts This Court's Preemption Case Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. CERTIORARI IS NOT WARRANTED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE NINTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED SETTLED PLEADINGS LAW\nA. Respondents Do Not Rely On Conclusory Allegations\nB. Respondents Alleged That Comcast Provided Preferential Treatment To Similarly Situated, White-Owned Channels\n1. Respondents' Allegations Are Sufficient Under Swierkiewicz\n2. There Is No Inter-Circuit Conflict On Pleading Similarly Situated Persons\nII. THE DECISION BELOW ON THE CAUSATION STANDARD FOR SECTION 1981 DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF THIS COURT OR ANY CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Gross Involved Age Discrimination Under The ADEA\n2. Nassar Involved Retaliation Under Title VII\n3. The Statutes Involved In Gross And Nassar Defined Discrimination Using Different Language Than Section 1981\n4. Comcast Fails To Identify An Error In The Ninth Circuit's Decision In Charter\na. The Ninth Circuit In Charter Applied The Analytical Approach Used By The Court In Gross And Nassar\nb. Comcast's Arguments Regarding The Civil Rights Act Of 1991 Have Already Been Rejected By This Court\nc. The Ninth Circuit Properly Interpreted Section 1981 To Permit Mixed-Motive Claims\nB. The Decision Below Does Not Conflict With Any Court Of Appeals Decision\n1. Comcast Concedes That The Decision Below Does Not Conflict With The Sixth Or Eighth Circuits\n2. Comcast Has Not Identified A Conflict With The Third, Seventh, Or Eleventh Circuits Either\n3. The Court Should Wait For An Actual Conflict To Develop Before Granting Certiorari\nC. This Case Is The Wrong Vehicle To Address The Causation Standards Under Section 1981 Because Respondents Allege But-For Causation",
        "reference": "A. The Decision Below Does Not Conflict With This Court's Decisions In Gross Or Nassar",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.63
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RULING OF THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT BELOW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED\nA. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution bars from federal and state office persons, like President Trump, who swore an oath to support the Constitution and later violated it by insurrection against the country.\n1. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is self-executing, as shown by its plain words and meaning\n2. In Case of Davis Chief Justice Chase of this Court, riding circuit in Virginia, ruled that Section 3 of Article 14 is self-executing, consistent with its plain meaning, in a split decision appealed to this Court then later mooted\n3. [MISSING]\n4. This Court has held that Article 14 is self-executing\nB. From the time of the Civil War until now States have enforced Section Three under their own laws so allowing\nC. Arguments that President Trump in Colorado received, and others later will receive, inadequate due process fail\nD. The Colorado Supreme Court correctly found that President Trump was an officer of the United States\nE. The Colorado Supreme Court correctly found that President Trump engaged in insurrection against the United States\nF. Jurisprudence from this Court shows clearly, by direct analogy, that President Trump's Brandenburg defense fails",
        "reference": "3. Chief Judge Chase's later ruling in Griffin's Case that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not self-executing, and can be enforced only by Congress, was erroneous. This ruling did not respect the plain words of Section 3 of Article XIV, nor cite, let alone distinguish, his earlier ruling to the contrary in Case of Davis, and evidenced improper judicial activism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The NCAA player-eligibility rules should have been found lawful on a \"quick look.\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The NCAA player-eligibility rules challenged here should have been upheld on a \"quick look.\"\n1. Joint action is necessary if the college-sports product is to be available\n2. This Court concluded in Board of Regents that the player-eligibility rules are valid\n3. Experience with NCAA player-eligibility rules confirms that they are procompetitive\n4. The player-eligibility rules are legitimate, core elements of the NCAA's product\nII. Alternatively, the NCAA rules survive full Rule of Reason review\nA. The Ninth Circuit improperly required the NCAA to prove the absence of a less restrictive alternative at Step 2 of the Rule of Reason inquiry\nB. The Ninth Circuit improperly used a \"least restrictive alternative\" test at Step 3\n1. The Ninth Circuit effectively placed the burden of proof on defendants at Step 3.\n2. The Rule of Reason does not require use of the least restrictive alternative\n3. Joint ventures are entitled to draw reasonable lines in defining their products\n4. Defendants prevail in this case under a proper application of the Rule of Reason\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's approach undermines the policies of the antitrust laws",
        "reference": "A. Antitrust policy can be furthered by resolution of Sherman Act claims on a \"quick look.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The courts play an important role in assessing government claims of secrecy.\nII. In many instances, the government has made wrongful assertions to support withholding of information.\nA. The government has asserted the state secrets privilege over information that was not a state secret.\nB. The government has made non-meritorious claims to secrecy in other contexts.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The decision below correctly recognized that the government's privilege claim must be critically examined and that non-privileged information must be disentangled and disclosed wherever feasible.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Text of the FAA Clearly States that it Applies to all Arbitration Agreements Unless Expressly Exempted by the FAA or other Federal Law\n1. Contrary to Iskanian, the FAA makes no distinction between the arbitration of ordinary commercial disputes and disputes between the government and private individuals\n2. The legislative history of the FAA does not alter the meaning of its textual language\nB. The Purpose of the FAA is to Enforce Bilateral Arbitration Contracts According to their Terms, and Representative PAGA Claims Violate that Objective\n1. Iskanian's public policy exception to bilateral arbitration for representative PAGA claims violates the FAA\n2. Iskanian's distinction between pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements makes no sense\n3. Vindication of an important state statutory right cannot obviate bilateral contractual arbitration\nC. The PAGA is Not a Qui Tam Action",
        "reference": "I. THE FAA'S MANDATE THAT INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS BE ENFORCED ACCORDING TO THEIR TERMS PREEMPTS CALIFORNIA'S ISKANIAN RULE THAT BARS ENFORCEMENT OF SUCH AGREEMENTS WHEN PROSECUTED UNDER THE STATE'S PAGA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decision below is incorrect\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The decision below warrants review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Right to Bear Arms Protected by the Second Amendment Is a Codification of the Natural Right of Self-Defense.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Infringement of a Textually Explicit Fundamental Right Should Be Reviewed Under Strict Scrutiny.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-935_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ALL AGREE THAT THE SIXTH CIRCUIT APPLIED THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD\nA. Taglieri Endorses A New Standard That His Own Foreign Authorities Do Not Apply To Infants\nB. [MISSING]\nII. APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD REVIEW HABITUAL-RESIDENCE DETERMINATIONS DE NOVO\nIII. A.M.T. WAS NOT HABITUALLY RESIDENT IN ITALY UNDER ANY HABITUAL-RESIDENCE STANDARD",
        "reference": "B. A Shared-Parental-Intent Standard Requiring Actual Agreement Is Most Consistent With The Text And Purpose Of The Hague Convention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. U.S. COURTS ARE BOUND TO DEFER TO A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN'S REASONABLE EXPLANATION OF ITS OWN LAW\nA. Pink Held That A Foreign Sovereign's Explanation Of Its Own Law Is Conclusive . 8\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Neither Rule 44.1 Nor Domestic Deference Doctrines Are Relevant Here\nD. The Solicitor General's Position Is Hopelessly Indeterminate\nII. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DEFERRED TO THE MINISTRY'S REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF CHINESE LAW\nA. The Second Circuit Properly Determined That The Ministry's Explanation Of Chinese Law Was Reasonable\nB. The Ministry's Authority To Interpret Its Own Rules Is Beyond Dispute",
        "reference": "B. Deference Serves The Interests of Accuracy and International Comity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Is Correct.\nA. Injury To The California Judgment Is A Domestic Injury.\nB. [MISSING]\nII. This Case Is An Exceptionally Poor Vehicle For Addressing The Question Presented.\nIII. Further Percolation In The Circuit Courts Is Warranted In Light Of The Developing Case Law.",
        "reference": "B. The Armada Residency Test That Petitioners Advocate For Is Not Supported By RICO Or RJR Nabisco.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Is Egregiously Wrong\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions From Other Courts\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle To Resolve These Exceptionally Important Questions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
        "reference": "I. This Court should decide whether the expropriation exception provides jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns alleged to have expropriated property from their own nationals in violation of international human rights law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-742_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest\nB. Respondents Attempt to Manufacture Factual Disputes Where There Are None\nII. Denial of Qualified Immunity Here Will Not Hinder Law Enforcement",
        "reference": "I. The Tenth Circuit's Misapprehension of Qualified Immunity under Hope v. Pelzer Warrants This Court's Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22o65_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The River Master did not clearly err in calculating New Mexico's delivery credit for evaporation losses\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The River Master appropriately entertained New Mexico's request for delivery credit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The President's Statements That Muslims Are A \"Problem\" And His Spreading Of Vilifying Propaganda\n1. Advocating That Muslims Are A \"Problem.\"\n2. Spreading Anti-Muslim Propaganda\nB. The President's Express Desire To Close Down And Surveil Mosques, Profile Muslims, And Create A Muslim Registry\n1. Closing And Surveilling Mosques\n2. Registering American Muslims\n3. Profiling Muslims\nC. The President's Specific Pledge To Restrict The Entry of Muslims Under the Guise of A Neutral Order\nD. The President Has Reaffirmed His Discriminatory Motive Since Being Elected And On In The Lead Up To This Proclamation\nII. The Government Would Have This Court Repeat Its Most Shameful Moments",
        "reference": "I. The President's Express Hatred, Dissemination Of Propaganda, And Pledges To Use His Official Power Against Muslims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Decision Below Does Not Conflict With The Decision Of Any Other Circuit\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Case Is An Unsuitable Vehicle For Certiorari",
        "reference": "B. The Petition Does Not Present An Important And Recurring Question",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Introduction\nII. Adjudicators of Public Franchise Rights\nIII. APJs Have More Power Than Article III Judges\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. APJ Qualifications Are Suspect\nVI. APJs Are Biased in Favor of Invalidation",
        "reference": "IV. APJs Compared to Magistrate Judges",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The government doesn't have a compelling interest in forcing some ministries to comply with the Mandate when other ministries, essentially identical, are excused\nA. Using Section 6033(a) to identify ministries who hold deep religious convictions and hire like-minded employees is seriously underinclusive and irrational\n1. In the context of the Mandate, Section 6033(a) irrationally discriminates against the separately incorporated ministries of Catholic dioceses\na. The exemption irrationally discriminates among Catholic schools\nb. The exemption irrationally discriminates among Catholic social service ministries\n2. [MISSING]\na. Westminster Theological Seminary is independent from church control as a matter of principle\nb. The calling of Reaching Souls International is to work alongside, not within, evangelical churches\n3. The exemption irrationally discriminates against ministries that raise their own financial support\n4. The exemption irrationally discriminates against ministries whose activities are not \"exclusively religious.\"\nB. This arbitrary religious classification system belies any claim to a compelling interest in forcing the Mandate on nonexempt ministries\nII. Denying an exemption to religious ministries cannot survive strict scrutiny both because the Mandate deprives tens of millions of the right to CASC coverage through their employers and because the government has other policy tools at its disposal\nA. The ACA's secular exemptions leave tens of millions outside the Mandate\nB. Given the secular exemptions to the Mandate and other policy tools available to the government, refusing to exempt religious ministries cannot survive strict scrutiny\n1. The Mandate's secular exemptions leave \"appreciable damage to [the government's] supposedly vital interests.\"\n2. The government can advance its interests in other ways, as it's now doing by expanding access to CASC services through Title X",
        "reference": "2. The Section 6033(a) exemption irrationally discriminates against evangelical ministries whose independence from church control is key to their religious mission",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1650_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Courts Must Consider Current Law and Facts in Section 404 Proceedings\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A Mandatory Rule Fosters Coherent Results\nC. Background Principles of Sentencing Law Require Consideration of Current Circumstances\nD. The Rule of Lenity Applies\nII. Vacatur Is Required",
        "reference": "A. Section 404's Text Requires Consideration of Current Law and Facts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The possibility that Plaintiffs may prevail on summary judgment is irrelevant to FISA's construction.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. CIPA distinguishes between merits and procedural determinations.\nB. The proffered lower court decisions lend Plaintiffs no support.\nIII. FISA's \"savings clause\" does not authorize courts to rewrite the statute.\nIV. Amici's suggestion that the Seventh Amendment should \"yield\" only underscores the need for constitutional avoidance.",
        "reference": "II. Plaintiffs' analogous authorities support the government's interpretation of FISA.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. True threats are, and have been, unprotected by the First Amendment because they inflict substantial harms on those threatened regardless of the intent of the person making the threat\nA. Regardless of the mental state of the person making the threat, threats harm their victims by causing them to fear for their physical safety, disrupting their lives, and silencing their speech\nB. Threats have traditionally been punished regardless of the mental state of the person making the threat\nC. A context-driven objective standard is consistent with this Court's true threats decisions\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Fighting words\nB. False or misleading commercial speech\nC. Defamation\nD. Obscenity\nE. Incitement, unlike true threats, does not cause harm by its mere utterance\nIII. A context-driven objective standard protects victims from the harms of true threats without chilling valuable speech or unfairly punishing the unwary\nA. A context-driven objective inquiry protects political hyperbole, art, and other valuable expression\nB. A context-driven objective inquiry protects speech that is merely \"poorly chosen words\"\nC. State criminal law doctrines afford additional protection to those with mental health conditions who make threats subject to criminal prosecution\nD. A context-driven objective test requires attention to a range of factors that protect unwary speakers along with innocent listeners\nE. Standards that require proof of the mental state of the person making the threat do not adequately protect the targets of threats from fear for their physical safety and the disruption caused by such fear\nIV. Counterman's conviction satisfies a context-driven objective test",
        "reference": "II. A context-driven objective standard adheres to this Court's approach when excluding other speech categories from the First Amendment's protections",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.41
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-292_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The common law of arrest defines the limits of seizure of the person in the Fourth Amendment.\nB. A common-law arrest required only physical touch with intent to restrain, not physical control.\nII. Respondents Identify No Reason To Ignore The Fourth Amendment's Original Meaning.\nA. This Court's precedents support the common-law rule.\nB. Policy concerns do not foreclose the common-law rule.",
        "reference": "I. The Original Meaning Of \"Seizure\" In The Fourth Amendment Does Not Require Submission To Physical Force.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PROCLAMATION IS NOT A \"MUSLIM BAN\"; THUS, THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR RESPONDENTS' ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIM\nII. THE PROCLAMATION IS AKIN TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ISSUED DURING THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS\nIII. PRIOR TO THE MULTI-AGENCY REVIEW AND PROCLAMATION, NUMEROUS SOURCES CONFIRMED THE WEAKNESSES IN U.S. VETTING, INCLUDING UNAVAILABILITY OF NEEDED INFORMATION\nIV. VULNERABLE U.S. GROUPS ARE AT PARTICULAR RISK FROM MIGRANTS\nV. THE PROCLAMATION IS NOT ANALOGOUS TO ERRONEOUS WWII REFUGEE POLICIES\nVI. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "VI. THE PROCLAMATION'S PURPOSE \u2014PROTECTING AMERICAN CITIZENS \u2014IS A FUNDAMENTAL DUTY AND VALUE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. REJECTION DOES NOT TERMINATE CONTRACTS OR REVOKE PROPERTY INTERESTS CONVEYED PRE-BANKRUPTCY\nA. Rejection Is A Breach, Not An Avoidance Power\nB. Section 365(n) And Similar Provisions Do Not Suggest That Rejection Terminates Contracts Or Avoids Interests In Property\nC. Bankruptcy Policy Does Not Support Terminology\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Rejection Did Not Terminate Mission's Trademark Rights\nB. Rejection Did Not Terminate Mission's Exclusivity Rights\nIII. THIS CASE IS NOT MOOT",
        "reference": "II. REJECTION OF THE AGREEMENT DID NOT TERMINATE MISSION'S RIGHTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Reflecting the distinct roles of prescribers and pharmacists, section 1306.04 imposes liability only on pharmacists who \"knowingly\" fill an illegitimate prescription\nB. The Court should not resolve these cases in a way that undermines the knowledge requirement for pharmacist liability\nII. Acting outside \"the usual course of professional practice\" means completely abandoning professional obligations, not merely failing to adhere to a professional standard\nA. The Court should confirm Moore's determination of what constitutes acting outside the usual course of professional practice\nB. The Court should reject any interpretation of \"usual course of professional practice\" that would expose pharmacists to liability under 21 C.F.R. section 1306.06 for minor infractions or mere non-compliance with professional standards\nIII. The Court can adopt standards that allow for punishment of wrongdoers while allowing pharmacists to practice their profession free from the unwarranted threat of liability",
        "reference": "I. In interpreting section 1306.04(a) to determine the scope of prescriber liability, the Court should in no way undermine the knowledge requirement that protects pharmacists from unwarranted liability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT SHOULD ADDRESS PERVASIVE CONFUSION OVER THE \"TRUE THREATS\" EXCEPTION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT\nA. The law governing the \"true threats\" exception is in disarray, threatening liberty\nB. This is the right vehicle for clarifying the \"true threats\" exception\nII. THE COURT SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE \"TRUE THREATS\" EXCEPTION IS NARROW\nA. The \"true threats\" exception is narrow\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Requiring both objective and subjective analyses will keep the \"true threats\" exception narrow and safeguard liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The unlicensed facility disclosure is constitutional\nA. The disclosure enables women to secure the services they deem appropriate\nB. The disclosure facially satisfies Zauderer or any other standard of review\nII. The licensed facility disclosure is constitutional\nA. The disclosure provides vital factual information to a specific population at a critical point\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The disclosure requirement is consistent with this Court's compelled-speech precedents\n1. The Act does not require a statement or endorsement of belief\n2. The delivery of governmental notices in healthcare does not hamper clinics' ability to present their own messages\n3. Reed does not change the analysis\nD. The Act does not discriminate based on viewpoint\nE. The district court properly denied preliminary injunctive relief under any level of scrutiny",
        "reference": "B. The FACT Act's limited, neutral disclosure requirement is permissible in its professional context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The State's Bulk Collection of Charitable Donor Information Threatens the Right to Make Anonymous Charitable Donations Pursuant to the Dictates of Faith\nB. The State's Bulk Collection of Charitable Donor Information Deters Anonymous Giving for Secular Personal Reasons\nC. The State's Bulk Collection of Charitable Donor Information Puts Donors to Unpopular Social and Political Causes at Risk\nII. The State Has No Compelling Interest in the Bulk Collection of Donor Information, Particularly Given the Serious Risks of Public Disclosure\nIII. California Has Ample Tools for Ensuring Compliance with State Law Without Any Need for the Bulk Collection of Donor Information",
        "reference": "I. The Ability to Make Anonymous Donations is an Important Vehicle for Encouraging Broad-based Civic Participation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Nominal Damages Are Essential to Preserving Priceless Freedoms\nA. Nominal Damages Vindicate First Amendment Violations\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Circumvents this Court's Framework, Leaving Constitutional Claims in No Man's Land\nII. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision Further Disincentivizes Proactive Protection of Free Expression\nA. Universities Do Not Have a Special Dispensation from the Government's Burden to Justify and Tailor Infringement of Constitutional Rights\nB. Schools Are Normalizing Prior Restraints\nIII. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision Exacerbates the Problems Created by Qualified Immunity",
        "reference": "B. A Party May be a \"Prevailing Party\" Under Section 1988 by Securing Nominal Damages",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S KACHALSKY DECISION WAS BASED ON A FLAWED UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND THIS COURT'S HELLER AND MCDONALD DECISIONS\nA. Confusion about Heller\nB. Disagreement with Heller\nC. Reliance on Lawrence v. Texas and Griswold v. Connecticut\nD. [MISSING]\nII. NEW YORK STATE'S LICENSING SCHEME UNDERMINES RATHER THAN PROTECTS OUR FREE STATE\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S USE OF INTEREST BALANCING VIOLATES BOTH HELLER AND MCDONALD\nA. Heller Did Address Use of Standards of Review\nB. Judges May Not Balance a Right that \"Is the Very Product of an Interest Balancing by the People\"\nIV. PRE-EXISTING RIGHTS ARE GOD-GIVEN RIGHTS\nV. A DECISION STRIKING DOWN NEW YORK'S \"PROPER CAUSE\" STANDARD ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL BE MANIPULATED BY THE LOWER COURTS TO LIMIT GUN RIGHTS IN SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION",
        "reference": "D. The Lower Court Erroneously Relied on the \"Longstanding\" Status of the Sullivan Law to Establish Its Constitutionality",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no relevant split between courts\nA. There is no true conflict between the Eighth Circuit's decision and other state and federal courts\nB. There is no relevant conflict between the Eighth and Sixth Circuits\nC. Even if there is a split between Tyler and Hall, the split warrants percolation\nII. Petitioner's first Question Presented was not actually decided by the Eighth Circuit\nIII. This case raises no \"pressing national problem\"\nIV. The Court of Appeals correctly held that Petitioner had no state law right to surplus equity\nA. After Petitioner failed to protect her property interest for five years, and \"absolute title\" forfeited to the state, Petitioner had no remaining property interest to take\nB. Nelson rejected a nearly identical takings claim\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Forfeiture of land is a longstanding practice in the United States\n2. Petitioner mischaracterizes this Court's precedent to manufacture a federal property law\nV. The Eighth Circuit properly rejected the Excessive Fines claim",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner is wrong to assert that a general, federal common law property right to surplus equity exists",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Assertions of the State Secrets Privilege Require Careful Judicial Scrutiny and Review\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. International Experience Demonstrates That Transparency and Accountability Are Critical for Ensuring Open and Secure Societies",
        "reference": "II. Resisting Public Disclosure of Abuses Committed by National Security Agencies Erodes Democratic Systems and Does Not Promote Public Safety",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1164_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Quiet Title Act Does Not Clearly State That Its Statute of Limitations Is Jurisdictional\nA. The Quiet Title Act Uses Only Mundane Statute-of-Limitations Language\nB. Congress Indicated That the Quiet Title Act's Statute of Limitations Is Nonjurisdictional By Codifying It in a Separate Section from the Grant of Jurisdiction\nC. The Legislative and Statutory History Shows That Both Congress and the Department of Justice Understood That the Statute of Limitations Would Be a Nonjurisdictional Affirmative Defense\nII. The Court Has Never Held That the Quiet Title Act's Statute of Limitations Is Jurisdictional\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court Has Never Provided a Definitive Earlier Interpretation About Whether the Quiet Title Act's Statute of Limitations Is Jurisdictional\n1. Block v. North Dakota held that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations applied to States, but it did not hold that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is jurisdictional\n2. United States v. Mottaz held that the Quiet Title Act is the exclusive means for challenging the federal government's interest in property but did not determine whether the statute of limitations is jurisdictional\n3. United States v. Beggerly supports the position that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional",
        "reference": "A. The Court Has Credited Statements That a Prescription Is \"Jurisdictional\" Only When That Prescription Was the Subject of a Definitive Earlier Interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The challenged law functions as a limit on personal gifts aggregating over $250,000, not as a limit on candidate campaign spending\nB. The district court's standing analysis relied on a material error\nII. Limiting Post-Election Payments that Personally Enrich Candidates Serves Demonstrated Anti-Corruption Interests that the District Court Failed to Credit\nA. The interests advanced by the challenged law are neither novel nor implausible\nB. The FEC provided ample evidence to substantiate the anti-corruption objective of the loan-repayment limit\nC. The district court failed to pay deference to Congress in an area of unique legislative expertise",
        "reference": "I. The Lower Court Misconstrued and Overstated the First Amendment Burdens Presented by the Loan-Repayment Limit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "The Court Should Reaffirm Illinois Brick's Across-The-Board Prohibition On Pass-Through Damages\nA. A Wide Variety Of Distribution Models Are \u2014 And Will Be \u2014 Used To Make Software Available To Ultimate Users\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Illinois Brick Precludes All Claims Based On Pass-Through Damages, Regardless Of The Particular Distribution Model",
        "reference": "B. Restricting The Illinois Brick Rule Could Disrupt These Distribution Models And Deprive Businesses And Consumers Of Access To New Technological Tools",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Websites Are the Expressive Doorways of the Modern World.\nII. Custom Website and Graphic Design Is an Artistic and Expressive Activity.\nA. A \"custom\" product is materially different than a \"mass-produced\" product.\nB. What is graphic design?\nIII. An Overview of the Design Process.\nA. From conception to finished design.\nB. Transforming non-custom webpages into custom works of art.\nIV. Custom Websites and Graphics Are Expressive Works That Enjoy First Amendment Protection.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Digital expressions are constitutionally protected.\nC. Custom website and graphic design are expressive conduct of the designer.\nD. Copyright Law supports the view that website and graphic design constitute artistic expression entitled to First Amendment protection.",
        "reference": "A. The Constitution protects expression with or without words.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.42
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1484_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Decision Below Conflicts with the Court's Retention of Exclusive Jurisdiction to Determine Rights to the Mainstream\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Matter Cannot Proceed If the District Court Lacks Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Will Cause Both Immediate and Long-Term Harm to the Management of the Colorado River",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE TOWNSHIP FAILS TO NEGATE THE CONFLICT AMONG THE COURTS ON WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S APPLICATION TO FACIAL TAKINGS CLAIMS",
        "reference": "I. THE TOWNSHIP FAILS TO REFUTE THE SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR RECONSIDERING WILLIAMSON COUNTY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE COURT SHOULD AVOID A PER SE RULE BECAUSE DRAWING THE BLURRY LINE BETWEEN GENERIC AND DESCRIPTIVE MARKS RESULTS IN SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES\na. Correctly identifying generic terms is important to brand owners and the public alike\nb. It is notoriously difficult to distinguish between generic terms and descriptive marks\nc. The rapid evolution of domain names further counsels against per se rules not tied to the facts of a case\n2. ALL ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING RELIABLE SURVEY EVIDENCE, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO DETERMINE WHETHER A TERM IS GENERIC\na. Properly conducted Teflon surveys are highly relevant and should always be considered to determine whether a term is generic\nb. The primary significance standard is applicable to all marks, not just coined terms.\nc. Cases that have excluded Teflon surveys have not applied the primary significance test\nd. [MISSING]\ne. When Congress codified the primary significance test in 1984, it intended that survey evidence would be admissible to determine the primary significance of any marks challenged as generic\nf. This Court has never held that evidence of consumer perception cannot be considered to evaluate a claim of genericness\n3. GOODYEAR IS INAPPOSITE, AS .COM IS NOT ANALOGOUS TO \"COMPANY\"\na. Goodyear is obsolete\nb. Modern case law regarding phone numbers and geographic terms provides a better legal framework than Goodyear, without a per se rule",
        "reference": "d. Rejecting evidence of consumer understanding because the subject term is generic wrongly assumes the disputed conclusion that the mark is generic",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Despite Coinbase's Suggestions to the Contrary, District Courts Clearly Retain Jurisdiction When Arbitrability Appeals Are Filed\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Griggs Is Not a Jurisdictional Rule\nII. Section 16(a) Does Not Deprive Courts of the Discretion to Determine Whether a Stay Is Appropriate",
        "reference": "A. Section 16(a) Is Not a Jurisdictional Provision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1259_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. \"Transient immaturity\" is not an inquiry distinct from consideration of a juvenile offender's youth and attendant characteristics under Miller\n1. Miller requires a sentencer to consider a juvenile offender's youth and attendant characteristics, which the trial court did in this case\n2. The Eighth Amendment does not require a distinct finding on \"transient immaturity\"\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Eighth Amendment permits States to treat \"transient immaturity\" as a mitigating circumstance for the juvenile offender to prove\n2. The trial court found that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence of \"transient immaturity\" in this case",
        "reference": "B. Even if a distinct factual finding were required, the Eighth Amendment does not require States to affirmatively prove \"permanent incorrigibility\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1432_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) does not apply to orders resolving CAT claims\n1. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) limits judicial review of a \"final order of removal.\"\n2. [MISSING]\n3. This construction is consistent with the framework for judicial review of CAT orders\nB. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review\nC. Judicial review is consistent with the INA's purposes",
        "reference": "2. An order resolving a CAT claim is not a \"final order of removal.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Viability Rule Should Be Discarded\nA. The Viability Rule Does Not Comport with Other Areas of the Law Addressing the Rights of Unborn Children\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Tort Law\n3. Property, Guardianship, Family, and Healthcare Law\n4. Conclusion\nB. Taken To Its Logical Conclusion, the Viability Rule Could Permit Families to Kill Children Who Have Already Been Born\nII. This Court Should Take the Opportunity to Overrule Roe and Its Progeny.\nA. If the Court Revisits the Viability Standard, Then It Cannot Escape the Question of Whether the Constitution Protects a Right to Abortion at All\nB. Roe and Its Progeny Are Unconstitutional.\n1. Roe Does Not Comport with Either the Text or Original Meaning of the Constitution\n2. Roe Does Not Comport with This Court's Traditional Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence Under Washington v. Glucksberg\n3. Dred Scott, Lochner, and Roe: the Substantive Due Process \"Hall of Shame\"\n4. Conclusion: The Due Process Clause Does Not Protect the Right to an Abortion\nB. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Does Not Bar This Court from Overruling Roe and Casey\nC. The Court Should Not Only Overrule Roe but Also Hold That the Constitution Protects the Child's Right to Life",
        "reference": "1. Criminal Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-287_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no conflict of authority.\nII. The decision below was correct.\nIII. Johnson's complaint is a procedurally and factually infirm vehicle for review.\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Summary reversal is not warranted because Bucklew did not create a new rule.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Permitting section 1608(a)(3) Service \"Through,\" \"Via,\" Or \"Care Of\" A Diplomatic Mission Conflicts With The Vienna Convention, In Violation Of U.S. Law\nIII. The FSIA's Legislative History Confirms That Congress Intended For section 1608(a)(3) To Comport With The Vienna Convention And To Preclude Mailing Process To A Diplomatic Mission\nIV. Foreign-Relations And Reciprocity Interests Of The United States Would Be Undermined If Mailing Process To A Diplomatic Mission Were Permitted Under section 1608(a)(3)",
        "reference": "I. The Text Of section 1608(a)(3) Is Naturally Read To Require That Process Be Mailed To The Head Of The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs In The Foreign State",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-442_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Reed's Suit Is Untimely\nA. Reed has abandoned his facial claim, leaving only his \"authoritative construction\" claim\nB. Reed's authoritative-construction claim accrued before the CCA denied rehearing\n1. Reed had a complete cause of action when the trial court issued its amended findings and conclusions\n2. At the latest, Reed's claim accrued when the CCA construed Chapter 64 in its decision\na. An appellate court's opinion is authoritative when issued\nb. Texas appellate procedure confirms that the CCA's decision, not its rehearing denial, authoritatively construed Chapter 64\nc. Recognizing that a CCA decision is authoritative as soon as it is issued advances federal-state comity\nC. Reed's abandoned challenge to Chapter 64 \"on its face\" accrued when the state trial court denied his motion in 2014\n1. Reed's facial claim accrued when he was first denied access to DNA testing\n2. The possibility of new state-court interpretations of state law does not prevent a claim from accruing\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Either Reed lacks standing, or his claim comes years too late\nB. Either sovereign immunity bars Reed's claim, or his claim comes years too late\nC. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes Reed's claim",
        "reference": "II. Reed's Suit Is Jurisdictionally Barred",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S DECISIONS RESOLVE THIS CASE AND COMPEL THE HOLDING BELOW\nA. Safe Deposit and Its Corollary Decisions Invalidate the North Carolina Tax\n1. This Court has rejected the tax North Carolina imposed\n2. Safe Deposit is part of a fair, principled, and practical due process framework\nB. Hanson v. Denckla Confirms the Safe Deposit Result and Resolves this Case\n1. Hanson rejected jurisdiction over a trustee based on the residence of a beneficiary\n2. [MISSING]\nII. DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES COMPEL THE DECISION BELOW AND REFUTE THE STATE'S JURISDICTIONAL THEORIES\nA. The State Cannot Show the Minimum Connection or Rational Relationship Necessary to Assert Jurisdiction\n1. Jurisdiction depends on the contacts of the taxpayer with the State and cannot rest solely on the taxpayer's relationship with a forum resident\n2. There are no minimum contacts between the trustee and North Carolina\n3. There is no rational relationship between the taxed income and North Carolina's fiscal values\nB. The Contacts of Any \"Trust Constituent\" Are Not Attributable to Everyone Else in the Trust Relationship\n1. The beneficiary and trustee are not agents, and the beneficiary does not represent the trust property\n2. This Court's decisions in the trust context focus on the contacts of the person over whom the State asserts jurisdiction\n3. North Carolina law treats beneficiary and trustee as separate and distinct entities\nC. The State Cannot Assert Jurisdiction over the Trustee on the Basis of Public Services Provided to a Beneficiary\nD. A Fiduciary Relationship with a Forum Resident Does Not Constitute Purposeful Availment by the Trustee\nIII. NORTH CAROLINA DOES NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT DISAGREES WITH THE TAX POLICY OF OTHER STATES\nA. States Have Ample Means of Taxing Trust Income Undisturbed by the Decision Below\nB. Differences in Tax Policy Are a Consequence of Federalism and Do Not Expand North Carolina's Jurisdiction\nC. Wayfair Is Not Relevant",
        "reference": "2. Hanson is materially indistinguishable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. BECAUSE THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT NEVER REOPENED DIRECT REVIEW, NO NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULES APPLY\nA. The Conditional Habeas Writ Here Did Not Itself Reopen Direct Review Or Require The Arizona Courts To Do So\nB. The Arizona Supreme Court's State-Law Determination That Post-Conditional-Writ Independent Review Is Not Part Of Direct Review Ends The Retroactivity Analysis\n1. The Arizona Supreme Court Has Held That Its Post-Conditional-Writ Independent Review Proceedings Are Not Part of Direct Review\n2. The Court Cannot Upend The Arizona Supreme Court's Dispositive Interpretation Of State Law\n3. McKinney Cannot Avoid The Arizona Supreme Court's Conclusions By Saying Finality Here Is Purely A Federal Question\nII. MANDATORY RESENTENCING FOR ALL EDDINGS ERRORS IS UNWARRANTED AND WOULD UNDERMINE THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE RECORD HERE\nA. A Mandatory Resentencing Rule Would Contradict Language From Prior Cases And Undermine The Interests Of Justice\nB. The Record Here Contradicts The Need For A Mandatory Resentencing Requirement\n1. The Identified Eddings Error Occurred At The Arizona Supreme Court, Not The Trial Court\n2. The Record Here Was More Than Adequate For Appellate Error Correction, Which Differentiates This Case From The Court's Trial-Level Eddings Remands\n3. Appellate Correction Of Appellate Error Is Supported By Clemons As Well As The Need To Tailor Post-Writ Proceedings\nC. McKinney's Attack On The Record Is Insufficient And Would Warrant At Most A Remand For Harmless Error Analysis As To The Scope Of The Mitigation Record\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Alternatively, The Court Should Correct The Ninth Circuit's Conflated Reading Of Arizona Case Law And Confirm That There Was No Eddings Error Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.07
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. Roe's Creation of a Constitutional Right to Abortion Was Egregiously Wrong.\nII. Casey's Reaffirmation of Roe's Supposed \"Central Holding\" Was Egregiously Wrong.\nIII. The Other Stare Decisis Factors Support Overruling Roe and Casey.\nA. There Is No Valid Reliance Interest in the Continued Availability of a Constitutional Abortion Right.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Factual Developments Have Also Undermined Roe and Casey's Reasoning.\nD. Casey's \"Undue Burden\" Test Has Proven To Be Hopelessly Indeterminate and Unworkable.\nIV. Three Decades of Upheaval and Controversy over Abortion Rights Have Conclusively Shown that Casey's Call for a Halt to the National Abortion Debate Is a Complete Failure.",
        "reference": "B. Roe and Casey Do Not Cohere With This Court's Broader Constitutional Jurisprudence.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. If the Court Does Constitutionalize the Right-to-Work Position in the Public-Sector Context, It Should Do so on Grounds That Do Not Extend to Private-Sector Unions",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Not Render a Public Policy Position That Is Widely Held Among U.S. Bishops \u2014 Opposition to \"Right-to-Work\" Legislation \u2014 Unconstitutional as to the Public-Sector Context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Prevailing Patentees May Recover Foreign Damages Proximately Caused by Domestic Infringement\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A Bar to Recovery of Foreign Damages Is at Odds with Settled Precedent\nC. Power Integrations Does Not Bar Foreign Damages Attributable to Domestic Infringement\nII. The Presumption against Extraterritoriality Does Not Bar Recovery of Foreign Damages Accrued due to Domestic Infringement\nA. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Does Not Apply to Section 284\nB. Microsoft Uses the Presumption in Accordance with This Court's Settled Precedent\nC. Providing Compensation for Patent Infringement Is An Appropriate Domestic Application of Section 284",
        "reference": "A. Section 284 Provides Complete Compensation for Damages Proximately Caused by Infringement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief056.pdf",
        "text": "I. SFFA has standing.\nII. Grutter should be overruled.\nA. Grutter is grievously wrong.\nB. Grutter has spawned significant negative consequences.\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. Harvard fails strict scrutiny.\nA. Harvard penalizes Asian Americans.\nB. Harvard engages in racial balancing.\nC. Harvard does not use race as a mere plus to achieve overall diversity.\nD. Harvard has workable race-neutral alternatives.",
        "reference": "C. Grutter has generated no legitimate reliance interests.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "The Executive Branch's Mass Student Loan Debt Cancellation Violates The Appropriations Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Executive Branch's abrogation of hundreds of billions of dollars in student loan debt assets is an unappropriated expenditure",
        "reference": "A. Enforcement of the Appropriations Clause is critical to the separation of powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Resolve the Circuit Split Regarding Whether Taxpayers Can Bring Pre-Enforcement Challenges to Rules Issued in Contravention of the Administrative Procedure Act or other Congressionally Mandated Requirements\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The AIA does not preclude pre-enforcement challenges to regulatory reporting requirements\nB. Citizens are permitted to challenge other laws, regulations and administrative guidance on a pre-enforcement basis\nC. The decision below conflicts with the Court's rejection of Tax Exceptionalism",
        "reference": "II. A Broad Reading of the AIA is inconsistent with the Court's Rejection of Tax Exceptionalism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction\nII. In the alternative, this Court should affirm the district court's finding that Plan H358 intentionally dilutes minority voting strength\nA. The challenged districts originated in 2011 legislation that was tainted by discriminatory motivations and not in a court-imposed remedy\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Plaintiffs in intentional vote dilution cases need not prove that it would be possible to draw additional majority-minority districts\nIII. The configuration of the districts in Nueces County violates Section 2's \"results\" test\nIV. HD90 in Tarrant County is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander",
        "reference": "B. The Legislature's 2013 reenactment of the challenged districts was purposefully discriminatory",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's Precedents, Relied upon by the Federal Circuit Panel, Establish That APJs Are Inferior Officers\nII. The Federal Circuit Panel Misapplied This Court's Decision in Edmond v. United States\nIII. The Secretary of Commerce and Director of the PTO Have Substantial Directorial and Supervisory Powers over APJs\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Congress Made the Deliberate Decision to Make APJs Inferior Officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Fifth Circuit failed to apply the \"strong presumption\" of judicial reviewability of agency actions\nB. This Court has recognized that the exception for agency actions committed to agency discretion under section 701(a)(2) is narrow and requires \"careful examination\" of the underlying statute\nC. The language of 16 U.S.C. section 1533(b)(2) and overall structure of the ESA do not preclude judicial review\nD. The Fifth Circuit failed to conduct the sort of \"careful examination\" required to establish that judicial review is precluded under section 701(a)(2)",
        "reference": "I. The Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1 from a critical habitat designation is subject to judicial review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Preserving the Secretary's Payment Policy Will Continue to Protect Rural Hospitals and Their Communities from Further Harm\nIII. The Current Payment Policy Equitably Protects All Hospitals and All Patients They Serve",
        "reference": "I. Savings Realized Under the Secretary's Current Policy are Redistributed to All Hospitals Under the OPPS, and Thus Subject to Budget Neutrality",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5726_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A claim that a district court failed to apply unambiguous law to record facts is a claim of \"mistake\" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)\nA. The plain meaning of \"mistake\" encompasses unintentional errors resulting from misapprehension or misconception\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The drafters deliberately modeled Rule 60(b)(1) on a California provision that authorized relief from mistakes of law\n2. The 1946 amendments ensured that Rule 60(b)(1) would reach mistakes made by courts\nC. Applying the plain meaning of \"mistake\" follows the structure and purpose of the federal rules\n1. Surrounding provisions support a plain-language interpretation of \"mistake\" that includes obvious judicial errors in the application of law\n2. Applying the plain meaning of \"mistake\" promotes justice and efficiency\nII. The judgment below should be affirmed",
        "reference": "B. The history of Rule 60(b)(1) supports its plain meaning",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Business Relationships Between Motor Carriers and Independent Owner-Operators Are Crucial to the Trucking Industry\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Decision Below Undermines the Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration, by Depriving Motor Carriers and Independent Owner-Operators of the Benefits of Arbitration Under the FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Reading of Section (f)(1) is Confirmed by the Statutory Structure.",
        "reference": "I. The Plain Text of Section 1252(f)(1) Limits Only Injunctions and Temporary Restraining Orders, and Does Not Bar Declaratory Relief.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATES HAVE STANDING BECAUSE THE LOAN CANCELLATION PROGRAM INJURES THEM IN THEIR CAPACITY AS PSLF EMPLOYERS\nII. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF THE HEROES ACT VIOLATES ART. I OF THE CONSTITUTION\nA. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Vesting Clause\nB. Petitioners' HEROES Act Interpretation Violates the Appropriations Clause\nIII. PETITIONERS' EXTENSION OF THE PAYMENT-AND-INTEREST PAUSE REINFORCES THE ILLEGALITY OF THEIR RELIANCE ON THE HEROES ACT IN THIS CASE\nA. Petitioners Misrepresent the HEROES Act's Role in the Payment-and-Interest Pause\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Extensions of the Payment-and-Interest Pause also Trample the Vesting and Appropriations Clauses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Appellees lack Article III standing\nA. Appellees cannot satisfy the traceability and redressability requirements for Article III standing\nB. The self-inflicted character of appellees' injury is a separate barrier to standing\nII. The loan-repayment limit complies with the First Amendment\nA. The loan-repayment limit does not trigger strict scrutiny\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Appellees' reliance on the overbreadth doctrine is misplaced",
        "reference": "B. The loan-repayment limit satisfies heightened scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1450_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. HALKBANK WAS CREATED TO FULFILL A CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND CARRY OUT SOVEREIGN FUNCTIONS.\nA. Turkiye is Halkbank's Owner and Controls the Bank.\n1. Turkiye has always owned Halkbank.\n2. Turkiye directs the management of Halkbank.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. TURKIYE DOES NOT PROSECUTE FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. PROTECTION OF DACA RECIPIENTS' WELL-BEING IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF MEXICO'S FOREIGN POLICY\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. MILLIONS OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS AND LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS ARE POSITIVELY IMPACTED BY DACA\nA. The DACA Program Strengthens Cultural Ties between Mexico and the United States\nB. The DACA Program Strengthens Educational Ties between Mexico and the United States\nIV. DACA HAS STRENGTHENED CROSS-BORDER EXCHANGES IN MULTIPLE AREAS\nV. THE U.S. HAS UNDERTAKEN TO PROTECT DACA RECIPIENTS AS PART OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ICCPR",
        "reference": "II. BENEFICIARIES OF THE DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS PROGRAM CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE U.S. ECONOMY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Take This Opportunity to Develop Its Major Questions Jurisprudence.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Major Questions Doctrine Avoids Non-Delegation Issues.\nB. The Constitution Gives the President the Power to \"Recommend\" Major Policy Changes to Congress, Not Make Such Changes Alone.\nIII. The D.C. Circuit's Expansive Reading of Section 111 is Wrong.",
        "reference": "II. Unless Cabined by the Major Questions Doctrine, Statutory Ambiguity Threatens the Separation of Powers.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-9526_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Did Not Disestablish The Creek Reservation\nA. This Court Will Not Find Disestablishment Absent Clear Statutory Text\nB. Congress Did Not Disestablish The Creek Reservation In The Relevant Statutes\nC. The Historical Evidence Reinforces The Text\nD. The Subsequent Demographic History, If Relevant, Does Not Demonstrate Disestablishment\nII. Oklahoma's Disestablishment Arguments Fail\nA. Oklahoma Is Not Uniquely Immune From Parker's Textual Hallmarks\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Other Arguments For State Jurisdiction Fail\nA. The Sky Is Not Falling\nB. Congress Did Not Give Oklahoma Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Country",
        "reference": "B. The \"Overall Thrust\" Of Congressional Action Did Not Disestablish",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CLAUSE APPLIES ONLY TO THE DIRECT APPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY OR THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT THEREOF\nA. The Takings Clause Was Originally Understood to Apply Only to the Direct Physical Appropriation of Property\nB. [MISSING]\nII. UNDER THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, THE CALIFORNIA REGULATION CHALLENGED HERE DOES NOT EFFECT A TAKING PER SE",
        "reference": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN MARITIME LAW, AND THE ERRORS IN THE DECISION BELOW, JUSTIFY GRANTING CERTIORARI\nII. ALL THREE COUNTERARGUMENTS IN THE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FAIL\nA. The Third and Sixth Circuits are split as to the question presented\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This case is ripe for review",
        "reference": "B. The respondents' defense of the Third Circuit's ruling fails",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Role Of Specialty Pharmacies Is Vital To Individuals Living With Rare And Chronic Diseases\nII. Market-Dominating Pharmacy Benefit Managers Threaten The Existence Of Specialty Pharmacies\nA. PBMs Have Enormous Market Power That They Have Abused\nB. PBMs Drive Down Reimbursement Rates For Medications Dispensed By Specialty Pharmacies To Crippling Levels\nC. PBMs Dictate The Pharmacies Its Members Can Utilize\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Affirmance Of The Decision Of The Court Of Appeals Would Leave States Powerless To Regulate PBM Conduct That Impacts Public Health",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1362_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 213(b)(10)(A) Unambiguously Exempts Service Advisors\nA. Service Advisors Are \"Salesmen\"\nB. Service Advisors Are Primarily Engaged in Servicing Automobiles\nC. Respondents' \"Distributive Phrasing\" Argument Lacks Merit\nD. Legislative History Does Not Aid Respondents\nE. Respondents Do Not Meaningfully Defend the Anti-Employer Canon\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Respondents Disregard Forty Years Of Reliance Interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ITFA HAS ESTABLISHED FEDERAL POLICY AGAINST MULTIPLE AND DISCRIMINATORY STATE TAXATION OF INTERNET COMMERCE\nA. Congress Has Recognized the Unique Vulnerability of Internet Commerce to Multiple and Discriminatory Taxation\nB. The ITFA Specifically Prohibits Multiple and Discriminatory Taxation of Internet Commerce\nC. State Sales Taxes Can Violate the ITFA's Ban on Multiple and Discriminatory Taxes\nII. SOUTH DAKOTA'S LAW VIOLATES BOTH THE LETTER AND THE NATIONAL POLICY AIMS OF THE ITFA\nA. The ITFA Applies to the Taxes on Internet Transactions That Are the Subject of South Dakota's Law\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. SOUTH DAKOTA'S PETITION IS NOT A LEGAL, BUT A POLICY ARGUMENT\nA. This Action Provides No Factual Record to Support South Dakota's Alternative National Policy for Interstate Commerce\nB. South Dakota's Policy Argument Is Based Upon a False Premise: Its Sales Tax Revenue Has Been Growing Rapidly, Not Shrinking\nC. Since Quill and DMA II, 'Changed Circumstances' Have Made 'Brick-and-Click' Ubiquitous, Negating South Dakota's Claims of Harm to 'Brick-and-Mortar'\nIV. CONGRESS, NOT INDIVIDUAL STATES OR THE COURTS, IS BEST SUITED TO DEVISE A SOLUTION TO THESE COMPLEX MULTISTATE TAX POLICY ISSUES",
        "reference": "B. South Dakota's Preferred National Policy Is Directly at Odds with the ITFA's Policy Against Multiple and Discriminatory Taxation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. PROPOSITION 12 IMPROPERLY REGULATES EXTRATERRITORIAL COMMERCE\nA. The Constitution Prohibits State Laws That Regulate Conduct Outside Their Borders\nB. States May Not Restrict Imports To Control Commerce In Other States\nC. Proposition 12's Sales Ban Is An Impermissible Extraterritorial Regulation\nII. PROPOSITION 12 EXCESSIVELY BURDENS INTERSTATE COMMERCE\nA. The Sales Ban Substantially Burdens Interstate Commerce\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Sales Ban Serves No Legitimate Local Interest",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The AIA's plain language dictates that the PTAB's time-bar determination under section 315(b) is not subject to judicial review\nB. Unreviewability of timeliness decisions is consistent with Cuozzo and SAS Institute\nC. The Federal Circuit's justifications for its holding are meritless\nD. The purpose of the AIA confirms that timeliness decisions are not appealable",
        "reference": "I. The AIA contains clear and convincing indications that Congress intended to preclude judicial review of the PTAB's determination, as part of its institution decision, that section 315(b)'s time bar did not apply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. Nominal damages should preclude mootness in free exercise cases.\nA. Claims for nominal damages preclude mootness.\nB. Government defendants frequently seek to strategically moot out meritorious free exercise claims.\nC. Nominal damages play a particularly important role in free exercise cases where compensatory damages are sometimes unavailable and often hard to prove.\nII. The free exercise rights of a wide variety of religious people and institutions are at stake.\nA. Prison inmates\nB. High school and college students\nC. Houses of worship\nIII. Recognizing that nominal damages preclude mootness in free exercise cases will not create excessive litigation.\nA. Article III standing requirements still apply.\nB. Exhaustion requirements in the regulatory and prison contexts check excessive litigation.\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Qualified immunity will shield many government defendants from suits for damages.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.42
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A [MISSING]",
        "reference": "A Subjectively Genuine Belief That the Charged Distribution Was \"Within the Bounds of Professional Practice\" Is Inconsistent With the Mens Rea Element of a Section 841(a) Offense, and in the Case of a Non-Professional May Be Predicated on a Sincere Belief That the Pertinent Professional Was Acting in Good Faith",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Patent Act requires patentees to enable the full scope of their claimed invention.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Enabling the invention's full scope serves the Patent Act's constitutional purpose.\nC. The Federal Circuit applied the enablement requirement as the Patent Act and longstanding precedents require.\nII. Full scope enablement promotes the creation and dissemination of scientific advances.\nIII. Relaxing the enablement requirement will needlessly aggravate the drug price crisis.\nA. Evidence ties broad functional claims to higher drug prices.\nB. Companies do not need broad functional claims to incentivize the development of biologic drugs.",
        "reference": "A. According to the statute's text, a patent must enable the full scope of the claims.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22o142_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Oysters play a vital role in the ecosystem and society of Apalachicola Bay\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The bay's oyster population has still not recovered",
        "reference": "II. The bay's oyster population suffered a catastrophic decline in 2012",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court of Appeals' Bright-Line Rule Is Needlessly Restrictive and Problematic\nA. Neither Trademark Licensors Nor Licensees Benefit in the Long Run from the Court of Appeals' Rule\nB. The Court of Appeals Relied on Misguided Concerns About a Licensor's Quality-Control Obligations\nC. The Court of Appeals' Rule Creates Potentially Unreasonable Results\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Until Congress Acts, the Best Rule for Trademark Licenses is an Equitable, Case-by-Case Approach with a Presumption in Favor of the Licensee's Rights\nA. Courts Should Start with Sunbeam's Rule as a Presumption, but Then Consider Whether Case-Specific Factors Overcome That Presumption\nB. The Approach Urged Here Strikes the Best Balance Between Various Interests",
        "reference": "D. The Court of Appeals Relied on Incorrect Assumptions\u2014Disproved by the Statutory Text and the Legislative History\u2014About Congress' Intent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. CLICK-TO-CALL IS A CALL-TO-ARMS FOR PATENT TROLLS TO GAME THE SYSTEM",
        "reference": "I. \"A COMPLAINT\" MEANS \"A COMPLAINT\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 1.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO BINDING CUSTOMARY NORM REGARDING CORPORATE CONDUCT THAT VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL LAW \u2014 PARTICULARLY AS TO AIDING AND ABETTING THOSE VIOLATIONS\nA. The Claims Here Implicate Norms of Corporate and Accessorial Conduct\nB. Nations Diverge Widely on Their Recognition of Corporate Liability and the Circumstances Under Which It Will Arise\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Corporate Conduct Relating to Aiding and Abetting Liability Is Even More Fraught and Unsettled\nII. CAUTION REQUIRES CONGRESS TO GRANT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FOR CORPORATE CONDUCT LIABILITY \u2014 PARTICULARLY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW\nA. The Actions of the First Congress Confirm that the ATS Does Not Grant Jurisdiction Over Causes of Action for Aiding and Abetting Violations of International Law\nB. It Is for Congress to Determine Whether and When Corporate Conduct for Aiding and Abetting Torts Under International Law Should Be Recognized Under the ATS, Especially Where the Primary Tortfeasors, Their Conduct, and Their Victims Are Outside the United States",
        "reference": "1. Major Jurisdictions Take Fundamentally Distinct Approaches to Corporate Liability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22o142_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Special Master Kelly Followed The Court's Instructions By Issuing Factual Findings On All Relevant Issues\nII. Florida Failed To Prove That Georgia Caused Harm To Florida\nA. Florida Failed To Prove That Georgia Harmed The Bay\nB. Florida Failed To Prove That Georgia Harmed The River\nC. The Special Master's Analysis Is Consistent With New Jersey v. New York\nIII. The Special Master Correctly Found That Georgia's Use Of ACF Waters Is Reasonable\nA. Georgia's Consumptive-Use Estimates Are Accurate And Reliable\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Georgia's Conservation Efforts Are Extensive\nIV. The Benefits Of A Decree Would Not Substantially Outweigh The Costs\nA. The Benefits Of A Cap Would Be Small, Rare, And Speculative\n1. Florida's Cap Would Not Meaningfully Increase State-Line Flows\n2. Even Assuming All Water Generated By A Cap Would Pass To Florida, The Ecological Benefits Would Be Minimal\nB. The Costs Of A Decree To Georgia Would Be Massive\nV. Florida Cannot Obtain A Decree Without Proving Its Case On The Merits",
        "reference": "B. Georgia's Consumptive Use Is Reasonable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reinforce That ERISA's Careful Pleading Requirements \u2014With Respect To Both Standing And The Merits \u2014Apply To Excessive-Fee Challenges To Defined-Contribution Plans\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Meaningful Pleading-Stage Scrutiny Protects ERISA Fiduciaries And Participants From Negative Consequences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1094_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle Because Several Antecedent Legal Principles Resolve the Case Without Reaching the Question Presented\nA. Lambert's Appeal Was Timely Under the Federal Rules and This Court's Longstanding Precedents, thus Presenting No Need to Consider Any Equitable Exceptions\n1. Lambert Timely Moved for Reconsideration at the March 2, 2015 Hearing\n2. Lambert's March 12, 2015 Motion for Reconsideration Was Timely Under Federal Civil Rule 59(e)\n3. Because Lambert's Reconsideration Motion Was Timely, He Had Until July 8, 2015 to File His Rule 23(f) Petition\n4. Lambert's Appeal Was Also Timely Based on the Plain Language of Rule 23\nB. Nutraceutical's Multiple Acts of Forfeiture and Waiver Are Obstacles to Consideration of the Question Presented\n1. Nutraceutical Committed Forfeiture and Waiver Before the District Court\n2. Nutraceutical Committed Forfeiture and Waiver Before the Ninth Circuit\nC. Given the Unique Posture of This Case, a Decision Regarding the Timeliness of the Appeal Is Unlikely to Have Any Effect on the Outcome of the Case\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Recognized that Nonjurisdictional Claim-Processing Rules Can Be Subject to Equitable Exceptions\nA. This Court's Precedents Demonstrate that Nonjurisdictional Claim-Processing Rules Can Be Subject to Equitable Exceptions\nB. Court-of-Appeals Case Law Further Shows that Nonjurisdictional Claim-Processing Rules Can Be Subject to Equitable Exceptions\nC. The Availability of Equitable Exceptions Has Not Caused the Adverse Consequences that Nutraceutical Fears; However, the Rule Nutraceutical Advocates Will Lead to Circuit Courts Being Presented with 23(f) Petitions that Will Be Amended or Withdrawn as Moot",
        "reference": "II. This Case Does Not Implicate Any Circuit Conflict",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1495_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text, Purpose, And History Of The Self-Incrimination Clause Foreclose Petitioner's Effort To Exclude The Probable Cause Hearing Against Officer Vogt From Fifth Amendment Protection\nA. Petitioner identifies no plausible textual basis for excluding the probable cause hearing here from Fifth Amendment protection\nB. The purpose and history of the Self-Incrimination Clause confirm its protections extend to the probable cause hearing here\nC. This Court's precedent confirms that the Self-Incrimination Clause applies to the probable cause hearing here\nD. Petitioner's arguments about grand jury proceedings do not support excluding from the Fifth Amendment's protections an in-court, adversarial probable cause hearing following the initiation of criminal charges against the defendant\nII. Petitioner's Policy Concerns Do Not Justify Limiting The Fifth Amendment's Protections\nA. The Fifth Amendment accommodates governmental interests\nB. Courts can accommodate the Fifth Amendment\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Other constitutional protections are inadequate to safeguard defendants",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Cy Pres Serves Important Purposes in Class Action Settlements\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. States Laws and Rules Providing for Cy Pres Awards in Class Action Proceedings Could Be Imperiled by a Ruling Imposing Constitutional or Other Strict Limitations on Cy Pres Awards",
        "reference": "II. Legal Services Organizations That Serve Low-Income and Indigent Litigants Are Proper Recipients of Cy Pres Awards Because They Share the Same Purpose as Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Anti-Injunction Act applies only where the taxes that are relied on by the government as the basis for applying the Act are taxes that are \"alleged to be [currently] due\"\nA. Williams Packing established that the Anti-Injunction Act applies only where the taxes involved in the suit are taxes that are \"alleged to be [currently] due\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Direct Marketing requires a return to the test from Williams Packing that the Anti-Injunction Act applies only to suits involving taxes that are \"alleged to be [currently] due\"\nD. Florida Bankers ignored the reasoning in Direct Marketing\nII. The existence of the Tax Court as a forum where taxpayers are able to contest a tax liability asserted against them by the IRS, without first having to pay the amount of the contested tax, very substantially undercuts the traditional rationale for the Anti-Injunction Act that has been invoked in support of a broad application of the Act\nIII. The issue in this case is an issue of exceptional importance that warrants prompt resolution by the Court despite the absence of a circuit conflict at this time",
        "reference": "B. Bob Jones University and \"Americans United\" substantially expanded the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act far beyond suits involving \"taxes alleged to be [currently] due,\" without either acknowledging or justifying this expansion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit's overbreadth invalidation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) remains unjustified",
        "reference": "A. Respondent provides no basis for a different certiorari disposition from Sineneng-Smith",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "Reply Brief for the Petitioner\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle\nC. Colorado's Negligence Test Is Wrong",
        "reference": "A. Colorado Concedes That Federal And State Courts Are Divided",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief041.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright Clause Secures to Authors the Property Rights Inherent in Their Own Labor and Serves to Incentivize Productive Activity to Advance the Public Good\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Google's Claims that its Unauthorized Copying of Oracle's Computer Code Should be Permitted to Prevent Anticompetitive Harm Ring Hollow in Light of Google's Own Troubling History of Anticompetitive Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-96_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. BOTH PUERTO RICO AND THE BOARD POSSESS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT\nA. The Court Should Not Address the Question of Puerto Rico's Sovereign Immunity\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Puerto Rico Enjoys Immunity in Federal Court\nD. CPI's Rule Would Yield Perverse and Destabilizing Results\nE. The Clear-Statement Rule Applies to Puerto Rico\nII. PROMESA CONTAINS NO CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE LANGUAGE SHOWING A CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO ABROGATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\nA. Inferential Arguments Cannot Satisfy the Clear-Statement Rule\nB. CPI's Arguments Do Not Show an Intent to Abrogate\nC. CPI's \"Design\" Argument Is Misguided",
        "reference": "B. Sovereign Governments Are Immune from Compulsory Process in All Courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Iskanian's Holding\nB. PAGA Suits Involve Both Public and Private Interests\nC. While Private Qui Tam Plaintiffs Are Likely Bound By Their Arbitration Agreements, the Question is Not Presented Here\nII. This Court Should Speak Clearly on the Scope of FAA Preemption",
        "reference": "I. PAGA Suits Fall Comfortably Within the Category of Claims Subject to the FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Compensatory damages are available to rectify intentional discrimination\nB. Emotional-distress damages are a standard form of compensatory damages for intentional discrimination\nC. Emotional-distress damages are equally appropriate under the statutes here\nII. Contract law confirms the propriety of emotional-distress damages in this context\nA. Damages for emotional distress are traditionally available for breaches of anti-discrimination contract provisions\nB. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule\nC. Barring emotional-distress damages would hobble the family of anti-discrimination laws at issue here",
        "reference": "I. Emotional-distress damages are appropriate relief for intentional discrimination under the Rehabilitation and Affordable Care Acts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENTS ADMIT THE CLEAR CIRCUIT SPLIT\nII. THIS CASE IS A CLEAN VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION PRESENTED\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS WRONG",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Law Requires That Aliens Who are Applicants for Admission and Not Entitled to Admission Must be Detained Pending Removal Proceedings\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Biden Administration and DHS Have Deliberately Reduced Available Detention Capacity\nB. DHS Has Eliminated All Family Detention Centers\nC. DHS Has Not Only Failed to Robustly Utilize Expedited Removal, But Also Restricted When That Authority May be Used\nIII. MPP Was an Effective Policy to Control the Crisis at the Southern Border",
        "reference": "II. The Biden Administration and Department of Homeland Security Have Failed to Employ Procedures Making it Possible For DHS to Comply With section 1225(b)'s Detention Mandate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. AUTHORITY TO CREATE GUN-FREE ZONES MUST BE ASCERTAINED BY EXAMINING HISTORY'S TREATMENT OF THE SELF-DEFENSE RIGHT\nII. HISTORY DEMONSTRATES THAT THE AUTHORITY TO CREATE GUN-FREE ZONES IS NARROWLY CIRCUMSCRIBED TO AREAS IN WHICH GOVERNMENT PROTECTION IS AT ITS APEX\nA. Pre-Revolution gun-free zones in England were limited to areas in which the King's security was at its peak\nB. Colonial, Founding-Era, and 19th Century gun-free zones were similarly limited\nC. The limited scope of gun-free zones around the time of the Founding coincides with the prevailing political philosophy at the time\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. MODERN ANALOGUES TO GUN-FREE ZONES RECOGNIZED THROUGHOUT HISTORY ARE FEW AND FAR BETWEEN",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Circuit Courts Have Held For Decades That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation\nB. A very Recent Circuit Split Does Not Warrant Granting Certiorari In This Case\nII. THE COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN RULING THAT TITLE VII DOES NOT PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION\nA. Petitioner's Contention That Discrimination Because Of \"Sex\" Includes Discrimination Because Of \"Sexual Orientation\" Is Meritless\nB. Price Waterhouse Did Not Abrogate Circuit Case Law Holding That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation\nC. Oncale Did Not Abrogate Circuit Case Law Holding That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation\nIII. PETITIONER'S ADDITIONAL REASONS AS TO WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED ARE IRRELEVANT TO THIS CASE\nIV. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE PETITIONER'S INVITATION TO GRANT CERTIORARI, SEIZE LEGISLATIVE POWER FROM CONGRESS AND REWRITE TITLE VII\nV. THIS CASE IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE VEHICLE TO RESOLVE WHETHER OR NOT TITLE VII PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION",
        "reference": "I. THE COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI AND AWAIT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS CONCERNING A RECENT CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT TITLE VII PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Debt Collection Industry Benefits Consumers, Government Agencies, and the U.S. Economy\nII. An Interpretation of Section 813(d) that is Faithful to the Plain Language of the Statute Benefits Consumers and the Broader U.S. Economy\nIII. Affirming the Third Circuit's Decision Will Not Lead to a Proliferation of Abuse and Fraud by Third-Party Debt Collectors\na. Consumers are protected by a robust framework of state and federal laws that include the FDCPA and extend beyond it\ni. The FDCPA is enforced not only through private lawsuits but also through administrative actions\nii. [MISSING]\nb. Affirming the Third Circuit's Decision Will Not Promote \"Sewer Service\"",
        "reference": "ii. State law provides significant protection to aggrieved consumers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. WHETHER MISSISSIPPI'S BAN ON ABORTION AFTER 15 WEEKS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IS NOT A QUESTION WARRANTING THIS COURT'S INTERVENTION\nA. The Court's precedent that bans on abortion before viability cannot stand is clear\nB. The federal courts of appeal uniformly agree that bans on abortion before viability are unconstitutional\nC. The Fifth Circuit faithfully applied this Court's binding precedent\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THERE IS NO REASON TO REVISIT THIS COURT'S WELL-SETTLED PRECEDENT REGARDING ABORTION PROVIDERS' STANDING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6662_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. TAYLOR'S CATEGORICAL APPROACH APPLIES TO ALL ACCA PREDICATES\nII. A PRIOR CONVICTION THAT LACKS A MENS REA ELEMENT CANNOT CONSTITUTE A \"SERIOUS DRUG OFFENSE\"\nA. Inclusion of the word \"involving\" in the enhancement provision is not grounds to reject the categorical approach\nB. As this Court recognized in Taylor, enhancement cannot depend on how the crime is labeled by the state of conviction\nC. ACCA's definition of \"serious drug offense\" should be read consistent with the presumption in favor of scienter\nIII. ACCA'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AFFIRMS THAT STATE DRUG CONVICTIONS LACKING A MENS REA REQUIREMENT DO NOT QUALIFY AS \"SERIOUS DRUG OFFENSES\"\nA. Congress intended for ACCA to be applied uniformly\nB. When ACCA was amended in 1986, the vast majority of states required mens rea\nC. Testimony during the 1986 hearings confirms that \"serious drug offenses\" were not intended to include state crimes lacking a mens rea requirement\nIV. ACCA WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A GEOGRAPHICALLY DISPARATE IMPACT UNLESS THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH IS APPLIED\nA. This Court has clearly indicated that ACCA must be read to prevent geographic disparity\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Allowing a state's requirements to control whether an offense qualifies as an ACCA predicate will continue to result in disparate sentences for similar conduct",
        "reference": "B. In direct contravention of Taylor, ACCA has had a geographically disparate impact",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is a Strong Presumption in Favor of Judicial Review When an Executive Agency Violates Its Statutory Authority\nII. The Presumption in Favor of Review Compels Judicial Enforcement of the Time-Bar in section 315(b)\nA. The Statutory Text Shows that section 315(b) Violations Are Not Immune from Judicial Review\nB. Cuozzo's Treatment of a \"Mine-Run\" Claim Does Not Apply to the Explicit Statutory Limitation in section 315(b)\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Upholding Judicial Review of section 315(b) Time-Bar Determinations Conforms with This Court's Precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "THE [MISSING]\nA. The Copyright Office Serves A Unique Role In Formulating Copyright Policy For The United States\nB. The Copyright Office Carefully Studied The Need To Abrogate States' Eleventh Amendment Immunity For Copyright Infringement\nC. The Copyright Office Compiled Substantial Evidence Of The Need To Abrogate Eleventh Amendment Immunity For Copyright Infringement\n1. The Register's Report Documented A Pattern Of Copyright Infringement By The States And A Lack Of Effective State Remedies\n2. Mr. Oman's Congressional Testimony Further Showed The Need For The CRCA",
        "reference": "THE CRCA IS SUPPORTED BY A SUBSTANTIAL RECORD DOCUMENTING THE NEED TO ABROGATE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY FROM COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Also Grant The Statutory Question",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Grant The First Amendment Question",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Second Circuit's Decision Inverts the Relationship Between Fair Use and the Right to Prepare Derivative Works\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Many successful fair use rulings, including Campbell, have involved prima facie infringements of the derivative work right\nII. This Court's Guidance About How to Distinguish Transformative Fair Uses and Infringing Derivatives Went Unheeded\nA. This Court has directed courts to assess whether a secondary work has a \"new expression, meaning, or message\" and hence is transformative\nB. In keeping with Campbell and its progeny, courts treat transformativeness as a matter of degree rather than an all-or-nothing proposition\nC. Transformativeness is generally the beginning, not the end, of a fair use inquiry\nD. Fair use, as well as transformativeness, should be assessed on a work-by-work basis\nE. Consistent with Google, it is important to consider whether Warhol's use of the Goldsmith photograph furthered the creativity objectives of copyright law\nIII. The Second Circuit's Focus on \"Overarching Purpose and Function\" Is Inconsistent with the Copyright Act and Would Make Fair Use Determinations Less Certain\nA. Nothing in the Copyright Act or this Court's precedents supports substituting \"overarching purpose and function\" for Section 107's \"purpose and character\"\nB. An \"overarching purpose and function\" standard would make fair use less certain for authors of nonfiction works",
        "reference": "A. The Copyright Act makes the derivative work right \"subject to\" fair use and other exceptions and limitations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Examination of the underpinnings of the Due Process Clause's theories of adjudicative jurisdiction and jurisdiction to tax reveals that the Due Process Clause does not support North Carolina's effort to tax the Kaestner Family Trust\nA. The theory of \"effects jurisdiction\" justifies neither North Carolina's assertion of adjudicative jurisdiction nor North Carolina's assertion of jurisdiction to tax\nB. Jurisdiction based on property cannot justify the tax because the Trust holds no property in North Carolina\nC. [MISSING]\nII. North Carolina cannot base jurisdiction over the trustee on the North Carolina domicile of the beneficiary\nA. The forum may not manipulate the party structure of the dispute solely in order to refocus the jurisdictional inquiry upon individuals more likely to be amenable to jurisdiction\nB. Due process principles limit state overreaching in the multistate context and prohibit attempts such as North Carolina's to acquire jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist",
        "reference": "C. \"At-home\" jurisdiction does not exist in the present case with regard to either jurisdiction to adjudicate or jurisdiction to tax",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A CONCLUSIVE DEFERENCE STANDARD WOULD IMPAIR ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND HARM AMERICAN CONSUMERS\nA. Strict Compliance with the Requirements of a Compulsion Defense or a \"True Conflict\" Is Required by the Sherman Act and Is Consistent with International Antitrust Norms\nB. Conclusive Deference to a Foreign Government's Contention that Its Laws Compelled Price Fixing Undermines the Strict Requirements for Proving a Compulsion Defense or a \"True Conflict\"\nC. The Lack of Transparency of a Foreign Government's Law is Grounds for Less, Not More, Deference\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Weakening Deterrence Is Unwise in an Era of Rampant International Cartels",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuit split is deep and the result of Smith\nA. The decision below deepens a 6-2 split\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Third Circuit's opinion runs afoul of this Court's unconstitutional conditions cases\nIII. This case presents an ideal vehicle for addressing the questions presented and resolving issues of national importance",
        "reference": "B. This case is an excellent vehicle to revisit Smith",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1983 Is Meant To Vindicate the Unique Rights Guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, Not the Interests Protected by the Common Law of Torts\nII. Common-Law Rules Are Borrowed To Fill in the Gaps of Section 1983 Only When Those Rules Help Fulfill the Statute's Purpose\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. To Advance the Goals of Section 1983, a Constitutional Claim that Fabricated Evidence Was Used To Initiate and Maintain Criminal Proceedings Should Accrue Only When Those Proceedings Have Terminated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Act 900 does not have a prohibited \"connection with\" ERISA plans\nA. ERISA does not preempt Act 900's regulation of rates\n1. ERISA does not preempt rate regulation\n2. ERISA does not preempt Act 900's regulation of drug reimbursement rates\nB. ERISA does not preempt Act 900's enforcement mechanisms because they are necessary incidents to its regulation of rates\n1. ERISA does not preempt necessary incidents to otherwise permissible laws\n2. Act 900's enforcement mechanisms are necessary incidents to its rate regulation\nC. Act 900's enforcement mechanisms do not regulate central matters of plan administration\n1. ERISA does not preempt state-law procedures for resolving reimbursement disputes between plans and service providers\n2. Reimbursement appeals do not regulate claims processing\na. Reimbursement disputes occur after a claim has been processed\nb. ERISA's claims-processing provisions do not address provider reimbursements\nc. Act 900's appeal procedures do not compromise nationally uniform plan administration\nd. Co-insurance and high-deductible plans present unusual circumstances, but do not justify preemption\n3. [MISSING]\nII. Act 900 does not refer to ERISA plans",
        "reference": "3. Act 900's decline-to-dispense provision is a typical drug-dispensing regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.19
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED, INVOLVING THE SECTION 315(b) TIME BAR\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER THE PTAB'S TIME-BAR DETERMINATION IS APPEALABLE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPLIED THE CORRECT PLEADING STANDARD\nA. This Court Has Already Decided that Burden Shifting Is Appropriate Under Section 1981 and There Is No Basis for Overruling that Precedent\n1. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, This Court Adopted a Burden Shifting Approach, Rather Than But-For Causation, for Section 1981\n2. Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Did Not Change Patterson's Causation Framework for Section 1981 Cases\n3. Stare Decisis Warrants Following This Court's Analysis in Patterson\n4. A Section 1981 Plaintiff Is Not Required to Allege Facts Which Negate Potential Race-Neutral Reasons\nB. A \"Motivating Factor\" Pleading Standard Is Consistent with the Text of Section 1981\n1. A Person Does Not Have the \"Same Right\" to Contract if His or Her Race Played a Role in the Refusal to Contract\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Legislative History and Statutory Structure Further Undermine the But-For Causation Argument\na. The Civil Rights Act of 1866\nb. The Civil Rights Act of 1991\nC. The Common Law in 1866 Did Not Require But-For Causation for Intentional Torts\nD. A \"Motivating Factor\" Pleading Standard Is Consistent with the Remedial Purpose of Section 1981\nII. RESPONDENTS ADEQUATELY ALLEGE CAUSATION UNDER ANY STANDARD",
        "reference": "2. The Text of Section 1981 Does Not Require But-For Causation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LOWER COURTS' FACT-SPECIFIC APPLICATION OF THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW\nA. Harvard Does Not Discriminate Against Asian-American Applicants\nB. Harvard Considers Race Only As This Court's Precedents Permit\nII. [MISSING]\nA. No Recent Developments Warrant Review Of The Bakke/Grutter/Fisher Framework\nB. SFFA's Attacks On This Court's Precedents Are Meritless\nC. Overturning Grutter Would Have Significant Adverse Consequences\nIII. SFFA'S LACK OF STANDING ALSO COUNSELS AGAINST CERTIORARI",
        "reference": "II. SFFA OFFERS NO REASON TO REVISIT THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appalachian Trail Segment Crossed By The ACP Project Is Not \"Land In The National Park System\" Under The Mineral Leasing Act\nA. Statutory Background\n1. The National Forest System\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The National Trails System\nB. When Congress Transfers Administrative Jurisdiction From The Agriculture Department's Forest Service And The Interior Department's Park Service, It Does So Explicitly\nII. The Circuit Court's Holding Conflicts With This Court's Decisions On Harmonizing Potentially Conflicting Statutes",
        "reference": "2. The National Park System",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "A. Given the Risks to First Amendment Rights, the Court Has Required a Compelling Interest, Subject to Exacting Scrutiny, to Justify Forced Disclosure of Donor Records\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Amicus Knows Firsthand That a Fear of Public Disclosure and of Consequent Harassment Diminishes Individuals' Willingness to Donate to Non-Profit Organizations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. PASSIVE DISPLAYS SUCH AS THE BLADENSBURG MEMORIAL LACK THE ELEMENT OF GOVERNMENT COERCION THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IS DESIGNED TO PROSCRIBE\nB. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A SYMBOL TO LOSE ALL RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE BEFORE IT CAN BE USED IN PUBLIC DISPLAYS\nII. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION EXHIBITS IMPERMISSIBLE HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION",
        "reference": "I. THIS CASE MUST BE HEARD TO CORRECT A FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED ANALYSIS THREATENING COUNTLESS HISTORICAL DISPLAYS WITH RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1432_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The circuits are divided\nB. This is an ideal vehicle\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The question presented warrants review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "Absent extraordinary circumstances, ERISA's duty of prudence requires an ESOP fiduciary to publicly disclose inside information only when the securities laws require such a disclosure\nA. ERISA's duty of prudence to disclose material nonpublic information should be informed by Dudenhoeffer and its emphasis on the requirements and objectives of the securities laws\n1. ERISA's duty of prudence cannot require ESOP fiduciaries to violate the securities laws' disclosure requirements\n2. An ERISA-based duty to disclose exceeding the securities laws' requirements would generally be inconsistent with the objectives of those laws\n3. Whether a prudent fiduciary could conclude that a disclosure required by the securities laws would do more harm than good should, absent extraordinary circumstances, be determined by reference to the securities laws\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court should vacate the judgment below and remand the case to allow the court of appeals to apply the correct standard in the first instance",
        "reference": "B. The court of appeals' and the parties' alternative approaches are misguided",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1415(l) applies to all actions seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE, no matter the plaintiff's preferred remedy.\nA. Congress tied section 1415(l)'s exhaustion rule to the right to a FAPE and did not authorize a plaintiff seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE to bypass the IDEA's reticulated procedures.\n1. Section 1415(l)'s text focuses on the right to a FAPE, not the specific remedy sought.\n2. Statutory history and context show that section 1415(l) channels damages claims through the administrative process.\n3. Fry, circuit uniformity, and familiar statutory exhaustion rules support reading section 1415(l) to focus on the FAPE.\nB. Perez's counterarguments fail.\n1. Statutory text, history, and context all undermine Perez's position.\n2. Fry does not support Perez.\n3. [MISSING]\nC. This case highlights the risks associated with allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the IDEA's reticulated procedures.\nII. Section 1415(l) does not contain a futility exception, much less one Perez can invoke.\nA. The Court should honor Congress' choice not to put a futility exception in section 1415(l).\n1. Courts may not read judge-made exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements.\n2. Section 1415(l) mandates exhaustion, barring courts from creating futility exceptions.\n3. Context confirms that Congress knew how to create a futility exception in section 1415(l) if it wanted to.\n4. Congress had good reasons not to create a futility exception.\nB. Even if section 1415(l) allows some futility exception, Perez cannot invoke it.\n1. Assuming section 1415(l) contains a futility exception, the exception extends only \"to the same extent\" as if \"the action [had] been brought under\" the IDEA.\n2. When a plaintiff seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE under the IDEA, neither the unavailability of damages nor settlement constitutes futility.\n3. Because Perez could not have invoked a futility exception had he sued under the IDEA, he also cannot invoke a futility exception here.\n4. Perez's counterarguments lack merit.\nC. This case, and particularly the third question Perez and the government try to add, underscores the risks of adopting an atextual futility exception.\n1. Perez and the government's new (and not presented) argument that settlement equals exhaustion fails.\n2. Adopting a futility exception in this case likely would lead to confusion in the lower courts in many IDEA cases while producing little benefit in the rare IDEA case like this one.",
        "reference": "3. Perez's policy arguments fail.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-778_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Taylor And ACCA Demand Contemporaneous Intent\nII. Contemporaneous Intent Was A Fundamental Component Of Burglary At Common Law, And Most States Retained That Rule When ACCA Was Enacted\nA. Contemporaneous Intent Was A Fundamental Component Of Common-Law Burglary\nB. [MISSING]\nC. At The Time Of ACCA's Enactment, Only A Small Minority Of States Had Rejected The Contemporaneous-Intent Requirement\nIII. A Contemporaneous-Intent Requirement Serves Congress's Purpose Of Reserving Enhanced Penalties For Dangerous Career Criminals",
        "reference": "B. Leading Commentators Around The Time Of ACCA's Enactment Continued To View Contemporaneous Intent As A Fundamental Requirement Of Burglary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-389_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT BELOW'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH INTERPRETATIONS OF OTHER FEDERAL ACTS USING THE SAME OPERATIVE PHRASE\nII. THE COURT BELOW'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH STATE INTERESTS\nA. The States Have A Strong Interest In What Occurs On OCS Oil Platforms\nB. State Law Applies On OCS Oil Platforms In Many Ways\nIII. AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT BELOW WOULD PROTECT WORKERS ON OIL PLATFORMS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner's Argument Could Limit Workers Compensation Benefits",
        "reference": "A. Life On OCS Oil Platforms Is Difficult And Dangerous",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-23_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. GENERIC OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE REQUIRES A PENDING OR ONGOING INVESTIGATION OR PROCEEDING\nA. The Ordinary Meaning Of \"Obstruction Of Justice\" Requires Interference With A Pending Or Ongoing Investigation Or Proceeding\nB. [MISSING]\nC. State Law Further Confirms That Obstruction Of Justice Requires A Pending Or Ongoing Investigation Or Proceeding\nII. THE GOVERNMENT'S COUNTERARGUMENTS ARE UNPERSUASIVE\nA. The Government Errs In Defining Generic Obstruction Of Justice By Reference To Witness-Tampering Offenses\n1. The government improperly focuses on witness-tampering offenses rather than obstruction-of-justice offenses\n2. The government additionally mischaracterizes witness-tampering offenses on which it relies\nB. The Statute's Use Of \"Relating To\" Does Not Expand The Scope Of Generic Obstruction Of Justice\nC. Chapter 73 Does Not Support The Government's Position\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT DEFER TO THE BIA'S INTERPRETATION OF \"OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE\"",
        "reference": "B. Federal Criminal Law Codified At Chapter 73 Likewise Shows That Generic Obstruction Of Justice Requires A Pending Or Ongoing Proceeding",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DEMONSTRATES THAT THE RAMOS RULE IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT AN IMPERMISSIBLY LARGE RISK OF AN INACCURATE CONVICTION\nA. A Unanimity Requirement Produces More Thorough Deliberations and Yields More Accurate Outcomes\nB. A Unanimity Requirement Increases Consideration of Minority Viewpoints, Thereby Increasing Verdict Accuracy\nC. A Unanimity Requirement Leads to Greater Confidence in the Accuracy of Verdicts\nII. THE RAMOS RULE ALTERED THIS COURT'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE BEDROCK ELEMENTS ESSENTIAL TO THE FAIRNESS OF A PROCEEDING\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's Decision in Ramos Altered Its Understanding of the Bedrock Right to Unanimity",
        "reference": "A. The Framers Understood That a Unanimous Jury Requirement Was an Essential Component of a Fair Jury Trial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief043.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Hippocratic Oath's History Demonstrates that Performing Abortions Was Originally Understood to Be Inconsistent with a Physician's Ethical Duty to Not Do Harm\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court Has Affirmed the Government's Interest in Protecting the Integrity of the Medical Profession\nB. Mississippi's Law Furthers Its Legitimate Interest in Regulating the Medical Profession to Promote Respect for Life\nC. Standard Abortion Procedures Confuse the Duties of a Physician by Requiring Doctors to Act Directly Against the Physical Life of an Unborn Child\nD. Preventing Lasting Scars and Trauma Borne by Children Who Survive Abortions Furthers Mississippi's Legitimate Interest in Protecting the Integrity of the Medical Profession",
        "reference": "II. Mississippi Has an Interest in Protecting the Integrity and Ethics of the Medical Profession and Promoting Respect for Life",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. SOFTWARE INTERFACES EMBODY ORIGINAL AND CREATIVE EXPRESSION\nII. COPYING TO REPLACE A COMPETITOR'S PRODUCT IS NOT \"INTEROPERABILITY\"\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. MEANINGFUL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR SOFTWARE INTERFACES IS VITAL TO THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Illegal aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. section 1231 do not have the right to periodic bond hearings\nA. Implied protections against indefinite detention do not extend to every detention\nB. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas\nC. A bond hearing requirement undercuts federal policies\nD. [MISSING]\nII. There is no jurisdiction for relief\nA. Under 8 U.S.C. section 1252(f)(1), the lower courts lack jurisdiction for classwide injunctive relief\nB. Under Article III, all federal courts lack jurisdiction\n1. Plaintiffs lack an injury in fact because they have no cognizable right\n2. Plaintiffs cannot raise procedural claims because they lack any underlying substantive rights\n3. Plaintiffs' detentions are self-inflicted injuries, and thus raise no Article III case or controversy",
        "reference": "D. The six-month trigger for a bond hearing is improper during a health pandemic",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-437_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1326(d)'s history and purposes confirm that each of its three prerequisites must be independently satisfied\nC. Adopting the court of appeals' rule would produce incongruous results",
        "reference": "A. The statutory text establishes that an unlawful reentry defendant must independently satisfy the procedural requirements in 8 U.S.C. 1326(d)(1) and (2)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. Tyler has Standing\nII. Confiscating Tyler's Equity Is a Taking\nA. The County's reliance on feudal practice is unavailing\nB. Historical practice in America supports Tyler's takings claim\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Kentucky's history supports Tyler's claims\n3. States protected equity until and past adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment\nC. Nelson and Bennis do not answer Tyler's claim\nD. Law concerning orderly transfer of title, adverse possession, and abandoned property has no bearing on takings analysis\nIII. The Excessive Fines Clause Protects Tyler\nA. Non-compensatory economic sanctions are \"punitive\"\nB. A sanction can be punitive even if it does not turn on crime or culpability",
        "reference": "1. Virginia's history supports Tyler's takings claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1086_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Is Contrary To Nearly 150 Years Of This Court's Precedent\nII. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Time-Tested Principles Of Res Judicata\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Claim Preclusion\n2. Issue Preclusion\nB. The Second Circuit's Novel \"Defense Preclusion\" Rule Is Antithetical to Both Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion\n1. The Second Circuit's rule is inconsistent with claim preclusion\n2. The Second Circuit's rule is inconsistent with the principles and protections of issue preclusion\nIII. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure\nIV. The Decision Below Would Result In Unnecessary And Inefficient Over-Litigation Of Defenses",
        "reference": "A. Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion Define the Universe of Res Judicata",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's restrictions on off-premises billboards are content-based and subject to strict scrutiny under Reed\nA. The breadth of Austin's restriction is particularly pernicious to political speech\nB. The Fifth Circuit properly protects speakers from the discrimination encouraged when officials evaluate a message's content\nC. Adding benign restrictions to content-based laws does not eliminate the danger of discrimination\nII. While Reed may raise questions about the proper level of scrutiny for commercial speech, this case does not present them\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Upholding Reed does not wreak havoc on the ability to control billboards",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-364_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "SUPREME COURT REVIEW IS NOT WARRANTED BECAUSE THE DECISION OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND THERE IS NOT A SPLIT AMONG THE LOWER COURTS AS TO WHETHER A STATE MAY REFUSE TO GIVE MONEY DIRECTLY TO CHURCHES TO BE USED FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES\nA. The Decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court Is Consistent With the Decisions of this Court\nB. The Decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court Does Not Conflict With Decisions of Other Jurisdictions\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Constitution Should Not Be Interpreted to Require that the Government Provide Funds to Churches for their Worship Facilities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. A STATE LEGISLATURE IS THE ONLY BRANCH OF STATE GOVERNMENT THAT CAN PRESCRIBE PROCEDURAL LAWS REGARDING FEDERAL ELECTIONS\nII. THE POWER OF STATE LEGISLATURES UNDER THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE IS NOT PLENARY\nIII. [MISSING]\na. SUBSTANTIVE ELECTION LAW PROVISIONS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS\nb. THE ROLE OF A STATE COURT IS TO ENSURE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES ARE FOLLOWED IN ENACTMENT OF FEDERAL ELECTION LAW BY A STATE LEGISLATURE",
        "reference": "III. THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT VIOLATED THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE WHEN IT SUBSTITUTED ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE STATE LEGISLATURE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Step One, Prong Two: What Is a \"Water\"?\nIII. Step Two: When Is a Water \"of the United States\"?\nIV. The Significant Nexus Test Should Be Rejected",
        "reference": "I. Step One, Prong One: When May a Wetland Be Treated as a \"Water\"?",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court's current jurisprudence recognizes a general need to \"complete\" a takings claim by first seeking just compensation under state law\nB. The extraordinary circumstances needed to overrule existing precedents are not present here\n1. For the most part, the Williamson County requirements have worked\n2. Nevertheless, excessive applications of the Williamson County second prong have occurred, which this Court can and should prevent\na. Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence must provide the floor when state courts decide state-law takings claims\nb. [MISSING]\nc. Plaintiffs and defendants should receive equivalent access to federal fora\nd. Williamson County's second prong should apply only to takings claims",
        "reference": "b. Takings plaintiffs should not be forced to use state procedures that, in practice, do not provide constitutionally meaningful avenues for obtaining compensation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT'S REFUSAL TO REVIEW PATENT CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR UNDERMINES THE RULE OF LAW\nA. When the Court Below Reopened the Case to Independently Review the Evidence as Part of Direct Review, It Rendered the Case Again Non-Final\nB. Failing to Apply the Full Range of Constitutional Protections to the Non-Final Case Undermined the Rule of Law",
        "reference": "I. UNDER ARIZONA LAW, INDEPENDENT REVIEW OCCURS AS PART OF THE DIRECT APPEAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. An officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle when the officer knows the registered owner cannot legally drive, absent information that the owner is not the driver.\nA. It is reasonable to suspect that the registered owner of a vehicle is the driver.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The rule applies absent information to the contrary.\nII. The Kansas Supreme Court adopted a standard more demanding than reasonable suspicion.\nIII. Investigative stops like the one here are reasonable and important to public safety.\nA. Investigative stops promote public safety.\nB. Investigative stops impose a minimal intrusion.\nC. Requiring officers to gather \"more evidence\" is impractical and would endanger law enforcement.",
        "reference": "B. The suspicion is objective and articulable.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The First Amendment does not supply judicially manageable standards for resolving how much politics is too much",
        "reference": "I. The Constitution entrusts the inherently political act of drawing district lines to the States and to Congress, not to the courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-196_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession that immediately inculpates the defendant based on the surrounding context\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Redaction does not eliminate a Confrontation Clause violation if the jury is likely to infer that the confessing defendant identified the nonconfessing defendant as an accomplice\nC. A court should consider context within the prosecution's knowledge and control when assessing whether the admission of a redacted confession violates the Confrontation Clause\nD. The admission of the confession in this case violated the Confrontation Clause",
        "reference": "A. Admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession that identifies the defendant as an accomplice violates the Confrontation Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. Laws that lack neutrality or general applicability are subject to strict scrutiny\n1. A law that regulates religious conduct but authorizes individualized exemptions or exempts comparable secular conduct lacks neutrality and general applicability\n2. A law also lacks neutrality and general applicability if the context of its adoption or enforcement indicates hostility to religion\nB. Philadelphia's policy is not neutral and generally applicable, but instead unconstitutionally discriminates against religion\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The context of the City's actions reveals impermissible hostility toward religion",
        "reference": "1. The City's refusal to extend its system of exemptions to Catholic Social Services discriminates against religion and violates the Free Exercise Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Physical-Presence Rule Is An Isolated And Outdated Doctrinal Error\nA. The physical-presence rule is indefensible\nB. Changed circumstances merit radically limiting or eliminating the physical-presence rule\nII. The Undisputed Facts Of This Case Demonstrate Quill's Dramatic Overbreadth\nIII. Quill Is Increasingly Unworkable\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. Respect For Congress's Role Requires Abrogating The Physical-Presence Rule\nVI. Respondents' Retroactivity Concerns Are Overstated",
        "reference": "IV. Respondents Overstate The Costs Of Nationwide Compliance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. In the \"Plan of the Convention,\" States Consented to Suits Brought Under Laws Passed Pursuant to Congress's War Powers\nII. The States' Consent to Suits Under the War Powers is Further Supported by Strong Historical Evidence that They Consented to Treaty-Based Suits\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Post-Ratification Evidence Supports the Conclusion that States Surrendered Their Immunity from Suits Under the War Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT MISCHARACTERIZE THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED PLANS\nII. THE COURTS BELOW CORRECTLY HELD THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PLAUSIBLY ALLEGE A BREACH OF ERISA'S DUTY OF PRUDENCE\nA. ERISA Requires Plausible Allegations Of Comparatively Imprudent Behavior\nB. Petitioners' Recordkeeping Claim Fails\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Petitioners' Attempt To Rely On Their Rejected Pleading Underscores The Deficiency Of The Claims At Issue\nIII. ALLOWING PETITIONERS' CLAIMS TO PROCEED WOULD UNDERMINE THE PROPER WORKINGS OF ERISA PLANS",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners' Investment Options Claim Fails",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION DOES NOT RENDER THE TCPA'S AUTODIALING BAN UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Underinclusiveness Inquiry Does Not Compel The Government To Treat Unlike Things Alike\nB. Random, Unsolicited Calls Banned By The TCPA Pose A Categorically Different Risk To Privacy Than Communications Solely To Collect Federal Debt\nC. Random, Unsolicited Calls Pose A More Significant Risk To Privacy Than Government-Debt Communications\nII. THE DECISION BELOW THREATENS COMPELLING GOVERNMENT INTERESTS\nA. The Government-Debt Exception Does Not Reflect Hostility Towards Particular Speakers Or Viewpoints\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Government Has A Compelling Interest In Protecting The Public Fisc And Helping Borrowers Stay Out Of Default",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5639_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. DISTRICT COURTS MUST ARTICULATE REASONS WHEN EXERCISING DISCRETION GRANTED BY CONGRESS\nA. The Duty To Consider Certain Factors Necessarily Entails The Duty Of Articulation\nB. The Need For Meaningful Appellate Review Demands Explanation\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Sentence-Reduction Decisions Are Fully Reviewable On Appeal\nII. THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPRESSIO UNIUS ARGUMENT IS INAPPLICABLE AND WOULD LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS\nIII. DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCE REDUCTIONS WILL ALWAYS DEMAND SOME EXPLANATION\nIV. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE REMANDED",
        "reference": "C. The Government Misconstrues The Court's Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act Under the Vanity Fair Test Promotes Access to Justice, Efficiency, and the Rule of Law.\nII. Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act Is Consistent with Its Plain Language and Objectives As Well As This Court's Precedent.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. A Substantial Effect on United States Commerce Is a Prerequisite to Application of the Lanham Act.\nB. United States Citizenship Is Relevant But Not Necessarily Dispositive.\nC. Actual or Potential Conflict with Foreign Trademark Rights Also Is an Important Consideration.",
        "reference": "III. The Second Circuit's Vanity Fair Test Correctly Applies the Lanham Act and This Court's Precedent and Appropriately Balances the Relevant Policy Interests.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Hold that Tribes Do Not Possess Sovereign Immunity for Off-Reservation Commercial Conduct\nIII. Judicial Restraint Favors Narrowing Common-Law Tribal Sovereign Immunity",
        "reference": "I. The Court's Creation of Common-Law Tribal Sovereign Immunity Has Profound Implications for the Separation of Powers and Federalism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-419_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 111 PROHIBITS A STATE FROM TAXING FEDERAL RETIREES MORE THAN STATE RETIREES UNLESS \"SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES\" JUSTIFY THE INCONSISTENT TREATMENT\nII. WEST VIRGINIA TAXES FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RETIREES MORE THAN STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT RETIREES, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW CONTRAVENES DAVIS\nA. Davis Does Not Turn On Whether A State Discriminates In Favor Of All Of Its Employees Or Only Some Of Them\nB. The Intent Behind A Discriminatory Tax Scheme Is Irrelevant\nC. A State's Treatment Of Private-Sector Retirees Is Irrelevant\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Unlike This Court's Bright-Line Rule, The State Court's Totality-Of-The-Circumstances Analysis Is Unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "A. Amex's market-power argument lacks merit\n1. Separate evidence of market power is unnecessary when a plaintiff proves actual adverse effects on competition\n2. The district court correctly held that separate evidence showed Amex's market power\nB. The facts found by the district court establish that the anti-steering rules adversely affect competition\n1. Amex does not deny that the anti-steering rules stifle price competition, block rivals, and stunt innovation\n2. The anti-steering rules have allowed all four networks to raise their fees above competitive levels\n3. [MISSING]\nC. Amex's services to cardholders and its services to merchants belong in separate antitrust markets\nD. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
        "reference": "3. Increased volume of credit-card transactions does not undermine the showing of anticompetitive effects",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-546_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's review is unnecessary because the decision below is consistent with Simmons v. Himmelreich and the FTCA\nA. In Simmons, this Court explained that the judgment bar's purpose is to prevent duplicative litigation\nB. The text and history of the FTCA support Simmons and the Sixth Circuit's decision\nC. [MISSING]\nII. There is no circuit split because the decision below does not conflict with the cases cited by the officers\nIII. The question presented in the petition does not warrant this Court's review, but even if it did, this case would make a poor vehicle to address it",
        "reference": "C. The officers' interpretation of the judgment bar would encourage, not prevent, duplicative litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Religion Clauses Guarantee All Denominations The Right To Select Those Who Will Educate Adherents And Their Children In The Tenets Of Their Faith\nB. The Ministerial Exception Provides A Critical Buffer Between Government And Faith-Based Institutions\nC. The Ministerial Exception Rests Primarily On The Religious Function Of The Employee\nD. Adopting A \"Rigid Formula\" For The Ministerial Exception Would Have Severe Harmful Consequences\n1. A Formulaic Approach Disfavors Religious Groups Whose Organization And Practices Differ From The Evangelical Lutheran Tradition\n2. [MISSING]\n3. A Formulaic Approach Will Harm Teachers Seeking To Participate In Religious Education And Parents Seeking To Secure A Religious Education For Their Children",
        "reference": "2. A Formulaic Approach Mires Civil Courts In Matters of Religious Doctrine And Practice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-467_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Undisputed Facts on Which the District Court Relied Are Sufficient for Summary Judgment\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Opinion Diverges from Four Circuits' Precedent on Potential Harm to Third Parties",
        "reference": "II. Summary Reversal Is Appropriate Because Precedent Had Not Clearly Prohibited Kisela's Actions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1432_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Retroactively Applying Minnesota's Statute Contravenes the Contracts Clause's Original Meaning\nII. Laws Impairing Private and Public Contracts Should Be Treated Alike\nIII. Minnesota's Law Violates the Contracts Clause as Currently Understood\nA. The Statute Substantially Impairs Contracts\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Petitioners' counterarguments are wrong\nB. Retroactive Application of Minnesota's Statute Does Not Further a Significant and Legitimate Purpose\nC. Retroactive Application of Minnesota's Statute Is Neither Reasonable nor Appropriate",
        "reference": "1. Automatically erasing the beneficiary from a life insurance contract is a substantial impairment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Effective Due Diligence and Farmer Interventions Reduce Liability Exposure\nB. Respondents' Aiding and Abetting Allegations Are Clearly Distinct from an Effective Due Diligence Program or Interventions to Reduce Child Labor\nC. Tony's Has Developed an Effective Sourcing Model That Is Replicable and Resists a Cocoa System Built on Modern Slavery and Illegal Child Labor\nII. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE FILLS A GAP IN U.S. LAW AND LEVELS THE PLAYING FIELD FOR TRANSNATIONAL COMPANIES, INCLUDING THOSE WITH U.S. SUBSIDIARIES\nA. There Is an Emerging Global Consensus in Favor of Binding Law for Corporate Liability on Both the National and Transnational Levels\nB. The Alien Tort Statute Fills a Gap in U.S. Law, Without Which the United States Would Become a Safe Harbor for Human Rights Abusers\nC. As Cocoa Companies Will Remain in the West African Market Regardless of the Outcome of this Case, Companies Operating in the Region Should Be Held to the Same Standards",
        "reference": "I. COMPANIES THAT SOURCE FROM COTE D'IVOIRE AND COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW HAVE NO REASON TO FEAR LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The debates over the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment itself show that the Framers understood the Amendment to require race neutrality\nB. The debates over the 1875 Act confirm that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes colorblindness\nC. The practice among the States underscores that the Fourteenth Amendment required race neutrality\nII. CONTRARY THEORIES DO NOT WITHSTAND SCRUTINY",
        "reference": "I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RENDERS THE CONSTITUTION COLORBLIND",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 13(b)'s Grant Of The Equitable Power Of Injunction Conveys The Power To Order The Return Of Unlawfully Taken Money\nA. In Traditional Equity Practice, A Court Hearing A Suit For An Injunction Could Order Restorative Monetary Relief\nB. Statutory Authority To Grant An \"Injunction\" Includes The Power To Grant Restorative Monetary Relief\nC. Section 13(b) Grants The District Courts Equitable Jurisdiction To Enter An Injunction And The Attendant Authority To Order Restorative Monetary Relief\nD. Congress Has Twice Ratified The Lower Court Rulings That Section 13(b) Allows Monetary Relief\nE. Tucker's Arguments That Section 13(b) Precludes Monetary Relief Are Incorrect\n1. Injunctions have always included restorative remedies\n2. [MISSING]\nII. Nothing In The FTC Act Provides A Clear Legislative Command To Restrict The Traditional Powers Of Equity\nA. Congress Created Two Enforcement Pathways In The FTC Act With Appropriate Statutory Text For Each\n1. Monetary remedies under Section 13(b) are compatible with Section 19, as its savings clauses make clear\n2. The provision for \"equitable relief\" in Section 5(l) does not restrict the scope of remedies under Section 13(b)\nB. Tucker Offers No Rational Explanation Why Congress Would Have Intended Wrongdoers To Keep The Proceeds Of Their Illegal Conduct\nIII. The Determination Of Monetary Remedies Below Was Correct",
        "reference": "2. Tucker cannot escape Porter, Mitchell, and the centuries of equity jurisprudence preceding them",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.79
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Secretary's implementation of the Medicare fraction embodies the best reading of the statute\nA. The statutory text strongly supports the Secretary's approach to the Medicare fraction\n1. The Medicare Act's text supports the Secretary's determination of who is \"entitled to\" Part A benefits\n2. The Secretary's approach is sound even under respondent's narrow reading of \"entitled to\"\nB. The statutory structure, history, and purpose reinforce the Secretary's interpretation of the text\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Respondent's assertions that the Secretary's approach undermines Congress's purposes lack merit\nII. The Secretary's approach at a minimum is reasonable and is entitled to deference",
        "reference": "1. The Secretary's interpretation best implements the statute's bifurcated, population-focused structure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Crime Victims Have the Right to Proceedings Free From Unreasonable Delay, Which Would Be Further Thwarted By the Granting of the Relief McKinney Seeks\nII. The Importance of \"Finality\" Militates Against the Granting of the Relief McKinney Seeks\nIII. Delays in Obtaining Justice Cause Significant Harm to Victims of Violent Crime\nIV. The Emotional Harm Caused to Victims by Delay, Which Is Recognized By State and Federal Law, Should Be Given Great Weight\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. There Was No Eddings Error in McKinney's Sentencing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief045.pdf",
        "text": "I. The president is not an \"officer of the United States\"\nII. President Trump did not \"engage in insurrection\"\nIII. Section 3 should be enforced only through Congress's chosen methods of enforcement\nIV. Section 3 cannot be used to deny President Trump access to the ballot\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. The Colorado Supreme Court violated the Electors Clause and the Colorado Election Code",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO ADDRESS ABSTENTION BASED ON INTERNATIONAL COMITY IN ORDER TO ANSWER THE QUESTION PRESENTED\nII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DOCTRINE OF ABSTENTION BASED ON INTERNATIONAL COMITY CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND THREATENS TO SUPPLANT MORE NARROWLY TAILORED DOCTRINES OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The Second Circuit's Abstention Doctrine Conflicts With This Court's Prescriptive Comity Decisions\n2. The Second Circuit's Abstention Doctrine Conflicts With This Court's Adjudicative Comity Decisions\nB. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ABSTENTION DOCTRINE THREATENS TO SUPPLANT MORE NARROWLY TAILORED DOCTRINES OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY",
        "reference": "A. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ABSTENTION DOCTRINE CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FTC Act Does Not Impliedly Strip Jurisdiction Over Axon's Claims\nA. Recent Jurisdiction-Stripping Precedent Breaks With Historical Practice\nB. Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional and Ultra Vires Challenges to FTC Administrative Prosecutions\nC. Case Law Does Not Bar the Courthouse Doors to Axon's Constitutional Claims\nD. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over At Least Some Ultra Vires Claims\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. FTC's Rigged Administrative Process Irreparably Harms Axon\nIV. FTC's Unconstitutional Structure Threatens Individual Liberty",
        "reference": "II. Exhaustion Before the FTC is Futile For Axon",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ROE COURT MISINTERPRETED THE MEANING OF THE WORD \"PERSON\" AS FOUND IN THE SECOND AND THIRD CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT\nII. THE CORPUS OF SUPREME COURT OPINIONS FROM 1850-1880 SUGGESTS THAT AN UNBORN CHILD IS A PERSON WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION\nIII. THE CORPUS OF HISTORICAL AMERICAN ENGLISH AND THE HANSARD CORPUS SUGGESTS THAT AN UNBORN CHILD IS A PERSON WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. STATUTES OUTLAWING ABORTION IN THE STATES IN 1868 CONFIRM THAT AN UNBORN CHILD IN A MOTHER'S WOMB WAS A PERSON WHEN THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT WAS RATIFIED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1415(l) Requires Exhaustion Only When The Remedy Sought Is Available In The IDEA Administrative Process\nB. Section 1415(l) Establishes A Sound And Workable Policy\nC. The Sixth Circuit's Analysis Is Flawed\nII. SECTION 1415(l) DOES NOT REQUIRE CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES TO REJECT SETTLEMENTS OF IDEA CLAIMS\nA. A Settlement Conclusively Resolving An IDEA Administrative Claim Qualifies As Exhaustion\n1. Dismissal Based On An IDEA Settlement Is The Preferred Resolution Of The IDEA Administrative Process\n2. The Sixth Circuit Mistakenly Adopted An \"Aggrieve[ment]\" Requirement For Exhaustion\nB. Further Exhaustion Would Be Futile And Is Not Required In These Circumstances\n1. Section 1415(l) Incorporates A Futility Exception\n2. Requiring Further Exhaustion Beyond An IDEA Settlement Is Futile And Inflicts Needless Harm On Children With Disabilities",
        "reference": "I. THE IDEA DOES NOT REQUIRE EXHAUSTION WHEN A NON-IDEA CLAIM SEEKS RELIEF THAT THE IDEA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. AT THE HEART OF A STATE'S SOVEREIGNTY IS ITS CHOSEN METHODOLOGY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JUDGES ARE NOT \"POLICYMAKERS\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. An invention is \"on sale\" when offered for sale\nB. Congress would act expressly if it sought to change the term's settled meaning\nC. Congress retained the term of art \"on sale\" and did not indirectly change its meaning\nD. Congress's treatment of \"public\" disclosures in the AIA confirms that it did not upset the meaning of \"on sale.\"\nE. The statute's drafting history shows that Congress intended to preserve the on-sale bar's established meaning\nF. Helsinn's position would allow patentees to commercialize their inventions for years, and perhaps indefinitely, before seeking patent protection\nG. The on-sale bar's settled interpretation is consistent with the policies served by other provisions of the AIA\nII. Helsinn's sale of the patented pharmaceutical product to its distributor made the invention available to the public\nA. A sale or offer that discloses the claimed invention to a commercial purchaser makes the invention available to the public\nB. Helsinn's sale to its distributor made the invention available to the public",
        "reference": "I. The America Invents Act did not narrow the well-established meaning of the on-sale bar by adding a new category of invalidating prior art",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. AWF's Use of Goldsmith's Photograph Was Not Transformative\nA. Transformative Uses Necessarily Borrow from the Original\nB. The Second Circuit Correctly Found No Transformativeness\nC. AWF's Policy Concerns Are Illusory\nII. AWF's Test Would Upend Copyright\nA. Text, Precedent, History, Structure, and Purpose Refute AWF's Test\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. AWF's Test is Unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S TITLE-BASED APPLICATION OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE RELIGION CLAUSES\nA. The Religion Clauses Forbid The Government From Controlling Ecclesiastical Appointments\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH COULD DISPROPORTIONATELY HARM RELIGIOUS MINORITIES\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis Threatens The Religious Autonomy Of Minority Faiths\nB. Muslim-Americans Could Be Especially Burdened By A Title-Focused Analysis",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis Threatens Religious Freedom",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Children urgently need access to more, not fewer, foster parents and families\nII. The Fourteenth Amendment secures children's interests in joining and forming families for their protection, education, and well-being\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The protection of children's interests in familial relationships is within the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning\nC. The Due Process Clause bars Respondents from frustrating children's ability to form familial relationships",
        "reference": "A. The Fourteenth Amendment's framers were concerned about state hostility to familial rights and children's interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "District Court Proceedings Should Be Stayed During Non-Frivolous Appeals From The Denial Of Arbitration\nA. Requiring Parties to Litigate the Underlying Claims During an Appeal Vitiates the Benefits of Arbitration Protected by the FAA\n1. Congress enacted the FAA to enable parties to avoid the disadvantages of litigation in court\n2. Denying a stay pending appeal subjects parties to the very disadvantages of litigation that the FAA entitles them to avoid\nB. District Court Proceedings Should Virtually Always Be Stayed During Appeals of a Denial of Arbitration\n1. Stays pending appeal are automatic in comparable interlocutory appeals\n2. The traditional stay factors will virtually always favor a stay until arbitrability is resolved\na. [MISSING]\nb. The defendant would be irreparably harmed by the denial of a stay in any appeal from the denial of arbitration\nc. The balance of the equities always favors a stay pending appeal\nd. The public interest favors a stay pending appeal",
        "reference": "a. Non-frivolous appeals would involve a serious question as to whether the claim belongs in arbitration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. EXCLUDING A GOOD FAITH DEFENSE FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS HARMS END-OF-LIFE PATIENT CARE",
        "reference": "I. THE LAW PROVIDES A GOOD FAITH DEFENSE FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1268_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The D.C. Circuit's Decision To Review The Imposition Of Punitive Damages Does Not Warrant This Court's Review\nA. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Pioneer And, Even If It Were, The Inconsistency Would Be Inconsequential Because The Decision Is Sound On Alternative Grounds\nB. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Consistent With Decisions Of Other Circuits And This Court\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Consistent With Decisions Of This Court, Including Altmann\nB. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Neither Creates Nor Deepens Any Conflict Among The Circuits\nC. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Irrelevant To Future section 1605A Cases",
        "reference": "II. The D.C. Circuit's Decision That Punitive Damages May Not Be Imposed Retroactively Under section 1605A Does Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-530_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The History Surrounding The RRTA's Enactment Demonstrates That \"Money Remuneration\" Does Not Extend To Stock\nA. Before The RRTA's Enactment, Railroad Employee Pensions Were Tied To Regular Pay, Base Pay, Or Base Salary\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Insofar As FICA Has Any Relevance, Congress Has Similarly Excluded Nonmonetary Remuneration For Domestic Service And Agricultural Workers",
        "reference": "B. Congress Enacted The RRTA To Secure Pre-Existing Railroad Pension Plans",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-882_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ADEA Requires Federal Employment Decisions To Be Made Free From Any Age Discrimination\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 633a(a)'s Link To The Title VII Federal-Sector Provision Confirms That But-For Causation Is Not Required\n1. Congress Patterned Section 633a(a) On Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision\n2. Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Has Never Required But-For Causation\n3. Section 633a(a) Embodied The Prevailing Understanding Of Title VII's Federal-Sector Provision Set Forth In Binding Regulations\nC. The EEOC's Interpretation Is Entitled To Chevron Deference\nII. The Government's Defense Of A But-For Causation Requirement Lacks Merit\nA. The Text Does Not Contain A But-For Causation Requirement\nB. The ADEA's Private-Sector Provision Has No Bearing On The Question Presented",
        "reference": "A. Section 633a(a)'s Plain Language Makes It Unlawful To Disfavor Employees On The Basis Of Their Age",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CLEAN AIR ACT CANNOT BEAR THE PANEL'S OVERREACHING INTERPRETATION\nA. This Case Concerns the Proper Frame for the EPA's Derivation of Emission Limits\nB. Expanding the EPA's Frame to the Entire Economy Requires Unambiguous Text\nC. The Act's Text and Structure Limit the EPA's Frame to the Individual Source\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Reinstating the CPP Harms Petitioners\nB. Invalidation of the ACE Rule Also Harms Petitioners",
        "reference": "II. THIS CASE REMAINS JUSTICIABLE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-248_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State Is Not a Party and Petitioners Are Entitled to Intervene in Any Event\nII. No Presumption of Adequate Representation Applies\nA. Petitioners and the State Board Have Different Interests\nB. Even if Petitioners and the State Board Had Identical Interests, That Would Not Justify Presuming That the State's Designated Agents Are Adequately Represented\nC. That Petitioners Are Seeking to Intervene on the Side of Existing Governmental Parties Does Not Justify Applying a Presumption of Adequate Representation\nD. Rule 24 Permits States to Speak Through More Than One Agent in Federal Court\nIII. Adequacy of Representation Is an Issue of Law That Should Be Reviewed De Novo\nIV. Petitioners Are Entitled to Intervene\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The State Board Is Not an Adequate Representative of the State's Interest.",
        "reference": "A. Petitioners Are Authorized to Assert North Carolina's Interest in the Validity of the State's Laws",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Applying history and tradition in this context requires an examination of Minnesota tax foreclosures, not foreclosures of any kind",
        "reference": "I. This Court has repeatedly held that federal courts should not use the Takings Clause to federalize the scope of state property rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-935_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE DEEPLY DIVIDED ON BOTH QUESTIONS PRESENTED\nA. The 7-2 Circuit Split On The Standard For Reviewing Habitual-Residence Determinations Warrants Review Now\nB. [MISSING]\nII. HABITUAL RESIDENCE IS AN IMPORTANT AND FREQUENTLY RECURRING ISSUE",
        "reference": "B. The 4-1 Circuit Split On The Standard For Establishing An Infant's Habitual Residence Also Warrants Review Now",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9572_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Courts must be vigilant in ferreting out racial discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory challenge\nA. Racial discrimination in the administration of justice is intolerable\nB. Courts must diligently review evidence that a peremptory strike was racially discriminatory\n1. Batson requires careful consideration of all evidence of racial discrimination\n2. [MISSING]\nII. The Mississippi Supreme Court failed to consider an important indicium of discriminatory intent and failed to evaluate the cumulative evidence of racial discrimination\nA. Evans' history of prior discrimination was proximate, repeated, and egregious\nB. The Mississippi Supreme Court failed to consider Evans' history of discrimination\n1. Perseverative error\n2. The majority's reasons for preservation\nC. The Mississippi Supreme Court failed to consider the cumulative evidence of discrimination\nIII. Abundant evidence supports an inference of purposeful discrimination\nA. The strength of the prima facie case\nB. The history of discrimination\nC. Demeanor\nD. Disparate questioning\nE. Factual misrepresentations\nF. Implausible reasons\nG. Comparison with accepted white jurors\nIV. Consideration of the totality of the circumstances compels the conclusion that Evans' facially race-neutral reasons were pretextual\nA. Reason by reason, strike by strike\nB. The whole story",
        "reference": "2. The persuasiveness of all the evidence of racial discrimination must be assessed cumulatively",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.95
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1472_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. There Should Be No \"Tax Exceptionalism\" For Purposes Of Determining Whether Equitable Tolling Applies To A Statutory Deadline For Filing Suit\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Many of the Statutory Deadlines Affecting Court Review of Various IRS Determinations and Decisions Are Amenable to Equitable Tolling\nD. The Doctrine of Equitable Tolling is Particularly Appropriate For the 30 Day Period for Filing a Petition With the Tax Court Under Section 6330(d)(1)\nE. The Failure of This Court to Allow Equitable Tolling of the time period under Section 6330(d)(1) Would Effectively Deprive Many U.S. Taxpayers Living Abroad of the Ability to Challenge Determinations Under Section 6330(d)(1) in the Tax Court",
        "reference": "B. This Court Has Allowed Equitable Tolling at the Request of the IRS; What is Sauce for the Goose is Sauce for the Gander",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-96_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Sovereign Immunity from Mandamus Actions to Compel Performance of Ministerial Duties.\nA. English Common Law Did Not Recognize Sovereign Immunity from Mandamus, Which Issued in the Sovereign's Name.\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Antebellum Decisions of This Court and State Supreme Courts.\n2. The Postwar Era and Federal Mandamus Against State Officials.\n3. Larson and Pennhurst Preserve the Ministerial Duty Basis for Mandamus.\nC. Puerto Rico Courts Issue Mandamus to Compel the Ministerial Function to Make Public Records Available.\nII. Affirming on Mandamus Grounds Avoids Injecting Uncertainty into Access to Information Suits.",
        "reference": "B. The Court's Opinions from Marbury to Pennhurst Find No Sovereign Immunity from Mandamus to Perform Ministerial Duties.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. In Deciding Federal Preemption Issues, the Atomic Energy Act Directs Courts To Examine Whether the State Acted for Radiological Safety Purposes\nIII. The Decision Below Conflicts With the Federal Government's Exclusive Regulatory Authority over the Radiological Risk of Nuclear Materials, on which the Nuclear Industry Has Long Relied\nIV. A Healthy Nuclear Industry Is Vital for National Security",
        "reference": "I. The Federal Government Occupies the Field of Nuclear Safety, Regulating the Entire Lifecycle of Radiological Materials from Uranium Processing to the Disposition of Spent Fuel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Treaties Guarantee Important Rights, But Not a Particular Standard of Living from Fishing\n1. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unsupported by Treaty Language\n2. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unsupported by History and Understanding\n3. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unsupported by Precedent\na. The Fishing Vessel Court refused to measure the treaty right by a standard of living\nb. The implied water rights doctrine of Winters v. United States depends on circumstances absent here\n4. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unnecessary\n5. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unworkable\nB. The State Should Be Allowed to Raise Equitable Defenses Against the Federal Government\n1. Powerful equities support the State given the federal role in designing and approving the culverts at issue\n2. Equitable defenses limit remedies, not treaty rights\n3. This Court's precedent supports the availability of equitable defenses here\nC. The Broad, Systemwide Injunction Here Ignores this Court's Legal Rules Limiting Injunctive Relief\n1. The injunction requires the State to replace culverts that will have no impact\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The injunction requires the State to replace culverts even where there is no evidence that the culvert has impacted tribal harvests\n4. The injunction ignores the equities, forcing the State to shoulder the entire burden of fixing problems created largely by the federal government",
        "reference": "2. The injunction requires the State to waste precious funds that could be better spent on other salmon-recovery efforts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.76
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1599_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Interpreting section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to Require No Notice to Third Parties Whose Bank Records Are Summoned Raises Serious Fourth Amendment Concerns\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Under the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, This Court Should Interpret section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to Avoid Serious Constitutional Problems",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-961_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are not entitled to relief under 10 U.S.C. 973(b)\nA. Section 973(b) does not prohibit military officers from serving on the CMCR\n1. A CMCR judgeship is not a \"civil office\" within the meaning of Section 973(b)\n2. Military officers are \"authorized by law\" to serve as CMCR judges\nB. Even if Section 973(b) prohibited military officers from serving on the CMCR, Congress expressly foreclosed the relief petitioners seek\nII. Simultaneous service on a CCA and the CMCR does not raise constitutional questions\nIII. This Court lacks jurisdiction in Dalmazzi and Cox, but has jurisdiction in Ortiz\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction\nIV. Even if this Court has jurisdiction in Dalmazzi and Cox, it should not disturb the CAAF's discretionary denials of review",
        "reference": "A. This Court lacks jurisdiction in Dalmazzi and Cox because Section 1259(3) does not authorize review of the CAAF's denial of discretionary review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs' ATS Claims Are Extraterritorial\nA. An ATS Claim Is Extraterritorial If The Conduct Relevant To the Statute's \"Focus\" Occurred In a Foreign Country\nB. The ATS's \"Focus\" Is The Principal Violation of International Law, And That Conduct And Resulting Injury Occurred In C\u00f4te d'Ivoire\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Aiding-and-abetting conduct is not the statute's focus\nC. Even If Aiding-and-Abetting Conduct Is Relevant To the \"Focus\" Inquiry, Plaintiffs' Claims Are Extraterritorial\nD. General Allegations Of Headquarters Oversight Cannot Displace The Extraterritoriality Presumption\nII. Domestic Corporations Are Not Subject To ATS Liability\nA. There Is No Specific, Universal, And Obligatory Norm Of Corporate Liability\nB. The ATS's Text And History Do Not Support Corporate Liability\nC. Sosa's Cautionary Factors Preclude Recognition Of Corporate Liability\n1. Separation of powers\n2. Interference with foreign relations",
        "reference": "1. Plaintiffs' argument for a \"non-geographic\" focus is nonsensical",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Petition Should Be Denied Because There Is No Circuit Split\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Second Circuit Correctly Applied Dudenhoeffer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit Failed To Properly Apply Its Decision Retroactively, Causing Significant Delay And Waste\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Although Rare Prospective Judicial Making May Still Be Permissible Under Chevron Oil, That Doctrine Does Not Support The Federal Circuit's Remands\nIV. Other Circuit Courts Have Similarly Shown Confusion Surrounding Retroactivity Doctrine In Recent Cases",
        "reference": "II. Lucia Does Not Support The Federal Circuit's Remands Because Any Fix In Lucia Was Administrative Rather Than Judicial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Safeco Objective Standard Applies to the FCA's Scienter Requirement.\nA. The Text of the FCA Supports an Objective Scienter Standard with Respect to a Company's Knowledge of Its Legal Obligations.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. An Objective Knowledge Standard Protects the Retail Pharmacy Industry from Excessive and Unfair False Claims Act Actions.\nII. Using the Safeco Standard, This Court Should Affirm.\nA. Respondents' Conduct Was Objectively Reasonable.\nB. No Authoritative Guidance Existed to Warn Respondents Away from Their Interpretation.\nC. The Erroneous Analysis of Garbe Reinforces the Need for an Objective Scienter Standard.",
        "reference": "B. An Objective Scienter Standard Respects Due Process.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-292_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Out of respect for the person, the common law recognized that an arrest could be either physical or constructive",
        "reference": "I. This case exemplifies a bigger problem: lower court neglect of common-law history in gauging searches and seizures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S CATEGORICAL RULE BARRING DAMAGES BASED ON FOREIGN SALES UNDER section 284 IS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF SUPERSEDING CAUSATION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Federal Circuit's Categorical Rule Barring Recovery of Damages for Foreign Sales Also Contravenes Goulds, Dowagiac, and its Own Precedent\nC. Non-Infringement Often Can Be Relevant to the Calculation of Damages under section 284 and the Determination of Liability under section 271",
        "reference": "A. The Federal Circuit's Categorical Rule Barring Recovery of Damages for Foreign Sales is Inconsistent with this Court's Precedent on Superseding Causation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. INNOVATION DEPENDS ON A STABLE PATENT SYSTEM\nII. ELIMINATING OR CURTAILING ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL WOULD DESTABILIZE THE PATENT SYSTEM\nA. Assignees Have Long Relied on Assignor Estoppel\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Assignor Estoppel Is More, Not Less, Important in the Context of Former Employees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE U.S. CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A FLOOR OF PROTECTION. STATES CANNOT PROVIDE LESS\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE WHOLE POINT OF 42 U.S.C. section 1983 WAS TO PROVIDE FEDERAL COURTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS\nIV. STATE COURTS POSSESS NO MAGICAL ABILITY TO APPLY LOCAL LAW THAT ALLOWS THEM TO EVADE FEDERAL COURT PROTECTION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS",
        "reference": "II. STATE COURTS CANNOT SERVE AS GATEKEEPERS, BLOCKING THE ENTRY OF PROPERTY OWNERS TO FEDERAL COURTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-96_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Questions Concerning Puerto Rico's Sovereign Immunity Do Not Create Vehicle Issues\nB. There Is No Serious Question Concerning \"Arm of the State\"\nC. There Are No \"Procedural Roadblocks\"\nII. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES A CIRCUIT SPLIT\nIII. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS IMPORTANT",
        "reference": "I. THIS CASE IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE FOR DECIDING THE QUESTION PRESENTED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text and History of the Takings Clause Demonstrate That the Clause Applies Only to the Direct Appropriation of Property or the Functional Equivalent Thereof\nA. The Takings Clause Was Originally Understood to Apply Only to the Direct Physical Appropriation of Property\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Under This Court's Precedents, Federal Strike Protections and Associated Preemption of State Law Tort Claims Do Not Effect a Taking.",
        "reference": "B. This Court Has Since Held That the Takings Clause Also Applies to the Functional Equivalent of a Physical Appropriation of Property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under this Court's precedent, petitioner's claim can proceed in state court only if the NLRB first determines the challenged conduct is not protected\nA. Respondent's strike was arguably protected\n1. The issuance of the General Counsel's complaint establishes that the conduct here is at least arguably protected\n2. Irrespective of the General Counsel's complaint, respondent's conduct was arguably protected\nB. Garmon's local feeling exception does not apply\n1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct\n2. Should this Court choose to extend the local feeling exception to arguably protected conduct, it still would not apply here\nII. Garmon does not need revision\nA. Congress has effectively ratified Garmon, which serves an important function\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner's suggestion that Garmon departs from \"ordinary preemption\" principles is also wrong\nIII. The Takings Clause is not implicated here",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's suggestion that Garmon departs from the NLRA's plain text ignores the Act's jurisdictional provisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.42
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1676_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Hudson's Reliance on Toxicology Reports Prepared by Another Expert Was Consistent with Williams v. Illinois\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Even if the Introduction of the Toxicology Reports Was in Error, That Error Was Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Temporary physical invasions are subject to a far more stringent level of review than regulatory actions that merely restrict an owner's use of property\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Temporary physical invasions are presumptive takings\nII. This Court should reaffirm the categorical difference between physical invasions and regulations of property use",
        "reference": "A. Regulatory taking doctrine presents a higher bar for property owners than physical invasions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1094_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Lambert's Appeal Was Timely Under the Federal Rules and This Court's Longstanding Precedents\nA. Lambert Timely Sought Reconsideration Under Federal Civil Rule 59(e) and Under the District Court's Order, Therefore Postponing the Time to Appeal Until After the District Court Disposed of the Reconsideration Motion\n1. Lambert's Written and Oral Requests for Reconsideration Were Timely Under Rule 59(e)\n2. Because Lambert Filed a Rule 23(f) Petition Within 14 Days of the Denial of His Timely Filed Reconsideration Motion, the Appeal Was Timely\na. This Court's Longstanding Precedents Confirm that Lambert's Appeal Was Timely\nb. The Federal Rules Confirm that Lambert's Appeal Was Timely\nB. Lambert's Appeal Was Also Timely Based on the Plain Language of Rule 23\n1. The District Court's Reconsideration Decision Altered the Previous Decertification Order\n2. A Reconsideration Decision Triggers the 14-Day Period Under the Plain Language of Rule 23(f)\nII. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Recognized that Nonjurisdictional Claim-Processing Rules Are Generally Subject to Equitable Exceptions\nA. The History of the Federal Rules Demonstrates that the Rules Are Designed to Be Flexible and Subject to Equitable Exceptions\nB. The Federal Rules Further Demonstrate that They Are to Be Interpreted Against the Backdrop of Equitable Principles\nC. This Court's Precedents Demonstrate that Nonjurisdictional Claim-Processing Rules Can Be Subject to Equitable Exceptions\nD. Court-of-Appeals Case Law Further Shows that Nonjurisdictional Claim-Processing Rules Can Be Subject to Equitable Exceptions\nIII. Rule 23(f) Is Subject to Equitable Exceptions Such as Equitable Tolling\nA. The Federal Rules Confirm that Rule 23(f) Is Subject to Equitable Exceptions\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Appellate Rule 3(a) Confirms that Equitable Exceptions Can Be Applied to Rule 23(f)\n3. Applying Equitable Exceptions to Rule 23(f) Is Fully Consistent with Appellate Rules 26(b) and 2\n4. Other Federal Rules Further Confirm that Rule 23(f) Is Subject to Equitable Exceptions\n5. Nutraceutical's Concessions Highlight that Rule 23(f) Is Subject to Equitable Exceptions\n6. Nutraceutical's Cited Authority Does Not Demonstrate that Rule 23(f) Is Insusceptible to Equitable Exceptions\n7. Tolling Rule 23(f)'s Time Prescription During the Pendency of a Timely Filed Reconsideration Motion Fulfills the Purposes of the Rules, Whereas Failure to Do So Would Lead to Senseless Inefficiencies\nB. The Importance of Interlocutory Review of Class-Certification Decisions Further Confirms that Rule 23(f) Is Subject to Equitable Exceptions\nIV. Nutraceutical's Challenge to the Ninth Circuit's Factbound Application of Equitable Exceptions Here Is Not Fairly Included Within the Question Presented, and, in Any Event, Is Without Merit\nA. Nutraceutical's Factbound Challenge Is Beyond the Scope of the Question Presented and Therefore Should Not Be Considered\nB. Even if Considered, Nutraceutical's Factbound Challenge Is Without Merit\n1. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Concluded that Equitable Tolling Is Warranted Here\n2. The Facts of This Case Are Directly Analogous to Thompson, Which Applied the Unique-Circumstances Doctrine",
        "reference": "1. The Purpose of Rule 23(f) Confirms that Tolling Is Available",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.97
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-442_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. Petitioner requested routine DNA analysis\nB. The potential contamination of the belt is typical in DNA analysis\ni. TXDPS has protocols for accepting and testing unsealed evidence\nii. [MISSING]\niii. TXDPS does not require that law enforcement to wear gloves when collecting evidence\nC. TXDPS has protocols for determining true donors even in cases of contamination\nD. The software can accurately determine true donors and non-donors when multiple unknown individuals are present in a mixture",
        "reference": "ii. TXDPS has protocols for accepting evidence that is comingled",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals' decision that petitioner lacks appellate standing is correct and does not warrant review\nII. The court of appeals' decision that the religious exemption is likely unlawful is correct and does not warrant this Court's review\nA. The court of appeals' decision that the agencies likely violated the APA when promulgating the religious exemption is correct and does not warrant this Court's review\nB. The court of appeals' decision that the agencies likely lacked statutory authority for the religious exemption is correct and does not warrant this Court's review\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The scope of the preliminary injunction does not warrant this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Affirming the Tenth Circuit's opinion will rightfully undercut EPA's ability to arbitrarily award secret financial windfalls to small refineries that escape judicial review and disrupt biofuels markets",
        "reference": "I. The ability of EPA to issue sporadic, unforeseeable, and largely unreviewable exemptions to small refineries imposes significant economic damage on biofuels producers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-921_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Legal Personality of the Catholic Church in Puerto Rico has been recognized by this Court\nB. Its Dependencies Act as \"Part of\" the Catholic Church\nC. The Catholic Church Was Sued and Appeared in the Present Case, Thus Waiving any Defense Related to Its Existence\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Dioceses Were Aware of the Implications of the Injunction\nF. The Catholic Church did not present Any Evidence as to its Legal Personality\nG. The Court of First Instance Ruled that the Catholic Church Disobeyed the Injunction\nH. The Issue Regarding the Catholic Church's Lack of Legal Personality Was Untimely Raised and Was Based on Canon Law, Which is Not Binding on Puerto Rico Courts\nI. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court's Ruling is Interlocutory in Nature\nJ. The Attachment Order Was Served on Banks holding Monies Belonging to the Archdiocese; No Other Dioceses Were Directly Affected\nK. The Catholic Church Filed for Bankruptcy\nL. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court Had Already Ruled the Catholic Church is Obliged to Pay if Schools Lack Separate Legal Personality\nM. Petitioners' Position is Wholly Inconsistent with Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church\nN. Canon Law is the Internal Regulation of the Catholic Church and is Not Binding in Court Cases Dealing with Contractual Matters Unrelated To Religion\nO. Under Canon Law, all Churches in Puerto Rico are Joined in an Ecclesiastical Province, which Enjoys Legal Personality\nP. The Court Should Not Issue a Certiorari in this Case\nQ. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico Did Not Intrude Into Church Matters\nR. The Catholic Church Cannot be the Judge of its Own Obligations",
        "reference": "D. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico Issued an Injunction Directed against the Catholic Church",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Deny the Second Question\nIII. The Case Is a Poor Vehicle",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Deny the First Question",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-938_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Jackson and Its Amici Misconstrue the Bullard Finality Standard\nII. The Majority Rule Rests on a Procedural Anachronism\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Orders Denying Stay Relief Are Not Analogous to Orders Denying Permanent Injunctive Relief\nB. Even if Stay-Relief Denials Are Analogous to Injunctions, That Does Not Mean Such Orders Are Final\nIV. Jackson and Its Amici Rely on Invalid Arguments Against the Single-Appeal Rule\nV. Treating the Denial Order as Interlocutory Will Benefit, Not Harm, the Bankruptcy System\nVI. Ritzen's Claim Remains Viable",
        "reference": "III. The Permanent-Injunction Analogy Fails",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Class Certification Order Violated Article III and Rule 23\nII. Class Action Lawyers Take Advantage of Statutory Damages Provisions to Generate Astronomical Settlement Demands\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. No-injury class actions have no social value\nB. No-injury class actions are unfair to defendants and induce nuisance settlements",
        "reference": "III. Classes that Include Uninjured Class Members Result in Class-Action Litigation at its Most Pathological",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The TCPA is Congress' Answer to the Robocall Epidemic\nA. The TCPA's Coverage of Autodialers Calling Stored Telephone Numbers is Essential to Protect Privacy and Stop Denial of Service Attacks\nB. Autodialed Calls Result in Hangups and \"Dead Air\"\nC. Congress was Aware of Autodialers Targeting Stored Numbers\nD. Congress Intended the TCPA to be Simple to Apply\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The D.C. Circuit's Concern with Smartphones was Alleviated when it Discarded the FCC's Expansive Interpretation of Capacity\nB. Ordinary Smartphone Usage is Not Automatic Dialing",
        "reference": "II. Ordinary Smartphone Usage is Not Subject to the TCPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Elections Clause is not the source of state legislatures' redistricting authority\nA. The text and original public meaning of the phrase \"Manner of holding Elections\" suggest that redistricting has nothing to do with how congressional elections should be held\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Historical context shows that the dominant purpose of the Elections Clause was simply to ensure that states held congressional elections in the first place\nD. This Court's precedents assuming \u2014 without analysis \u2014 that the Elections Clause includes the power to draw congressional districts are entitled to little or no weight\nII. State legislatures may be vested with redistricting authority under traditional Tenth Amendment principles",
        "reference": "B. The structure of the Constitution supports an interpretation that redistricting falls outside the scope of the Elections Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The three-year limitations period in 29 U.S.C. 1113(2) begins to run only when a plaintiff is actually aware of the breach or violation\nA. \"Actual knowledge\" means actual, not constructive, knowledge\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The history of the statute confirms that \"actual knowledge\" does not encompass constructive knowledge\n3. The structure and context of the statute confirm that \"actual knowledge\" excludes constructive knowledge\nB. Petitioners' contrary view is inconsistent with the statute and should be rejected\n1. Petitioners' reliance on the doctrine of willful blindness is misplaced\n2. ERISA's disclosure regime does not support reading \"actual knowledge\" in Section 1113(2) to include constructive knowledge of the content of plan disclosures\n3. Petitioners' reading would frustrate enforcement of ERISA by fiduciaries and the Secretary\n4. Petitioners' policy arguments are unfounded",
        "reference": "1. The plain meaning of \"actual knowledge\" is knowledge a person in fact has or acquires",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Second Amendment, by its Text, Protects the Right to Bear Arms in Public\nA. The Plain Language of the Second Amendment Places \"Keep\" and \"Bear\" on Equal Footing\nB. The Original Public Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms Confirms the Right Extends Outside the Home\nII. Traditional Regulation of the Right to Bear Arms \u2014 Surety Laws and the Massachusetts Model\nA. The Text of the Surety Laws Imposes a Minimal, Individualized, Post-Offence Restriction on Public Carry\nB. The Historical Background of the Massachusetts Model Evidences a Longstanding Protection of Peaceable Carry\nC. Nineteenth Century Application and Treatment of Surety Laws\ni. [MISSING]\nii. The Rare, but Discriminatory, Enforcement of Surety Laws\niii. The Public Understanding of the Right to Bear Arms in Surety Law Jurisdictions",
        "reference": "i. Subsequent Legislation Confirms the Right to Peaceful Public Carry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Rule 23 And Article III Are Satisfied Even When Not All Class Members Can Prove Injury At The Class Certification Stage Of A Case\nC. Rule 23 Gives The District Court Discretion To Handle Individual Questions Concerning Potentially Uninjured Class Members\nD. The District Court Correctly Applied Existing Rule 23(a)(3) Standards In Certifying The Class\nIV.",
        "reference": "A. Whether Every Member Of A Class Has To Show Article III Standing At The Rule 23 Stage Of The Case Is Not Before The Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Longstanding Principles Of Criminal Law Counsel In Favor Of Adopting A Good Faith Medical Purpose Standard\nII. The Vagueness Of Section 841(a)(1) And 21 C.F.R. section 1306.04(a) Provide Additional Support For Requiring A Good Faith Medical Purpose Standard\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Statute And Regulation's Imprecision Invites Arbitrary Enforcement",
        "reference": "A. The Statute And Regulation's Lack Of Clear Guidelines Presents Grave Notice Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The City's limitations on off-premises signs are a permissible regulation of the place and manner of advertisements\nA. The ordinance is content-neutral under this Court's time, place, or manner decisions\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Any constitutional infirmities in the ordinance would not justify its facial invalidation",
        "reference": "B. The City's ordinance serves significant governmental interests and leaves ample alternative channels for communication",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The court of appeals correctly held that neither Section 102(b) nor the merger doctrine forecloses copyright protection\nB. Further review is not warranted\nII. The fair-use question does not warrant review\nA. The court of appeals correctly held that no reasonable jury could find fair use on this record\nB. The court of appeals' fact-bound decision on fair use does not warrant further review",
        "reference": "I. The copyrightability question does not warrant review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "Resentencing In A Trial Court Is The Sole Appropriate Remedy When A Sentencer Was Precluded At Trial From Giving Meaningful Consideration To A Capital Defendant's Significant Mitigating Evidence\nA. This Court Has Never Permitted An Appellate Court To Cure A Death Verdict In Which The Sentencer At Trial Was Precluded From Giving Meaningful Consideration To Significant Mitigating Evidence\nB. Resentencing In The Trial Court Is Essential In This Case Because The Trial Record Does Not Fairly Capture McKinney's Mitigating Evidence\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Even If Appellate Review Of McKinney's Death Sentence Could Potentially Cure The Error In This Case, The Arizona Supreme Court's Independent Review Again Failed To Give Appropriate Consideration To McKinney's Mitigating Evidence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION DOCTRINE IS JURISDICTIONAL, RATHER THAN AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE\nIII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S MECHANICAL APPLICATION OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION ESTABLISHED IN HOSANNA-TABOR FAILS TO PROTECT CORE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD ACCORD DEFERENCE TO A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION'S DESIGNATION TO FULLY PROTECT THE IMPORTANT LIBERTIES AT STAKE",
        "reference": "I. THE PRINCIPLES ADOPTED IN THE COURT'S PRIOR RELIGION CASES DICTATE RECOGNITION OF A ROBUST MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims has important implications for racial gerrymandering claims\nII. Declaring partisan gerrymandering claims non-justiciable would erroneously depart from this Court's precedent\nIII. This Court's decisions concerning challenges to state election laws provide judicially manageable standards for partisan gerrymandering claims\nA. The Court has developed judicially manageable standards for challenges to state election laws\nB. The standards for challenges to state election laws can be applied to partisan gerrymandering claims\n1. Assessing the character and magnitude of the asserted injuries to First and Fourteenth Amendment rights\n2. Considering the state's purported justifications\n3. Measuring the asserted injuries against the purported justifications\nIV. The application of these proposed standards to Rucho confirms that the standards are judicially manageable, and that the Rucho plaintiffs should prevail\nA. The Rucho plaintiffs have shown that the challenged districts impose severe burdens on their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights\n1. Plaintiffs demonstrated that the General Assembly drew the 2016 Plan with a predominantly partisan intent\n2. Plaintiffs established that the 2016 Plan burdens their voting and associational rights\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The injuries inflicted by the 2016 Plan easily outweigh the State's purported justifications\nV. At minimum, partisan gerrymandering should not be a valid defense to racial gerrymandering claims",
        "reference": "B. The evidence belies North Carolina's purported justifications for the 2016 Plan",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. From the Start, FBI Agents Dominated the Process of Building the No Fly List\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Combination of Substantial Control and Low Oversight Invites Error and Misuse\nIV. The Working Environment of the Terrorist Screening Center Reinforces Deference to the Real Decisionmakers",
        "reference": "II. The FBI's Terrorist Screening Center Consolidated the Central Role of the FBI and its Agents in the Watchlisting Process with Low Criteria and Standards for Oversight",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5639_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "District courts need not provide an extensive explanation for a Section 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction within a revised Guidelines range\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner's proposed explanation requirement lacks foundation\n1. The incorporation of Section 3553(a) considerations into Section 3582(c)(2) does not imply the existence of an explanation requirement\n2. Appellate courts do not need additional explanation to provide meaningful review of within-Guidelines sentence reductions\nC. The court of appeals correctly affirmed the district court in this case",
        "reference": "A. The limited procedures for Section 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions do not require a specific explanation of a reduced within-Guidelines sentence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Juries: Discrimination, Partiality, and the Right to Public Trials\nA. Batson and Racial Discrimination in Peremptory Challenges\nB. Juror Partiality\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Sentencing: Due Process and the Right to a Jury Trial\nA. The \"Awesome Responsibility\" of Capital Juries\nB. Ensuring Reliability of Sentences\nC. Sentencing by Jury, Not by Judge\nIII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nIV. Due Process and Mental Health",
        "reference": "C. Voir Dire and the Right to a Public Trial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Under Concepcion and Epic, the FAA Preempts the Iskanian Rule\nB. Iskanian's Holding That the FAA Does Not Apply to PAGA Claims Conflicts With This Court's Precedents\nII. The Question Presented Is Enormously Consequential And Warrants The Court's Review",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Conflicts With The FAA And This Court's Precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Common Law Of 1871, Which 42 U.S.C. section 1983 Implicitly Incorporated, Allowed Plaintiffs To Vindicate Their Rights Even If They Sought Only Nominal Damages\nII. Nominal Damages Are Retrospective Relief For A Plaintiff Whose Rights Have Been Violated But Did Not Or Cannot Prove The Extent Of The Injury\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. A Nominal-Damages Claim For Retrospective Relief Is Not Mooted By A Prospective Change In Law Or Policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Apply the Proper Test in Determining the Corps's Jurisdiction Over Wetlands Under the Act\nA. The Ninth Circuit, Among Other Courts and the Corps, Have Improperly Chosen \"Significant Nexus\" Ignoring Congressional Intent and Supreme Court Holdings.\nB. The Act Does Not Support a \"Significant Nexus\" Test to Determine Jurisdiction Over Wetlands\nC. \"Significant Nexus\" is Inconsistent with the Court's Prior Decisions Regarding the Act's Application to Wetlands",
        "reference": "I. Congress Granted the Corps Broad but Limited Jurisdiction Under the Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-927_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Cannot Justify the Extraordinary Relief It Seeks.\nA. There is no basis for certiorari before judgment.\nB. There is no basis for mandamus.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The district court's judgment cannot be modified.\nB. Section 3596 does not require the district court to designate an alternate state.",
        "reference": "II. The District Court Correctly Determined that It Lacked Authority to Designate a State to Implement Mr. Higgs's Death Sentence.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-587_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Circuit Split Regarding section 630(b)'s Meaning Is Clear And Firmly Entrenched\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Of The ADEA Is Incorrect\nIII. The Question Presented Is Important\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle For Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "HOME EQUITY IS HISTORICALLY A PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHT AT MINNESOTA COMMON LAW, SO THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY HOW AND WHEN A LEGISLATURE CAN CHANGE LONG-STANDING RULES AND CONFISCATE VESTED EQUITY IN REAL PROPERTY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Minnesota Legislature Gradually Removed the Homeowner's Right to Recover the Equity\nC. This Case Is an Opportunity to Clarify When a Legislature Can Remove a Common-Law Property Right Without Just Compensation",
        "reference": "A. Home Equity Is the Private Property of the Homeowner Under Common Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. DEBT COLLECTION ACTIVITY IS PERVASIVE IN THE UNITED STATES AND NEGATIVELY IMPACTS CONSUMERS WHO ARE LOW-INCOME, ELDERLY, OR PERSONS OF COLOR IN PARTICULAR\nA. Debt Collection Is Prevalent\nB. Debt Collection Litigation Is Also Prevalent\nC. Debt Collection Particularly Impacts Vulnerable Consumers and Consumers of Color\nD. The FDCPA Provides Important Protections for Consumers\nII. FDCPA CLAIMS OFTEN EVADE DETECTION DURING THE YEAR AFTER THE VIOLATION OCCURS\nA. Improper or Untimely Service of Process Can Impede the Timely Assertion of FDCPA Claims Based on the State Court Proceeding\n1. Improper or Untimely Service of Process Was Deliberately Caused\n2. Improper or Untimely Service of Process Was Knowingly Permitted\nB. False Affidavits of Service Cause Violations to Go Undetected\nC. Collectors' False Affidavits About Personal Knowledge of Account Records Are Hard for Consumers to Detect\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Debt Collectors Often Conceal Important Information From Consumers\nF. Misrepresentations to Consumer Reporting Agencies Often Go Undetected for Years",
        "reference": "D. Debt Collectors' Explicit Misrepresentations to Consumers Can Lead to Default Judgments and Other Harm",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit Erred By Holding Petitioner's Conduct Was Not Protected\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. This Case Demonstrates The Need To Define And Limit Garcetti",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The rule against extraterritorial regulation follows from the equality of the States.\nB. Any power of a State to regulate commerce outside of its borders was delegated to the federal government by the Commerce Clause.\n1. The Constitution vested all power over interstate commerce exclusively in Congress.\n2. Although States lack commerce power, they can legislate in ways that affect commerce.\nC. The structure of the Constitution presupposes and reinforces the rule against extraterritorial regulation by States.\nII. Proposition 12 impermissibly regulates conduct that lawfully takes place in other States, and thus attempts to exercise a power that California does not have.\nIII. This Court need not apply Pike balancing to conclude that California lacks the power to enact this law, but the law nonetheless fails to serve a legitimate interest under Pike.\nIV. California is increasingly leveraging its regulatory power over the largest state product market in the Nation to regulate conduct in other States.",
        "reference": "I. The Constitution does not permit States to engage in extraterritorial regulation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Case Poses Important Questions About the Scope of Review Under the AIA\nB. This Case Is a Proper Vehicle for Resolving the Questions Presented\nII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JUDGMENT IS INCORRECT",
        "reference": "I. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED MERIT REVIEW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Below Wrongly Requires Section 1983 Plaintiffs to Satisfy the Elements of a Common Law Tort in Addition to the Elements of a Fourth Amendment Violation\nII. Because Section 1983 Addresses Violations of the Constitution, Common Law Rules May Be Borrowed Only When They Advance That Purpose and Are Compatible with the Constitutional Right at Stake\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Courts that Have Adopted an \"Indications of Innocence\" Rule Have Not Provided Any Sound Justification",
        "reference": "III. A Favorable Termination Rule that Demands \"Indications of Innocence\" Is Incompatible with the Fourth Amendment and Section 1983",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Little Sisters Have Appellate Standing.\nII. RFRA Requires \u2014 And Both RFRA And The ACA Empower \u2014 The Government To Grant The Religious Exemption To The Contraceptive Mandate.\nA. Respondents' Claim That The \"Accommodation\" Complies With RFRA Is Deeply Flawed.\nB. RFRA Empowers The Government To Grant The Religious Exemption And Does Not Require The Least Accommodating Accommodation.\nC. The ACA Authorizes The Religious Exemption.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Religious Exemption Does Not Violate The APA.\nB. The Third Circuit Erred In Affirming The Nationwide Injunction.",
        "reference": "III. The APA And Remedial Holdings Below Were Flawed.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-935_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A subjective agreement between the parents is not required to establish an infant's habitual residence\nA. Determining a child's habitual residence requires a flexible and fact-bound inquiry\nB. Under a flexible and fact-bound inquiry, a subjective parental agreement is not categorically necessary\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Appellate courts should review determinations of habitual residence for clear error",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE USUAL DISPARATE IMPACT FRAMEWORK IS APPLICABLE TO VOTING\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Voting Is Sufficiently Similar to Other Activities Covered by the Usual Framework\nII. THE USUAL DISPARATE IMPACT FRAMEWORK WOULD RESOLVE A SERIES OF ISSUES ABOUT RACIAL VOTE-DENIAL CLAIMS\nA. Must a Plaintiff Challenge a Specific Practice or the Whole Electoral System?\nB. Does the Magnitude of the Racial Disparity Matter?\nC. What Kind of Racial Disparity Must Be Shown?\nD. Is Interaction with Discrimination Necessary?\nE. What Is the Proper Remedy?\nIII. THE USUAL DISPARATE IMPACT FRAMEWORK WOULD BOLSTER SECTION 2'S CONSTITUTIONALITY\nA. The Usual Framework Tightens Section 2's Fit with Underlying Constitutional Violations\nB. Compliance with the Usual Framework Requires Less Focus on Race\nIV. THE COURT IS FREE TO ADOPT THE USUAL DISPARATE IMPACT FRAMEWORK AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION",
        "reference": "A. The Theoretical Justifications for the Usual Framework Apply to Voting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Opinion Below Unjustifiably Departs From This Court's Approach to Market Definition\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decision Below Justifies Its Departure from Settled Antitrust Principles on Grounds That Violate the Sherman Act's Central Tenet",
        "reference": "II. The Court of Appeals' Market Definition Distorts the Rule-of-Reason Inquiry and Insulates an Admitted Restraint on Price Competition from Antitrust Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1606_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "Orders of the Social Security Appeals Council dismissing requests for review as untimely are not judicially reviewable under section 405(g)\nI. The agency's longstanding interpretation reflects the best reading of the statute\nA. Section 405(g) should be interpreted based on its specific text, context, and structure\nB. A \"final decision\" is a decision on the merits of a claim for benefits following the exhaustion of agency processes\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The agency's interpretation of section 405(g) is also supported by longstanding practice in many other contexts\nII. The agency's longstanding interpretation is at a minimum reasonable and therefore entitled to deference",
        "reference": "C. A final decision \"after a hearing\" is a decision on a matter on which the Social Security Act requires a hearing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Hardison implicates this Court's near-categorical presumption against overruling statutory precedents\nB. Petitioner fails to offer the special justification required to overrule a statutory precedent\n1. Hardison has neither proved unworkable nor foreclosed religious-accommodation claims\n2. Hardison's underpinnings have not eroded\n3. Petitioner's remaining arguments lack merit\nC. When properly applied, Hardison's \"de minimis cost\" language is consistent with Title VII\nD. This Court should clarify Hardison by reinforcing the EEOC's longstanding interpretation of that decision\nII. The court of appeals correctly held that burdens on other employees may inform the undue-hardship analysis\nA. An accommodation's effect on other employees may impose an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business\nB. Petitioner's contrary arguments are unavailing\nIII. The Court should affirm under any understanding of undue hardship",
        "reference": "I. This Court should not overrule Hardison, but should clarify that it affords substantial protection for religious observance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-565_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below Is Correct",
        "reference": "I. The Question Presented Does Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-546_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "An FTCA claimant who fails to establish the liability of the United States is barred from pursuing individual Bivens claims against the same involved employees, based on the same factual allegations.\nA. The judgment bar applies when an FTCA plaintiff fails to establish the torts that he alleges.\n1. The judgment bar is an important part of the FTCA's remedial compromise.\n2. The text and context of the judgment bar, and this Court's decision in Simmons, foreclose Bivens claims after a plaintiff's unsuccessful FTCA claims.\n3. The FTCA's structure and history confirm that the judgment bar applies to the Bivens claims here.\n4. The purposes of the judgment bar are served by applying it here.\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The panel majority's reasoning is contrary to this Court's precedents.\n2. The panel majority's reasoning is contrary to common-law claim-preclusion principles.\n3. The panel majority's reasoning is contrary to every other federal appellate decision on this question.\nC. Respondent's alternative arguments lack merit.\n1. The judgment bar is not limited to individual claims alleging torts identical to those at issue in the plaintiff's FTCA action.\n2. The judgment bar does not exempt individual claims brought together with FTCA claims.",
        "reference": "B. The court of appeals erred in refusing to apply the judgment bar in this case.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under Lujan, if standing is not factually controverted, plaintiffs must merely sufficiently allege standing to satisfy the standard of proof for standing at the settlement-class-certification stage\nII. Named plaintiffs' allegations of Electronic Communications Privacy Act violations are concrete for Article III standing\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Named plaintiffs allege a private right that satisfies Justice Thomas's Spokeo concurrence\nIII. The named plaintiffs would normally be entitled to another opportunity to satisfy more stringent burdens of proof of Article III standing",
        "reference": "A. Dissemination of plaintiffs' Google searches is closely related to the harm of disclosure of private communications protected at common law and elevated by Congress",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THIS PETITION TO STOP THE SEC FROM ROUTINELY PURSUING A FORM OF RELIEF THAT CONGRESS NEVER AUTHORIZED\nA. Congress Did Not Give the SEC Power To Seek Disgorgement Penalties\nB. Review Is Especially Warranted Because This Issue Arises Frequently and Circuit Courts Continue To Rely on an Erroneous Pre-Kokesh Understanding\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioners Raised Their Challenge to the Disgorgement Penalty Below\nB. Petitioners Present a Question of Law, Not Fact",
        "reference": "II. THIS CASE SQUARELY PRESENTS A PURELY LEGAL ISSUE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE WAS DESIGNED TO PREVENT RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION, NOT TO ERADICATE RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS FROM PUBLIC LIFE\nII. THE CREATION AND MAINTENANCE OF A WORLD WAR I MEMORIAL CROSS IS NOT AN ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION\nIII. THE LEMON TEST FAILS THE STARE DECISIS ANALYSIS IN JANUS, AND SHOULD BE ABANDONED\nA. The Lemon Test Is Unworkable: It Creates More Undefined Terms Than the Establishment Clause and Fosters Inconsistent Precedent\nB. The Court's Reasoning in Lemon Was Based on Minimal Precedent and Little Historical Analysis\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Court Has Been Rightly Declining to Rely on Lemon, Which Minimizes Any Reliance Society or Courts Place on It",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The individual respondents are not subject to a command and face no threat of enforcement\nB. The state respondents have not substantiated their alleged financial harm\nC. Respondents' inseverability theory does not establish standing\nII. Section 5000A does not violate the Constitution\nA. Setting the alternative tax to zero did not transform a constitutional choice into an unconstitutional command\nB. Section 5000A does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority\nIII. If Section 5000A is now unconstitutional, it is severable from the rest of the ACA\nA. The text Congress created shows that the rest of the ACA should remain in place without an enforceable Section 5000A\nB. The circumstances surrounding the TCJA's enactment confirm that Section 5000A is severable\nC. An order holding Section 5000A unenforceable would be the only appropriate remedy",
        "reference": "I. Respondents lack standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail\nB. There is no \"overwhelming\" support for the plaintiffs' position in state law\nC. The plaintiffs' rule makes bad policy\nII. MARITIME LAW PRINCIPLES DO NOT JUSTIFY A DEVIATION FROM COMMON LAW DOCTRINE\nA. The plaintiffs rely entirely on the special solicitude owed to seamen\nB. The petitioners' position is fully consistent with this Court's maritime law decisions\nIII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT SHOULD BE REVERSED WITHOUT REGARD TO THE NAVY'S KNOWLEDGE",
        "reference": "I. THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT LIABLE UNDER TORT LAW DOCTRINE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS SHOULD DECIDE THIS ISSUE DUE TO ITS UNIQUE COMPETENCE IN THIS AREA\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IS A MISCHARACTERIZATION AND NOT A SPECIAL FACTOR\nIV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT IS INCORRECT IN ITS APPLICATION OF ABBASI\nV. THE PETITIONERS' CLAIM IS A NEW CONTEXT\nVI. CANNOT FASHION AN \"EL PASO CULVERT\" DECISION ON THIS ISSUE",
        "reference": "II. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED THIS COURT'S RULING IN ABBASI",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Enforcing Congress's intent allowing claimants a pathway to correct a prior administrative decision that violates the plain language of a statute will not result in a deluge of CUE appeals",
        "reference": "I. The Federal Circuit improperly imposed finality and res judicata principles of ordinary civil litigation on the pro-claimant, paternalistic system of VA claims adjudication",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-984_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent Satisfies The HCE Regulation And Is Therefore Deemed Exempt\nII. The Separate Requirements Of 29 C.F.R. section 541.604 Do Not Apply To The HCE Regulation\nA. The Regulatory Text, Structure, and History Make Clear That section 541.604 Does Not Apply to the HCE Regulation\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Requiring Overtime Pay for Highly Compensated Supervisors Would Divorce the Regulations From the Statute\nD. The Fifth Circuit's Anomalous Decision Is Badly Misguided\nIII. If Allowed To Stand, The Fifth Circuit's Decision Will Upset Longstanding Practices And Provide Windfalls For High Earners",
        "reference": "B. The Regulatory Text Comports With the Regulatory Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief047.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Public Charities Play A Unique Role In The U.S. Economy\nB. Charities Have Inherent Accountability Problems That Can Lead To Mismanagement And Wrongdoing\nII. INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS WORK TO ADDRESS THESE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEMS, BUT POLICIES LIKE CALIFORNIA'S ARE ALSO NECESSARY\nA. Independent Organizations Promote Accountability By Analyzing Charities' Public Information\nB. California's Oversight Is Necessary Because Independent Organizations Can Use Only Publicly Available Information And Lack Enforcement Power\nC. Recent Examples Of Mismanagement And Fraud Show That Meaningful Accountability Requires Both Watchdog Organizations And Government Regulators\nD. California Plays A Crucial Role By Preventing Charitable Wrongdoing Without Imposing Costs On Most Charities And Donors",
        "reference": "I. CHARITIES ARE BOTH UNIQUELY IMPORTANT AND STRUCTURALLY UNACCOUNTABLE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1252(f)(1) deprived the lower courts of jurisdiction to grant an injunction or vacatur\nA. The district court lacked jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief\nB. The district court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the Secretary's decision\nII. Section 1252(f)(1)'s jurisdictional limit is not forfeitable, and in any event was not forfeited here\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Section 1252(f)(1) does not limit this Court's jurisdiction to decide the questions presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. BECAUSE CADA COMPELS THE PETITIONER TO CREATE A WEBSITE FOR A SAME-SEX WEDDING, IT VIOLATES THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT\nIII. DETERMINING WHETHER CADA VIOLATES THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IS LESS FRAUGHT WITH SUBJECTIVITY THAN DETERMINING WHETHER CADA VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
        "reference": "I. THE REASONING OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT MAJORITY EVINCES A TROUBLING WILLINGNESS TO TREAT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS ANACHRONISTIC HINDRANCES TO CONTEMPORARY POLICY CHOICES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Washington Supreme Court misapplied and unwisely expanded this Court's preemption principles\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Unions possess and use unique legal privileges and exemptions that should be narrowed, not expanded",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Eighth Amendment Review of State Forfeitures and Fines Is a Constitutionally Necessary Check on Abuse\nA. The Excessive Fines Clause Is Precisely the Type of Constitutional Provision That Should Be Incorporated\nB. Incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause Will Prevent Indiana, and Other States, from Ignoring an Essential Element of Ordered Liberty\nII. The Unchecked Proliferation of Disproportionate Forfeitures and Revenue-Seeking Fines Undermines Economic Growth\nA. Mandatory Forfeitures Are Increasingly Common and Problematic\nB. Governments Are Increasingly Misusing Mandatory Forfeitures and Fines as Revenue Streams Rather Than as Proportionate Punishments for Particular Offenses\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. As under Federal Law, This Court Should Hold That a State or Local Fine Is Excessive under the Eighth Amendment When It Is Disproportionate to the Harm Caused by the Underlying Offense",
        "reference": "C. Excessive Fines, and the Legal Uncertainty Surrounding Whether They May Be Imposed, Hinder Beneficial Economic Activity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1498_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S RIGHT-TO-FISH PRECEDENTS, AND YAKAMA INDIAN NATION, ESTABLISH THE FRAMEWORK FOR RESOLVING THIS CASE\nA. This Court's right-to-fish precedents, and Yakama Indian Nation, are the authorities most relevant to this case\nB. This Court's right-to-fish precedents, and Yakama Indian Nation, establish four critical principles\n1. The right-to-travel provision protects the right to transport goods for purposes of trade\n2. The right-to-travel provision secures preexisting rights, including the right to be free from fees and taxes arising from treaty-protected activity\n3. The right-to-travel provision applies to non-discriminatory fees and taxes\n4. The right-to-travel provision preempts fees and taxes, but does not preempt certain regulatory provisions\nII. BECAUSE WASHINGTON'S TAX INFRINGES A PREEXISTING RIGHT THAT THE YAKAMA TREATY PROTECTS, IT IS PREEMPTED, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT IS A \"POSSESSION\" OR \"TRANSPORTATION\" TAX\nA. Because Washington's tax infringes a preexisting tax exemption, it is preempted\nB. The Treaty is naturally understood to treat taxation of off-reservation travel in parallel with taxation of on-reservation activity\nC. Taxes on activities not protected by the Treaty are not preempted\nD. Whether the tax is \"on\" possession or \"on\" transportation is irrelevant to preemption\nIII. EVEN IF PREEMPTION TURNED ON WHAT THE TAX WAS \"ON,\" WASHINGTON'S TAX WOULD BE \"ON\" IMPORTATION\nA. The tax is preempted because it is expressly triggered by importation\nB. Preemption turns on the trigger for the tax, not its holistic operation\nC. The State's and United States' explanation of what the tax is \"on\" is arbitrary\nD. It is irrelevant that the statute does not explicitly mention highways\nIV. NO CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE STATE'S POSITION\nA. There is no clear-statement rule\nB. Mescalero and Oklahoma do not assist the State\nV. [MISSING]\nA. Respondent's position will not \"decimate\" the State's fuel-tax regime\nB. Respondent's position will not affect the collection of cigarette and other taxes",
        "reference": "V. THE STATE'S PRACTICAL CONCERNS ARE UNWARRANTED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.35
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-334_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. Rule 39's text and structure establish that district courts have discretion in awarding costs under Rule 39(e)\nB. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)\nC. Rule 39's history and common practice further confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The Court should reverse the judgment and remand for the district court to exercise its discretion under Rule 39(e)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. IF THIS COURT IS UNWILLING TO OVERTURN SMITH, IT COULD FOLLOW SMITH AND STILL HOLD PHILADELPHIA'S POLICY UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nII. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACIAL EQUALITY OF PHILADELPHIA'S POLICY ON FOSTER CARE SERVICES, ITS ADMINISTRATIVE POLICYMAKING PROCESS IS UNEQUAL AND EVEN PREJUDICED\nA. The Inequality of Administrative Policymaking\nB. Philadelphia's Unequal Administrative Policymaking\nIII. A PROPER REMEDY WOULD BE TO HOLD THE POLICY UNEQUAL AND THUS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. Taking Equality Seriously\nB. The First Amendment's Text, Drafting, and Underlying History Preclude a General Right of Religious Exemption\nC. Especially When Administrators Make Statements Confirming That Their Policymaking Is Indifferent, Hostile, or Otherwise Discriminatory, the Resulting Policy Should Be Held Unequal and Unconstitutional\nD. [MISSING]\nIV. THIS COURT NEEDS TO CONFRONT THE RELIGIOUS INEQUALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICYMAKING",
        "reference": "D. There Are Advantages to Holding the Policy Void Rather Than Carving out an Exemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1158_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL DOCTRINE IS DEPLOYED IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT TO PROCURE CONVICTIONS WITHOUT PROOF OF PROPERTY FRAUD\nA. Prosecutors Rely On The Elastic Doctrine When There Is Deceit But They Cannot Prove Contemplated Economic Harm\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S RULING UNDULY EXPANDS HONEST SERVICES FRAUD TO NON-GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND INTRODUCES UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHO OWES A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO THE PUBLIC\nA. This Court Has Repeatedly Limited The Doctrine Of Honest Services Fraud\nB. To Prevent The Punishment Of Ordinary Advocacy, The Court Should Clarify That A Defendant Must Have An \"Official Position\" To Owe a Duty Of Honest Services To The Public",
        "reference": "B. Jury Instructions On The Right To Control Demonstrate The Doctrine's Elasticity And Incoherence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE IS KEY TO HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM\nA. Successful Horizontal Federalism Requires States To Respect Other States' Policy Decisions\nB. Proposition 12 Violates Horizontal Federalism Principles\nII. ALLOWING STATE AGRICULTURAL REGULATIONS THAT HARM THE NATION'S FOOD CHAIN WOULD HAVE DEVASTATING RESULTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Will Interrupt The Food Supply\nC. The Effects Of Increased Food Prices Are Devastating",
        "reference": "A. Now Is Not The Time To Interrupt Food Supplies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Make Clear That Deciding Whether The Section 1 Exemption Applies Requires Analysis Of A Nationwide Class Of Workers\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Crossing Borders Is Necessary For The Section 1 Exemption To Apply\nB. The Court Should Take Care Not To Suggest That The Section 1 Exemption Is Applicable If Only A Small Portion Of A Class's Work, Carried Out By A Subset Of Class Members, Involves Crossing National Or State Lines\nIII. If The Court Concludes That Crossing Of National Or State Lines Is Not Required For The Section 1 Residual Clause To Apply, The Court Should Make Clear That Not Every Class Of Workers That Is Arguably Linked To A Larger Foreign Or Interstate Journey Is Covered By The Exemption\nA. The Court Should Not Disturb The Distinction Between Workers Who Actually Provide Transportation And Those Who Merely Support Or Facilitate Transportation\nB. The Court Should Leave In Place The Distinction Between Two Kinds Of Intrastate Work That Precede Or Follow International Or Interstate Travel\nC. The Court Should Frame Any Holding That Intrastate Work Can Trigger The Section 1 Exemption Around Analysis Of A Nationwide Class",
        "reference": "II. This Court Should Rule That Crossing National Or State Borders Is A Necessary Condition For Application Of The Residual Clause, But Should Take Care In Doing So Not To Suggest That Section 1 Applies Wherever Any Portion Of A Class Crosses National Or State Lines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1472_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD IN SECTION 6330(d)(1) IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Limitations Period Is Not Jurisdictional Under The Most Natural Reading Of Section 6330(d)(1)\n1. The Statutory Text Does Not Condition Jurisdiction On The Limitations Period\n2. The Statutory History Strongly Reinforces The Plain Text\n3. The Purpose Of CDP Proceedings Supports A Nonjurisdictional Reading\nC. There Is (At Least) No Clear Statement That Section 6330(d)(1) Is The Rare Jurisdictional Limitations Period\n1. The Commissioner's Alternative Interpretation Is The Opposite Of Clear\n2. There Is No Longstanding Jurisdictional Interpretation To Fall Back On\nII. THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD IN SECTION 6330(d)(1) IS SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE TOLLING\nA. Limitations Periods Are Presumptively Subject To Equitable Tolling\nB. Nothing Rebuts The Irwin Presumption\n1. The Text Of Section 6330(d)(1) Does Not Preclude Equitable Tolling\n2. The Nature Of The Collection Due Process Regime Supports Equitable Tolling\n3. This Court's Cases Rejecting Equitable Tolling Are Readily Distinguishable\n4. Any Administrability Concerns Are Misplaced And Overstated",
        "reference": "A. Limitations Periods Are Rarely Jurisdictional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Amendment Forbids Government from Excluding Religious Speech and Speakers from Forums It Creates\nII. Several Courts \u2014 Including the Court Below \u2014 Mistakenly Allow the Government To Evade This Constitutional Protection by Banning All Religious Speech from Its Forums\nA. Three Circuits Allow the Government To Use Restrictions on Religious Speech to Avoid Creating a Designated Public Forum\nB. The First Circuit Similarly Allowed the Government's Speech Restriction To Transform a Public Forum into Government Speech\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. The Court Should Reaffirm that Excluding Only Religious Speech Does Not Transform a Public Forum Into a Limited Forum or Government Speech",
        "reference": "C. Other Circuits Have Correctly Applied This Court's Precedents to Protect Religious Speech in a Public Forum",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FAA PRECLUDES COURTS FROM IMPOSING CLASS ARBITRATION ABSENT UNMISTAKABLE INDICIA THAT THE PARTIES INTENDED TO AUTHORIZE SUCH PROCEDURES\nA. The FAA Requires That A Valid Arbitration Agreement Be Enforced As The Parties Actually Wrote It\nB. Where An Arbitration Agreement Is Silent As To The Availability Of Class Arbitration, Stolt-Nielsen Bars The Forced Imposition Of Such Procedures Where No Contractual Basis Exists For Doing So\n1. Inferred consent does not constitute a contractual basis for imposing class arbitration\n2. The presence of standard, boilerplate contract terms also is insufficient to establish a contractual basis for class arbitration\nA. Arbitration agreements typically contain clauses that are materially indistinguishable from those at issue here\nB. Construing such terms as establishing a contractual basis for class arbitration effectively would preclude bilateral arbitration with respect to every agreement that does not contain an express class waiver provision\nC. Because Such Procedures Fundamentally Change The Nature Of Arbitration, An Agreement To Allow Class Proceedings Must Be Explicit\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. CLASSWIDE ARBITRATION DOES NOT COMPORT WITH THE PRINCIPAL AIM AND PURPOSE OF TRADITIONAL ARBITRATION, NAMELY, SPEEDIER, MORE EFFICIENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Applying Pickering and Garcetti in this Case, the Ninth Circuit Decision Should be Affirmed\nA. In this Case, Kennedy Spoke as an Employee, and Kennedy's Application of Garcetti is Overly Narrow and Unworkable Especially in a Public School Context\nB. In this Case, the Balance of Interests Tip in the District's Favor\n1. The District's Actions Were Justified by the Legitimate Governmental Interests it Sought to Protect and Advance\n2. A Rule That a Disclaimer by a Public School District Cures any Establishment Clause Concerns Would be Unworkable and Ineffective",
        "reference": "I. Pickering and Garcetti Appropriately Balance Individual Interests and Government Interests, Especially in the Public School Setting, and They Should be Applied in this Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "A. No Named Plaintiff Has Article III Standing to Bring The Asserted Stored Communications Act Claim\n1. Plaintiffs' first alleged harm \u2014 the disclosure of their search terms alone \u2014 is not a concrete injury in fact\na. Congress has not expressed a judgment that plaintiffs' asserted harm provides a basis for suit\nb. Neither common-law privacy torts nor intellectual-property protections provide a historical analog for plaintiffs' asserted harm\n2. Plaintiffs' second alleged harm \u2014 the risk that disclosure of their search terms will result in reidentification \u2014 is overly speculative\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. No Named Plaintiff Has Article III Standing to Bring The Asserted State-Law Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This case squarely presents the question whether a plaintiff's actual knowledge of the breach or violation is defeated solely by the plaintiff's own failure to read or to recall having read information provided to him.\nII. This case presents an important question on which the courts of appeals are divided.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Ninth Circuit's decision is incorrect.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. World-Wide Volkswagen: Application of the non-affiliation principle.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. These cases satisfy the criteria for the assertion of personal jurisdiction set out in World-Wide Volkswagen.",
        "reference": "II. Uppgren and Tilley: a deeper look at World-Wide Volkswagen",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE QUESTION PRESENTED DOES NOT MERIT REVIEW\nA. The Encouragement Provision Is Rarely Used And Unnecessary\nB. The Circuits Are Not Divided As To The Encouragement Provision's Unconstitutionality\nC. This Case Is A Poor Vehicle For The Question Presented\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted The Encouragement Provision To Cover A Wide Array Of Protected Speech\nB. The Financial-Gain Enhancement Does Not Remedy The Chilling Effect Of The Overbroad Encouragement Provision\nC. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Fall Under The Narrow First Amendment Exception For Speech Integral To A Crime",
        "reference": "II. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief044.pdf",
        "text": "I. The President Is Not an \"Officer of the United States\" Under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nA. The President Is Not an Officer of the United States.\nB. The Oath the President Takes Is Distinct from the Oath That Can Trigger Section Three.\nII. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.\nIII. The Historical Evidence Continues to Confirm that Section Three Applies Only to Holding Office.\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Anderson Respondents' Theories Pose a Danger to the First Amendment.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. It Cannot Be Reasonably Disputed That This Court Has Jurisdiction over the Federal Question Presented by this Case\nII. There is a Clear Split that this Case Compounds\nIII. This Case Involves an Issue of National Importance\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Decision Below Creates, Not Cures, Free Exercise and Equal Protection Problems",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should replace Lemon with a historical approach\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A historical approach provides a workable framework for resolving Establishment Clause claims\nII. Respondents lack standing\nA. Standing under the Establishment Clause requires a concrete, personal injury\nB. Offended-observer standing is an anomaly\nC. The Court should harmonize standing under the Establishment Clause with standing under the Equal Protection and Free Exercise Clauses",
        "reference": "A. History has long played an important role in interpreting the Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress indisputably chose to eliminate the individual mandate's legal consequences while leaving the rest of the ACA intact\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court's precedents require it to honor congressional intent in determining whether to sever invalid statutory provisions\nB. Congress's unambiguously expressed intent requires severance if the Court deems the individual mandate unconstitutional\nC. None of the arguments against severance justifies disregard of Congress's choice to decouple the rest of the ACA from the individual mandate by making the mandate legally inconsequential",
        "reference": "II. Congress's choice definitively answers the question whether the individual mandate can be severed from the remainder of the ACA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief041.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter encourages evasion of Parents Involved\nII. Grutter subjects K-12 students to escalating racial divisions.\nA. Racist instruction\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Outright segregation",
        "reference": "B. Racist (or no) discipline",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The NGA Plainly Delegates The Federal Government's Eminent Domain Power As To Private And State Property Alike\nII. The Third Circuit's Contrary View Ignores Text To Avoid Perceived Constitutional Difficulties That Do Not Exist\nA. States Have No Sovereign Immunity From the Exercise of the Federal Government's Eminent Domain Power\nB. New Jersey's Effort to Bifurcate the Eminent Domain Power and the Power to Bring Court Actions to Effectuate It Has No Grounding in Law or Logic\nC. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Decision Below Threatens To Disrupt The Development Of Energy Infrastructure Throughout The Nation",
        "reference": "III. The Court Of Appeals Properly Exercised Jurisdiction Over This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This court has already recognized that a jury should hear Bivens claims\nB. The traditional Seventh Amendment test requires a jury to hear Plaintiffs' Bivens claims\n1. Bivens claims are analogous to legal claims recognized at common law\n2. Plaintiffs' claims raise factual issues that a jury must resolve\nII. The canon of constitutional avoidance requires reversal of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of FISA.\nIII. Consideration of the Seventh Amendment is not premature.\nIV. The proffered authorities lend no support to the decision below",
        "reference": "I. The Seventh Amendment guarantees the individual defendants' right to have a jury hear Plaintiffs' claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1259_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Sentencing A Juvenile Homicide Offender To Life Without Parole Requires Finding That He Is Permanently Incorrigible\nA. Eligibility Rules Require Finding That The Defendant Does Or Does Not Belong To The Eligible Class\nB. Miller And Montgomery's Eligibility Rule Requires Finding That The Defendant Does Or Does Not Belong To The Eligible Class\nIII. At A Minimum, Petitioner Is Entitled To A Remand For A Finding As To Whether He Is Permanently Incorrigible\nIV. Petitioner Is Not Permanently Incorrigible",
        "reference": "I. For Juveniles, The Eighth Amendment Restricts Life Without Parole To Permanently Incorrigible Homicide Offenders",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE WYOMING DISTRICT COURT WOULD HARM STATE FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION ACROSS THE WESTERN UNITED STATES\nA. States have primary legal authority to manage fish and wildlife within their borders with the exception of federally protected species\nB. Even under the understanding of treaty rights and state sovereignty established by Mille Lacs, the hunting rights at issue were terminated by federal and state law\nII. REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE WYOMING DISTRICT COURT WOULD CAUSE JURISDICTIONAL CONFUSION BETWEEN STATE, TRIBAL, AND FEDERAL LAND MANAGERS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Even if the Crow's right to hunt was not extinguished by Wyoming's statehood, the Bighorn National Forest as well as state lands managed for wildlife are occupied within the meaning of the treaty",
        "reference": "A. Even if the Crow's right to hunt was not extinguished by Wyoming's statehood, Wyoming should retain authority to regulate tribal hunting off-reservation because this Court and the Forest Service have both interpreted Mille Lacs to allow for such regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. GOOGLE CONFLATES SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY WITH COPYRIGHTABILITY AND CONFLATES NECESSITY WITH CONVENIENCE.\nA. The first question presented pertains to eligibility for copyright protection\u2014not the scope of that protection.\nB. Google could have enabled Java programmers to transition to Android by making a code-conversion tool.\nII. GOOGLE'S ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH TO FAIR USE DESTROYS MARKETS AND CONCENTRATES WEALTH.\nA. Even if it is seen as transformative, Google's use was not fair.\nB. There are major, and growing, costs to an all-or-nothing approach on fair use.\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. A more nuanced approach to fair use shows greater fidelity to the Copyright Act and its animating purposes.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The NLRA, enacted to prevent industrial strife, does not protect acts of force like intentional destruction of private property\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The opinion below invites private property destruction and conflicts with the public interest in public safety",
        "reference": "II. Petitioner's state tort claims fit squarely within the local interest exception to Garmon preemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "The USPTO Advocates for a Per Se Rule Prohibiting the Registration of Generic.com Marks. The USPTO's Per Se Rule Conflicts with the Purpose and Goals of the Lanham Act, Namely the Avoidance of Consumer Confusion.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The USPTO's Per Se Rule Would Harm Consumers by Making It More Difficult for Brand Owners to Stop Consumer Confusion. The Potential Availability of Claims that Do Not Require Ownership of a Federal Trademark Registration Is Not an Adequate Substitute to Rights Conferred by Registration. The USPTO's Purported Fears of Overreach Are Unfounded and Unsupported by Case Law.\nA. Booking.com and Similarly-Situated Brand Owners Already Are Deterred from Asserting Frivolous Trademark Infringement Claims.\nB. Courts Routinely Adjudicate Likelihood of Confusion Between Marks and the Fair Use of Terms Other than as Marks. Potential Enforcement of the BOOKING.COM Mark Is Not Before This Court. The USPTO Does Not Need a Per Se Rule to Evaluate Generic.com Marks.\nA. The USPTO Regularly Evaluates the Registrability of Marks Consisting of Two Otherwise Generic Terms Without a Per Se Rule and Is Capable of Doing So Here.\nB. The USPTO's Per Se Rule Is Predicated upon the Dissection of the BOOKING.COM Mark, Which Violates This Court's Precedent.\nC. Goodyear's Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co. Does Not Extend to Domain Names.",
        "reference": "A. The USPTO's Per Se Rule Would Harm Many U.S. Businesses.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "II. THERE IS AN EXCEEDINGLY HIGH BAR FOR SUBJECTING PRIVATE ACTORS TO CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY\nA. Public Forum Analysis is Almost Never Appropriate When Applied to Private Property\nB. \"Public Function\" Analysis Also Sets a High Standard\nIII. THERE ARE SERIOUS ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES TO TREATING INTERNET COMPANIES AS STATE ACTORS\nA. An Unintentionally Broad Ruling That Treats Private Companies as State Actors Would Transform the Modern Internet\nB. A Determination That Private Internet Companies Are State Actors Would Violate Those Actors' First Amendment Rights\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. ANY RULING IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE AN EXCEEDINGLY NARROW ONE, INFORMED BY THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES SET FORTH ABOVE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-389_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit Expressly Rejected Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Case Law Interpreting OCSLA\nB. Contrary to Respondent's Contention, the Fifth Circuit Has Not Abandoned Continental Oil\nII. THE DECISION BELOW DISRUPTS EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES ADOPTED IN REASONABLE RELIANCE ON CASE LAW INTERPRETING OCSLA",
        "reference": "I. THE DECISION BELOW IRRECONCILABLY CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS FROM THE FIFTH CIRCUIT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SUCCESSION CLAUSE DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS' CHALLENGE TO THE NET WORTH SWEEP\nA. Plaintiffs' Statutory Claim is Direct Under the APA\nB. Plaintiffs' Statutory Claim Is Direct Under Background Principles of Corporation Law\nC. Plaintiffs Can Maintain a Derivative Suit Because the Conservator Has a Conflict of Interest\nII. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION CLAUSE DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS' STATUTORY CHALLENGE TO THE NET WORTH SWEEP\nA. The Net Worth Sweep is Antithetical to FHFA's Conservatorship Mission\n1. FHFA's conservatorship mission is to preserve and conserve assets and restore the Companies to soundness and solvency\n2. FHFA abandoned its conservatorship mission when it imposed the Net Worth Sweep\n3. The Net Worth Sweep is an impermissible end-run around the statute's receivership provisions\nB. Defendants' \"Vicious Cycle\" Argument Fails on its Own Terms and Proceeds from a Disputed Factual Premise\nIII. FHFA'S STRUCTURE VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS\nIV. THE THIRD AMENDMENT MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE IT WAS IMPOSED BY AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AGENCY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Harmless Error Rule Does Not Provide a Basis for Denying Plaintiffs a Meaningful Remedy\n1. The harmless error rule does not apply in separation of powers cases\n2. FHFA's violation of the separation of powers was not harmless\nC. Defendants' Equitable Defenses Do Not Provide a Basis for Denying Plaintiffs a Meaningful Remedy\nD. HERA's \"Best Interests\" Provision Cannot be Severed from the Director's For-Cause Removal Protection",
        "reference": "A. When a Federal Official Acts Without Constitutional Authority, Vacatur of the Official's Actions Is the Appropriate Remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.61
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A. States cannot legislate away rights secured by the Fifth Amendment\n1. The Just Compensation Clause limits a State's ability to define away constitutionally protected property rights\n2. States may not abrogate their constitutional obligations by \"redefining\" private property as public property\n3. The Court repeatedly has invalidated state actions that run afoul of the Fifth Amendment\nB. The Eighth Circuit misunderstood and misapplied the tax lien holdings that this Court carefully cabined to avoid a Fifth Amendment taking\n1. The Eighth Circuit misinterpreted this Court's holding in Nelson v. City of New York\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. Nelson is inapposite where, as here, a state statute precludes a property owner from receiving the surplus proceeds from a judicial sale",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. COERCION IS THE PROPER STANDARD FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIMS\nA. Respondents' Endorsement Approach Cannot Be Squared With The Text Or History Of The First Amendment\nB. Respondents' Sectarian Endorsement Exception, Rejected In Town of Greece, Is Ahistorical And Unworkable\n1. Town of Greece Rejected Respondents' Rule\n2. Respondents' Rule Rests On Unreasonable Assumptions\nC. Respondents Mischaracterize The Legion's Standard\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Court Must Address The Appropriate Standard\nII. THE PEACE CROSS IS CONSTITUTIONAL",
        "reference": "D. The Legion Is Not Seeking A \"Sea Change\" In The Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief043.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PREVENTION OF GUN VIOLENCE IS AN ISSUE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO YOUNG AMERICANS\nA. Samantha Mayor\nB. Elimar Depaula\nC. Victoria Gwynn\nD. Selene San Felice\nE. DeAndra Dycus\nF. Maggie Montoya\nG. Brandon Wolf\nH. Senator Dayna Polehanki\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. EXPANDING THE CORE PROTECTIONS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT BEYOND THE HOME WOULD SMOTHER DEMOCRATIC DEBATE ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE",
        "reference": "II. STATES HAVE A COMPELLING INTEREST IN PROTECTING CITIZENS AND SAFEGUARDING THEIR ABILITY TO EXERCISE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-292_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Fourth Amendment Seizure Occurs When An Officer Applies Physical Force With Intent To Restrain\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The original meaning of seizure of persons arises from the common law of arrest\n2. At common law, a police officer's use of physical force against a person with intent to restrain her was an arrest, regardless of whether the person escaped\nB. This Court's precedents confirm that when a police officer shoots someone with the intent to restrain her, the shooting is a Fourth Amendment seizure\nII. Respondents' Contrary Arguments Fail\nA. Respondents misunderstand this Court's precedents\nB. Any policy concerns are misplaced",
        "reference": "A. The original meaning of seizure in the Fourth Amendment included common-law arrests, which did not require the suspect to submit in response to intentional physical force",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. Background Decisions\nB. Congress Explicitly Made Extraterritorial Activities Part of Several of the Patent Statutes\nC. Because Infringement Occurred in the United States, Section 271(f) Does Not Prohibit the Court from Considering Foreign Activities in Measuring Appropriate Damages\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The Federal Circuit's Refusal to Permit Lost Profits for Section 271(f) Liability Will Have a Significant Adverse Impact on U.S. Businesses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Third Circuit's decision violates not only the Religious Freedom Restoration Act but also the Free Exercise Clause",
        "reference": "I. Nationwide injunctions violate the doctrine of separation of powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\n2. Garmon Preemption and the Babcock Test\n3. The Court Should Grant the Petition to Clarify Babcock's Continuing Vitality After Cedar Point Nursery\n4. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance Favors Granting the Writ to Clarify that Destruction of Property is Not \"Arguably Protected\" by the NLRA",
        "reference": "1. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause Exists to Protect Against Statutory Appropriations of Property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. REVIEW OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE TRANSPORTATION WORKER EXEMPTION SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PLAIN MEANING IS UNWARRANTED\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There is No Circuit Split on the Meaning of the Term \"Contract of Employment\" as Used in the Federal Arbitration Act\nII. REVIEW OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S CONCLUSION THAT COURTS MUST DETERMINE WHETHER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT APPLIES BEFORE RELYING ON IT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION IS UNWARRANTED\nA. The First Circuit's Conclusion Accords with Supreme Court Precedent\nB. There Is No Split of Authority Worthy of this Court's Review\nIII. PRIME AND ITS AMICI VASTLY OVERSTATE THE IMPACT OF THE DECISION BELOW\nIV. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR REVIEW",
        "reference": "A. The First Circuit's Interpretation of the Transportation Worker Exemption is Consistent with this Court's Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Section 365 does not empower a bankrupt trademark owner to revoke a trademark license that it could not have revoked outside bankruptcy\nA. Outside bankruptcy, Tempnology could not have revoked Mission's trademark license\nB. Section 365(a) does not empower a bankrupt trademark owner to revoke a trademark license it could not revoke outside bankruptcy\n1. Under Section 365(a) and (g), the Chapter 11 trustee may decline to undertake the debtor's future performance obligations under an executory contract\n2. The court of appeals' understanding of \"rejection\" would undermine the statutory limitations on \"avoidance\" of pre-bankruptcy transfers\n3. The statute's history supports the Seventh Circuit's decision in Sunbeam Products\n4. The court of appeals' concerns were misplaced\n5. The court of appeals' rule would undermine strong reliance interests\nC. [MISSING]\nD. This Court should not decide in the first instance what effect rejection of the agreement had on Mission's exclusive distribution rights",
        "reference": "C. Neither Congress's enactment of Section 365(n), nor its omission of trademarks from the applicable definition of \"intellectual property,\" supports the court of appeals' decision in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "A. Heller's conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms unrelated to service in a well regulated Militia is inconsistent with the language and history of the Second Amendment\n1. Heller's reasoning did not give effect to the Second Amendment's Militia Clause\n2. Even disregarding the Militia Clause, the Arms Clause itself only extends to military contexts\na. The Heller majority opinion did not give sufficient weight to substantial evidence that the phrase \"bear arms\" had a military connotation\nb. New empirical methods for studying founding-era English usage further demonstrate that the phrase \"keep and bear Arms\" refers to collective, military firearm use\n3. There is no evidence that the Second Amendment was understood to codify a preexisting right to bear arms\n4. The drafters knowingly declined to include language in the Second Amendment that would have provided for an individual right to use firearms for self-defense\n5. [MISSING]\nB. The Court should overrule Heller",
        "reference": "5. The Second Amendment's reference to the right to keep and bear arms as a right of \"the people\" does not establish that it was an individual right belonging to every person",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1348_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE PROTECTS DEFENDANTS AGAINST THE STRUCTURAL POWER IMBALANCE BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THE GOVERNMENT\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE COMMONWEALTH'S POSITION NEGATES THE COMMUNITY'S PREROGATIVE TO DETERMINE FACTS THROUGH TRIAL BY JURY AND IMPUGNS THE INVIOLATE NATURE OF JURY ACQUITTALS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1215_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MISREAD THE TEXT OF SECTION 523(a)(2)(A)\nA. Congress's Use Of \"Financial Condition\" Is Telling\nB. The Eleventh Circuit's Open-Ended Construction Of \"Respecting\" Does Not Withstand Scrutiny\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THE CENTURIES-OLD \"HONEST DEBTOR\" PRINCIPLE AS WELL AS THE HISTORY OF THE PROVISION AT ISSUE REINFORCE THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MISREAD SECTION 523(a)(2)(A)\nA. This Court Does Not Lightly Assume That Congress Intends A Bold Departure From Existing Practice\nB. The Statute's History Underscores That Congress Intended Only A Narrow Exception To Settled Practice\nIII. APPLING'S AND THE GOVERNMENT'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS LACK MERIT\nA. Congress Did Not Decide To Excuse Certain Oral Frauds To Promote More \"Reliable Evidence\"\nB. Congress Did Not Ratify A Supposedly Pre-Existing Broad Interpretation Of The Language At Issue\nC. It Is The Eleventh Circuit's Interpretation, Not Lamar's, That Invites \"Line-Drawing Problems\"",
        "reference": "C. The Court Can, And Should, Give Effect To All The Words Congress Used",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Exonerations in Louisiana\nII. The Non-Unanimous Verdict Rule Has Remained True to Its Origins \u2014 It is Used to Wrongly Incarcerate Black People by Removing the Power of Black Jurors.\nA. The Innocent Men and Women Convicted By Non-Unanimous Juries Were Mostly Black and Faced Unreliable Evidence.\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Amicus Estimates That There are 100 Innocent People Currently in Prison Based on Non-Unanimous Verdicts.",
        "reference": "B. The Jurors That Had Their Votes Discounted Were Three Times More Likely to be Black than White.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Plain Language of the Residual Clause in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act Exempts Airline Cargo Loaders Who Load and Unload Goods for Transport in the Flow of Interstate Commerce\nA. Section 1's reference to seamen, railroaders, and their relationship to interstate commerce exemplifies the type of work exempted from the FAA\nB. The residual clause exempts workers, like those in Ms. Saxon's class, who perform necessary loading and unloading of goods for travel in interstate commerce\nII. Finding that Ms. Saxon and the Narrow Class She Represents are Exempt is Consistent with the Express Language of the FAA and Furthers the Legislative Purpose of the Act\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Ms. Saxon's class of airline cargo loader is narrow and the only class before the Court\nIII. The Seventh Circuit's Analysis Mirrored Other Circuits and Properly Held Ms. Saxon's Class Exempt from the FAA",
        "reference": "A. Recognizing that airline cargo loaders are exempt under Section 1 of the FAA upholds the legislative intent to prevent labor disruptions in the flow of interstate commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Religious animus substantially motivated Proclamation 9645\nIII. The Proclamation is not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest",
        "reference": "I. Section 1182(f) does not permit the President to intentionally discriminate against Muslims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1712_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Eighth Circuit's Decision Conflicts With No Other Section 1132(a)(3) Decision\n1. Plaintiffs conflate statutory and Article III standing\n2. The Eighth Circuit's decision is consistent with Article III decisions\nB. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct\nC. This Petition Is A Poor Vehicle For Addressing Section 1132(a)(3)'s Scope\nII. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SEEK MONETARY RELIEF\nA. The Eighth Circuit's Decision Conflicts With No Other Section 1132(a)(2) Decision\n1. No circuit holds that uninjured plaintiffs have statutory standing\n2. There is no split on Article III standing\nB. The Eighth Circuit Was Correct",
        "reference": "I. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SEEK INJUNCTIVE RELIEF",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is a prohibition on facilitating or soliciting unlawful conduct\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s coverage of civil immigration violations does not establish overbreadth\nD. Respondent's overbreadth challenge is especially misplaced because he was convicted of the aggravated offense in Section 1324(a)(1)(B)(i)\nE. Respondent's alternative arguments lack merit and, in any event, are best addressed on remand",
        "reference": "B. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is not unconstitutionally overbroad",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IS INCORRECT, AND ONLY THIS COURT CAN PROVIDE THE REQUISITE CLARITY\nIII. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO ADDRESS AN IMPORTANT AND WIDELY RECURRING QUESTION",
        "reference": "I. THE CIRCUITS ARE INTRACTABLY DIVIDED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Commercial Impression of a Mark Depends on the Mark as a Whole\n1. The Proposed Per Se Rule Violates USPTO Procedures\n2. Adopting the USPTO's Proposed Per Se Rule Will Lead to the Absurd",
        "reference": "I. THE FOCUS OF TRADEMARK LAW IS CONSUMER PERCEPTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Bounds Of Tribal Sovereign Immunity From Suit Do Not Extend To In Rem Proceedings Involving Freely Alienable, Non-Sovereign Lands Owned In Fee Title By An Indian Tribe. 5\nA. Yakima Upheld The Assertion Of In Rem Jurisdiction Over Freely Alienable, Fee-Titled Lands\nB. Sherrill Upheld The Assertion Of In Rem Jurisdiction Over Fee-Titled Lands Where The Indian Nation's \"Embers Of Sovereignty\"\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Federal and State Sovereign Immunity Applies Within The Sovereign's Own Jurisdiction\n2. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Does Not Extend To In Rem Actions To Establish Rights In Immovable Property\nD. The Extension Of Tribal Sovereign Immunity To Off Reservation Commercial Activities Does Not Provide A Basis To Extend Immunity To In Rem Proceedings To Determine Rights In Freely Alienable, Fee-Titled Land\nII. Even If This Court Declines To Affirm the Washington Supreme Court's Decision, The Quiet Title Proceeding At Issue Here Is Potentially Distinguishable From An In Rem Tax Foreclosure Proceeding",
        "reference": "C. The Principles Underlying Sovereign Immunity Do Not Justify The Extension of Tribal Sovereign Immunity To In Rem Proceedings Involving Land Owned By An Indian Tribe Outside of Its Sovereign Jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The People Delegated Power to Distinct Branches, Each To Check the Others\n1. All of government's power comes from the sovereign people\n2. The people delegated only part of their power to separate branches\nB. The People Delegated to Courts the Independent Duty To Hear Cases and Controversies To Police the Constitution's Structure and Protect the People's Liberty\nII. Delaying Review of Axon's Structural Constitutional Claims Poses a Grave Threat to the Separation of Powers and Individual Liberty\nA. Article III Extends the Judicial Power to \"All Cases\" Arising Under the Constitution\nB. The Constitution Precludes Congress from Stripping All Federal Courts of Jurisdiction Over Federal Claims\nC. Congress Has Conferred Jurisdiction to District Courts Over Axon's Claims, So Courts Must Hear the Case\nD. Ignoring Axon's Case Now Will Undermine Rights That the Judicial Power Was Designed To Protect\n1. The FTC violates due process by acting as a judge in its own cause, which requires court intervention now\n2. Without federal court intervention now Axon will never receive judicial consideration of its equal protection claim\nIII. Thunder Basin Does Not Apply, But Even If It Does, Axon Prevails\nA. Axon's No-Win Situation Demands Court Intervention\nB. Axon's Here-and-Now Injury Will Only Worsen as the FTC Process Continues",
        "reference": "I. The Constitution Embodies the Sovereign People's Will To Prevent Arbitrary Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS BELOW DEMONSTRATED AN INAPT ANTIPATHY TOWARD EMOTIONAL SUPPORT DAMAGES THAT SHOULD NOT GUIDE THIS COURT'S DECISION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Criticisms of Emotional Distress Damages Should Play No Role in Determining their Availability\n1. Criticism of emotional-distress damages does not provide a valid basis for limiting the availability of damages\n2. Studies confirm that juries award pain-and-suffering damages responsibly and in line with the severity of the injury\nII. Sufficient Notice of Potential Emotional-Distress Damages Exists when Intentional Discrimination Occurs, and Tort Cases that Involve Quasi-Contractual Relationships Deepen that Notice\nA. Federal Funding Recipients Have Sufficient Notice that the Full Compensation Is Available for Intentional Discrimination\nB. Tort Actions Deemed Quasi-Contract Provide Useful Lessons about the Availability of Emotional-Distress Damages",
        "reference": "A. The Courts Below Erroneously Treated Emotional Support Damages as Similar to Punitive Damages",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Forest Service Has Authority Under The Mineral Leasing Act To Grant Rights-Of-Way Across Forest Service Lands Traversed By The Appalachian Trail\nA. The Trails Act Leaves the Forest Service's Jurisdiction over National Forest Lands Undisturbed\nB. Other Statutes Confirm that the Trails Act Does Not Transfer Jurisdiction\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Respondents' Reliance on the Organic Act Is Misplaced\nB. Both the Park Service and the Forest Service Agree that the Lands Here Are Forest System Lands\nC. Respondents Have No Answer to the Anomalous Results Their Position Would Produce",
        "reference": "II. Respondent's Theory Is Deeply Flawed, Contrary To The Park Service's Longstanding Views, And Would Have Anomalous Consequences That Congress Could Not Have Intended",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1471_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The lower courts' consensus is correct and does not conflict with this Court's decisions\nA. CAFA incorporates the settled construction of the term \"defendant\" as used in other removal statutes\nB. Home Depot's arguments for a different construction of CAFA are unpersuasive and provide no reason for review by this Court\nIII. The policy arguments of Home Depot and its amici do not warrant review",
        "reference": "I. Review of an issue on which the circuits are in agreement is unwarranted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PRESIDENT HAS NO CATEGORICAL IMMUNITY FROM A SUBPOENA FOR DOCUMENTS UNRELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES\nA. Article II And The Supremacy Clause Provide Immunity Only From Subpoenas That Interfere With A President's Official Functions\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A Subpoena Seeking Non-Privileged Evidence About A President's Private, Unofficial Conduct May Be Challenged As Applied If The President Shows An Impermissible Burden On Article II Functions\nII. THE PROPHYLACTIC IMMUNITY RULES PROPOSED BY PETITIONER AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL ARE UNSOUND\nA. The Considerations Asserted To Justify Presidential Immunity From Prosecution Do Not Justify Immunity From Investigation For Unofficial Conduct\nB. Absolute Immunity From State Criminal Investigation Would Strike Deeply Into Principles Of Accountability And Federalism\nC. The Solicitor General's Heightened-Need Standard Applies Only To Privileged Materials\nD. The Prophylactic Rules Proposed By Petitioner And The Solicitor General Would Impose Severe And Unwarranted Negative Consequences On The Criminal Justice System\nIII. PETITIONER HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THIS SUBPOENA IMPERMISSIBLY BURDENS HIS ABILITY TO PERFORM OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS OR WAS ISSUED IN BAD FAITH",
        "reference": "B. The Mere Risk That A Subpoena Duces Tecum May Interfere With Official Presidential Functions Does Not Afford A President Categorical Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1215_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eleventh Circuit's fraudster-friendly extension of Section 523(a)(2)(A) to misrepresentations about a single asset is unfaithful to the text, history, and background principles of the Bankruptcy Code\nII. The Eleventh Circuit transformed Section 523(a)(2)(A) into a national super-Statute of Frauds in derogation of traditional state responsibility\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Demanding that small businesses create and keep comprehensive written records of all customer statements that induce credit is impractical\nB. The Eleventh Circuit's rule would exacerbate the already serious credit risks to small business",
        "reference": "III. The Eleventh Circuit's misinterpretation would saddle small business with significant and unwarranted burdens that Congress never intended",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Kansas Supreme Court's decision exposes the existence and breadth of the conflict among authorities concerning Section 1324a(b)(5).\nA. This case presents a clean conflict.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. This case presents a clean vehicle to resolve the split.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-921_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. PUERTO RICO COURTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO REORGANIZE CATHOLIC CHURCH POLITY\nA. The longstanding church autonomy doctrine protects churches' right to determine their polity\nB. The opinion below disastrously restructured the polity governing Catholic churches in Puerto Rico\nII. THE OPINION BELOW FUNDAMENTALLY SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED ECCLESIASTICAL INDEPENDENCE INTEGRAL TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY\nA. The decision below traps the Catholic Church in the polity of the court's creation\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The decision below's \"secular contract\" exception revokes a church's autonomy if it dares to step outside its doors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEC MAY NOT SEEK DISGORGEMENT IN FEDERAL COURT BECAUSE CONGRESS HAS NOT AUTHORIZED IT\nA. Disgorgement Is Not \"Equitable Relief\" Under section 78u(d)(5)\n1. Kokesh establishes that the SEC's disgorgement remedy is a penalty\n2. The SEC's disgorgement remedy is not traditionally available equitable relief\n3. This Court's more recent cases do not support the SEC's disgorgement remedy\nB. Section 77t(d)(3)(C) Does Not Save the SEC's Disgorgement Remedy\nII. CONGRESS DID NOT RATIFY THE SEC'S DISGORGEMENT REMEDY\nA. The Prior-Construction Canon Does Not Save the SEC's Disgorgement Remedy\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THE SEC HAS AMPLE TOOLS TO PROTECT INVESTORS",
        "reference": "B. The Other Provisions Cited by the SEC Did Not Ratify Texas Gulf Sulphur",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1576_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government's Failure To Prove Venue Requires Acquittal\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Founding-Era Practice Confirms That Acquittal Is The Appropriate Remedy\nC. Current Jury Trial Practice Further Confirms That Acquittal Is The Appropriate Remedy\nII. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
        "reference": "A. The Text, History, And Purposes Of The Venue Right Require A Remedy Of Acquittal After The Government Fails To Prove Venue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "A. National Bellas Hess and Quill Set Forth Long-Enduring and Still Valid Constitutional Principles Protecting All Remote Retailers From Unjustified Local Entanglement\nB. Retail Sales of Services Involve Considerations Different From Retail Sales of Tangible Personal Property\n1. The Services Sector Has Thrived in Part Due to an Absence of State Sales Taxes and Sales Tax Compliance Requirements on Service Providers\n2. States Have Been Unsuccessful in Their Attempts to Fashion Sales Taxes Applicable to a Broad Base of Services\n3. [MISSING]\nC. Any Rollback of the Physical Presence Requirement Should be Confined to Retailers of Tangible Personal Property\nD. State Revenue Departments and Tax Practitioners Know How to Distinguish Sales of Services From Sales of Tangible Personal Property",
        "reference": "3. Notwithstanding the Above, Sales Taxation of the Services Sector Seems Inevitable Due to the Amount of Potential Tax Revenues",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Because TCPA and FDCPA filings in general and putative class actions in particular far outpace those under the FCRA, the Ninth Circuit's decision below will dramatically increase the exposure to class-action abuse ACA members face\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit's unfettered interpretation of Article III standing and Rule 23 typicality will invite class-action abuse under the TCPA and the FDCPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Alabama's Congressional Districts Do Not Violate section 2\nA. Section 2 requires \"equally open\" political processes\n1. \"Equally open\" redistricting\n2. Constitutional guardrails in redistricting\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The first Gingles precondition separately requires plaintiffs to proffer race-neutral comparator maps\n5. In the alternative, section 2 does not apply to single-member districts\nB. Alabama's congressional districts are \"equally open\"\n1. The State's congressional districts were drawn for race-neutral reasons\n2. The State's enacted plan resembles millions of race-neutral comparators\n3. The district court erred by employing a race-based benchmark and disregarding the State's legitimate, race-neutral interests\n4. The district court's application of Gingles misconstrues this Court's precedents\nII. If Section 2 Requires Replacing Neutrally Drawn Districts With Race-Based Districts, Then The Statute Is Unconstitutional As Applied To Single-Member Districts\nA. Section 2 must be interpreted consonant with the Fifteenth Amendment\nB. Section 2 must be interpreted consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment",
        "reference": "3. The relevant benchmark for \"equally open\" electoral districts is a race-neutral redistricting plan",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-210_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Purely Legal Issues Resolved at Summary Judgment Are Preserved for Review\nA. Mr. Younger is mistaken about how the final judgment rule works: \"final decisions\" are those that end the litigation on the merits\nB. A legal error that forecloses a party from success on a defense at trial is \"final\" enough to appeal\nC. A requirement to pursue foreclosed claims at trial merely to preserve them has no foundation in the text of the Federal Rules or this Court's precedent\nII. The History of Appellate Review and the Federal Rules Supports Review in These Circumstances\nIII. Requiring Parties to Press Doomed Claims at Trial Merely to Preserve Them for Appeal Would Be Extremely Wasteful\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Any gain in \"clarity\" from a rule requiring ritual Rule 50 motions would be outstripped by its drawbacks\nIV. No Difficult Remedial Questions Arise from Reviewing a District Court's Failure to Grant Summary Judgment on the Basis of Purely Legal Error",
        "reference": "A. Requiring parties to press doomed claims at trial would be astonishingly inefficient",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION BANNING CERTAIN TRAVELERS FROM NATIONS POSING A THREAT TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court Should Abandon the Lemon Test",
        "reference": "A. The Court Should Apply the Plain Meaning of the Words in the Establishment Clause to the President's Proclamation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISION IGNORES THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE AMENDED ON SALE BAR UNDER AIA SECTION 102(A)(1)\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. SECRET COLLABORATIONS ARE VITAL TO INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY SPACE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Must Be Reversed Under The Canon Of Constitutional Avoidance\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. If The Canon Of Constitutional Avoidance Does Not Apply, The Decision Below Should Be Reversed And The Ninth Circuit Required To Address The Respondent Agents' Seventh Amendment Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the 2013 Legislature engaged in intentional vote dilution\nA. Plaintiffs bear the heavy burden of proving that the 2013 Legislature acted with a discriminatory racial purpose in permanently adopting the 2012 court-ordered interim plans\nB. Plaintiffs have not identified facts sufficient to rebut the presumption of good faith\nIII. Congressional District 35 is not an unconstitutional racial gerrymander",
        "reference": "I. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over these appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S RETENTION OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS IN A TAX FORECLOSURE SALE VIOLATES THE TAKINGS CLAUSE\nA. The Government's Retention Of Surplus Proceeds In A Tax Foreclosure Sale Is A Per Se Taking\nB. State Laws Cannot Override Protections For Private Property Rights Provided By The Takings Clause\nII. THE TAKINGS CLAUSE REQUIRES THE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION WHEN THE GOVERNMENT ACQUIRES TITLE TO PROPERTY\nA. Tax Foreclosure Schemes Cannot Limit A Property Owner's Right To Receive The Full Value Of The Property Taken\nB. Tax Foreclosure Schemes Must Provide Property Owners The Opportunity To Obtain Any Surplus Equity To Satisfy The Just Compensation Requirement\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE LOSS OF HOME EQUITY THROUGH FORECLOSURE HAS NEGATIVE, LONG-TERM FINANCIAL IMPACTS ON AFFECTED HOMEOWNERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. History of California's Private Attorneys General Act\nB. Iskanian's Creation of a Back Door to Avoid Arbitration Agreements\nC. Epic Systems Establishes A Strong Basis For Enforcing All Arbitration Agreements After Iskanian and Waffle House\nD. Post-Epic Decisions Upholding Iskanian Improperly Analogize PAGA to Governmental Qui Tam Actions\nE. PAGA's Fiction\n1. PAGA is More Like A Class Action Than A Qui Tam Action and Is Thus Encompassed By Epic\n2. Post-Epic Cases Cannot Escape FAA Preemption On The Basis of California Public Policy\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. Post-Epic Cases Upholding Iskanian Were Wrongly Decided",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Functional Claims Like Amgen's Impede Innovation \u2014 and The Federal Circuit's \"Full Scope\" Enablement Standard Is an Essential Counterweight to Prevent Overclaiming.\nII. The Federal Circuit's Full Scope Enablement Test Rests Upon Nearly 250 Years of Settled Legal Principles.\nA. Full Scope Enablement Dates Back to the Earliest Days of the Republic and Ensures Balance in the Quid Pro Quo that Is the Foundation of the Patent Bargain.\nB. This Court's \"Full Scope\" Enablement Jurisprudence Is the Forerunner of the Wands Factors and the Manner in Which the Federal Circuit Applies Them to Functional Claims.\nC. The Federal Circuit's Application of the Wands Factors Is Wholly Consistent with This Court's Precedents.\nIII. The Federal Circuit Properly Followed These Long-Settled Principles.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Amgen's Alternative Standard Would Effectively Overturn This Court's Enablement Precedents and Vitiate Full Scope Enablement.\nIV. Diluting the Full Scope Enablement Standard Will Open the Door to Overbroad High Tech Patents That Deter Innovation.\nA. The Full Scope Enablement Standard Is a Valuable Tool for Weeding Out Overbroad High Tech Patents.\nB. Functional Patent Claiming in the High Tech Field Has Led to a Blight of Overbroad Software Patents and Business-Driven Litigation That Ultimately Stifles Innovation.",
        "reference": "A. The Full Scope Enablement Test Applied Below Mirrors This Court's Approach.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Seventh Circuit distorted Congress's straightforward and comprehensive statutory text in favor of a narrow and implausible alternative\nB. The Seventh Circuit created its new scienter test from whole cloth\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Seventh Circuit improperly reasoned that Congress intended the separate categories of scienter as subsets of one another",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress lacks historical support for its use of implied authority to subpoena the President's private papers\nA. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent\nB. These legislative subpoenas have no historical precedent\nII. These subpoenas are an effort to engage in law enforcement, cannot result in valid legislation, and are not pertinent to any valid purpose\nA. The subpoenas seek to illegitimately engage in law enforcement\n1. The primary purpose of the subpoenas is what dictates if the Committees are engaging in law enforcement\n2. The primary purpose of these subpoenas is law enforcement\nB. These subpoenas cannot be justified by any legislation Congress could validly enact\n1. The Mazars subpoena cannot lead to valid legislation\n2. The bank subpoenas cannot lead to valid legislation\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. There is no clear statement of authority authorizing the Committees to subpoena the President's private papers",
        "reference": "C. The subpoenaed documents are not pertinent to the asserted legislative purposes of the Committees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW UNDERCUTS CERCLA IN MANY DISCRETE WAYS\nA. The Decision Below Undermines The CERCLA-Mandated National Contingency Plan\nB. The Decision Below Flouts CERCLA's Bar On Independent Site Cleanups\nC. The Decision Below Flouts CERCLA's Bar On Legal Challenges To An EPA-Crafted Cleanup Plan\nD. The Decision Below Disrupts CERCLA's Settlement Scheme\nE. The Decision Below Disrupts CERCLA's Contribution Scheme\nII. THE DECISION BELOW MISCONSTRUES CERCLA'S SAVINGS CLAUSES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Decision Below Conflicts With This Court's Cases Addressing The Proper Scope Of A Remedies Savings Clause\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW WILL HARM TAXPAYERS, COMPANIES, LANDOWNERS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT",
        "reference": "A. The Decision Below Erroneously Adopts The Broadest Possible Reading Of CERCLA's Savings Clauses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-12_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S OPINION CATEGORICALLY DENIES RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT TEACHERS AND COACHES OF THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. In Holding That Any Religious Expression By A Coach or Teacher While On The Job And In View Of Students Constitutes State Endorsement of Religion, The Circuit Court Opinion Has Stripped Religiously Observant Employees of the Use of Their Religion\nII. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S OPINION EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATES THE ABILITY OF A RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT COACH TO SERVE AS A MENTOR, COUNSELOR, AND PSEUDO-PARENTAL FIGURE TO HIS OR HER PLAYERS\nIII. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION",
        "reference": "A. The District's Treatment of Coach Kennedy Was Facially Violative of His First Amendment Right to Freely Exercise His Religion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Permit Judicial Review Without Administrative Exhaustion of Core Separation-of-Powers Challenges Like Axon's\nA. Parties Often Never Receive Judicial Review of Core Separation-of-Powers Challenges.\nB. Subsequent Judicial Review of Removal Challenges Usually Results in Hollow Victories.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Early Judicial Review Provides Meaningful Relief, Obviates Remedial Disputes, and Incentivizes Challenges.\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Ruling Is Especially Inequitable Because Axon's Underlying Challenge Is Obviously Meritorious.",
        "reference": "1. Retrospective Relief Is Hotly Disputed but Rarely Meaningful.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Courts Have Misapplied the Thornburg v. Gingles Preconditions\nIII. In Misapplying the Gingles Preconditions, Lower Courts Have Ignored this Court's Rulings Articulating the Appropriate Standard that Gives States Substantial Deference to Rely on Traditional Redistricting Criteria\nIV. The Court has the Opportunity to Provide Needed Clarity to States for Section 2 Map Drawing",
        "reference": "I. The Voting Rights Act Requires Equality of Opportunity, Not Proportionality of Outcomes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. FEDERAL LAW HOLDS THAT FEDERAL FUNDING RECIPIENTS ARE ONLY ON NOTICE OF REMEDIES TRADITIONALLY AVAILABLE IN SUITS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES ARE NOT TRADITIONALLY AVAILABLE\nA. There Is No Conflict Between the Circuits as to the Requirement That a Federal Funding Recipient Must Be \"On Notice\" of Remedies \"Traditionally Available\" in Order to Be Liable Under the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act\nB. There Is No Conflict Among the Circuits as to the General Rule of Contract Law That Emotional Distress Damages Are Not Recoverable\nII. THE COMMON LAW \"PERSONAL CONTRACT\" EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND DOES NOT PUT RESPONDENT ON NOTICE THAT IT MAY BE LIABLE FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES FOR ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY DECIDED THE QUESTION PRESENTED IN THE APPEAL\nA. The Fifth Circuit Correctly Relied Upon Barnes v. Gorman and the Common Law of Contracts to Determine That Emotional Distress Damages Were Not Available to Ms. Cummings as Such Damages Were Not Traditionally Available in Breach of Contract Actions\nB. That Petitioner Would Be Left Without \"Any Available Remedy\" If Her Petition Is Denied Does Not Justify an Expansion of Those Limited Circumstances Under Which a Funding Recipient Is on Notice of Its Liability for Damages Under the Rehabilitation Act and Affordable Care Act",
        "reference": "III. THE FACTS OF SHEELY AND THIS CASE SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE PERSONAL CONTRACT EXCEPTION WILL NOT APPLY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Second Amendment Protects The Right To Carry Arms Outside The Home For Self-Defense\nA. The Text of the Second Amendment Secures the Right to Carry Arms, Not Just to Keep Them\nB. [MISSING]\nII. New York's Restrictive Carry Regime Violates The Second Amendment",
        "reference": "B. History and Tradition Confirm that the Second Amendment Protects the Right to Carry Arms Outside the Home for Self-Defense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Regulatory takings doctrine presents a higher bar for property owners than physical invasions\nB. Temporary physical invasions are presumptively takings\nII. This court should reaffirm the categorical difference between physical invasions and regulations of property use",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit's decision fails to recognize that temporary physical invasions are subject to a different and far more stringent level of review than regulatory actions that merely restrict an owner's use of property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Causal Relationship Between Public-Sector Collective Bargaining and Pension Underfunding or Municipal Bankruptcy\nA. Public Pension Problems Stem Primarily from Underfunding and the Great Recession Rather than Public-Employee Unionization or Agency Fees\n1. States and Local Governments Established Pensions for Their Employees Well Before Public Employees Were Permitted to Collectively Bargain\n2. Underfunding Also Exists in States that Permit Free-Riding or Prohibit Public-Sector Collective Bargaining\n3. Research Shows that Long-Term Underfunding and Outside Financial Pressures, Not Collective Bargaining, Caused Illinois' and Other States' Public Pension Challenges\nB. State and Municipal Financial Problems Are Not Due to Public-Sector Unions\n1. There Is No Correlation Between Public-Sector Collective Bargaining and State Fiscal Health\n2. The Detroit Bankruptcy Was Not Caused by Collective Bargaining. 20\n3. [MISSING]\n4. State and Local Governments Experience Financial Hardships and Bankruptcies for a Variety of Reasons\nII. The Same Debates Over Public-Employee Pensions and Their Funding Existed at the Time of Abood",
        "reference": "3. Similarly, the City of Stockton and the City of San Bernardino Did Not File for Bankruptcy Because of Collective Bargaining",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-21_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A damages claim for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to plead and prove the absence of probable cause\nA. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause\nB. Analogous common-law torts support requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a retaliatory-arrest claim\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. A damages remedy is not essential to deter police officers from making retaliatory arrests supported by probable cause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FCA's Text and Structure Confirm that the Government May Dismiss Qui Tam Suits Even When It Initially Declines to Intervene\nA. The FCA Imposes No Limitations on When the Government May Exercise Its Dismissal Authority.\nB. At a Minimum, the FCA Authorizes the Government to Seek Dismissal After Intervening.\nII. Petitioner's Interpretation Would Render the FCA's Qui Tam Provisions Unconstitutional\nA. Under Petitioner's Interpretation, the Qui Tam Provisions Violate Separation-of-Powers Principles.\n1. The President must retain substantial control over qui tam suits.\n2. Petitioner's interpretation prevents the President from fulfilling his constitutional duty to control FCA suits.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner's Historical Arguments Are Unpersuasive.\nIII. The Government's Decision to Dismiss This Qui Tam Suit Is Not Subject to Judicial Review, But That Decision Was Reasonable in Any Event\nA. The FCA Does Not Authorize Judicial Review of the Reasonableness of the Government's Dismissal Decisions.\nB. Far from Mandating Judicial Review of the Reasonableness of the Government's Dismissal Decisions, the Constitution Prohibits It.\nC. Remand Is Unnecessary Even If the Court Adopts a Substantive Due Process Test.",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's Interpretation Also Raises Constitutional Concerns Under the Appointments Clause.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.77
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1576_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. ACQUITTAL NECESSARILY DISCOURAGES FORUM SHOPPING AND ALLEVIATES UNFAIR LEVERAGE IN PLEA BARGAINING\nA. Vacatur Incentivizes Prosecutorial Forum Shopping\nB. Acquittal Corrects an Imbalance at the Bargaining Table",
        "reference": "I. PROSECUTORS HAVE NEAR UNFETTERED DISCRETION IN CHOOSING A TRIAL VENUE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Reversing Counterman's Conviction Would Allow Egregious Conduct To Go Unpunished and Leave Innocent Victims Unprotected.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The State's Objective Standard Protects Victims Without Offending The First Amendment.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Interplay Between the Religion Clauses as Articulated in Locke Has Created a Conflict in the Courts Below\nA. The Establishment Clause Requires Secular Purpose and Neutrality and Proscribes Coercion and Excessive Entanglement, Which Montana's Student Aid Program Satisfies\nB. The Free Exercise Clause Requires General Applicability and Neutrality, Which Montana's Student Aid Program Satisfies\nC. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Locke's Interplay Between the Religion Clauses Raises the Important Question of Allowing Religion to be Marginalized in Civil Society, in Violation of the Equal Protection Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The new Section 2 exceeds Congress's authority.\nB. The new Section 2 is an improper delegation.\nII. The new Section 2 is unconstitutional as applied below.\nIII. Complying with the new Section 2 is not a compelling interest.",
        "reference": "I. Section 2 is unconstitutional to the extent it reaches beyond intentional discrimination.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. AN AS-APPLIED CHALLENGER TO A METHOD OF EXECUTION NEED NOT PROVE AN AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE METHOD\nIII. THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT LETHAL GAS WILL SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE RISKS BUCKLEW FACES FROM MISSOURI'S LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL\nIV. BUCKLEW MET HIS BURDEN TO DEFEAT RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING ANY COMPARISON OF LETHAL GAS AND LETHAL INJECTION\nA. Respondents Did Not Dispute That Lethal Gas Was A Feasible And Readily Available Alternative Method When Moving For Summary Judgment\nB. An Inmate Challenging His Method Of Execution Need Not Detail The Protocols For His Execution\nV. BUCKLEW'S CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR RES JUDICATA",
        "reference": "I. COURTS SHOULD NOT ASSUME BUCKLEW'S EXECUTION WILL GO AS PLANNED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress, This Court, And The Executive Branch Have Consistently Concluded That Structural Separation Of Powers Constraints Do Not Apply When Congress Acts In The Territories \u2014And Aurelius Fails To Show Otherwise\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Has Been Universally Accepted Since The Founding Because It Protects Public Confidence In Our Free Government Institutions\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Has Always Applied To Constitutional Infirmities, Including Those Involving An Officer's Qualifications Or Appointment At Any Level\nC. The Primary Purpose Of The De Facto Officer Doctrine Is The Protection Of Public Reliance Interests And The Public's Confidence In The Rule Of Law",
        "reference": "II. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Has Applied In Instances Of Constitutional And Appointments Infirmities For Centuries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. REQUIRING A SHOWING OF RETALIATORY INTENT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY TEXT AND GIVES EMPLOYERS AND HR PROFESSIONALS CLARITY ABOUT THE TYPE OF CONDUCT THAT GIVES RISE TO LIABILITY\nA. The Second Circuit's Holding is Consistent with SOX's Plain Language\nB. The Second Circuit's Holding is Consistent With Other Anti-Retaliation Statutes\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Second Circuit's Decision Advances SOX's Goals\nII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH CONGRESS' BURDEN OF PROOF FRAMEWORK",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner's Approach Would Cause Confusion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reexamine its Decision to Defer to the Agencies' Interpretation of the Clean Water Act.\nA. The Constitution requires separation of powers to protect individual liberty.\nB. Chevron deference violates constitutionally mandated separation of powers.\ni. Deference to agency interpretation of statutory texts allows the Executive to exercise legislative power.\nii. Deference to agency interpretation of statutory texts allows the Executive to exercise judicial power.\nII. The Clean Water Act Only Applies to Navigable Waters.\nA. Proper interpretation of the Clean Water Act requires adherence to the principle of enumerated powers.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Regulation of \"wetlands\" is outside the scope of Congress's powers to regulate the channels of interstate commerce.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' Subjective Scienter Test Would Impede Government Contracting, Including in the Defense Industry, and Undermine National Security Interests.\nA. Contractors Routinely Confront Ambiguous Legal Requirements When Dealing With the Federal Government.\nB. Petitioners' Proposed Scienter Standard Would Impose Liability for Claims That Are True and Without Fair Notice.\n1. A claim based on a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision is not \"knowingly\" \"false.\"\n2. Petitioners' reading would create grave fair-notice problems.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Only Guidance Carrying the Force of Law Can \"Warn Away\" a Contractor From an Objectively Reasonable Interpretation of an Ambiguous Legal Provision.",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners' Proposed Test Would Threaten Predictability and Stability of Government Contracting and Harm the Public Fisc.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1981 REQUIRES A PLAINTIFF TO PLEAD AND PROVE THAT RACE WAS A BUT-FOR CAUSE OF THE CHALLENGED CONTRACTING DECISION\nA. The Plain Text Of Section 1981 Requires But-For Causation\nB. Other Indicia Of Statutory Meaning Confirm But-For Causation Is Required, And At A Minimum Fail To Overcome The \"Default Rule\" Of But-For Causation\n1. But-For Causation Was The Sine Qua Non Of Tort Liability When Section 1981 Was Enacted In 1866\n2. Congress Declined To Depart From But-For Causation Under Section 1981 When It Adopted A Motivating-Factor Standard For Other Antidiscrimination Statutes\n3. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Rejection Of A But-For Causation Standard For Section 1981 Claims Contravenes The Statutory Text And This Court's Decisions\nII. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ALLEGE BUT-FOR CAUSATION",
        "reference": "3. This Court's Prior Interpretations Of Section 1981 Confirm That It Requires But-For Causation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5924_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Counsels Against Overruling Apodaca v. Oregon\n1. This Court's stare decisis jurisprudence shows that this petition is not worthy of a grant of certiorari\n2. This Court's recent Sixth Amendment cases do not cast doubt upon Apodaca\nB. Petitioner's Historical Arguments Provide no Reason to Revisit Apodaca\n1. Neither the text of the Sixth Amendment nor intent of the Founders suggests that the Sixth Amendment contains a requirement of unanimity\nC. The Petitioner's Incorporation and Historical Racial Discrimination Arguments do not Warrant Certiorari Either\n1. Unanimity is not subject to incorporation because it is not a fundamental right of trial procedure\n2. The history of Louisiana does not counsel in favor of overruling Apodaca\n3. [MISSING]\nD. The People's Decision to Amend their State Constitution to Prospectively Eliminate Non-Unanimous Juries makes this Petition less Worthy of Certiorari",
        "reference": "3. Other procedural safeguards and policy considerations further undermine any purported need to revisit Apodaca",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 202(h)'s Text Requires The FCC To Consider \"Competition.\"\nB. The Statute's Structure and Purpose Reinforce That \"Competition\" Is Section 202(h)'s Primary Goal.\nC. Legislative History Corroborates That Congress Intended Section 202(h) To Focus On Competition.\nII. The Third Circuit's Decision Erroneously Ignores That Competition Is Section 202(h)'s Primary Consideration.\nA. The FCC Correctly Revised Its Broadcast Ownership Duopoly Rule In Light Of Competition.\nB. The Third Circuit Erred In Vacating The FCC's Reconsideration Order.\nIII. The Third Circuit's Decision Harms Companies Like Gray, Which Seek To Improve And Expand Local News Coverage Through Increased Investment Allowed By Economies of Scale.\nA. The Economics of Local Television.\nB. Gray's Business Strategy.\nC. The Effect Of The Third Circuit's Decision On Companies Like Gray.",
        "reference": "I. Properly Construed, Section 202(h) Directs The FCC To Modernize Ownership Rules Regularly Based On Competition.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief041.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Second Amendment permits states to experiment with firearms regulations to meet the needs of their communities\nII. New York's proper-cause requirement is the result of generations of government experimentation in response to evolving public-safety challenges in the City and the State\nA. At the Founding, New York's firearms regulations varied according to local conditions\nB. New York adopted the proper-cause requirement in response to changing firearms technology and increasing gun crime after other approaches were unsuccessful\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The City applies the proper-cause requirement relatively rigorously, in line with its unique conditions and public-safety concerns\nB. Petitioners elide the substantial local variation in the application of the proper-cause requirement\nC. The proper-cause requirement reflects a public-safety judgment that other states have made, courts have upheld, and this Court should not lightly disturb",
        "reference": "III. The proper-cause requirement allows New York's diverse communities to regulate concealed carry in line with local conditions and public-safety needs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner's 1997 burglary convictions are for 'offenses committed on occasions different from one another' under the ACCA\nA. Offenses that involve temporally distinct criminal conduct are 'committed on occasions different from one another'\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The history of Section 924(e)(1) confirms that temporally distinct crimes are committed on occasions different from one another'\nB. Petitioner's interpretation of Section 924(e)(1) is inconsistent with the provision's text, context, and history, and it would create significant uncertainty\n1. Petitioner's interpretation is inconsistent with the statutory text and context\n2. Petitioner's interpretation is not supported by the history of Section 924(e)(1)\n3. Petitioner's interpretation would be unworkable\n4. The Court should not resort to the rule of lenity",
        "reference": "1. Offenses occur on different 'occasions' when the criminal conduct necessary to satisfy the offense elements occurs at different times",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5924_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT COMPELS THE INCORPORATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT UNANIMOUS JURY TRIAL RIGHT\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE DISCRIMINATORY DESIGN OF LOUISIANA'S NON-UNANIMOUS JURY PROVISION PERSISTED AS INTENDED",
        "reference": "II. LOUISIANA'S NON-UNANIMOUS JURY PROVISION WAS DESIGNED TO NULLIFY BLACK JURY SERVICE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The most straightforward reading is that \"using a random or sequential number generator\" describes how ATDS equipment \"produces\" numbers, not how it \"stores\" them.\nA. Ordinary and technical meanings of \"random number generator\" and \"sequential number generator\" refer to means of producing numbers.\nB. The correct grammatical reading of the definition aligns with the semantic content of the words.\nC. Facebook's reading makes the words store or surplusage.\nII. Applying the prohibition on unwanted robocalls to autodialers that do not use random or sequential number generators is consistent with the TCPA's structure, manifest purposes, and context.\nA. Congress drafted the robocalling prohibition to carry out the statute's broad privacy-protection goals.\nB. Prohibiting robocalls to stored numbers accords with the statutory text's focus on automatically dialed calls.\nC. Limiting ATDSs to systems that store numbers using a number generator would have illogical and anomalous consequences.\nD. The TCPA's historical context supports its application to systems that automatically dial stored numbers.\nE. [MISSING]\nF. Correctly applying the TCPA to autodialers that make robocalls to stored numbers poses no threat to ordinary smartphone users.",
        "reference": "E. Facebook's reading of the statute would unleash the torrent of robocalls Congress wrote the TCPA to stop.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Unprecedented Net Worth Sweep Exceeds the Statutory Powers of a Conservator to Rehabilitate Troubled Financial Institutions\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Enforcement of the Anti-Injunction Provision to Insulate the Net Worth Sweep from Judicial Review Would Violate Due Process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Eminent Domain Law Recognizes the Obligation to Provide Compensation For Less-than-Permanent Takings\nIII. Nothing is Truly \"Permanent\"",
        "reference": "I. The Duration of an Invasion Is Less Important Than The Interference With The Owner's Right to Exclude",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The agencies had statutory authority to adopt the expanded exemptions\nA. The ACA authorizes both expanded exemptions\nB. RFRA requires or at least authorizes the expanded religious exemption\n1. RFRA requires the expanded religious exemption\n2. RFRA authorizes the expanded religious exemption\nII. The final rules are procedurally valid\nA. The final rules comply with the APA's procedural requirements regardless of whether the interim rules did\n1. The final rules comply with the APA's procedural requirements\n2. Any procedural defects in the interim rules do not undermine the procedural validity of the final rules\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The interim rules were expressly authorized by statutes other than the APA\n2. The interim rules were justified by the APA's good-cause exception\nIII. At a minimum, this Court should vacate the nationwide injunction\nA. Nationwide injunctions exceed courts' constitutional and equitable powers\nB. Any relief in this case should be narrowed to the plaintiff States",
        "reference": "B. The interim rules were procedurally valid",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. COURTS AND EMPLOYERS INTERPRET HARDISON'S DE MINIMIS STANDARD NARROWLY, LEADING TO ABSURD RESULTS\nA. Hardison Effectively Stifles Title VII's Protections For Employees With Religious Objections To Their Employer's Vaccination Mandate\nB. Relying On Hardison, District Courts Reduce Title VII's Religious Protections To Near Futility\nC. The Suffocating Effect Of Hardison Is So Strong That It Even Usurps State Laws Requiring A Religious Exemption From Certain Employment Practices\nD. Hardison Seemingly and Erroneously Waives The Burden On The Employer To Prove That A Religious Accommodation Would Pose A Direct Threat To Health And Safety\nE. Hardison Allows District Courts To Find Undue Hardship Based On Hypothetical Harms, And Subjects Religious Beliefs To A Heckler's Veto\nII. HARDISON'S DE MINIMIS RULE MAKES A MOCKERY OF TITLE VII AND DISCRIMINATES AGAINST RELIGION, RELEGATING RELIGIOUS RIGHTS TO ODD MAN OUT STATUS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Hardison's De Minimis Rule Is Contrary To The Legislative History Of Title VII, Plain English, And Statutory Canons\nC. Hardison's De Minimis Rule Impermissibly, and Unconstitutionally, Makes Religion The \"Odd Man Out\" For Employment Discrimination\n1. Other anti-discrimination statutes do not relegate religious beliefs to \"odd man out\" status\n2. Other classes protected from discrimination are not relegated to \"odd man out\" status",
        "reference": "A. Hardison's De Minimis Rule Is Directly Contrary To The Plain Text Of Title VII",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ESTABLISH FETUSES AS HUMAN PERSONS AND RENDER ROE AND ITS PROGENY OBSOLETE\nA. The Court in Roe based its viability standard on: (a) lack of scientific consensus on when human life begins, (b) absence of uniform legal protection of fetuses, and (c) maternal burdens of pregnancy\nB. Scientific, legal, and social developments have robbed Roe's viability standard of its original justification\n1. Casey's stare decisis factors for reviewing Roe require evaluation of changes in fact and law\n2. A consensus of biologists now acknowledges that a human fetus is, biologically speaking, a human being\na. The scientific literature has established that fertilization initiates a new human being\nb. An overwhelming majority of biologists recognize human life begins at fertilization\nc. Legislative hearings on when life begins marshalled scientific evidence that life begins at fertilization\nd. Abortion doctors and proponents of abortion rights commonly admit fetuses are human beings\ne. Views opposing the position that human life starts at fertilization are unscientific and ideological\n3. Changes in law demonstrate that the human fetus is recognized as a human being\na. Enactment of fetal homicide laws in almost 80% of the states demonstrates that outside of the abortion context a human fetus is legally recognized as a human being\nb. States are increasingly proposing and enacting laws protective of unborn human beings even when abortion is curtailed as a result\n4. Protective legislation has ameliorated many detriments associated with pregnancy\nC. The Court should not continue to follow Roe and its progeny in view of Roe's failure to acknowledge that a human fetus is a human being at all stages of the life cycle\nII. SINCE A HUMAN FETUS IS A HUMAN BEING, ACT 620 SHOULD BE SUSTAINED AS A REASONABLE PROTECTION OF A PREBORN PERSON UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT\nA. The Fourteenth Amendment covers all human beings, including the preborn, and guarantees the due process right to life and equal protection of the laws\n1. The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect every human being within the jurisdiction of the U.S\n2. Overwhelming evidence now exists that human fetuses are human beings and therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment\n3. The Court has a constitutional duty to recognize the right of human fetuses to legal protections as persons, and to begin to build a consensus favoring protection of fetuses under law\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Louisiana is entitled to protect preborn human persons by passing laws that impact abortion access",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1155_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD ESTABLISHES THREE PERTINENT RULES GOVERNING REVIEW OF AGENCY FINDINGS\nA. Courts May Uphold An Agency's Factual Findings Only On The Grounds Clearly Expressed By The Agency\nB. Courts Must Assess The Agency's Factual Findings Against The Standard Of Proof The Agency Was Required To Apply\nC. Courts Must Ensure That The Agency Took Into Account Any Relevant Evidence In The Record\nII. A REVIEWING COURT MUST ASSUME THAT AN APPLICANT TESTIFIED CREDIBLY WHERE NEITHER THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE NOR THE BIA EXPLICITLY MADE AN ADVERSE CREDIBILITY FINDING\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Text Of The REAL ID Act Imposes A Presumption Of Credibility That Courts Must Give Force To When Reviewing BIA Decisions\nC. The Approach Dictated By Chenery And The Text Of The REAL ID Act Is Not Unduly \"Rigid\"\nIII. IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND THE BIA MAY DECLINE TO ACCEPT CREDIBLE TESTIMONY AS TRUE IF THEY PROVIDE A REASONED BASIS FOR THAT DECISION\nIV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE",
        "reference": "A. The Chenery Rule Bars Courts From Deeming Testimony Non-Credible In The Absence Of An Adverse Credibility Finding By The Agency",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-334_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. District Courts Lack Authority To Deny Taxable Appellate Costs To A Party Entitled To Appellate Costs\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Rule 39(a) Gives Appellate Courts Sole Authority To Determine Whether A Prevailing Party Is Entitled To An Award Of Full Appellate Costs\n2. Rule 39(e) Binds The District Court To The Court Of Appeals' Entitlement Determinations\n3. The District Court's Responsibility Is To Determine The Amounts Within Rule 39(e)'s Four Categories\n4. Rule 39(e)'s Use Of The Word \"Taxable\" Does Not Expand The Trial Court's Role\nB. Petitioner's Position Conflicts With The History Of Rule 39 And Appellate-Cost Practices\nII. Even If The Court Disagrees With The Fifth Circuit's Reading Of Rule 39, There Is No Need To Remand",
        "reference": "A. Petitioner's Position Conflicts With The Text Of Rule 39",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1143_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. Review is premature as to whether the look-through analysis applies to petitions to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Review is inappropriate as the district court had continuing jurisdiction over the action to vacate, despite Petitioner's forum shopping and attempts to relitigate dismissed claims",
        "reference": "B. Review will not be outcome-determinative as dismissal of the action to vacate is inevitable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-467_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case is a Poor Candidate for Certiorari or Summary Reversal Because the Facts Are Muddled by Various Conflicting Accounts, and the Petition Does Not Present the Facts in the Light Most Favorable to Hughes\nA. The Record Contains Contradictory Evidence on Virtually Every Important Fact\n1. Did Hughes appear agitated, or calm and peaceable?\n2. Did Hughes threaten Chadwick?\n3. How many times did the police instruct Hughes to drop the kitchen knife?\n4. Did the officers reasonably believe that Hughes heard their instructions to drop the kitchen knife?\n5. What did Chadwick say to the officers who were pointing their guns at Hughes?\n6. When Kisela shot Hughes, how far apart were Hughes and Chadwick?\n7. When Kisela shot Hughes, was Hughes approaching Chadwick or standing still?\n8. Did Hughes \"wield\" the kitchen knife at any point?\n9. When Kisela shot Hughes, where was the kitchen knife?\nB. The Petition Omits Important Facts that a Rational Juror Could Find\nC. The Dissent from Denial of Rehearing En Banc Misstates the Facts\nII. Viewing the Facts in the Light Most Favorable to Hughes, Corporal Kisela is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity\nA. Viewing the Facts in the Light Most Favorable to Hughes, Corporal Kisela Committed an Obvious Constitutional Violation\nB. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Both Ninth Circuit Law and the Law of Other Circuits Clearly Establish that Police Cannot Shoot a Person Merely for Being Armed if She Does Not Make Any Threatening Moves\nC. Kisela Is Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because Prior Cases Had Clearly Established a Set of Factors that Govern Use of Deadly Force, and Every One of Those Factors Cuts in Favor of Hughes\nD. The Court of Appeals Did Not Define Clearly Established Law at Too High a Level of Generality\nE. [MISSING]\nIII. This Case Does Not Present the Question Whether the Police May Use Deadly Force To Prevent Third Party Harm, Nor Is There a Circuit Split on that Question\nA. This Case Does Not Present the Question Whether a Police Officer May Use Deadly Force To Prevent Third Party Harm\nB. There Is No Circuit Split as to Whether Police Officers May Use Deadly Force To Prevent Third Party Harm\nC. There is No Conflict Between the Decision Below and the Prior Decisions of the Ninth Circuit and this Court",
        "reference": "E. No Appellate Judge Disagreed with the Conclusion that Kisela Committed a Constitutional Violation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.35
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Plain Object Of section 202(h) Review Is The Public Interest\nA. Section 202(h)'s Text Confirms that the Public Interest Is Paramount\nB. Congress Accepted a Broad Public-Interest Standard when Amending section 202(h)\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Reconsideration Order Rests on an Unreasoned Reinterpretation of the Same Facts, Not a Transparent and Reasoned Policy Choice\nB. The Commission's Ownership-Diversity Findings Are Irrational\nC. The Commission's Decision Rested on an Arbitrary Assessment of the Past, Not a Reasoned Predictive Judgment\nD. Nothing in section 202(h) Exempts the Commission from the Ordinary APA Requirement to Show Its Work\nIII. The Third Circuit's Remedy Was Correct",
        "reference": "II. The Commission's About-Face Conclusion That Relaxing Ownership Rules Would Not Harm Ownership Diversity Was Arbitrary And Capricious",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE BOARD MEMBERS ARE SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. The Board Members Clearly Satisfy the Test for Principal Federal Officers\nB. PROMESA's Procedure for Selecting Board Members Violates the Appointments Clause and Undermines the Separation of Powers\nC. The Territorial Clause Does Not Supersede the Appointments Clause\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Private Parties' Enforcement of Constitutional Structure Provides a Meaningful Check on Government\nB. Private Parties Bringing Successful Separations-of-Powers Challenges Against the Administrative State Are Entitled to Meaningful Remedies\nIII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE TO VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION'S STRUCTURAL PROVISIONS AND CANNOT SAVE DEFECTIVE AGENCIES FROM APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CHALLENGES\nA. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Cures Only Minor Statutory Defects in Appointments, Not Those That Violate the Constitution's Structural Provisions\nB. The First Circuit's Application of the De Facto Officer Doctrine Contravenes This Court's Precedents",
        "reference": "II. MEANINGFUL REMEDIES FOR APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CHALLENGES ARE NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THIS STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MAJORITY JURISDICTIONAL RULE GRANTING AUTOMATIC STAYS UPON APPEAL FROM AN ARBITRABILITY DECISION COMPLIES WITH AND FURTHERS THE FAA, WHILE THE MINORITY RULE FAVORING JUDICIAL DISCRETION THAT WAS APPLIED HERE, CONFLICTS WITH AND IMPEDES THE FAA\nA. The Text of the FAA Favors Issuance of an Automatic Stay when a Party Appeals from the Denial of a Motion to Compel Contractual Arbitration\nB. The Purpose of the FAA Favors an Automatic Stay\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The \"bright line\" majority rule for an automatic stay on appeal of an order denying arbitration rests on sounder reasoning than the minority rule's discretionary stay approach",
        "reference": "1. Permitting discovery in the district court pending an appeal of arbitrability conflicts with the FAA's objectives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-489_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A [MISSING]\nA. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases\nB. The court of appeals erred in holding that a creditor's unreasonable good-faith belief that its collection efforts are lawful precludes the imposition of contempt sanctions\nC. This Court should not adopt petitioner's proposed rule\nD. The Court should vacate the judgment below and remand the case to allow the court of appeals to apply the correct standard in the first instance",
        "reference": "A creditor's subjective good faith does not preclude a finding of civil contempt, but civil contempt remedies are not available if there is an objectively fair ground of doubt about whether the creditor's conduct violates a discharge order",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-225_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This is an appropriate case for deciding whether to overrule Seminole Rock/Auer deference",
        "reference": "I. The government neither defends Seminole Rock/Auer deference nor denies the issue's importance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Text of the Free Exercise Clause\nII. The Constitution's Ratification Turns Into a Rally for a Bill of Rights\nIII. The Free Exercise Clause in Congress, June to September 1789\nA. House of Representatives\nB. Before the Senate\nC. Conference Committee, September 22-23\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Preamble\nIV. Comparison with State Constitutions Adopted 1775 to 1784",
        "reference": "D. Final Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. Exacting Scrutiny's Definitional Fluidity Renders It Inadequate to Protect Against Chilling of First Amendment Associational Rights\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Harassment and Retaliation for Disfavored Political Views - A Recent Fixture of American Life\nB. The Pervasiveness of Harassment and Retaliation Against Those with Disfavored Political Views\n1. Major Media Outlets\n2. Corporate America\n3. Boycotts\n4. Educational Institutions\n5. Retaliation by Government Officials",
        "reference": "II. Strict Scrutiny Review Is Necessary to Forestall Further Chilling of First Amendment Associational Rights from the Dramatic Increase in Retaliation Against Those with Disfavored Political Views",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. MARTINEZ DOES NOT ENCOURAGE PRISONERS AND THEIR COUNSEL TO WITHHOLD CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE UNTIL FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS",
        "reference": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents have standing\nII. The Secretary adopted the Program without following the proper procedures\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The HEROES Act does not authorize the Program",
        "reference": "A. The Secretary cannot avoid his rulemaking obligations unless the Program is authorized by the HEROES Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE D.C. COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT THE EXPROPRIATION EXCEPTION CONFERS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER IN THIS CASE\nA. Reliance on the Simon v. Republic of Hungary precedent was correct because it accurately demonstrated the scope of the expropriation exception\nB. The Simon decision is consistent with Congress's position when it passed the \"Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Immunity Clarification Act\" in 2016\nII. PETITIONERS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL ARE INCORRECT IN ASSERTING THAT THE EXPROPRIATION EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE THEIR EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE OPPOSITE RESULT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' and the Solicitor General's position is not supported by the record they present\nC. Contrary to Petitioners' and the Solicitor General's assertions, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States does not foreclose the possibility that domestic takings violate international law\nIII. THIS COURT HAS ALREADY DECLINED TO ADOPT THE NARROW READING OF THE EXPROPRIATION EXCEPTION WHICH PETITIONERS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL SUPPORT\nIV. PETITIONERS' POSITION WOULD RESULT IN UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INEQUITABLE ACCESS TO U.S. COURTS\nV. OVERTURNING THE D.C. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE POLICY OF MULTIPLE CONGRESSIONAL ACTS, AS WELL AS THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S POSITION ON HOLOCAUST-ERA RESTITUTION POLICY",
        "reference": "A. Contrary to Petitioners' and the Solicitor General's contention, there is no \"consensus view\" regarding the expropriation exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. Individual Rights to be Free of a Political Gerrymander\n1. Intentional cracking and packing does not cause a palpable injury at the level of the individual voter\n2. Cracking and packing ultimately measures injury to a party that roughly coincides with the party's failure to achieve statewide proportional representation\n3. Failing to recognize the \"loss of weight\" as a true injury for political purposes leaves this court's minority vote dilution precedent undisturbed\nB. A System of Proportional Representation Is Foreign to our System of Government and Cannot Coexist with Traditional Districting Principles\n1. Systems of Proportional Party Representation have no place in our constitutional order\n2. Experience in Missouri and elsewhere shows that party-proportional representation is at war with traditional districting principles\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. A Constitutional \"Group Right\" to Proportional Representation Is Unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Amendment guarantees the right of local self-government in all matters not expressly prohibited to the states or clearly delegated to the federal government\nA. The drafter of the Ninth Amendment, James Madison, expressly described the Ninth Amendment as working in tandem with the Tenth to prevent the national government from interfering with matters constitutionally reserved to the people in the states\nB. Between the Founding and Reconstruction, scholars, lawyers, and judges repeatedly and consistently interpreted the Ninth Amendment as working in tandem with the Tenth to preserve the retained powers and rights of the people in the states\nC. Antebellum Republicans relied on constitutional federalism in their opposition to the spread of slavery\nII. The Fourteenth Amendment neither enforces unenumerated substantive rights against the states nor alters the federalist meaning of the Ninth Amendment\nA. John Bingham, primary draftsman of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, sought to apply enumerated constitutional rights against the states while preserving the structural principles of constitutional federalism declared in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments\nB. Senator Jacob Howard introduced Bingham's redrafted Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting the first eight amendments and other enumerated constitutional rights\nC. The ratifying public was well informed of the speeches of John Bingham and Jacob Howard\nD. Nothing about the ratified Fourteenth Amendment affected the original federalist meaning of the Ninth Amendment\n1. Members of the Reconstruction Congress distinguished the federalist Ninth and Tenth Amendments from the personal rights enumerated in the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights\n2. [MISSING]\nE. In The Slaughterhouse Cases, this Court correctly rejected an effort to read the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting unenumerated rights",
        "reference": "2. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not protect unenumerated substantive rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Free Exercise Clause should be analyzed in accordance with its original meaning\nII. As originally understood, the Free Exercise Clause mandates exemptions for sincerely held religious beliefs from neutral and generally applicable laws\nA. The text of the Free Exercise Clause, informed by historical practice, requires accommodations for religious exercise\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The prevailing political philosophy at the time of the Founding suggests that the Free Exercise Clause compels religious exemptions\nIII. The need to revisit Smith has become more imperative over time",
        "reference": "B. The broader historical record suggests that religious exemptions from generally applicable legal duties are required by the Free Exercise Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-846_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Respondent fails even to establish that Sections 1681n and 1681o unambiguously create causes of action that encompass the United States\nC. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
        "reference": "A. Respondent identifies no textual waiver of sovereign immunity for actions under 15 U.S.C. 1681n and 1681o",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-897_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents' statutory arguments are incorrect\n1. Respondents lack meritorious answers to the government's statutory arguments\n2. Respondents misread Section 1226\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Respondents' view of finality is mistaken\nB. Respondents' constitutional arguments are incorrect\nC. At a minimum, the government's reading of Section 1231(a) deserves deference",
        "reference": "3. Respondents also misread Section 1231(a)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. According less First Amendment protection to Petitioners because they are \"professionals\" would threaten the rights of speakers nationwide\nIII. This case does not hinge on whether Petitioners are paid for their services",
        "reference": "I. The \"professional speech\" doctrine advanced below is a doctrinal innovation squarely at odds with this Court's precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A FEDERAL PROSECUTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. section 242 IS NOT THE \"SAME OFFENSE\" AS A STATE HOMICIDE, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT, ASSAULT, OR OTHER SIMILAR PROSECUTION\nA. The Blockburger Test Would Remain in Force Even if Dual Sovereignty is Abolished\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Issue Preclusion Component of Double Jeopardy Does Not Apply to Successive Inter-Sovereign Prosecutions\nII. CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE SUPPORTS AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL RIGHTS EXCEPTION TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY",
        "reference": "B. Section 242 \"Same Offense\" Analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The experience of Orthodox Jews throughout history demonstrates the need for robust accommodations of religious observance and practice in the workplace.\nA. Jewish law frequently requires accommodation in the workplace setting.\nB. Before the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Orthodox Jews frequently suffered from lack of accommodation in the workplace.\nC. The promise of the 1972 amendments was quickly smothered by Hardison.\nD. Since Hardison, Orthodox Jews have continued to suffer harms in the workplace.\nII. The experience of Orthodox Jews shows that an undue hardship standard like the ADA's is a good fit for resolving disputes over workplace religious accommodations.\nA. The ADA's fact-dependent balancing test is well-suited to resolve typically fact-dependent religious accommodation requests.\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Adopting an ADA-like standard would also allow Title VII's religious discrimination standard to dovetail with other religion-in-the-workplace standards recognized by the Court.",
        "reference": "B. Adopting the ADA's balancing test will allow Orthodox Jews to participate more fully in commercial and professional life.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Lacked Article I Authority to Enact ICWA\nA. Congress's authority to legislate regarding Indians does not include the authority to enact ICWA\n1. The Constitution does not give Congress plenary power to enact ICWA\na. Indian Commerce Clause\nb. Treaty Clause\nc. Other constitutional provisions\n2. A historical understanding of Congress's Indian authority does not include ICWA\nB. This Court's precedents do not require a contrary result\n1. This Court's references to a \"plenary power\" over Indians are of dubious origin\n2. [MISSING]\nII. ICWA Violates the Equal-Protection Rights of Everyone Involved in Child-Custody Proceedings\nA. Texas has standing to raise an equal-protection challenge\nB. ICWA racially discriminates against both Indian children and adoptive families\n1. Indian children\n2. Indian children's current or potential families\nC. ICWA's racial-discrimination mandates violate the Fifth Amendment\n1. Strict scrutiny applies whether ICWA benefits or burdens Indians\n2. ICWA does not even advance a legitimate government interest\u2014let alone a compelling one\n3. ICWA is not narrowly tailored\n4. ICWA does not promote \"tribal self-governance\"\nIII. ICWA Violates the Anticommandeering Doctrine\nA. Congress may not commandeer Texas officials to enforce ICWA\nB. ICWA commandeers state actors to administer Congress's child-custody regime\nC. ICWA's unconstitutional commands cannot be excused under any other doctrine\n1. ICWA does not merely preempt state law\n2. ICWA cannot be justified as a regulation of States as market participants\nIV. Section 1915(c) Violates the Nondelegation Doctrine",
        "reference": "2. Even a \"plenary power\" over \"Indian affairs\" would not justify ICWA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-58_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents lack Article III standing\nA. A federal policy's incidental effects on a State do not qualify as judicially cognizable injuries\nB. A plaintiff lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the enforcement of the law against third parties\nC. The district court's standing analysis was flawed\nII. The Guidelines are lawful\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Guidelines are not arbitrary and capricious\nC. The Guidelines did not require notice and comment\nIII. The district court's remedy was unlawful\nA. Section 706(2) does not authorize vacatur\nB. Section 1252(f) bars vacatur of the Guidelines",
        "reference": "A. The Guidelines do not violate Sections 1226 and 1231",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5716_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eighth Circuit's Categorical Rule Is Contrary to the Governing Statutes and This Court's Construction of Section 3582(c)(2)'s Threshold Condition for Eligibility, \"Based On.\"\nA. The plain meaning of the governing statutes compels the conclusion that petitioners are eligible for sentence reductions\nB. The Eighth Circuit's categorical rule is contrary to this Court's construction of the term \"based on.\"\nII. District Court Practice Across the Nation Accords with the Correct Reading of Section 3553(e) and the Relevant Guidelines and Policy Statements, Basing Sentences for Cooperating Defendants on the Guideline Range\nA. The correct reading of Section 3553(e) and the relevant policy statements requires that courts base substantial assistance sentences on the applicable guideline range\nB. District courts routinely impose sentences below or within the applicable guideline range, and otherwise base sentences on that range, in cases like those of petitioners\nIII. The Principles Underlying the Sentencing Reform Act Favor the Petitioners' Eligibility for Sentence Reductions\nA. Congress intended Section 3582(c)(2) to promote fairness and reduce arbitrary outcomes\nB. The retroactive application of an amendment demonstrates a reasoned judgment that the change is significant enough to compel reconsideration of existing sentences\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Eighth Circuit's rule creates unwarranted disparity and unjust results, in contravention of the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act",
        "reference": "C. Section 3553(e) and Section 3582(c)(2) are not inconsistent and should operate in a complementary fashion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-438_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eighth Circuit correctly analyzed the case.\nA. A \"modified categorical approach\" applies to divisible statutes.\nB. The petitioner cannot challenge 8 C.F.R. section 1240.8(d) as ultra vires under the INA.\nC. 8 C.F.R. section 1240.8(d) correctly allocates the burden of proof for the modified categorical approach.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Imposing the burden of proof on the Government is unworkable.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. In Evaluating Senate Factors One, Three, and Five, the Lower Court Elevated the Importance of Justice Department Activities\nIII. The Application of Senate Factor Six Merits Reconsideration",
        "reference": "I. The Application of the Senate Factors Merits Reconsideration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief050.pdf",
        "text": "I. WHILE STARE DECISIS PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ADJUDICATION, THAT DOCTRINE CANNOT EXALT KNOWINGLY INCORRECT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS OVER THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court Should Not, in the Name of Stare Decisis, Exalt over the Constitution Roe, Casey, or an Invented Viability Line\nC. The Proper Response of this Court to a Prior Unjust Decision Is the Repudiation of that Decision\n1. Dred Scott\n2. Plessy v. Ferguson\n3. Buck v. Bell\n4. Korematsu v. United States\nII. WHAT IS DONE TO BABIES IN THE WOMB IN POST-15 WEEK ABORTIONS WOULD VIOLATE THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IF DONE TO CONVICTED CRIMINALS AND WOULD VIOLATE LAWS AGAINST HUMANE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS\nA. The Notion of a Constitutional Right to Late-Term Abortions Is in Grave Tension with the Eighth Amendment\nB. The Notion of a Constitutional Right to Late-Term Abortions Is in Grave Tension with the Permissibility of Animal Cruelty Laws\nIII. ABORTION, RATHER THAN AN ACT OF FEMALE AUTONOMY, IS TOO OFTEN A HANDY TOOL FOR THOSE PURSUING NEFARIOUS PURPOSES AT THE EXPENSE OF WOMEN.\n1. Abortion and Human Trafficking\n2. Abortion and Sexual Predators\n3. Abortion and Domestic Abuse\n4. Abortion and Male Irresponsibility\n5. Abortion and Employer Coercion\n6. Abortion and Eugenics and Racism",
        "reference": "A. Stare Decisis Cannot Mean Knowingly Exalting Incorrect Judicial Opinions over the Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.28
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below Cannot Be Reconciled With Fifth Third.\nIII. The Decision Below Will Have Far-Reaching and Deleterious Implications.",
        "reference": "I. The Courts of Appeals Are Split Over The Same Allegations By The Same Lawyer.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress did not intend open-ended delegations of emergency powers to the executive branch\nA. Congress has recognized that, unless properly checked, emergency powers are subject to abuse\nB. [MISSING]\nII. This Court's construction of emergency statutory delegations, including the HEROES Act, should be guided by the text and history of emergency delegations and separation of powers principles\nA. Courts should weigh several factors to determine whether emergency executive actions exceed what Congress authorized\n1. Is the precipitating situation a qualifying \"emergency\" \u2014 an unforeseen set of circumstances calling for immediate action?\n2. How close is the nexus between the emergency and the action taken?\n3. Does the context of the executive branch's actions suggest the invocation of the emergency is pretextual?\n4. Does the action result in longer-term exercise of power or aggrandizement of power to the executive branch?\nB. Applying a tailored emergency action analysis to the student loan relief plan indicates that it exceeds congressional authorization",
        "reference": "B. Congress has recognized the need both to delegate and to constrain the use of emergency powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Comity Is A Foundational Principle That Should Not Be Lightly Or Indirectly Circumvented\nII. Jurisdiction Respecting Law-Enforcement Measures Is Presumptively Territorial But Supplemented By Cooperation Among Countries\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Responsibility For Protecting Privacy Is A Matter Of Territorial Jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. APPLYING ARTICLE X, SECTION 6(1) TO BAR RELIGIOUS OPTIONS IN STUDENT-AID PROGRAMS VIOLATES THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE\nA. Article X, section 6(1) as applied discriminates against \"religious beliefs,\" \"religiously motivated conduct,\" and religious \"status\" in contravention of Trinity Lutheran\nB. Article X, section 6(1) as applied also discriminates against the \"religious use\" of student-aid money in violation of decades of precedent\nC. Locke reinforces that applying article X, section 6(1) to bar religious options from student-aid programs cannot pass constitutional muster\nII. APPLYING ARTICLE X, SECTION 6(1) TO BAR RELIGIOUS OPTIONS IN STUDENT-AID PROGRAMS VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE\nA. Laws violate the Equal Protection Clause when they are enacted to discriminate against certain groups\nB. Article X, Section 6(1) is a Blaine Amendment that was enacted to discriminate against Catholics and Catholic schooling\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Court should apply the test used in Zelman to hold that article X, section 6(1) as applied violates the Establishment Clause\nB. Article X, section 6(1) as applied also fails the Lemon test\nC. Article X, section 6(1) as applied conflicts with the traditions, values, and historical understanding of the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "III. APPLYING ARTICLE X, SECTION 6(1) TO BAR RELIGIOUS OPTIONS IN STUDENT-AID PROGRAMS VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Threat Prosecutions Traditionally Required Proof Of Intent To Threaten\nB. This Court Has Repeatedly Required Proof Of Subjective Intent Before Punishing Speech\nC. This Court's True Threats Decisions Are Best Read To Require Subjective Intent\nII. Colorado's Negligence Standard Impermissibly Chills Protected Speech\nA. A Purely Objective Standard Would Criminalize Misunderstandings, Which Abound In The Internet Era\nB. A Purely Objective Standard Would Stifle Unpopular Political Views, Minority Religious Beliefs, And Artistic Expression\nC. An Objective Standard Does Not Survive Exacting Scrutiny\nIII. Counterman's Messages Were Protected Speech\nA. Counterman Lacked Intent To Threaten\nB. Counterman's Conduct Would Not Support A Finding Of Recklessness",
        "reference": "I. To Establish A True Threat, The Government Must Prove The Speaker's Subjective Intent To Threaten",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. APJ S ARE INFERIOR OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\nA. Administrative Patent Review Has Deep Historical Roots\nB. APJs Are Inferior Officers Under Edmond's Established Framework\nC. Arthrex's Attempt To Rewrite Edmond Fails\n1. Precedent Forecloses Arthrex's Bright-Line Test\n2. The Constitution Forecloses Arthrex's Test\n3. [MISSING]\nD. Arthrex's Proposal Would Require Revisiting Humphrey's Executor\nII. ARTHREX IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF IT REQUESTS\nA. The Only Appropriate Arthrex-Specific Relief Is A Declaration\nB. Overturning The IPR Regime Is Not An Appropriate \"Fix\"\n1. The Court Should Use A Scalpel, Not A Bulldozer\n2. The Contours Of Any Surgical Solution Would Depend On The Court's Merits Analysis",
        "reference": "3. APJs' Removal Protections Do Not Make Them Principal Officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-23_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "\"AN OFFENSE RELATING TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE\" REQUIRES A PENDING PROCEEDING\nI. THE PHRASE \"OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE\" UNAMBIGUOUSLY INCLUDES THE HISTORICAL REQUIREMENT OF A PENDING PROCEEDING\nA. \"Obstruction Of Justice\" Is A Term Of Art That Historically Required Interference With A Pending Proceeding\n1. The pending-proceeding requirement has deep roots in the legal term of art \"obstruction of justice\"\n2. This Court's decision in Aguilar reaffirmed the pending-proceeding requirement\nB. Congress Can Be Presumed To Have Relied On This Court's Understanding Of Obstruction Of Justice In Describing The Generic Offense\nII. THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPANSIVE APPROACH TO OBSTRUCTION IS UNFOUNDED\nA. Chapter 73 Offenses\nB. State Law\nC. The Model Penal Code\nD. Dictionary Definitions\nE. [MISSING]\nIII. THE PHRASE \"RELATING TO\" IN SECTION 1101(A)(43)(S) DOES NOT EXPAND GENERIC \"OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE\" BEYOND ITS CORE PENDING-PROCEEDING REQUIREMENT\nA. An \"Offense Relating To Obstruction Of Justice\" Retains The Pending Proceeding Requirement\nB. The Government's Approach Is Boundless\nIV. ANY AMBIGUITY SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF NONCITIZENS, NOT BY DEFERRING TO THE BIA\nA. Chevron Deference Does Not Apply\nB. Traditional Tools Of Interpretation Do Apply\nC. This Court's Cases Support The Application Of The Rule Of Lenity Over Chevron\nV. SHOULD THE COURT DECIDE THAT SECTION 1101(A)(43)(S) DOES NOT REQUIRE A PENDING PROCEEDING, IT SHOULD REMAND FOR APPLICATION OF THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT",
        "reference": "E. Sentencing Guidelines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.35
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-177_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals erroneously invalidated a significant application of an Act of Congress on constitutional grounds\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. This Court's review is warranted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. History and this Court's Precedent Demonstrate Congress's Power to Require State Actors to Perform Certain Tasks that Supplement the Adjudicative Process, Including Keeping Records and Sharing Information with the Federal Government",
        "reference": "I. Founding-Era History and this Court's Precedent Demonstrate that Congress May Make Rules that Apply in State Courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. DACA's rescission is not judicially reviewable under the APA\nA. DHS's decision to rescind a policy of enforcement discretion is committed to agency discretion by law\nB. The lower courts' rationales for reviewing DHS's decision lack merit\nII. DACA's rescission is lawful\nA. The rescission is reasonable in light of DHS's serious doubts about DACA's lawfulness\nB. The rescission is reasonable in light of DHS's additional policy concerns\n1. The Secretary reasonably concluded that DHS should not decline on this scale to enforce the law adopted by Congress\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Secretary reasonably concluded that DHS should discourage illegal immigration by projecting a message of consistent enforcement\n4. The Secretary adequately considered any reliance interests\nC. The rescission is reasonable in light of DHS's conclusion that DACA is unlawful\n1. DHS correctly concluded that DACA is unlawful\n2. DHS's legal conclusion provides ample basis for upholding the decision\nD. The rescission does not violate equal protection",
        "reference": "2. The Secretary reasonably concluded that DHS should exercise its prosecutorial discretion not to enforce on a case-by-case basis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Seventh Circuit adopted an overly demanding standard for proving scienter under the FCA\nB. The FCA's text, history, and common-law background demonstrate that scienter under the Act turns on the defendant's state of mind at the time of its false claims or statements\nC. The court of appeals erred in treating respondents' post hoc rationales for their conduct as negating scienter under the FCA\n1. This Court's decision in Safeco provides no sound basis for the court of appeals' construction of the FCA's scienter requirement\n2. Additional arguments advanced by the court of appeals and respondents do not support adoption of an \"objective reasonableness\" standard here\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Petitioners' evidence demonstrates material disputes of fact regarding knowledge",
        "reference": "D. The court of appeals erred in treating contractual language and warnings from non-governmental actors as irrelevant to the scienter analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Hold That the Constitution Protects the Right to Life Instead of a Right to Abortion\nA. Roe and Its Progeny Do Not Comport with the Due Process Clause\n1. The Due Process Clause's Original Meaning\n2. Substantive Due Process from Dred Scott to Lochner to Roe\n3. Conclusion: The Due Process Clause Does Not Protect the Right to an Abortion\nB. This Court Should Not Continue to Affirm Roe Based on Casey's Incorrect View of Precedent\nC. The Court Should Not Only Overrule Roe but Also Hold That the Constitution Protects the Child's Right to Life\nII. The Third-Party Standing Issue in the Cross-Petition, No. 18-1460\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Primary Case Allowing Third-Party Representation of Women Seeking Abortions Rested on a Serious Misconception of the Typical Role of an Abortion Doctor\nC. The Issue Is Not Academic. Without Third-Party Standing, Petitioners Cannot Succeed in This Case\nD. The Court May Still Overrule Roe in This Case Even If the Petitioners Lack Standing",
        "reference": "A. Procedural History",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Government actors increasingly establish expressive forums for public discourse on privately owned communications infrastructure\nII. This Court's public forum doctrine safeguards public discourse in government-controlled expressive spaces that are crucial to democracy\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. A rigid property-based rule would risk categorically foreclosing application of the public forum doctrine to expressive spaces online",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-8709_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TEXT AND STRUCTURE OF RULE 52 AND THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS SHOW THAT AN APPELLATE COURT REVIEWS A TRIAL ERROR IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TRIAL RECORD\nA. The text and structure of Rule 52 limit the scope of appellate review to the trial record when determining the effect of a trial error\nB. This Court's precedents demonstrate that the scope of review depends on the nature and context of the error, not the standard of review\n1. Rule 52(b) codified this Court's pre-1944 law, which looked only to the trial record when reviewing sufficiency of evidence on plain-error review\n2. This Court held in Olano that Rule 52(b)'s plain-error standard \"requires the same kind of inquiry\" as Rule 52(a)'s harmless-error standard, which does not permit consideration of evidence beyond the trial record\n3. To justify its consideration of evidence not introduced at trial, the court of appeals relied on out-of-context language from this Court's prior opinions\nII. AN APPELLATE COURT'S EXAMINATION OF MATERIALS OUTSIDE THE TRIAL RECORD TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF ERRORS ON THE JURY VERDICT OR TO DETERMINE WHETHER TO EXERCISE REMEDIAL DISCRETION VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED ROLE OF THE JURY AS FACT FINDER, AND THE DEFENDANT'S FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS\nA. The jury's constitutionally mandated role as fact finder and the defendant's constitutional rights to trial preclude the appellate court from determining that trial errors did not affect the jury verdict or from declining to exercise its remedial discretion based on materials not presented to the jury\nB. The Eleventh Circuit unconstitutionally relieved the government of its burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The failure to instruct the jury on the essential mens rea element and the lack of evidence to support that element violated Mr. Greer's substantial rights\n2. The lack of a jury instruction and sufficient evidence of the knowledge-of-status element seriously affects the integrity of the judicial proceedings\nIII. EXPANDING APPELLATE REVIEW TO MATERIALS OUTSIDE THE TRIAL RECORD WOULD HAVE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE JUDICIARY\nA. There is no basis for expanding appellate review, especially where an intervening case has recognized a previously unrecognized element\nB. The sentencing record is not a reliable vehicle for determining elemental facts\nC. Tolerating the imprisonment of a defendant despite an acknowledged failure of the government to prove its case to a jury will seriously harm the integrity and public perception of judicial proceedings",
        "reference": "C. The third and fourth prongs of plain-error review must be considered based only on the trial record",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-712_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Inter Partes Review Violates Article III\nA. Inter Partes Review Adjudicates Disputes Between Individuals Over Private Rights\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Inter Partes Review Violates The Seventh Amendment\nIII. The Policy Concerns Of Respondents And Their Amici Are Misplaced",
        "reference": "B. Neither The Public Rights Doctrine Nor Any Other Exception Can Excuse The Article III Violation Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. As its text and history demonstrate, the Fifteenth Amendment gives Congress broad enforcement power to prevent impairment of the right to vote\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Race-consciousness is baked into the text and history of the Fifteenth Amendment",
        "reference": "II. Congress used its express power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to prohibit dilutive practices that nullify the effectiveness of Black votes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution's Text Demonstrates That The President Is Not An \"Officer Of The United States\"\nII. Section 3's Legislative History Demonstrates The President Is Not An \"Officer Of The United States\"\nA. Section 3's Legislative History\ni. Initial Consideration In The House of Representatives\nii. Senate Consideration\na. [MISSING]\nb. The Senate Establishes Which Rebel \"Officers\" Are Ineligible to Hold \"Office,\" and Those \"Officers\" Do Not Include the President of the United States\niii. Final Action In The House of Representatives\nB. The Colorado Supreme Court's Erroneous Analysis Of Section 3's Legislative History\nIII. Case Law Does Not Support The President Being An \"Officer Of The United States\"\nIV. Attorney General Opinions Do Not Support The President Being An \"Officer Of The United States\"",
        "reference": "a. The Senate Establishes Which \"Offices\" Rebels May Not Occupy, Which Includes the Presidency",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. THE FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION WAS DEVELOPED TO ENSURE PARTIES TO A CONTRACT HAVE ACCESS TO EFFICIENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION\n1. [MISSING]\n2. ARBITRATION PROVIDES BOTH PARTIES WITH A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THEIR DAY IN COURT\nB. COURTS SHOULD NOT LOOK BEYOND THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT FALLS WITHIN THE SECTION 1 EXCLUSION",
        "reference": "1. ARBITRATION IS A COST-EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT ALTERNATIVE TO LITIGATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-489_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. All sides now agree that the Ninth Circuit applied the wrong legal standard\nB. The government's and respondents' proposed standards are incompatible with traditional contempt principles and the Bankruptcy Code\n1. The new proposed standards are at odds with traditional contempt authority\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Even if a reasonableness standard applies, respondents' conduct was patently unreasonable",
        "reference": "2. The new proposed standards are at odds with the courts' statutory remedial authority under the Bankruptcy Code",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-8709_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. AN APPELLATE COURT REVIEWS ONLY THE TRIAL RECORD WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER A TRIAL ERROR AFFECTS SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS\nA. Whether under harmless error or plain error review, this Court reviews the trial errors here by reviewing the trial record\nB. The government's cases involving different types of errors do not support a holding that a reviewing court may look outside the trial record to assess the effect of a trial error\nII. AN APPELLATE COURT ABUSES ITS DISCRETION ON PRONG FOUR BY RELYING ON MATERIAL OUTSIDE THE TRIAL RECORD WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER TO CORRECT A PLAIN TRIAL ERROR\nA. Equitable principles and systemic concerns support a holding that an appellate court reviews a trial record to determine the effect of a trial error\nB. The government misplaces its reliance on Johnson, Cotton, and Puckett\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. THE CONSTITUTION ALSO PROHIBITS APPELLATE COURTS FROM REVIEWING MATERIAL OUTSIDE THE TRIAL RECORD WHEN REVIEWING A TRIAL ERROR\nIV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE VACATED MR. GREER'S CONVICTION",
        "reference": "C. Old Chief does not invite the appellate court to review evidence outside the trial record on prong four",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Apple has established a bottleneck over the distribution of iPhone apps\nII. Consumers of iPhone apps have a cause of action against Apple under the direct-purchaser rule, and no exception to that rule is warranted\nIII. Applying the direct-purchaser rule here would not create a risk of duplicative recoveries\nA. A hypothetical antitrust suit by app developers would seek damages for an injury distinct from the injury alleged by consumer-plaintiffs here\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. As a practical matter, developers are unlikely to bring an antitrust suit for damages against Apple",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief048.pdf",
        "text": "I. ADL'S EXPERIENCE DEMONSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE OF DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION\nII. RACE MUST NEVER BE USED AS A DETERMINATIVE FACTOR IN MAKING ADMISSIONS DECISIONS, AND HARVARD DOES NOT UTILIZE RACE IN THAT MANNER\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. In the 1920s and 1930s, Harvard Intentionally Discriminated Against Jewish Applicants by Design and Through Quotas\nB. Petitioner's Comparison Between Harvard's Historic and Current Admissions Practices Is Fundamentally Flawed",
        "reference": "III. HARVARD'S CURRENT ADMISSIONS PRACTICES ARE NOT ANALOGOUS TO ITS HISTORIC DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES USED TO EXCLUDE JEWISH APPLICANTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-58_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1226(C) IMPOSES A MANDATORY DUTY ON DHS TO ARREST AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS\nA. Section 1226(c)'s text and history demonstrate that it requires the arrest and removal of criminal aliens.\nB. The United States' contrary arguments lack merit.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Section 706(2) of the APA authorizes vacatur of unlawful agency action.\nB. Section 1252(f)(1) does not bar vacatur of the guidelines.",
        "reference": "II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY VACATED DHS'S UNLAWFUL ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES UNDER SECTION 706(2) OF THE APA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. The City authorized agency fees in response to a series of devastating strikes that caused massive public harm\nA. The City's early adoption of public-sector collective bargaining proved insufficient to prevent labor disruption\nB. The City's use of agency shop provisions ultimately fortified a successful collective bargaining system\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The City's circumstances render labor peace a particularly compelling interest here\nB. Governments' practical need to adapt to local circumstances points against constitutionalizing a single approach to public-sector labor relations",
        "reference": "II. Petitioner and amici ignore the compelling public interest of New York City and other jurisdictions in avoiding disruption of essential public services",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lower Decision's Restrictive View of Article II Ignores the Text and Purpose of the Convention, and is Belied by International Legal Authorities\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. International Arbitration in the United States Will Suffer if Non-Signatories Cannot Enforce International Arbitration Agreements Consistent with Other Contracting States\nA. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision Decreases Efficiency in Drafting and Enforcing Arbitration Agreements\na. Parties Relying on Arbitration Agreements Drafted Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's Decision are Subject to Greater Uncertainty\nb. Future Arbitration Agreements Would Be More Complex and Costly, by Requiring the Participation and Pre-Approval of Every Conceivable Party\nc. Non-Signatories Would Be Deprived of Meaningful Relief if a Contracting Party's Assets are In the United States",
        "reference": "II. Fellow Convention Member Courts Recognize That Non-Signatories May Enforce Arbitration Agreements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR DECIDING WHETHER TINKER APPLIES TO OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH BECAUSE B.L.'S SNAP DID NOT CAUSE OR THREATEN ANY MATERIAL DISRUPTION\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
        "reference": "I. THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S OPINION AND DECISIONS OF THE OTHER FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. CASES INVOLVING NONSIGNATORIES AND COMPETING CONTRACTS DEMAND A FLEXIBLE STAY STANDARD.\nIII. THE FAA'S POLICIES ARE BEST SERVED BY DISTRICT COURT DISCRETION, NOT AUTOMATIC STAYS.",
        "reference": "I. COURTS ROUTINELY SEPARATE CASES INTO ARBITRABLE AND NONARBITRABLE ISSUES, WHICH CAN PROCEED ON SEPARATE TRACKS.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Seeks A Bright-Line Rule That Would Devalue Registered Domain Names As A Class Of Intellectual Property Assets\nII. The Government's Rule Would Discourage Investment In The Internet Economy By Precluding Trademark Protection For New Types of Domain Names\nIII. The Government's Rule Would Eliminate A Critical Consumer Protection And Anti-Fraud Tool, Opening The Door To More Domain Name Abuse\nA. Cybercriminals Abuse Domain Names Through Typosquatting And Domain Name Hijacking To Perpetrate Fraud And Proliferate Malware\nB. Companies Rely On Trademark Protection To Combat Domain Name Abuse\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Non-Trademark Remedies Do Not Provide A Sufficient Means For Combatting Domain Name Abuse",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT RING V. ARIZONA DOES NOT APPLY TO PETITIONER'S CASE\nII. THE PURPORTED CIRCUIT COURT AND STATE HIGH COURT \"SPLITS\" IDENTIFIED BY PETITIONER DO NOT MILITATE IN FAVOR OF AN ORDER GRANTING THE WRIT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Whether Eddings Error Can Be Remedied Only By the Trial Court\nIII. UNDER PETITIONER'S THEORY, THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS \"FINALITY\" IN CAPITAL CASES OR, INDEED, IN CRIMINAL CASES GENERALLY",
        "reference": "A. Whether Courts Must Apply Current Law When Conducting Error Correction Proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Right-To-Control Doctrine Is Deployed In The Second Circuit To Procure Convictions Without Proof Of Property Fraud\nA. Prosecutors Rely On The Elastic Right-To-Control Doctrine When There Is Deceit But They Cannot Prove Contemplated Economic Harm\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Jury Instructions On The Right To Control Demonstrate The Doctrine's Elasticity And Incoherence",
        "reference": "B. Even When There Is Proof Of Contemplated Economic Harm, The Right-To-Control Doctrine Serves As An Improper Shortcut For Prosecutors To Procure Convictions And Obtain Other Advantages",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The NCAA Does Not Seek Antitrust Immunity\nB. Caselaw Supports Abbreviated Rule-Of-Reason Analysis Here\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RULE-OF-REASON ANALYSIS WAS FATALLY FLAWED\nA. The Lower Courts Improperly Redefined Amateurism\nB. The Lower Courts Improperly Required Petitioners To Prove The Benefits Of Each Type Of Challenged Rule\nC. Respondents' Defense Of The District Court's Alternative Compensation System Fails",
        "reference": "I. NCAA AMATEURISM RULES ARE SUBJECT TO ABBREVIATED RULE-OF-REASON ANALYSIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Assignor Estoppel Doctrine Results In Inconsistent Patent Validity Outcomes Depending On Whether The Claims Are Adjudicated By The USPTO Or In The Federal Courts\n1. The Application Of Assignor Estoppel In The Federal Courts\n2. Assignor Estoppel Does Not Apply At The PTAB, Which May Lead To Inconsistent Results, As Happened Here\nB. The Rationale For Broad Assignor Estoppel Has Been Undermined By Changes In The Patent Laws And Jurisprudence, Economic Realities, and Public Policy\n1. Estoppel Is No Longer Justified By Representations Typically Made By Inventors\n2. Changes In Economic Practices And The Circumstances Under Which Patents Are Procured Also Support Limiting the Doctrine\n3. This Court Has Moved Away From A Real Property -Based View of Patents\n4. Public Policy In The Interests Of Innovation, Competition, And Startup Technologies Are Best Served By Limiting The Assignor Estoppel Doctrine\nC. Assignor Estoppel Doctrine Should Be Limited Through Application Of A Multifactor Test In Federal Court\n1. Patents Assigned Pre-Issuance, Absent Specific Representations Or Warranties As To Validity\n2. The Assignor Did Not Receive Any Additional Valuable Consideration For Their Assignment\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The Assignor Was Not Actively Involved In Prosecution Of The Subject Patent\n5. Privity Between Assignor And Defendant",
        "reference": "3. The Prior Art Now Asserted By The Assignor Was Not Considered During Prosecution Or Known To The Assignor At The Time Of Assignment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. NPS's Reliance on the Organic Act Is Misplaced\nII. NPS Fundamentally Misconstrues the Text, Purpose, History, and Structure of ANILCA\nA. NPS's Position Is Contrary to the Text of ANILCA\nB. The Other Provisions of ANILCA Cited by NPS Do Not Justify Its Assertion of Jurisdiction\nC. ANILCA's History and Purpose Reinforce Its Textual Limitations on NPS's Authority\nD. Congress Has Not \"Ratified\" NPS's Interpretation of \"Public Lands\"\nE. The Reserved Water Rights Doctrine Cannot Convert the Nation River into \"Public Land\"\nF. There is No Need for this Court to Address the Katie John Line of Decisions\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. If Any Interpretive Canon Applies Here, It Is the Federalism Canon, Not Chevron Deference",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government has not violated any statutory or constitutional requirement\nA. Illegal aliens are not \"the People\" of the United States\nB. Neither section 2a nor the legislative history relied on below provide an answer\nII. The district court did not have jurisdiction\nA. The district court lacked Article III jurisdiction\n1. Plaintiffs cannot show a differential undercount injury\n2. Plaintiffs cannot show a diverted resource injury\n3. Plaintiffs' claim is not ripe\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Plaintiffs lack both the direct injury and the ongoing violation of federal law required for equity review",
        "reference": "B. No final action has occurred for APA review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Third Circuit Flipped RFRA on Its Head by Erroneously Using the \"Undue Burden\" Standard to Find that the Presence of Third-Party Harm Overcomes Free-Exercise Rights",
        "reference": "I. Congress Enacted RFRA to Broadly Protect Religious Liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A defendant in a securities class action may rebut the Basic presumption of classwide reliance by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements\nA. In determining whether a defendant has rebutted the Basic presumption, a court must consider any evidence bearing on price impact\nB. The generic nature of an alleged misstatement is evidence that is highly relevant to the price-impact inquiry\nC. This Court's decision in Amgen does not require a contrary approach\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The plaintiffs in a securities class action retain the ultimate burden of persuasion when invoking the Basic presumption\nIII. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
        "reference": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PROTOTYPICAL SECTION 1983 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIM INVOLVES A WRONGFUL CONVICTION\nII. SECTION 1983 CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTION BASED ON FABRICATED EVIDENCE FOLLOW A DEFERRED ACCRUAL RULE UNDER HECK V. HUMPHREY\nIII. THE \"FAVORABLE TERMINATION\" RULE SHOULD APPLY TO ANY SECTION 1983 CLAIM THAT FABRICATED EVIDENCE WAS USED IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS\nA. Section 1983 fabrication claims seeking damages for pretrial detention present a distinct question, but the same accrual rule should apply\nB. Under the Wallace framework, any Section 1983 fabrication claim is analogous to malicious prosecution, and accrues upon favorable termination of the criminal proceeding\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Deviation from the Heck/Wallace framework would result in irreconcilable results in Section 1983 lawsuits arising from prosecutions based on fabricated evidence\nB. Continuous incarceration based on a series of separate convictions \u2014 the case of Juan Rivera\nC. Lengthy prosecution after vacatur\n1. The case of Anthony Wright\n2. The case of John Restivo\nD. Prolonged pretrial detention \u2014 the case of Jonathan Barr",
        "reference": "IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION WOULD DEPRIVE SOME EXONEREES OF A REMEDY AND CREATE STARKLY DIVERGENT OUTCOMES FOR SIMILARLY SITUATED PLAINTIFFS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Dismissal Of Charges Terminates A Criminal Proceeding In The Accused's Favor\nA. This Court Has Consistently Understood The Favorable Termination Rule To Be About Consistency And Finality, Not \"Indications Of Innocence.\"\nB. In 1871, Favorable Termination Was Understood To Require An End To The Prosecution, Not \"Indications Of Innocence.\"\nII. Contrary To The Second Circuit And Respondent, The Fourth Amendment Does Not Contain Its Own Favorable Termination Element\nIII. The Indications Of Innocence Standard Is Unworkable And Undesirable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Standard Is Perverse\nC. The Standard Is Inadministrable",
        "reference": "A. The Standard Is Incoherent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Store-level SNAP-redemption information is \"confidential\" under FOIA Exemption 4\nA. The term \"confidential\" in Exemption 4 carries its ordinary meaning\n1. Exemption 4's text, context, and history show that \"confidential\" carries its ordinary meaning\n2. The D.C. Circuit's National Parks test is atextual and wrong\n3. Respondent's arguments for adopting the National Parks test are unpersuasive\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Stores maintain their SNAP-redemption data as confidential\n2. The government has for decades assured retailers that their SNAP data will not be publicly disclosed\nC. Respondent's jurisdictional contention lacks merit",
        "reference": "B. Store-level redemption information is \"confidential\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' interpretation of the Elections Clause is incompatible with Indiana's separation of powers\nA. Indiana's legislature derives its power from, and is bound by, Indiana's Constitution\nB. Petitioners' interpretation of the Elections Clause would upend Indiana's democratic framework\nII. Petitioners' interpretation of the Elections Clause would cement Indiana's highly partisan gerrymandered congressional districts\nA. Indiana's General Assembly has long engaged in highly partisan gerrymandering to maintain political power at Hoosiers' expense\n1. Indiana's sordid history of highly partisan political gerrymandering\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The few state-law protections Petitioners concede the Elections Clause accommodates are unavailable to Hoosiers\nC. State-court enforcement of state constitutional guarantees is critical to ensuring democracy in Indiana",
        "reference": "2. Indiana's congressional delegation does not fairly represent Hoosiers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT SHOULD NOT APPLY BECAUSE TAXES ARE NOT AT ISSUE, THE PURPOSE OF THE SUIT IS NOT TO RESTRAIN REVENUE ASSESSMENT OR COLLECTION, AND ASSESSMENT OR COLLECTION HAS NOT OCCURRED.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Effect Is Not Purpose\nC. Pre-Assessment Is Not Assessment\nII. THE IRS POSITION THAT ITS GUIDANCE IS NOT BINDING FOR PURPOSES OF THE APA BUT BINDING FOR PURPOSES OF THE AIA ALLOWS ITS ACTIONS TO BE TOTALLY INSULATED FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.",
        "reference": "A. Penalties Are Not Taxes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. EPA may not grant an extension of the small refinery exemption to a petitioner that has not maintained that exemption\nA. The statutory text and context indicate that an \"extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A)\" can be granted only to a small refinery that has maintained its exemption under subparagraph (A)\n1. The statutory provision at issue here uses the term \"extension\" in its temporal sense .. 18\n2. The term \"extension\" includes a continuity element\n3. Petitioners were not eligible for an \"extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A)\" in 2017 and 2018\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that an \"extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A)\" can be granted only to a small refinery that has maintained its exemption under subparagraph (A)\n1. Congress structured the RFS program to force a significant increase in renewable fuel production\n2. Properly construed, the small-refinery provisions fit with the RFS program's design\nII. Petitioners' contrary readings lack merit\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The term \"extension\" in Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) does not mean \"grant\"\n2. The term \"extension\" in Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) does not encompass a resumption of an exemption that had previously lapsed\nB. The terms surrounding \"extension\" provide no reason to depart from that term's ordinary meaning\nC. The statutory structure and purpose do not support petitioners' reading\nD. Petitioners' reliance on a 2014 EPA regulation is misplaced",
        "reference": "A. Petitioners' proposed interpretations of the term \"extension\" in Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) are textually unsound",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. COACH KENNEDY'S PRAYER IS PROTECTED PRIVATE SPEECH\nA. Public Employees Do Not Shed Their Constitutional Rights As A Condition Of Government Employment\nB. The District Infringed Coach Kennedy's Free Speech And Free Exercise Rights When It Prohibited Coach Kennedy's Prayer\n1. The Free Speech Clause Subjects the District's Viewpoint Discrimination to Strict Scrutiny\n2. The District Impermissibly and Unconstitutionally Infringed Coach Kennedy's Right to Free Exercise of Religion\nII. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PROVIDES NO JUSTIFICATION FOR SUPPRESSING COACH KENNEDY'S PRIVATE, RELIGIOUS SPEECH\nA. [MISSING]\nB. To The Extent This Court Maintains The Reasonable Observer Test, Coach Kennedy's Prayer Satisfies It",
        "reference": "A. The Reasonable Observer Test Facilitates An Unconstitutional Heckler's Veto And Should Be Relegated To Its Rightful Place In The Constitutional Graveyard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "a. [MISSING]\nb. A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is an outright acquittal.\nc. The repugnant verdict rule established by the Georgia Supreme Court in McElrath I and affirmed in McElrath II impermissibly authorizes courts to arbitrarily reverse acquittals when a conviction is appealed, and it expanded the number of cases where this improper rule can be applied.\nd. McElrath's acquittal of malice murder bars subsequent prosecution.",
        "reference": "a. Damian McElrath was properly acquitted of malice murder by reason of insanity.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The expropriation exception does not cover Respondents' claims\nA. Respondents' interpretation is contrary to the text and context of the expropriation exception\nB. No subsequent enactment supports Respondents' interpretation of the expropriation exception\nC. The Nazis' undisputed looting of art to persecute Jews is irrelevant to statutory interpretation\nD. Respondents' new theory of the international law of takings is waived and erroneous\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Comity-based abstention is available in FSIA cases\nB. Petitioners have not waived abstention\nC. Abstention is appropriate here",
        "reference": "II. International comity warrants dismissal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief044.pdf",
        "text": "I. Abortion Regulation Belongs in the Realm of the States and State Governance.\nA. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.\nB. States Demonstrated the Ability to Self-Govern Prior to Roe.\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. States Remain Capable of Self-Governance Regarding Abortion.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Is Not An Appropriate Vehicle For This Court's Review\nA. There is no extant agency rule that reflects the agency's view of its statutory authority, thus rendering this case an inappropriate vehicle for review\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below Is Correct And Does Not Present The Broad Issues Urged By Petitioners\nA. The decision below correctly vacated and remanded the ACE Rule because it was based on the erroneous view that the Rule was unambiguously mandated by statute\nB. The decision below does not present the broad range of other issues urged by Petitioners\nC. The decision below maintains the longstanding regulatory environment in which the EPA, States, and the regulated industry use flexible compliance mechanisms to reduce power sector emissions under the Clean Air Act\nD. The decision below will not result in the massive consequences claimed by Petitioners",
        "reference": "B. The stay entered years ago against the CPP Rule does not provide grounds for this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Reversal of the Decision Below Is Both Necessary and Appropriate to Resolve the Circuit Split Caused By the Eleventh Circuit's Decision\nC. Limiting the Availability of Nominal Damages Will Undermine the Purpose of Fee-Shifting Statutes to Ensure Enforcement of Civil Rights",
        "reference": "A. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision Is Inconsistent With This Court's Precedents Recognizing Nominal Damages Claims for Violations of Constitutional Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Bladensburg Cross Is A Sectarian Symbol\nA. The Latin cross is a religious symbol\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Bladensburg Cross is a Christian symbol that does not represent the sacrifice of Jewish soldiers from the area\nII. The Government's Support of the Cross Is Unconstitutional Under Core Establishment Clause Principles\nIII. Affirming the Fourth Circuit Would Not Affect Most War Memorials",
        "reference": "B. The cross remains a religious symbol in the context of war memorials",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under its original public meaning, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are unjustly harsh in light of longstanding practice\nII. Under its original public meaning, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are significantly disproportionate to the offender's culpability in light of longstanding practice\nA. The requirement of proportionality in punishment is deeply rooted in Anglo-American law\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Early American sources considered whether punishment was disproportionate to culpability in judging whether the punishment was \"cruel and unusual.\"\nIII. The abolition of the insanity defense is an abrupt and severe departure from settled punishment practices",
        "reference": "B. The \"Cruel and Unusual Punishments\" Clause in the English Bill of Rights was originally understood to prohibit excessive or disproportionate punishments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "A. Catalog sellers continue to meet the needs of the traditional mail order customer while adapting to the internet\n1. Payments by check present difficulties when complying with sales tax laws\n2. Catalog retailers sell diverse types of products, serve differing customer needs, and operate in varying ways\nB. Complying with sales tax collection requirements is hard\n1. The proper evaluation of the taxable status of sales remains difficult because of the inherent complexity of the sales tax\n2. Sales tax returns require frequent filings\n3. Reporting errors are costly to sellers and consumers\n4. Administrative costs are high especially for smaller sellers\nC. The Commerce Clause prohibits the imposition of excessive burdens on interstate commerce\nD. Applying principles of economic nexus destroys the concept of a safe harbor and pushes off all of the compliance burdens on interstate commerce\nE. Protecting interstate commerce is not the role of the states\nF. Catalog mailers have a legitimate concern that a reversal of Quill could be applied to prior transactions causing real hardships to these sellers\nG. The Quill decision should not be limited to the use of mail and common carriers\nH. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "H. The multiplicity of jurisdictions and their varying compliance requirements impose demonstrable burdens on catalog companies that are not addressed by the states",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.21
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD TRAVEL BAN IS MERELY A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANTI-MUSLIM POLICIES\nA. The President Banned Muslims\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Third Travel Ban Is A Continuation Of Its Predecessors And Is Equally Flawed\nII. THE THIRD TRAVEL BAN IS NOT ONLY ILLEGAL, BUT IT WILL OPERATE AGAINST THE PUBLIC INTEREST, INCLUDING AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE TECHNOLOGY SECTOR\nA. The Domestic Technology Industry Benefits From Immigration\n1. Immigration Supports The Innovation Economy\n2. Immigrants Are Inventors\n3. Immigrants Are Technology Leaders\n4. Immigrants Are Business Leaders\n5. Immigrants Contribute To The Field Of Medicine\nB. Unless It Is Enjoined, The Third Travel Ban Will Harm The Technology Industry\nC. Unless It Is Enjoined, the Third Travel Ban Will Undermine the Competitive Strength of the Domestic Technology Industry and Will Chill the Culture of Innovation",
        "reference": "B. The Federal Courts Ordered The President To Cease Implementing The Ban",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. A Survey of Recent Gingles and Section 2 Cases Reveal That Legislative Policy Determinations Are Rarely Sustained\nB. State Legislatures Need an Objective Standard Based on the Text of Section 2\n1. State Legislatures Must Have Discretion to Apply Traditional, Race-Neutral Redistricting Criteria\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. Courts Should Not Disturb Redistricting Legislation Unless The Sole Reasonable Explanation For Irregularities is Racial Discrimination",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Separation of Powers Is One of the Most Important Structural Features of the Constitutional Design to Protect Liberty\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Seminole Rock and Auer Deference Violate Separation of Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1364_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The District Court Erred By Invalidating Four Districts As Racial Gerrymanders\nA. The District Court Applied the Wrong Legal Standard\nB. There Is No Evidence That the General Assembly Was Motivated by Race\nIII. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' State-Law Challenges\nIV. The District Court Improperly Prevented The State From Enacting A Remedial Map",
        "reference": "I. Challenges To Legislatively Enacted \"Remedial\" Plans Are Not Exempt From The Ordinary Rules Of Adversarial Litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1143_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. VADEN SUPPORTS A LOOK-THROUGH APPROACH FOR MOTIONS TO CONFIRM OR VACATE UNDER FAA SECTION 9 AND 10\nA. Vaden Confirmed That Jurisdiction Over An FAA Petition Is Based On The Parties' Underlying Controversy\nB. Vaden's Application To Confirmation And Vacatur Actions Has Been Recognized By A Substantial Body Of Caselaw\nII. THE LOOK-THROUGH APPROACH IS THE ONLY SENSIBLE POLICY\nA. Formalism Is Not A Valid Approach\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Where Parties Arbitrate Federal Issues, Federal Jurisdiction Over Post-Arbitration Enforcement Is Consistent With The FAA's Policy Goals And With Federal Interests",
        "reference": "B. Where Parties Arbitrate Federal Issues, The Action Before The Court Arises Under Federal Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-441_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Court Should First Ascertain, as a Matter of Statutory Interpretation, Whether the 2017 Act Applies to Petitioner and MF Global\nB. Courts Presume That Statutes Apply Prospectively Only\nC. The 2017 Act Contains No Clear Statement That It Should Apply Retroactively\nD. The 2017 Act Operates Retroactively When Applied To Petitioner and MF Global",
        "reference": "I. THE 2017 ACT DOES NOT APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO PETITIONER AND MF GLOBAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals misapplied the Illinois Brick rule\n1. Under Illinois Brick, a plaintiff cannot state a claim for treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act by alleging that the defendant unlawfully overcharged a third party and the third party passed on the overcharge to the plaintiff\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The court of appeals' analysis reflects a misreading of Illinois Brick\nB. The decision below conflicts with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Campos\nC. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
        "reference": "2. Respondents' treble-damages claim is barred by Illinois Brick",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. A claim for nominal damages to remedy unquantifiable injuries attributable to a past violation of a right confers standing and defeats mootness.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The court of appeals' contrary conclusion undermines the adjudicatory role of Article III courts.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Petition Should be Granted Because Limiting the Scope of the Inflation-Maintenance Theory Will Have Important Public Policy Benefits",
        "reference": "I. The Petition Should be Granted Because the Second Circuit's Decision Is Inconsistent with Supreme Court (and Other Circuit Court) Precedent on Assessing Price Impact",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNDERLYING HISTORY AND THE DRAFTING OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT CONGRESS MEANT TO EXCLUDE ALL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF WORKERS FROM THE ACT\nA. Background of the FAA\nB. 1922: ABA Drafts a Federal Arbitration Bill Which Is Introduced in Congress\nC. The International Seamen's Union of America and the American Federation of Labor Voice Serious Concerns About the Proposed Bill\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Herbert Hoover Sends the Committee a Letter Regarding the Bill Which Specifically Adds Railroad Employees to the Exemption\nF. 1925: The ABA Revises the Bill with Hoover's Proposed Language and the Bill is Passed into Law\nII. BY IGNORING THE ENTIRE DRAFTING AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESS SURROUNDING THE FAA, THE DECISION BY THE CIRCUIT CITY COURT IS BASED UPON FACTUALLY INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS AND INCORRECT ANALYSIS\nIII. EVEN IF CIRCUIT CITY WERE CORRECTLY DECIDED, RESPONDENT, WHO IS CLEARLY A TRANSPORTATION WORKER, IS STILL EXEMPT FROM THE FAA",
        "reference": "D. 1923: Hearings Take Place Regarding the Benefits of the FAA With the ABA Offering to Revise the Bill to Include an Exemption for Workers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ruling Below Conflicts with the Statute's Text and History\nB. The 1991 Amendments to the Statute Confirm that Congress Imposed a But-For Causation Requirement\nC. Lessening section 1981's Causation Standard Will Likely Incentivize the Filing of Frivolous Claims\nII. PRICE WATERHOUSE -BURDEN SHIFTING IS INAPPLICABLE TO RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS\nA. The Court Has Declined to Apply Price Waterhouse -Burden Shifting Outside the Title VII Context in Which It Arose\nB. Burden Shifting Is Never Appropriate When, as Here, the Complaint Includes No Factual Allegations Constituting Substantial Evidence of Racial Discrimination",
        "reference": "I. A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 42 U.S.C. section 1981 REQUIRES PROOF OF BUT-FOR CAUSATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. IN EVERY MAJOR ABORTION CASE, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS HAS CONSISTENTLY ARGUED AGAINST ANY LIMITATION OF ABORTION",
        "reference": "I. DESPITE PROMOTING STRICT LIMITS ON THERAPEUTIC ABORTIONS SINCE ITS FOUNDING, ACOG CHANGED ITS POLICY FOR POLITICAL REASONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-96_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "Section 106(a) of PROMESA does not abrogate the Board's sovereign immunity\nA. The government of Puerto Rico is entitled to sovereign immunity\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Section 106(a) does not contain the requisite clear statement abrogating the Board's sovereign immunity\nD. This Court should remand to allow the lower courts to determine whether the Board is immune from this suit under Puerto Rico law",
        "reference": "B. The Board is a territorial entity entitled to sovereign immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-290_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. WHEN THE FDA REJECTS A MANUFACTURER'S PROPOSAL TO WARN ABOUT A DISCLOSED RISK, THE MANUFACTURER CANNOT BE PENALIZED FOR FAILING TO WARN OF THAT RISK\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Where the FDA Rejects a Request To Add a Warning, Failure-To-Warn Claims Are Preempted\nC. Respondents' Failure-To-Warn Claims Are Preempted\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT MISUNDERSTOOD LEVINE AND THE REGULATORY SCHEME\nA. The FDA's Real-World Action Here Eliminates the Need for Counterfactual Inquiry\nB. The Third Circuit's Approach Also Led It Astray in Other Ways\nIII. IN LIGHT OF THE FDA'S POSITION HERE, MERCK MUST PREVAIL",
        "reference": "A. Failure-To-Warn Claims Are Preempted If Federal Law Would Have Forbidden the Manufacturer To Revise Its Label",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "The Anti-Injunction Act requires dismissal of petitioner's suit to enjoin enforcement of IRS Notice 2016-66\nA. The Anti-Injunction Act bars petitioner's suit\n1. The Anti-Injunction Act bars suits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax\n2. Petitioner's suit is one for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of a tax\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Petitioner's suit to restrain the taxes that enforce the reporting and recordkeeping requirements is barred regardless of the suit's potential effect on the assessment and collection of other taxes\n2. The application of the Anti-Injunction Act does not depend on whether petitioner has already violated the reporting and recordkeeping requirements\n3. Petitioner's characterization of its objective in bringing suit does not render the Anti-Injunction Act inapplicable\nC. Neither the APA nor constitutional-avoidance principles support petitioner's interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act\n1. The APA does not override the Anti-Injunction Act's bar on pre-enforcement suits to restrain taxes\n2. Constitutional-avoidance principles provide no basis to disregard the Anti-Injunction Act's text",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's contrary interpretation reflects a misreading of the statutory text and this Court's precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-459_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Statute Unambiguously Triggers The Stop-Time Rule Only Upon Service Of Notice That Satisfies The Statutory Definition Of A \"Notice To Appear\"\nA. A \"Notice To Appear Under Section 1229(a)\" Is A Notice That Has The Elements Specified In Section 1229(a)\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The BIA's Interpretation Is Unreasonable And Not Entitled To Deference",
        "reference": "B. Traditional Tools Of Statutory Interpretation Confirm That Only Notice That Satisfies The Statute's Definition Of A \"Notice To Appear\" Triggers The Stop-Time Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Legislative subpoenas for the President's private records press the outer limits of Congress's authority\nA. This Court has held that Congress has implied authority to subpoena documents and testimony in aid of legislation\nB. Congress has no history of issuing legislative subpoenas for the private records of the sitting President\nC. [MISSING]\nII. These subpoenas do not have a legitimate legislative purpose\nA. The subpoenas were issued for law enforcement purposes\nB. These subpoenas could not result in valid legislation\nC. The Committees cannot establish a heightened need for the President's personal records\nIII. The Committees lack express authority to issue these subpoenas\nA. The Committees are not expressly authorized to subpoena the private records of the President\nB. Resolution 507 does not provide the clear statement that the Committees would need",
        "reference": "C. The lack of historical precedent for these subpoenas casts serious doubt on their validity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1059_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IGNORES THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS ABOUT HOW TO CONSTRUE VAGUE CRIMINAL STATUTES\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW CRIMINALIZES THE ORDINARY ACTIVITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS, TURNING NEARLY EVERY PUBLIC OFFICIAL INTO A FELON",
        "reference": "I. THE DECISION BELOW IS A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS AND OTHER CIRCUITS' DECISIONS FAITHFULLY FOLLOWING THEM",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "A. Petitioners' Theory Is Inconsistent With This Court's NLRA Jurisprudence\nB. Petitioners' Theory Is Inconsistent With This Court's Takings Jurisprudence\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners' Proposed Rule Would Invalidate Many Longstanding Regulations That Allow for Access to Commercial Property, and the Efforts of Petitioners' Amici to Control the Damage Only Highlight the Rule's Deficiencies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-499_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The petition presents a weak and eroding conflict that will eventually resolve itself\nB. This case is a suboptimal vehicle for deciding the question presented\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The decision below is correct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Government cannot commandeer private speakers on public issues to carry the state's preferred messages and views\nA. The Free Speech Clause protects private speakers' decisions to say and not say what they want\nB. Private speakers have a right not to spread a state-sponsored message with which they fundamentally disagree\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Government cannot target for dilution messages and views it disfavors\nA. The Act is a content-based speech regulation\nB. Reed v. Town of Gilbert mandates that courts apply strict scrutiny when examining any content-based speech laws\nC. The Act discriminates based on viewpoint by compelling a select group of disfavored speakers to issue discrediting disclaimers or advertise for \"free or low-cost\" abortion services\nIII. The Act cannot survive strict scrutiny\nA. Strict scrutiny is a demanding standard\nB. California fails to identify an interest of the highest order demanding a particular speech burden on all pro-life organizations\nC. The Act is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest",
        "reference": "C. Government cannot use restrictions on private speech to promote its own favored view",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-437_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT BASE A section 1326 CHARGE ON A CONCEDEDLY INVALID REMOVAL ORDER\n1. Innocent-of-removal defendants are a small subset of section 1326 defendants\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The government's rule multiplies the injustice inflicted on innocent-of-removal individuals\n4. Precluding prosecution based on an invalid removal order will not absolve a defendant from all consequences for his reentry into the United States\n5. A rule protecting innocent-of-removal defendants in federal criminal court does not threaten the administrative process\n6. This rule will not burden the federal courts\nB. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MR. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS REMOVED BUT NOT REMOVABLE SATISFIES section 1326(D)(1) AND (2)\n1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability\n2. The exhaustion requirement is also satisfied because the agency acted beyond its authority",
        "reference": "2. This class of innocent-of-removal defendants are afforded special solicitude under the law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Farmers, Packers, Distributors, And Others Work Together To Supply Pork To Consumers.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The pork industry has traced individual pigs since at least the early 1900s.\nB. Tracing and segregation also occur once pigs are ready for slaughter and turned into pork for retail sale.\nIII. The Traceability And Segregation Of Pork Product Meet Critical Needs Of Pork Producers And Consumers.\nIV. The Pork Industry Can Use Existing Tracing And Segregation Methods To Supply Prop 12-Compliant Pork.",
        "reference": "II. The Pork Industry Has Long Traced Product From Farm To Retail Sale And Successfully Segregated Supply Chains.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE INCORPORATES THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE AGAINST THE STATES\nA. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment against the States\nII. PAST JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT BAR INCORPORATING THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE THROUGH THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's Statements about Incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause Do Not Bar Judgment for Petitioners\nC. Historical In Rem Practices are No Bar to Enforcing the Excessive Fines Clause Against Modern Forfeitures\nIII. FORFEITURE IN THIS CASE WOULD VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF SALVO CONTENEMENTO",
        "reference": "A. Neither Slaughter-House Nor Any of Its Progeny Bar Judgment for Petitioners",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. PROPERLY FRAMING THE PURPOSE OF AGENCY SHOP PROVISIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC SAFETY UNIONS\nA. Purpose Of And Rationale For Agency Shop Provisions\nB. Why Eliminating Agency Shop Provisions Would Be Detrimental To Public-Sector Unions\nC. Unique Aspects Of Law Enforcement And Public Safety Employment Further Justify Agency Shop Provisions To Fund Sophisticated Collective Bargaining Efforts\nII. EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN ON BEHALF OF PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEES BENEFITS THE PUBLIC\nA. Law Enforcement Unions, And Similarly-Situated Public Safety Unions, Engage In Bargaining Activity That Is Not Political Speech Or Lobbying\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Decisions About Whether To Allow Agency Shop Agreements Are Properly Left To The States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Restore Statutory and Constitutional Limits on the Scope of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Any Durable and Defensible Interpretation of \"Waters of the United States\" Should Recognize that Certain Features, Including Arid Ephemeral Drainages, Are Unlikely to Be Subject to Federal Jurisdiction.",
        "reference": "II. A Decision Here Could Affect the Scope of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction in Numerous Other Contexts, Including in the Arid Southwest.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATE AND FEDERAL LAW SUPPLEMENTS THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT BY REQUIRING HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS TO MAKE NEUTRAL AND TRUTHFUL DISCLOSURES TO PATIENTS REGARDING LAWFUL END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS\nA. The Doctrine of Informed Consent Requires Certain Disclosures Concerning an Individual's End-Of-Life Options\nB. States And Federal Laws Require Healthcare Providers to Disclose Additional Information to Patients Regarding Various End-Of-Life Options\nII. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PERMITS STATES TO REQUIRE HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS TO MAKE NEUTRAL AND TRUTHFUL DISCLOSURES RELATED TO LAWFUL TREATMENT OPTIONS\nA. Petitioners' Arguments Could Be \u2014and Indeed Have Been \u2014Used to Attack End-Of-Life Disclosure Requirements\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The First Amendment Permits Reasonable Regulations Requiring that Healthcare Providers Disclose Neutral, Truthful Information Concerning Lawful Treatment Options to Their Patients and Prospective Patients",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1155_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit's decision is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Suits for damages against government officials are the historical cornerstone of government accountability\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Legislatures have historically considered policy in determining the need for immunity and indemnity from damages\nII. Damages are essential to constitutional accountability and the rule of law\nA. This Court and the government have long agreed that damages are appropriate relief for certain constitutional violations\nB. Through the Westfall Act, Congress codified the availability of damages as appropriate relief for constitutional violations\nC. The government seeks to undermine the historical importance of damages by urging this Court to engraft its recent criticisms of Bivens onto a statute passed decades earlier\nIII. This Court should resist the government's request to interpret \"appropriate relief\" as a call for judicial policymaking\nA. Congress's retention of damages as \"appropriate relief\" upholds the constitutional roles of the judicial and legislative branches\nB. Even if this Court's constitutional role encompassed the policymaking urged by the government, the government's preferred policy is empirically unsound",
        "reference": "A. Since the founding, the constitutional role of courts has been to adjudicate legal violations by awarding damages and other appropriate relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "The Eighth Amendment Bars The Imposition Of The Federal Death Penalty On Respondent For A Crime Committed Entirely Within A State That Does Not Authorize Capital Punishment For Any Offense .\nA. The federal government has virtually never imposed the death penalty for crimes committed in States that do not authorize capital punishment.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The arguments marshalled against a State-specific view of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause are easily refuted.\nD. Because the court of appeals did not address this argument, the Court should direct it to do so on remand.",
        "reference": "B. The original understanding of the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of Respondent.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The District's Treatment of Coach Kennedy Was Facially Violative of His First Amendment Rights to Freely Exercise His Religion\nB. In Holding That Any Religious Expression by a Coach or Teacher While on the Job and in View of Students Constitutes State Endorsement of Religion, the Circuit Court Opinion Has Stripped Religiously Observant Employees of the Use of Their Religion\nII. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S OPINION EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATES THE ABILITY OF A RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT COACH TO SERVE AS A MENTOR, COUNSELOR, AND PSEUDO-PARENTAL FIGURE TO HIS OR HER PLAYERS\nIII. NO REASONABLE OBSERVER COULD HAVE INTERPRETED COACH KENNEDY'S SILENT PRAYER AS STATE/DISTRICT ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION",
        "reference": "I. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S OPINION CATEGORICALLY DENIES RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT TEACHERS AND COACHES OF THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-290_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIMS AGAINST BRAND-NAME DRUG MANUFACTURERS ARE NOT PREEMPTED UNLESS THE MANUFACTURER SHOWS BY CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT FDA WOULD HAVE RESCINDED AN ADEQUATE LABEL CHANGE\nA. The FDCA Does Not Expressly Preempt Failure-To-Warn Claims Against Brand-Name Drug Manufacturers, And Such Claims Pose No Obstacle To The Statute's Purposes\nB. A Brand-Name Drug Manufacturer Has The Power To Strengthen A Drug Label To Comply With State Law\nC. The 2007 FDCA Amendments Do Not Preempt State Law\nII. MERCK HAS NOT SHOWN BY CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT FDA WOULD HAVE RESCINDED AN ADEQUATE WARNING OF ATYPICAL FEMORAL FRACTURES\nA. The Complete Response Letter Regarding Merck's Proposed Stress-Fracture Warning Did Not Preclude Merck From Adding An Adequate Warning Of Atypical Femoral Fractures\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Complete Response Letter did not preclude Merck from adding an adequate warning of atypical femoral fractures through a CBE supplement\n3. The government's post hoc interpretations of the Complete Response Letter are implausible and inconsistent with FDA regulations\nB. Merck's Informal Communications With FDA Do Not Establish Preemption\nC. FDA's Decision To Mandate An Atypical-Femoral-Fracture Warning Undercuts Merck's Preemption Defense\nIII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S GUIDANCE FOR THE DISTRICT COURT ON REMAND WAS CORRECT\nA. A Jury Should Resolve Disputed Factual Questions Necessary For Preemption\nB. The Third Circuit Correctly Required A Heightened Standard Of Proof For Impossibility Preemption Under Levine\nC. Granting Summary Judgment Would Violate Respondents' Procedural Rights",
        "reference": "1. Merck never proposed an accurate warning of atypical femoral fractures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Lessons from History and Tradition on the Law Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons\nA. Summary of Laws Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons Until the Mid-Nineteenth Century\nB. Mid-to-Late Nineteenth Century Changes in Laws Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Limitations on the Use of History in Law\nIII. Historical Misunderstandings on the Law and Armed Carriage\nA. Sir John Knight's Case\nB. William Hawkins' 1716 A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown\nC. Compulsory Arms Bearing Laws\nD. The Armed Carriage Restrictions Are Racist and Instruments of Slavery Allegation",
        "reference": "C. The Twentieth Century Proliferation of Discretionary Licensing Laws Governing the Carrying of Concealed and Dangerous Weapons",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The decision below is egregiously wrong and revives a circuit split that warrants review.",
        "reference": "I. The Third Circuit's standing ruling is unnecessary and wrong.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. Anonymous Giving By Women Was A Critical Feature Of Pivotal Movements Throughout American History\nA. The Women's Suffrage Movement Benefited Substantially From The Anonymous Participation Of Women\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Continued Popularity Of Anonymous Giving By And To Women Underscores The Importance Of Anonymous Giving To America's Political And Cultural Future",
        "reference": "B. Anonymous Women Played An Important Role In The Abolitionist Movement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-432_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. CLASS MEMBERS ARE ENTITLED TO RELY ON THE FILING OF A CLASS ACTION TO PRESERVE THEIR CLAIMS AND TO AGGREGATE THEIR TIMELY CLAIMS WHERE THE FIRST ACTION'S RULE 23 DEFICIENCY IS CURABLE\nII. PERMITTING SUBSEQUENT CLASS ACTIONS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PSLRA\nIII. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF \"PERPETUAL TOLLING\" IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. CONGRESS AND THIS COURT HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS CONTRIBUTE TO STRONGER MARKETS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. Congressional committees may not subpoena the President's personal records unless the information is demonstrably critical to a clearly identified legitimate legislative purpose\n1. Congress's implied investigatory powers are subject to several limitations\n2. The President's unique status requires special solicitude from Congress and the Judiciary\n3. Congress must satisfy a heightened showing when it directs its implied investigatory powers at the President\nB. The congressional subpoenas here do not satisfy the constitutional requirements\n1. Mazars\n2. Deutsche Bank and Capital One\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Constitutional avoidance also counsels reversal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. PROPOSITION 12 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Proposition 12 Is Constitutional Under Pike Balancing\n1. Proposition 12 Imposes No Substantial Burden On Interstate Commerce\n2. The Benefits of Proposition 12 Are Significant\nII. PETITIONERS' SUIT DOES NOT CHALLENGE PROPOSITION 12'S EGG-RELATED PROVISIONS",
        "reference": "A. Proposition 12's Regulation Of In-State Sales Does Not Regulate Extraterritorial Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Hall opens a path for putative taxpayers to disrupt state tax enforcement\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There are significant incentives to sue a taxing state in an out-of-state court, even if the suit may not succeed\nC. Conflict of law issues create special problems that can be exploited in the state tax area\nII. States cannot solve these problems through reciprocal agreements to exercise comity",
        "reference": "A. States have specialized administrative processes and procedures to resolve tax disputes while ensuring tax collection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Statute of Northampton's text, structure, and widely held understanding show that there was no \"intent to terrorize\" requirement\nB. The petitioners' arguments to the contrary rely on a misreading of two historical sources\nII. The petitioners' attempts to diminish the robust American tradition of restricting public carry are without historical foundation\nA. Early American Northampton-style laws\nB. Good-cause (or Massachusetts model) laws\nC. Early-20th-century \"good cause\" laws\nD. Blatantly discriminatory laws\nIII. The petitioners cherry-pick a handful of cases from the slaveholding South, which took an outlier approach to public carry and exhibited wide variability even within the region\nIV. A law that is less restrictive of public carry than laws enacted in dozens of states and cities \u2014both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification \u2014is constitutional under Heller",
        "reference": "I. The petitioners' cramped reading of the Statute of Northampton contradicts the historical record",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1263_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Medicaid Act's plain text limits a State to the portion of a beneficiary's recovery that represents payment for past medical care\nA. The anti-lien and anti-recovery provisions broadly restrict a State's authority to seek reimbursement from a beneficiary's tort recovery\nB. The implied exception: The Medicaid Act permits and obligates the State to recover third-party payments for health care items or services furnished by the State\nC. The assignment/cooperation provision reinforces the payment-recovery provision's limits on the State's rights\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The more specific, later-enacted payment-recovery provision controls in any event\nII. Ahlborn reinforces what the statutory text makes clear\nIII. The Eleventh Circuit erred by applying the presumption against preemption\nIV. Florida's argument that the payment-recovery provision is inapplicable because it addresses subrogation is wrong\nV. The proper reading of the third-party provisions gives effect to each and integrates them into a workable whole",
        "reference": "1. The assignment/cooperation provision must be read consistently with the payment-recovery and third-party liability provisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The question presented is important and recurring\nC. This case is an optimal vehicle",
        "reference": "A. There is a clear and intractable conflict",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-897_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents' detention is governed by Section 1231(a) rather than Section 1226\n1. The text of Section 1231(a) shows that it governs respondents' detention\n2. The text of Section 1226 shows that it does not govern respondents' detention\n3. Context and structure confirm that Section 1231(a), not Section 1226, governs respondents' detention\n4. Statutory purposes confirm that Section 1231(a), not Section 1226, governs respondents' detention\nB. The contrary arguments lack merit\n1. The court of appeals misinterpreted Section 1226 and Section 1231\n2. The court of appeals misinterpreted the provisions governing the removal period\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Respondents retain substantial protection under Section 1231(a)\nC. At a minimum, the government's interpretation of the statute deserves deference",
        "reference": "3. The court of appeals' decision rests on a mistaken view of statutory withholding and CAT protection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress has repeatedly and knowingly chosen to ratify, rather than prohibit, the Federal Trade Commission's use of Section 13(b) to seek disgorgement.\nII. Reading Section 13(b) to silently prohibit courts from exercising their equitable powers would undermine the statute.\nA. Disgorgement is an essential tool for preventing unfair methods of competition.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Federal Trade Commission depends on courts' traditional equitable authority to fashion effective preliminary relief.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The purpose behind censures and reprimands is self-governance\u2014not the curtailing of free speech rights\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The ability to censure a board member is an act of self-governance free of scrutiny under the First Amendment\nIV. The established ability of a board to express its views through the censuring of a board member does not implicate the First Amendment",
        "reference": "II. The Fifth Circuit's exercise in semantics leaves duly elected boards without any guidance as to when they allegedly run afoul of the First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-23_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. THE PARTIES AGREE THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI\nB. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING THE SPLITS AT ISSUE\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. THE DECISION BELOW IS INCORRECT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PROSPECTIVE PARENTS HARMS CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE\nA. Discrimination Against LGBTQ Parents Deprives All Children In Foster Care Of Opportunities For Stable Homes\nB. Discrimination Against LGBTQ Parents Harms LGBTQ Youth In Foster Care\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Discrimination against LGBTQ foster parents deprives LGBTQ youth of an important group of affirming homes and sends them a harmful message about their own identities\nII. NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF MANY FAITH-BASED FOSTER AGENCIES",
        "reference": "1. LGBTQ youth make up a disproportionately large percentage of children in foster care",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Trail Is More than Just a Long, Narrow Strip of Land\nA. The Trail was conceived as a \"realm\" of natural experience\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Trails Act continued and enhanced the cooperation among multiple agencies and the ATC\nII. The Cooperative Management System in Place Today Is the Product of Extensive Negotiation\nA. Federal agencies and the ATC preserved the pre-1968 management model, adjusted to conform to the Trails Act\nB. The three primary partners developed a common vision of the Trail\nC. Local management of the Trail is critical to the cooperative system\nD. Congress has endorsed the current cooperative management system\nIII. All Partners Must Strive to Preserve the Essential values of the Appalachian Trail",
        "reference": "B. Creating the Trail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The AFL, Representing the Teamsters Union, Successfully Lobbied to Have All Transportation Workers Exempted from the FAA, Including Respondent, Without Regard to Whether the Worker Was Paid as an \"Employee\" or \"Independent Contractor\"\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. In Historical Context the Use of the Term \"Contracts of Employment\" Was Routinely Used to Include the \"Employment\" of \"Independent Contractor\" Drivers and, Hence, Not Meant to Exclude Any Drivers from the Benefit of the Lobbied-For Exemption\nIV. Mandatory Individual Arbitration for Far-Flung Transportation Workers Places Them at a Distinct Disadvantage Inconsistent with Congressional Intent That These Critical Workers Would Not be Subject to the FAA\nV. Labels Attached by Petitioner to the Agreement It Prepared Cannot Be Dispositive",
        "reference": "II. That Congress Meant to Exempt All Workers in the Transportation Sector from the FAA, Not Limited to How That Worker Happened to Be Paid, Is Consistent with This Court's Prior Decisions and Other Congressional Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMBINING THE RELATIVE PERMANENCE AND SIGNIFICANT NEXUS STANDARDS IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE TEST OF CLEAN WATER ACT AUTHORITY\nA. [MISSING]\n1. As written by Kennedy: case-by-case determinations run unconstitutionally wild\n2. As interpreted in the 2015 rule\na. Trading Vagueness for Overreach\nb. Physical indicators, alone, are insufficient\nB. Shortcomings of the relative permanence standard\n1. Regulation of the \"merest trickle\"\n2. As interpreted in the Navigable Waters Protection Rule, relative permanence constituted flow in a \"typical year\"\nC. Combine significant nexus and relative permanence to achieve a two-part test that constitutionally regulates the nation's waters\n1. Step 1: Are visual indicators present?\n2. Step 2: If visual indicators are present, does the feature have relatively permanent flow with a continuous surface connection to navigable-in-fact water?\n3. Combining the tests provides much-needed clarity for landowners\n4. Adopting the \"Rapanos two-step\" remedies the failings of the significant nexus and relative permanence tests\nII. SHOULD THE COURT DECLINE TO REQUIRE SATISFACTION OF BOTH THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS AND RELATIVE PERMANENCE TESTS, IT SHOULD FIND THE RELATIVE PERMANENCE TEST AS THE SOLE JURISDICTIONAL TEST\nA. Varying tests among the federal circuits create uncertainty within the regulated community\nB. Of the existing tests, the plurality's test most closely follows congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent",
        "reference": "A. Shortcomings of the Significant Nexus Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-290_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FDA'S DENIAL OF MERCK'S PROPOSED WARNING PREEMPTS RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW\nA. Failure-To-Warn Claims Are Preempted When the FDA Rejects a Proposed Warning About a Disclosed Risk\nB. This Legal Rule Preempts Respondents' Claims Here\nII. MERCK PREVAILS IN THIS CASE UNDER ANY LEGAL FRAMEWORK\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Every Other Piece of Evidence Cuts in Merck's Favor as Well\nC. There Is No Heightened Burden of Proof for Preemption\nIII. RESPONDENTS' PROCEDURAL COMPLAINTS ARE MERITLESS AND IRRELEVANT",
        "reference": "A. The FDA Has Told This Court That It Would Not Have Approved a Warning",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. By Focusing The Question Of Defendant's Guilt On The Degree Of Effort Put Into Educating Himself On Proper Practices, Respondent's Standard Exacerbates Vagueness Problems And Is Inconsistent With Moore And Harrison Act Cases\nA. Respondent's standard fails to resolve the indeterminacy plaguing current caselaw\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Respondent's insistence upon an objective standard is inconsistent with Moore and Harrison Act cases\nII. Petitioner Is Not Arguing For A Radical Standard Allowing Defendants To Define Practice Standards For Themselves\nIII. Because It Entirely Disregards A Prescription's Purpose, Respondent's Standard Is Inconsistent With The Purpose Of The CSA\nIV. Even Under Respondent's Standard, Reversal Is Necessary Because It Is Inconsistent With The Tenth Circuit's Holding And The Instructions In Petitioner's Case",
        "reference": "B. Respondent's insistence on an objective standard does not separate criminal from apparently innocent conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING TO APPEAL THE APPROVAL OF A SETTLEMENT THEY ELECTED TO JOIN\nA. Devlin Does Not Support Appellate Standing For Members Of Non-Mandatory Settlement Classes\nB. Petitioners' Election To Remain In The Settlement Class And Be Bound By The Settlement Defeats Their Standing To Appeal The Approval Of That Settlement\nC. This Court Has Not Addressed Whether Devlin Applies To Appeals From Non-Mandatory Class Settlements\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Intervention Is Irrelevant To Determining Petitioners' Appellate Standing\nII. PETITIONERS' ARTICLE III STANDING MUST BE ADDRESSED BEFORE CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF THE PETITION",
        "reference": "D. Appellate Standing Is A Constitutional Requirement, Not A Policy Choice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1599_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PRIVACY CONCERNS THAT MOTIVATED CONGRESS TO ENACT SECTION 7609 ARE PARTICULARLY PRONOUNCED IN THE CONTEXT OF BUSINESS RECORDS.\nA. The Purpose of Section 7609 Is to Protect the Privacy Rights of Taxpayers.\nB. Privacy Is No Less Important for the Business Community.\nC. Privacy Concerns Are Especially Grave Where Uniquely Sensitive Customer or Client Information Is Involved.\nII. AFFIRMING THE SIXTH CIRCUIT WILL INCREASE THE COSTS IMPOSED ON THIRD-PARTY RECORDKEEPERS.\nA. Third-Party Recordkeepers Will Be Forced to Choose Between Upsetting the IRS or Alienating Their Customers or Clients.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Administrative Burden on Third-Party Recordkeepers Will Increase Because the IRS Will Almost Certainly Increase Its Use of Summonses.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. AMEX'S DEPARTURE FROM THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S LOGIC CONFIRMS THE COURT'S ERROR\nA. Amex Wrongly Disputes Facts\nB. [MISSING]\nII. AMEX OVERLOOKS THE DIFFERENT WAYS TO PROVE \"MARKET POWER\"\nIII. CONTRARY TO AMEX'S CLAIM, THE EFFECTS OF ITS RESTRAINTS PROVE ITS POWER\nA. Amex Wrongly Claims That The Government Must Prove That Its Restraints Caused Higher Prices And Lower Output\nB. Amex Wrongly Claims That The Higher Merchant Fees Did Not Suffice To Prove Anticompetitive Prices\nC. Amex Wrongly Claims That The Government Relies Only On A \"Quick Look\"\nIV. AMEX (AND ITS AMICI) MISTAKENLY CLAIM THAT A HOLDING FOR THE GOVERNMENT WILL RISK \"FALSE POSITIVES\" IN FUTURE CASES",
        "reference": "B. Amex Wrongly Equates Its Vertical Restraints With Vertical Restraints From Other Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-389_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FLSA, Not California Wage-and-Hour Law, Supplies The Applicable Federal Law On The OCS\nA. OCSLA Makes Clear That All Law on the OCS is Federal Law and State Law is Limited to a Gap-Filling Role\nB. California Wage-and-Hour Law is Inapplicable on the OCS Because the FLSA Provides the Applicable Federal Wage-and-Hour Rules\nC. California Wage-and-Hour Law Does Not Extend to the OCS Because It is Inconsistent With the FLSA\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Applying California Wage-and-Hour Law on the OCS Makes No Sense and Produces Results Congress Never Intended",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Free Exchange of Expression is Essential to a Free Society.\nA. Successful Trademarks Appropriate Cultural Iconography.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Proper Response to Critical Speech is More Speech.\nII. The Sale of Expression Enjoys Full First Amendment Protection.\nA. The Test for Noncommercial Speech: What is Being Sold?\nB. Message Trumps Medium.\ni. Jack Daniel's Proposes an Unconstitutional Content-Based Regulation.\nii. Political and Artistic Expression Have Always Been Everywhere.\nIII. The Likelihood of Confusion Test Suppresses Free Speech.\nA. The Likelihood of Confusion Test Contradicts the First Amendment.\nB. The Likelihood of Confusion Test is Unpredictable.\nC. The Likelihood of Confusion Test is Overbroad.\nD. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
        "reference": "B. Both Political and Artistic Speech Appropriate Trademarks.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. SEC ALJs Exercise Very Substantial Government Power\nA. The Expanded Authority Of SEC ALJs\nB. The Commission's Increased Use of Its In-House Administrative Proceedings\nC. The Commission's Increased Use Of Administrative Proceedings Adversely Affects Companies And Individuals\nII. SEC ALJs Have Been Hired Using A Diffuse And Opaque Process\nIII. SEC ALJs Are \"Officers\" Who Must Be Appointed In Accordance With The Appointments Clause\nA. The Clause Ensures Accountability For Appointments Of Officials Who Exercise Significant Executive Authority\nB. [MISSING]\n1. SEC ALJs exercise significant authority\n2. Final decision-making authority is not an indispensable characteristic of \"Officers.\"",
        "reference": "B. SEC ALJs Are \"Officers\" Because They Exercise Significant Authority Pursuant To The Laws Of The United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Every circuit to address the question has held that a \"final order\" of the FCC interpreting the TCPA may be challenged only in the court of appeals in a Hobbs Act proceeding, and there is no circuit split on the issue\nII. The difference of interpretation between the Second Circuit and the Fourth Circuit regarding the meaning of the FCC's free-goods-or-services rule does not warrant this Court's review\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Fourth Circuit's ruling does not \"prohibit\" PDR from sending faxes offering free copies of its e-book, as long as it follows the rules",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. NEW YORK'S COLLECTIVE BARGAINING STATUTE PURPOSEFULLY REGULATES RELATIONS BETWEEN WELL-FUNDED PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS ROLE AS AN EMPLOYER\nA. In Enacting the Taylor Law, the New York Legislature Chose to Replace Increasingly Frequent Public Employee Strikes with Structured Collective Bargaining\nB. The Modern-Day Taylor Law Provides a Carefully Balanced Framework for New York's Public Employees to Bargain with Their Government Employers through Well-Funded Unions\n1. To ensure uniform and fair employee relations, New York law grants exclusive representation rights and adequate funding to its public sector unions\n2. New York law limits collective bargaining to the terms and conditions of employment\n3. New York's Public Employee Relations Board is authorized to refer bargaining parties to binding arbitration, insulating collective bargaining from political decision makers\n4. [MISSING]\n5. Striking down fair share fees will upset the Taylor Law's carefully balanced employee relations scheme\nII. THE SBA'S EXPERIENCE AT THE BARGAINING TABLE CONFIRMS THAT THE TAYLOR LAW FOSTERS A SYSTEM THAT IS LIMITED TO EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS\nA. Unions and Government Employers Bargain, Not to Set Policy, but to Determine the Employment Rules That Are Necessary to Implement Those Policies\nB. Pattern Bargaining Limits the Scope of Labor Negotiations\nC. Other Collectively Bargained Initiatives Are Further Removed from Politics\nIII. BY BEING MORE THAN JUST A NEGOTIATOR, THE SBA PROVIDES SERGEANTS WITH AN ARRAY OF SERVICES AND A HELPING HAND IN TIMES OF NEED\nA. The SBA's Work on behalf of Sergeants and Their Families in Times of Need Demonstrates the Importance of Well-Funded Unions\nB. Because It Is Well-Funded, the SBA Is Able to Provide Other Critical Services to Its Bargaining Unit",
        "reference": "4. Both the Taylor Law's ban on public employee strikes and its requirement that the government respect expired CBAs while negotiating new CBAs foster employment-focused negotiations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section Three's prohibition against having \"engaged in insurrection or rebellion\" requires a direct, overt act of insurrection, not incitement through speech.\nA. To \"engage\" requires more than mere words.\n1. The text's omission of incitement is weighty evidence that \"engage in insurrection or rebellion\" does not cover incitement.\n2. Plainly disjunctive language puts a wall between the meaning of \"engaging\" and the wholly separate inchoate acts of aiding or comforting.\nB. [MISSING]\n1. An \"enemy\" is an enemy nation.\n2. Civil War prosecution amplifies the conclusion that \"aid or comfort\" to non-enemy insurrectionists is not covered by Section Three.\n3. Potential overlap of \"enemies\" and \"insurrectionists\" does not mean per se overlap.\n4. Casual construction of \"enemies\" leads to dangerous outcomes.\nC. The second opinion from Attorney General Stanbery fits well within this construction.\nII. Even if Section Three's use of \"engaged\" included incitement, Brandenburg applies and the Ellipse Speech is constitutionally protected.\nA. Under the Brandenburg test, only the Ellipse Speech's words may be analyzed to determine whether they were directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action.\nB. President Trump's speech was not directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action.",
        "reference": "B. \"Insurrectionists\" or \"rebels\" are not, without more, \"enemies.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. In 1988, district courts routinely exercised their traditional, equitable stay powers pending arbitrability appeals and comparable interlocutory appeals.\nB. Congress did not alter the discretionary stay backdrop in enacting section 16.\nII. Coinbase's arguments to the contrary lack merit.\nA. Coinbase's appeals to pro-arbitration policy conflict with this Court's precedent.\nB. Coinbase's reliance on the narrow \"divestiture\" principle is unsound.",
        "reference": "I. The Federal Arbitration Act does not strip federal courts of their inherent power to decide whether to grant or deny a stay pending appeal.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Nielsen Memorandum should be considered\nB. [MISSING]\nC. DACA's rescission is lawful\nD. The judgments and orders should be reversed",
        "reference": "B. DACA's rescission is not reviewable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Hardison's Unsound Definition Of \"Undue Hardship\" Lacks Precedential Force, And The Court Should Construe That Term According To Its Plain Meaning\nA. Hardison's undue hardship test is dicta that lacks stare decisis effect\nB. Title VII's plain language requires a showing of significant difficulty or expense to excuse an employer from offering an accommodation\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Requiring significant difficulty or expense honors Title VII's unique treatment of religion\n3. Requiring significant difficulty or expense accords with the history and purpose of the 1972 amendment\nC. Even if Hardison's de minimis test were not dicta, stare decisis would not mandate adherence to its egregiously unsound reasoning\n1. The cursory consideration of Hardison's de minimis test saps its precedential force\n2. Hardison's de minimis test cannot survive scrutiny under a stare decisis analysis\nII. An Employer Does Not Demonstrate Undue Hardship By Showing Only That The Requested Accommodation Burdens The Employee's Co-Workers\nIII. Applying The Proper Standard, USPS Failed To Demonstrate That Accommodating Groff Would Cause Undue Hardship",
        "reference": "1. Requiring significant difficulty or expense accords with the ordinary meaning of \"undue hardship,\" while Hardison's de minimis test affronts the statutory text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE INFERIOR OFFICERS\nII. IF THIS COURT CONCLUDES THAT ADMINISTRATIVE PATENT JUDGES ARE IMPROPERLY APPOINTED, IT SHOULD SEVER THEIR REMOVAL PROTECTIONS\nA. Severing the removal restrictions is consistent with this Court's severability doctrine and avoids disruption to the inter partes review system\nB. Eliminating tenure protections will not undermine congressional intent because Congress has already elected to cabin the independence of administrative patent judges\nIII. THE OTHER REMEDIAL OPTIONS PROPOSED BY THE PARTIES THREATEN SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION TO THE INTER PARTES REVIEW SYSTEM\nA. This Court should reject Arthrex's startling suggestion that the Court decline to adopt any remedy\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Expanding the scope of the Director's authority undermines the benefits of the PTAB's structure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE SIGNIFICANT NEXUS TEST LEADS TO NEVERENDING LITIGATION",
        "reference": "I. THE EXPERT AGENCIES CANNOT DETERMINE WHAT TO, HOW TO, OR WHETHER TO APPLY THE \"SIGNIFICANT NEXUS\" ANALYSIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Vesting Clause Prohibits Any Congressional Delegation of Legislative Power\nB. The \"Intelligible-Principle\" Test Requires, at a Minimum, that a Law Provide Some Discernible Standards to Guide Those to Whom It Extends Authority\nC. Section 1915(c) Provides No Guidance to Tribes Regarding When and How They May Exercise Their Authority to Reorder Congress's Placement Priorities\nII. SECTION 1915(c) VIOLATES THE VESTING CLAUSE OF ARTICLE I BY DELEGATING LEGISLATIVE POWER TO ENTITIES OUTSIDE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT\nA. The Rationale for Judicial Caution in Some Nondelegation Cases Is Inapplicable Here\nB. The Attributes of Sovereignty Possessed by Indian Tribes Do Not Exempt Them from the Nondelegation Doctrine\nC. The Constitution Does Not Authorize Congress to Delegate to Indian Tribes the Legislative Power Congress Possesses Under the Indian Commerce Clause",
        "reference": "I. SECTION 1915(c) LACKS AN \"INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE\" TO WHICH INDIAN TRIBES MUST CONFORM WHEN EXERCISING THEIR DELEGATED AUTHORITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. SUNDANCE'S INTENTIONAL ACTS CONSTITUTED WAIVER OR RESCISSION, CONTRACT DEFENSES WITHIN THE FAA'S SAVING CLAUSE\nII. SUNDANCE'S VIEW WOULD IMBUE \"DEFAULT\" WITH A MEANING IT DID NOT HAVE IN 1925\nA. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the American Arbitration Association Rules Alter What \"Default\" Meant in 1925\nB. The FAA's Other Provisions Counsel Against Reading a Prejudice Requirement into the Word \"Default\"\nC. The FAA Only Instructs Courts to Assess Whether the section 3 Applicant Is \"in Default\" at the Time of Requesting the Stay and Says Nothing About Curing Default\nIII. ADOPTING SUNDANCE'S POSITIONS WOULD YIELD ABSURD, DESTABILIZING RESULTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Abolishing the Equal-Treatment Principle Would Deprive Parties Contracting to Arbitrate of Protections Other Contracting Parties Enjoy\nIV. COURTS CAN APPLY DISPARATE STATE CONTRACT LAW RULES WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE FAA'S OBJECTIVES",
        "reference": "A. Sundance's Approach to Contractual Waiver Would Elevate Procedure Over Substance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' challenge to the Proclamation is not justiciable\nA. Respondents' statutory claims are not justiciable\nB. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable\nII. The Proclamation is authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act\nA. The Proclamation is authorized under 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 8 U.S.C. 1185(a)(1)\nB. The Proclamation does not violate 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(1)(A)\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Proclamation is constitutional under Mandel and Din\nB. The Proclamation is constitutional under domestic Establishment Clause precedent\nIV. The global injunction is vastly overbroad",
        "reference": "III. The Proclamation does not violate the Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Plaintiffs' Bar Adopts \"Disclosure-Only\" Settlements\nB. Trulia Eliminates Delaware as a Friendly Forum\nC. The Plaintiffs' Bar Shifts to Federal Court\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION ENCOURAGES FORUM-SHOPPING AND RISKS CREATING A DE FACTO NATIONWIDE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD\nIII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CREATES UNCERTAINTY AND RISK WITH RESPECT TO TENDER OFFER DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS\nIV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CREATES ADDITIONAL RISKS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS PARTICIPATING IN MERGER TRANSACTIONS\nV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN ADOPTING A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD",
        "reference": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION WORKS AGAINST TRULIA AND WILL INCREASE THE NUMBER OF FRIVOLOUS \"MERGER OBJECTION\" CASES FILED IN FEDERAL COURTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Commerce Clause prohibits state laws that unduly restrict interstate commerce\n1. The Commerce Clause safeguards a vibrant interstate market and a cooperative Union of sovereign States\n2. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners plausibly allege that Proposition 12 unduly restricts interstate commerce under Pike\n1. States must demonstrate a legitimate interest to justify substantial burdens on interstate commerce\n2. Petitioners plausibly allege that Proposition 12 does not advance a legitimate local interest\na. California has no legitimate interest in the housing conditions of out-of-state animals\nb. Petitioners plausibly allege that Proposition 12 has no human health or safety benefits\n3. Petitioners plausibly allege that Proposition 12 substantially burdens interstate commerce\nC. The court of appeals erred in describing this Court's decisions concerning extraterritorial regulation",
        "reference": "2. States must not excessively burden or directly regulate commerce in other States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FCC has broad statutory authority to regulate media ownership in the public interest\nA. The APA requires judicial deference to reasoned agency judgments\nB. Judicial deference is especially warranted when the FCC regulates in the public interest under Section 202(h)\nII. In fashioning the orders at issue in this case, the Commission made reasonable policy judgments based on the available facts\nA. The Reconsideration Order\nB. The 2016 and Incubator Orders\nIII. The court of appeals' contrary holding reflects serious analytic flaws\nA. The court of appeals disregarded the statutory text\nB. The court of appeals substituted its judgment for that of the agency\nC. The decision below undermines the proper functioning of Section 202(h) reviews\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. All \"Officers of the United States\" Exercise Sovereign Authority\nA. Officers of the United States exercise \"significant\" authority \u2014properly defined\nB. \"Significant\" authority denotes sovereign authority \u2014of varying levels of importance\nII. The Distinctions Among Officers Depend on the Importance and Scope of Their Authority\nA. The Constitution recognizes that \"Officers of the United States\" exercise varying levels of sovereign authority\nB. Long-settled practice confirms that superior officers \u2014although not Heads of Departments \u2014exercise important power and wield substantial discretion\n1. The Department of Justice\n2. Health and Human Services\n3. [MISSING]\nC. Edmond's direction-and-supervision standard is inadequate to distinguish between inferior and non-inferior officers\nD. The key distinction between superior and inferior officers is the nature and scope of their authority\n1. The power to issue final decisions on behalf of the government may be exercised only by superior and principal officers\n2. The authority to exercise substantial discretion in carrying out responsibilities of high importance may be exercised only by superior and principal officers\nIII. Administrative Patent Judges Are Superior Officers",
        "reference": "3. The \"inferior Courts\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents Do Not Satisfy Either Part Of The Two-Part Test For Determining Whether Action Is Taken \"Under Color Of State Law.\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Respondents Have Not Alleged Any Action Attributable to State Law\nC. MNN Is Not a State Actor\nII. MNN's Public-Access Channels Are Not Public Forums Because They Are Private Property\nIII. The Decision Below Does Not Accord With The Realities Of Public-Access Television And Would Impose Unwarranted Burdens On Public-Access Operators",
        "reference": "A. Section 1983 Establishes a Two-Part Test for Determining Whether Action Was Taken \"Under Color of State Law.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to the D.C. Circuit's assertion otherwise, it was settled in 1971 that ANCs were not and never would be sovereign entities\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Federal agencies have considered ANCs \"Indian tribes\" under ISDA\nB. Courts have affirmed that ANCs are \"Indian tribes\" under ISDA\nC. Congress intends for ANCs to be included under ISDA\nD. ANCs act as \"Indian tribes\" under ISDA\nIII. The State cannot simply step in and provide services to Alaska Natives on an emergent basis in the same way as, and in place of, ANCs",
        "reference": "II. Since 1975, all three branches of the federal government have considered ANCs \"Indian tribes\" under ISDA, and ANCs have acted as such",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY MUST APPLY TO NONPROFIT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. ANY INTEREST IN SECURING NONPROFIT MEMBER AND DONOR INFORMATION MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THIS SENSITIVE INFORMATION WILL NOT BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A Territorial Limit on Evidence of Harm Is Inconsistent with Longstanding Remedial Practice\nIII. A Number of Well-Established Doctrines Are Available to Limit Claims of Lost Profits\n1. Causation-in-fact\n2. Proximate Causation\n3. Reasonable Certainty, New Businesses, and Other Settled Rules of Compensatory Damages",
        "reference": "I. A Territorial Limit on Evidence of Harm Is Inconsistent with the Rightful Position Principle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-961_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "Under Article III, Section 2, this Court lacks authority to issue writs directly to executive branch officers such as the members of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Under this Court's precedents, the CAAF's members are executive branch officers over whom this Court cannot exercise direct \"appellate jurisdiction.\"\nC. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
        "reference": "A. Marbury v. Madison prohibits this Court from exercising direct \"appellate jurisdiction\" over executive branch officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The State-Secrets Privilege Does Not Permit Dismissal Here\nA. This Court's State-Secrets Cases Do Not Permit Dismissal Here\nB. The Pre-Reynolds Common Law Does Not Permit Dismissal Here\nC. The Few Lower Court Cases Permitting Dismissal Where Defendants Seek to Use Privileged Evidence to Defend Themselves Precede General Dynamics, and Are Wrong or Inapplicable\nII. If the State-Secrets Privilege Otherwise Authorizes Dismissal, FISA Displaces It, and Requires Ex Parte, In Camera Review Rather Than Dismissal\nA. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Triggers FISA's Special Review Procedures Under Sections 1806(c) and (f)\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Defendants' Objections Are Meritless\n1. Defendants' Interpretation of \"Use\" Contravenes Its Ordinary Meaning\n2. Defendants' Non-Textual Limitation on Section 1806(f) Cannot Be Squared With Its Plain Text\n3. Defendants' Limiting Construction Would Eviscerate the Civil Remedy Congress Created in Section 1810\nIII. FISA Speaks Clearly to Displace Any \"Dismissal Remedy\" That the State-Secrets Privilege Might Otherwise Authorize\nA. Section 1806(f)'s Review Procedures Displace the State-Secrets Privilege in Cases Involving Domestic Electronic Surveillance\nB. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance Does Not Support Defendants' Interpretation\n1. FISA's Ex Parte, In Camera Review Procedures Present No Article II Concerns\n2. The Agent Defendants' Speculative Due Process and Seventh Amendment Concerns Do Not Support Their Interpretation",
        "reference": "B. Plaintiffs' Prayer for Relief Independently Triggers FISA's Special Review Procedures Under Section 1806(f)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The LGBTQ+ Community is Well Funded and Engaged, Wielding Significant Political Power.\nIII. Influential Labor Unions Support LGBTQ+ Rights.\nIV. Cultural Support Is Likely to Enhance LGBTQ+ Political Power.\nA. Cultural Icons Sway Public Opinion in Favor of LGBTQ+ Rights.\nB. Various Religious Groups Support LGBTQ+ Rights.\nV. Public Opinion Favors LGBTQ+ Rights, And First Amendment Protections.\nVI. Reversing the Decision Below Prevents Discrimination.",
        "reference": "I. The Overwhelmingly Pro-LGBTQ+ Economic Environment Makes Respondents' Slippery-Slope Argument Untenable.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Partisan Gerrymandering Undermines Public Trust in Representative Democracy\nII. The Application of Well-Settled First Amendment Doctrine Provides the Rule of Decision Here\nA. Partisan Gerrymandering Burdens the Associational Rights of Parties and Their Members\n1. The Burdens Imposed on Appellees' Associational Rights Are Severe and Unconstitutional\n2. Even if the Associational Burdens Were Less Than Severe, Partisan Gerrymandering Would Still Fail the Flexible Test This Court Designed in Anderson v. Celebrezze\nB. Partisan Gerrymandering Also Flouts Other First Amendment Principles\n1. Partisan Gerrymandering Amounts to Unconstitutional Retaliation Against Minority Party Voters for Their Political Views Manifested in Their Past Electoral Choices\n2. Partisan Gerrymandering Unconstitutionally Favors Majority Political Viewpoints over Others\n3. Partisan Gerrymandering Imposes Discriminatory Burdens on the Basis of a Speaker's Identity as a Minority Party Adherent\nIII. Claims of Partisan Gerrymandering Are Justiciable\nA. Courts Should Intervene Because Partisan Gerrymandering Raises the Distinct Possibility That a Legislature Has Entrenched Itself and Is No Longer Accountable to the People\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Court Has Not Hesitated to Intervene When Comparable First Amendment Liberties Are at Stake",
        "reference": "B. Our Federal Courts Have Expertise in Ascertaining Legislative Intent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Epic does not support Viking's request for review\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court's FAA decisions do not require enforcement of agreements that bar assertion of statutory rights\nB. This Court's decisions do not require enforcement of agreements that strip states of police power to authorize enforcement actions on their behalf\nC. Iskanian and Sakkab do not reflect hostility to arbitration\nD. Iskanian does not impose procedures incompatible with arbitration\nIII. This case does not present the question whether Iskanian forecloses arbitration of PAGA claims\nIV. Viking's objections to PAGA provide no basis for review",
        "reference": "II. Iskanian is fully consistent with this Court's precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Security Clause requires a robust warrant requirement with narrow exceptions for true emergencies\nIII. A categorical rule for misdemeanor pursuits would violate the Security Clause",
        "reference": "I. The Security Clause requires freedom from threats to our persons and property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Grant Certiorari to Resolve the Circuit Split by Adopting the Sunbeam Rule\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Sunbeam Rule, Treating Rejection of a Debtor-Licensor's Contractual Obligations Under a Trademark License Agreement as a Breach but Not a Termination, Best Promotes the Strength and Stability of the Trademark System\nII. This Case Presents a Rare Opportunity to Clarify a Commercially Critical Area of the Law",
        "reference": "A. The Split Below Is Substantial and Leads to Uncertainty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle",
        "reference": "I. This Case Should Be Decided Along with Rather Than Held for Liu",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief059.pdf",
        "text": "I. Unsafe Abortion Poses A Significant Threat To Women's Health\nII. Legally Restricting Abortion Care Results In More Unsafe Abortions, Not Fewer Abortions Overall\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Trend Toward Eliminating Abortion Restrictions Has Contributed To Increasingly Safe Abortions And Improved Maternal Health And Well-Being",
        "reference": "III. Poor And Marginalized Women Are Disproportionately Harmed By Unsafe Abortion That Results From Legal Restrictions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-8255_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT GRANTS THE CLIENT THE RIGHT TO CONTROL THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF HIS OR HER DEFENSE\nII. ABA AND LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES PROTECT THE CLIENT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DECIDE WHETHER TO ADMIT OR CONTEST GUILT\nA. ABA and Louisiana State Bar Association Ethical Rules Confirm the Constitutional Guarantee That Clients Control the Fundamental Objectives of Their Representation\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Respecting Client Control Over Fundamental Decisions Is Consistent With the Ethical Duty of Candor to the Tribunal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Government Has a Long History of Secretly Abusing Individual Rights\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. An Imperfect Remedy Is Better Than No Remedy at All, and Any Burden on Seventh Amendment Rights Is Caused by, and Can Be Remedied by, the Government",
        "reference": "II. Where a Right Has Been Infringed, There Must Be a Remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Creditor Violates The Automatic Stay When It Refuses To Return Estate Property To The Debtor\nA. The Majority Rule Is Consistent With Section 362(a)'s Text And Its Context And Purpose Within The Code\nB. The City's Contrary Interpretation Of Section 362(a)(3) Fails\nC. The Seventh Circuit Correctly Rejected The City's Legislative History Arguments\nII. Section 362(a)(3) Should Be Read In The Context Of Section 542(a) Which Commands Delivery Of Estate Property To A Debtor Or Trustee\nA. The Text Of Section 542(a) Compels The Conclusion That Section 542(a) Is Self-Executing\nB. The City's Attempts To Dismiss Section 542(a)'s Text Are Unavailing\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Seventh Circuit's Decision Is Wholly Consistent With Strumpf",
        "reference": "III. Bankruptcy Code Section 362(a)(3) And Section 542(a) Work Together To Protect The Bankruptcy Court's Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Estate Property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Compelled Speech Enjoys the Highest Protection\nII. The First Amendment Cannot Be Neutered by Characterizing Speech as Commercial Activity\nA. Waiver of Constitutional Rights Cannot Be a Condition of Doing Business\nB. Commercial Trappings do Not Strip Creative Professionals of First Amendment Protection\nC. Professional Speech is Protected\nD. An Imported and Misplaced Theory of Monopoly Regulation Cannot Displace Established Rules Against Compelled Performance\nIII. Rendering a Person an Accommodation Nullifies Any Limiting Principle on Government Regulation of Expressive Enterprise\nA. People Cannot be Conflated With Places and Things\n1. An Artist is Not a Common Carrier or a Public Accommodation\n2. A Customer is not a Product\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Artists Need Not Open the Door Before Speech Can Be Compelled, Putting Their Unique Contributions at Risk",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Court should not review the other questions presented by petitioners",
        "reference": "A. Review is warranted to resolve a circuit conflict on the question whether the CWA's prohibition on the unpermitted discharge of pollutants covers activities that cause pollutants to be conveyed through groundwater to waters of the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 2 requires plaintiffs to prove that a challenged law causes a substantial disparity in opportunities for members of a protected class to participate in the political process and to affect electoral outcomes\nA. Respondents' proposed standard breaks from section 2's text and precedent\nB. Respondents' view of section 2 raises serious constitutional concerns\nII. Arizona's out-of-precinct policy and ballot-collection law do not violate section 2\nA. Arizona's out-of-precinct policy does not violate section 2\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's intentional-discrimination holding is untenable\nIV. The State has standing to seek review of the out-of-precinct policy\nV. The Court should reverse the judgment without remanding for further proceedings",
        "reference": "B. The ballot-collection law does not violate section 2",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. There Is No Circuit Conflict Regarding What Type of Assistance Constitutes Aiding and Abetting Under Section 2333(d)(2)\nIII. The Atypical Circumstances of This Case Do Not Present An Issue of General Importance",
        "reference": "I. There Is No Circuit Conflict Regarding The Knowledge Requirement of Section 2333(d)(2)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The decision below conflicts with decisions of other courts of appeals\nC. The question presented is important and squarely presented here",
        "reference": "A. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Meaningful Circuit Conflict That Warrants This Court's Review\nII. The Decision Below Is Correct\nA. [MISSING]\nB. \"Full Costs\" Has Always Meant Full Costs\nIII. This Case Is A Poor Candidate For Plenary Review",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of section 505 Is Entirely Consistent With This Court's Precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1094_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. LAMBERT'S RULE 23(f) PETITION WAS LATE\nA. LAMBERT DID NOT MAKE AN ORAL MOTION\nB. RULE 59(e)'S DEADLINE IS IRRELEVANT\n1. Rule 59(e) Does Not Apply\n2. A Motion for Reconsideration Must Be Filed Before the Appeal Deadline Expires\nC. APPELLATE RULE 4(a) IS INAPPLICABLE\nD. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DID NOT RESTART THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE\nII. CLAIM-PROCESSING RULES CAN PRECLUDE EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS\nIII. THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE IS INSUSCEPTIBLE TO EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. LAMBERT'S RELIANCE ON OTHER FEDERAL RULES AND DOCTRINES IS MISPLACED\nC. EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS CONTRAVENE RULE 23(f)'s PURPOSE\nIV. EVEN IF EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS COULD APPLY, THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION BELOW WOULD STILL NEED TO BE REVERSED\nA. WHETHER THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTED AN ERRONEOUS EQUITABLE EXCEPTION IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT\nB. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTED OVERLY BROAD AND IMPROPER EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS",
        "reference": "A. THE FEDERAL RULES PRECLUDE EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.87
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Appellate review of all grounds at issue in a remand order is compelled by Congress's use of the word \"order\" in section 1447(d)\nA. Congress has long defined scopes of review at the level of an \"order,\" which courts have understood to permit review of the entire order\nB. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Appellate review of all grounds at issue in a remand order is compatible with Congress's policy in enacting section 1447(d)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONER HAS NOT ADEQUATELY ALLEGED ARTICLE III STANDING\nII. PETITIONER FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE TAKINGS CLAUSE\nA. Minnesota's Forfeiture Law Is Deeply Rooted In Anglo-American History\n1. Minnesota's forfeiture practices trace back to the Statute of Gloucester\n2. Laws like Minnesota's were common in colonial America\n3. Laws like Minnesota's persisted through the Founding Era\n4. Laws like Minnesota's continue to the present\n5. Petitioner's selective history is flawed\nB. Minnesota's Approach Comports With A Long Line Of This Court's Precedents\n1. This Court has long recognized that failure to comply with reasonable conditions on property ownership may result in forfeiture of the entire property\n2. The Civil War-era cases confirm that Minnesota's law is constitutional\n3. Petitioner's remaining arguments are wrong\nC. Federalism Principles Favor Upholding Minnesota's Law\nIII. TYLER FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE\nA. Minnesota's Law Is Remedial, Not Punitive\nB. History Does Not Support Treating Property Tax Forfeiture As Punitive\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. If Property Tax Forfeiture Constitutes Punishment, A Remand Is Required",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Election laws violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments only when they deny or abridge the right to vote as a result of purposeful discrimination\nB. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Section 2, which allows courts to enjoin even race-neutral state election laws if they result in a \"more than de minimis\" statistical disparity, is unconstitutional\nC. This Court should interpret Section 2 so that it goes no further than the limits of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by holding that it prohibits only those state election laws motivated by purposeful discrimination\nII. State Officials Need A Clear Rule To Avoid Confusion And Ensure The Efficient Administration Of Elections",
        "reference": "I. This Court Should Interpret Section 2 Consistently With The Limitations Of The Fourteenth And Fifteenth Amendments' Enforcement Clauses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONSENT EXPRESSED BY REGISTRATION TO DO BUSINESS AND APPOINTMENT OF AN AGENT TO RECEIVE SERVICE WAS AN ACCEPTED BASIS FOR JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN 1868 AND COMPORTS WITH THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.\nA. Procedures that Were Accepted Practice in State Courts When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted Satisfy Due Process.\nB. State Courts Based Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations on Statutory Registration To Do Business and Appointment of an Agent To Receive Service of Process When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Adopted.\nII. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO BE SUED IN A COURT WITH PERSONAL JURISDICTION IS A PERSONAL RIGHT THAT MAY BE EXPRESSLY WAIVED BY COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS.\nA. A Corporation's Act of Registering To Do Business and Appointing an Agent To Receive Service May Constitute Express Waiver of Its Due Process Right To Personal Jurisdiction If State Law So Provides.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. This Court has not rejected personal jurisdiction based on express consent.\n3. Consent statutes are consistent with this Court's \"at-home\" jurisprudence.\nB. Norfolk Southern's Compliance With Pennsylvania's Registration Requirement Constitutes a Voluntary, Knowing and Intelligent Waiver of the Due Process Right To Be Sued \"At Home.\"\nC. Norfolk Southern's Consent To General Jurisdiction Was Not Coerced by an \"Unconstitutional Condition.\"\nIII. CONSENT STATUTES SAFEGUARD IMPORTANT STATE INTERESTS, AND STATES ALREADY POSSESS NONCONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO DECLINE ADJUDICATION OF CASES IN WHICH THE STATE HAS NO LEGITIMATE INTEREST.\nA. Consent Statutes Advance Important State Interests.\nB. State Courts Possess Common-Law or Statutory Authority To Invoke Forum Non Conveniens To Decline To Exercise Jurisdiction over Cases in Which the Forum State Has Little Legitimate Interest.",
        "reference": "1. This Court has long upheld personal jurisdiction based on registration and express consent to general jurisdiction.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Application of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the offices of the President and Vice President both conforms with the intent of the drafters and is the obvious plain meaning of the section.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Any interpretation which fails to apply section 3 to the President and Vice President would not only lead to an 'absurd result,' but would be demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters.\n3. The drafters would have been aware the Electoral College could not act as an unassailable bulwark to prevent a constitutional crisis if Section 3 does not apply to the President and Vice President.\nII. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is self-executing and does not need supplemental legislation by Congress for states to apply it to someone who engaged in insurrection or revolt.\n1. The language of Section 3 states a factual condition, not a potential outcome based upon speculative enforcement.\n2. Congressional passage of legislation to remove the disability incurred by Section 3 would have been unnecessary if it was not self-executing.\nIII. Preclusion of a potential candidate from a ballot due to a constitutional disability is not a violation of the First Amendment, but rather serves to avoid misleading the public.",
        "reference": "1. The keystone of Section 3 is whether someone in a position of governmental power or authority took an oath to support the Constitution, and then broke that oath.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1184_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Richardson v. Perales Mandates That Vocational Experts Provide The Data Underlying Their Conclusions Upon An Applicant's Request\n1. Perales identifies various indicia of reliability that expert testimony must possess to constitute \"substantial evidence\" under section 405(g)\n2. Under Perales, the testimony of a vocational expert cannot constitute substantial evidence when an expert withholds the data upon which the testimony is based\n3. Requiring vocational experts to provide upon request the data underlying their testimony satisfies the indicia of reliability identified in Perales\nB. This Court's Rulings In Other Administrative Contexts Confirm That \"Substantial Evidence\" Requires Experts To Provide Upon Request The Data Underlying Their Testimony\nII. FINDING AN EXPERT'S TESTIMONY, ALONE, TO BE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IGNORES THE REQUIREMENT THAT TESTIMONY BE RELIABLE, AND CONFLATES THE CREDIBILITY OF AN EXPERT WITH THE RELIABILITY OF THE EXPERT'S EVIDENCE\nA. Requiring vocational experts to provide upon request the data underlying their conclusions does not import the Federal Rules of Evidence into social security hearings\nB. Expert testimony in administrative proceedings must be reliable, and this Court has recognized that reliability is best assured through cross-examination of the data and methodology resulting in the expert's",
        "reference": "I. A VOCATIONAL EXPERT'S TESTIMONY CANNOT CONSTITUTE \"SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE\" OF \"OTHER WORK\" UNDER 42 U.S.C. section 405(g) IF THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT REFUSES TO PROVIDE, UPON REQUEST, THE DATA UNDERLYING THAT TESTIMONY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Established a Unique \u2014but Unconstitutional \u2014Independent Agency When It Devised the Bureau\nII. The For-Cause Removal Provision Cannot Be Judicially Severed from Title X\nA. Congress drew from other U.S. financial regulators in structuring the Bureau\nB. Early proposals favored independent, bipartisan, multi-member leadership\nC. The enacted leadership structure for the Bureau is a mishmash\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Congress would have preferred a bipartisan, multi-member commission over a CFPB director who serves at the will of the President\nIII. The Court Should Vacate the Lower Court's Decision but Stay Its Mandate to Allow the Political Branches to Reconstitute the Bureau",
        "reference": "D. Congress would not have passed Title X with a Director removable at will by the President",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Austin Ignores Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions Between On- and Off-Premises Signs That Would Not Require Discrimination",
        "reference": "I. Austin Ignores That Its Code Mandates Content and Viewpoint Discrimination Against Messages Advocating for Businesses Located Outside of Austin or A Particular Property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-8369_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court's Opinion Should Not Imply that a Dismissal Partly for Lack of Jurisdiction and Partly for Failing to State a Claim Is a Strike\nII. The Court Should Reserve the Question Whether a Heck Dismissal Is a Strike\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Where an Inartful or Incomplete Complaint by a Pro Se Litigant Fails To State a Claim, District Courts Should Dismiss the Complaint \u2014 Not the Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REJECTED SHAMMAS AND INSTEAD APPLIED THE AMERICAN RULE\n2. [MISSING]\n3. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD THAT \"EXPENSES OF THE PROCEEDING\" IS AMBIGUOUS\n4. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOES NOT SHOW THAT CONGRESS EXPLICITLY AND CLEARLY INTENDED \"EXPENSES\" TO INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES IN EITHER THE PATENT OR LANHAM ACT\n5. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT JUSTIFIED THE USPTO'S NEW INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 OR SECTION 21(b)(3)",
        "reference": "2. BECAUSE CONGRESS EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE PATENT AND LANHAM ACTS, THIS COURT SHOULD PRESUME THAT CONGRESS ACTED INTENTIONALLY AND PURPOSELY IN OMITTING SUCH A PROVISION FROM SECTION 145",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit and Other Courts of Appeals Are Misapplying Thunder Basin's \"Meaningful Judicial Review\" Prong.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Ninth Circuit and Other Courts of Appeals Should be Reminded that Whether Plaintiffs Would Suffer Independent and Irremediable Harm from the Delays Associated with Proceeding Through the Administrative Scheme is an Indispensable Factor in Channeling Analysis.",
        "reference": "II. Courts of Appeals Disagree on How Much Weight to Give Thunder Basin's \"Wholly Collateral\" Prong. The Ninth Circuit and Other Courts of Appeals Effectively Ignore It.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1471_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Excluding [MISSING]\nA. Requiring national corporations to litigate, or settle, high-stakes interstate class actions in state courts is incompatible with civil justice\nB. Court of Appeals decisions narrowly construing section 1453(b) fail to take into account CAFA's objective of removing interstate class actions from the throes of state-court abuses\nC. Holding that CAFA's expanded right to remove encompasses third-party class-action defendants will deter proliferation or reinstatement of state-court class-action abuses",
        "reference": "Excluding third-party class-action defendants from CAFA's expanded right to remove would perpetuate, or reinstate, state-court class-action abuses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Garcetti must not be expanded, especially now when Americans are more stridently policing each other's speech.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The government speech doctrine has an obvious limit: Garcetti, and no further.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Discrimination against persons because of their minority sexual orientation or transgender status occurs because of sex and violates Title VII\nA. Sexual orientation and transgender status discrimination only occur \"because of\" the individual's \"sex\"\nB. Sexual orientation and transgender status discrimination necessarily rest on sex stereotypes\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Sexual orientation and transgender status discrimination impose a considerable detrimental impact on individuals and society as a whole",
        "reference": "C. Sexual orientation discrimination constitutes impermissible associational discrimination",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-542_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's Claims are Moot\nII. The Court Should Not Grant Review of Petitioner's Constitutional Claims\nA. Petitioner Lacks Article III Standing to Advance Their Constitutional Claims\nB. This Case is a Poor Vehicle to Address the Federal Constitutional Claims\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. The Court Should Not Grant Review of Petitioner's Federal Statutory Claims",
        "reference": "C. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Ruling was Entirely Consistent with the Elections and Electors Clauses' History, Structure, and Text, As Well As This Court's Decisions Concerning Those Clauses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-935_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. An \"Actual Agreement\" Between The Parents Is Not Required To Establish An Infant's Habitual Residence\nA. The Habitual Residence Test Requires A Flexible Factual Inquiry To Determine Where The Child Usually Or Customarily Lives\n1. The Convention's text, drafting history, and context\n2. Interpretations by other signatory nations\nB. There Is No Justification for Petitioner's \"Actual Agreement\" Requirement\n1. Parental intent is one factor in the habitual residence inquiry \u2014 but a court also must consider other facts relevant in determining where the child usually lives\n2. An \"actual agreement\" between the parents is not necessary to establish the parents' intent regarding a child's habitual residence\n3. The habitual residence test requires only that the nation in question was the child's usual residence, not that the child will remain there for the indefinite future\nII. Habitual Residence Determinations Are Subject To Clear Error Review\nA. The U.S. Bank Standard Requires Deferential Review\nB. Clear Error Review Furthers The Convention's Goals\nC. Petitioner's Arguments Provide No Grounds For Ignoring the U.S. Bank Standard\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This Court Should Affirm The Court Of Appeals' Judgment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. A GENERIC TERM ADDED TO A GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN (TLD) SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED GENERIC PER SE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Courts of Appeals Have Not Applied a Per Se Rule to Marks Having a Generic Term Added to a Generic TLD\nC. Goodyear's Did Not Create a Per Se Rule Against Trademarking a Generic Term Added to a Generic TLD\nD. Domain Names Can Represent Source Identifying Locations on the Internet\nE. A TLD Indicator Added to a Generic Term Does Not Make the Composite Term Per Se Functional\nII. GRANTING TRADEMARK PROTECTION TO A GENERIC TERM ADDED TO A GENERIC TLD WILL NOT NECESSARILY RESULT IN OVERLY BROAD MARKS",
        "reference": "A. A Generic Term Added to a Generic TLD Should Be Analyzed for Secondary Meaning or Inherent Distinctiveness",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. RAMOS DID NOT ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE\nA. Long-settled precedent logically dictated the result in Ramos\nB. Apodaca does not make Ramos a new rule for retroactivity purposes\nII. IF RAMOS ANNOUNCED A NEW RULE, IT IS A UNIQUE WATERSHED RULE\nA. Ramos announced a watershed rule implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings\nB. Ramos is uniquely deserving of watershed status\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF RAMOS WILL NOT RESULT IN UPHEAVAL\nA. Ramos applies retroactively to a relatively small number of cases, and fewer still will require retrials\nB. The racist origins of non-unanimous jury rules vitiate Louisiana and Oregon's finality interests",
        "reference": "C. This Court's pre-Teague decisions are no obstacle to holding that Ramos is a watershed rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS, THROUGH THE RATIFICATION OF THE ICCPR AND THE ICERD, HAS GUARANTEED THE RIGHT TO VOTE FREE FROM PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND DISCRIMINATION, AS WELL AS AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY TO VINDICATE THAT RIGHT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Right To Vote Free From Discrimination\nC. The Right To An Effective Remedy When Voting Rights Are Violated\nII. ADOPTION OF THE ISLT WOULD DEPRIVE VOTERS OF ANY EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR PROHIBITED GERRYMANDERING IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE WILL OF CONGRESS AND THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE LEGISLATURE\nIII. ADOPTION OF THE ISLT WOULD CONTRAVENE THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES THAT ANIMATED CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF THE ICCPR\nIV. ADOPTION OF THE ISLT WOULD UNDERMINE PROTECTIONS AGAINST PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING THAT ARE A BULWARK AGAINST OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS\nA. In Sri Lanka, District Gerrymandering Has Led To The Disenfranchisement Of Religious Minorities\nB. Iran's Political System Demonstrates That Without Effective Voting Remedies, Citizens Cannot Exercise Fundamental Rights",
        "reference": "A. The Right To Vote Free From Partisan Gerrymandering",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT, AS BIELSKI EFFECTIVELY CONCEDES\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS WRONG\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE QUESTION PRESENTED HAS IMPORTANT REAL-WORLD CONSEQUENCES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE RULE-MAKING PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE IMMUNE FROM REVIEW BY THE MERE PRESENCE OF A POTENTIAL ASSESSABLE PENALTY\na. Brief Historical Context of the AIA and APA\nb. The AIA Does Not Bar a Challenge to Rule-Making that Merely Restrains the Collection of Information\nIII. ACTUAL EFFECTS ON LOW-INCOME TAXPAYERS\na. An Example\nb. The Example Above is Unfortunately Not a Fanciful Hypothetical\nc. The Administrative Regime Does Not Provide an Adequate Solution\nd. Social Programs Should Receive Similar APA Protections, Regardless of Whether They are Administered through the IRC",
        "reference": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TRUE THREAT EXCEPTION TO FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF SPEECH MUST BE BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, REQUIRING EVIDENCE OF BOTH OBJECTIVE HARM AND SPECIFIC INTENT\nA. This Court's Prior Decisions Require Evidence of Both Objective Harm and Specific Intent to Establish a True Threat\nB. To Be \"Extremely Limited\" and \"Narrowly Circumscribed\" as the First Amendment Commands, the True Threat Exception Requires a Finding of Specific Intent\nC. The So-Called Objective Test, Focusing Solely on the Effect of the Challenged Speech on the Listener, Is Only Appropriate for Establishing the Conduct Element of the True Threat Exception\nD. A Comprehensive Analysis of the Context in Which Speech Is Offered Is Required to Determine If Both the Conduct and the Speaker's Intent Elements of the True Threat Exception Are Satisfied\nII. THE NATURE OF THE MODERN WORLD'S COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA, COMBINED WITH THE UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILDREN, UNDERSCORES THE NEED FOR A TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST\nA. Online Speech, One of the Most Common Methods of Expression in Today's World, by Its Nature Creates Serious Risks of Misunderstanding the Speaker's Words and Intent\nB. The Relevant Contextual Aspects of Speech That Must Be Considered Will Vary Widely in Online Communication, Especially That of Children\nC. Failure to Require a Finding of Specific Intent to Satisfy the True Threat Exception Especially Burdens Speech Where the Challenged Speech Is Child-Generated and Delivered Via Social Media\n1. Children Throughout the Country Are Subject to Both State and Federal Prosecution as Adults for Threat-Based Offenses\n2. [MISSING]\n3. An Objective Test Reduces the Requisite Mental State for Criminality to Mere Negligence, a Standard That When Applied to Children Will All Too Frequently Result in Loss of Their First Amendment Right of Free Speech\n4. Only Upon a Showing of Subjective Intent to Transmit a Threat, Considering the Totality of the Circumstances, Should Children Forfeit First Amendment Protection\n5. Application of the Specific Intent Test Standing Alone Can Result in Unfair Punishment for Kids Simply Being Kids",
        "reference": "2. Children's Cognitive Immaturity and Speaking Style Should Be Considered in Establishing the Appropriate Mens Rea Requirement of the True Threat Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.07
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Individual Shareholders Generally Have No Right to \"Opt Out\" or Otherwise Control the Use of Capital They Invest in a Corporation\nII. Most Individual Shareholders Cannot Indirectly Influence the Use of Their Invested Capital for Political Expression\nA. Shareholders do not typically have the right to compel a corporation to repurchase or find a buyer for their shares\nB. Shares of most corporations are not traded on public markets, and finding buyers for such shares is difficult or impossible\nC. Stock sales cannot generally be used to prevent, deter, or influence the political activities of publicly traded companies\nD. Shareholder voting rights are not generally useful for directing or influencing specific corporate actions\nIII. Many Individuals Are Effectively Compelled to Maintain Investments in Companies Whose Political Expenditures They Do Not Know and Cannot Control\nA. Most beneficial owners of public corporations are individuals who own through institutions such as mutual funds and pension funds\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Individual investors have little prudent choice other than investing through institutions to achieve diversification\nD. Institutional intermediaries are not generally required to track or disclose to their beneficiaries the political activities of the companies in which they invest\nE. Most individual investors are in practice compelled to maintain investments in companies that can engage in political expenditures with which the investors disagree",
        "reference": "B. Individuals who own stock through intermediaries do not have the right to direct the sale or votes of their shares",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-432_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNDER RULE 23, CLASS MEMBERS ARE ENTITLED TO BRING THEIR TIMELY INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS AS A CLASS ACTION\nA. As Petitioner Concedes, Each Class Member Had A Timely Individual Claim Under American Pipe And Crown, Cork\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Rules Enabling Act Mandates That Timely Individual Claims Cannot Be Deemed Untimely Because They Are Asserted As A Class Action\nII. UNDER THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, TOLLING APPLIES FOR ALL PUTATIVE CLASS MEMBERS\nA. Class Tolling Is A Doctrine, Rooted In This Court's Equitable Powers, To Facilitate The Judicial Economy Of Rule 23 Class Actions\nB. This Court Repeatedly Has Held That A Timely Class Action Suspends The Statute Of Limitations For All Asserted Members Of The Class\nC. The Rationales Justifying Class Tolling Apply Fully To Subsequent Class Actions\nIII. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS FOR LIMITING CLASS TOLLING ARE UNPERSUASIVE\nA. Petitioner Fails To Justify A Judge-Made Equitable Limitation On Class Tolling\nB. Petitioner's Policy Arguments Are Overstated And Best Addressed Through Other Means\nIV. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED LIMITATION ON CLASS TOLLING WOULD CAUSE INEQUITABLE OUTCOMES",
        "reference": "B. Because These Class Members Have Timely Individual Claims, They May Maintain Them As A Class Action If They Satisfy The Requirements Of Rule 23",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1599_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PAST IS PROLOGUE: THE IRS' LONG HISTORY OF ENFORCEMENT ABUSE\nII. PROTECTING THIRD PARTIES IS ESSENTIAL WHEN THE IRS WILL GET $45.6 BILLION FOR ENFORCEMENT.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT \"IN AID OF\" IS NARROWLY APPLIED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "A. A \"trail\" is distinct from the land that it traverses\nB. Multiple Trails Act provisions confirm that a \"trail\" is distinct from the \"land\" it traverses\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The broader legal and practical context confirms that respondents' position is incorrect",
        "reference": "C. The 1970 amendment to the definition of \"National Park System\" did not convert the Trail into Park System lands",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT BOTH PETITIONS",
        "reference": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION WARRANTS REVIEW AND A THIRD QUESTION SHOULD BE ADDED ON AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. There Is No Clean Circuit Split on the Question Presented\nA. HHS's Position Before This Court Is Not the One It Advanced Before the Ninth, D.C., and Sixth Circuits\nB. Even if Review Could Be Warranted at Some Point, It Isn't Warranted Now\nIII. Additional Reasons Warrant Denial of HHS's Petition\nIV. HHS's Concerns About the Administration of Medicare Are Unfounded",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Is Correct Because HHS's Interpretation Conflicts With the Plain Language of the Statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Respondents Have Article III Standing to Assert Their Claims\nIII. The Mandate Is Inseverable from the Rest of the Affordable Care Act",
        "reference": "I. The Individual Mandate Is an Unconstitutional Exercise of Federal Power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. American military service members who are attacked while bravely facing the grave danger posed by state-sponsored terrorism deserve to hold nations like Sudan accountable in U.S. courts\nII. Congress unquestionably intended the FSIA to make terror sponsoring nations like Sudan accountable in U.S. courts to American victims\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Having failed to convince courts that the FSIA's terrorism exception violates U.S. and international law, Sudan now asks this Court to gut the exception by misreading the statute's procedural rules",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 145 PROCEEDINGS PROVIDE A CRUCIAL CHECK ON THE PTO, TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL INVENTORS\nA. Section 145 Civil Actions differ in purpose and effect from Section 141 appellate review\nB. Affirmance will preserve a palpable and needed benefit for all patent applicants\n1. Voluntary Dismissals\n2. Joint stipulated and settlement remands\nC. Small Entities Resort to Section 145 Proceedings Disproportionately and Will Suffer Much Prejudice Should this Court Reverse\nII. THE PTO'S POSITION HERE IS BUT THE LATEST OF DECADES OF ATTEMPTS TO END OR CURTAIL SECTION 145 PROCEEDINGS\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THE PTO'S COST ARGUMENT IS CONTRADICTED BY DATA ON SECTION 145 PROCEEDINGS",
        "reference": "III. THE PTO'S TIMING FOR SHIFTING FEES IN SECTION 145 PROCEEDINGS MAKES NO SENSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 2333(d)(2) Imposes Aiding-And-Abetting Liability Only If A Defendant Aided And Abetted The Act Of International Terrorism That Injured The Plaintiff\nII. Plaintiffs Failed To Allege That Defendants \"Knowingly Provided Substantial Assistance\" As section 2333(d) Requires\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Ninth Circuit's Stark Departures From Traditional Aiding-And-Abetting Principles Produce Untenable Consequences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federalism Interests Inform and Limit the Scope of Specific Jurisdiction\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Requiring a Causal Connection for Specific Jurisdiction Promotes Predictability and Discourages Forum Shopping",
        "reference": "II. This Court's Precedents Require a Causal Connection Between the Defendant's Forum Contacts and the Plaintiff's Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-846_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Arizona Supreme Court's holding that Lynch is not a significant change in the law under Arizona's post-conviction procedural rules is an independent and adequate state-law ground to support the judgment\nA. The Arizona Supreme Court's conclusion that Lynch was not a \"significant change in the law\" under Rule 32.1(g) is independent of federal law\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The decision below did not depend on any antecedent ruling on Cruz's federal claim and is therefore independent of federal law\nB. The Arizona Supreme Court's holding that Lynch is not a significant change in the law also is adequate under this Court's jurisprudence\n1. Rule 32.1(g) is firmly established and regularly followed by the Arizona courts\n2. Rule 32.1(g) does not treat state court decisions more favorably than decisions of this Court\n3. Rule 32.1(g) does not deprive defendants of the ability to vindicate federal constitutional rights\n4. Rule 32.1(g) is a neutral procedural rule\nII. Cruz's reliance on federal retroactivity principles is misplaced because the state court did not reach \u2014and was not required to reach \u2014that issue\nA. Rule 32.1(g) requires a retroactivity analysis only if a claim is first determined to be based on a significant change in the law\nB. Arizona is not required to permit Cruz to present his claim of a Simmons violation in a successive collateral proceeding",
        "reference": "1. State procedural rules that do not depend on resolving the merits of a federal claim are independent of federal law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "Enforcement of a security interest through a nonjudicial foreclosure generally is not debt collection under the FDCPA\nA. Enforcement of a security interest, without more, generally is not debt collection under the FDCPA\nB. Initiating a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding constitutes enforcement of a security interest and so generally is not debt collection under the FDCPA\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CITY OF BOSTON, BY WRITTEN POLICY AND LONG STANDING PRACTICE, INTENTIONALLY CREATED A DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM FOR PRIVATE SPEECH ON ONE OF ITS CITY HALL FLAG POLES OPEN TO ALL COMERS TO TEMPORARILY RAISE THEIR FLAGS\nA. Camp Constitution's Challenge of the City's Policy Excluding Camp Constitution's Flag Requires the Court to Determine Whether the City Intended to Designate the City Hall Flag Poles a Public Forum\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Boston's Most Recent 2018 Flag Raising Policy Upholds Its Prior Policies and Practices Intentionally Designating the City Hall Flag Poles One of \"the City of Boston's public forums\" Open to \"all applicants\" for Private Flag Raisings\nII. THE CITY'S CENSORSHIP OF CAMP CONSTITUTION'S PRIVATE RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THE CITY'S DESIGNATED PUBLIC FORUM VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT\nA. The City Unconstitutionally Discriminated Against Camp Constitution's Christian Viewpoint Because of the Word \"Christian\" in the Application\nB. The City's Content-Based Restriction on Camp Constitution's Private Speech Is Subject To, and Fails, Strict Scrutiny\nC. The City bears the burden of satisfying strict scrutiny\nD. The City's Establishment Clause justification is not a compelling interest in a public forum open to all applicants\nE. The City's censorship of Camp Constitution's religious speech is not the least restrictive means of serving any legitimate government interest\nF. Even if the City Hall Flag Poles Are a Limited Public Forum, the City's Exclusion of Camp Constitution Was Unconstitutional Because neither Viewpoint Neutral nor Reasonable\nG. The City's Flag Raising Policy Vesting the Commissioner with Unbridled Discretion to Approve or Deny Private Flag Raisings Is an Unconstitutional Prior Restraint\nIII. THE CITY'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH DEFENSES ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nA. The Establishment Clause Cannot Justify Boston's Censorship of Private Religious Speech in a Public Forum\nB. Acceptance of Boston's Contrived Government Speech Defense Would Unconstitutionally Expand the Government Speech Doctrine\nC. The written policies and unbroken, twelve-year history prior to Camp Constitution's application in 2017, and continuing policy and practice after 2017, evidence conclusively that the private flags were private speech, and readily distinguishable from the government speech found in Summum and Walker\nD. The foreign government flags raised by private groups cannot be government speech because it is a criminal offense for a local government to raise a foreign nation's flag\nE. The First Circuit Did Considerable Damage to the Forum Doctrine and Wiped Away Protections for Private Speech by Inventing a Test That Distorts the Government Speech Doctrine in Violation of This Court's Precedents",
        "reference": "B. By Written Policies and Longstanding Practices Over Twelve Years, Boston Intentionally Designated One of Its City Hall Flag Poles a Public Forum for Private Individuals and Groups to Temporarily Raise Their Own Flags for Their Own Events and Allowed 284 Private Flag Raisings With No Denials",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. General personal jurisdiction based on physical presence is consistent with traditional notions of fairness\nII. Corporations should not be exempted from the longstanding principle that it is fair to sue a defendant where it is found.\nA. Recent decisions threaten to create an inconsistent due-process standard for corporations and individuals.\nB. Retreating from the recognition of general jurisdiction over corporations based on presence creates an incongruous distinction between due-process rights of natural and artificial persons.\nC. A restrictive rule of general jurisdiction over corporations favors large corporations over smaller ones.\nD. Narrow corporate jurisdictional rules harm the states.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Norfolk Southern's presence in Pennsylvania permits general jurisdiction there.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the Supreme Court's Two-Step Test in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 35 U.S.C. section 271(f) Applies Extraterritorially\nII. The Federal Circuit's Bright-Line Rule Restricts Patent Owners from Recovering Damages When There is No Other Law to Apply\nIII. The Federal Circuit's Total Prohibition against Recovering Foreign Damages is in Tension with Other Intellectual Property Statutes\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Federal Circuit's Decision is Contrary to an Application of Damages under a Proximate Cause Analysis in Tort Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Applies to All \"Commerce\" Without Geographic Limitation\nA. Congress' Definition of Commerce\nB. All \"Use in Commerce\" Is Covered by the Lanham Act\nC. There Is No Minimum Amount in Controversy Requirement When the Conduct Is a \"Use in Commerce\"\nD. If Acts Are Covered Only When They Cause an Effect on Commerce, Then Any Material Effect Is Sufficient\nE. Once the Lanham Act Applies to an Infringement Scheme, It Applies to the Entire Scheme\nF. Congress Has Long Sought to Protect American Exports\nG. [MISSING]\nII. Three Principles Prevent Lanham Act Overreach\nA. Specific Personal Jurisdiction Limits Extraterritorial Jurisdiction\nB. Comity Will Prevent Interference with the Reasonable Interests of Other Countries\nC. Enforcement of Judgment in Foreign Country\nIII. Damages Should Be Awarded under the Lanham Act If the Foreign Acts Are \"in Commerce\" or \"Effect Commerce\"\nA. Counterfeiting in Today's World Ignores Borders\nB. Scenarios Illustrating the Many Ways \"Commerce\" Can Be Involved\nC. Effect on USA Commerce\nIV. Suing a Worldwide Infringer in Each Country Is Not Practical\nV. Impact on Other Lanham Act Remedies\nA. Injunctive Relief May Be Broader than Damages\nB. Effect of the Court's Ruling on Statutory Damages",
        "reference": "G. Effectuation of the Purpose of the Lanham Act Requires Extraterritorial Jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.45
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief043.pdf",
        "text": "I. BAKKE, GRUTTER, AND FISHER SHOULD STAND\nA. Bakke, Grutter, And Fisher Are Correct\n1. Text And History Refute SFFA's View\n2. Bakke And Grutter Correctly Held Diversity Is A Compelling Interest\n3. [MISSING]\nB. Bakke, Grutter, And Fisher Are Workable And Have Had Positive Impact\nC. Substantial Reliance Interests Are At Stake\nII. HARVARD'S ADMISSIONS PROGRAM COMPLIES WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nA. Harvard Does Not Discriminate Against Asian-American Applicants\nB. Harvard Considers Race Only As This Court's Precedents Permit\n1. Harvard Does Not Engage In Racial Balancing\n2. Harvard Considers Race Flexibly As One Factor Among Many\n3. Harvard Currently Has No Workable Race-Neutral Alternative",
        "reference": "3. Bakke, Grutter, And Fisher Correctly Applied Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Accommodations Clause regulates discriminatory sales practices, not speech.\nA. The Accommodations Clause regulates conduct, not speech.\nB. The Accommodations Clause does not address what a business chooses to sell \u2014 only who can buy what it sells.\nC. The Accommodations Clause does not compel any business's speech in violation of the First Amendment.\nD. The Act does not regulate expressive conduct.\nE. This case is not ripe if its resolution depends on the nature of the products or services offered by the Company.\nII. At most, intermediate scrutiny applies because any burden on expression is incidental to the Accommodations Clause's regulation of conduct.\nIII. The Company's proposed exemption from public accommodations laws is unworkable.\nA. The Company's proposed exemption misstates this Court's holdings.\nB. The Company fails to show how exemptions for \"artists,\" \"custom products,\" or where a \"speaker's own message was affected\" are workable.\nC. The Company's exemption has no limiting principle.\nD. Other tests offered by amici suffer from similar defects or misstate the law.\nIV. The Accommodations Clause satisfies any level of scrutiny.\nA. Colorado has a compelling interest in ensuring equal access to publicly available goods and services.\n1. The State's interest in equal access is rooted in history and tradition.\n2. This Court's decisions confirm that Colorado's interests are compelling.\nB. The Accommodations Clause effectively furthers Colorado's compelling interest.\nC. [MISSING]\nV. The Communications Clause does not violate the First Amendment because it prohibits only speech facilitating illegal conduct.",
        "reference": "C. No alternative means would ensure equal access to publicly available goods and services.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-315_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "USCIS [MISSING]\nA. The court of appeals correctly determined that USCIS's decision was in accordance with law\n1. USCIS's decision was consistent with the statutory text\n2. Other closely related statutory provisions support USCIS's decision\n3. The TPS program's history and purpose support USCIS's decision\nB. Petitioners have not shown that USCIS's statutory construction was contrary to law\nC. Petitioners' argument by syllogism is flawed in several respects\n1. Petitioners' argument disregards the statutory definition of \"admitted\"\n2. Petitioners' syllogism relies on faulty premises\n3. Petitioners' argument favors a chain of inferences when Congress could have used clear alternatives\nD. The government's statutory construction is reasonable and entitled to deference\n1. The Executive Branch has consistently interpreted the statute with the force of law\n2. Petitioners have failed to show that the government's position is not entitled to deference",
        "reference": "USCIS lawfully determined that recipients of temporary protected status who entered the United States without inspection and admission or parole are not eligible to adjust to lawful permanent resident status",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Flags Boston Flies On Its City Hall Flagpoles Are Government Speech\nA. Background\nB. The Government Speech Doctrine\nC. Flying a Flag on Boston's City Hall Flagpoles Is Quintessential Government Speech\n1. Flags Are a Traditional and Powerful Way to Convey Government Messages\n2. The Public Understands That a Flag Flying on a Government-Owned Flagpole at the Seat of Government Sends a Government Message\n3. Consistent with the Traditional Practice of Governments, Boston Has Been Selective in Choosing What Flags to Fly at the Seat of Government\n4. Limited Duration Government Speech Is Still Government Speech\n5. [MISSING]\nII. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF A RULING THAT BOSTON'S CITY HALL FLAGPOLE IS A PUBLIC FORUM\nA. Private Speakers Would Be Drawn to the City Hall Flagpoles Because of the Likelihood that Their Message Would Be Mistaken for a Government-Endorsed Message\nB. Some Private Speakers Would Be Drawn to the Powerful Propaganda Value of Expressing a Provocative Message from the City Hall Flagpoles",
        "reference": "5. Boston Owns its Flagpoles, and Ownership of the Substitute Flag Does Not Alter the Analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-9526_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON RESERVATION BOUNDARIES FULLY APPLIES TO THE STATUS OF THE CREEK RESERVATION\nA. Federal Treaties Solemnly Guaranty the Creek Reservation Boundaries\nB. Creek Treaties Provided Fee Simple Ownership to Afford Stronger Protection for Creek Land\nC. This Court Created the Disestablishment Test to Interpret Statutes Like These\nD. Statehood and Federal Authority Over Tribal Governments Do Not Undermine Reservation Status\nII. [MISSING]\nA. With Intergovernmental Cooperation, Predominantly Non-Indian Cities and Towns Thrive Within Reservations\nB. Affirmance Can Improve Law Enforcement on the Creek Reservation",
        "reference": "II. RESERVATION STATUS WILL NOT BE DISRUPTIVE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5726_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Short History of Post-Judgment Relief\nA. The Common Law Regime\nB. The Origin of Rule 60(b)\nC. The 1946 Amendment\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Post-Adoption Interpretation",
        "reference": "D. The Structure of the Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief058.pdf",
        "text": "I. Black Women Have Been Denied Bodily Autonomy And Reproductive Freedom\nA. Forced Reproduction in Bondage\nB. Sexual Violence in Reconstruction\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Reproductive Freedom\nII. Mississippi's Abortion Ban Will Disproportionately Harm Black Women And Women Experiencing Poverty\nA. Mississippi's Abortion Ban Robs Black Women of Reproductive Choice to Avoid Increased Pregnancy-Related Health Risks Due to Lack of Adequate Healthcare\nB. Mississippi Refuses to Provide the Resources Necessary to Protect the Health of Black Women\nC. Mississippi's Refusal to Include an Exception for Rape Victims Is Indefensible and Contrary to the Ban's Purported Purpose of Protecting Women",
        "reference": "C. Compulsory Sterilization",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Adding A Categorical Willfulness Requirement Is Antithetical to The Statute's Mandate that Principles of Equity are to Govern\nB. The Willfulness Requirement Unnecessarily Harms the Important Goals of the Trademark Laws\nC. Imposing a Willfulness Requirement Is Inconsistent with The Statutory Scheme",
        "reference": "I. PROOF OF WILLFULNESS SHOULD NOT BE A PREREQUISITE TO AN ACCOUNTING OF PROFITS UNDER SECTION 35(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Harvard Uses a Rigid Set of Racial Categories to Decide Which Students to Recruit, Admit, and Reject\nII. Harvard's Racial Categories are Arbitrary and Irrational\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. An Admissions System that Relies on Self-Identification is Inherently Flawed and Unreliable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Strict Scrutiny Should Apply to the Exclusion of Puerto Rico Residents from SSI\nA. Puerto Rico Residents Are Politically Powerless and Have Suffered a History of Discrimination Based on Race and Ancestry\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Under Any Standard of Review, This Exclusion Fails\nIII. Califano and Harris Should Be Overruled",
        "reference": "B. Puerto Rico's \"Unique\" Status Does Not Preclude, but Rather Compels, Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Tenth Circuit admits CADA is a content-based, viewpoint-based regulation of protected expression.\nB. The action required to create expression is entitled to First Amendment protection.\nC. Like other speakers, creative professionals have the right to remain silent.\nII. PETITIONER'S OPERATION OF HER WEBSITE DESIGN BUSINESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH HER PERSONAL BELIEFS AND CONSCIENCE IS NOT IRRATIONAL, INVIDIOUS, OR ARBITRARY\nA. Early anti-discrimination laws were carefully crafted with narrow definitions of protected categories and the places regulated.\nB. Action motivated by conscience or religious faith is not arbitrary, irrational, or unreasonable.\nC. The state must guard the rights of all citizens, including those who do not share the values of current legislative majorities.\nIII. THE GOVERNMENT HAS A COMPELLING INTEREST IN SAFEGUARDING THE RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION.\nIV. CADA WEAPONIZES PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAW TO PUNISH EXPRESSION OF TRADITIONAL VIEWS ABOUT MARRIAGE.\nV. CADA CRUSHES DISSENT, CREATING INTOLERANCE, UNIFORMITY, EXCLUSION, AND INEQUALITY.",
        "reference": "I. THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS THE PERSONAL SERVICES REQUIRED TO CREATE PROTECTED EXPRESSION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENTS ARE SUBJECT TO A DUTY OF PRUDENCE DERIVED FROM TRUST LAW\nA. ERISA's Text Applies The Same Duty Of Prudence, Derived From Trust Law, To All Fiduciaries\nB. This Court's Precedents Establish The Applicability Of Trust-Law Principles\nC. Respondents' Proposed Atextual Revision Of ERISA Produces Counter-Textual Results\nII. PETITIONERS PLEADED VALID ERISA CLAIMS\nA. Respondents Misstate The Applicable Pleading Standard\nB. Petitioners Plausibly Alleged That Respondents Imprudently Failed To Control Recordkeeping Fees\nC. Petitioners Stated A Valid Claim Based On Imprudent Selection Of Retail-Class Funds\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Court Need Not Disregard Information That Refutes Respondents' Arguments\nIII. RESPONDENTS' POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE MISGUIDED",
        "reference": "D. Petitioners Stated A Valid Claim Based On Respondents' Imprudent Retention Of Hundreds Of Duplicate Options",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. Text, History, and Tradition Establish That the Restrictions Placed on Petitioners' Concealed-Carry Licenses Comport with the Second Amendment.\nA. The text of the Second Amendment does not enshrine an unqualified right to carry concealed firearms in virtually any public place.\nB. History and tradition confirm that governments may restrict the carrying of concealed firearms in public places.\nC. Petitioners' concealed-carry licenses are consistent with the historical scope of the right to bear arms.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of review.\nB. Intermediate scrutiny is satisfied here.",
        "reference": "II. The Challenged New York Licensing Law Also Satisfies Means-Ends Scrutiny.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1269_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A FEDERAL-LAW PRESUMPTION CONCERNING OWNERSHIP OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REFUNDS\nA. The FDIC Misapprehends The Basic Question In Dispute\nB. The Bob Richards Rule Is Unlawful\nC. [MISSING]\nII. UNDER COLORADO LAW, UWBI IS THE OWNER OF THE TAX REFUND",
        "reference": "C. The FDIC's New Rule Is Both Non-Responsive To The Question Presented And Meritless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Health Coverage Consistently Improves Healthcare Outcomes, as Illustrated by Evidence Related to Respiratory Diseases\nA. Asthma\nB. Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease\nC. Sleep Disorders\nD. Lung Cancer\nIII. The ACA Provides Health Coverage to Millions of Americans and Contributes to Improved Economic Health",
        "reference": "I. The COVID-19 Pandemic Would Be Much Worse Without the ACA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1566_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. In Theory and in Practice, the Federal Common Law's and the Forum's Choice-of-Law Tests Lead to the Same Result\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Holding Is Correct\nIV. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle to Decide the Question Presented",
        "reference": "I. The Scope of the Split Is Shallow",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT WILL BE DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF COLLEGE STUDENTS AS WELL AS K-12 STUDENTS\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. ATHLETES NEED ASSURANCE THEY CAN ENGAGE IN SAFETY-MOTIVATED WHISTLEBLOWING WITHOUT FEAR OF RETRIBUTION\nIV. THE RULE SET BY THE COURT WILL AFFECT NOT JUST SOCIAL MEDIA SPEECH, BUT ALL OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH, INCLUDING LAWSUITS AND TESTIMONY\nV. BEING DEPRIVED OF PARTICIPATION IN SPORTS OR OTHER EXTRA-CURRICULAR ACTIVITIES IS A LIFE-CHANGING LOSS, THE RISK OF WHICH WILL INHIBIT SPEECH\nVI. CONDITIONING ELIGIBILITY FOR SPORTS ON WAIVING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WOULD VIOLATE THE \"UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS\" DOCTRINE",
        "reference": "II. ATHLETES HAVE OFTEN USED THEIR VOICES IN THE VANGUARD OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Assembly Clause Complements The Ministerial Exception And Further Supports Reversal In These Cases\nA. The Assembly Clause was originally understood to protect the rights of religious groups\n1. Early Congressional debates show that the Assembly Clause was meant to protect groups' rights to form and to meet without government interference\n2. Throughout the Nineteenth Century, state court decisions relied on assembly rights to protect the rights of religious organizations to meet and to determine their own membership\nB. Modern First Amendment doctrine focuses on a right of \"expressive association\" that is narrower than the right of assembly\n1. The Court's Assembly Clause jurisprudence was robust and distinct during the 1930s and 1940s\n2. The modern right of association is partially anchored in the Assembly Clause\n3. The Court's decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees formed a conceptual framework for the right of association distinct from the assembly right\nC. The Court should expressly recognize the Assembly Clause roots of the right of association in assessing the scope of the ministerial exception here\nD. The Assembly Clause also prevents the state from interfering in Petitioners' decisions regarding whom they empower to carry out their religious missions\nII. Hosanna-Tabor And Other Supreme Court Decisions Establish That The Assembly Clause, Along With The Religion Clauses, Provides Support For A Robust Ministerial Exception\nIII. Recognizing The Role Of The Assembly Clause Would Help Ensure Adequate Protection For The Rights Of Religious Groups\nA. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez illustrates the risks of assessing religious groups' right of association claims without regard to the Assembly Clause\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Lower court decisions upholding prohibitions on worship in public spaces illustrate the risks of assessing religious groups' First Amendment claims without regard to the Assembly Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should resolve this case without deciding the constitutionality of the CFPB Director's removal protection\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A flaw in the removal protection would not affect the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act\nII. The CFPB Director's removal protection is constitutional\nA. This Court has long held that Congress has authority to create independent agencies\nB. The CFPB fits comfortably within the Nation's long tradition of independent regulatory agencies\n1. The CFPB has the same functions, powers, and removal protection as other independent agencies\n2. The CFPB's single-director structure enhances Presidential oversight\n3. The other arguments based on the CFPB's single-director structure lack merit\nIII. There is no basis for overruling this Court's precedents upholding independent agencies",
        "reference": "A. The removal protection has no bearing on the CID at issue here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-601_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' ROUTINE, FACT-SPECIFIC DECISION THAT A MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS NOT TIMELY FILED PRESENTS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT AND DOES NOT MERIT REVIEW\nII. THIS IS AN INAPPROPRIATE VEHICLE BOTH BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO PURSUE AVAILABLE REMEDIES IN THE COURTS BELOW AND BECAUSE GRANTING PETITIONER'S REQUEST WOULD NOT AFFECT THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME OF THE CASE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. June Medical Does Not Change the Outcome of this Case\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
        "reference": "A. This Court Should Not Grant Certiorari Where the Attorney General Has Not Sought to Intervene to Seek Relief from Judgment in the District Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-9493_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Certain Kinds Of Plain Errors, Like A Miscalculated Sentencing Guidelines Range, Ordinarily Should Be Corrected\nB. Correcting Guidelines Errors In The Ordinary Case Still Leaves Room For Countervailing Factors In Particular Cases\nII. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S SHOCK-THE-CONSCIENCE STANDARD IS IRRECONCILABLE WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS AND IMPOSES AN IMPROPER BURDEN ON CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS\nA. The Fifth Circuit's Standard Is Unduly Harsh And Has No Place In Plain Error Review\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Standard Is Especially Misguided In The Unique Context Of Guidelines Errors",
        "reference": "I. IN THE ORDINARY CASE, A GUIDELINES MISCALCULATION SATISFIES THE FOURTH PRONG OF THE OLANO STANDARD FOR PLAIN ERROR REVIEW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-292_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The application of restraining physical force can effect a temporary seizure even if the subject does not yield\nA. A physical-force seizure under the Fourth Amendment requires intentional application of restraining physical force by law enforcement\nB. A subject's failure to yield affects the duration, but not the existence, of a physical-force seizure\nII. [MISSING]\nA. When petitioner was shot, she was momentarily seized by the application of physical force\nB. This Court should remand for further consideration of respondents' other arguments in support of summary judgment",
        "reference": "II. This Court should vacate the decision below and remand for further proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. There is no obstacle to reaching the constitutional question presented\nB. The structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau violates the separation of powers\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Court should not extend the Humphrey's Executor exception to the CFPB\n3. In the alternative, Humphrey's Executor should be overruled\n4. The removal provision at issue here cannot be construed to avoid the constitutional question\nC. The Court should reverse the judgment below and, if it reaches the question of severability, invalidate Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "reference": "1. The CFPB's structure violates the rule against restrictions on the President's ability to remove executive officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. \"Step One\" of the Ninth Circuit's results test requires elections officials to predict voter behavior with near-perfect precision\nB. Elections officials cannot predict the potential impact of adopting \u2014or even leaving in place \u2014elections standards, practices, or procedures with the decision's required degree of specificity\nC. In practice, the unpredictable nature of the Ninth Circuit's standard invites constant litigation\nII. The Ninth Circuit disregards the impact its decision will have on Arizona's precinct-based voting system",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit reads the \"totality of circumstances\" out of section 10301(b)'s results test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Second Circuit's Collapse of a Two-Sided Platform Into a Single Market Ignores the Market Reality That Merchants are Distinct Customers of Amex\nA. The Realities of the Payment Card Ecosystem\nB. The Second Circuit Ignored Market Realities Experienced by Merchants When it Collapsed the Two-Sided Platform Into a Single Market\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Second Circuit's Disregard for the Record Led to an Erroneous Reliance on Abstract Economic Theory that Bears Little Similarity to the Reality Merchants Face\nII. The Existence of Market Power Should Be Determined by Actual Evidence, Not by Abstract Economic Theory\nA. The Market for Card Acceptance Services is Highly Concentrated and Features Significant Barriers to Entry\nB. The Pernicious Effects of Amex's Restraints on Merchants Demonstrate the Overwhelming Strength of Its Market Power\n1. In a Competitive Market, Merchants Would Behave Differently\n2. The Realities of How Cardholders Use Credit and Charge Cards Leaves Merchants With Little Choice But to Accept Amex\n3. Amex Charges Merchants a Premium When Compared to its Competitors and Price Increases Have Not Caused Loss of Merchant Customers\n4. The NDPs Further Increase Amex's Market Power Over Merchants",
        "reference": "1. The Evidence Provided No Basis upon which to Collapse the Two Sides of the Platform into a Single Market",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit's holding is compelled by this Court's maritime precedent\nA. Maritime law has long recognized negligence, including its foreseeability test\nB. Petitioners' proposed blanket immunity is antithetical to maritime law\n1. Maritime negligence law applies a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances of each case\n2. Maritime law holds that a product is the entire \"integrated package,\" including its asbestos parts and maintenance manual\n3. Blanket immunity for petitioners would unfairly require shipyards and ship owners to pay for petitioners' negligence\n4. Solicitude for sailors is not an \"outdated\" policy\nC. Under maritime law, there was no superseding cause\nD. In maritime cases, this Court has clearly distinguished between property damage and personal injury claims\nII. The Third Circuit's test accords with maritime law\nA. A test based on reasonable care under the circumstances of each case accords with maritime principles\nB. Lindstrom is limited to strict products liability, and has no bearing on negligent failure to warn claims\nIII. The Third Circuit's test accords with the prevailing law on land\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The two state court decisions cited by petitioners do not preclude the application of the Third Circuit's test\nC. Petitioners' rule would leave maritime workers worse off than land-based workers\nIV. The Third Circuit's test accords with traditional common-law tort principles\nA. Traditional principles of tort law impose a duty to warn of foreseeable dangers of a product\nB. The manufacturer's duty of care extends to warning about foreseeable dangers arising from its integrated product\nC. Whether a harm is a foreseeable consequence of one's actions is the foundation of this Court's negligence jurisprudence\nD. Petitioners are not innocent manufacturers of innocuous components parts\nV. Petitioners are the parties best positioned to avoid the loss\nVI. The government contractor defense is not at issue\nVII. The Third Circuit applied the correct rule, and properly remanded for further factual determinations",
        "reference": "A. A clear majority of the states adopt the same rule as the Third Circuit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "A. The remedy should be retroactive\nB. UTIER prayed and is entitled to a meaningful relief\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Equity considerations of this case do not outweigh separations of powers and liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENTS' PROPOSED INTERPRETATION BEST COMPORTS WITH THE ACT'S TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND PURPOSE\nA. Respondents' Proposed Reading Is Supported By The Act's Plain Text\nB. Petitioner's Proposed Interpretation Does Not Comport With The CWA's Plain Text\nC. The Structure And Purpose Of The CWA Support Respondents' Reading\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. PETITIONER AND ITS AMICI'S PARADE-OF-HORRIBLES ARGUMENTS ARE EXAGGERATED\nA. Petitioner, Not Respondents, Seeks To Change The Status Quo Radically\nB. Petitioner And Its Amici's Supposed Harms Have Not Transpired To Date\nC. Petitioner And Its Amici's Speculative Harms Are Unlikely To Materialize",
        "reference": "II. ADOPTING PETITIONER'S POSITION WOULD INJURE THE NATION'S STREAMS, RIVERS, AND LAKES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1471_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A newly added counterclaim defendant counts as \"any defendant\" entitled to remove a putative class action under CAFA\nB. The decision below frustrates CAFA's essential purpose of ensuring federal jurisdiction over interstate class actions\nII. The Question Presented Is A Recurring One Of Exceptional Importance\nIII. This Court's Review Is Essential Because Only This Court Can Clarify The Limits Of Its Holding In Shamrock Oil",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With CAFA's Clear Text And Purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-979_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Courts of Appeals Have Jurisdiction to Review Eligibility for Cancellation of Removal\nA. Eligibility Determinations Under VAWA Cancellation of Removal Are Reviewable\nB. Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Physical Presence and Good Moral Character Questions\nC. Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Hardship Questions\nIII. Under the Eleventh Circuit's Erroneous Interpretation, Questions of Law Would Not Be Reviewable In District Courts",
        "reference": "I. Nothing in 8 U.S.C. section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) Bars Review of Threshold Eligibility Determinations for the Enumerated Discretionary Relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "The Proliferation of Concealed Weapons Places the Judiciary, Attorneys, and the Public at Undue Risk of Harm from Gun Violence\nI. Courthouse Operations Are, By Their Very Nature, a Forum for Conflict\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Violence Against Legal Professionals Continues to Rise",
        "reference": "II. Courthouse Violence Continues to Rise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief049.pdf",
        "text": "I. RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS BENEFIT THE LARGER EDUCATIONAL COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY AS A WHOLE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE RACIALLY DIVERSE CLASSROOMS BECAUSE OF PERSISTENT AND PERVASIVE RACIAL SEGREGATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION\nA. Racial Disparities in Housing and Income Drive an Inequitable Education System, Which Impedes Black Students' Access to Postsecondary Education\nB. Racial Disparities in Income and Housing Segregation Lead to Inequality in Elementary and Secondary Education\nC. Disparities in Elementary and Secondary Education Lead to Inequality in Access to Preparation for Postsecondary Education\nIV. RACE-BLIND ADMISSIONS REGIME UNFAIRLY BURDENS AND UNIQUELY HARMS BLACK APPLICANTS\nA. Race-Blind Admissions Materially Disadvantages Black Students\nB. A Race-Blind Admissions Process, Consistent With a Colorblind Ideology, Inflicts a Dignitary Harm Upon Black Students",
        "reference": "II. RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS PROGRAMS ARE NOT HARMFUL TO THE PROFESSIONAL ASPIRATIONS OR THE PERSONAL WELL-BEING OF BLACK LAW STUDENTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-882_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 633a(a) Prohibits \"Any Discrimination\" In The Process Of Making Federal Personnel Decisions\nA. The Government's Textual Arguments Lack Merit\nB. The Government Is Wrong About The Constitution And Executive Orders\nC. The Government Misconstrues The Regulations\nD. [MISSING]\nE. At A Minimum, The EEOC's Construction Of Section 633a(a) Is Entitled To Chevron Deference\nII. Section 633a(a)'s Discrimination Ban Is Workable And Results In Appropriate Remedies",
        "reference": "D. Gross, Safeco, And Nassar Do Not Govern Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1472_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statutory time limit to petition the Tax Court for review of a collection-due-process determination is jurisdictional\nA. The statutory text, context, and history clearly show that the deadline for seeking Tax Court review of a collection-due-process determination is jurisdictional\n1. The text of Section 6330(d)(1) expressly conditions the Tax Court's jurisdiction on a timely petition\n2. The statutory context confirms that the deadline to petition the Tax Court is jurisdictional\n3. Congress enacted Section 6330(d)(1) against the backdrop of a longstanding lower-court consensus that a similarly worded provision is jurisdictional\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Alternative interpretations of \"such matter\" are untenable\n2. Arguments premised on prior versions of the statute do not demonstrate any ambiguity today\n3. Neither legislative history nor broad statements of legislative purpose support petitioner's reading\n4. Policy concerns do not support petitioner's reading\nII. Even if Section 6330(d)(1)'s filing deadline is not jurisdictional, it is mandatory and not subject to equitable tolling",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's contrary interpretations are unsound",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW ENTRENCHES A CIRCUIT SPLIT AND EXACERBATES ALREADY-PRESENT CHALLENGES IN DECIDING SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL CLAIMS\nII. WITHOUT GUIDANCE FROM THIS COURT, THE DECISION BELOW CREATES SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE VALIDITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF INNUMERABLE FACIALLY-NEUTRAL TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS\nA. The Decision Below Emphasizes the Need for a Uniform Standard\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Ruling Also Imposes Multiple Untenable Limitations on States",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Will Create Numerous Problems in Enforcement of Election Laws",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief047.pdf",
        "text": "I. ROE AND CASEY WERE WRONGLY DECIDED.\nA. The Stare Decisis Factors Demonstrate That This Court Should Overrule Roe and Casey.\nB. Roe and Casey Were Egregiously Wrong.\nC. Casey Has Failed to Provide Consistency and Stability.\nII. MISSISSIPPI'S ABORTION RESTRICTION IS JUSTIFIED BY THE STATE'S DUTY TO AND INTEREST IN PROTECTING LIFE.\nA. Mississippi Has A Duty To Protect Nascent Human Life.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Mississippi Has A Substantial Interest In Protecting Life.\nD. Mississippi Has a Substantial Interest In Protecting The Life and Health of Mothers.\nE. The Court Should Analyze Restrictions and Prohibitions To Abortion Under Rational Basis Review.",
        "reference": "B. The Most Prevalent Abortion Procedure From Approximately 12-Week To 24-Weeks Is Dilation and Evacuation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Collateral estoppel bars the Cliffords from maintaining here the claims they lost in Minnesota\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Cliffords cannot again press here the exact constitutional challenges they lost in Minnesota\nII. The record from the Minnesota litigation shows that Article III bars the claims of the Individual Plaintiffs, including the Cliffords\nA. The Individual Plaintiffs' hypothetical future injuries are speculative\nB. The Cliffords' alleged injury cannot be redressed by this Court",
        "reference": "A. The final determinations of the Minnesota courts are binding in this litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1164_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "The lower courts correctly determined that they lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners' untimely claims:\nA. Section 2409a(g)'s 12-year time bar warrants jurisdictional treatment\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Congress acquiesced in this Court's jurisdictional understanding of the Quiet Title Act's 12-year bar when it amended that provision in 1986\nB. Petitioners' contrary arguments lack merit\n1. North Dakota and Mottaz were not mere drive-by jurisdictional decisions, but instead merit respect as considered precedents of this Court\n2. The Court's decision in United States v. Beggerly confirms the jurisdictional treatment in North Dakota and Mottaz\n3. Petitioners cannot show that other intervening decisions of this Court warrant overruling North Dakota and Mottaz",
        "reference": "1. This Court has previously held that Section 2409a(g)'s time bar is jurisdictional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The text of Section 362(a)(3) does not impose a turnover requirement\n2. The text of Section 542(a) confirms that Section 362(a)(3) does not impose a turnover requirement\n3. Respondents' contrary textual arguments lack merit\nB. The history of Sections 362(a) and 542(a) confirms that Section 362(a)(3) does not reach the City's passive retention of respondents' vehicles\n1. The history of Section 362(a) demonstrates that the automatic stay was designed to preserve the status quo\n2. The statutory history confirms Congress's intent that Section 542(a) would define the circumstances under which creditors must turn over property that they possess at the commencement of a bankruptcy case\nC. Enforcing turnover through Section 362(a)(3) is inconsistent with the broader policy of the Bankruptcy Code",
        "reference": "A. The text and structure of the Bankruptcy Code demonstrate that the automatic stay does not compel turnover of property that was seized by a creditor before the bankruptcy petition was filed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROTECT PERSONAL, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ESSENTIAL TO LIBERTY\nA. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment Ensures the Full Promise of Liberty and Equality for All\nB. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects the Full Scope of Liberty, Not Merely Rights Enumerated Elsewhere in the Constitution\nC. This Court's Precedents Establish Broad Protections for Substantive Liberty and Equality\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE COURT BELOW ABDICATED ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CENTRAL TO DIGNITY AND AUTONOMY AS REQUIRED BY CASEY AND WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH",
        "reference": "II. THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT REQUIRE COURTS TO CAREFULLY REVIEW STATE LEGISLATION IMPINGING ON INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reverse and Require that Placing an Invention On Sale Constitutes Prior Art Only When the Invention is Thereby Made Available to the Public\na. [MISSING]\nb. Judge O'Malley's Proposed Statutory Construction Does Not Support a Proposition that a Sale can have Prior Art Effect if it Does Not Make the Invention Available to the Public\nc. Reversal Here Will Not Fundamentally Affect Prior On-Sale Jurisprudence\nII. The Lower Court's Decision Has Extraordinary Extraterritorial Implications That Were Likely Unintended by Congress\nIII. The Policy Ramifications of the Federal Circuit Decision are Contrary to the Purposes of the AIA and Negatively Impact Biotechnological Innovation",
        "reference": "a. Significant Ambiguities Created by the Court of Appeals' Atextual Interpretation of the AIA Require Resolution through Statutory Construction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTORY TEXT AND CONTEXT DO NOT SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S STRAINED INTERPRETATION\nA. The Government's Invocation of \"Consistent Usage\" Is Self-Defeating\nB. \"Person\" Is Presumed to Exclude the Government Regardless of Whether a Statute Imposes a Burden or Provides a Benefit\nII. THE GOVERNMENT'S HISTORICAL ARGUMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY CONGRESSIONAL USAGE OR AGENCY RATIONALE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Meager Record of Unremarked, Unanalyzed PTO Action Does Not Warrant Deference\nIII. THE GOVERNMENT'S ESTOPPEL ARGUMENT WOULD COMPLICATE PATENT LITIGATION, RATHER THAN STREAMLINE IT AS INTENDED",
        "reference": "A. Congress Has Demarcated the Government's Role in the Patent System with Textual Clarity, Not by Implication",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution's Text and History Reflect the Framers' Strong Interest in Preventing Corruption\nA. In Drafting the Constitution, the Framers Were Keenly Concerned with Preventing Both the Appearance and Reality of Corruption\nB. The Text of the Constitution Reflects Both Broad Anti-Corruption Principles and Specific Gift, Salary, and Appointment Restrictions Designed to Prevent Corruption and the Appearance Thereof\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. By Faulting the Government for Failing to Provide Specific Examples of Quid Pro Quo Corruption Averted by the BCRA Provision, the Court Below Defied Constitutional Text and History and this Court's Precedents Permitting Measures to Avoid the Appearance of Quid Pro Quo Corruption",
        "reference": "II. The BCRA Provision at Issue Here Does Not Burden Campaign Speech and Fits Comfortably Within the Constitutional Tradition of Avoiding Corruption in Government, Including Quid Pro Quo Corruption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit improperly ignored the commercial advantage and financial gain element of the crime\nB. The Ninth Circuit analyzed a lesser included offense\nII. The crime defined by section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is not overbroad\nA. The canon of constitutional avoidance counsels for a narrowing interpretation\nB. This Court has approved a narrowing interpretation that applies here\nC. Properly understood, section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) does not pose a risk of chilling speech protected by the First Amendment\nD. section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is not a content-based restriction on speech\nIII. The crime defined by section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i) is not overbroad\nA. When this Court properly considers the commercial advantage and financial gain element of the crime, no instances of chilled speech protected by the First Amendment remain\nB. Commercial speech is inherently less protected than the pure advocacy and intra-family expressive speech that the Ninth Circuit analyzed",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the wrong crime",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5554_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. Curtis Johnson Defined \"Physical Force\" as \"Violent Force\"\nB. Florida Robbery Lacks \"Violent Force\" \"as an Element\"\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Government's Analysis of Other State Robbery Offenses Contravenes the Categorical Approach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN ENACTING THE CRCA, CONGRESS VALIDLY EXERCISED ITS POWER UNDER THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE TO MAKE STATES AMENABLE TO SUIT\nA. The Intellectual Property Clause Reflects A Plan-Of-The-Convention Waiver Of Sovereign Immunity\n1. The Plain Text Of The Intellectual Property Clause Evinces Waiver\n2. The History And Purpose Of The Intellectual Property Clause Confirm The Clause Embodies A Waiver Of State Sovereign Immunity\nB. This Court's Prior Decisions Do Not Foreclose Congressional Reliance On The Intellectual Property Clause To Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity\nC. Congress Validly Exercised Its Authority Under The Intellectual Property Clause To Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity For Copyright Infringement\nII. THE CRCA ALSO REFLECTS A VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESS'S POWER TO ENFORCE THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Unlike The Patent Remedy Act, The CRCA's Record Addresses A Fourteenth Amendment Violation That Lacks An Adequate State Remedy\n1. The Legislative Record Shows That, In Enacting The CRCA, Congress Sought To Remedy A Pattern Of Fourteenth Amendment Violations\n2. The Remedy Afforded By Congress In The CRCA Represents A Congruent And Proportional Response To States' Copyright Infringement",
        "reference": "A. Copyright Infringement By States Is A Rightful Concern Of Congress And Basis For Abrogation Under The Fourteenth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A 15-Week Abortion Limit May Seem Highly Reasonable, Given the Many Nations with More Stringent Limits, and Given the Whole First Trimester Allowed for Legal Abortion\nIII. Not Every Abortion May Be in the Womb; or, the Breadth of What \"Pro-Life\" May Mean\nIV. Supply and Demand in the Abortion Debate: Regulating Abortion Strongly, but Providing Viable Alternatives, So That Fewer Women Would Choose Abortion\nV. The Court May Consider Whether Mississippi Offers Sufficient Support to Pregnant Women, in Considering the Legality of the State's Experiment with a 15-Week Ban\nVI. Discussion of Prosecuting Abortions After Coerced Sex (Rape, Incest, Etc.) May Be Necessary for Fair Consideration of Abortion Law\nVII. Abortion Polls Are Disparate, But Many Indicate Public Support for Serious Limits on Legal Abortion\nVIII. Respecting the Legacy of Justice Ginsburg, in Considering the Instant Case\nIX. An Extreme Ruling in Either Direction Could Devastate the Credibility of the Court; or, Avoiding the \"Constitutional Bends\"",
        "reference": "I. People May Call Abortion a Colossal Moral Evil in Many Circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Unconstitutional Statutory Provisions Are Invalid When Adopted, and Are Not Made Invalid Later When a Court Finds Unconstitutionality, and Severable Provisions are Operative When Adopted, and Do Not Become Operative Only Later When a Court Finds Severability\nA. Unconstitutional Statutory Provisions Are Void When Enacted\n1. The Constitution Makes Unconstitutional Statutory Provisions Invalid Ab Initio, and Courts Later Find Invalidity as Necessary to Decide Cases\n2. The Court's Cases Concerning the Timing of Invalidity Show that If the Removal Restriction Is Unconstitutional, It Never Protected the Director from Removal\n3. [MISSING]\nB. Aspects of a Statute That Are Severable from Unconstitutional Aspects of That Statute Become Effective When the Statute Is Adopted\n1. Severability Is An Aspect of Statutory Content, Which Is Fixed at Enactment\n2. Severability Questions May Arise in Formulating a Remedy, but Severance Is Not a Remedy Given by the Courts\nII. The Court Need Not Give Petitioners Relief to Hold that the Removal Restriction Is Unconstitutional\nIII. Officials' Possibly Mistaken Beliefs About Removability May Present Questions of Administrative Law, Not Constitutional Law, Which Have Not Been Addressed in This Case",
        "reference": "3. The Remand in Seila Law, and Statements Made Concerning It, Rested on the Position Taken by One of the Parties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "1. THE LANHAM ACT PASSES THE FIRST STEP OF RJR NABISCO AND REBUTS THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY\n1.1 [MISSING]\n1.2 Despite the \"extraterritorial\" label, neither Steele nor its progeny confer unlimited worldwide application of the Lanham Act\n1.3 RJR Nabisco's focus on only the statutory text ignores other foundations for Steele's assertion of extraterritorial application of trademark rights\n1.4 Congress has ratified (by acquiescence) the assertion in Steele (and the circuit courts) that the Lanham Act has extraterritorial effect\n2. THE LANHAM ACT PASSES THE SECOND STEP OF THE RJR NABISCO TEST BECAUSE PREVENTING FOREIGN CONDUCT THAT CAUSES DOMESTIC CONFUSION OR INJURES DOMESTIC REPUTATION IS A PERMISSIBLE DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF THE LANHAM ACT\n2.1 Because Steele was based on reputational injury in the U.S., it reflects permissible domestic application of the Lanham Act\n2.2 Preventing domestic consumer confusion and reputational injury is a \"permissible domestic application\" of the Lanham Act\n2.3 The Solicitor General's definition of the Lanham Act's focus is too narrow\n2.4 Circuit Court tests that have followed Steele to require a substantial impact on U.S. commerce should be preserved, but the impact should be within the focus of the Lanham Act\n3. IF THE COURT RULES THAT THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT APPLY EXTRATERRITORIALLY, COURTS SHOULD RETAIN AUTHORITY TO STOP FOREIGN TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT BY U.S. CITIZENS\n4. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S ERRORS REQUIRE REMAND\n4.1 The Tenth Circuit mistakenly prevented defendant from establishing the relative amount of domestic and foreign confusion\n4.2 The Tenth Circuit incorrectly allowed recovery based on a diversion-of-sales theory\n5. INTERPRETING THE LANHAM ACT AS OUTLINED ABOVE IS CONSISTENT WITH U.S. INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND THE GENERAL TERRITORIALITY OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS",
        "reference": "1.1 Steele v. Bulova applied the Lanham Act extraterritorially against a U.S. citizen",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATE FAILS TO REFUTE CONGRESS'S ARTICLE I BASIS FOR THE CRCA\nA. The State Errs In Characterizing Precedent As Foreclosing Abrogation Under The Intellectual Property Clause\nB. The State Ignores Indicia Of A Plan-Of-The-Convention Waiver\nII. [MISSING]\nA. State Copyright Infringement Poses A Constitutional Violation Warranting Remedy\nB. The CRCA Is A Congruent And Proportional Response To Unremedied Copyright Infringement By States\n1. The Record Demonstrates States' Pattern Of Infringement\n2. The Record Demonstrates The Inadequacy Of Alternative Remedies\n3. The CRCA Represents A Congruent And Proportional Remedy",
        "reference": "II. THE STATE FAILS TO UNDERMINE CONGRESS'S SECTION 5 BASIS FOR THE CRCA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-281_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. APPELLANTS DO NOT HAVE STANDING\nII. RACE PREDOMINATED IN THE CHALLENGED DISTRICTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Panel Applied The Correct Legal Standard And Its Factual Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous\nC. District-Specific Evidence\n1. Richmond and Tri-City Region (Challenged Districts 63, 69, 70, 71, and 74)\n2. North Hampton Roads (Challenged Districts 92 and 95)\n3. South Hampton Roads (Challenged Districts 77, 80, 89 and 90)\nIII. THE CHALLENGED DISTRICTS ARE NOT NARROWLY TAILORED\nA. Appellants Point To No Legislative Inquiry Into Whether A 55% BVAP Floor Was Required In Any Of The Challenged Districts\nB. Appellants' Excuses For Failing To Perform A Functional Analysis Are Unavailing",
        "reference": "A. The Panel's Findings Of Racial Predominance Are Amply Supported By The Record",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Second Circuit departed from longstanding tradition\nB. Definitions of \"two-sided\" platforms are too vague and contested to sustain a critical legal distinction\nII. The Second Circuit's approach risks immunizing some of the most dominant companies in America's political economy from antitrust scrutiny\nA. A small number of tech platforms mediate a growing share of our commerce and communications\nB. By dramatically raising the plaintiffs' initial burden, the Second Circuit's rule will exempt platforms from effective antitrust review",
        "reference": "I. A special rule for \"two-sided\" markets is unnecessary and risks enabling legal arbitrage",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. ICWA VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION\nA. [MISSING]\n1. ICWA's \"Indian Child\" Definition Is A Racial Classification\n2. ICWA's Placement Preferences Establish A Racial Classification\nB. ICWA's Classifications Are Not Political\nC. ICWA Fails Any Level Of Scrutiny\nD. Ruling In Petitioners' Favor Will Not Endanger Title 25\nE. Respondents' Justiciability Objections Are Meritless\n1. Individual Petitioners Have Standing To Maintain Their APA Claim\n2. Individual Petitioners Have Standing To Maintain Their Equal-Protection Claim\nII. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS AND COMMANDEERS STATES",
        "reference": "A. ICWA's Classifications Are Subject To Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs' ATS Claims Are Extraterritorial\nA. All Of The Relevant Conduct Occurred Outside The United States\nB. The Very Limited Allegations Of U.S. Conduct Fall Outside The ATS's Focus\n1. The ATS's \"focus\" is the principal violation of international law that injures the plaintiffs \u2014 and all of that conduct occurred in C\u00f4te d'Ivoire\n2. Even if aiding and abetting were the relevant \"focus,\" Plaintiffs' claims are extraterritorial\nC. Permitting ATS Claims To Proceed Based Solely On Corporate Headquarters Oversight Would Greatly Increase Clashes With Foreign Nations And Interference With U.S. Foreign Policy\nII. [MISSING]\nA. There Is No Specific, Universal, And Obligatory International-Law Norm Imposing Liability On Corporations For Employees' Acts That Violate International Human-Rights Norms\nB. Separation-Of-Powers Principles Bar Judicially Created Corporate Liability\nC. Guidance From Analogous Statutes Enacted By Congress Weighs Heavily Against Corporate Liability\nD. Domestic Corporate Liability Is Not Necessary To Serve The ATS's Goals",
        "reference": "II. Domestic Corporations Are Not Subject To ATS Liability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LANHAM ACT APPLIES EXTRATERRITORIALLY\nA. The Lanham Act Rebutts the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality\nB. This Court Already Concluded that the Lanham Act Has Extraterritorial Effect\nC. The Lanham Act Should Not Be Truncated at the U.S. Border\nII. THE LANHAM ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO ALL FOREIGN COMMERCE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Lanham Act's Extraterritoriality Does Not Depend on a Defendant's U.S. Citizenship\nC. Most Circuits Already Limit the Lanham Act's Reach to Foreign Commerce That Has a Substantial Effect on U.S. Commerce\nIII. INFRINGEMENT REMEDIES SHOULD BE SEPARATELY ADDRESSED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD REMAND TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON U.S. COMMERCE AND TO REASSESS ANY REMEDY",
        "reference": "A. The Lanham Act Applies Only to Foreign Commerce Having a Substantial Effect on U.S. Commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "The Executive Branch's Mass Student Loan Debt Cancellation Violates The Appropriations Clause\nA. Enforcement of the Appropriations Clause is critical to the separation of powers\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Executive Branch's abrogation of hundreds of billions of dollars in student loan debt assets is an unappropriated expenditure of government money",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Neither Arizona's out-of-precinct policy nor its ballot-collection restriction violates Section 2's results test\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The challenged practices do not cause the result prohibited by Section 2\nII. The court of appeals erred in rejecting the district court's factual finding that H.B. 2023 was not motivated by discriminatory intent",
        "reference": "A. Section 2's results test prohibits voting practices that are responsible for members of one race having less ability to vote in the totality of circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Government's Approach Would Criminalize the Very Conduct This Court Has Declared Non-Criminal in Many of Its Recent Cases\nB. The Government's Reading of the CFAA Invites All of the Dangers Noted in This Court's Overcriminalization Decisions\nII. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY CANNOT RESOLVE STATUTORY AMBIGUITY AGAINST A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT",
        "reference": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S READING OF THE CFAA WOULD EVISCERATE THIS COURT'S OVERCRIMINALIZATION JURISPRUDENCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. History of California's Private Attorneys General Act\nB. Iskanian's Creation of a Back Door to Avoid Arbitration Agreements\nC. Epic Systems Establishes A Strong Basis For Enforcing All Arbitration Agreements After Iskanian and Waffle House\nD. Post-Epic Decisions Upholding Iskanian Improperly Analogize PAGA to Governmental Qui Tam Actions\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Post-Epic Cases Upholding Iskanian Were Wrongly Decided\nE. PAGA's Fiction\n1. Post-Epic Cases Cannot Escape FAA Preemption On The Basis of California Public Policy\n2. Permitting the Door to Court to Remain Open for PAGA-Like Matters Will Further Undermine the FAA, Concepcion, and Epic Systems\nIV.",
        "reference": "1. PAGA is More Like A Class Action Than A Qui Tam Action and Is Thus Encompassed By Epic",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 112(a) of the Patent Act requires inventors to enable skilled artisans to make and use the full scope of whatever invention they claim without undue experimentation.\nA. The \"full scope\" requirement is squarely rooted in the text of Section 112(a) and this Court's precedents.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court's reading of the enablement requirement should be informed by its flexible approach to obviousness law.\nII. The Federal Circuit's enablement precedent is consistent with the text of the Patent Act and this Court's precedents.\nA. Wands enforces the \"full scope\" requirement of section 112 while recognizing that a need for experimentation, if not undue, does not defeat enablement.\nB. Contrary to petitioners' assertions, the decision below is consistent with Wands and should be affirmed.\nC. Wands underscores the invalidity of petitioners' patents.\nIII. Petitioners' parade of horribles has no basis in reality, but departing from the Wands framework would destabilize patent law.",
        "reference": "B. The \"undue experimentation\" element of enablement law is likewise grounded in the Patent Act's text, this Court's precedents, and Congress's actions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The District's Treatment of Coach Kennedy Was Facially Violative of his First Amendment Rights to Freely Exercise his Religion\nB. In Holding that Any Religious Expression by a Coach While on the Job and in View of Students Constitutes State Endorsement of Religion, the Circuit Court Opinion has Stripped Religiously Observant Coaches of the Use of their Religion\nII. The Circuit Court's Opinion Unnecessarily Restricts the Ability of a Religiously Observant Coach to Serve as a Mentor, Counselor, and Pseudo-Parental Figure to his or her Players\nIII. No Reasonable Observer could have interpreted Coach Kennedy's silent prayer as state/district endorsement of religion",
        "reference": "I. The Circuit Court's Opinion Categorically Denies Religiously Observant Coaches of their First Amendment Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Courts of Appeals Are Divided on the Questions Presented\nII. The Questions Presented Are Recurring, Important, and Squarely Presented\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Decision Below Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Through Its Broad Power to Establish New Legal Rights and Remedies, Congress May Create Procedural Entitlements that Protect Private Interests from Being Put at Risk of Harm",
        "reference": "I. By Limiting the Scope of \"Concrete\" Injury Based on Intuitive Notions Unmoored from Any Standard, TransUnion's Position Would Expand the Power of the Judiciary at the Expense of the Elected Branches",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FTC's \"Expansion\" of Section 13(b) Violates the Separation of Powers.\nA. Congress Created a Multi-Step Process for the Recovery of Money Damages.\nB. The FTC Rejects Congress's Statutory Scheme.\nC. The FTC Uses Test Cases to Expand Its Section 13(b) Powers.\nD. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language.\nE. FTC Pursuit of Monetary Awards Cannot Be Squared with Recent Precedent.\nF. FTC's Section 13(b) Power Grab Deserves No Deference.\nII. The FTC's Pursuit of Monetary Awards Violates Constitutional Rights and Evades Venerable Procedural Protections.\nA. Collateral Damage: A Case Study.\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The FTC Uses Section 13(b) to Circumvent the Fourth Amendment.\n2. Pursuing Damages Under the Guise of Equity Deprives Defendants of their Seventh Amendment Jury Trial Right.\n3. The FTC's Pursuit of Money Damages Undermines the Sixth Amendment.\n4. The FTC's Misuse of Section 13(b) Is Contrary to Values Protected by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.\nC. Abrogation of the Burden of Proof Opens the Door to The FTC's Abuse of Section 13(b).\n1. FTC \"Deception\" Cases Require no Actual Deception or Injury.\n2. The First Element to Secure a Preliminary Injunction Is Automatically Satisfied.\nIII. Stare Decisis Does Not Shield FTC's Overreach.",
        "reference": "B. The FTC's Abuse of Section 13(b) Threatens Constitutional Rights.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.72
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "A. Alabama's Gulf Coast has a long history as a unique community of interest\nB. Alabama's Gulf Coast continues to stand as a unique community of interest\nC. Appellees' maps would fracture the Gulf Coast and merge part of it with the Wiregrass's divergent community\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Section 2 does not require this fracturing of the Gulf Coast community",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The unique status of insurers in our economy and federal system\nII. This Court has almost always upheld States' use of consent-by-registration laws to supervise insurers\nIII. Even if it affirms, the Court should retain Pennsylvania Fire for insurance cases\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Overruling Pennsylvania Fire would expose States to destructive litigation over their insurance regulatory systems",
        "reference": "A. The interests animating this Court's general jurisdiction cases do not apply to insurers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-9493_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A forfeited Guidelines calculation error does not warrant correction under the fourth prong of the plain-error standard as a matter of course\nA. Rule 52(b) grants courts limited authority to correct unpreserved errors in exceptional circumstances\nB. A presumption that Guidelines calculation errors satisfy the fourth plain-error prong \"in the ordinary case\" has no basis in Rule 52(b)\n1. A forfeited Guidelines error warrants reversal only in exceptional cases based on a case-specific and fact-intensive review\n2. A presumption that Guidelines errors warrant reversal under the fourth plain-error prong is inconsistent with the plain-error standard\n3. [MISSING]\nC. Although the court of appeals' opinion inaccurately describes the fourth prong of the plain-error standard, its judgment reflects an appropriate exercise of discretion\n1. The fourth plain-error prong is not limited to errors that \"shock the conscience\"\n2. The court of appeals properly declined to correct the Guidelines calculation error in this case",
        "reference": "3. Petitioner's arguments to the contrary are unsound",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts Must Conduct A Rigor-ous Textual Analysis When Reviewing Agency Action Under The Chevron Framework\nA. Chevron requires careful analysis of the statutory text before deference is given\nB. Properly applying Chevron would have required rejecting the Service's interpretation\nII. The Fifth Circuit's Decision Contravenes This Court's Teaching That A Vigorous Application Of Chevron's Reasonableness Test Is An Essential Protection Against Ultra Vires Agency Action\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Decision Below Will Have Far-Reaching Implications For Landowners Across The Country",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. Stare decisis demands adherence to Bellas Hess's physical-presence requirements for sales and use taxes\nA. Stare decisis applies with enhanced strength in this case\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Congress retains the power to relax Bellas Hess's physical-presence requirement in prospective, nuanced ways that this Court cannot accommodate\n3. Congress has foregone multiple opportunities to change or otherwise modify Bellas Hess and Quill\n4. Bellas Hess's physical-presence requirement creates a bright-line rule of taxation that creates business confidence\nB. No special justifications of any significance counsel overturning Bellas Hess's physical-presence requirement\nC. The considerations in favor of stare decisis outweigh any special justifications",
        "reference": "1. Overturning Bellas Hess's physical-presence requirement for sales and use taxes will unsettle existing property and contract rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's \"Meaning-or-Message\" Test Has No Substantive Support in The Law or the Legislative History of Section 107\nA. The Legislative History of Fair Use Confirms that Congress Intended It to Remain a Case-by-Case Analysis Consistent with Section 107's Preamble\nB. Campbell Does Not Mandate a \"Meaning-or-Message\" Test\n1. The Genesis of the Campbell Transformative Use Test Does Not Support Petitioner's Formulation\n2. Campbell Involved a Parody and Does Not Have the Breadth Petitioner Ascribes to It\nC. Google Was a Complex and Unique Case That Does Not Support Petitioner's Proposed Test\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Right of Publicity Is a Century-Old Property Right in One's Persona\nB. The Supreme Court Recognized a Property Right in One's Persona Nearly Half a Century Ago\nC. The California Supreme Court Borrowed from Campbell to Create a \"Transformative Use\" Test to Balance Competing Interests in Right-of-Publicity Cases",
        "reference": "II. The Test Formulated by this Court in Campbell Has Been Imported into Right of Publicity Jurisprudence to Balance an Individual's Intellectual Property Rights with the First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1442_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "SOCIAL [MISSING]\nA. The Reasoning of Sims Forecloses Imposing an Issue-Exhaustion Requirement Before ALJs\n1. No Statute or Regulation Requires Issue Exhaustion\n2. ALJ Proceedings Are As Non-Adversarial As Appeals Council Proceedings\n3. Claimants Lacked Notice of an ALJ Issue-Exhaustion Requirement\n4. Sims Forecloses the Government's Broad Issue-Exhaustion Rule\nB. Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Would Be Reviewable Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles\nC. Strong Policy Grounds Weigh Against Requiring Issue Exhaustion Here",
        "reference": "SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMANTS NEED NOT OBJECT TO ALJS THAT ALJS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPOINTED TO PRESERVE JUDICIAL REVIEW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court of Appeals' Severance Remedy Was Insufficient To Cure the Violation\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Other Oversight Powers Are Not Substitutes for Review\nII. The Court of Appeals' Severance Remedy Defies Congressional Intent\nA. Congress Would Not Have Enacted the Statute Without Tenure Protections\nB. Congress Should Determine the Appropriate Remedy\nC. Arthrex Is Entitled to Dismissal\nIII. Smith & Nephew's Remaining Arguments Are Not Properly Before the Court",
        "reference": "A. The Appointments Clause Requires Review of Administrative Patent Judges' Decisions by Superior Executive Officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Named Plaintiffs Have Article III Standing To Assert Stored Communications Act Claims\nA. Founding-Era Courts Redressed Unauthorized Disclosures Without Requiring Further Harm\nB. Communications Have Long Been Protected as Confidences Without Proof of Further Harm\nC. The Complaint Alleges the Types of Breaches Courts Have Long Redressed\nII. The Four Other Claims Independently Support Jurisdiction\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Quasi-Contract Claims Likewise Support Jurisdiction\nIII. The Complaint Establishes Jurisdiction over the Settlement",
        "reference": "A. Breach of Contract Is Actionable Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. \"Expenses\" Is Ambiguous, at Best\na. 1839: Congress First Adds \"Expenses\" to the Patent Act\nb. 1870: Congress Requires Legal Qualifications within the USPTO and the USPTO Appears in Court\nc. 1946: Congress Added Attorneys' Fees in the Predecessor of 35 U.S.C. section 285, but Not for USPTO Attorneys\nd. 1952: Patent Act Includes 35 U.S.C. sections 145 and 285\ne. 1984: Patent Act Adds Another Attorneys' Fees Provision\nf. 1999: Congress Adds More Attorneys' Fees Provisions, Not in section 145\ng. 2015: USPTO Seeks Attorneys' Fees Under section 145\n2. The American Rule\n3. \"Expenses\" Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees\na. Congress Does Not Include Attorneys' Fees in the Statute\ni. Section 145 does not say attorneys' fees\nii. [MISSING]\niii. Section 145 lacks the \"clear support\" required to overcome the American Rule presumption\nb. Arguments over Various Historical Definitions of the Word \"Expenses\" Are Inapposite\nc. The Longstanding Practice of the USPTO Has Been to Not Ask for Attorney's Fees\nd. Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the USPTO conflicts with the Provisions and Purpose of the Equal Access to Justice Act",
        "reference": "ii. Section 285 does say attorneys' fees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.41
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6819_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first question presented does not warrant review\nA. The question seeks error correction on an issue that will not affect the outcome of this case\nB. Reasonable jurists could not debate that Pena-Rodriguez does not apply retroactively\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Neither of Teague's exceptions apply\na. Pena-Rodriguez did not announce a \"substantive\" rule\nb. Pena-Rodriguez does not create a \"watershed\" rule\n3. Teague's retroactivity doctrine applies to this case\nII. The court of appeals' denial of Tharpe's motion for a certificate of appealability of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion was in accord with this Court's precedent\nA. The court of appeals did not issue inconsistent orders\nB. The court of appeals correctly applied the COA standard\n1. Buck does not support granting a COA as to Tharpe's Rule 60(b)(6) motion because reasonable jurists could not debate that Pena-Rodriguez is not retroactive\n2. Buck does not support granting a COA as to Tharpe's Rule 60(b)(6) motion because reasonable jurists could not debate that he failed to prove cause",
        "reference": "1. Pena-Rodriguez announced a new rule of constitutional law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-200_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The 2008 Amendment Required Registration of the Entire Offering\nB. The 2018 Amendment Process Also Indicates that the Commission Intended for Securities Act Liability to Attach to the Entire Direct Listing\nC. SEC Commentary Following the 2018 Amendment Supports the \"Entire-Transaction-Registration\" View\nII. PIRANI CORRECTLY DECLINED TO FOLLOW BARNES\nA. Barnes Cited Scant Caselaw, and What it did Cite Was Inapposite\nB. Barnes Was Decided in an Antiquated Certificated Share Environment that Gave Context to the Term \"Tracing\"\nC. Barnes Has Not Been Regularly Cited by the Courts of Appeals to Restrict Section 11 Standing",
        "reference": "I. A DIRECT LISTING IS A REGISTERED OFFERING OF SECURITIES THAT GIVES RISE TO LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 11",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "A. The State Fails To Meet Its Burden Of Showing A Historical Tradition Of Punishing Negligent Speech\nB. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech\nC. The State Misreads This Court's True-Threats Cases\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The Subjective Standard Will Not Hinder Prosecutions Or Disrupt Civil Protections",
        "reference": "D. The State's \"Context-Driven Objective Inquiry\" Is Constitutionally Deficient",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Illegal Aliens Are Not Members Of Our National Political Community\nII. THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT BOTH EQUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE AND EQUALITY IN VOTING",
        "reference": "A. Only Members Of Our National Political Community Should Be Represented In Our National Government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress spoke in clear and straightforward language, and that language permits the use of a machine to dial telephone numbers in many instances. What Congress prohibited was the use of a machine to dial random or sequential numbers. Indiscriminate dialing is not the same thing as purposeful contact with specific consumers\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The structure and context in the statute show that Congress was addressing a specific issue \u2014 telemarketing robocalls\nC. The purpose of the statute was to limit only a specific type of automated calling\nD. Courts agree that an \"automated telephone dialing system\" includes only equipment that stores or produces numbers randomly or in sequence\nE. Congress was clear in its language, structure, and purpose: Using equipment that simply dials a predetermined stored number does not violate the Act\nII. Commercial speech, even about unpleasant topics, is nevertheless protected by the First Amendment. Congress struck a careful balance when it passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and the Ninth Circuit has upset that balance",
        "reference": "A. The TCPA defines an \"automatic telephone dialing system\" in simple terms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 14(e) prohibits negligent misstatements and omissions of material fact\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The history and purpose of the Williams Act confirm that Section 14(e)'s first clause does not require scienter\nC. Negligence is the appropriate floor for liability under Section 14(e)\nII. Section 14(e) does not create a private right of action\nA. This Court's precedents foreclose inferring a private right of action under Section 14(e)\nB. The absence of a private right of action reinforces the conclusion that Section 14(e) does not require scienter",
        "reference": "A. The plain text of Section 14(e)'s first clause does not require scienter",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-7505_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Vernon Madison Suffers from a Verifiable and Confirmed Case of Vascular Dementia, and the Resulting Cognitive and Physical Disabilities Render Him Unable to Understand or Appreciate the Circumstances of His Pending Execution\nII. The Inclusion of Individuals Suffering from Vascular Dementia in the Class of People for Whom Execution Would Constitute a Cruel and Unusual Punishment Does Not Alter the Analysis Established in Ford and Panetti or Otherwise Expand the Category of Individuals for Whom Execution Is Inappropriate\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. A Finding that Mr. Madison Is Incompetent Does Not Implicate the State's Ability to Punish but Rather Enforces the Community's Understanding of Human Dignity in the Context of Punishment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text and History of Article III Give the Federal Courts Broad Judicial Power To Protect Constitutional Rights and Prevent Abuse of Power by the Government\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment Viewed Civil Damage Suits Against Government Officers as a Critical Bulwark against Government Overreach\nIV. Courts in the Founding Generation Vindicated Fourth Amendment Rights by Granting Damages Remedies for Unlawful Seizures in Common Law Tort Suits\nV. A Bivens Action is Appropriate To Enforce the Fourth Amendment When There Are No Alternative Remedies Available",
        "reference": "II. The Framers Wrote Article III To Ensure that Where There Is a Legal Right, There Is a Legal Remedy for Infringement of that Right",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-442_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The federal courts have jurisdiction over Reed's section 1983 claim.\nII. Reed's section 1983 claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.\nA. The accrual analysis for section 1983 claims starts with the specific constitutional right and the context for invoking it.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Goertz's counterarguments lack merit.\n1. The nature of Reed's claim shows that the trial court's denial of testing is the wrong accrual date.\n2. General accrual rules, due process values and purposes, and federalism and fairness all show that Reed's claim did not accrue before the state-court litigation ended.",
        "reference": "B. Reed's section 1983 claim accrued after the CCA authoritatively construed Article 64 and denied rehearing.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Court Requires Personal Culpability\nB. Circuit Courts Require Intent to Deceive and Reject Implied Fraud to Bar Discharge\nC. The Ninth Circuit Misconstrued Prior Law\nII. In re Huh Persuasively Explains Why Imputed Liability for Fraud Should Not Bar Discharge Absent Proof of the Debtor's Personal Culpability",
        "reference": "I. This Court and the Courts of Appeals Recognize That Fraud in 523(a)(2)(A) Means \"Actual Fraud\" and Nondischargeability Requires Proof of Personal Culpability and Intent to Deceive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The opinions of this Court in Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) and Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) are not dispositive of this case\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The classification established by Congress, excluding Puerto Rico residents from the SSI program, is based on race and/or national origin; thus, the proper Equal Protection analysis is strict scrutiny and not rational-basis review\nA. The Insular Cases\nB. Equal Protection",
        "reference": "II. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit correctly determined that, even under rational-basis review, the exclusion of residents of Puerto Rico from the SSI program violated their right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Holguin's Case Would Be Analyzed Differently Under Reasonableness Review",
        "reference": "I. Resolving the Circuit Split Is Important to the Uniformity, Fairness, and Integrity of the Federal Criminal Justice System and to Individual Defendants",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 2(a) Cannot Survive Intermediate Scrutiny, Which Is The Appropriate Standard Of Review\nA. Intermediate Scrutiny Is The Appropriate Standard Of Review\n1. Trademarks Are Commercial Speech, Restrictions On Which Are Subject To Intermediate Scrutiny\n2. Strict Scrutiny Is Not Warranted Here\nB. Section 2(a) Cannot Survive Intermediate Scrutiny\n1. The Government Does Not Have A Substantial Interest In Prohibiting The Registration Of \"Immoral\" Or \"Scandalous\" Trademarks\na. The Government Has No Substantial Interest In Protecting Public Order And Morality Through The Trademark Registration System\nb. Protecting The Orderly Flow Of Commerce Is Not A Legitimate Governmental Interest In This Context\nc. Restrictions On Trademark Registrations Cannot Be Overcome By Mischaracterizing Trademarks As The Appearance Of Government Speech\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Immoral Or Scandalous Provision Is Not Narrowly Tailored To Achieve The Desired Objective\nII. The Immoral or Scandalous Provision Also is Void for Vagueness\nIII. The Trademark Registration System Is Not A Government Subsidy That Entitles The Government To Engage In Viewpoint Discrimination\nA. Trademark Registration Does Not Implicate Congress's Powers To Spend Or Control Government Property\nB. Under The Government's Position, Any Government Registration Program, Including That For Copyrights, Would Provide The Government With Censorship Rights",
        "reference": "2. Even If The Government Had A Substantial Interest, The Immoral Or Scandalous Provision Does Not Advance That Interest",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The City is permitted to insist that private entities contracting to carry out government programs comply with conditions central to those programs\nA. [MISSING]\nB. In addition to protecting the interests of children, the City's nondiscrimination policy furthers the City's permissible policy goal of eliminating unequal treatment of LGBTQ couples in the context of the City's own programs\nC. Requiring a private agency to abide by the terms of its contract with the City that are central to the City's program does not violate that party's First Amendment rights\nII. An alternative ruling would have dramatic implications, including for the protection of religious minorities",
        "reference": "A. The City of Philadelphia permissibly requires parties contracting to perform foster care services on behalf of the City to comply with the program's terms, including not to exclude suitable foster parents on the basis of characteristics unrelated to child welfare, such as sexual orientation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION THREATENS THE VITAL ROLE CORPORATIONS PLAY IN CREATING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AND ADDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES ABROAD\nA. The Coca-Cola Company's Efforts Demonstrate The Beneficial Impact Corporations Can Have Abroad\nB. Imposing ATS Liability For Corporate Oversight Would Deter These Efforts\nII. THE LACK OF CONSENSUS FOR EXTENDING INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUS TO CORPORATIONS STEMS IN PART FROM CONCERNS THAT DOING SO WILL COMPROMISE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIONS\nA. Recognizing Corporations As \"Subjects\" Of International Law Is Perceived To Compromise State Sovereignty\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. NEITHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES, NOR DOMESTIC SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES, PERMIT COURTS TO RECOGNIZE CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ATS\nA. The Lack Of International Law Consensus Regarding Corporate Liability Forecloses Such Liability Under The ATS\nB. To The Extent That Corporate Liability Poses A Domestic Law Question, It Is One That Congress Must Answer",
        "reference": "B. Acceptance Of Corporations As International Law Subjects Does Not Follow From The Fact That Some International Law Norms Have Been Deemed To Bind Individuals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. CERCLA's anti-preemption provisions directly address the issues of implied preemption that are central to this case\nII. Issues of implied preemption, like all other questions involving preemption, turn on the meaning of statutory language\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Geier and similar decisions do not control the application of CERCLA's broad anti-preemption provisions",
        "reference": "III. This Court has often read broad anti-preemption provisions to preclude implied preemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE IS DEBT COLLECTION ACCORDING TO THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE FDCPA\nA. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE FDCPA'S PURPOSES CONFIRM THAT THE STATUTE APPLIES TO NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS\nIII. THE FDCPA'S APPLICATION TO NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURES IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SOLICITUDE FOR HOMEOWNERS IN OUR LEGAL TRADITION\nIV. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES PARTICULAR RISKS FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN HOMEOWNERS",
        "reference": "B. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Attorneys Collect Debt \"Directly or Indirectly.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Casey plurality's undue-burden standard has been unworkable from the start\nA. The Casey plurality failed to provide an objective standard for determining whether a burden is \"undue.\"\nB. Over time, the undue-burden standard has proven to be nothing more than a vehicle for judges to make policy judgments\nC. The undue-burden standard has created intractable confusion among the lower courts\nD. The undue-burden standard treats abortion as a \"super right,\" shielding bad actors from accountability\nII. The viability rule is similarly arbitrary and unworkable\nA. The viability rule fails to honor the state interests involved\nB. There is scholarly consensus that the viability rule is arbitrary\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Scientific and medical advances since Roe and Casey underscore the standard's unworkability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT AMONG THE FEDERAL APPEALS COURTS OVER CORPORATE ATS LIABILITY\nII. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY STANDARD ADOPTED BY THE NINTH CIRCUIT CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS OF THIS COURT AND OTHER APPEALS COURTS\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. REVIEW IS WARRANTED IN LIGHT OF THE ADVERSE \"PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES\" OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ATS STANDARD",
        "reference": "III. IMMEDIATE REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO END ABUSIVE ATS SUITS WHOSE PRINCIPAL GOAL IS TO ATTRACT PUBLICITY BY KEEPING LITIGATION ALIVE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. APJ S ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS WHO MUST BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE\nA. Officers Are Principal Officers When, as Here, They Issue Adjudicative Decisions Not Reviewable by Any Superior Officer\n1. Clear Line-Drawing Is Necessary; A Multi-Factor Balancing Test Provides Congress with Inadequate Guidance Regarding the Principal/Inferior Distinction\n2. Removal Power Is Central to Challenges Under the Take-Care Clause but of Limited Relevance to Appointments Clause Challenges\nB. The Court Should Not Defer to Congress's Alleged Determination that APJs Are Inferior Officers\n1. There Is No \"Established Practice\" of Treating APJs as Inferior Officers\n2. Judicial Deference to the Other Branches' Constitutional Views Is Not Appropriate\nII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S REMEDY IS UNLAWFUL\nA. There Are Significant Judicial Restraints on a Severance Remedy\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Severance Is Unconstitutional When the Court Must Speculate Which of Several Ways Congress Might Resolve the Issue\nD. Severing Removal Protections Is Inconsistent with the Congressional Purpose of Inter Partes Review\nE. The Federal Circuit's Remedy Did Not Solve the Problem",
        "reference": "B. The Federal Circuit Attempted to Remedy the Wrong Issue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Not Allow Its Sui Generis Campaign-Finance Jurisprudence to Undermine First Amendment Protection in Other Areas of the Law\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Ruling Conflicts with This Court's Repeated Recognition That Compelled Disclosure Is Necessarily Chilling\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Below Conflicts with This Precedent\nIII. The Ninth Circuit Applied the Wrong Level of Scrutiny Because of the Multiplicity of Tests Called \"Exacting Scrutiny\"\nA. Strict Scrutiny Applies to Burdens on Charitable Solicitation\nB. The Ninth Circuit Applied Intermediate Scrutiny, in Conflict with This Precedent, Because of the Confusing and Conflicting Labels This Court Has Applied to Its Tests",
        "reference": "A. This Court Has Long Protected Private Association from Compelled Disclosure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 3 Directs Courts to Stay Litigation in Favor of Agreed-Upon Arbitration Absent Default\nB. A Party Is Not \"In Default\" Under Section 3 Absent a Violation of a Clear Rule or a Showing of Prejudice\nII. The Same Conclusion Would Follow Under Section 2 And Its Saving Clause\nA. Section 2 Prohibits Discrimination Against Arbitration but Does not Impose a Strict Equal-Treatment Principle or Govern the Timeliness of Demanding Arbitration Under a Valid Agreement\nB. When Parties Delay in Enforcing Contractual Rights, Estoppel and Laches, Not \"Waiver,\" Provide the Correct Framework and Require a Showing of Prejudice\nC. A Party That Waives a Contractual Right May Retract That Waiver Absent Prejudice to Other Parties\nIII. The Prejudice Requirement Best Advances The Aims Of The FAA While Foreclosing Gamesmanship",
        "reference": "I. Section 3 Of The FAA Directly Addresses The Question Here And Requires Affirmance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Is Incorrect\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Of The Statute Leads To Absurd And Pernicious Results\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Conflicts With The Principle Of Constitutional Avoidance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. Roe created an abortion right to insulate women from burdens that are greatly diminished or even nonexistent today\nA. Childrearing responsibilities are now easily avoidable without abortion\nB. Unwed pregnancy no longer causes devastating social stigma\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Roe errantly evaluated a state's interest in \"potential\" life instead of \"actual\" life\nIII. The viability standard, which has changed since Roe, is unworkable and arbitrary\nA. Casey's revised viability standard is unworkable, allowing doctors to abort children who are already sufficiently developed to live outside the womb\nB. The viability standard is arbitrary and denies protection to certain second-trimester children who, like \"viable\" unborn babies, will almost certainly live outside the womb eventually",
        "reference": "C. Pregnancy no longer bars employment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure or home entry that is reasonably necessary to protect health or safety\nA. The constitutionality of a non-investigatory search or seizure turns on its overall reasonableness, not a presumption that a warrant is required\nB. A warrantless seizure or home entry objectively justified by health or safety concerns and conducted in a reasonable manner is constitutionally permissible\nII. The warrantless search and seizures in this case were reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment\nA. The challenged actions in this case were reasonable under the circumstances\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. In the alternative, the respondent officers are entitled to qualified immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-389_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Will Have Wide-Ranging Effects On the OCS\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Is Incorrect\nA. State Law Is Applicable Only to Fill Gaps in Federal Law\nB. California Wage-and-Hour Laws Are Inconsistent With the FLSA for OCSLA Purposes",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Conflicts With Fifth Circuit Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Increasing Use of Oracle I as Binding or Persuasive Copyright Authority Warrants Supreme Court Review\nA. Courts in Multiple Circuits Treat Oracle I as Binding or Persuasive Authority for Copyright Disputes\nB. Cases With Patent and Copyright Claims Especially Rely on Oracle I as Binding Authority\n1. [MISSING]\n2. SAS Institute v. World Programming\nC. Legal Scholars Have Treated Oracle I as Important and Persuasive Authority, Including a Special Issue of the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology\nD. Stakeholders and the Copyright Office Have Relied on Oracle I in Rulemaking Proceedings\nE. Numerous Articles in the Legal and Technical Press Show the Importance of This Case\nII. The Federal Circuit's Copyright Decisions in This Case Conflict With Decisions From Other Circuits\nA. The Oracle I Copyrightability Decision Conflicts With Decisions From the Ninth, First, Second, and Sixth Circuits\nB. Oracle II's Cramped Fair Use Analysis Conflicts With the Holdings of This Court as Well as the Ninth and First Circuits\n1. Liberal and Flexible Fair Use Analysis Is Especially Crucial When Dealing With New, Functional Technologies\n2. Oracle II's Analysis of the Second and Third Fair Use Factors Conflicts With the Ninth Circuit",
        "reference": "1. Cisco v. Arista",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRES AN EXPRESS SHOWING OF ABROGATION OF TREATY RIGHTS\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE RIGHT TO HUNT ON \"UNOCCUPIED LANDS\" IS NOT EXTINGUISHED BY STATEHOOD OR BY THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL FOREST",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents lack Article III standing\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Brown and Taylor lack standing\nII. The Secretary's plan is lawful\nA. The HEROES Act authorizes the plan\n1. The plain text of the HEROES Act authorizes the plan\n2. Respondents' attempt to exclude discharge as a form of HEROES Act relief contradicts the Act's text\n3. Respondents' remaining statutory arguments lack merit\n4. The major questions doctrine provides no reason to depart from the statutory text\nB. The plan is reasonable and reasonably explained\nC. The Secretary's action was procedurally proper",
        "reference": "A. The States lack standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. PUBLIC SAFETY IS OF TRANSCENDENT VALUE TO OKLAHOMANS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Federal-Tribal Criminal Justice System Is Failing Oklahomans",
        "reference": "A. McGirt Has Confused Basic Jurisdictional Questions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Flawed even in the takings context, Williamson County has metastasized to interfere with other land-use claims, including RLUIPA claims\nII. Williamson County is particularly inappropriate in the context of RLUIPA land-use claims\nA. RLUIPA was intended to remedy burdensome and discriminatory actions by local land-use authorities\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Application of Williamson County to RLUIPA may encourage the use of burdensome and discriminatory procedures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents Lack Article III Standing\nA. It Was Decided Below that the Six Colorado Voters, Anderson, et al., Did Not Have Article III Standing\nB. As a Matter of Law, Anderson, et al., Lack Article III Standing\nC. [MISSING]\nII. To Answer the Certified Question on the Merits, the Court Would Have to Adjudicate Matters of Fact that Have Not Been Litigated \"At Law\"\nIII. The Matter Before the Court Is an Academic Question Cloaked in Juridical Trappings\nA. Baude v. Blackman: the Rarified Debate to Which the Court Has Been Invited\nB. It is an Invitation the Court Must Decline",
        "reference": "C. Standing as Antidote to \"Lawfare\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-7028_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Minnesota's courts were adequately apprised of the substance of the federal claim presented.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The lower courts failed to consider analogous conduct that Respondents regulate less or not at all.\nIV. Respondents failed to prove that alternatives being used in other jurisdictions are incapable of working in Minnesota.",
        "reference": "II. Minnesota's courts did not apply RLUIPA's \"to a person\" standard for the \"Compelling Interest\" test nor properly scrutinize comparable conduct the government does not regulate.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS INTENDED STATES TO VET THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT INTERSTATE NATURAL-GAS PROJECTS THROUGH THE FERC PROCESS, NOT VETOING PIPELINES' EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES A SIGNIFICANT HOLD-UP PROBLEM FOR PIPELINES WITH FERC-APPROVED ROUTES, AS COLUMBIA'S EXPERIENCE SHOWS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. GOVERNMENT HAS NO COMPELLING INTEREST IN AN AGENCY FEE TO OVERRIDE THE FIRST AMENDMENT\nA. Abood Failed to Properly Apply the Required First Amendment Scrutiny to Coerced Agency Fees\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THE AGENCY FEE ARE INVALID\nA. Plenty of Would-Be \"Free Riders\" Do Not Benefit From the Unions' Collective Bargaining Efforts\nB. The Free-Rider Rationale is Inherently Contradictory\nC. The Free-Rider Rationale Fails to Account for the Realities of Public-Sector Collective Bargaining\nD. While Unions Profess Concerns with Free Riders, They Free Ride on Taxpayers and Government Grace",
        "reference": "B. The Court Has Already Provided the Basis for Overruling Abood",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THERE IS NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND THEREFORE THERE IS NO ARTICLE III JURISDICTION",
        "reference": "I. PETITIONER DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LIMITS ON REMOVAL OF THE CFPB DIRECTOR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-389_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "The Fair Labor Standards Act, and not California wage-and-hour law, provides the enforceable federal law on the outer continental shelf\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Under OCSLA, state law is \"applicable\" only if needed to fill a gap in existing federal law\n2. The meaning of \"applicable\" adopted by respondent and the court below conflicts with OCSLA's text, context, history, and purpose\n3. The FLSA leaves no gap to fill, so California wage-and-hour law is not applicable under OCSLA\nB. California wage-and-hour law is \"inconsistent with\" federal law under 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2)(a)\n1. The meaning of \"not inconsistent with\" in Section 1333(a)(2)(A) derives from federal-enclave law\n2. The California wage-and-hour law governing respondent's claims is inconsistent with the FLSA\n3. The court of appeals' holding that California law is \"not inconsistent with\" the FLSA is mistaken\nC. The decision below would disrupt settled expectations and orderly administration on the OCS",
        "reference": "A. California wage-and-hour law is not \"applicable\" to the OCS within the meaning of 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2)(a)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Constitution protects the independence of the Office of the President from the States\n1. Article II guarantees the independence of the Office of the President\n2. The Constitution grants the Office of the President heightened protection from the States\nB. State grand-jury subpoenas for a sitting President's personal records threaten the independence of the Office of the President\n1. State grand-jury subpoenas expose the President to the prospect of harassment and threaten to divert his time and energy from his official duties\n2. Subpoenas for a President's personal records pose particularly serious risks when issued by States\n3. The lack of historical precedent for the subpoena here underscores the constitutional concerns it poses\n4. State grand-jury subpoenas continue to pose risks to the Office of the President when they seek personal records in the hands of a third-party custodian\nC. At a minimum, state grand-jury subpoenas for the President's personal records must satisfy a heightened standard of need, which the District Attorney has not met here\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The District Attorney has not satisfied the minimum constitutional standard",
        "reference": "1. Precedent supports requiring a heightened showing of need before a state grand jury may issue a subpoena for the President's personal records",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Giving public schools universal jurisdiction over student speech chills religious speech\nA. Petitioner's rule sweeps far too broadly\nB. Petitioner's rule gives students and administrators a heckler's veto to suppress religious speech\nC. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure\nII. Giving public schools universal jurisdiction over student speech interferes with the right of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Parental rights do not evaporate when parents send their children to public school\nC. Applying Tinker to off-campus speech \"unreasonably interferes\" with parental rights",
        "reference": "A. Parents have the right to direct the religious upbringing of their children",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari Should Be Granted\nII. The Court Should Decide How Marks Applies to the Plurality Opinions in Tam\nIII. The Scandalous Clause Is a Restriction on Speech\nA. Tam Held that the Disparagement Clause Is a Restriction on Free Speech; the Scandalous Clause Is No Different\nB. Use of a Scandalous Mark Could Be Totally Prohibited if the Scandalous Clause Were Constitutional\nIV. The Scandalous Clause Is Viewpoint Regulation\nA. The Scandalous Clause Cannot Be Reasonably Interpreted as Limited to Profanity, Excretory and Sexual References\nB. All Profanity, Excretory or Sexual Refusals Are Based Upon Offensiveness\nC. Profanity Expresses Viewpoint\nD. All Scandalous Clause Refusals Are Based Upon Viewpoint\nE. The Refusal in This Case Was Inextricably Intertwined With Brunetti's Core Speech Viewpoints\nV. The Government Advances Arguments that Were Explicitly or Implicitly Rejected in Tam\nA. Trademark Registration Is Not a Government Subsidy\nB. Spending Clause\nC. Time and Place/Limited Public Forum\nD. Government Speech\nVI. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "VI. The Scandalous Clause Is Unconstitutionally Vague",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS DEEPLY IMPORTANT\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Hyatt's Defense Of Hall Relies On A Selective And Incorrect Reading Of Precedents\nB. Stare Decisis Considerations Are At Their Weakest Here",
        "reference": "II. HALL WAS WRONGLY DECIDED, AND STARE DECISIS IS NO REASON TO PRESERVE IT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES NUMEROUS OBSTACLES TO THE PROPER OPERATION OF CERCLA\nA. The Decision Below Obstructs Implementation Of The CERCLA-Mandated National Contingency Plan\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Decision Below Flouts CERCLA's Bar On Legal Challenges To An EPA-Crafted Cleanup Plan\nD. The Decision Below Disrupts CERCLA's Settlement Scheme\nE. The Decision Below Disrupts CERCLA's Contribution Scheme\nII. THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT'S FAULTY CONSTRUCTION OF CERCLA'S SAVINGS CLAUSES CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S CASE LAW ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SAVINGS CLAUSES AND FEDERAL LAW\nA. The Montana Supreme Court Erroneously Adopted The Broadest Possible Reading Of CERCLA's Savings Clauses\nB. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Conflicts With This Court's Cases Addressing The Proper Scope Of A Remedies Savings Clause\nIII. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT CASE THAT WARRANTS REVIEW\nA. The Decision Below Creates Large And Immediate Adverse Consequences\nB. The Decision Below Disrupts Our Federalized System Of Government",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Flouts CERCLA's Bar On Independent Site Cleanups",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "ERISA [MISSING]\nA. The Arkansas statute does not make \"reference to\" ERISA plans\nB. The Arkansas statute does not have an impermissible \"connection with\" ERISA plans\n1. The Arkansas statute has only an indirect economic effect on the choices of ERISA plans\n2. Respondent's counterarguments lack merit",
        "reference": "ERISA does not preempt Arkansas's regulation of the rates at which pharmacy benefits managers reimburse pharmacies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "New [MISSING]\nA. New York's licensing regime accords with longstanding historical restrictions, and is especially important in light of today's handgun environment\n1. The handgun industry has shifted production from revolvers to high-capacity semiautomatic pistols\n2. The modern handgun is designed for superior lethality\na. The ammunition capacity of handguns has increased dramatically\nb. Today's handguns use ammunition designed for increased lethality\nB. New York's licensing regime furthers the state's public safety goals because handguns are not particularly effective for self-defense\nC. New York's licensing regime is a legitimate restriction in light of the reported incidents of killings by concealed permit holders\n1. Numerous police officers have been killed by concealed carry permit holders\n2. Concealed carry permit holders have also committed numerous mass shootings",
        "reference": "New York's \"Proper Cause\" Licensing Regime Is A Legitimate Restriction On Any Private Right To Carry A Concealed Firearm In Public",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the longstanding American Rule, litigants presumptively bear their own legal fees and expenses\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. In keeping with the American Rule, this Court has held that nontaxable expenses such as expert fees will be exacted from the losing party only with express statutory authorization\nIV. The bare term \"full costs\" in section 505 of the Copyright Act does not warrant departing from the American Rule and the limited set of taxable costs specified by Congress",
        "reference": "II. The American Rule grew out of judicial reluctance to chill good-faith litigation without direction from Congress",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. A TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED PURSUANT TO A TREATY IS AN \"INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL\" WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 1782\nA. In This Case, An International Tribunal Has Been Constituted Pursuant To An Investment Treaty Between Russia and Lithuania\nB. There Is Nothing In The Plain Language of Section 1782 That Would Justify Excluding The Tribunal In This Case From The Class of International Tribunals Eligible For Discovery\nC. Nothing Else In The 1964 Act Dictates The Exclusion This Tribunal From The Class Of \"International Tribunals\" Eligible For Discovery Under Section 1782\nD. Section 1782 Does Not Conflict With The Federal Arbitration Act\nII. SECTION 1782'S HISTORIC CONTEXT ALSO DICTATES THAT THE TRIBUNAL IN THIS CASE SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE CLASS OF \"INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS\" ELIGIBLE FOR DISCOVERY UNDER SECTION 1782\nA. Section 1782's Legislative History Directly Ties \"International Tribunal\" To International Arbitrations Arising Under Treaties\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION WAS CORRECT",
        "reference": "B. The Tribunal In This Case Is Substantively Similar To The Tribunals Charged With Adjudicating The Claims Of Individuals Against Sovereigns Predating 1964",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The question presented warrants review in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Secretary has permissibly included in the Medicare fraction all patient days of patients who satisfy the requirements to be \"entitled to\" benefits under the Medicare Part A program\nA. The Secretary's approach to the Medicare fraction embodies the best reading of the statute's text in light of its context, structure, history, and purpose\n1. The Secretary's approach to the Medicare fraction reflects the best reading of the relevant statutory text\n2. Other provisions of the Medicare Act confirm the Secretary's interpretation of the Medicare fraction\n3. [MISSING]\nB. The Secretary's approach embodies at a minimum a reasonable interpretation that warrants deference\nII. The court of appeals erred in concluding that the Medicare Act clearly forecloses the Secretary's interpretation",
        "reference": "3. The statutory structure, history, and purpose further support the Secretary's interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Only narrow categories of regulatory actions qualify as per se takings\nB. The access regulation does not fall within any category of per se takings\nC. Penn Central provides the appropriate framework for evaluating a Takings Clause challenge to the access regulation\nII. The per se theories advanced by petitioners and their amici are unsound\nA. Petitioners' theory that any access right akin to an easement effects a per se taking is unsupported and unworkable\nB. Petitioners' amici identify no persuasive alternative rationale for applying a per se rule\nC. The per se theories advanced by petitioners and their amici would imperil an array of state and federal policies",
        "reference": "I. The access regulation does not effect a per se taking",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1432_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Immigration judges adjudicate torture claims within an overtaxed system lacking sufficient safeguards against error\nA. The United States is committed, by treaty, to refrain from removal to torture in all cases\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The need for robust judicial review is critical given the various crimes that can be swept up by Section 1252(a)(2)(C)\nA. Section 1252(a)(2)(C) applies to a wide array of criminal conduct\nB. Traditional judicial review promotes important democratic values in this important class of cases\nIII. CAT protection is distinct from traditional immigration relief\nA. CAT relief conveys unique rights and limitations\nB. In many cases, Immigration Judges adjudicating protection claims do not enter removal orders at all\nIV. The Government's reading of Section 1252(a)(2)(C) is constitutionally doubtful\nA. Jurisdiction-stripping precedent has not adequately grappled with the Constitution's vesting of judicial power in the courts\nB. Jurisdiction-stripping in this context raises problematic due process concerns",
        "reference": "B. The administrative immigration system fails to adequately safeguard against fact errors leading to the denial of mandatory protection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-199_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Board Decisions Denying Requests to Reopen\nA. The Text of Sections 355(f) and 231g Confirm that All Final Board Decisions Are Reviewable\nB. Board Decisions Denying Reopening Are Final\nC. The Presumption of Judicial Review Supports Reviewability\nD. Policies Underlying the Statute Support Judicial Review\nII. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Califano v. Sanders Does Not Justify Cutting Off Judicial Review Under the RRA and RUIA",
        "reference": "A. Congress Did Not Insulate All Board Decisions Outside Section 355(c) from Judicial Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE HOBBS ACT DOES NOT PRECLUDE A DISTRICT COURT FROM DECIDING LEGAL QUESTIONS IN TCPA ENFORCEMENT SUITS BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES\nA. The Hobbs Act Solely Addresses Suits Against The Government Seeking Equitable Or Declaratory Relief From Unlawful Agency Action\nB. The Administrative Procedure Act Confirms That A Defendant Generally May Challenge Agency Action In A Judicial Enforcement Proceeding\nC. The Presumption Of Reviewability Of Agency Action Supports Construing The Hobbs Act Narrowly\nD. The Fourth Circuit's Interpretation Of The Hobbs Act Raises Grave Constitutional Concerns That Can And Should Be Avoided\n1. The Fourth Circuit's Interpretation Raises Grave Due Process Concerns\n2. The Fourth Circuit's Interpretation Raises Severe Separation Of Powers Concerns\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. ALTERNATIVELY, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE FCC'S INTERPRETATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE THE AGENCY STATEMENTS AT ISSUE ARE NOT BINDING ON THE COURTS OR ANY PRIVATE PARTY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THIS CASE IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT TO CLARIFY THE PROCESS FOR RESOLVING AS-APPLIED METHOD OF EXECUTION CLAIMS",
        "reference": "I. RESPONDENTS' ONE-SIDED VIEW OF THE FACTS DEMONSTRATES THE UNRELIABILITY OF THE LITIGATION PROCESS THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT ENDORSED.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE HAS BECOME HOPELESSLY UNMOORED FROM THE CONSTITUTION'S ORIGINAL MEANING\nII. A PUBLIC MEMORIAL FEATURING RELIGIOUS IMAGERY IS NOT A LAW RESPECTING AN ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION\nA. The Establishment Clause in its Historical Context\nB. The Phrase \"Establishment of Religion\" in the Founding Era\nC. Evidence from the Early Republic Illuminates How Narrow the Scope of the Establishment Clause Originally Was\nIII. UPHOLDING THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT AND WIDESPREAD CONSEQUENCES\nA. The Town of Taos's Inextricable Link to the Bataan Death March\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Broader Implications",
        "reference": "B. The Taos Memorial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief039.pdf",
        "text": "I. Nothing in the Twentieth Amendment's text or history prohibits states from removing disqualified insurrectionist candidates from their ballots.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Cases interpreting the Twentieth Amendment have uniformly interpreted it in line with its text and history.",
        "reference": "II. Nothing in the Twentieth Amendment's text or history conveys to Congress any power \u2014 much less exclusive power \u2014 to determine whether presidential candidates are disqualified.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Fidelity to the ATS' purpose \u2014 ensuring redress for international law violations implicating U.S. responsibility \u2014 disposes of both questions presented\nII. The ATS may apply to injuries abroad\nA. Kiobel's \"touch and concern\" test governs the extraterritoriality analysis in the unique context of an ATS case, and does not incorporate Morrison's \"focus\" test\nB. Even if the \"focus\" inquiry applied, the claims against U.S. nationals are at the heart of the ATS's focus\nIII. U.S. corporations are not immune from suit\nA. Federal common law governs the issue of whether corporations can be sued under the ATS\n1. The text of the ATS requires that federal common law governs corporate liability\n2. Sosa and international law direct courts to apply federal common law\n3. Courts generally look to federal liability rules to effectuate federal causes of action\n4. Congress' purpose of providing a federal forum suggests that who can be sued must be determined by common law rules\nB. Federal common law provides for corporate liability\nC. The ATS's history and purposes support corporate liability\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. This Court should not create a new immunity for corporations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-340_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A defendant satisfies 18 U.S.C. 3553(f)(1) only if he does not have more than four criminal-history points, does not have a three-point offense, and does not have a two-point violent offense\nA. Context determines what \"and\" connects\nB. Context makes clear that Section 3553(f)(1) uses \"and\" to connect three criteria, each modified by the phrase \"does not have\"\n1. Only the distributive interpretation avoids rendering subparagraph (A) entirely superfluous\n2. Only the distributive interpretation avoids turning Section 3553(f)(1) into an arbitrary measure of a defendant's criminal history\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner incorrectly characterizes this case as about whether \"and\" means \"or\"\nB. Context does not support petitioner's view of what \"and\" connects\n1. Petitioner cannot square his implicit-bracket reading with the antisurplusage canon\na. Petitioner's efforts to avoid superfluity misunderstand the Sentencing Guidelines\nb. Petitioner provides no sound reason to disregard the antisurplusage canon here\n2. Petitioner cannot square his implicit-bracket reading with congressional design and common sense\n3. Petitioner's arguments against the distributive interpretation are mistaken\na. The distributive interpretation is textually sound\nb. The distributive interpretation is consistent with canons of construction\nc. The distributive interpretation is consistent with legislative intent\nC. Petitioner's reliance on the rule of lenity is misplaced",
        "reference": "II. Petitioner's arguments lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.59
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "For Applying The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality To Limit Damages Caused By The Very Foreign Combinations ION Intended In Violating Section 271(f) Are Unsound\nA. ION's Arguments Depend on the Demonstrably False Premise That Petitioner Seeks to Recover for a Foreign Injury\nB. Even if the Presumption Applies, the Plain Text and Evident Intent of Section 271(f) Satisfy It\nC. [MISSING]\nD. ION's Policy Arguments Miss the Mark",
        "reference": "C. The Presumption Does Not Apply to Damages for Injuries Congress Plainly Intended to Redress",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A plaintiff must prove retaliatory intent to prevail in a civil action under 18 U.S.C. 1514A\nA. The text of Section 1514A demonstrates that retaliatory intent is an element of a plaintiff's claim\nB. Section 1514A's incorporation of AIR-21's burden-of-proof provisions does not eliminate the requirement for a plaintiff to prove retaliatory intent\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The contrary interpretation of Section 1514A would interfere with the employer-employee relationship",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-778_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Taylor Requires Criminal Intent At Initial Trespass\nII. Contemporaneous State Practice Defeats The Government's Maximalist Reading Of Taylor\nA. \"Entry-Only\" States Are Central To The Question Presented\nB. Most \"Remaining\" Burglary States Required Proof Of Trespass To Commit A Crime\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Requiring Intent With Initial Trespass Furthers Congress's Purpose Of Reserving ACCA's Harsh Penalties For Violent Career Criminals\nV. Lenity And Avoidance Doctrines Foreclose The Government's Position",
        "reference": "III. Taylor's Other Authorities Support Quarles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Structured the Individual Mandate and the Shared Responsibility Payment as Separate Provisions of the ACA\nII. NFIB v. Sebelius Held That the Individual Mandate, Standing Alone, Is Unconstitutional\nA. Parts III-A and -B held that the mandate cannot be sustained under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause, or under the taxing power, respectively\nB. Part III-C upheld section 5000A under a \"saving construction.\"\nC. Part III-C, but not -B, held that section 5000A gave people a \"lawful choice to do or not do a certain act.\"\nD. Part III-D affirms that Part III-C's analysis is limited to the saving construction\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The private plaintiffs in NFIB asserted an Article III injury based on the mandate, not the penalty\nB. John Nantz and Neill Hurley, the private plaintiffs here, assert an Article III injury based on the mandate, not the penalty\nC. The TCJA did not render the individual mandate \"toothless\" for purposes of Article III standing\nIV. The Individual Mandate Can No Longer Be Saved, Because the TCJA Zeroed Out the Shared Responsibility Payment\nV. Under Frost v. Corp. Comm'n of Oklahoma, the Legislative \"Will\" of the 115th Congress That Enacted TCJA section 11081 Is a \"Nullity\"\nA. Section 11081 of the TCJA Created a Frosty \"Convergent Constitutional Violation\" with Section 5000A of the ACA\nB. But the Court cannot enjoin TCJA section 11081\nC. The 115th Congress's legislative \"will\" should be deemed a \"nullity\" because it flouted NFIB's saving construction\nVI. The Individual Mandate Is Unconstitutional, So GICR Can Be Declared Unenforceable for Individual-Market, Off-Exchange Policies",
        "reference": "III. Plaintiffs Hurley and Nantz Assert the Same Injury that NFIB's Private Plaintiffs Did",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. Permit Holders are Extremely Law-abiding\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Discriminatory Nature of May-Issue Laws\nIV. The Impact of Concealed Handgun Permit Fees and Training Requirements on The Type of People Who Get Permits",
        "reference": "II. A Review of Regression Literature",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-483_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Circuits Are in Conflict over Whether Laws Directing the Disposition of Fetal Remains Impermissibly Attribute Constitutional Personhood to Human Fetuses\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Public Officials Need Guidance on Whether Accommodation of the Ancient Common Law Right of Sepulcher Renders a Fetal Disposition Law Unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A whistleblower need not prove his employer acted with \"retaliatory intent\" as part of his case in chief under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Prior construction of SOX's burden-shifting framework confirms that plaintiff need not prove \"retaliatory intent\" in his case in chief\nII. No legal or practical concerns entitled the Second Circuit to ignore the burden-shifting framework prescribed by SOX",
        "reference": "A. SOX's text makes clear the plaintiff need not prove \"retaliatory intent\" in his case in chief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. FAA Preemption Of PAGA Is Unconstitutional Because States Have Broad Powers To Design And Control The Enforcement Of State-Created Rights\nII. The Clear Text Of The FAA Demonstrates The FAA Does Not Govern This Case\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The FAA Cannot Block The State Of California's Enforcement Of Its Own Labor Code Because The State Of California Is Not A Party To The Arbitration Agreement",
        "reference": "III. The Historical Understanding Of Arbitration Law And The FAA's Legislative History Demonstrate That The FAA Was Never Intended To Override State Sovereignty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A registration to prescribe drugs under the CSA is limited to prescriptions for a legitimate medical purpose in the usual course of a medical practice\nB. The wholly subjective views of a physician who has not reasonably tried to practice medicine as conventionally understood do not preclude conviction under Section 841(a)\n1. The CSA prohibits a physician from self-defining the scope of his medical practice\n2. This Court has recognized that a physician can violate Section 841(a) when he fails to make an \"honest effort\" to rely in \"good faith\" on his DEA registration\n3. Congress designed the CSA to allow for the prosecution of doctors who elevate their own views of acceptable medicine above the medical community's\nC. Petitioners' arguments for a solely subjective definition of lawful prescribing practices under Section 841(a) are unsound\n1. Petitioners' construction of Section 841(a) is textually foreclosed and unnecessary\n2. The terms of the regulatory standard do not invite self-definition of medicine\n3. The regulatory standard does not contain an independent wholly subjective component\n4. The legal standard for physician prosecutions under Section 841(a) is not unconstitutionally vague\n5. Reference to the usual course of professional practice respects the tradition of state medical regulation\n6. Petitioners' practical concerns are unsupported\nII. PETITIONERS' CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED\nA. The juries in petitioners' cases were sufficiently instructed on the requirements of Section 841(a)\nB. Any instructional defect was harmless",
        "reference": "I. DISPENSING DRUGS WITHOUT ANY OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE EFFORT TO ACTUALLY PRACTICE MEDICINE VIOLATES 21 U.S.C. 841(a)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. SECTION 1 DOES NOT EXEMPT INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AGREEMENTS FROM THE FAA\nA. Independent Contractor Agreements Are Not \"Contracts of Employment\"\nB. \"Contracts of Employment\" Must Be Identified By The Terms Of The Contract Alone\nC. Respondent's Operating Agreements Are Not \"Contracts of Employment\"",
        "reference": "I. APPLICABILITY OF THE FAA SECTION 1 EXEMPTION IS AN ARBITRABILITY ISSUE THAT THE PARTIES DELEGATED TO AN ARBITRATOR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. PROPOSITION 12 VIOLATES THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. California's Purported Local Interests Do Not Justify the Burdens Prop 12 Places on Interstate Commerce\nII. CALIFORNIA'S ONEROUS REGULATION OF THE NATION'S PORK INDUSTRY VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY",
        "reference": "A. Prop 12 Severely Burdens Interstate Commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit's Reach-the-Full-Scope Standard Defies Text, Precedent, History, and Policy\nA. The Federal Circuit's Reach-the-Full-Scope Standard Finds No Support in section 112\nB. This Court's Precedents Refute the Federal Circuit's Test\nC. Centuries of Enablement Practice Refute a Reach-the-Full-Scope Test\nD. The Federal Circuit's Reach-the-Full-Scope Standard Defies Patent-Law Policy and Harms Innovation\nII. The Statutory \"Make and Use\" Standard Should Govern\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The \"Make and Use\" Statutory Standard Fully Addresses Concerns About Overbroad Claims\nIII. Amgen's Patents Are Enabled",
        "reference": "A. The Statute Provides a Practical Test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOOD-FAITH DEFENSE FOR DOCTORS ACCUSED OF MISPRESCRIBING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES HAS BEEN PART OF FEDERAL LAW FOR OVER 100 YEARS\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE CSA PREVENTS STATES FROM EXERCISING THEIR SUPERIOR JUDGMENT OVER REGULATION WITHIN THEIR BORDERS\nA. Section 841(a)(1) Regulates a Narrow Scope of Conduct\nB. Without a Scienter Requirement, the CSA Effectively Regulates the Practice of Medicine\nC. Patients Benefit from State Control Over Medical Practices\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. There Is No One Discernable \"Usual Course of Their Professional Practice\" to which Practitioners Can Conform Their Conduct\nB. An Objective Standard Turns the Vague Requirements of Section 841(a)(1) into a Strict Liability Crime for Doctors",
        "reference": "III. WITHOUT A SUBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH COMPONENT, PRESCRIBING PHYSICIANS DON'T KNOW WHEN THEIR CONDUCT IS AT RISK OF PUNISHMENT UNDER THE STATUTE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1017_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Four Judges' Dual Officeholding Terminated Their Military Service\nIII. The Government's Position Raises Serious Constitutional Questions\nIV. This Court Can \u2014 and Should \u2014 Reverse All Eight Judgments Below",
        "reference": "I. The Four Judges' Dual Officeholding Violated section 973(b)(2)(A)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1363_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1226(C) IMPOSES MANDATORY DETENTION ON ALIENS WHO ARE REMOVABLE FOR ANY OF THE REASONS SPECIFIED IN THE STATUTE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1226(c)(1) Directs Immigration Officers to Take Custody of Criminal Aliens as Soon as They Are Released from Criminal Custody\nC. The Mandatory Nature of Detention Provided for in Section 1226(c) Does not Dissipate if Immigration Officials Delay Taking Criminal Aliens into Custody\nD. The Aliens \"Described\" in Section 1226(c)(1) \u2014and Thereby Made Subject to Mandatory Detention \u2014Are Those Specified in Subparagraphs (A) through (D)\nII. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1226(C) CONFIRMS THAT CRIMINAL ALIENS DO NOT GAIN EXEMPTION FROM MANDATORY DETENTION IF THEY ARE NOT TAKEN INTO CUSTODY IMMEDIATELY\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD DIRECT DECERTIFICATION OF THE PLAINTIFF CLASSES WHEN THE CASE IS REMANDED FOR CONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS' DUE PROCESS CLAIMS",
        "reference": "A. Congress Cut Back on Immigration Officers' Broad Discretion to Detain or Release Criminal Aliens",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Was Correct Because Congress Did Not Confer The Sovereign Power Of The United States On SEC ALJs\nA. Congress Creates an Office Only when It Delegates Sovereign Power in the Form of Authority to Bind the Government or Third Parties\nB. Congress Did Not Delegate Sovereign Authority to SEC ALJs Because They Lack the Power to Render and Enforce Final, Binding Decisions\nII. Any Ruling That SEC ALJs Are Inferior Officers Should Not Control For ALJs In Other Agencies\nA. The \"Significant Authority\" Test May Play Out Differently across Agencies when Agency-Specific ALJ Duties Are Considered\nB. [MISSING]\nC. SSA Judges Exemplify Why ALJs Are Not Inferior Officers\nIII. This Court Should Not Reach The Removal Question, But The APA Provisions Regarding Removal Are Constitutional\nA. The Removal Question is Not Presented\nB. The APA Removal Provision Is Constitutional Because ALJs Perform Quasi-Judicial Functions and the APA Permits Sufficient Executive Control",
        "reference": "B. SEC ALJs Exercise Significantly More Authority than Most Other ALJs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Right to Control\" Theory of Mail and Wire Fraud Conflicts with the Statutory Text.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. State courts have carefully crafted the scope and remedies for civil fraudulent inducement claims.\nB. The federal government's position would criminalize many fraudulent inducements, yielding harmful consequences.\nIII. The Court Should Reject the Right-to-Control Theory and Limit the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Core Fraud.",
        "reference": "II. Adopting the \"Right to Control\" Theory of Mail and Wire Fraud Would Lead to Harmful Consequences.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Kansas prosecuted respondents for fraud on the federal employment verification system\nA. Kansas misrepresents the nature of these prosecutions\nB. Kansas has not invoked its tax laws\nII. Preemption here is \"as applied.\"\nIII. IRCA expressly preempts these prosecutions\nA. IRCA bars States from prosecuting fraud on the federal employment verification system\nB. Kansas would eviscerate IRCA's preemption provisions\nC. The statute is limited in scope\nIV. IRCA impliedly preempts these prosecutions\nA. IRCA preempts the field of fraud on the federal employment verification system\nB. These state prosecutions conflict with comprehensive federal law\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. States may not prosecute W-4 fraud",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Reconstruction Amendments Were Born Out of the Civil War and Intended to Ensure the Worst Abuses in Our Nation's History Are Not Repeated.\nII. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment Is Self-Executing and Does Not Present a Nonjusticiable Political Question.\nA. Section 3, Like the Other Substantive Provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments, Is Self-Executing.\nB. The Insurrectionist Bar in Section 3 Does Not Present a Nonjusticiable Political Question.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This Court Has a Constitutional Responsibility to Apply the Fourteenth Amendment and Avoid Repeating Its Gravest Mistakes.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1144_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text, Structure, History, And Purpose Of section 7212(a) Confirm That It Has A Pending Proceeding Requirement\nA. Section 7212(a)'s \"Due Administration\" Clause Concerns Obstruction Of Pending Proceedings\nB. The Government's Interpretation Cannot Be Reconciled With The Rest Of section 7212(a)\nC. Section 7212(a)'s Legislative History Supports A Pending Proceeding Requirement\nD. The Government's \"Purpose\" Arguments Are Unavailing\nII. The Government's Interpretation Cannot Be Reconciled With The Code's Substantive Offenses\nA. The Government's Interpretation Creates Glaring Incongruities\nB. Section 7212(a) Should Be Construed To Avoid Those Glaring Incongruities\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. To The Extent The Court Finds section 7212(a) Ambiguous, The Rule Of Lenity Warrants Reversal",
        "reference": "III. The Government's Interpretation Reaches Conduct Congress Never Intended To Criminalize And Poses A Grave Danger of Prosecutorial Abuse",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Adams has not established standing.\nII. The political balance provisions do not violate the First Amendment.\nA. Adams lacks any convincing argument that the Elrod-Branti line of decisions invalidates Article IV, Section 3.\nB. The political balance provisions are not subject to strict scrutiny.\nC. Delaware is free to achieve politically balanced courts by constitutional rule.\nD. The political balance provisions are narrowly tailored to a compelling interest in promoting public confidence in the courts.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The narrow tailoring requirement.\nE. Amici's alternative theories should either be disregarded or rejected.\nIII. The severability ruling cannot be defended.\nA. The Court should not invalidate a bare majority provision that does not and cannot injure Adams.\nB. The bare majority provision is severable under the traditional two-part test.",
        "reference": "1. The compelling interest requirement.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Resolve The Deep Disagreement Among The Lower Courts.\nII. New York's \"Proper Cause\" Regime Plainly Violates The Second Amendment.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This Is An Excellent Vehicle To Resolve This Exceptionally Important Question.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Java Standard Library is copyrightable\nA. The Copyright Act makes clear that computer code is copyrightable despite its functional character\nB. Section 102(b) does not foreclose copyright protection for respondent's work\nC. The merger doctrine is inapplicable\nD. Petitioner's policy arguments are unpersuasive\nII. Petitioner's copying was not fair use\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner's remaining fair use arguments lack merit",
        "reference": "A. Petitioner's commercial copying harmed the market for respondent's work and was not transformative",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fourteenth Amendment and Section 1983 Elevate Federal Courts as a Vital Forum for the Vindication of Federal Constitutional Rights\nII. S.B.8's \"Novel\" Enforcement Scheme Cannot Evade Federal Judicial Review\nA. State Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Suit Against State Judicial Officers Under These Circumstances\nB. S.B.8 Gives State Judicial Officers an Outsized Role in Private Litigants' Ability to Enforce the Statute, Thus Confirming State Judicial Officers as Proper Defendants for Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Relief\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. Inaction by This Court Threatens to Upend All Manner of Constitutional Rights and Protections",
        "reference": "C. This Court's Precedent Makes Clear That Judicial Enforcement of a Patently Unconstitutional Law Confers the Requisite State Action to Implicate the Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Real property that contains human remains is subject to unique common law doctrines that limit the rights of the fee owner to exclude others\nII. When Ms. Knick acquired her real property, it was subject to the common law protections afforded to cemeteries regardless of a formal dedication or record title\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Many states have codified the common law right of access; none have been held to be takings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The State concedes that the majority's change-every-election standard is wrong\nC. Plaintiffs' claim neither outlaws politics in redistricting nor favors the status quo ante\nD. Plaintiffs proved specific intent\nE. Plaintiffs proved burden and causation\nF. The floodgates will remain closed\nG. The Court cannot and should not affirm on alternative grounds",
        "reference": "A. Article III courts are capable of detecting constitutional burdens in cases like this",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Decision Below Is A \"Palpable Evasion\" Of Stolt-Nielsen\nB. The Panel Decision Also Runs Afoul Of The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration\nII. Summary Reversal Is Warranted",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Patently Violates The FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1011_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The International Organizations Immunities Act affords designated international organizations the same jurisdictional immunity as is currently enjoyed by foreign states\nA. The text, structure, and history of the IOIA support application of the same immunity enjoyed by foreign states to international organizations\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The court of appeals' view of international organization immunity would present practical problems and is not required by respondent's policy concerns",
        "reference": "B. The conduct of the political Branches following enactment of the IOIA supports affording international organizations the jurisdictional immunity currently enjoyed by foreign sovereigns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-419_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "West Virginia may not tax retirement benefits of federal law-enforcement officers more heavily than it taxes retirement benefits of comparable state law-enforcement officers\nA. Section 111 prohibits a State from subjecting federal employees to heavier taxation than similarly situated state employees\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals identified no sound reason for finding Section 111 to be inapplicable here",
        "reference": "B. Unless respondent can identify significant differences between Mr. Dawson and the state law-enforcement officers who receive a total state tax exemption, the inconsistent treatment between them violates Section 111",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Elections Clause Vests Redistricting Power in the North Carolina General Assembly, not the North Carolina Courts\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina Violates the Elections Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "A Government's post-filing change in policy does not moot a nominal-damages claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress provided individuals with a nominal-damages remedy in Section 1983 to give them \"effectual relief\" from state actors' constitutional violations\nC. The Eleventh Circuit's \"practical effects\" test for Article III mootness creates serious separation of powers problems, because it judicially strips Section 1983 plaintiffs of the \"effectual relief\" Congress gave them",
        "reference": "A. Nominal damages have provided individuals \"effectual relief\" since common law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The system Harvard defends is at odds with its stated goal of diversity.\nA. Harvard's favoritism towards ALDCs is racially unfair and thwarts Harvard's stated goal of promoting racial and socioeconomic diversity.",
        "reference": "I. Harvard was presented with workable race-neutral alternatives to its race-based admissions program.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Seminole Rock and Auer should be clarified and narrowed\nA. Seminole Rock deference raises serious concerns\n1. The basis for Seminole Rock deference is unclear\n2. Seminole Rock deference is in tension with the APA's distinction between legislative and interpretive rules\n3. Overly broad deference to agency interpretations can have harmful practical consequences\nB. Seminole Rock deference should be subject to certain prerequisites\n1. Courts should apply Seminole Rock deference only after exhausting all the traditional tools of interpretation and determining that the agency has reasonably interpreted any genuine ambiguity\n2. [MISSING]\nII. Appropriately limited, Seminole Rock and Auer should not be overruled\nA. Stare decisis counsels against overruling Seminole Rock deference\n1. Congress could alter Seminole Rock deference\n2. Overruling Seminole Rock deference would upset significant private reliance interests\n3. Overruling Seminole Rock deference would impose practical costs on courts and regulated parties\nB. Petitioner fails to offer sufficient special justifications for overruling, rather than narrowing, the decisions\nIII. The judgment should be affirmed",
        "reference": "2. Courts should apply Seminole Rock deference only if the agency's interpretation represents its fair, considered, and consistent judgment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.53
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS SUBJECT TO THE CONVENTION\nA. Domestic Doctrines Like Equitable Estoppel Apply to Arbitration Agreements Subject to the Convention Absent a \"Conflict.\"\nB. Neither Chapter 2 nor the Convention Conflicts with Equitable Estoppel\n1. Chapter 2 Does Not Conflict With Equitable Estoppel\n2. The Convention Does Not Conflict With Equitable Estoppel\nII. THE DECISION BELOW WAS WRONG\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Eleventh Circuit's Reasoning Cannot Be Reconciled With Arthur Andersen\nC. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision Is Internally Inconsistent\nD. Respondents' Reliance on the Word \"Parties\" Is Both Beside the Point and Wrong\nE. Reading section 2 to Bar Enforcement by Non-Signatories Would Undermine the Convention's Goals",
        "reference": "A. The Eleventh Circuit Misconstrued the Convention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Implications of Interpreting \"Person\" to Include the Government\nB. Implications of Interpreting \"Person\" to Exclude the Government\nII. SECTION 18 OF THE AIA DEFINES THOSE WHO MAY BRING A CBM PROCEEDING DIFFERENTLY FROM THOSE WHO MAY BRING IPR AND PGR PROCEEDINGS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 311(a) AND 321(a)\nIII. HISTORICAL PRACTICE ALLOWED U.S. GOVERNMENT TO FILE REQUESTS FOR EX PARTE REEXAMINATIONS AND INTER PARTES REEXAMINATIONS\nA. Ex Parte Reexamination\nB. Inter Partes Reexamination\nIV. \"PERSONS\" FOR IPR AND PGR PROCEEDINGS MAY INCLUDE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES BASED ON HISTORICAL PRACTICE, WHILE \"PERSONS\" WHO CAN BRING CBM PROCEEDINGS MAY NOT",
        "reference": "I. THERE IS NO GLOBAL DEFINITION OF \"PERSON\" IN THE PATENT ACT OR THE AIA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Havens Realty forecloses Acheson's challenge to Ms. Laufer's standing.\nA. Havens Realty's reasoning squarely applies to Reservation Rule testers.\nB. Ms. Laufer experienced actionable discrimination when she encountered an unlawful barrier to her full and equal enjoyment of Acheson's reservation services.\nC. Acheson's other efforts to distinguish this case from Havens Realty fail.\nII. Havens Realty was correctly decided.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. History and tradition confirm that the discriminatory denial of services by a place of public accommodation inflicts concrete injury.\nIII. Acheson's public policy arguments are misplaced.\nIV. Laufer's claims are moot only because she dismissed her complaint with prejudice.",
        "reference": "A. A person who experiences discrimination suffers a concrete injury independent of any downstream consequences.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5924_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. If the Court applies the Due Process Clause, it should repudiate the two-track approach used in Apodaca \u2014 incorporated rights apply to the States the same way they apply to the federal government",
        "reference": "I. The common law right to conviction by a unanimous jury applies to the States through the Privileges or Immunities Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Under this Court's Precedents, a Remedial Sanction Falls Within the Ambit of the Excessive Fines Clause so Long as It Also Serves Some Punitive Purpose\nIII. The Courts Below Erred by Fixating on the \"Primary Purpose\" of the Financial Penalty and the Fact that It Was Not Linked to Any Criminal Conduct",
        "reference": "I. The Historical Roots of the Excessive Fines Clause Make Clear that It Applies to Financial Penalties that Serve Remedial Purposes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. Colorado May Exclude Ineligible Insurrectionists from Its Presidential Primary Ballots.\nA. States may exclude ineligible candidates from the ballot.\nB. Colorado may exclude from its ballot a candidate who is ineligible under the Fourteenth Amendment.\nC. The Colorado Supreme Court properly ordered Petitioner Trump excluded from the ballot under the Fourteenth Amendment.\nII. The Colorado Supreme Court Did Not Violate the Electors Clause.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Moore v. Harper confirms that the Colorado Supreme Court did not violate the Electors Clause.\nC. Expanding federal review of state supreme court interpretations of state election law would create chaos.\nIII. Colorado Law Does Not Violate the CRSCC's First Amendment Rights.\nA. Limiting presidential primary ballots to candidates eligible to hold office does not severely burden the CRSCC's associational rights.\nB. Limiting the presidential primary ballot to candidates eligible to hold office advances the state's important interest in ballot integrity in a reasonable and non-discriminatory manner.\nC. The CRSCC's argument would lead to unacceptable consequences.",
        "reference": "A. Petitioner Trump forfeited this issue.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Education is a vital church function\nII. Examining the ministerial exception leads to excessive entanglement of government with religion\nIII. Exempting church employment is the way to avoid the entanglement problems of the ministerial exception\nIV. This step is justified because religious liberty is the first and foremost right guaranteed by the Constitution\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Medieval and Reformation Foundations of Religious Liberty\nC. The Colonial Foundations of Religious Liberty",
        "reference": "A. The Biblical Foundations of Religious Liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The mere presence of a berm or other barrier does not defeat CWA coverage of an adjacent wetland that has a significant nexus to a traditional navigable water\nA. The \"waters of the United States\" include adjacent wetlands\nB. There is no sound basis for imposing petitioners' rigid continuous-surface-connection requirement\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The agencies' understanding of the CWA's coverage of adjacent wetlands is entitled to deference\nII. Petitioners' restrictive view of the tributaries covered by the CWA is not properly before the Court and lacks merit in any event\nA. The Court should not consider petitioners' new arguments about covered tributaries\nB. Petitioners' new arguments lack merit\nIII. The court of appeals' judgment should be affirmed",
        "reference": "C. The significant-nexus test is a permissible basis for identifying adjacent wetlands covered by the CWA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. Regulation of Signs and Outdoor Advertising Serves Several Significant Governmental Interests and is a Necessary Component of Functional, Safe, and Aesthetically Pleasing Communities\nB. Regulation That Addresses the Special Problems Presented by Off-Premises Billboards is a Widely-Employed Feature of State and Local Land Use Regulation, and Has Been So For Over a Hundred Years\n1. Billboard Regulation Today\n2. Historical Billboard Regulation\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Irrespective of Its Decision in This Case, the Court Has a Significant Opportunity to Clarify Questions of Significant Practical Importance to Community Members, Sign Owners, and Regulators",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-177_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Government's Proposal For Avoiding The Burden Imposed By A Compelled-Speech Requirement Is Illusory",
        "reference": "I. The First Amendment Rights Of International Religious Organizations Based In The United States Are Severely Burdened When Their Foreign Affiliates Are Compelled To Endorse The Government's Message",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The County's Confiscation of Property in Excess of the Amount of the Debt Is a Fine within the Meaning of the Eighth Amendment\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Individual Rights in Property Are at the Core of Individual Liberty Protected by the Constitution\nB. The Just Compensation Clause Requires that the County Pay the Owner the Amount Confiscated in Excess of the Debt",
        "reference": "II. Confiscation of Property in Excess of the Amount Owed the County Is a Taking in Violation of the Fifth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The USPTO's Claim For \"Personnel Expenses\" Under The \"Expenses\" Clause Of Section 145 Is Actually Directed To Attorneys' Fees\nII. The Patent Statute Distinguishes \"Expenses\" From \"Attorneys' Fees\"\nIII. This Court Recognizes A Distinction Between \"Expenses\" And \"Attorneys' Fees\"\nIV. Multiple Federal Statutes Recognize A Distinction Between Expenses And Attorneys' Fees\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. Granting The USPTO Its Staff Attorneys' Fees Would Have A Chilling Effect On Patent Applicants Seeking District Court Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1650_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 404 Provides a Chance at Another Chance \u2014 Not a Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card\nA. District Courts Have Wide Latitude to Determine Whether and How to Exercise Discretion to Grant Sentence Reductions\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Use of the Section 3553(a) Rubric to Take Into Account Post-Sentencing Factual and Legal Developments Makes Sense\nII. The Panel Majority's Approach Is As Illogical As It Is Atextual\nIII. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Lingering Doubts",
        "reference": "B. Courts Should Apply the Section 3553(a) Factors Afresh, Accounting for Post-Sentencing Developments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The State does not dispute that the Indiana Supreme Court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedent\nIII. The question presented is important and should be resolved in this case",
        "reference": "I. The State does not dispute that there is a split of authority on the question presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF \"SEX\" AS USED IN TITLE VII PROHIBITS DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX, NOT SEXUAL ORIENTATION\nA. This Court Repeatedly Has Interpreted Statutes Applying Their Original Public Meaning\nB. The Original Public Meaning Of The Term \"Sex\" At The Time Congress Adopted Title VII In 1964 Was The Trait Of Being Male Or Female, Not Sexual Orientation Or Homosexuality\nII. THIS COURT HAS NEVER INTERPRETED TITLE VII'S PROHIBITION AGAINST SEX DISCRIMINATION IN A MANNER THAT CONFLICTS WITH THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF \"SEX\"\nA. The Court Did Not \"Reject\" The Original Public Meaning Of Discrimination Because Of \"Sex\" In Oncale, But Rather Applied It\nB. The Other Cases Cited By Bostock Properly Applied The Original Public Meaning Of \"Sex\" In Title VII\nIII. THE LEGAL THEORIES OFFERED BY BOSTOCK IN HOPES OF CONVINCING THE COURT TO REWRITE TITLE VII TO PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION ARE WRONG\nA. Employment Decisions Based On Sexual Orientation Are Not Made Because Of Sex\n1. The \"Simple Test\" Bostock Recites Is Fatally Flawed\n2. Decisions Based On Sexual Orientation Are Not Motivated By Sex And Do Not Favor One Sex Over The Other Sex\nB. Employment Decisions Based On Sexual Orientation Do Not Involve Sex Discrimination Using Sex-Specific Stereotypes Prohibited By Price Waterhouse\nC. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Is Not A Form Of Association Discrimination Based On Sex\nD. Congress Did Not Enact A Prohibition Against Sexual Orientation Discrimination Through The Subtle Device Of Prohibiting Sex Discrimination\nIV. NUMEROUS LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS FURTHER CONFIRM THAT TITLE VII DOES NOT INCLUDE SEXUAL ORIENTATION AS A PROTECTED CLASS\nA. The Fact That Congress Repeatedly Has Failed To Adopt Proposed Legislation To Add Sexual Orientation As A Protected Class Further Confirms That Title VII Does Not Encompass Sexual Orientation\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress Repeatedly Has Enacted Certain Civil Rights Statutes That Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sex And Other Civil Rights Statutes That Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Both Sex And Sexual Orientation\nV. THE REMAINING REASONS ASSERTED BY BOSTOCK FOR WHY THE COURT SHOULD REWRITE TITLE VII TO ADD SEXUAL ORIENTATION AS A PROTECTED CLASSIFICATION SHOULD BE REJECTED\nA. Holding Sexual Orientation To Be Beyond The Scope Of Title VII Does Not Conflict With The \"Motivating Factor\" Provision Of 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-2(m)\nB. Distinguishing Between Viable Claims Of Sex Discrimination Based On Evidence Of Sex Stereotyping And Sexual Orientation Discrimination Is Not \"Unworkable\"",
        "reference": "B. By Enacting The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress Incorporated The Unanimous Decisions Of The EEOC And Several Circuits That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuit split is square, deep, acknowledged, and intractable.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This appeal is the best vehicle for addressing the split.\nA. This appeal is in the heartland of the ministerial exception cases applying Hosanna-Tabor.\nB. The factual record in this case is robust.",
        "reference": "II. The scope of the ministerial exception is a vital and recurring question of nationwide importance.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Excessive Fines Clause applies to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause\nA. When the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the right to be free from excessive fines was already deeply rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition\nB. When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the right to be free from excessive fines remained fundamental to our Nation's legal system\nC. The right to be free from excessive fines remains fundamental today\nD. Applying the Clause to the States is consistent with Eighth Amendment precedent\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Excessive Fines Clause applies to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. UNDER THE AMERICAN RULE, A STATUTE MUST NOT BE READ TO SHIFT ATTORNEYS' FEES UNLESS THE TEXT IS SPECIFIC AND EXPLICIT\nII. THE AMERICAN RULE PRECLUDES ATTORNEYS' FEES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY AND EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED BY section 145\nA. The History Of Statutory And Judicial Usage Demonstrates That \"Expenses\" And \"Attorneys' Fees\" Are Distinct\nB. Longstanding Judicial Precedent Demonstrates That \"Expenses\" Do Not Include \"Attorneys' Fees\"\nC. The PTO's Failure To Seek Attorneys' Fees For More Than 170 Years Demonstrates That Such Fees Are Unavailable\nD. Other Provisions Of The Patent Act Demonstrate That Congress Did Not Intend For \"Expenses\" To Include \"Attorneys' Fees\"\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE PTO'S ATTEMPT TO CONSTRUE THE TERM \"EXPENSES\" BROADLY TO ENCOMPASS \"ATTORNEYS' FEES\"\nA. The PTO's Assertion That The \"Ordinary\" Meaning Of \"Expenses\" Includes \"Attorneys' Fees\" Is Both Unsupported And Irrelevant Under The American Rule\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The American Rule Applies To section 145\n2. This Court Has Consistently Applied The American Rule Presumption To Statutes That Award Fees To Non-Prevailing Parties\nC. None Of The Case Law Cited By The PTO Demonstrates That \"Expenses\" Include \"Attorneys' Fees\"\nD. Neither The Purpose Of section 145 Nor Its Legislative History Demonstrate That \"Expenses\" Include \"Attorneys' Fees\"\n1. The PTO's Policy Arguments Are Irrelevant And Overblown\n2. Section 145's Legislative History Does Not Support The PTO's Position",
        "reference": "B. Contrary To The PTO, The American Rule Applies Whenever A Litigant Seeks To Have Another Pay His Attorneys' Fees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.13
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-546_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Through the FTCA, Congress conferred subject-matter jurisdiction on courts to adjudicate a limited class of tort claims and adopted a version of common-law res judicata to prevent duplicative litigation\nA. The FTCA waived sovereign immunity to accept vicarious liability for certain common-law torts\nB. As the Court explained in Simmons and Will, the judgment bar adopted an application of common-law res judicata to prevent duplicative litigation\nII. The government's interpretation of the judgment bar violates the text of the FTCA and presumes jurisdiction where Congress says none exists\nA. The judgment bar does not apply to a dismissal of claims in the same lawsuit\nB. [MISSING]\nC. When a court dismisses a claim for lack of jurisdiction under Section 1346(b), it cannot adjudicate the merits of that claim as required to trigger the judgment bar\nIII. The government's interpretation of the judgment bar embodies the \"strange result\" the Court rejected in Simmons",
        "reference": "B. The judgment bar does not apply to a dismissal for failure to establish all six jurisdictional elements of Section 1346(b)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-210_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Denials of Summary Judgment Are Not Appealable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Dupree Failed to Obtain a Final Decision on His Affirmative Defense\nC. Dupree's Proposed Exception Lacks Merit\nII. The History of the Federal Rules Supports Affirmance\nIII. Affirmance Promotes Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Actions\nA. Affirmance Prevents Piecemeal Litigation\nB. Affirmance Promotes Clarity\nC. Affirmance Avoids Difficult Remedial Questions",
        "reference": "A. Denials of Summary Judgment Are Not Final Decisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first amendment does not prohibit a state government from considering the partisan affiliation of judicial candidates\na. states have a compelling interest in setting eligibility criteria for their judicial officers\nB. States may consider judicial candidates' political affiliation because judges are policymakers 1. The sixth and seventh Circuits' conclusion that judges are policymakers should be endorsed\n2. The Third Circuit's conclusions that section 3 does not protect a compelling state interest and that judges are not policymakers are unfounded and should be rejected\nII. Any ruling affirming the decision below should not cast doubt on the constitutionality of other partisan-balancing regimes\na. Historic Partisan-Balancing requirements\nB. [MISSING]\nC. federal regulatory agencies\n1. Interstate Commerce Commission\n2. federal Trade Commission and other Contemporaneous agencies 3. securities and exchange Commission\n4. federal Communications Commission\n5. United States Commission on Civil rights\n6. Other Federal Agencies\nd. sentencing Commissions\ne. state and federal election Commissions\n1. federal election Commission\n2. election assistance Commission\n3. state election Commissions\nf. state redistricting Commissions\ng. state judicial Nominating Commissions",
        "reference": "B. federal and state Civil service Commissions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause Exists to Protect Against Statutory Appropriations of Property\n2. Garmon Preemption and the Babcock Test\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance Counsels Reversal on the Grounds that Destruction of Property is Not \"Arguably Protected\" by the NLRA",
        "reference": "3. The Court Should Clarify that Babcock Does not Authorize Vandalism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-290_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Third Circuit's Ruling Was Correct",
        "reference": "I. The Court's Review Is Unwarranted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Reject Petitioner's Proposal for a \"Federal Public Policy\" Exception to a Marine Insurer's State Choice-of-Law Clause.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Forum's Public Policy Interests Are Not Presumptively Subverted by Inserting a Choice-of-Law Clause into a Maritime Contract.\nC. A Federal Public Policy Exception to State Choice-of-Law Clauses Has No Effect on Maritime Contracts Under Wilburn Boat.\nII. Pursuant to Wilburn Boat, This Court Should Adopt a Forum Public Policy Exception That Protects the States' Compelling Interests in Regulating Marine Insurance Coverage for Their Citizens and Risks Within Their Borders.\nA. Marine Insurance Policies, as Contracts of Adhesion, Should Not Be Regulated by the Insurer's Preferred Jurisdiction.\nB. Eschewing Uniformity, Wilburn Boat Instructs That Federal Courts Should Defer to State Interests in the Sphere of Marine Insurance Where No Federal Admiralty Law or Policy Exists.\nC. Courts Have Correctly Applied The Bremen and the Restatement to Determine Whether the Forum State's Public Policy Invalidates a Marine Insurer's Choice of State Law.",
        "reference": "A. The \"Forum Public Policy Exception\" to Enforcement of Foreign Contracts Is Firmly Settled Law.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. NIFLA rejects attempts to regulate speech under the guise of regulating conduct\nB. Laws restricting what speech professionals can and cannot say will especially burden pregnancy centers\nII. There is a troubling trend of weaponizing laws against pregnancy resource centers\nA. Pregnancy resource centers face increasing political attacks and unwarranted scrutiny from lawmakers\nB. Pregnancy resource centers also increasingly face threats of violence and violent attacks",
        "reference": "I. Allowing states to restrict disfavored speech by recasting it as conduct will have a disproportionate effect on pregnancy resource centers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Conflicts With The FAA And Defies This Court's Precedents\nA. Because Bilateral Arbitration Is The Type Of Arbitration Envisioned By The FAA, The FAA Requires A Contractual Basis For Class Or Other Representative Arbitration\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Inference Of An Agreement To Class Arbitration Lacked Any Contractual Basis\n1. The provisions relied upon by the Ninth Circuit do not support an agreement to arbitrate using class procedures\n2. The Ninth Circuit did not meaningfully address the Agreement's language contemplating bilateral arbitration\n3. The Ninth Circuit's decision cannot be justified as a neutral application of California contract law principles\n4. The Ninth Circuit's reliance on the state-law contra proferentem doctrine was misplaced\n5. Upholding the decision below would empower courts and arbitrators to impose class procedures on unconsenting parties and create substantial practical problems\nC. [MISSING]\nII. There Is No Jurisdictional Issue",
        "reference": "C. An Arbitration Agreement Permits Class Or Representative Procedures Only If The Agreement's Text Clearly And Unmistakably Authorizes Such Procedures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. These Cases Are Not Justiciable\nII. Section 7411 Does Not Contain the Restriction That Was EPA's Sole Basis for Repealing the Clean Power Plan\nIII. Reliance on Major Questions Principles Is Misplaced\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. North Dakota's Arguments Are Meritless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1650_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Interpreting section 404(b) to Require Consideration of Intervening Factual and Legal Changes Accords with Congress's Plan to Reduce Disparities in Sentencing and Provide for Individualized Sentencing Review\nIII. Concerns About Alleged Unfairness Have Never Superseded a Sentencing Court's Obligations Under section 3553(a)",
        "reference": "I. The Text of the First Step Act Makes Clear that Judges Are Required to Consider Intervening Legal and Factual Developments in section 404(b) Proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief045.pdf",
        "text": "1. Roe claims the right to choose an abortion at any stage of pregnancy\n2. Texas alleges that it has a duty to protect the fetus, which is a human life\n3. This case involves \"these interests, and the weight to be attached to them.\"\n4. \"The right of privacy [under the Fourteenth Amendment] is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.\"\n5. \"[T]he right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.\"\n6. [MISSING]\n7. The fetus is not a person\n8. A \"pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy\" because at some point a State can determine that \"another interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved.\"\n9. But \"the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.\"\n10. Thus, given the uncertainty surrounding when human life begins, Texas cannot \"override the rights of the pregnant woman\" simply \"by adopting one theory of life.\"\n11. Although a woman's privacy right is absolute during the first trimester, each of the States' interests \"grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes 'compelling.'\"",
        "reference": "6. If the fetus is a person, \"the appellant's case, of course collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. NO \"SPECIAL FACTORS\" COUNSEL AGAINST RECOGNITION OF A BIVENS REMEDY HERE\nA. Petitioners' Claims Do Not Intrude Into \"Foreign Affairs and National Security\"\nB. The Deliberate \"Congressional Inaction\" Abbasi Highlighted Is Absent Here\nC. Even if \"Extraterritoriality\" Could Be a Special Factor, It Is Not in This Case\nII. THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALTERNATIVE REMEDY WEIGHS HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF RECOGNIZING A BIVENS CLAIM\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WOULD RESULT FROM REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE A REMEDY HERE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The FTC's Constitutional Flaws Make Pre-enforcement Review Critical",
        "reference": "I. District Courts Have Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure and Procedures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "B. The jury rejected Petitioner's mental illness evidence\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. If this Court considers the mens rea issue, it should also articulate constitutional guideposts for States to exercise their discretion when defining mental illness defenses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents seek discovery that would confirm or deny whether a CIA detention facility existed in Poland\nB. The state-secrets privilege bars respondents' discovery request\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Mitchell and Jessen's contractor status does not diminish the national-security harm from discovery\n3. Purported \"public knowledge\" does not undermine the national-security harm from discovery\nC. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
        "reference": "1. The Ninth Circuit failed to afford appropriate deference to the CIA Director's national-security judgment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should not permit agencies to circumvent notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures through improperly issued interim rules\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Courts engaged in pre-enforcement review of agency rulemaking have authority to grant relief with nationwide effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION COMPELS A PLAIN-TEXT READING OF SECTION 1447(d)'S SECOND CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress's Preference For Federal Resolution Of Important Cases Was Reinforced During And After The Civil War\nC. The Purpose Of The First Bar On Appellate Review Of Remand Orders Differed From The Rationale For Section 1447(d)'s General Rule\nD. Congress Has Explicitly Expanded Appellate Review of Remand Orders",
        "reference": "A. The Founders Recognized The Need For Federal Courts To Resolve Important Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATES HAVE BROAD AUTHORITY TO REGULATE APPOINTMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS\nA. The Constitution gives States considerable discretion over regulating state-run presidential primary ballots\nB. State regulation of presidential elections is deeply rooted in the Nation's history\nII. TRUMP RECEIVED MORE THAN ADEQUATE PROCESS\nA. Trump Has Identified No Interest Cognizable Under the Due Process Clause in Appearing on Colorado's Primary Ballot\nB. [MISSING]\ni. Trump Received Ample Notice\nii. Trump Had an Opportunity to Be Heard",
        "reference": "B. Colorado Provided Trump Due Process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. PROPOSITION 12 IS AN ANTI-MEAT LAW DISGUISED AS AN ANIMAL WELFARE STATUTE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. CALIFORNIA MAY HAVE A RIGHT TO ENFORCE ITS POLICE POWERS WITH REGARD TO ANIMAL WELFARE, BUT SO DOES EVERY OTHER STATE",
        "reference": "II. PROPOSITION 12 ALSO SERVES NO HEALTH OR SAFETY BENEFIT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Bladensburg Cross violates fundamental Establishment Clause principles irrespective of the Lemon test\nA. The central principle of the Establishment Clause is that the government cannot align itself with any one religion\n1. The government violates the central command of the Establishment Clause when it places its imprimatur upon a potently sectarian symbol such as the Latin cross\n2. The Latin cross is not a secular symbol that represents Islam, Judaism, Atheism, and Christianity alike\nB. Using a Latin cross as a war memorial does not make the cross secular; it makes the war memorial Christian\n1. Neither the Latin cross generally, nor this Cross in particular, commemorates, honors, or respects non-Christian veterans\n2. The Latin cross is not a universal secular World War I symbol and, even if it were, that\u2019s not why it was chosen here\ni. In World War I cemeteries, a cross marks a Christian soldier\u2019s grave and a Star of David marks a Jewish soldier\u2019s grave\nii. The Bladensburg Cross does not evoke a World War I headstone nor was it intended to\n3. Allowing the government to redefine the meaning of the Latin cross as a \u201csecular\u201d and \u201cbenign\u201d symbol of all \u201cthe fallen\u201d\u2014to represent the sacrifices of Atheists and Muslims alike\u2014would degrade religion in the very ways the Founders feared\nC. Far from undercutting the government\u2019s imprimatur, the Cross\u2019s context only aggrandizes it\n1. The Cross was erected with the Town\u2019s blessing and has been owned, funded, used, promoted, and prominently displayed by the government for decades\n2. The Cross is a permanent, not ephemeral, monument\n3. The Cross is the Town\u2019s most prominent monument\n4. The Cross dominates its surroundings and is not integrated into a larger display\n5. The nature of the property on which this Cross stands makes the government\u2019s imprimatur unambiguous\n6. The longevity of this Cross has intensified its exclusionary sectarian meaning\nII. The \u201chistory\u201d and \u201ccoercion\u201d tests advocated by Petitioners and their amici have little to commend themselves and, in any event, would not change the outcome here\nA. The \u201chistory\u201d test is unworkable and unprincipled, has been repeatedly rejected by this Court, and is in any event met here\n1. Town of Greece did not modify the legal standard for legislative-prayer, let alone for Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally\n2. This Court has never held\u2014and indeed has disavowed\u2014that a practice is authorized under the Establishment Clause simply because it has a strong historical pedigree\n3. Even if Town of Greece were applicable here, it would not call for a reversal\ni. This imposing 40-foot Cross is not an internal practice to accommodate the spiritual needs of lawmakers\nii. The Bladensburg Cross is not ecumenical\niii. There is no long, unbroken, and unambiguous history accepted by our Framers of conspicuously displaying massive solitary Latin crosses or using the Latin cross as a non-Christian military symbol\n4. The \u201chistory\u201d test is neither a workable nor principled approach to religious-display cases\nB. Holding that the Establishment Clause does nothing more than preclude religious coercion would write the Establishment Clause out of the Constitution and overturn seventy years of precedent\n1. This Court has consistently rejected the argument that coercion is a necessary requirement for an Establishment Clause violation\n2. The coercion-only standard is unworkable, unprincipled, and akin to no test at all in the context of religious displays\n3. The Cross fails the coercion test\nIII. If the Court reaches the question, it should reaffirm the Lemon test and hold that the Bladensburg Cross runs afoul of the test\nA. The Lemon test derived from decades of precedent, effectuates the principles of the Establishment Clause, and has brought clarity and consistency to religious-display cases\nB. The Cross is unconstitutional under Lemon\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Declaring the Bladensburg Cross unconstitutional would not doom other war memorials\n1. Petitioners overexaggerate the ubiquity of freestanding Latin cross memorials\n2. The Bladensburg Cross is materially distinguishable from crosses in cemeteries and other multi-faith complexes\nB. Affirming the Fourth Circuit\u2019s ruling would not portend the \u201cmutilation\u201d of the Cross; nor would reversing save the Cross from its own demise",
        "reference": "IV. Upholding the Fourth Circuit\u2019s decision will not have the calamitous consequences Petitioners and their amici forecast",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. To effectuate Congress's purpose, \"hearing on the claim\" in section 2254(e)(2) is best understood as applying to both the merits and the prerequisites of the claim.\nII. \"Failed\" in section 2254(e)(2) has been definitively construed to include failures of counsel, and the meaning cannot change to conform to later developments in this Court's caselaw.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. To the extent that the rule of Martinez v. Ryan conflicts with the statute, Martinez must yield.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Bureau Is Insulated From Accountability To The People's Elected Representatives\nB. The Limits On The Removal Of The Director Violate The Constitution's Separation Of Powers\nC. The Bureau's Short History Confirms The Importance Of The Constitution's Safeguards\nII. The Court Should Reverse The Judgment Below And Deny Enforcement Of The Bureau's Civil Investigative Demand",
        "reference": "I. The Bureau's Structure Violates The Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nIII. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING AN UNMISTAKABLY IMPORTANT QUESTION",
        "reference": "I. RESPONDENT ACKNOWLEDGES A CLEAR CIRCUIT SPLIT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"WAR OF EXPERTS\" CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN \"SCOPE OF PRACTICE\" PROSECUTIONS\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. DECISION IN RUAN SHOULD HAVE FULL RETROACTIVE EFFECT",
        "reference": "II. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS NEED A CRIMINAL REFERRAL FROM STATE MEDICAL BOARDS PRIOR TO INITIATING PROSECUTION FOR CHARGES RELATING TO \"SCOPE OF PRACTICE\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Undermining The FDCPA's One-Year Statute Of Limitations With An Atextual Discovery Rule Would Disrupt The Careful Balance That Congress Struck When It Enacted A Statute That Encourages The Immediate Filing Of Meritorious Lawsuits\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Court Should Decline To Opine In This Case On Whether And When Equitable Tolling Is Available Under The FDCPA",
        "reference": "II. Petitioner's Policy Concerns Provide No Justification For Grafting The Discovery Rule Onto The FDCPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE IS BASED UPON A CHERISHED CONCEPT OF \"DUAL SOVEREIGNTY\"\nII. THE ACA VIOLATES THE TENTH AMENDMENT BY INVADING THE POWERS OF THE STATES\nA. Creation of Health Benefit Exchanges Exceeds the Bounds of \"Cooperative Federalism\" and Violates the Tenth Amendment\n1. Forcing the creation of the SBEs Violates Anti-Commandeering Doctrine\n2. Federally Funded Exchanges Usurp State Authority Over Intrastate Insurance Regulation\nB. Section 1332 Waiver Does Not Cure the Unconstitutionality of the Tenth Amendment\nC. Creation of Exchanges Diminishes Accountability\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Penalties on Intrastate Insurers under ACA Diminish Accountability\nIII. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE DOES NOT APPLY TO LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH ARE NOT MADE PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION\nIV. IF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IS A TAX, IT VIOLATES THE ORIGINATION CLAUSE OF ARTICLE I SECTION 7 AND IS VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE IT ORIGINATED IN THE SENATE RATHER THAN THE HOUSE\nA. The Practice in England\nB. The Concerns of the American Colonists\nC. The Decisions of the Constitutional Convention of 1787\nD. The Effect of the Seventeenth Amendment\nE. The Courts' Interpretation of the Origination Clause\nF. The Use of a \"Shell Bill\"",
        "reference": "D. Qualified Health Plans Violate the Tenth Amendment by Substantially Invading Traditional States' Authority to Regulate Health Care",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Requirement that Petitioners Engage in Speech Contrary to Their Own Viewpoints Violates the First Amendment and the Consistent Precedent in this Court Barring Such Governmental Compulsion.\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Requirement that Petitioners Engage in Speech Contrary to Their Own Viewpoints Violates the First Amendment Because There Are No Judicially Manageable Standards by Which Courts or Other Governmental Agencies Can Measure the Alleged Compliance or Noncompliance of the Speech Which the Government Seeks to Compel.",
        "reference": "2. The Requirement that Petitioners Engage in Speech Contrary to Their Deeply Held Religious Convictions Deprives Petitioners of Their Rights of Expression Which Include Rights to Choose the Religious Viewpoints They Espouse and Effectively Imposes Upon Them the Involuntary Expression of Alien Religious Viewpoints.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE DECISION BELOW IS GRIEVOUSLY WRONG\nIII. THE UNION CONCEDES THAT THIS CASE PRESENTS AN EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT ISSUE IN A CLEAN VEHICLE",
        "reference": "I. THE UNION FAILS TO UNDERMINE THE SPLITS GLACIER IDENTIFIED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION TO STAND UNREVIEWED\nII. WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH IS NOT DISTINGUISHABLE\nA. Act 620 Confers No Medical Benefits and Serves No Relevant Credentialing Function\nB. Act 620 Will Cause Undue Burdens\nC. The Fifth Circuit Misapplied the Undue Burden Test\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. NO VEHICLE PROBLEMS EXIST",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "IRCA does not expressly or impliedly preempt Kansas's prosecution of respondents\nA. IRCA does not expressly preempt the prosecutions\n1. The text of Section 1324a(b)(5) does not bar the prosecutions\n2. The structure and purpose of IRCA confirm that Section 1324a(b)(5) does not bar the prosecutions\nB. IRCA does not impliedly preempt the prosecutions\n1. [MISSING]\n2. IRCA does not impliedly preempt the prosecutions through conflict preemption",
        "reference": "1. IRCA does not impliedly preempt the prosecutions through field preemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Jurisdiction To Review The District Court's Orders\nII. The Legislature Did Not Engage In Intentional Discrimination When It Enacted Districts Imposed By The District Court Itself\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There Is No Evidence that the 2013 Legislature Engaged in Intentional Discrimination\nIII. There Never Was Any Vote Dilution Or Racial Gerrymandering To Begin With In The Districts Imposed By The District Court In 2012\nA. There Was No Vote Dilution in Districts Imposed by the District Court in 2012\n1. Intentional vote dilution claims require proof of an actual vote dilution effect\n2. There was no discriminatory intent or effect in CD27\n3. There was no discriminatory intent or effect in Bell County state-house districts\n4. There was no discriminatory intent or effect in Dallas County state-house districts\n5. There was no discriminatory intent or effect in Nueces County state-house districts\nB. There Was No Racial Gerrymandering in CD35\nIV. There Was No Racial Gerrymandering In HD90",
        "reference": "A. The District Court's Intentional Discrimination Analysis Rests on a Fatally Flawed Legal Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.15
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent Concedes That There Is An Acknowledged And Deeply Entrenched Split On The First Question Presented\nII. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle For Deciding Whether Rule 59(e) Motions May Be Recharacterized As Second Habeas Petitions\nIII. Respondent's Merits Arguments Provide No Reason To Deny Review\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The Court Should Grant The Second Question Presented To Allow Full Consideration Of The Consequences Of The Fifth Circuit's Approach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. As Applied to Pregnancy Care Clinic, the Reproductive FACT Act Should be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Present Judicial Standards Employed to Protect Physician Speech are Confused and Often at Odds with the Values of a Free Society\nB. Rather than Approach the Issue Incrementally, the Court Should Articulate a Rationale for its Decision that will Extend Beyond the Facts of this Case\nC. The Proposed Rule of Decision is the Right One\nIII. The State of California has a Compelling Interest in Mitigating PCC's Prima Facie Unethical Medical Conduct",
        "reference": "II. Any Law that Restricts or Compels Physician Speech and is Targeted Toward a Matter of General Public Debate Should be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Seminole Rock and Auer Contravene the APA\nB. Seminole Rock and Auer Violate Separation of Powers Principles\nC. Auer Undermines the APA's Important Safeguards of the Public Interest\nD. Auer Encourages Agencies to Promulgate Ambiguous Regulations",
        "reference": "I. Auer v. Robbins and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. Should Be Overruled",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The enablement standard of the patent law has a clear expression in the statutory patent law, the same expression it has had since 1790\nII. The enablement standard, further, arose from English common law roots, that used the same standard\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Related aspects of the Court of Appeals' jurisprudence also cause confusion and doubt\nV. Because of stare decisis, settled expectations, and that the Court of Appeals has varied greatly from deciding enablement issues based on the time-honored standard, the decision of the case should be vacated and the case returned to the Court of Appeals\nVI. Stating the correct standard for decision, and vacating and returning the case to the Court of Appeals is what the case needs, all that it needs",
        "reference": "III. Exemplary law review articles not written for the purpose of advocacy in this case document that the Court of Appeals has recently varied greatly from deciding enablement issues based on the time-honored standard and has muddled its own jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PRESIDENT CAN REMOVE AN FHFA ACTING DIRECTOR AT WILL\nA. An Acting Director Is Removable At Will\nB. The Court Should Reverse the Fifth Circuit's Constitutional Holding\nII. THE FHFA'S LIMITED POWERS COMPORT WITH THE CONSTITUTION\nA. The FHFA Does Not Wield \"Significant Executive Power.\"\nB. The FHFA Does Not Offend Structural Constitutional Principles\nC. The FHFA Has Historical Precedent\nIII. \"FOR CAUSE\" REMOVAL DOES NOT PREVENT FAITHFUL EXECUTION\nA. The FHFA's Combination of Narrow Powers and Modest Tenure Is Lawful\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. A HOLDING THAT THE FHFA VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS WOULD HAVE FAR-REACHING EFFECTS",
        "reference": "B. The Recovery Act's Text Further Supports the FHFA's Constitutionality",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ELIMINATION OF THE ANTI-STEERING RULES FOSTERED PRICE COMPETITION AND A DRAMATIC DROP IN AMEX'S MERCHANT FEES\nA. The elimination of the anti-steering rules quickly resulted in lower merchant fees\nB. Studies confirm that the elimination of the anti-steering rules has improved competitive dynamics and the Australian economy overall\nC. Industry participants, including Amex, recognized the pro-competitive benefits of the reforms\nD. Woolworths provides a case study of competition in action\nE. Lower merchant fees have led to hundreds of billions of dollars of savings to merchants (and consumers)\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Competition has increased output\nB. Competition has spurred innovation\nC. Competition has benefited consumers\nD. Competition has even benefited Amex",
        "reference": "II. OUTPUT, INNOVATION, CONSUMERS, AND EVEN AMEX HAVE BENEFITED IN AUSTRALIA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. No Deference is Warranted to the VA's Construction.\nA. [MISSING]\nII. Stare Decisis Does Not Justify Retention of Auer Deference.\nIII. Petitioner Offers the Best Reading of Section 3.156(c).",
        "reference": "A. Auer is Incompatible with the APA.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-389_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. The New Wage-and-Hour Law that the Ninth Circuit Engrafted from California Is a Major Departure from the FLSA\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Creates Unanticipated Liabilities and Disrupts Established Compensation Arrangements for Employers Who Complied with the FLSA",
        "reference": "The Ninth Circuit's Decision Disrupts Settled Compensation Arrangements By Replacing Federal Law With Flatly Inconsistent, Outlier State-Law Rules",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief063.pdf",
        "text": "I. Stare Decisis Requires the Court to Follow Its Longstanding Precedent Recognizing a Woman's Fundamental Right to Choose Whether to Bear a Child.\nII. There Are Particularly Compelling Reasons to Apply Stare Decisis Here.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The right to choose whether to bear a child is an integral part of our understanding of constitutionally protected liberty.\nC. Roe and Casey Have Engendered Important Reliance Interests, Including for Women in The Legal Profession.\nD. The Precedent Set in Roe and Reaffirmed in Casey Is Well Reasoned.\nE. Roe has proven entirely workable.",
        "reference": "A. Roe's longevity, consistent reaffirmation by this Court, and faithful application by lower courts heavily favor retaining it.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1270_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE NO EFFECTIVE RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED\nA. The Bankruptcy Court Lacks In Rem Jurisdiction To Order a Different Disposition of the Res\nB. Reversal of the Transfer Order Would Not By Itself Divest Transform of its Ownership of the Leasehold Interest\nC. The Transfer Is Not Avoidable\nD. [MISSING]\nII. SECTION 363(m) IS JURISDICTIONAL\nA. Section 363 Applies\nB. Section 363(m) Is a Jurisdictional Limitation\n1. Section 363(m) confirms the lack of in rem jurisdiction over the transferred res\n2. Section 363(m) constrains an appellate court's subject matter jurisdiction",
        "reference": "D. Moac Lacks Standing To Set Aside the Transfer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8491_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "This [MISSING]",
        "reference": "This Court should deny certiorari review of the denial of habeas relief on a fact intensive question of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel in a case which is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of any of this Court's precedent and presents no significant or important federal question. Further, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision does not conflict with that of any other courts of appeal.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Church Autonomy Doctrine in the Religion Clauses Shields the Internal Affairs of Religious Organizations from Secular, Government Interference\nA. Church Autonomy Is Deeply Rooted in the History and Tradition of Church-State Separation and Is Inscribed in the Religion Clauses\n1. The Development of Church-State Separation in the Middle Ages\n2. The Religious Establishment in England\n3. The Constitutional Separation of Church and State Established Church Autonomy\n4. The State Disestablishment Movement Rejected Government Control of the Church\nB. The Church Autonomy Doctrine Is Grounded in Supreme Court Precedent that Undergirds the Ministerial Exception\nII. The Church Autonomy Doctrine Prohibits the State from Restructuring a Church's Relationship with Its Employees\nA. Selecting Employees Is an Internal Matter of Church Governance Committed Exclusively to Religious Organizations\nB. Selecting Employees Is an Inherently Religious Matter Incapable of Division into Smaller Parts\n1. Courts Are Incompetent to Determine What Roles Are Central to a Religious Organization's Mission\n2. Courts Are Incompetent to Determine What Roles Within a Church Are Religious and What Roles Are Secular\n3. Courts Are Incompetent to Determine Who Speaks for a Religious Organization\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Individual Interests Do Not Favor Government Regulation and Intervention\n2. State Interests Do Not Favor Government Regulation and Intervention\n3. Church Interests Do Not Favor Government Regulation and Intervention\n4. A Bright-Line Rule Is Consistent with the Interests of the Stakeholders and Is Demanded by the Constitution",
        "reference": "C. The Bright-Line Approach Is Consistent With the Interests of the Church, State, and Individuals Involved",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CY PRES DEVICE IS A VALID MEANS OF RESOLVING CLASS-BASED LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURT\nA. Cy Pres Settlements Are Permissible Under The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure\nB. Parties To A Class Action Are Broadly Free To Structure A Settlement Agreement As They Wish, Provided That It Is \"Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate\"\nC. Cy Pres Settlements Offer The Best Method Of Settlement Distribution In Certain, Rare Circumstances\n1. [MISSING]\n2. In the absence of a feasible direct distribution, the other options for distributing the settlement are worse than cy pres\nD. Numerous Courts Of Appeals Endorse The Use Of Cy Pres Settlements\nII. WHETHER A CY PRES SETTLEMENT ALSO INCLUDES DIRECT DAMAGES IS OF NO IMPORT, AS LONG AS THE SETTLEMENT MEETS RULE 23(e)'s REQUIREMENTS\nIII. FOR EMPLOYERS THAT FACE LARGE CLASS ACTIONS, THE AVAILABILITY OF A RANGE OF SETTLEMENT OPTIONS, INCLUDING THE CY PRES SETTLEMENT DEVICE, IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT\nA. Cy Pres Settlements Promote Prompt Dispute Resolution, And Decrease The Likelihood That Costly Class Procedures Will Be Necessary\nB. Cy Pres Settlements Are Beneficial To Both Class Members And Employers.\nC. Cy Pres Settlements Are Particularly Well-Suited For The Types Of Disputes That Employers Face",
        "reference": "1. When a settlement cannot be directly distributed to class members, use of the cy pres mechanism is appropriate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. Third Party Standing Should Not Be Granted Automatically in Abortion Cases\nA. The development of third party standing in general\nB. Third party standing in abortion cases began narrowly, but has come to be applied rather \"generously.\"\nC. [MISSING]\nD. At minimum, third party standing should be allowed only when the plaintiff has no interests adverse to the third party he purports to represent",
        "reference": "C. In the present case, third party standing was merely assumed sub silentio, not analyzed by either the District Court or the Court of Appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1983 provides an express cause of action for rights established by all federal laws, including Spending Clause laws.\nA. Spending Clause laws are federal \"laws\" within the scope of the section 1983 right of action.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. A Spending Clause law creates a right enforceable under section 1983 if the law unambiguously confers that right.\nB. The express right of action in section 1983 does not require a separate right of action in the federal law sought to be enforced.\nII. The contract-law analogy is inapplicable here because section 1983 supplies an express right of action.\nA. This Court employs the contract-law analogy when the statute lacks clarity on the type of conduct or remedy for which a funding recipient may be liable.\nB. The contract-law analogy is inapplicable to section 1983 claims.\nC. The third-party beneficiary theory urged by Petitioners is unfounded.",
        "reference": "1. There is no exception to the section 1983 right of action for Spending Clause laws.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. FISA DOES NOT PURPORT TO DISPLACE THE STATE-SECRETS PRIVILEGE OR AUTHORIZE SECRET ADJUDICATION OF THE MERITS OF A LAWSUIT\nA. The State-Secrets Privilege And Its Dismissal Remedy Serve Vital Interests for Private Defendants That Congress Would Not Lightly Have Disturbed\nB. Section 1806(f) Applies Only To Decide Admissibility Issues In Certain Circumstances\nII. THE COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION RAISES GRAVE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS\nA. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Due Process Clause\nB. Adjudicating The Religion Claims Through In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures Would Violate The Seventh Amendment\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. That Courts Do Not Use In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures To Resolve Disputes On The Merits In Comparable Contexts Underscores The Constitutional Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-177_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE QUESTION ON WHICH THE GOVERNMENT SEEKS REVIEW IS NOT PRESENTED\nII. THE QUESTION THAT IS PRESENTED DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW\nA. The Decision Below Reflects A Discretionary And Fact-bound Application Of Settled Principles To Remedy A Violation This Court Already Found\nB. There Is No Circuit Split Or Conflict With This Court's Precedent\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Whether The District Court Abused Its Discretion Has No Importance Beyond The Facts Of This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ministerial Exception Serves the Purpose of the Religion Clauses by Ensuring that the Federal Government Does Not Interfere with Individual Freedom of Religion\nA. The Establishment Clause protects religious institutions from federal interference\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Courts Must Defer to a Religious Organization's Sincere Determination as to Who Qualifies as a \"Minister.\"",
        "reference": "B. The ministerial exception keeps government out of religious matters and should be applied broadly",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "Ramos announced a new rule of criminal procedure that does not apply retroactively to cases on federal collateral review\nA. Ramos announced a new procedural rule that would apply retroactively on federal collateral review only if it were a \"watershed rule of criminal procedure\"\n1. The rule announced in Ramos is new\n2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Ramos rule neither prevents an impermissibly large risk of inaccuracy nor alters the understanding of bedrock procedures essential to fairness\n2. Petitioner fails to show that Ramos satisfies either prerequisite for a watershed rule\nC. Retroactive application of the Ramos rule to upset final state convictions would be unduly disruptive",
        "reference": "B. Ramos did not announce a watershed procedural rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The use of agency fees to support a public-sector union's representational activities is not subject to heightened First Amendment scrutiny\nA. The Constitution permits States to place reasonable conditions on government employment\nB. The government may require the payment of a fee to support the activities of a mandatory association\nC. Agency fees are conditions of public employment that support the costs of a mandatory association\nD. The use of agency fees to support lobbying and other speech directed to the government as a sovereign is not entitled to judicial deference\nE. Petitioner's arguments for subjecting all agency fees to heightened scrutiny are without merit\nII. Agency fees in support of a union's representational activities are a permissible condition of public employment\nA. Agency fee provisions are justified by the State's substantial interest in dealing with a fairly and adequately funded exclusive representative\n1. The State has a well-recognized interest as an employer in dealing with an exclusive representative\n2. The State has a substantial interest in ensuring that the representative is fairly and adequately funded\nB. Agency fees represent a limited impingement on employees' First Amendment interests\nIII. There is no special justification for departing from stare decisis\nA. Overruling Abood would undermine the reliance interests of States, public employers, employees, and unions\nB. Abood's standard is workable\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Overruling Abood would cast several lines of First Amendment jurisprudence into doubt",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court has correctly recognized that state and federal crimes are not the \"same offence\" under the Double Jeopardy Clause\nA. The transgression of one sovereign's law is not the \"same offence\" as the transgression of a different sovereign's law\n1. An \"offence\" is the transgression of a specific sovereign's law\n2. The Constitution's federalist structure distinguishes between federal and state \"offence[s]\"\n3. A sovereign-specific interpretation of \"same offence\" underlies multiple aspects of this Court's double-jeopardy jurisprudence\nB. The Constitution's text and structure have underpinned this Court's consistent treatment of state and federal crimes as separate \"offence[s]\"\nC. This Court's precedent accords with the Framing-Era understanding\n1. The Framers did not intend the Double Jeopardy Clause to subordinate domestic law-enforcement power to foreign entities\n2. Framing-Era law is consistent with a sovereign-specific understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause\na. Common-law decisions do not support petitioner's asserted foreign-judgment bar\nb. Treatises cited by petitioner do not illustrate a universal understanding that foreign prosecutions precluded domestic ones\nc. Early state cases do not support petitioner\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner has not justified discarding this Court's long line of decisions treating separate sovereigns' crimes as different \"offence[s]\"\n1. Abandoning the sovereign-specific understanding of \"offence\" would unsettle double-jeopardy law\n2. No intervening developments justify a reinterpretation of \"same offence\"\nB. The political branches are best situated to address case-specific concerns with successive prosecutions",
        "reference": "II. No sound reason exists to overturn 170 years of precedent interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The expropriation exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not provide jurisdiction in any case involving a domestic taking\nA. Under the domestic takings rule, the expropriation exception does not apply when a sovereign has taken the property of its own nationals\nB. The expropriation exception does not provide jurisdiction over domestic takings that occur in the context of a human-rights violation\n1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The FSIA's statutory history reinforces that the expropriation exception applies only in cases involving a foreign state's taking of the property of a foreign national\n4. More recent statutes are unavailing\nC. Any ambiguity should be resolved against jurisdiction\nII. A court may abstain on the basis of international comity from exercising jurisdiction under the FSIA",
        "reference": "2. Statutory context confirms that the expropriation exception does not encompass property taken as part of a genocide or other human-rights violation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Administrative Patent Judges Are Principal Officers\nA. The Appointments Clause's Careful Structure Ensures Accountability for Executive Officers\nB. Administrative Patent Judges Are Principal Officers Because Their Decisions Are Not Reviewable by Any Superior Executive Officer\n1. This Court's Precedents Require Principal Officer Review of Decisions\n2. [MISSING]\nC. The Removal Restrictions Exacerbate the Appointments Clause Violation\n1. APJs Are Removable Only Under a Restrictive For-Cause Standard\n2. The Director's Designation Authority Is No Substitute for Removal from Office\nD. The Director's Supervisory Powers Are No Substitute for Review\n1. The Director Lacks Authority To Manipulate the Outcomes of Specific Cases\n2. Prospective Direction Is Not an Adequate Substitute for Review\nII. The Court of Appeals Erred by Severing Administrative Patent Judges' Tenure Protections\nA. The Statute Is Unconstitutional Even Without Removal Restrictions\nB. Congress Would Not Have Enacted the America Invents Act Without Tenure Protections for Administrative Patent Judges\n1. Congress Has Long Considered Tenure Protections Essential for Officers Exercising Judicial Functions\n2. Tenure Protections Are Particularly Important Under the AIA\n3. Eliminating Tenure Protections for APJs Defies Congressional Intent\nC. Severance Is Especially Inappropriate Given the Many Ways Congress Could Remedy the Violation\nD. Seila Law and Free Enterprise Fund Do Not Support Severance in This Case\nE. Severance Violates Constitutional Avoidance Principles",
        "reference": "2. The AIA Departs Sharply from Tradition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. ALL RELEVANT STATUTORY TEXT PRECLUDES MANDATORY STAYS PENDING SECTION 16 APPEALS\nA. Section 3's Satisfaction Clause Remains Unambiguous\nB. Analogous Provisions of the JIAJA, Which Added Section 16 Into the FAA, Demonstrate Congress's Intent Not to Impose Automatic Stays Pending Section 16 Appeals\nC. Section 6's Language Precludes Any Extension of Griggs to Interlocutory Appeals Under Section 16\n1. The \"Usual Federal Procedural Rules\" Provide for Discretionary Stays Pending Interlocutory Appeals\n2. The Bradford-Scott Rule Is \"Arbitration-Specific\"\n3. The Bradford-Scott Rule Renders Arbitration Agreements More Enforceable Than Forum-Selection Agreements\n4. The \"Usual,\" Four-Factor Test for Discretionary Stays Fulfills the Purpose of Section 16, Without Favoring Arbitration Agreements over Litigation Agreements\nII. THE BRADFORD-SCOTT RULE CREATES UNNECESSARY PROBLEMS FOR LITIGANTS AND COURTS\nA. Automatic Stays Make Messes Out of Multi-Party Cases\nB. The \"Frivolous\" Exception Presents No Barrier Against Extensive, Expensive Appellate Gamesmanship\nC. Automatic Stays Reduce Access to Justice and Blindly Risk Serious, Gratuitous Harm to Non-Appealing Parties\nIII. COURTS LACK ANY POWER TO \"STAY\" THIS CASE UNDER THE FAA, BECAUSE THE \"CONTRACT[S]\" AND \"CONTROVERS[IES]\" HERE ARE OUTSIDE THE FAA'S SCOPE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. \"If 'You' Transact, Then This Is a Contract\"\nC. The Parties' Sweepstakes \"Controvers[ies]\" Do Not \"Aris[e] Out Of\" the Statutory \"Contract\" or \"Transaction\"",
        "reference": "A. The Two, Distinct Types of Agreements and Controversies Covered by Section 2",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Common Sense Approach Dictates That Title VII's Prohibition Against \"Sex\" Discrimination Does Not Include Sexual Orientation\nA. Title VII Prohibits Discrimination On The Basis Of Sex\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress Did Not Intend Discrimination On The Basis Of Sex To Include Sexual Orientation\nII. Sexual Orientation Is Not Per Se Sex Stereotyping\nA. Sex Stereotyping Is Not A Separately Protected Class Under Title VII\nB. It Would Require A Court To Engage In Sex Stereotyping To Conclude That All Sexual Orientation Discrimination Constituted Sex Discrimination Based On Sex Stereotype\nIII. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
        "reference": "B. A Person's Sexual Orientation Is Distinct From His Or Her Biological Sex",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Enforcing [MISSING]\nA. Under the plain text of the FDCPA, enforcing a security interest is not debt collection\nB. The FDCPA's legislative history confirms that enforcing a security interest by initiating a non-judicial foreclosure is not debt collection\nC. Petitioner's alternative interpretation is contrary to the plain text of the FDCPA\nD. The FDCPA should not be construed to interfere with a core area of state concern",
        "reference": "Enforcing a security interest by initiating a non-judicial foreclosure does not constitute debt collection under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari To Decide Whether Congress Impliedly Stripped District Courts Of Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges To the FTC's Structure, Procedures, And Existence\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Questions Presented Are Recurring And Exceptionally Important, And This Is An Excellent Vehicle To Address Them",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Grant Certiorari To Decide Whether FTC Adjudicators Are Unconstitutionally Insulated From Presidential Control",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MCDONOUGH'S SECTION 1983 CLAIM DID NOT BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL FAVORABLE TERMINATION UNDER THIS COURT'S \"ANALOGOUS TORT\" ANALYSIS\nII. MCDONOUGH'S CLAIM IS TIMELY UNDER THE \"STANDARD\" RULE FOR ACCRUAL\nA. Because Preiser And Heck Foreclose Section 1983 Claims Before Favorable Termination, Such Claims Do Not Accrue Until That Point\nB. The Court Should Adopt Favorable Termination As An Element Of McDonough's Section 1983 Claim\nIII. MCDONOUGH'S SUIT IS TIMELY UNDER THE CONTINUING VIOLATION DOCTRINE\nIV. SMITH'S ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY FAIL\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The District Court's Dismissal Of McDonough's Section 1983 Claim Alleging Malicious Prosecution Has No Bearing On His Section 1983 Claim Alleging Fabrication Of Evidence\nV. PRACTICAL AND POLICY CONCERNS STRONGLY MILITATE IN FAVOR OF STARTING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD AT FAVORABLE TERMINATION",
        "reference": "A. McDonough Has Identified The Constitutional Right At Issue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Muslim women and Hijab\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Hardison has disproportionately harmed Muslim women who wear hijab",
        "reference": "II. Hardison shuts down discussion: a typical case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Insular Cases and Their Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation Should Be Overruled\nII. Short of Overruling the Insular Cases, the Court Should Clarify The Narrow Scope of Their Application Today\nA. The Insular Cases Were Grounded In A Transitory Historical Context\nB. The Insular Cases Did Not Limit Constitutional Protections To A Narrow Category Of Fundamental Rights\nC. More Recent Supreme Court Decisions Cabin the Insular Cases To Their Facts\nIII. Silence Here Would Ensure the Continued Misapplication of the Insular Cases, With Serious Consequences\nA. The D.C. Circuit's Restrictive View of Fundamental Rights in Tuaua v. United States is Improper\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Allowing Elected Officials to Determine the Scope of the Constitution's Application is Inappropriate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The plain language of section 1117(a) shows that willful infringement is not required to obtain an award of profits for a violation of section 1125(a)\nB. The statutory interpretation and legislative history of section 1117(a) show that Congress did not intend that plaintiffs must show willful infringement to recover an infringer's profits under section 1125(a)\nC. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act and the 1999 Amendment show why section 1117(a) does not require willful infringement to obtain an award of an infringer's profits under section 1125(a)\nII. THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND PURPOSE OF section 1117(A) DISFAVOR REQUIRING A SHOWING OF WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT UNDER section 1125(A) TO OBTAIN AN INFRINGER'S PROFITS",
        "reference": "I. 15 U.S.C. section 1117(A) DOES NOT REQUIRE A SHOWING OF WILLFULNESS TO OBTAIN AN INFRINGER'S PROFITS UNDER 15 U.S.C. section 1125(a)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Respondents' Taking Absolute Title to Petitioner's Home is a Per Se Physical Taking Requiring Just Compensation\nB. States Cannot, by Legislative Fiat, Sidestep the Takings Clause\nC. The Takings Clause Protects Historically Protected Property Interests, Including Equity Interests in Real Property\nD. Nelson Did Not Disavow Centuries of Anglo-American Property Law\nII. Respondents' Confiscation of Petitioner's Property Worth Far More Than The Debt She Owed is a \"Fine\" Under the Eighth Amendment",
        "reference": "I. Retention of Surplus Equity Is a Taking Requiring Just Compensation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Three Tracks Of State Secrets Doctrine\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The Reynolds Procedure\n2. The Government's Arguments Conflict With The Reynolds Evidentiary Privilege\n3. The Reynolds Privilege Only Excludes Evidence\nB. The State Secrets Nonjusticiability Bar In Government Contract Cases\nC. Congress Has The Power To Modify Or Displace The State Secrets Privilege\nII. Evidence, Facts, and Official Acknowledgments\nIII. The Court Should Continue Its Practice Of Deciding State Secrets Issues Narrowly\nIV. This Case Is Easily Resolved By Applying The Court's Established State Secrets Jurisprudence\nA. Because Mitchell And Jessen Indisputably Possess Nonprivileged Information, Reynolds Directs That The Discoverable Nonprivileged Information Should Be Separated From The Privileged Information\nB. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Determined That Some Of The Matters Claimed By The Government Are Not Privileged\n1. Nonprivileged Matters\n2. Mitchell's And Jessen's Testimony Is Not An Official Statement Or Acknowledgment By The Government\nV. The Government's Section 1782 Arguments Lack Merit\nA. The MLAT Argument Fails\nB. The Burdensomeness Argument Fails\nC. A Rejected Privilege Claim Is Not A Discretionary Factor Weighing Against Discovery Under Section 1782",
        "reference": "A. The State Secrets Evidentiary Privilege",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Precedent does not establish a categorical hot-pursuit exception that applies in the misdemeanor context\nB. The relevant considerations weigh against extending the categorical hot-pursuit rule to misdemeanor offenses\n1. Founding-era history\n2. Privacy interests\n3. Law enforcement interests\nC. The United States recognizes the need for case-specific inquiries in misdemeanor pursuit cases\nII. The Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for application of the good-faith exception",
        "reference": "I. The categorical hot-pursuit exception should not be extended to pursuits of suspected misdemeanants",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. Mississippi Should Be Free To Make Reasonable Determinations About Abortion Policy That Place A Higher Value On The Life Of Mothers And Their Unborn Children\nII. The Court Has Undervalued The State's Interest In Women's Health By Failing To Give Proper Weight To The Physical, Psychological, And Emotional Harms Abortion Can Have On Women's Lives\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Court Should Give Proper Weight To The Views Of A Wide Range Of Women's Voices, Including Those Who Support Mississippi's Law and Reject The Court's One-Sided Abortion Jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. RESPONDENT'S ACTS CREATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION ON OBTAINING A LICENSE TO ENGAGE IN FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS\nIII. RESPONDENT'S ACTS VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY VIOLATING FEDERAL LAW PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL TAX RETURN INFORMATION\nIV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
        "reference": "I. RESPONDENT'S DRAGNET SCHEME VIOLATES THE REQUIREMENT THAT CHARITABLE SOLICITATION REGULATION BE NARROWLY TAILORED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-7153_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "WHERE [MISSING]",
        "reference": "WHERE A DEATH SENTENCED PETITIONER HAS CONTINUALLY FOUGHT TO HAVE HIS DEATH SENTENCE VACATED SINCE IT WAS INITIALLY IMPOSED IN 1976, WHICH RESULTED IN ONE RETRIAL OF THE SENTENCE PHASE AND SEVERAL RETRIALS OF THE SENTENCE PHASE, IS GROUNDS FOR FINDING THAT THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE VACATED, WHEN THE ISSUES WHICH UNDERLIE THIS CLAIM HAVE ALL BEEN PRESENTED, ON THE MERITS, TO THE STATE COURT, THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS AND THIS COURT AND RELIEF HAS BEEN DENIED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Redress for Constitutional Deprivations\nA. Constitutional violations are not always quantifiable\nB. Minority faiths frequently experience unquantifiable burdens on religious exercise in the zoning and prison contexts\nC. [MISSING]\nII. History and this Court's Precedent Compel the Rule That a Claim for Nominal Damages Can Preserve a Case Seeking to Vindicate Constitutional Rights",
        "reference": "C. The ability to vindicate a constitutional deprivation should not depend upon whether the harm suffered is quantifiable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. A state court may not exercise general jurisdiction based solely on registration to do business\n1. General jurisdiction based on registration violates this Court's precedents\n2. General jurisdiction based on registration violates the principles underlying this Court's precedents on personal jurisdiction\n3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction\nB. Petitioner's arguments lack merit\n1. Pennsylvania Fire does not justify the exercise of general jurisdiction based on registration\n2. History does not justify the exercise of general jurisdiction based on registration\n3. [MISSING]\nC. This Court need not address circumstances beyond a state court's exercise of general jurisdiction based on registration",
        "reference": "3. General jurisdiction based on registration is not analogous to transient jurisdiction over individuals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court should vacate the injunction because plaintiffs' claims are not justiciable\nA. All plaintiffs lack standing because DACA could not and did not create any rights\nB. Rescission would not redress plaintiffs' injuries because DACA's invalidity would require reinstating the pre-DACA status quo ante litem\nC. The amendment or rescission of mere enforcement policies \u2014 as distinct from rules or regulations \u2014 is unreviewable generally, and especially so in the immigration context at issue here\nII. [MISSING]\nA. As a legislative rule adopted without an APA rulemaking, DACA is void ab initio\nB. If DACA did not bind agency discretion, rescission would be a lawful exercise of the same discretion used to issue DACA\nC. Assuming arguendo that MVMA review is available, DACA's rescission meets that narrow test\nD. DACA violated the INA\nIII. Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claims should be dismissed\nA. The \"information-sharing\" due-process claims fail to state a claim\nB. The equal-protection claims fail to state a claim",
        "reference": "II. Rescission was lawful because DACA was unlawful",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.42
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in applying an inflexible voir dire rule to invalidate the jury's penalty verdict\nA. The court of appeals' inflexible voir dire rule is legally unfounded\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The court of appeals erred in deeming the district court's handling of the penalty-phase evidence to be a basis for vacatur\nA. The district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding inquiry into the unsolved Waltham crime\nB. The Waltham evidence would not have changed the jury's penalty verdict",
        "reference": "B. The court of appeals' inflexible voir dire rule is practically unsound",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The traffic stop in this case was lawfully based on reasonable suspicion that a vehicle was being driven by its registered owner whose license had been revoked\nA. A law enforcement officer can reasonably suspect that a vehicle is being driven by its registered owner whose license has been revoked\nB. Respondent provides no sound basis for disputing the reasonableness of the traffic stop in this case\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Kansas Supreme Court misapplied the Fourth Amendment to the circumstances of this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-439_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING THAT NANCE'S CLAIMS ARE COGNIZABLE ONLY IN HABEAS CORPUS DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW\nA. There Is No Meaningful Split Among the Circuits on the Issue of Whether Nance's Claims Are Cognizable in Habeas\nB. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision Was Correct\nC. This Petition Presents a Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Whether section 1983 or Habeas Is the Appropriate Procedure\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS' FACTBOUND DETERMINATION THAT NANCE'S HABEAS CLAIMS WERE SUCCESSIVE UNDER 28 USCS section 2244(B)(2)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-546_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The decision below conflicts with the FTCA's text and this Court's decision in Simmons\nB. The decision below conflicts with decisions of other federal courts of appeals\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This case is an appropriate vehicle to decide the question presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE DECISION BELOW, BY RECOGNIZING A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 14(e), CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S PRIVATE-RIGHT JURISPRUDENCE\nA. Since 1975, this Court has made clear that private rights of action may not be inferred without an indication of Congressional intent\nB. There is no basis to infer a private right under Section 14(e)\nC. Inferring a private right under Section 14(e) is unnecessary because Section 10(b) will continue to provide a remedy for fraud in tender offers\nIII. THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY THIS CASE IS IMPORTANT",
        "reference": "I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS OF SIX OTHER CIRCUITS ON WHETHER ANY IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 14(e) MAY BE BASED MERELY UPON NEGLIGENCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Termination of DACA Is Judicially Reviewable\nA. Petitioners Chose to Base the Termination Solely on a Legal Conclusion About Their Authority\n1. Petitioners expressly rested the termination on a conclusion that DACA was unlawful\n2. Petitioners cannot retroactively inject new considerations into their termination decision\nB. The APA Permits Review of an Agency's Conclusion that Its Authorizing Statutes Forbid a Particular Action\n1. An agency's determination about the limits of its authority is not a discretionary non-enforcement decision\n2. Petitioners misconstrue Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers\n3. 8 U.S.C. section 1252(g) does not bar review here\nII. Petitioners' Termination of DACA Was Arbitrary and Capricious\nA. Petitioners' Asserted Conclusion That DACA Was Illegal Rested on Substantial Errors of Fact and Law\n1. Petitioners erroneously assumed that DACA prevented agency officials from exercising discretion\n2. Petitioners purported to rely on the holding of a case that contained no such holding\nB. Petitioners' Evaluation of DACA Omitted Essential Factors\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Petitioners failed to explain their change in position or to consider the significant interests affected\nC. Petitioners' Defective Legal Analysis Led to a Flawed Legal",
        "reference": "1. Petitioners failed to address significant differences between DACA and DAPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Applies Extraterritorially And Encompasses Petitioners' Willful Infringement\nA. The Lanham Act's Text Overcomes The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality\nB. This Court Has Repeatedly Recognized That The Lanham Act's Unique Language Overcomes The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality\nC. The Lanham Act's Extraterritorial Reach Rightfully Encompasses Foreign Infringement That Substantially Affects U.S. Commerce\nD. Background Legal Principles Limit The Class Of Lanham Act Suits Involving Foreign Conduct\nE. The Court Of Appeals Properly Concluded That Petitioners Violated The Lanham Act\nII. Petitioners' Contention That The Lanham Act Does Not Apply Extraterritorially Is Meritless\nA. Petitioners' Textual Arguments Have No Merit\nB. Petitioners' Arguments Based On Precedent Have No Merit\nC. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Have No Merit\nIII. This Case Involves A Domestic Application Of The Lanham Act\nA. The Lanham Act Is Focused Both On Protecting The Goodwill Of Mark Owners And On Preventing Consumer Confusion\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioners Committed A Domestic Violation Of The Lanham Act By Using Hetronic's Marks In A Manner Likely To Confuse U.S. Consumers",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners Committed A Domestic Violation Of The Lanham Act By Tarnishing The Goodwill Of A U.S. Business",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. INTENT IS IMPORTANT IN DISCRIMINATION CASES\nA. Congress Uses Distinct Language When Requiring Plaintiffs To Prove Intent\nB. There Are Good Policy Reasons For Requiring Intent For Some Causes Of Action\nII. SOX DIFFERS IN SIGNIFICANT WAYS FROM THE WPA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. SOX's Legislative History Does Not Support Murray's Argument\nC. Private Industry Employees Have Different Needs Than Federal Government Employees",
        "reference": "A. SOX's Text Does Not Resemble The WPA's Text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Application Of The Right-To-Control Theory Risks Criminalizing Important Business Practices In The Government Contracting Process And Is Contrary To Existing Precedent\nII. Pre-RFP Interactions Between Government Contracting Officials And Industry Are Routine And Beneficial To Both The Government And Industry\nA. [MISSING]\nB. State Procurement Officials Employ Similar Policies Promoting Pre-RFP Communications With Industry",
        "reference": "A. The Federal Government Has Codified Early Pre-RFP Communications In The FAR And Related Guidance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Before the Constitution, States were immune from suit in each other's courts\n2. The Constitution did not abrogate States' immunity from suit in each other's courts\n3. The history of the Eleventh Amendment confirms the understanding that States were immune in each other's courts\n4. Pre-Hall decisions of this Court and other courts reflect the Framing-era consensus\n5. Hyatt's reliance on The Schooner Exchange is unavailing\nB. Post-Hall Decisions Have Clarified The Constitutional Values That Hall Flouts\nII. STARE DECISIS DOES NOT JUSTIFY MAINTAINING HALL\nA. The Court's Post-Hall Jurisprudence Has Left Hall An Outlier\nB. Stare Decisis Has Little Force Here Because Hall Is A Constitutional Decision That Has Not Engendered Reliance Interests\nC. Hall Has Proven Harmful In Practice",
        "reference": "A. Hall Ignored The Framing-Era Understanding Of Interstate Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1484_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Navajo Nation's breach-of-trust claim fails to allege the violation of any specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted\nA. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted\nB. The requirement that a tribe identify a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted applies to claims for non-monetary relief\nC. No substantive source of law expressly establishes a trust duty to assess and address the Navajo Nation's general water needs\n1. The court of appeals' reliance on the Winters doctrine was misplaced\n2. The 1868 Treaty's farming provisions do not support the Navajo Nation's breach-of-trust claim\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The environmental impact statement that the court of appeals cited lacks any prescriptive, trust-creating force\nII. An order compelling the government to deliver water from the Lower Colorado River mainstream to the Navajo Reservation would violate this Court's decree in Arizona v. California",
        "reference": "3. The government's general control over the Lower Colorado River mainstream does not create specific trust duties owed to the Navajo Nation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ABA's Mental Health Standards Project\nA. The 1984 Mental Health Standards\nB. The 2016 Mental Health Standards\nII. The Insanity Defense Reflects The Core Values And Long Historical Tradition Of Anglo-American Criminal Law\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Kansas's Mens Rea Approach Is Incompatible With the History and Tradition of the Anglo-American Criminal Justice System",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FCA'S TEXT AND HISTORY PERMIT THE GOVERNMENT TO DISMISS A RELATOR'S SUIT AT ANY TIME.\nA. The Statutory Background And History Show The Importance Of Executive Control Over Qui Tam Suits.\nB. The Plain Text And Statutory Context Give The Government Virtually Unfettered Dismissal Authority.\nII. THE GOVERNMENT'S DISMISSAL AUTHORITY PROTECTS AGAINST MERITLESS AND UNDULY BURDENSOME FCA LITIGATION.\nA. An FCA Suit's Viability May Not Be Apparent Until Discovery Commences.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Broad Dismissal Authority Is Needed To Protect Against Frivolous Litigation That Hinders Lifesaving Treatments.",
        "reference": "B. The Burdens And Costs Of Qui Tam Litigation Often Are Not Apparent At The Outset.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Article I, Section 4's plain text assigns to State Legislatures the authority to regulate elections within their boundaries.\nB. The Constitution's structure confirms that Article I, Section 4 means what it says.\nC. This Court's precedent, from the founding era through the present, confirms Article I, Section 4's textual limitation.\nII. KEEPING STATE COURTS IN THEIR PROPER LANE DOES NOT MEAN STRIPPING THEM OF THEIR ROLE.\nA. When State Legislatures pass laws, they must do so against the backdrop of state and federal constitutional requirements.\nB. When courts shift from reviewing legislative acts to acting as legislatures, an Article I, Section 4 violation arises.\nIII. THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT COULD NOT HAVE TRANSGRESSED ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 MORE SEVERELY.\nA. The North Carolina Supreme Court invented an extra-textual prohibition on partisan gerrymandering.\nB. The North Carolina Supreme Court empowered lower state courts to determine which analytical method best gauges partisan gerrymandering.",
        "reference": "I. ARTICLE I, SECTION 4 FORECLOSES THE ABILITY OF COURTS (STATE OR FEDERAL) TO CREATE ELECTION RULES.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The EPA lacks authority to restructure the power sector\nA. Whether the power sector should be restructured to address climate change is a major question that Congress has not delegated to the EPA\nB. This Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA did not give the EPA carte blanche authority to regulate all emissions, much less the ability to restructure the nation's power sector\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Allowing the EPA to mandate generation shifting disproportionately burdens some states without the protection of the political process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "Unless Congress provides otherwise, the federal government's criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country is exclusive of state jurisdiction\nA. Section 1152's text and history demonstrate that the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over crimes by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country\nB. Congress has consistently acted on and confirmed the understanding that States lack jurisdiction over offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The State's remaining arguments lack merit",
        "reference": "C. This Court has long recognized that States do not generally have jurisdiction over offenses by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Immigration and Nationality Act mandates removal of unauthorized aliens\nB. DACA and DAPA are both categorical, and therefore unconstitutional, suspensions of the law\nC. The provision of benefits and a \"lawful\" status are beyond the scope of prosecutorial discretion\nII. A Discretionary Decision Not To Enforce The Law Cannot Give Rise To A Reliance Interest In Continued (And Certainly Not In Perpetual) Non-Enforcement",
        "reference": "I. The DACA Program That President Trump's Administration Seeks to Rescind Was Itself Legally and Even Constitutionally Infirm",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Act's Sweep Should Be Limited to Navigable-in-Fact Waters Connected to Traditional Navigable Waters\nII. The Government's Interpretation of the Act Conflicts with the Act's Text and Structure, and Common Sense\nIII. The Constitution Cabins the Reach of 33 U.S.C. section 1362(7)\nA. EPA's Expansive Reading of the Act Would Exceed the Scope of Congress's Authority Under the Commerce Clause\n1. Congress Cannot Confer on EPA Regulatory Authority It Does Not Have\n2. The Act Should Be Construed Consistent with Federalism Principles and Limits on Federal Power\nB. 33 U.S.C. section 1362(7), as Interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, Would Unconstitutionally Grant EPA Legislative Power\n1. [MISSING]\n2. If the CWA Authorized EPA's Sweeping Assertion of Jurisdiction, the Act Would Be Unconstitutional\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Jurisdictional Test Violates Due Process\n1. Lack of Fair Notice\n2. Danger of Arbitrary Enforcement\nIV. To the Extent Doubts Persist as to the Act's Sweep, It Should Be Narrowly Construed Under the Rule of Lenity",
        "reference": "1. The Constitution Bars Congress from Transferring Its Legislative Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Crow's right to hunt under the 1868 Treaty was not extinguished by Wyoming's admission to the Union\nA. Wyoming's admission to the Union did not terminate the Crow's right to hunt under the 1868 Treaty\n1. The 1868 Treaty does not provide for the hunting right to terminate at statehood\n2. Wyoming's statehood Act did not repeal the hunting right reserved by the 1868 Treaty\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. In light of Mille Lacs, Race Horse does not compel a different",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. RYDER CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Opposing Parties' Remaining Arguments Lack Merit\nII. THE OPPOSING PARTIES' FEARS OF DISRUPTION ARE UNSUPPORTED AND EXAGGERATED\nIII. THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE CANNOT VALIDATE THE BOARD'S FUTURE ACTIONS",
        "reference": "A. The De Facto Officer Doctrine May Not Deprive Litigants Of Relief From Timely Challenged Actions By Officials Exercising Power In Violation Of The Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This is a poor vehicle for deciding the question presented.\nA. Petitioner admitted that he engaged in multiple acts of surveillance that separately could support his conviction.\nB. Colorado's approach addresses the concerns identified in statements respecting the denial of certiorari in Perez and Boettger.\nII. Petitioner overstates the circuit split.\nIII. Colorado's standard follows this Court's precedent.\nA. This Court applied a context-driven objective standard for identifying true threats in Watts, and neither Elonis nor Black casts doubt on the Watts approach.\nB. [MISSING]\n1. True threats cause harm independent of the defendant's mental state.\n2. Stalking cases illustrate the importance of context-driven objective standards.\n3. Colorado's context-driven objective inquiry safeguards victims from the harms of true threats while protecting free expression.",
        "reference": "B. A context-driven objective inquiry recognizes that true threats are unprotected by the First Amendment because of the substantial harm they create, harm that does not turn on the defendant's mental state.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS PROHIBITED PRESCRIBING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ONLY WHEN DONE WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PRESCRIPTION WAS ISSUED OUTSIDE THE COURSE OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE\nII. ALLOWING CONVICTIONS FOR MERE DEPARTURES FROM PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE, REGARDLESS OF A PHYSICIAN'S INTENT, WOULD JEOPARDIZE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS\nA. The Statute Requires Knowledge of Wrongdoing\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Due Process Forbids Criminalizing Good Faith Efforts To Comply With the CSA\nD. The Rule of Lenity Was Designed To Prevent These Constitutional Problems",
        "reference": "B. Only Congress May Create a New Criminal Offense; Allowing DEA To Do So Violates the Non-Delegation Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INTERNET'S GROWING PREVALENCE SINCE 1986 MAKES THE ACT'S PROTECTIONS MORE IMPORTANT, NOT LESS SO.\nII. AN AGENCY APPROACH SUPPORTS AFFIRMANCE ON THE NARROW GROUNDS THAT AGENTS LOSE AGENCY-BASED ENTITLEMENTS WHEN THEY UNDERTAKE EGREGIOUS ACTS THAT TERMINATE THEIR AGENCY.\nIII. THE PROPOSED AGENCY APPROACH AVOIDS THE POLICY CATASTROPHES THAT PETITIONER AND AMICI FEAR.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The proposed agency approach avoids criminalizing trivial breaches of websites' terms of service.",
        "reference": "A. The proposed agency approach avoids criminalizing innocuous violations of workplace web-browsing policies.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Lawyer May Not Override a Client's Decision to File a Notice of Appeal Because the Client Signed a Plea Agreement with an Appeal Waiver\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Because All Appeal Waivers Are Partial, the Mere Existence of a Plea Waiver Could Never Render the Filing a Notice of Appeal Frivolous\nC. The Client Retains Full Control Over the Decision to File a Notice of Appeal, Even if a Court Later Determines that an Argument Made on Appeal Breached the Plea Agreement\nII. Counsel's Failure to File a Notice of Appeal, Over Mr. Garza's Express Wishes, Violated the Most Basic Principle of Agency Law and Is Presumptively Prejudicial\nA. A Lawyer Who Deliberately Disregards a Client's Instructions to File a Notice of Appeal Violates the Lawyer's Obligations of Loyalty by Disobeying the Client's Lawful Direction\nB. Counsel's Decision Not to File a Notice of Appeal Is Presumptively Prejudicial Because It Forfeited Mr. Garza's Right to an Entire Judicial Proceeding\nIII. The Court Should Establish a Clear Rule that Prevents Lawyers from Sacrificing a Client's Clearly Expressed Desire to a Constitutional Right\nA. Lawyers Need a Clear Rule to Understand Their Obligation to Their Clients to File a Notice of Appeal\nB. If This Court Does Not Presume Prejudice Here, Defendants Will Have No Choice but to Proceed Pro Se to Demonstrate Prejudice Because They Had Constitutionally Deficient Trial Counsel Who Failed to Obey Them",
        "reference": "A. The Client, Not the Lawyer, Has the Authority to Decide Whether to Appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1261_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The lower courts uniformly apply this Court's qualified immunity precedents\nA. This Court's precedents hold that a principle is clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity when it is obvious or has been previously applied in similar circumstances\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Fifth Circuit's approach to qualified immunity is the same as every other circuit's\nII. There is no basis to \"abolish\" or overhaul this Court's longstanding qualified immunity jurisprudence\nA. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983\nB. Statutory stare decisis considerations do not justify intervention by this Court\nIII. If the Court intends to revisit section 1983 immunity, it should also revisit Monroe and section 1983 liability\nIV. The decision below is correct\nA. Binding authority provides that short-term housing assignments in unsanitary conditions do not violate the Eighth Amendment\nB. Hope v. Pelzer supports the judgment below\nC. Any other circuit would have reached the same",
        "reference": "B. Every circuit correctly and consistently applies those principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. LEMON V. KURTZMAN HAS CAUSED CONFUSION AND INCONSISTENCY IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRECEDENT AND SHOULD BE OVERRULED\nA. THE FRAMERS INTENDED THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TO RESTRAIN FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION AND NOT AS AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT\nB. EVEN IF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IS APPLIED TO THE STATES, THE FRAMERS INTENDED ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE VIOLATIONS TO BE REVIEWED WITH A STANDARD OF LEGAL COERCION\nII. [MISSING]\nA. THE MEMORIAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE LEGAL COERCION STANDARD\nB. THE MEMORIAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE VAN ORDEN TEST\nC. EVEN UNDER THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST, THE MEMORIAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL",
        "reference": "II. UNDER ANY ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE STANDARD OR TEST, THE MEMORIAL IS CONSTITUTIONAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "Appending a top-level domain like \".com\" to a generic term does not create a protectable mark\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Sound trademark policy supports the conclusion that adding a top-level domain to a generic term does not create a protectable mark\n1. This case directly implicates the concerns that animated the Court's decision in Goodyear\n2. The nature of the Internet further confirms that adding a top-level domain to a generic term generally will not create a protectable mark\n3. Respondent has ample protection against unfair competition even without federal trademark registration of BOOKING.COM\nC. Respondent's Teflon survey does not provide a sound basis for treating BOOKING.COM as a registrable trademark\n1. Respondent's survey evidence is irrelevant under Goodyear\n2. Reliance on respondent's survey evidence conflates generic and descriptive terms",
        "reference": "A. Like the addition of an entity designation, the addition of a top-level domain to a generic term does not create a registrable trademark",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. American Counterterrorism Policy Supports Liability for Persons and Entities That Knowingly Provide Services to Terrorists and Their Agents\nIII. This Court Should Affirm the Judgment Below",
        "reference": "I. JASTA's Text Imposes Civil Liability on Persons and Entities That Knowingly Provide Substantial Assistance to Terrorists and Their Agents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Introduction\nII. The Trust Does Not Have Minimum Contacts (Nexus) with North Carolina\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Even If Minimum Contacts Could Be Established by a Resident Beneficiary, the Beneficiary Would Have to Be Vested, Not Contingent\nIII. North Carolina Seeks to Tax 100 Percent of the Trust's Income, Which Is Not Rationally Related to \"Values Connected with the Taxing State\"\nIV. By Following Federal Models for the Taxation of Grantors and Beneficiaries, North Carolina Can Prevent Tax Sheltering",
        "reference": "A. The Relevant Minimum Contacts Are Those Between the Trustee and North Carolina",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Fifth Circuit's decision does not raise an important question of federal law that needs to be settled by this Court\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Metromedia's test for regulation of commercial speech is unaffected by the Fifth Circuit's holding\n3. Local governments are already adjusting their laws to ensure that Metromedia will continue to apply to their billboard regulations\n4. Austin's ability to regulate digital displays remains firmly in place\nB. As Austin concedes, the Fifth Circuit's decision does not conflict with other circuit courts of appeals decisions\nC. The Fifth Circuit's decision was correct\n1. Austin's goals and motives are irrelevant under Reed\n2. Austin's regulation is not based on the location of the sign, but on what the sign says\n3. Austin asks this Court to carve out an unnecessary and problematic exception to Reed",
        "reference": "1. The Fifth Circuit's holding was completely consistent with Reed's majority opinion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Original Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Support Political Gerrymandering Causes of Action\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Allowing a Federal Cause of Action Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments for Partisan Gerrymandering Upsets the Constitutional Balance",
        "reference": "II. The Constitution Grants the States the Power Over Elections",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-565_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Mischaracterizes the Realities of Commercial Shipping\nA. Shipping under safe-berth provisions\nB. The Third Circuit's decision relies on an oversimplified and erroneous account of a charterer-vessel relationship\nC. [MISSING]\nII. A Strict-Liability Regime Would Misalign Incentives for Safety and Cooperation\nA. Strict liability insulates the party best able to avoid damage\nB. Imposing strict liability injects uncertainty into dynamic commercial relationships\nIII. This Court's Decision Will Have Vast Practical Consequences for the U.S. Maritime Community and Economy",
        "reference": "C. The Fifth Circuit's analysis reflects the dynamic and efficient reality of maritime commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. There is no conflict warranting review.\nB. The decision below is correct.\nC. Petitioner's \"constitutional power\" question does not warrant review.\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Petitioner misstates the implications of the holding below.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1414_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "1. Congress has authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter into agreements with tribal governments under which tribal law-enforcement officers are certified to enforce generally applicable federal criminal laws in Indian country\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The government's fear that special law-enforcement commissions will undermine tribal sovereignty is misplaced",
        "reference": "2. By extending to tribal governments the power to enforce generally applicable federal criminal law in Indian country, Congress has exercised its power to delegate law-enforcement authority to the tribes without undermining tribal sovereignty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. PAGA claims are administrative enforcement actions, and the FAA does not preempt California's sovereign right to enforce its Labor Code via delegated private proxies\nA. PAGA actions serve the public interest, not the individual interests of aggrieved employees\nB. [MISSING]\nC. PAGA enforcement actions are fundamentally different from individual class actions\nD. California's sovereign interest in Labor Code enforcement must be respected in the absence of manifest, contrary Congressional intent\nII. The writ of certiorari should be dismissed for having been improvidently granted\nIII. Congress never intended for the FAA and private arbitration agreements to be used as a weapon against state law enforcement measures",
        "reference": "B. PAGA's public service incentive structure and minimal procedural controls following administrative exhaustion do not subject PAGA claims to FAA preemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. FAA CHAPTER 1 IS RELEVANT HERE ONLY INSOFAR AS IT CONFIRMS THE ERROR IN GE FRANCE'S POSITION\nII. THE CONVENTION AUTHORIZES CONTRACTING STATES TO COMPEL INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ONLY BETWEEN PARTIES TO A WRITTEN AGREEMENT EVIDENCING THEIR CONSENT TO ARBITRATE THEIR DISPUTES\nA. The Text Of Article II Allows Contracting States To Compel Arbitration Only Between Parties To A Written Agreement To Arbitrate Disputes Between Them\nB. The Convention's Drafting History Confirms Its Plain Text\n1. The Drafters Intended To Limit Arbitration Under The Convention To Parties Who Consent In Writing To Arbitrate Disputes Between Them\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Contemporaneous Views Of The Political Branches Confirm The Text\nD. The Post Hoc UNCITRAL Recommendation Provides Little Guidance\nIII. THE EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE INVOKED BY GE FRANCE IS UNRECOGNIZED IN OTHER NATIONS AND CONTRAVENES THE CONVENTION'S REQUIREMENT OF CONSENT EXPRESSED IN A WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES\nA. Other Nations Adhere To The Convention's Consent And Written Agreement Requirements\nB. The Equitable Estoppel Theory Invoked By GE France Reflects Neither Privity Nor Consent\nC. GE France's Position Would Frustrate The Policies Of The Convention And FAA Chapter 2\nIV. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IS GOVERNED BY GERMAN LAW, WHICH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE NON-CONSENT-BASED ESTOPPEL\nA. German Law Governs Disputes Concerning The Arbitration Agreement\nB. German Law Does Not Recognize The Equitable Estoppel Doctrine GE France Invokes",
        "reference": "2. The Drafters Intended The Requirement Of Consent Evidenced By Writing To Constitute A Mandatory Prerequisite For Compelling A Party To Arbitrate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 314(d) rebuts the presumption of judicial review\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Cuozzo and SAS Institute confirm that section 315(b) determinations are not reviewable\nIV. The purpose of the AIA confirms that time-bar determinations under section 315(b) are not reviewable",
        "reference": "II. Respondent's textual arguments fail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "The Memorial Cross does not violate the Establishment Clause\nA. A clear standard is needed to govern Establishment Clause challenges to passive displays acknowledging the role of religion in American life\nB. The Memorial Cross is constitutional by reference to historical practices and understandings\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Memorial Cross does not coerce religious belief or adherence in any relevant sense\nC. The Memorial Cross is constitutional under more modern understandings of the Establishment Clause\n1. The Memorial Cross conveys a secular message in its full context\n2. The Memorial Cross neither endorses religion nor excessively entangles the State with religion",
        "reference": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Example of Federal Employee Unions Does Not Show that Illinois Lacks an Important Interest in Fair-Share Arrangements\nA. Federal employee collective bargaining is not analogous to typical state and local bargaining\nB. Most federal employees free ride even though a majority of covered employees support union representation\nC. The federal government must directly support core collective bargaining activities\nII. The Example of Collective Bargaining in Other Environments Without Fair-Share Arrangements Does Not Support Petitioner's Arguments\nA. Unionization rates are much lower and free riding is often rampant without fair-share arrangements\nB. Some bargaining units are not viable without a requirement that all employees share in the cost of representation\nC. Employee representatives are less effective in systems that do not fairly distribute the cost of representation\nD. Opponents of public employee unions understand and exploit the economic logic of free riding\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Court Should Not Prohibit States from Using What They Determine to be the Most Effective Collective Bargaining System to Fix Employment Terms and Resolve Grievances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. NORTH CAROLINA STATE COURTS LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES\nA. The North Carolina Courts Usurped the Role of the North Carolina Legislature\nB. In Prescribing Election Regulations, State Legislatures are Not Exercising a Legislative Function\nII. LIKE THE ELECTORS CLAUSE, THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE ENTRUSTS POWER TO STATE LEGISLATURES TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF CORRUPTION\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The 2020 Federal Election Devolved into a Battle for Court Decisions to Overrule Legislatively Prescribed Regulations\nB. Election Lawfare Does Not Seek Principled, Consistent Outcomes, Damaging Confidence in Elections\nC. Upholding the Elections Clause Is Inherently Democratic, Not \"Un-democratic\"\nD. Allowing State Courts to Usurp the Duty of State Legislatures Establishes an Oligarchy, Not a Democracy",
        "reference": "III. CHAOTIC RULE CHANGES IN RECENT ELECTIONS DEMONSTRATE THE WISDOM OF THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE VESTING RULEMAKING ONLY TO LEGISLATURES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Using a trademark for an expressive purpose does not convert an ordinary consumer product into an expressive work\nIII. The TDRA's \"noncommercial use\" exception does not automatically immunize humorous uses of a trademark\nIV. Not every joke that uses another's trademark is a parody",
        "reference": "I. The Rogers v. Grimaldi test is ill-suited for trademark infringement cases involving the sale of ordinary consumer products and should not be applied to such cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Legislative Investigations Have a Long History, Both in the British Parliament and in Early American Congresses\nII. This Court Has Consistently Affirmed That Congress's Power to Investigate Is Coextensive With Its Power to Legislate\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Committees' Requests For Documents In These Cases Fall Well Within Congress's Investigatory Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Subsection (IV) Could Criminalize Lawful Conduct\nII. [MISSING]\nA. \"Know Your Rights\" Materials\nB. Community Resources and Advocacy\nC. Policy Advocacy\nIII. The Government's Assurances Do Not Save The Statute\nIV. The Impact on the U.S. Immigrant Community Could Be Far-Reaching",
        "reference": "II. Subsection (IV) Threatens the Legitimate Work of Community-Based, Advocacy, and Social Services Organizations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1576_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A venue error requires vacatur of the conviction, not the preclusive acquittal of a defendant found factually guilty\nA. Retrial in a proper venue is the traditional remedy for a venue error\nB. This Court's general precedents on constitutional remedies support retrial as the remedy for trial in an improper venue\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The purposes of the venue right do not favor the outlier remedy of a preclusive acquittal\n2. A vacatur on venue grounds is unlike a general verdict\n3. The standard retrial-permissive remedy does not encourage government abuse\n4. Encouragement of more venue claims is neither an empirical nor legal reason for an outlier remedy",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner's remaining arguments lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. Women Are Not Treated \"Unequally\" Simply Because Men Do Not Bear Children\nII. Fetuses When Aborted Are Treated as Slaves, in Violation of the Thirteenth Amendment\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Providing for No Violation of Law for an Owner's Killing of a Slave\nC. Treating Slaves as Partial Persons for Purposes of Representation\nD. Adjudicating Slaves to Be Property Under the Constitution\nE. Stripping Slaves of Legal Privileges, Including the Right to Testify\nF. Prohibiting Slavery and Its Application to Abortion\nG. The Thirteenth Amendment's Prohibition Sweeps More Broadly Than the Fourteenth's Protections",
        "reference": "A. Revising the Common Law to Treat Children as Property of the Mother",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The petition raises important federal questions that warrant this Court's review\nII. The Sixth Circuit's decision was wrong\nA. The plain text of the Anti-Injunction Act does not reach CIC's lawsuit\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Sixth Circuit's decision deepens a circuit split on whether a challenge to a regulatory mandate can be distinguished from the tax penalty that enforces it",
        "reference": "B. Neither this Court's precedent nor Respondents' concerns about crafty pleading compel a different result",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. States Regulate Healthcare and Insurance, and ERISA Did Not Displace That Authority\nB. The Affordable Care Act Merges Healthcare and Insurance Regulation for the States\nC. The Eighth Circuit's Decision Below Disregards This Critical Context\nII. An Expansive View of ERISA Preemption Frustrates State Authority\nA. The Nation's Healthcare and Insurance Challenges Are Well Known\nB. A Broad View of ERISA Preemption Threatens States Working to Address These Challenges",
        "reference": "I. The States Have \u2014and Require\u2014 Broad Authority to Regulate Healthcare Insurance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5924_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Brief in Opposition Erroneously Asserts that Louisiana's Amendment of the Constitution by the Electorate Provides a Basis for Denying Certiorari\n2. The Brief in Opposition Offers No Argument for Denying Certiorari, Focusing On The Merits Question Of Whether The Sixth Amendment Requires A Unanimous Jury\n3. The Brief in Opposition Erroneously Claims that This Court's Recent Sixth Amendment Cases Do Not Cast Doubt Upon Apodaca v. Oregon\n4. The Brief in Opposition Erroneously Argues that Louisiana's Racist History Is Irrelevant\n5. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "5. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Does Not Prevent Resolution of This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Gideon Was a New Rule Only Because It Overruled Betts, Which Had \"Made an Abrupt Break\" with the Court's Previous \"Well-Considered Precedents\"\nB. Ramos Constitutes a Watershed Rule Because, Like Gideon, It Rejected a Prior Errant Decision to Restore a Bedrock Procedural Element Necessary to a Fair Trial\nII. AS GIDEON DEMONSTRATES, AN \"ACCURATE\" CONVICTION IS ONE THAT REFLECTS A FAIR PROCESS, AND A UNANIMOUS JURY IS ESSENTIAL TO A FAIR PROCESS\nA. The Gideon Rule Increases the Likelihood the Defendant Will Be Protected by the Bedrock Procedural Elements Essential to a Fair Trial, Not the Likelihood That Actual Guilt or Innocence Will Be Accurately Determined\nB. Like Gideon's Assistance of Counsel Rule, the Ramos Unanimous Jury Rule Substantially Increases the Accuracy of Convictions",
        "reference": "I. GIDEON WAS NO MORE GROUNDBREAKING THAN RAMOS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's \"Explicitly Misleading\" Formulation Was Initially Limited To A Specific Context And Was Repudiated By The Very Judge That Created It\nA. The Explicitly Misleading Test Was Initially A Tentative Proposal Limited To The Specific Context Of Artistic Titles Using Celebrity Names\nB. The Judge That Authored Rogers Later Repudiated The Explicitly Misleading Formulation That Was Used In This Case\nII. Even The Ninth Circuit Often Considers Likelihood Of Confusion Factors While Purportedly Applying The Explicitly Misleading Test\nIII. Most Other Circuits Have Declined To Adopt The Ninth Circuit's Rigid Explicit Misleadingness Approach\nIV. This Court Should Clarify That Likelihood Of Confusion Is Ultimately A Question Of Law, Especially When Balanced Against Free Expression\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. The Respondent Should Prevail In This Case Because There Is Not A Sufficiently Compelling Likelihood Of Confusion As A Matter Of Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reject Respondent's Reformulation of the Question Presented\nII. Reed Embraces a Subject-or-Topic Test for Analyzing Whether a Law Is Content Based\nA. Reed Did Not Adopt Respondent's Broad \"Function or Purpose\" Test\nB. Respondent Cannot Reconcile Its Interpretation of Reed With This Court's First Amendment Precedents\nIII. Austin's Rule Is Content Neutral and Survives Intermediate Scrutiny\nA. Austin's Rule Has No Indicia of Content Discrimination\nB. Austin's Rule Is Valid Under Intermediate Scrutiny\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Respondent Has Not Shown an Entitlement to Facial or As-Applied Relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The decision below is correct",
        "reference": "A. The question presented lacks sufficient importance to merit review by this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The CFPB Lacks the Structural Features of Executive Agencies and Other Independent Agencies\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. This Court Should Grant Review to Resolve the Exceptionally Important Question Whether the CFPB is Unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH CONTROLS THIS CASE\nA. When, As In Whole Woman's Health, This Court Declares A Law Unconstitutional, Materially Indistinguishable Laws Are Invalid As Well\n1. Declaring A Law Unconstitutional Is Different From Resolving A Purely Fact-Based Dispute\n2. Whole Woman's Health Invalidated Texas's Admitting-Privileges Law For Reasons That Extend Beyond Texas\nB. Louisiana's Admitting-Privileges Law Is Materially Indistinguishable From The Texas Law In Whole Woman's Health\n1. The District Court Found That The Facts Of This Case Are Materially Indistinguishable From Whole Woman's Health\n2. The Fifth Circuit Had No Warrant To Reject The District Court's Findings\na. The Fifth Circuit Erred In Finding That Act 620 Confers Benefits\nb. The Fifth Circuit Erred In Opining That Act 620 Would Not Burden Abortion Access\nII. ACT 620 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL EVEN ASSUMING THE BURDENS HERE ARE LESS THAN IN WHOLE WOMAN'S HEALTH\nA. A Law That Burdens The Right To Abortion With No Offsetting Benefit Violates The Undue Burden Test\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Even If Act 620 Conferred A Minimal Benefit, The Law Would Still Be Unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. In The Absence Of Adequate Detention Space, Contiguous Return Is Necessary To Effectuate Congress's Statutory Scheme\nIII. Petitioners' Refusal To Exercise Their Contiguous-Return Authority Forces Them To Abuse Their Parole Authority",
        "reference": "I. By Rescinding MPP, Petitioners Force Themselves to Violate Section 1225",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Overcriminalization is a growing problem that this Court continues to confront\nB. The Controlled Substances Act only criminalizes activities that fall outside the usual course of a doctor's professional practice\nII. This Court should strictly enforce the mental state that Congress required to impose criminal liability under the Controlled Substances Act",
        "reference": "I. The overuse and abuse of federal criminal law threatens innocent conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE DOES NOT INVOLVE WAIVER\nA. Morgan Invokes Laches\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Alternatively, Morgan's Argument Is That Sundance Is Estopped From Demanding Arbitration\nII. THE COURT SHOULD REAFFIRM THE WELL-SETTLED PRINCIPLE THAT FEDERAL LAW FAVORS ARBITRATION",
        "reference": "B. If Not Laches, Morgan's Argument Is That Sundance Forfeited Its Right To Arbitrate The Parties' Dispute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Public Official's Operation of a Personal Social-Media Webpage Does Not Constitute State Action Without Some State-Conferred Authority\nA. The state-action doctrine serves to preserve the individual liberty not only of private citizens but also of those who serve them in state government\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioner's Appearance-and-Function Test Should Be Rejected As Legally And Practically Unworkable\nA. Petitioner's approach misapplies this Court's precedent\nB. Petitioner's appearance-and-function test is practically unworkable in the increasingly digital world\nC. Treating public officials' actions on a personal social-media account as state action is legally unworkable in the light of other First Amendment precedent\n1. This Court's forum-analysis framework is a poor fit for assessing public officials' use of social media\n2. Petitioner's approach to state action may create friction with this Court's government-speech precedents",
        "reference": "B. State action is present only where a public official's conduct is undertaken pursuant to a source of state authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Grant Review to Repudiate Hardison's Non-Textual Interpretation of \"Undue Hardship.\"\nA. The More-Than-De-Minimis Standard Is Dictum and Finds No Refuge In Stare Decisis.\nB. Hardison Is Not True Precedent Because the More-than-De-Minimis Standard Is Unmoored from the Statutory Text and Was Adopted without a Minimally Plausible Ratio Decidendi.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Congress is not responsible for fixing Hardison's antonymous definition of undue hardship.",
        "reference": "1. Hardison is also ineligible for the super-stare decisis presumption.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Elections Clause preempts the state law provisions on which the state court relied.\nA. The Election Clause has neither a reservation of State rights under the Tenth Amendment nor a presumption against preemption.\n1. State legislation under the Elections Clause exercises federal law.\n2. This Court does not defer to States under the Elections Clause.\nB. The Elections Clause field and conflict preempts the state law provisions on which the state court relied.\nII. The Elections Clause prohibits delegation to \u2014and a fortiori usurpation by \u2014non-legislative actors.\nA. States cannot delegate authority under the Elections Clause to non-legislative actors.\n1. The Guarantee Clause can help resolve claims under the doubt canon.\n2. The entity exercising power under the Elections Clause must be a \"legislature.\"\n3. The state law provisions on which the state court relied do not clearly give state courts the power that the state court claims.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Courts cannot usurp authority under the Elections Clause.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Appropriate Relief\" Available Under RFRA Includes Money Damages\nII. RFRA Damages Are Recoverable Against Officials in Their Individual Capacities\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Arguments of Petitioners' Amici FFRF and AA Are Properly Rejected",
        "reference": "III. Interpreting RFRA As Congress Intended Raises No Separation of Powers Issues",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-23_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. The aggravated felony statute is written into federal criminal law\nB. Because of its criminal applications, the aggravated felony statute lies beyond Chevron's domain\n1. Chevron deference has no role to play in the interpretation of criminal law\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Chevron deference is as ill-suited for criminal offenses described in Title 8 as for those described in Title 18",
        "reference": "2. Chevron deference likewise does not extend to statutes with both criminal and civil applications",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the de minimis use doctrine, North Carolina did not violate copyright law\nA. The de minimis use doctrine excuses trivial copying of copyrighted works\nB. North Carolina's limited display of a fragment of Allen's works was a de minimis use\nII. Under the fair-use doctrine, North Carolina did not violate copyright law\nA. Certain fair uses of copyrighted works are permissible under copyright law\nB. North Carolina's use of Allen's works falls within the fair-use doctrine\n1. North Carolina's use did not reduce the market value of Allen's works\n2. [MISSING]\n3. North Carolina relied in good faith on its contract with Allen",
        "reference": "2. North Carolina's use educated the public about the state's history",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1143_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Standing alone, the text of Sections 9 and 10 indicates that federal courts are empowered to confirm any arbitral award\nB. At a minimum, federal courts have jurisdiction to hear motions under Sections 9 or 10 whenever the court has jurisdiction to decide the underlying action\n1. Federal jurisdiction is determined on the basis of an entire \"civil action,\" not on a motion-by-motion basis\n2. The FAA's text indicates that federal jurisdiction extends to the \"action\" to resolve the parties' dispute and is not lost if an individual \"motion\" does not disclose an independent basis for jurisdiction\n3. The statutory context indicates that jurisdiction applies to the entire \"action\"\n4. Petitioner's motion-by-motion approach would undermine the FAA's purposes and lead to anomalous asymmetries\nC. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Depriving federal courts of authority to enforce federal-question awards would be harmful to business interests",
        "reference": "I. Federal courts have jurisdiction to confirm awards that resolve federal-question disputes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text Of section 1608(a)(3) Is Naturally Read To Require That Process Be Mailed To The Head Of The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs In The Foreign State\nII. The Vienna Convention Prohibits Mailing Service Of Process To A Diplomatic Mission\nIII. Legislative History Confirms That Congress Intended For section 1608(a)(3) To Preclude Mailing Process To A Diplomatic Mission\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. U.S. Interests Would Be Undermined If Mailing Process To A Diplomatic Mission Were Permitted Under section 1608(a)(3)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-979_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not bar judicial review of non-discretionary determinations\nA. The text of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) is best read to permit review of non-discretionary determinations\nB. The statutory structure and context confirm the government's longstanding interpretation\nC. The statutory history reinforces the reviewability of non-discretionary determinations\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Other considerations support the government's interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari Should Be Granted So The Court Can Clarify That Its Campaign Finance Jurisprudence Is Limited To Campaign Finance Cases\nA. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. This case demonstrates the dangers of grafting the unique work this Court has undertaken in the context of official corruption and public interest in elections onto different circumstances, and counsels in favor of cabining the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in holding that courts are required to consider a full range of ameliorative measures after finding that return poses a grave risk of harm\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A discretionary approach to ameliorative measures accords with the longstanding view of the State Department, which finds support in international understandings of the convention\nC. A flexible ameliorative-measure approach best serves the Convention's purposes\nII. The scope of judicial discretion under Article 13(b) is an important issue dividing the circuits that warrants this Court's review",
        "reference": "A. The text of neither the Convention nor ICARA mandates consideration of ameliorative measures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court's Precedents Support Finding a Plan of the Convention Waiver\nIII. Texas's \"State Law Immunity\" Argument Fails",
        "reference": "I. The States Surrendered Their Sovereign Immunity To Suits Authorized by the War Powers In the Plan of the Convention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. The System of Real Property Taxation\nA. The Nature of Real Property Taxation\nB. The Evolution of Real Property Taxation\nII. The Evolving Due Process Guardrails for Property Tax Enforcement\nA. The Early 20th Century: Adequacy of Notice by Publication\nB. Due Process in Property Tax Foreclosures\nIII. The Centrality of Equity and of Redemption\nA. The Equity of Redemption\nB. The Double Meaning of Equity: Mortgage Law and Property Tax Law\nIV. The Measurement of Financial Equity\nV. [MISSING]\nA. The Local Government as the Default Owner\nB. The Cost of Doing Nothing\nC. The Role of Land Banks and Land Banking",
        "reference": "V. The Costs of Abandonment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. WEAKNESS IN SALES TAX REVENUES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The claims are not ripe against Montgomery\nA. This Court's jurisprudence on ripeness in pre-enforcement cases\nB. This case has not been ripe at any stage of the proceedings\nII. Fallbrook's claims are also not prudentially ripe\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The notice provisions of the FACT Act mean that Fallbrook will not be harmed if its claims are found unripe",
        "reference": "A. Fallbrook's claims would be substantially aided by further factual development",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-200_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Constitutes Judicial Legislating and Disrupts the Settled Understanding of Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) Standing.\nA. Lower Federal Courts Have Consistently Interpreted Section 11's Tracing Requirement.\nB. Congress Has Ratified Section 11's and Section 12(a)(2)'s Tracing Requirements.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit's Ruling Threatens To Harm Investors.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-8369_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. In Deciding When to Impose a \"Strike,\" Congress Incorporated into section 1915(g) the Well-Established Merits-Based Distinction Between a With-Prejudice Dismissal and a Without-Prejudice Dismissal\nB. Treating a Dismissal Without Prejudice As a Strike Undermines the Judiciary's Inherent Equitable Power to Leave the Courthouse Doors Open to Meritorious Claims Brought by Indigent Prisoners\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Treating a Without-Prejudice Dismissal As a Strike Penalizes Poor Prisoners for Proceeding Pro Se and Stifles Meritorious Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CUE STANDARD PLACES INTOLERABLE BURDENS ON VETERANS SEEKING DISABILITY BENEFITS\nA. Veterans face massive hurdles in navigating the disability-benefits system\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE PRO-VETERAN CANON\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ERROR AND ENSURE THAT VETERANS RECEIVE THE BENEFITS TO WHICH THEIR SERVICE HAS ENTITLED THEM",
        "reference": "B. The Federal Circuit's decision exacerbates these difficulties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5924_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict\nA. This Court has already determined multiple times that the Jury Trial Clause requires unanimity\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The unanimity requirement applies to the states\nA. The Fourteenth Amendment requires states to abide by the unanimity requirement\nB. The State lacks any valid reliance interest in Apodaca",
        "reference": "B. First principles confirm this Court's consistent understanding of the Jury Trial Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Securities Laws Require that Officers Hold Securities\nII. Legislative History of the Securities Laws Confirms that Congress Used the Word \"Officer\" to Mean Constitutional Officer\nA. The Legislative History of the Securities Act\nB. The Legislative History of the Securities Exchange Act\nIII. Congress Intended SEC ALJs to Be Properly Appointed Constitutional Officers under the APA\nA. The APA Also Places ALJs on the Same Footing with Principal Officers\nB. Empowerment of ALJs Was a Reaction to Earlier Functioning of Administrative Agencies\nC. Congress Intended ALJs to Be \"Presiding Officers,\" Appointed in Accordance with the Appointments Clause\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The statutory definitions of \"officer\" and \"employee\" confirm that Congress intended SEC ALJs to be \"inferior officers\"\nD. Congress Explicitly Made Certain that ALJs' Appointments Complied with the Appointments Clause\nE. Congress Was Conferring Significant Executive Powers in the APA",
        "reference": "1. Congress referred to hearing examiners as \"presiding officers\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Abortion providers lack article III standing to challenge abortion regulations on behalf of their patients\nA. Abortion providers and their patients lack the \"close relationship\" this Court's precedent requires\n1. Third-party standing cannot be based on hypothetical future relationships\n2. Abortion providers' interests conflict with their patients' interests\nB. There is no hindrance to patients bringing suit\nC. The Court's other cases do not establish that abortion providers have third-party standing\nD. The Court should repudiate Singleton\n1. Singleton was poorly reasoned\n2. Singleton is unworkable because it permits abortion providers to police themselves\n3. Singleton is inconsistent with related decisions and subsequent developments\n4. Singleton does not implicate any reliance interests\nII. Hellerstedt is an unworkable \"anomaly\" and should be discarded\nA. Hellerstedt's application of the undue-burden standard was poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the Court's abortion jurisprudence\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Hellerstedt is inconsistent with Mazurek and Gonzales\n3. Hellerstedt is inconsistent with the Court's large-fraction test for facial challenges to abortion-related laws\nB. Hellerstedt's unworkable rule has created confusion in the lower courts\nC. No reliance interests justify retaining Hellerstedt",
        "reference": "1. Hellerstedt conflicts with Casey",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.72
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-938_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The conclusive denial of a motion for relief from the automatic stay is final and appealable\n1. An order is appealable if it finally resolves a proceeding within the bankruptcy case\n2. The conclusive denial of a stay-relief motion finally resolves a proceeding within the bankruptcy case\nB. Ritzen's contrary arguments lack merit\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The denial of stay relief is final even where the request for relief rests on an allegation of bad faith\n3. Allowing appeals from denials of stay relief is consistent with relevant congressional policies",
        "reference": "1. The denial of stay relief is final even where the relief sought is permission to litigate in another forum",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-419_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. DAVIS AND JEFFERSON COUNTY ESTABLISH THAT A STATE CANNOT TREAT GROUPS OF STATE RETIREES MORE FAVORABLY THAN SIMILARLY SITUATED GROUPS OF FEDERAL RETIREES\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO DECIDE THIS IMPORTANT AND RECURRING QUESTION",
        "reference": "II. RESPONDENT FAILS TO REFUTE PERSUASIVELY THE CONFLICT IN THE LOWER COURTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. This Court should not grant review to consider overruling its precedents in this area",
        "reference": "A. The court of appeals' application of this Court's precedents does not warrant further review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A COMPELLING REASON OR AN UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE TO GRANT CERTIORARI, PARTICULARLY AHEAD OF JUDGMENT\nA. Because the decision below lacks a remedy, there is no sufficiently compelling reason to grant certiorari at this time\nB. While the Fifth Circuit's remand falls well within the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, a premature grant of certiorari does not\n1. This Court rarely grants certiorari on questions that have not yet been addressed by the court below\n2. Courts of appeals regularly remand a case to a district court for further consideration\nII. CERTIORARI IS ALSO IMPROPER BECAUSE THIS CASE INVOLVES ONLY STRAIGHTFORWARD APPLICATION OF SETTLED LAW\nA. This Court already resolved the issue of an individual's standing to challenge the individual mandate in NFIB\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The individual respondents' circumstances and arguments are nearly identical to those of the private plaintiff in NFIB\nB. The Fifth Circuit followed this Court's unambiguous, directly-on-point precedent in NFIB to invalidate the individual mandate\nC. In deciding severability, the courts below need only apply this Court's settled precedent",
        "reference": "1. This Court considered and implicitly decided private plaintiffs' standing in NFIB",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1566_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Language of Section 1606 of the FSIA Manifests Congress's Intent to Prescribe State Law Choice of Law Rules in FSIA Cases Asserting State Law Claims\nII. Any Ambiguity Should Be Resolved in Favor of Applying State Choice of Law\nA. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law\nB. Congress Enacted the FSIA Subject to the Rules of Decision Act\nC. The Absence of Developed, Relevant Federal Common Law Further Reinforces That Congress Intended State Law to Apply\nD. Courts Should Not Presume That Congress Intended to Displace State Choice of Law Rules\nE. [MISSING]\nIII. Respondent's Defense of the Ninth Circuit's FSIA Choice of Law Rule Is Unavailing",
        "reference": "E. Federalism and the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance Further Undermine the Ninth Circuit's Approach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1042_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A FELA JUDGMENT IS NOT TAXABLE COMPENSATION UNDER THE RRTA\nA. The RRTA's Text Does Not Cover FELA Damages Judgments\n1. The RRTA taxes remuneration \"for services rendered\"\n2. A FELA damages award is not remuneration for services rendered\nB. Petitioner's Invocations Of Different Statutes To Define The RRTA Lack Merit\n1. The inclusion of \"pay for time lost\" in the RRA does not support reading the RRTA to tax FELA damages awards for past wage loss\na. [MISSING]\ni. \"Pay for time lost\" is not a form of remuneration for services rendered\nii. \"Pay for time lost\" expands the definition of compensation\niii. Congress amended the RRTA to remove \"pay for time lost\"\niv. The RRA and the RRTA are not in pari materia\nb. In any event, \"pay for time lost\" does not encompass satisfaction of a FELA judgment\n2. Decisions interpreting the Social Security Act and FICA likewise do not support reading the RRTA to tax FELA damages for past wage loss\nC. The Court Of Appeals' Approach Advances Congress's Purposes\nII. A FELA JUDGMENT IS NOT TAXABLE INCOME UNDER THE RRTA\nA. Section 104(a)(2) Excludes Personal-Injury Damages From The RRTA's Tax On Employee Income\nB. Applying section 104(a)(2) To The RRTA's Employee Tax Comports With The Prevailing Approach Under FICA\nC. Petitioner's Responses Lack Merit\n1. The textual relationship of the RRTA to section 104(a)(2), not their location in the Code, governs\n2. Cross-references to fringe-benefit exclusions do not negate the general exclusion for personal-injury damages\nIII. TREASURY HAS NOT ADDRESSED WHETHER A FELA JUDGMENT IS TAXABLE UNDER THE RRTA, AND ITS LITIGATING POSITIONS DO NOT WARRANT DEFERENCE\nA. Chevron Deference Is Inappropriate In This Case\nB. The Regulations' Inclusion Of \"Pay For Time Lost\" Does Not Support Petitioner's Position\nC. The Revenue Rulings Do Not Support Petitioner's Argument\nD. History Supports The Court Of Appeals' Interpretation",
        "reference": "a. The RRTA does not tax \"pay for time lost\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.68
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "RULE 23'S REQUIREMENT THAT A SETTLEMENT BINDING CLASS MEMBERS MUST BE \"FAIR, REASONABLE, AND ADEQUATE\" CANNOT BE SATISFIED BY A CY PRES AWARD OF CLASS ACTION PROCEEDS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE IS NO DIRECT RELIEF TO CLASS MEMBERS\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Rule 23 Sets Forth A Standard\n2. The Circuits' Efforts To Apply Rule 23's Standard Are Unsatisfactory\n3. Cy Pres Is An Equitable Doctrine Arising Under Trust Law Unrelated, If Not Antithetical, To The Adversary System\nB. A Rule That A Cy Pres Settlement Award Cannot Be Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate Under Rule 23 Would Permit The Court To Interpret Rule 23 Within The Limits Of The Rules Enabling Act Authority And Also Avoid The Serious Constitutional Issues Raised By The Parties And Amici\n1. Cy Pres Is An Improper Use Of Judicial Power Under Article III\n2. Cy Pres Violates The Rules Enabling Act By Imposing A Fine On Defendants Not Authorized By The Underlying Substantive Law\n3. Cy Pres Implicates Due Process\n4. Cy Pres Infringes On Class Members' First Amendment Rights\nC. A Cy Pres Award Of Class Action Proceeds That Provides No Direct Relief To Class Members Does Not Support Class Certification",
        "reference": "A. Rule 23 Requires That Any Settlement Be \"Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. ERISA Does Not Preempt Arkansas's Law\nA. This Court's ERISA Preemption Precedents Resolve This Case\nB. Arkansas's Statute Achieves Laudable Policy Goals Unrelated to ERISA\nII. The Court Should Not Make Any Changes to its Broader ERISA Preemption Jurisprudence\nA. This Court's ERISA Preemption Cases Are Correct\nB. This Court's ERISA Preemption Cases Provide a Clear and Administrable Standard\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Congress Has Ratified This Court's Decisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Presents An Important Issue Impacting Millions Of Ordinary Citizens\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. This Case Presents An Important Question Regarding Congress' Intent In Enacting The CFAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important, And There Are No Obstacles To This Court's Review",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Effectively Invalidates An Act of Congress",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 111 Does Not Authorize EPA To Restructure the Nation's Electricity Sector\nA. The Court's Precedents Require Clear Congressional Authorization for Agencies To Make Decisions of Vast Economic and Political Significance\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress Did Not Clearly Authorize EPA To Restructure Industries, Let Alone the Nation's Electricity Sector\nII. Interpreting Section 111 To Authorize EPA To Restructure Entire Industries Would Result in a Forbidden Delegation of Legislative Power",
        "reference": "B. Whether and How To Restructure Entire Industries Is Indisputably a Question of Vast Economic and Political Significance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "Non-judicial [MISSING]\nA. According to the Act's plain and ordinary meaning, non-judicial foreclosure qualifies as \"debt collection\"\nB. The FDCPA's context and purpose confirm that non-judicial foreclosure is subject to the Act\nC. The FDCPA's legislative history further confirms that non-judicial foreclosure qualifies as debt collection\nD. The FDCPA does not intrude in any meaningful way on any traditional state interest",
        "reference": "Non-judicial foreclosure constitutes debt collection under the FDCPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SEC DISGORGEMENT IS NOT \"EQUITABLE RELIEF\" UNDER SECTION 21(d)(5) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT\nA. Kokesh Established That SEC Disgorgement Operates as a Penalty Under 28 U.S.C. section 2462\nB. [MISSING]\nII. BECAUSE CONGRESS HAS EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED THE SEC TO OBTAIN CIVIL PENALTIES, SEC DISGORGEMENT IS NOT \"APPROPRIATE OR NECESSARY FOR THE BENEFIT OF INVESTORS\"\nIII. SEC DISGORGEMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES LAWS AUTHORIZING COURTS TO \"ENJOIN\" VIOLATIONS",
        "reference": "B. SEC Disgorgement Does Not Otherwise Correspond to a Remedy \"Typically Available in Equity\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Civic Courage\" Required to Publicly Exercise First Amendment Rights Affecting the Election of Public Officials and the Legislative Process Is Not a Burden Imposed Upon Donors of Nonprofit Charities\nII. The Rise of the Internet Has Created New Ways to Inflict Serious and Irreparable Harm Upon Donors Since the Days of Donor Disclosure Cases Like NAACP v. Alabama\nIII. The Harms Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters Show That Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Against Publicly Identified Donors Are Real, Severe, and Effective\n1. Vandalism\n2. Death Threats\n3. Physical Violence\n4. [MISSING]\n5. Harassment in the Workplace\nIV. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Consider the Severe Harm Suffered by Prop 8 Supporters in Assessing the Grave Risks of Disclosure Facing Petitioners and Their Donors",
        "reference": "4. Economic Reprisals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. Proposition 12 Does Not Impose a Substantial Burden on Interstate Commerce\nII. If the Court Nonetheless Undertakes the Pike Balancing Test, Proposition 12's Alleged Burden to Interstate Commerce Does Not Clearly Exceed the Benefits of the Legislation\nA. By Prohibiting Intensive Confinement of Farmed Animals in California, Proposition 12 Reduces the Risk of Zoonotic Disease for California Consumers\nB. By Prohibiting Intensive Confinement of Sows, Proposition 12 Reduces the Risk of Zoonotic Pathogen Contamination All the Way to Slaughter, as Well as in Subsequent Retail Pork Sales, Thereby Reducing the Risk of Disease Transmission to California Consumers\n1. Gestation crates increase the risk of zoonotic pathogens in piglets\n2. Zoonotic pathogens in piglets may persist undetected all the way through slaughter and subsequent retail pork sales\nC. By Prohibiting the Intensive Confinement of Pigs in California, Proposition 12 Will Reduce Pork Producers' Use of Antibiotics, Which Will in Turn Reduce the Number of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections in California Consumers\nD. If Proposition 12 Raises Pork Prices in California, Any Resulting Decrease in Pork Consumption in California Would Significantly Benefit Californians' Health\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Pork consumption, in particular, increases risk of serious health problems\n3. Consumption of red meat increases the risk of serious health problems\nE. The Petitioners failed to plead sufficient facts that any burden on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits",
        "reference": "1. Increased pork prices in California would likely reduce pork consumption in California",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Prince Series Is Transformative\nA. Under Campbell, A Follow-On Work Is Transformative If It Can Reasonably Be Perceived As Communicating A New Meaning Or Message\nB. Campbell's Meaning-Or-Message Test Aligns With The Copyright Act's Text, Purpose, And History\nC. The Prince Series Can Reasonably Be Perceived To Communicate A New Meaning Or Message\nII. The Second Circuit Wrongly Departed From Campbell's Meaning-Or-Message Test\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Second Circuit's Cramped Understanding Of Transformative Use Would Harm Artists And The Public",
        "reference": "A. The Second Circuit's Approach Violates This Court's Precedent And Is Unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS ARE INAPPLICABLE WHEN CONGRESS LEGISLATES FOR THE TERRITORIES\nII. WHEN EXERCISING ITS ARTICLE IV POWERS, CONGRESS MAY ADOPT WHATEVER STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT THE STATES ARE FREE TO ADOPT FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR LOCALITIES\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. SENATE CONFIRMATION IS NOT A FUNDAMENTAL PERSONAL RIGHT INHERENT IN FREE AND FAIR GOVERNMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Auer Deference Violates Article III by Commanding Judges to Abandon Their Duty of Independent Judgment\nII. Auer Deference Violates the Due Process Clause by Requiring Judges to Display Bias\nA. Showing Bias Toward an Agency Litigant Violates Due Process\nB. Showing Bias Against a Litigant Opposed to an Agency's Position Denies Due Process\nC. Other Canons of Construction Construe Ambiguity Against Government Drafters\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Court Must Confess Its Constitutional Errors in Auer",
        "reference": "III. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Cannot Support the Retention of This Unconstitutional Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) Does Not Require Consecutive Exemptions in all Prior Compliance Years\nA. The Text\nB. Statutory Context\nC. The History\nD. Congress's Logic\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Small Refining Industry is Still Reeling from the Decision Below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. APJs Are Principal Officers Because They Make Final Decisions On Behalf Of The Executive Branch On Important Matters Of Federal Law\nA. APJs Are \"Officers Of The United States\" Because Their Decisions Control A Federal Agency's Execution Of Federal Law\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Constitutional Problem Cannot Be Remedied By Simply Invalidating APJs' Tenure Protections",
        "reference": "B. APJs Are Principal Officers Because Their Decisions Are Not Subject To Review By Any Other Executive Branch Official",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE'S FAILURE TO CONSIDER DUE PROCESS CONCERNS AND ITS NARROW RECORD RENDER IT AN INAPPROPRIATE VEHICLE FOR ABROGATING QUILL\nA. This Case Lacks Consideration Of Due Process, Thus Stymieing This Court's Ability To Reconsider Quill In The Context Of This Case\nB. [MISSING]\nII. EVEN WERE THIS COURT TO RECONSIDER QUILL ON COMMERCE CLAUSE GROUNDS ALONE, DOING SO IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS CASE WOULD PLACE THE COURT IN A POSITION OF LEGISLATIVE RULE-MAKING FOR DECADES TO COME\nA. Quill Firmly Established That Proper Reconsideration Of Quill's Bright-Line Standard For Sales And Use Taxes Lies With Congress\nB. Denial Of Certiorari Would Permit Congress To Continue Its Efforts To Establish A Legislative Standard For Remote Sales Tax Collection\nC. Denial Of Certiorari Would Maintain Well-Settled Expectations Of Sellers Nationwide While Congress Crafts A Comprehensive Legislative Solution\nIII. QUILL'S BRIGHT-LINE TEST HAS CONTINUING VITALITY IN TODAY'S INCREASINGLY COMPLEX SALES AND USE TAX ENVIRONMENT\nIV. RECONSIDERING QUILL HAS IMPLICATIONS BEYOND THE PARTICULAR APPROACH CHAMPIONED BY SOUTH DAKOTA AND EVEN BEYOND THE ISSUE OF REMOTE SALES TAX COLLECTION",
        "reference": "B. South Dakota's \"Fast Track\" Process Makes This A Problematic Vehicle For Broad-Based Review Of Quill",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "The Director's determinations regarding a petition's timeliness under 35 U.S.C. section 315(b) are subject to judicial review because Congress has not clearly stated otherwise\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court requires a clear statement from Congress to eliminate or restrict judicial review of agency action\nC. Congress provided no clear statement that the Director's timeliness determinations under Section 315(b) ought to be unreviewable",
        "reference": "A. Clear statement requirements preserve vital separation of powers principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. McGirt v. Oklahoma should be overruled",
        "reference": "A. Review is warranted regarding the authority of a State to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS FORMULATION OF \"EXACTING SCRUTINY\" IS INSUFFICIENTLY PROTECTIVE OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND UNDULY DEFERENTIAL TO THE GOVERNMENT\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Flawed Approach Will Cause a Chilling of Constitutionally Protected Expressive and Associational Activities\nB. Upon a Showing of an Arguable First Amendment Infringement, the Government Must Establish that Coerced Disclosure Is the Least Restrictive Means of Advancing a Compelling Interest\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court Has Never Recognized a Generalized \"Informational Interest\" That Can Justify Compelled Disclosure of Sensitive Associational Information\nB. The Generalized \"Informational Interest\" Propounded by the Lower Courts Lacks Factual Support and Persuasive Force",
        "reference": "II. A GENERAL \"INFORMATIONAL INTEREST\" IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE COMPELLED DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONAL INFORMATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Employer's Hardship Must Be Genuine, Significant, And Necessary In Order To Avoid Accommodating An Employee's Religious Observance Or Practice\nA. The Employer's Hardship must be Genuine\nB. The Employer's Hardship must be Significant\nC. The Employer's Hardship must be Necessary to the Conduct of the Business\nII. An Employer Should Not Be Allowed To Voluntarily Manufacture Its Own Undue Hardship\nA. Allowing Employers to Create Their Own Undue Hardship Thwarts Title VII's Fundamental Purpose\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Allowing Employers to Create Their Own Undue Hardship Defies Abercrombie's Teaching that Religion is Preferred",
        "reference": "B. Case Study: Air Canada's Prohibition on Pilot Beards",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. In Quill, the Court Did Not Need to Consider International Sales, but the South Dakota Law Requires Such Consideration\nIII. Application of South Dakota's Tax to International Sales Over the Internet Requires Analysis Under the Import-Export Clause\nIV. South Dakota's Law Also Presents Enforcement Problems in Relation to Foreign Sellers with No Presence in the United States",
        "reference": "I. Internet Sales Often Involve Foreign Commerce and Many Fall Under the Import-Export Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-177_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. PETITIONERS' REMINDER THAT FOREIGN AFFILIATES LACK CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IS BESIDE THE POINT\nIII. AOSI CORRECTLY HELD THAT CONGRESS HAS LIMITED AUTHORITY TO BURDEN FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS A CONDITION TO RECEIVING FUNDS",
        "reference": "I. THE POLICY REQUIREMENT'S SPEECH COMPULSION HARMS U.S. ENTITIES IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The North Carolina Legislature Authorized the Courts' Actions Below, So No Elections Clause Violation Occurred\nA. The General Assembly has committed to following the state constitution and authorized the courts to enforce compliance\nB. The state statutes do not impermissibly delegate lawmaking power over redistricting to the courts\n1. Authorizing state-court judicial review does not violate separation of powers\n2. By authorizing state courts to draw remedial maps, the General Assembly did not impermissibly delegate lawmaking power\na. This Court lacks jurisdiction over the trial court's remedial map\nb. Courts may constitutionally draw remedial maps under their equitable powers\nII. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Legislatures To Violate Their Own Constitutions\nA. Petitioners' theory is incompatible with constitutional text and structure\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Petitioners' arguments also collide with the Constitution's structure\n3. Petitioners' contrary \"evidence\" cannot support their novel theory\nB. Petitioners' theory ignores founding-era practice\nC. Petitioners' theory disregards post-founding historical practice\nD. Petitioners' theory contradicts longstanding precedent\nIII. Petitioners' Reading of the Elections Clause Would Upend Elections Nationwide",
        "reference": "1. Petitioners' argument cannot be squared with the Elections Clause's text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. OVERRULING A DEFENDANT'S DECISION TO FILE AN APPEAL VIOLATES DEFENDANT AUTONOMY\nIII. SECURING DEFENDANT AUTONOMY NOTWITHSTANDING APPEAL WAIVERS IS ESPECIALLY CRUCIAL IN LIGHT OF THE INCREASING PREVALENCE OF PLEA BARGAINING",
        "reference": "I. THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS THE AUTONOMY OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS TO MAKE FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS ABOUT THEIR CASES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TEXT OF THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE DELEGATES POWER TO STATE LEGISLATURES, NOT STATE COURTS\nII. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION REINFORCES THE CLAUSE'S PLAIN MEANING\nIII. THE HISTORY OF THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE SHOWS THAT DISCRETION WAS ENTRUSTED TO LEGISLATURES NOT COURTS\nA. Federal Constitutional Convention records confirm the Clause's meaning\nB. State Convention records reflect the Clause's original meaning\nC. Congressional precedents confirm the primacy of state legislatures\nD. [MISSING]\nE. State Constitutions guaranteeing \"free elections\" address voter qualifications and are consistent with the Clause's original meaning",
        "reference": "D. Early judicial precedents affirm the Clause's delegation of authority to legislatures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. The two-part section 2 results test tracks section 2's text and purpose and adheres to this Court's jurisprudence\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Under any standard, the court correctly found that Arizona's out-of-precinct policy and ballot-collection ban disparately impact minority voters\nC. The court properly analyzed causation at step two of the section 2 results test\nD. The two-part section 2 test will not result in a one-way ratchet to liability\nE. Republican Petitioners' arguments cannot be reconciled with section 2's text or purpose\n1. Racially-neutral \"time, place, and manner\" laws are not immune from section 2 review\n2. Republican Petitioners' baseline and benchmark arguments are unfounded\nII. The two-part section 2 results test presents no constitutional concerns\nA. Section 2 falls comfortably within Congress's constitutional authority\nB. The section 2 results test does not impermissibly intrude on powers reserved to the states\nC. The section 2 results test does not mandate an excessive focus on race\nIII. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the ballot-collection ban was enacted with intentional discrimination",
        "reference": "A. Step one of the section 2 results test requires plaintiffs to show disparate impact but does not impose a \"substantial\" test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Grant Review to Prevent Its Sui Generis Campaign-Finance Jurisprudence from Undermining First Amendment Protection in Other Areas of the Law\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Ruling Conflicts with This Court's Repeated Recognition That Compelled Disclosure Is Necessarily Chilling\nA. This Court Has Long Protected Private Association from Compelled Disclosure\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Ninth Circuit Applied the Wrong Level of Scrutiny Because of the Multiplicity of Tests Called \"Exacting Scrutiny\"\nA. Strict Scrutiny Applies to Burdens on Charitable Solicitation\nB. The Ninth Circuit Applied Intermediate Scrutiny, in Conflict with This Precedent, Because of the Confusing and Conflicting Labels This Court Has Applied to Its Tests",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Below Conflicts with This Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-984_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Respondent is not an executive employee exempt from overtime requirements\nA. An employee paid on a daily-rate basis does not satisfy Section 541.602(a)'s general salary-basis test\n1. Section 541.602(a)'s text and context\n2. [MISSING]\n3. DOL's interpretation reflects the best interpretation of its salary-basis regulation and is entitled to deference\n4. The court of appeals correctly interpreted Section 541.602(a)\nB. Employees paid on a daily-rate basis must satisfy Section 541.604(b) to be exempt under Section 541.601's provisions applicable to highly compensated employees\n1. Section 541.604(b) requires a salary-like guarantee\n2. Section 541.601's HCE provisions apply the same salary-basis test as the standard EAP regulations\nC. The salary-basis test is consistent with the FLSA\nD. No sound reason exists to excuse the application of longstanding salary-basis rules",
        "reference": "2. Regulatory history",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1259_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Sentencing courts must ask and answer the question whether a juvenile's crime reflects irreparable corruption before sentencing that juvenile to life without parole.\nII. The Court can prescribe boundaries for State procedures to make the Miller inquiry without encroaching on federalism interests.\nA. Courts can answer the Miller question by making a factual finding as to whether a juvenile defendant is irreparably corrupt.\nB. Alternatively, courts can answer the Miller question by requiring the prosecution to rebut the presumption that a juvenile is not irreparably corrupt.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Mississippi courts below failed to answer the question whether Jones is irreparably corrupt before sentencing him to life without parole.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit's Enablement Standard Is Faithful to Section 112's Text and This Court's Precedents and Was Properly Applied Here\nA. Section 112 and This Court's Decisions Require Enablement of the Full Scope of a Claim Without Elaborate Experimentation\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Amgen Provides No Persuasive Reason to Establish a New Enablement Standard\nA. Amgen Mischaracterizes the Decision Below\nB. To the Extent Amgen Is Proposing a New Enablement Standard, Its Standard Conflicts With Statutory Text, Settled Precedent, and Longstanding Practice\nIII. Claims Like Amgen's Harm Innovation\nIV. Amgen's Claims Are Not Enabled Under Any Viable Test for Enablement",
        "reference": "B. The Federal Circuit, in General and in the Decision Below, Requires No More Than the Statutory Text and This Court's Cases Demand",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Prohibition On State Regulation Of Out-Of-State Commerce Is Fundamental To Our Federal System And Safeguarding Liberty\nII. Notwithstanding Healy And Baldwin, States Continue To Enact Laws That Regulate Transactions Conducted Out Of State\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Neither Precedent Nor Sense Supports Limiting The Doctrine Applied In The Healy Line Of Cases To Price-Control Statutes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A court of appeals may review any ground of removal encompassed in an order remanding a case that was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1442 or 1443\nA. When its exception applies, the text of Section 1447(d) permits review of the remand \"order,\" not just the ground of removal that triggered the exception\nB. This Court's precedents strongly support the conclusion that Section 1447(d)'s exception permits appellate review of the entire remand order\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Reading Section 1447(d) to allow appellate review of the entire remand order is consistent with the policy balance struck in that provision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. AUER DEFERENCE UNREASONABLY INTERFERES WITH EMPLOYERS' ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH ALREADY-COMPLEX REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS\nA. Auer And Seminole Rock Undermine The Value Of Notice-And-Comment Rulemaking\nB. Fulsome Judicial Review Of Agency Policy Interpretations Provides A Much Needed Check On The Administrative State\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. AGENCIES TOO OFTEN ABUSE DEFERENCE ACCORDED THEM UNDER AUER",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-979_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. The text of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) permits review of non-discretionary determinations\nB. Statutory structure and context support the government's interpretation\nC. Statutory history supports the government's interpretation\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Other considerations support the government's interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6662_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND HISTORY OF section 924(e) REQUIRE COURTS TO APPLY AN OFFENSE-MATCHING CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO DETERMINE WHETHER A STATE OFFENSE QUALIFIES AS A \"SERIOUS DRUG OFFENSE\" UNDER ACCA\nA. Through section 924(e)'s Plain Text, Congress Indicated That Certain State Drug Offenses Would Be ACCA Predicates\nB. Section 924(e)(2)'s Structure Supports the Plain-Text Reading\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Rule of Lenity Favors Mr. Shular's Interpretation\nII. SECTION 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)'S LIST OF QUALIFYING OFFENSES UNDER STATE LAW MUST INCLUDE A MENS REA REQUIREMENT\nIII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH HAS NO CLEAR BOUNDARIES AND LEADS TO INDETERMINATE OUTCOMES\nIV. THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH EXCLUDES MR. SHULAR'S FLORIDA CONVICTIONS AS \"SERIOUS DRUG OFFENSES\"",
        "reference": "C. Legislative History Confirms Congress's Intent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-196_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Redaction does not eliminate a Confrontation Clause violation if the jury is likely to infer that the confessing defendant identified the nonconfessing defendant as an accomplice\nC. A court should consider context within the prosecution's knowledge and control when assessing whether the admission of a redacted confession violates the Confrontation Clause\nD. The admission of the confession in this case violated the Confrontation Clause, and vacatur of petitioner's convictions is warranted",
        "reference": "A. Admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession that identifies the defendant as an accomplice violates the Confrontation Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE HISTORY OF THE NLRA AND GARMON PREEMPTION ESTABLISHES THAT GLACIER'S STATE-LAW CLAIMS ARE NOT PREEMPTED\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1268_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary To The View Of The United States, The D.C. Circuit's Purported Misapplication Of The Correct Legal Standard Does Not Warrant A Writ Of Certiorari\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Any Review Of The Availability Of Punitive Damages For State-Law Claims Under section 1605A Necessarily Implicates The Question Whether State-Law Claims Are Available Under section 1605A At All\nIV. The United States Overstates The Importance Of The D.C. Circuit's Decision On Punitive Damages",
        "reference": "II. The United States Proposes An Expanded Question Presented But Misreads The D.C. Circuit Decision, Which Is Correct And Consistent With Altmann",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Wait to Determine Whether the Excessive Fines Clause Is Incorporated",
        "reference": "I. This Case Is a Flawed Vehicle for Determining Whether the Excessive Fines Clause Is Incorporated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Does Not Implicate Any Circuit Split.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Tire Engineering Is Not To The Contrary\nII. The Decision Below Is Correct\nIII. This Case Is An Exceedingly Poor Vehicle",
        "reference": "A. Across Circuits, The Test For Applying The Lanham Act To Infringement Overseas Is Fundamentally The Same.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court's review is warranted to resolve an acknowledged circuit split.\nII. The issue presented is regularly recurring.\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Eleventh Circuit's decision clashes with this Court's nominal-damages precedents.",
        "reference": "III. Respondents' vehicle objections are unfounded.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. Traditional Principles of Self-Defense Support the Constitutionality of New York's Law\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Castle Doctrine\nC. The Necessity Requirement\nD. The Doctrine of Excuse\nII. Departing from Traditional Self-Defense Principles Would Conflict with Constitutional Structure\nA. The Constitution and Public Safety\nB. The Constitution and Vigilantism",
        "reference": "A. Origins of Self-Defense Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Bremerton Violated Coach Kennedy's Freedom of Speech and Religious Liberty\nB. Suppression of Coach Kennedy's Prayer Also Infringed Upon the Constitutionally Protected Rights of Those Players Who Wished to Join With Coach Kennedy in Prayer\nII. Bremerton Would Not Have Violated the Establishment Clause By Allowing Coach Kennedy and His Players to Join Together To Give Thanks Through Prayer\nA. Bremerton Did Not Endorse Coach Kennedy's Personal Prayer\nB. Neither Bremerton nor Coach Kennedy Ever Attempted to Coerce Anyone to Participate in Religious Expression\nC. Indirect Encouragement of Religious Expression in the Form of Ill-defined and Unquantifiable Peer Pressure Does Not Violate the Establishment Clause\nIII. Bremerton's Sweeping Suppression of Religious Expression Exhibited Hostility Toward Religion In Violation of the Constitution.",
        "reference": "I. Bremerton Violated the First Amendment Rights of Both Coach Kennedy and Those Players Who Wished to Pray With Him",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURTS BELOW SHOULD NOT HAVE DEFERRED TO THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ESA\nA. The FWS Interpretation of \"Essential\" Is Unreasonable\nB. When a Statutory Construction Has Major Political and Economic Consequences, the Court Requires a Clear Statement from Congress before It Will Apply Chevron\nII. THE CONSTITUTION PERMITS NEITHER CONGRESS NOR AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY TO REGULATE EITHER \"MR. FILBURN'S IMPOSSIBLE FARM\" OR UNIT 1\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Regulation of Unit 1 Is Neither Necessary Nor Proper\n1. The Regulation Is Not Necessary\n2. The Regulation Is Not Proper",
        "reference": "A. Unit 1 Isn't Habitat for the Frog, So It's Noncommercial under the ESA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1269_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE ISSUE IS SIGNIFICANT AND THIS CASE IS A PROPER VEHICLE FOR RESOLVING IT",
        "reference": "I. THE CIRCUITS DISAGREE ON HOW TO ASSESS THE OWNERSHIP OF INCOME TAX REFUNDS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSOLIDATED TAX REPORTING GROUPS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-778_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress's Definition Of Burglary As Surreptitiously Remaining Embodies A Contemporaneous Intent Requirement\nA. Pre-ACCA commentators recommended that burglary expand to only surreptitious remaining\nB. Congress incorporated this recommendation in its 1980s legislation\nC. A surreptitious remaining necessarily embodies a contemporaneous intent requirement\nII. Eliminating Burglary's Contemporaneous Intent Requirement Would Violate The Principles Of Due Process And Separation Of Powers Underlying The Rule Of Lenity\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There is insufficient evidence of Congressional intent to eliminate the contemporaneous intent requirement to justify that dramatic change in the definition of burglary\n1. Contemporaneous intent at entry has long been a defining characteristic of burglary\n2. \"Remaining\" was seen as modifying the entry element, not the intent element\n3. Congress did not suggest an intent to deviate from this consensus\nC. Eliminating the contemporaneous intent requirement would lead to unjustified and draconian results",
        "reference": "A. Absent a clear expression of Congressional intent, the choice between interpretations of a criminal statute is governed by the rule of lenity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. The state supreme courts erred in upholding the exercise of specific jurisdiction over Ford\n1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum\n2. Specific jurisdiction turns on the conduct of the defendant, not the unilateral acts of other parties\n3. The claims here do not arise out of or relate to the forum-state contacts identified by the state supreme courts\nB. [MISSING]\n1. This Court's cases do not support the state courts' exercise of jurisdiction\n2. The forum States' interests do not justify the state courts' exercise of jurisdiction\n3. The plaintiffs' interests do not justify the state courts' exercise of jurisdiction\nC. This Court should not adopt Ford's proximate-cause test for specific jurisdiction\nD. These cases raise no issues concerning constitutional limits on the personal jurisdiction of federal courts",
        "reference": "B. No sound justification supports the state supreme courts' contrary theory of jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1450_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. FOREIGN STATES HAVE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL JURISDICTION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The International Law Of State Immunity Applies To Criminal Jurisdiction\nII. FOREIGN STATE INSTRUMENTALITIES ARE IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL JURISDICTION FOR ACTIONS TAKEN ON THEIR STATE'S BEHALF\nA. The International Law Of State Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction Extends To Foreign State Instrumentalities\nB. Failure To Abide By These Principles Risks Retaliation Against U.S. Officials\nIII. ON THE FACTS ALLEGED, HALKBANK IS IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.",
        "reference": "A. The International Law Of State Immunity Derives From The Sovereign Equality Of States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1077_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The D.C. Circuit Majority Decision Renders Janus's Standards for Misstatement Liability Meaningless\nA. The Statutory and Regulatory Text\nB. The Janus Court Held Only Defendants who Make Misstatements Can Be Primarily Liable Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b)\nC. The D.C. Circuit Majority Erroneously Held that Lorenzo's Ministerial Acts in Forwarding An Email to Two People Provided a Basis for Fraudulent Scheme Liability\nD. Mere Misstatements By Themselves Cannot Be The Basis of Fraudulent Scheme Claims Under the Federal Securities Laws\nII. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Erases the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Liability and Greatly Expands the Number of Defendants Who Qualify as Primary Violators\nA. The D.C. Circuit's Holding is Inconsistent With this Court's Precedent in Central Bank, Stoneridge and Janus\n1. Central Bank Held that There is No Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting under Section 10(b)\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Janus Drew a Clean Line Between Those Who Are Primarily Liable and Those Who are Secondary Actors\nB. The Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Liability is Important in SEC Enforcement Cases Because SEC Claims for Aiding and Abetting Have Different Elements Than Claims for Primary Violations\nC. The SEC Could Have Brought This Action Against Petitioner as an Aider and Abettor But Chose Not to Do So\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE TEXT OF SECTION 10(b) AND 17(a) BECAUSE LORENZO DID NOT EMPLOY A MANIPULATIVE DEVICE OR CONTRIVANCE, NOR DID HE EMPLOY A DEVICE, SCHEME, OR ARTIFICE TO DEFRAUD\nA. This Court Has Defined the Terms \"Deception\" and \"Manipulation\" in Section 10(b), and Petitioner's Conduct Does Not Meet the Definitions\nB. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent with the Text of Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1) Because Petitioner Did Not Engage in Active Misconduct\nIV. OVERTURNING THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S MAJORITY DECISION WOULD NOT HARM THE SEC'S ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM\nV. BROAD SCHEME LIABILITY FOR SECONDARY ACTORS WOULD HARM U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND IS UNNECESSARY TO DETERMINE CONDUCT OR COMPENSATE INVESTORS",
        "reference": "2. Stoneridge Rejected a Broad Theory of Primary Liability Like the One the SEC is Pursuing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1484_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The executive branch has historically played a complex role in the formalization and quantification of tribal water rights, both as a litigant and, more often, by negotiating water settlements that are ultimately adopted by congressional enactments\nA. Indian water rights settlements\nB. The Blackfeet Water Rights Settlement .. 10\nC. The Crow Water Rights Settlement\nD. The Big Horn General Stream Adjudication\nIII. To fulfill its trust responsibilities, the United States must assess and quantify how much water is held in trust for each tribe",
        "reference": "I. Title to tribal water rights is held by the United States in trust for the tribes, and it is blackletter law that the beneficiaries of a trust are entitled to an accounting of their property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Case Does Not Implicate Any Circuit Split\nIII. AWF Exaggerates the Effect of the Decision Below",
        "reference": "I. The Second Circuit's Decision Follows This Court's Fair-Use Precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Not Eliminate Assignor Estoppel\nA. This Court in Westinghouse Interpreted the Patent Laws to Incorporate Assignor Estoppel\nB. Congress Incorporated Assignor Estoppel into the Patent Act of 1952\nC. Stare Decisis Compels Adherence to this Court's Precedent Upholding Assignor Estoppel\nII. This Court Should Not Narrow Assignor Estoppel\nA. Assignor Estoppel Applies to Assignments of Patent Applications\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Assignor Estoppel Applies Absent an Express Representation of Validity or Reliance",
        "reference": "B. Assignor Estoppel Applies to Invalidity Challenges Under section 112",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE KANSAS SUPREME COURT'S DECISION WAS NARROWLY FOCUSED ON THE USE OF THE I-9 AND INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN THE I-9 AS THE BASES FOR A STATE LAW IDENTITY THEFT PROSECUTION OF AN ALIEN WHO USES ANOTHER PERSON'S SOCIAL SECURITY INFORMATION FOR EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION\nII. THE PETITIONER'S USE OF STATE IDENTITY THEFT STATUTES TO PROSECUTE THE USE OF FALSE DOCUMENTS BY UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS SEEKING EMPLOYMENT LEADS TO ABSURD RESULTS, DISRUPTS NORMAL COOPERATION WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND RESULTS IN DISPARATE AND DISPROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT\nA. Petitioner's Use of State Identity Theft Statutes to Prosecute the Use of False Documents by Unauthorized Aliens Seeking Employment Leads to Absurd Results\nB. Petitioner's Use of State Identity Theft Statutes to Prosecute the Use of False Documents by Unauthorized Aliens Seeking Employment Results in Disparate and Disproportionate Punishment\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner's Use of State Identity Theft Statutes to Prosecute the Use of False Documents by Unauthorized Aliens Seeking Employment Disrupts Normal Cooperation with Law Enforcement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Review Whether Article III And Rule 23 Permit A Plaintiff To Be Part Of An FCRA Class When No Creditor Requested Or Saw The Claimed Error In The Plaintiff's Credit File\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Creates Conflicts With Other Courts Of Appeals\nB. Congress Recognized The Harm That Consumer Reporting Agencies Impose By Disseminating Inaccurate Information To Creditors, Not From Having A Line Of Inaccurate Information Merely Sitting In A Consumer File\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Punitive Damages Holding Magnifies The Threat That Its Article III And Rule 23 Holdings Pose To Consumer Reporting Agencies",
        "reference": "C. The Ninth Circuit's Holding Needlessly Harms Consumer Reporting Agencies, And Thus Consumers And The Economy As A Whole",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-979_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "SUBSECTION 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) IS BEST READ TO BAR REVIEW ONLY OF THE ULTIMATE JUDGMENT WHETHER TO GRANT RELIEF TO AN ELIGIBLE NONCITIZEN\nA. The Text Of Subsection (B)(i) Supports Petitioners' Interpretation\n1. \"Any Judgment\"\n2. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1252(a)(2)'s Broader Statutory Context And History Support Petitioners' Reading\nC. The Canons Of Construction Support Petitioners' Reading\nD. Amicus's Reliance On Legislative History And Policy Considerations Is Unavailing",
        "reference": "2. \"Regarding The Granting Of Relief\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Establishment Clause Also Protects Religious Autonomy by Guarding Against State Control of How Religious Organizations Operate\nIII. The Ministerial Exception Is Grounded Primarily in the Right to Religious Autonomy\nIV. Because of the Purpose of the Ministerial Exception, a Minister Must Be Defined by Virtue of Religious Functions",
        "reference": "I. The Free Exercise Clause Protects Not Only the Right of Conscience, but Also the Right to Religious Autonomy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW CLICK-TO-CALL, WHICH ROBS MANY DEFENDANTS OF THEIR ABILITY TO PETITION FOR IPR AND THUS FOSTERS LITIGATION, FRUSTRATING THE VERY PURPOSE OF IPR\nA. Many Defendants Are In Dex Media's And Superior's Position\nB. These Defendants Will Have No Choice But To Clog The Federal Courts With Patent Infringement Litigation That Congress Wanted Resolved By IPR\nII. CONGRESS PROHIBITED APPEALS OF INSTITUTION DECISIONS TO AVOID THE VERY WASTE OF RESOURCES ENCOURAGED BY WI-FI ONE\nA. Congress Prohibited Appeals Of The Institution Decision To Avoid Unnecessary Litigation Expense\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Wi-Fi One Causes The Waste Congress Designed IPR To Avoid",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. DECLARING CODE EMBODIES CREATIVE DECISIONMAKING AND MERITS COPYRIGHT PROTECTION\nA. The Copyright Act Protects All The Source Code (Both Declaring Code And Implementing Code), And The Declaring Code Is Not A Method Of Operation\nB. The Merger Doctrine Does Not Eliminate Copyright Protection For Declaring Code\nC. Permitting Copying Of Declaring Code Allows Knockoff Software Products And Diminishes The Incentives To Create Original Software\nD. Affirming The Copyrightability Of Declaring Code Will Not Harm Interoperability Or Innovation\nII. COPYING DECLARING CODE TO DEVELOP A COMPETING COMMERCIAL PRODUCT IS NOT FAIR USE\nA. The Indisputably Commercial Nature Of Google's Copying Weighs Against A Finding Of Fair Use\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Google's Copying Significantly Harmed Oracle In The Marketplace Just As COMSOL Script Threatened To Devastate The Sale Of MATLAB",
        "reference": "B. Google Copied A Substantial Portion Of The Java Platform",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER IS JUSTIFIED IN MAKING A WARRANTLESS ENTRY IN HOT PURSUIT OF A SUSPECT WHO DISOBEYS A LAWFUL ORDER MADE BY THE OFFICER FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING A TERRY STOP OR MAKING AN ARREST IN A PUBLIC PLACE\nA. Enforcement of highway and traffic safety laws protects the public\n1. Unlicensed and uninsured drivers\n2. Intoxicated drivers\nB. Discourage flight for minor infractions\nC. The rule set forth herein only applies to \"hot pursuits.\" If the pursuit \"cools,\" the officer's warrantless entry is no longer justified\nII. DEPARTMENT PURSUIT POLICIES AND OFFICER TRAINING MAKE CERTAIN THAT WARRANTLESS ENTRY WHILE IN HOT PURSUIT OF A FLEEING SUSPECT IS RARE AND OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED\nA. Police departments implement and enforce internal policies that clearly define when pursuit of a fleeing suspect is \u2014and is not \u2014appropriate\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Law enforcement officers are well-trained to make appropriate determinations on pursuit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE LANHAM ACT ALREADY ACCOUNTS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS\nA. Trademark Law Has Existed Since Before The Nation's Founding\nB. Trademark Law Has Long Balanced Expressive Interests And Promoted Creative Expression\nC. The Lanham Act Protects Serious First Amendment Concerns\n1. Likelihood-of-Confusion Test\n2. Rogers Test For Inherently Expressive Works\n3. Nominative Fair Use\nII. PROFIT-MOTIVATED, COMMERCIAL SPEECH THAT CONFUSES CONSUMERS HOLDS MINIMAL, IF ANY, FIRST AMENDMENT VALUE\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW UPSETS THE TRADITIONAL BALANCE OF TRADEMARK LAW, RISKING CONSUMER CONFUSION AND DEFEATING TRADEMARK'S PURPOSE\nA. Silly Squeaker Dog Toys Are Paradigmatic Examples Of Commercial Products That Confuse Consumers\n1. Silly Squeakers Are Commercial Products, Not Works of Artistic Expression or Social Commentary\n2. The Bad Spaniels Squeaker Toy Irrefutably Confuses Consumers\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Ninth Circuit opened the door to infringement with a thin veneer of humor\n2. The Ninth Circuit failed to consider brands' own use of humor\nIV. VIP'S SALES WERE NOT NONCOMMERCIAL USE",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Protects Blatant Infringement And Invites Abuse",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no circuit split over the type of evidence that may be considered in Free Exercise Clause claims\nII. Even if there were a split over what evidence to consider, this case would be a hopelessly flawed vehicle to address it\nIII. The City did not act with religious hostility in enforcing its generally applicable and longstanding nondiscrimination policy\nIV. This is not a suitable vehicle for revisiting Employment Division v. Smith\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. The decision below correctly applied this Court's unconstitutional-conditions precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE DOES NOT IMPLICATE THORNTON.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THORNTON IS EGREGIOUSLY WRONG AND SHOULD NOT BE REAFFIRMED OR EXTENDED.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1484_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 1395hh(a)(2) REQUIRES NOTICE AND COMMENT HERE\nA. The 2014 Issuance Fits Comfortably Within The Terms Of Section 1395hh(a)(2)\n1. \"Rule, requirement, or other statement of policy\"\n2. \"Change\"\n3. \"Substantive legal standard\"\nB. The Government's Cramped Conception Of \"Substantive Legal Standard\" Contradicts The Medicare Act's Text And Purpose\n1. Section 1395hh(a)(2) requires notice and comment for agency issuances that otherwise lack the \"force of law\"\n2. Legislative history and context show Congressional intent to expand notice and comment\nII. SECTION 1395hh(a)(4) INDEPENDENTLY REQUIRES NOTICE AND COMMENT HERE\nA. The Plain Terms Of Section 1395hh(a)(4) Require Notice And Comment In Light Of The 2004 Rule's Logical Outgrowth Failure\nB. The Applicability Of Section 1395hh(a)(4) Does Not Depend On How The Agency Tries To Make The Previously Invalidated Rule Take Effect\n1. The readoption of the 2004 rule need not take the form of a notice-and-comment regulation to trigger Section 1395hh(a)(4)\n2. The agency's claim that it proceeded through adjudication does not avoid Section 1395hh(a)(4)\nIII. AFFIRMING THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S DECISION WILL HELP, NOT HINDER, THE MEDICARE PROGRAM\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Section 1395hh(a)(2) Holding Is Appropriately Narrow",
        "reference": "A. The Section 1395hh(a)(4) Holding Should Have Virtually No Implications Beyond This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Consistent With the Goals of Copyright Law, Software Interfaces Simplify the Creation of Software and Promote Innovation.\nA. Software Interfaces Enable Parallel Innovation in Multiple Layers of Hardware/Software Systems and Accelerate Innovation by Enabling Multiple Developers to Collaborate Across Large Software Projects.\nB. Software Interfaces Promote Competition and Increase Innovation by Preventing Lock-In Between Otherwise Independent Layers in Hardware/Software Systems.\nIII. Restricted Rights in API Declarations and Libraries are Inconsistent With Copyright Law and the Nature of Software.\nA. Restrictions on API Declarations Would Frustrate the Purpose of Copyright Law, Because Free and Open APIs Promote Innovation.\nB. Copyright of API Declarations is Inconsistent With the Letter of Copyright Law, Because API Declarations are Functional and Not Creative.\nC. Absolute Restrictions on API Declarations and Libraries are Inconsistent with Established Exceptions to Copyright Under the Law.",
        "reference": "I. Copyright in Software Must be Viewed with the Nature of Software as Context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits' Decisions Misinterpret the Rapanos Plurality Opinion and Undermine Cooperative Federalism\nA. The Lower Courts Misread and Misapplied the Rapanos Plurality Opinion\n1. The Rapanos Plurality Sought to Narrow the Agencies' Overbroad Application of the Clean Water Act\n2. The Rapanos Plurality Opinion Does Not Support Federal Regulation of Groundwater\nB. Extending the Clean Water Act to Groundwater Undermines the Federal-State Balance Established by Congress\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Regulating Groundwater Under the Act Violates Landowners' Due Process Rights\nB. The Clean Water Act's Regulation of Groundwater Pollution Places Unacceptable Burdens on Landowners\nC. Overzealous Enforcement Makes the Statute's Defects Intolerable",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits' Expansion of the Clean Water Act Undermines the Rights of Landowners",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1484_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1395hh(a)(2) did not require notice-and-comment rulemaking for CMS to furnish the challenged instructions to its contractors\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The statutory phrase \"establishes or changes a substantive legal standard\" excludes nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act\n2. The drafting history of Section 1395hh confirms that it does not apply to nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act\nB. The challenged agency action here is based on a nonbinding interpretation of the Medicare Act\nC. The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of Section 1395hh would substantially undermine HHS's ability to administer the Medicare Program\nII. Section 1395hh(a)(4) did not require notice-and-comment rulemaking for CMS to furnish the challenged instructions to its contractors\nA. Section 1395hh(a)(4) did not provide an independent basis to require notice-and-comment rulemaking\nB. Even if Section 1395hh(a)(4) had some independent force, it did not apply here because the agency chose to proceed by adjudication",
        "reference": "A. The notice-and-comment procedures in Section 1395hh do not apply to nonbinding interpretations of the Medicare Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-155_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals correctly determined that petitioner is ineligible for a sentence reduction by applying this Court's precedent\nA. Marks gives divided decisions of this Court binding effect in future cases\nB. The court of appeals correctly applied the principles of Marks\n1. Petitioner's \"common reasoning\" approach is mistaken\na. Petitioner's \"common reasoning\" requirement cannot be squared with Marks and other decisions of this Court\nb. Petitioner's \"common reasoning\" approach is unsound\n2. This Court should not replace Marks with a rule under which only majority opinions have precedential effect\n3. Freeman does not lack precedential effect on the theory that no single opinion in that case qualifies as the narrowest\nII. Defendants who plead guilty in exchange for specific sentences pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) are not eligible for sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Defendants who plead guilty in exchange for specific sentences under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements are sentenced \"based on\" their plea agreements, not based on any Guidelines range\n1. A defendant's sentence is \"based on\" a calculation of the Guidelines range only when that calculation is the foundation of the defendant's sentence\n2. The foundation of the sentence of a defendant who pleads guilty under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) is the plea agreement, not a Guidelines range\nC. The Sentencing Commission's limitations confirm that defendants sentenced under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements are ineligible for Section 3582(c)(2) reductions\nD. Using Section 3582(c)(2) to reduce a sentence that was required under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) inappropriately vitiates the terms of the parties' agreement\n1. Plea agreements are essential to the administration of criminal justice\n2. The government's construction of Section 3582(c)(2) preserves the parties' bargain",
        "reference": "A. Section 3582(c)(2) represents a narrow exception to the rule that a sentence of imprisonment may not be modified",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is a direct split among nine state courts on the question presented\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Trust's arguments on the merits are unavailing",
        "reference": "II. This case is an ideal vehicle for resolving the question presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-776_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The court of appeals erred because petitioners challenge the governing legal standard\nC. The Saving Clause provides judicial review of the application of law to settled historical fact. The statutory text compels this",
        "reference": "A. The Court construes jurisdictional statutes in favor of judicial review and simplicity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "The court of appeals properly denied petitioners' motion to intervene\nA. Petitioners were not entitled to intervene as of right\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Petitioners lack a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of this suit\nB. The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention\n1. The court of appeals reasonably determined that petitioners should not be permitted to intervene in and prolong this preliminary injunction appeal\n2. Petitioners' criticisms of the federal government's litigation decisions do not justify intervention",
        "reference": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-439_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A method-of-execution claim identifying an alternative not authorized by existing state law may be brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The current limits of state law do not constrain the alternative methods of execution that may be identified in a Section 1983 action\nC. The court of appeals' approach is unjustified\nII. Because petitioner's claim may be brought under Section 1983, the Court need not reach the second question presented",
        "reference": "A. A method-of-execution claim that accepts the validity of a prisoner's death sentence can proceed under Section 1983 rather than in habeas",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief045.pdf",
        "text": "I. OVERVIEW OF JAVA FRAMEWORK\nA. Brief History of Java\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE JAVA PACKAGES ARE CREATIVE AND EXPRESSIVE\nA. Designing an Elegant Set of Packages Was Central to Java's Success\nB. There Are Countless Ways to Achieve the Functionality Provided by the Java Packages\nIII. GOOGLE'S USE OF JAVA WAS UNAUTHORIZED\nA. Sun's Licensing Requirements\nB. Google's Flawed \"Industry Practice\" Argument\nIV. GOOGLE'S USE OF JAVA WAS NOT TRANSFORMATIVE\nV. GOOGLE'S USE UNDERMINES JAVA'S PROMISE OF \"WRITE ONCE, RUN ANYWHERE\"",
        "reference": "B. How Java Works",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-391_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The amicus briefs confirm \u2014 and the respondents do not dispute \u2014 that a uniform rule is essential\nIII. The respondents' vehicle arguments are based on a clear misrepresentation of the record below\nIV. The respondents' defense on the merits \u2014 that asphyxiating force is justified as a matter of law solely to make a person be \"quiet\" \u2014 is outrageous",
        "reference": "I. The respondents all but concede the circuit split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's decisions confirm that whether SEC ALJs are \"Officers of the United States\" must be evaluated in accordance with the phrase's original public meaning\nII. Substantial evidence proves that the original public meaning of \"Officers of the United States\" encompassed any federal civil official with ongoing responsibility to perform a statutory duty\nA. The Constitutional Text\nB. \"Officers of the United States\" is not a term of art\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Contextual uses of \"Officer\" and \"Officers of the United States\" in Founding-era sources debating the Constitution\nE. Early appointment practices\nIII. The Court should not distort the meaning of the Appointments Clause based on alleged practical implementation concerns",
        "reference": "C. Founding-era dictionaries and commentaries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5410_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Recklessness is a culpable mens rea, properly included in the mental state for violent crimes as both morally justified and practically necessary.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The problem of proof\nII. The three-conviction requirement of ACCA precludes absurd results",
        "reference": "A. Moral justification",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court's Approval of the Agencies' Sweeping Religious and Moral Exemptions Could Impede Access to Life-Saving Healthcare for Children\nA. Many Individuals Have Religious or Moral Objections to Vaccinations that Are Essential for Children's Health\nB. Religious and Moral Objections to Vaccinations Have Become More Common, and Dangerous, in Recent Years\nC. If This Court Accepts Petitioners' Arguments as to Contraceptive Coverage, Others Will Likely Seek to Expand the Reasoning to Vaccines\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The Agencies' Interim Final Rules Will Increase Costs and Administrative Burdens on Families, Making It Harder for Them to Obtain Life-Saving Preventive Care for Their Children",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "THE [MISSING]",
        "reference": "THE LEGACY AND OTHER ALDC PREFERENCES FATALLY UNDERMINE HARVARD'S RACIAL ADMISSION PREFERENCE.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A [MISSING]\nA. Parties may seek court-of-appeals review of FTC and SEC adjudications after the agency proceedings conclude\n1. The FTC Act and Exchange Act authorize judicial review only after agency proceedings conclude\n2. The FTC Act and Exchange Act authorize judicial review only in courts of appeals\nB. A party may not challenge an ongoing Commission proceeding in district court\n1. District courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over challenges to ongoing Commission proceedings\n2. The APA confirms that district courts may not review ongoing Commission proceedings\n3. No cause of action enables a party to seek district-court review of ongoing Commission proceedings\n4. Precedent confirms that parties may not challenge ongoing Commission proceedings in district court\n5. The contrary arguments advanced by Axon and Cochran lack merit\n6. Free Enterprise Fund does not support Axon's and Cochran's requests for district-court review\nC. The nature of Axon's and Cochran's claims does not entitle those parties to district-court review while agency proceedings are ongoing\n1. The Acts' review schemes encompass the removal-power claims that Axon and Cochran have asserted\n2. Axon and Cochran cannot secure immediate review by framing their claims as challenges to the agency proceedings themselves\n3. The factors this Court identified in Thunder Basin do not support district-court review here\nD. Axon's and Cochran's objections to the Commissions' proceedings lack merit",
        "reference": "A party may not challenge ongoing FTC and SEC adjudications in district court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The agencies violated the APA's procedural requirements\nA. The 2017 rules are procedurally invalid\n1. The agencies lacked statutory authority to bypass notice-and-comment procedures\n2. The agencies lacked \"good cause\" to bypass notice-and-comment procedures\nB. The 2018 rules are procedurally invalid\nII. The ACA does not authorize the rules\nIII. RFRA does not justify the religious rule\nA. RFRA does not require the religious rule\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. The scope of the injunction was not an abuse of discretion\nV. The Little Sisters lack appellate standing",
        "reference": "B. RFRA does not authorize the religious rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Decision Affirming Appellants' Lawmaking Power Over Redistricting is Consistent with This Court's Previous Elections Clause Precedents.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court Below Engaged in Impermissible Lawmaking, which the Recent Precedents It Purported to Rely Upon Do Not Support.\nII. The Court Should Announce a Clear Test That Will Prevent State Courts from Engaging in Similar Lawmaking in the Future",
        "reference": "A. This Court's Caselaw Makes Clear That Redistricting Under the Election Clause is an Exercise of Exclusively Legislative Power.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. CIRI's role in providing services to the region's Alaska Natives and American Indians is unique and irreplaceable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Under ISDEAA, Congress has transferred to CIRI its responsibility to care for Alaska Natives\nC. Loss of CIRI's status under ISDEAA could threaten services for more than 40% of Alaska's Natives\nII. CIRI's provision of critical services to Alaska Natives and American Indians demonstrates that ANCs satisfy the Eligibility Clause\nA. Congress and the Executive Branch recognize ANCs as eligible for Indian-specific programs and services\nB. Section 325(d) reconfirms Congress's understanding that CIRI is an \"Indian tribe\" for ISDEAA purposes",
        "reference": "A. ANCs were created by ANCSA to serve an Indian law purpose and to provide programs and services to Alaska Natives and American Indians",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Subjective Reliance on \"Transformative-ness\" has Led to Unintended Consequences\nII. A Determination of Fair Use Should Use an Objective, not Subjective, Analytical Framework\n1. What is the \"Purpose and Character\" of the Secondary use?\n2. Define the Relevant Market for the Primary Work\n3. How Much was Taken?\n4. The Fourth Factor\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Policy Implications",
        "reference": "III. Petitioner Fails this Objective Test for Fair Use",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals' decision is correct\nA. Section 523(a)(2)(A) bars discharge of any debt for money obtained by fraud without regard to the debtor's awareness of the fraud\nB. Petitioner's counterarguments lack merit\nII. The split is lopsided, longstanding, and has limited practical significance\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This case is not an ideal vehicle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE SERVICE'S REVIEW OF THE BENEFITS OF INCLUDING OR EXCLUDING AN AREA IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW",
        "reference": "I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE REQUIRES THE DESIGNATED LAND TO ACTUALLY BE HABITAT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Federal Circuit's Enablement Standard Goes Beyond the Literal Requirements of the Statute's Plain Language\nB. Notwithstanding the Plain Language of the Statute, the Federal Circuit's Enablement Standard Does Address a Valid Concern\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Adverse Impact on the U.S. Patent System Resulting from How Patentees Would Behave if the Federal Circuit's Enablement Standard were Confirmed by This Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT ERRED IN SUBJECTING THE JUDICIAL-BALANCE REQUIREMENTS TO ELROD-BRANTI'S HEIGHTENED-SCRUTINY ANALYSIS\nA. Elrod-Branti Should Not Be Extended To State Constitutional Requirements For Judicial Appointments\nB. At Most, The Court Should Review Delaware's Judicial-Balance Provisions Under An Intermediate Standard That Appropriately Balances The State's Interests In Self-Government Against The Interest In Individual Expression\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Judicial-Balance Provisions Promote Public Confidence In The Judiciary\nB. Judicial-Balance Provisions Encourage Moderation And Stability In Decisionmaking\nC. Experience Proves That Delaware's Judicial-Balance Provisions Promote Effective Government\nD. Congress's Widespread Use Of Political Balancing Underscores Its Value In Promoting Effective Government",
        "reference": "II. DELAWARE'S JUDICIAL-BALANCE PROVISIONS SERVE GOVERNMENT INTERESTS OF THE FIRST ORDER",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE CLEARLY ABROGATES TRIBAL IMMUNITY\nA. The Operative Language of section 106(a) and section 101(27) Is Clear\n1. A Tribe Is a \"Government\"\n2. A Tribe Is a \"Domestic\" Government\na. The Ordinary Meaning of \"Domestic\" Includes Tribes\nb. The Immediate Context of \"Other Foreign or Domestic Government\" Shows That It Includes Tribes\nB. Reading the Code as a Whole Confirms That a Tribe Is a \"Governmental Unit\"\n1. The Automatic Stay, Discharge Injunction, and Plan Confirmations Bind All Creditors, Including Governments\n2. Other Code Provisions Address Governmental Units in Terms of Governmental Functions That Tribes Perform\nC. The Scope and History of Congress's Bankruptcy Power Further Show That the Code Abrogates Tribal Immunity\nII. THE BAND FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE BANKRUPTCY CODE IS UNCLEAR\nA. Congress Need Not Use the Specific Word \"Tribe\" To Clearly Abrogate Immunity\n1. The Sovereign-Immunity Canons Do Not Require Congress To Use Magic Words\n2. The Band Fails To Show That Congress Must Use the Word \"Tribe\"\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Court Can and Should Apply the Ordinary Meanings of \"Domestic\" and \"Government\"\n2. This Court's Decisions About Tribes Confirm That They Are \"Domestic Government[s]\" in the Ordinary Sense\n3. Ejusdem Generis Does Not Make the Statutory Text Unclear\n4. The Breadth of section 101(27) Does Not Make It Unclear\nC. The Band's Remaining Arguments Also Fail To Overcome the Code's Clear Language",
        "reference": "B. The Band Fails To Show That the Phrase \"Other Foreign or Domestic Government\" Is Unclear on Its Face or in Context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Courts and State Constitutions Play a Fundamental Role in Protecting Our Democratic Institutions.\nA. State Judicial Review of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations Is Consistent with the Separation of Powers and Principles of Federalism.\nB. Permitting State Legislatures to Ignore Constitutional Constraints Would Upend the Long-Established Understanding of the Role of State Courts in Congressional Redistricting.\nII. Depriving State Courts of the Ability to Enforce State Constitutional Limits on Congressional Redistricting Undermines Democratic Institutions and Threatens the Rights of Voters of Color.\nA. The Court Must Uphold Its Assurance That States Have the Power to Regulate Partisan Gerrymandering.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Prohibiting State Constitutional Regulation of Gerrymandering Would Make Voters of Color Vulnerable to Partisan Maneuvering.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The conservation necessity doctrine inadequately protects the states' interests in wildlife management",
        "reference": "A. Unregulated off-reservation hunting by Crow Tribe members will undermine and jeopardize Wyoming's management and conservation of its wildlife",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "The deliberative process privilege through FOIA Exemption 5 protects the Services' draft documents prepared during the interagency ESA consultation process\nA. Congress incorporated the deliberative process privilege into FOIA to protect effective governmental decision-making\nB. The Services' discussion drafts prepared during their deliberations before making a decision are privileged\n1. The Services continued deliberating until they issued their final biological opinion addressing EPA's final rule\n2. The Services' draft documents that were not adopted and were not shared in full with EPA did not have binding legal force\nC. The court of appeals erred by refusing to sustain the deliberative process privilege for the Services' draft documents\n1. [MISSING]\n2. A discussion draft does not become final unless and until an official with authority makes a decision to adopt the draft",
        "reference": "1. Draft documents do not lose their privilege when the agency action under review is abandoned or modified",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief052.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court should adhere to Grutter's holding that the educational benefits of diversity are a compelling interest\nA. Grutter held that universities have a compelling interest in diversity that justifies narrowly tailored consideration of race in admissions\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The United States military depends on a well-qualified and diverse officer corps that is prepared to lead a diverse fighting force\n2. Well-qualified and diverse graduates are critical to other national interests\n3. Recent research reinforces the longstanding recognition of the educational benefits of diversity\nC. Stare decisis supports adherence to Grutter\nD. Petitioner has not justified overruling Grutter\n1. The Equal Protection Clause does not categorically forbid consideration of race\n2. Petitioner's criticisms of Grutter's analysis of diversity lack merit\n3. Overruling Grutter would have harmful consequences\nII. The lower courts correctly upheld Harvard's admissions process under this Court's precedents\nA. Petitioner fails to show clear error in the lower courts' finding that Harvard does not intentionally discriminate against Asian Americans\nB. Petitioner fails to show any error in the lower courts' application of Grutter and Fisher",
        "reference": "B. The educational benefits of diversity remain a compelling interest of vital importance to the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Public access to agencies' threshold and intermediate decisions is necessary to ensure compliance with privacy and other oversight obligations.\nIII. This Court should provide clear guidance on the narrow scope of Exemption 5 to prevent unnecessary litigation and delay.",
        "reference": "I. A primary purpose of FOIA is to prevent the development of \"secret law.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Nondelegation Doctrine Is Misleading and Fictitious and Should Be Abandoned\nA. The Doctrine Disguises What It Does and Why\nB. The Term \"Delegation\" Falsely Implies an Easily Revocable Transfer\nC. The Doctrine Rests on Legal Fictions\nII. Congress May Not Divest Itself of Its Legislative Power\nA. The Principles of Consent and Separation of Powers\nB. [MISSING]\nC. \"Shall Be Vested\" Textually Mandates That All Legislative Powers Must Be in Congress, Not Elsewhere\nD. The Evasion of Bicameralism and Presentment\nE. The Executive May Not Exercise Legislative Power\nIII. Efficiency Cannot Justify this Court in Failing to Uphold the Constitution",
        "reference": "B. The Framers' Rejection of All Congressional Delegations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1423_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are not entitled to relief under 10 U.S.C. 973(b)\nA. Section 973(b) does not prohibit military officers from serving on the CMCR\n1. A CMCR judgeship is not a \"civil office\" within the meaning of Section 973(b)\n2. Military officers are \"authorized by law\" to serve as CMCR judges\nB. Even if Section 973(b) prohibited military officers from serving on the CMCR, Congress expressly foreclosed the relief petitioners seek\nII. Simultaneous service on a CCA and the CMCR does not raise constitutional questions\nIII. This Court lacks jurisdiction in Dalmazzi and Cox, but has jurisdiction in Ortiz\nA. This Court lacks jurisdiction in Dalmazzi and Cox because Section 1259(3) does not authorize review of the CAAF's denial of discretionary review\nB. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Even if this Court has jurisdiction in Dalmazzi and Cox, it should not disturb the CAAF's discretionary denials of review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1117(a) incorporates traditional principles of equity that limit monetary relief\nB. Nothing in Section 1117(a) overrides the traditional requirement of willfulness\nII. Traditional Principles Of Equity Require Willfulness For A Profits Award\nA. Traditional trademark law required willfulness for an infringer's profits award\nB. Courts required willfulness for a profits award after the 1905 Act\nC. Romag is wrong to claim that equitable principles cannot limit courts' discretion\nIII. Romag's Interpretation Is Bad Policy\nA. The threat of a profits award will enable trademark owners to extort innocent infringers and consolidate market power\nB. Romag offers no reason to award an innocent infringer's profits\nC. Other intellectual property statutes do not support Romag's reading",
        "reference": "I. The Text Of Section 1117(a) Incorporates Traditional Limits On Equitable Relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should clarify that railroad ditches are not waters of the United States.\nA. Railroads depend on engineered ditches to keep their track stable and operational.\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Because ditches are point sources, they cannot be waters of the United States.\nA. The Clean Water Act distinguishes point sources from navigable waters.\nB. Ditches are not tributaries.\nC. If ditches are not navigable waters, they cannot extend federal jurisdiction.\nIII. Ditches are regulated in other ways.",
        "reference": "B. Regulatory uncertainty over railroad ditches risks rail safety and operations.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Endorsement Test's Unworkability Has Resulted In Disarray And Confusion\nII. The Endorsement Test Perversely Singles Out Religion For Disfavored Treatment\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Endorsement Test Should Be Replaced By A Clear Rule That History And Tradition Are The Proper Guideposts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. European Union Law Encourages Competition in the Software Industry\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. U.S. Free Trade Agreements Encourage Competition in the Software Industry",
        "reference": "II. Copyright Policies Around the Pacific and Across the World Promote Competition in the Software Industry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-58_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The District Court Correctly Concluded that the States Have Standing\nA. The States suffered a redressable injury traceable to the Final Memorandum\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The States have parens patriae standing\nII. The Final Memorandum Is Substantively and Procedurally Invalid\nA. The Final Memorandum is contrary to the INA's detention mandates\nB. The Final Memorandum is arbitrary and capricious\nC. The Final Memorandum is procedurally invalid for lack of notice and comment\nIII. The District Court's Remedy Was Lawful\nA. The APA authorizes vacatur\nB. The INA does not bar vacatur of the Final Memorandum\nC. If the district court erred, this Court should vacate or enjoin the Final Memorandum",
        "reference": "B. This Court should not make States disfavored litigants in its standing analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5924_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NON-UNANIMOUS JURIES ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT AND LESS DELIBERATIVE THAN THE SIXTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE PERNICIOUS RACIAL ORIGINS OF THE NON-UNANIMITY RULE FURTHER UNDERMINE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT JURY TRIAL RIGHT",
        "reference": "II. NON-UNANIMOUS JURIES ALSO FUNDAMENTALLY SKEW THE DECISION OF WHETHER TO EXERCISE THE JURY TRIAL RIGHT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. REVIEW IS NEEDED TO CLARIFY HOW LOWER COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE THUNDER BASIN FACTORS\nA. The Fifth Amendment's Original Meaning Protects The Right To Judicial Process\nB. Congress Cannot Replace Judicial Process With Administrative Process\nC. [MISSING]\nII. FURTHER PERCOLATION IN THE LOWER COURTS IS UNNECESSARY",
        "reference": "C. Lower Courts Mistakenly Allow Congress To Replace Judicial Process With Administrative Process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Coinbase argues only about an alleged misapplication of a properly stated rule.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's decision is correct.",
        "reference": "II. The question presented is not worthy of certiorari because its practical effects are minimal.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-846_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Cruz waived any claim under Simmons or Lynch\nII. The Arizona Supreme Court's decision rested on an independent and adequate state law ground\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Even if Lynch's retroactivity were at issue, Cruz's case presents a poor vehicle to address it",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Question Presented Is Important and Warrants Review",
        "reference": "A. The Decision Below Is Deeply Flawed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Commerce Clause restrains state authority in limited and carefully defined circumstances.\nA. The dormant Commerce Clause aims primarily at laws that discriminate against or excessively burden interstate commerce.\nB. A state also lacks authority to regulate commerce wholly outside its borders.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Petitioners' proposed expansion of the extraterritoriality principle would harm states' ability to protect consumers.",
        "reference": "II. The extraterritoriality principle does not bar a state from enacting nondiscriminatory consumer-protection laws for products sold in the state.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Unlike a typical \"voucher\" or \"school choice\" program, the benefit made available by Maine's tuition program is a free public education for students who reside in a school administrative unit that neither operates a public school nor contracts for schooling privileges\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has previously rejected claims that Maine's tuition program violates the Free Exercise Clause and nothing in this Court's Trinity Lutheran decision casts doubt on the First Circuit's decision",
        "reference": "II. Unlike a sweeping \"Blaine Amendment\" or \"no-aid\" clause, Maine's tuition program is the result of carefully considered legislative judgment as to what constitutes a public education",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. WILLIAMSON COUNTY WAS WRONGLY DECIDED. LATER DECISIONS OF THIS COURT HAVE PLAINLY DEMONSTRATED THAT ERROR\nA. Williamson County is Fatally Flawed\nB. This Court's More Recent Cases Are Not Compatible with Williamson County\nII. NO OTHER CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS ARE SHUNTED TO STATE COURTS FOR \"RIPENING\"\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE WHOLE POINT OF 42 U.S.C. section 1983 WAS TO PROVIDE FEDERAL COURTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF FEDERAL RIGHTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "A. The CFPB's Investigative Authority Is Inoperative Only If It Is Inseverable from the Removal Restriction\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Order in Which the Court Addresses Severability and the Constitutional Question Is Within Its Discretion, Guided by Prudential Considerations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The class members' injuries here comfortably satisfy Article III's minimum requirements\nII. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Consistent with Tyson Foods, lower courts have developed administrable mechanisms to address the unlikely possibility that uninjured class members could recover damages",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. Because the meaning of Section 411(a) is unclear, the Court should construe the statute to be consistent with the intent of Congress to adhere to international treaties, in this case Berne\nB. The registration interpretation is contrary to Berne\nC. The registration interpretation deprives copyright owners of important enforcement rights\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The plain language of the Copyright Act supports the application interpretation",
        "reference": "D. Requiring the issuance or denial of a registration decision is bad policy and makes no practical sense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. Luxshare Does Not Deny That The Section 1782 Issue Warrants Review\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Luxshare's Vehicle Arguments Fail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Abood Was Wrongly Decided Because There Is No Distinction Between Bargaining with the Government and Lobbying the Government: Both Are Political Speech\nB. Abood Conflicts with Harris, Knox, and Other Precedents That Subject Compelled Association and Speech to Heightened Scrutiny\nC. Abood Is Unworkable\nD. Reliance Interests Do Not Justify Retaining Abood\nE. Abood Should Be Overruled\nII. Agency Fee Requirements Fail Heightened Constitutional Scrutiny Because They Are Not Necessary for Exclusive Representation\nA. Exclusive Representatives Do Not Need Agency Fees Because the Status Provides Unions with Valuable Powers, Benefits, and Membership Recruitment Advantages\nB. Agency Fees Are Unneeded Because the Obligations That Come with Exclusive Representative Authority Are Voluntarily Assumed and Are Limited\nC. Agency Fees Force Nonmembers to Pay for Compulsory Representation That Infringes on Their Rights and Often Harms Their Interests\nD. Abood's Free Rider Rationale Inverts Reality by Presuming That Exclusive Representation Burdens Unions and Benefits Nonmembers\nE. Alternatively, No Compelling State Interest Justifies Agency Fee Requirements\nIII. The Court Should Hold That No Union Fees Can Be Seized from Nonmembers Without Their Consent",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Overrule Abood",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.31
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This case presents an important opportunity to correct doctrinal distortions concerning content- and viewpoint-neutrality analysis\nA. The FACT Act is one of many laws targeting speech by pro-life pregnancy counselors\nB. The Court can provide an important correction to First Amendment neutrality doctrine\n1. Content- and viewpoint-discriminatory laws, including those enacted for the purpose of discriminating on the basis of content or viewpoint, are subject to strict scrutiny\n2. The Act should be subject to strict scrutiny\n3. The Ninth Circuit's errors with respect to content and viewpoint discrimination are reflected in other pregnancy-center cases, too\nII. This case presents an important opportunity to clarify that the \"commercial\" and \"professional\" speech categories cannot be used to shield ideological speech restrictions from strict scrutiny\nA. Under this Court's cases, pro-life advocacy by pregnancy centers is not commercial speech\nB. The Ninth Circuit's \"professional speech\" holding is in clear conflict with this Court's cases\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Other pregnancy-center cases demonstrate confusion over commercial speech doctrine, which should be considered in this Court's disposition of this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1184_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "Upon A Claimant's Request, An ALJ Should Order Disclosure Of Private Data Relied On By A Vocational Expert\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Vocational Experts' Use Of Secret Job Incidence Data Undermines The Fairness And Integrity Of Disability Hearings",
        "reference": "A. SSA's Reliance On Testimony From Vocational Experts Is A Response To Judicial Insistence That The Agency Rely On Concrete Vocational Evidence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Compelled Speech Is an Especially Egregious Violation of the First Amendment\nII. Strict Scrutiny is the Proper Standard of Review for the Compelled Speech in This Case\nIII. The FACT Act Discriminates on the Basis of Both Content and Viewpoint\nIV. Weighing the Right to Abortion Against the Right to Freedom of Speech\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Enumerated Right of Freedom of Speech Should Take Priority Over the Unenumerated Right to Abortion. The Spiritual Root of the Attack on Pro-Life Pregnancy Centers",
        "reference": "A. The Abortion \"Liberty\" Rests on Weak Legal Ground.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief044.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF GOVERNMENT-HELD CONFIDENTIAL DONOR INFORMATION IS HIGHLY LIKELY\nIII. MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION MAKE DISCLOSURE PROTECTIONS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER",
        "reference": "I. DISCLOSURE WILL RESULT IN HARASSMENT, INTIMIDATION, AND RETALIATION AGAINST DISCLOSED DONORS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A Per Se, Unconditional Prohibition on Viewpoint Discrimination Could Throw Out the Baby with the Bathwater\nIII. Unlicensed Clinics Have Little Reason to Complain about Having Publicly to State the Truth of Their Medically Unlicensed Status\nIV. Apposite Comparisons to Masterpiece Cakeshop: The Need for Institutions' Public Disclosure of Prima Facie Questionable Behavior\nV. The State May Amend the FACT Act, or Pass New Laws, to Offer Referrals Which Nurture Fetuses Instead of Destroying Them",
        "reference": "I. Commandeering Anti-Abortion Clinics to Advertise Abortion Services Is of Questionable Legitimacy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-155_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Courts of Appeals Are Irretrievably Divided, And the Freeman Question Is, And Will Continue to Be, Important\nII. This Case Is Also an Ideal Vehicle for Considering the Marks Question\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Eleventh Circuit Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1094_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. CLAIM-PROCESSING RULES LIKE RULE 23(f) ARE MANDATORY AND MUST BE ENFORCED WHEN PROPERLY INVOKED\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRONEOUSLY ADOPTED EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE\nA. CLAIM-PROCESSING RULES CAN PRECLUDE EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS\nB. THE FEDERAL RULES PRECLUDE EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE\n1. Rule 23(f) and Appellate Rule 5(a)(2) are Strict and Mandatory\n2. Appellate Rule 26(b) Expressly Prohibits Extending the Rule 23(f) Deadline\n3. Appellate Rule 2 Reinforces the Prohibition Against Extending the Rule 23(f) Deadline\nC. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONTRAVENES THE PURPOSE BEHIND THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE\nD. THERE IS NO NEED FOR EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW REQUIRES REVERSAL EVEN IF EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS COULD APPLY\nA. EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS APPLY ONLY WHERE AN EXTERNAL OBSTACLE CAUSED THE UNTIMELINESS\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Doctrine of Unique Circumstances\nB. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTED OVERLY BROAD AND IMPROPER EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS\nIV. LAMBERT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT POSTPONE OR RESET THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE",
        "reference": "1. Equitable Tolling",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1143_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award where the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question\nA. The FAA's text and context establish that Vaden's \"look-through\" approach does not apply to motions under Sections 9 and 10\nB. Longstanding jurisdictional rules and procedural norms further promote the FAA's plain-text reading\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The FAA's purpose and history are consistent with reading Sections 9 and 10 to mean what they say",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Patent Prosecution Procedure Provides Dissatisfied Patent Applicants with Numerous, Effective Alternatives to Costly section 145 Litigation\nA. An Applicant May Restart Agency Proceedings at Any Time Through Continuation Practice\nB. Documentary Evidence and Expert Opinions May Be Presented in Affidavits\nC. Oral Testimony May Be Given in Interviews Between Examiners and Applicants' Witnesses\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Oral Advocacy Is Available Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board\nF. Examiner Difficulties Can Be Relieved by the Patents Ombudsman and Agency Supervisory Structures, or by Federal Circuit Appeal\nII. The Actual Benefit of section 145 Accrues to Well-Financed Patent Applicants Who Are Unaffected by USPTO Expense Recovery\nIII. There Is No Denial of Justice or Impediment to Small Inventors in Allocating All Expenses of section 145 Litigation to Patent Applicants",
        "reference": "D. Cross-Examination Is Usually Unnecessary, and Interviews Are Generally Adequate Alternatives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The FCC orders implementing the TCPA are essential to protect consumers against unwanted robocalls",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Abood Allows Government to Compel Support for Political and Ideological Advocacy\nA. The Union Respondent in This Case Charges the Petitioner and Other Non-Members for a Wide Variety of Political and Ideological Advocacy\nB. Other Public-Sector Unions Charge Non-Members for Extensive Political and Ideological Advocacy\n1. The American Federation of Teachers\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The Service Employees International Union\nC. Public-Sector Unions Charge Non-Members for Union Organizing Advocacy\nII. Abood Fails to Account for the Fact that Labor Unions Are Inherently and Pervasively Political Organizations",
        "reference": "2. The National Education Association",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1 of the FAA exempts classes of workers that participate directly in the transportation of goods or people through the channels of foreign or interstate commerce\nA. Congress used \"very particular\" language in section 1 to exempt \"narrow\" categories of transportation workers from section 2's \"expansive\" coverage\nB. Being \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" means moving goods or people through the channels of such commerce and across borders\n1. Common usage favors Southwest\n2. Precedent proves that, in the transportation context, \"engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" requires direct participation in the movement of goods or people through the channels of commerce\n3. Border crossing is a key part of foreign or interstate transportation\nC. The typical activities of seamen and railroad employees show that a \"class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce\" participates directly in foreign or interstate transportation\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Ramp-agent supervisors are not exempt from the FAA",
        "reference": "D. The FAA's purpose confirms that section 1 should be narrowly construed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "The courts below in this Section 1782 proceeding could not properly compel former CIA contractors to confirm or deny whether Poland hosted a clandestine CIA detention facility or provided related assistance\nA. The state-secrets privilege applies to evidence from former CIA contractors that would confirm or deny whether Poland hosted a clandestine CIA detention facility\n1. The CIA Director's state-secrets privilege assertion, which rests on his expert assessment of harm to the national security, warrants utmost deference\n2. The disclosure of classified information by former CIA contractors risks significant harm to the national security\n3. Purported \"public knowledge\" does not undermine the state-secrets privilege assertion here\na. Information from nongovernment sources does not eliminate the national-security harms of confirming or denying the accuracy of that information\nb. The Ninth Circuit's public-knowledge analysis underscores the error of its failure to accord deference to the CIA Director's national-security judgment\n4. [MISSING]\nB. The district court could not properly authorize discovery of national-security information for use by foreign prosecutors investigating clandestine CIA activity",
        "reference": "4. Discovery requests for information for use in foreign proceedings investigating alleged clandestine CIA activities warrant enhanced deference to the Executive's assertion of privilege",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Atlantic Coast Pipeline Will Have a Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities",
        "reference": "I. Racial Minorities Have Historically Been, And Continue To Be, Subject To Environmental Racism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Court has only applied a categorical hot-pursuit exception in the felony context\nB. The Court should not extend the categorical hot-pursuit exception to the misdemeanor context\nC. Existing doctrine enables police to enter a home in pursuit of a misdemeanor suspect in appropriate cases\nD. The Court should remand for application of the good-faith exception",
        "reference": "I. The categorical hot-pursuit exception should not be extended to pursuits of suspected misdemeanants",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief048.pdf",
        "text": "I. ABORTION IS A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS PROCEDURE\nA. Ambulance calls\nB. Maternal abortion deaths\nII. THE CLAIM THAT ABORTION IS SAFER THAN CHILDBIRTH IS NOT SUPPORTED AND MOST LIKELY FALSE\nA. Relevance to abortion jurisprudence\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Refutation of the fiction and possible backpedaling\nD. Dissecting the fiction\nE. Response to contrary statements in Whole Woman's Health\nIII. PUBLISHED LITERATURE INDICATES THAT ABORTION IS MORE DANGEROUS THAN CONTINUED PREGNANCY",
        "reference": "B. Repetition of the fiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. EQUALITY MEANS \"SHOW NO PARTIALITY\"\nA. The \"Show No Partiality\" Principle Is Part Of The Law Of Nature, As Affirmed By the Declaration Of Independence And, Therefore, Dictates The Exclusive Legal Meaning Of Equality\n1. We Are All Equally Human, Requiring Impartial, Equal Treatment\n2. Show No Partiality Is The Law Of Nature\n3. State Power Is Limited By The Law Of Nature's Mandate To Show No Partiality\n4. Distinctions Based Upon \"Race,\" \"Color of Skin,\" Or \"National Origin,\" Are Contrary To The Law Of Nature\nB. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause And Title VI Are Built Upon And Controlled By The \"Show No Partiality\" Principle, And In The Context Of Race, Skin Color And Ethnicity, Compel Color-Blindness In College Admissions And Academic Programs\n1. The Law of Nature, And of The Land, Mandate Color-Blindness In College Admissions And Other Educational Programs\n2. Race-Based Criteria, Such As Diversity, Is Inherently Unequal\n3. The Slave Trade Was Abolished After 20 Years, But The Diversity Trade Still Remains After 50 Years.\nC. This Court's Racial Equality Jurisprudence, As Expressed In Plessy, Bakke, Grutter, and Fischer, Are Unconstitutional Departures From The \"Show No Partiality\" Principle\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Court's Open Departure From The Declaration's Meaning Of Equality Is Morally Shocking",
        "reference": "1. The Law Of Nature, Not The Case Law, Is The Only True Guide",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1143_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's Arguments About The FAA's History And Purpose Are Not Accurate\nA. Congress Did Not Prioritize Section 4 Over The FAA's Other Provisions\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Vaden's Look-Through Approach Should Apply To All Aspects Of The FAA, Including The FAA's Confirmation And Vacatur Provisions\nA. Section 4 Holds The Jurisdictional Key For The Entire FAA\nB. In His Brief To The Judiciary Committees In Connection With Joint Hearings, The FAA's Principal Drafter Applied A Look-Through Approach Beyond Section 4 Of The FAA\nC. Petitioner's Restrictive View Of Jurisdiction Would Undermine The FAA's Broad Framework Supporting Arbitration\nD. Petitioner Fails To Explain How Subject Matter Jurisdiction Would Work With The Remainder Of The FAA's Provisions\nE. Petitioner's Restrictive Jurisdictional View Is In Tension With The Court's FAA Precedents\nIII. Under An Original Understanding Of The FAA, The FAA Would Not Apply In This Case, But Under Stare Decisis And Consistent With The FAA's Governing Framework, The Court Should Adopt Vaden's \"Look-Through\" Approach For All FAA Proceedings\nA. The FAA Was Never Designed To Cover Statutory Claims\nB. The FAA Was Never Designed To Cover Employment Disputes",
        "reference": "B. Congress Did Not Intend For The States To Enforce The FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lanham Act Is Not Extraterritorial\nA. The Act Lacks the Requisite Unmistakable Indication of Extraterritorial Effect\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Act's Commerce Provision Reinforces Rather than Lifts Territorial Limits\nD. Extraterritoriality Contravenes Treaty Obligations and Threatens International Friction\nE. Steele Does Not Counsel a Different Result\nII. The Act Does Not Apply \"Domestically\" to Foreign Sales\nA. Any Argument that the Act Applies \"Domestically\" to Foreign Sales Is Waived\nB. The Act Requires Domestic Use in Commerce\nIII. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Must Be Rejected\nA. The \"Diversion of Foreign Sales\" Theory Distorts the Lanham Act Beyond Recognition\nB. Any Extraterritorial Application Must Be Confined to Statutory Criteria",
        "reference": "B. Extraterritoriality Defies Traditional Trademark Principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Private securities class actions provide critical investor remedies and ensure that investors have a viable source of redress for fraud and deception\nB. Private securities class actions are a necessary and effective supplement to government enforcement\nII. FRAUDS THAT SERVE TO MAINTAIN AN ALREADY-INFLATED STOCK PRICE ARE AS HARMFUL AS INFLATION-INDUCING FRAUDS, AND MUST BE SUBJECT TO REDRESS UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS\nIII. DEFENDANTS SEEKING TO REBUT THE BASIC PRESUMPTION SHOULD CONTINUE TO BEAR THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION, AND THE SO-CALLED \"GENERAL\" OR \"GENERIC\" CHARACTER OF ALLEGED MISSTATEMENTS MUST NOT BE CONCLUSIVE AS TO PRICE IMPACT\nA. A defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption properly bears the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence\nB. The so-called \"general\" or \"generic\" nature of alleged misstatements alone must not be conclusive as to price impact",
        "reference": "I. PRIVATE SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS ARE CRUCIAL TO ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH THE SECURITIES LAWS AND PROMOTING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE IN THE MARKETS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision's Devastating and Destabilizing Effect on Private Parties Warrants Immediate Review\nII. There Are No Jurisdictional Barriers to Review, and Trial Will Not Aid This Court's Review\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. There Are Three Square Splits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals' decision is wrong\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. This Court's review is warranted now",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1259_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Neither \"irretrievable depravity,\" \"irreparable corruption,\" nor \"permanent incorrigibility\" is required for a constitutional sentence of life without possibility of parole for a juvenile offender\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Miller v. Alabama had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component\nC. A court need not find irretrievable depravity before sentencing a juvenile murderer to LWOP\n1. No finding is necessary to impose an LWOP sentence because if one were required, a jury would need to make it\n2. Irretrievable depravity, irreparable corruption, or permanent incorrigibility are not prescriptive elements of a maximum sentence but descriptions of maximally culpable offenders\n3. Irretrievable depravity is not an intelligible standard for a sentencer, who can assess the present magnitude of depravity but not its future duration\nII. Balancing the costs of overconfinement and underconfinement is a task for the democratic process, not litigation\nA. Both overconfinement and underconfinement impose costs on the public\nB. The democratic process should determine how to balance the risks of underconfinement and overconfinement",
        "reference": "A. Objective factors guide the review of both capital and non-capital sentences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tenth Circuit Correctly Held Custom Art Is Pure Speech Because the Originality and Expressiveness Inherent in Custom Art Make It Uniquely Deserving of Broad First Amendment Protection\nA. Original, Expressive Art Is Pure Speech, Regardless of the Medium Used to Create It\nB. Original, Expressive Art Is Pure Speech, Regardless of What Observers Understand the Art to Mean\nC. Original, Expressive Art Is Pure Speech, Regardless of Whether the Art is Commissioned or Non-Commissioned\nD. Custom Wedding-Related Art Always Conveys an Expressive, Protected Message About the Wedding Because Weddings Are Expressive Events\nII. Compelling Artistic Speech Will Devastate the Lives of Artists Who Refuse to Abandon their Convictions, Reducing Citizens' Access to Goods and Services and Creating Inferior Markets for Everyone\nA. Government Coercion of Speech Devastated Aaron and Melissa Klein's Lives and Destroyed Their Business\nB. Government Coercion of Speech Is Devastating Lives and Destroying Businesses Across the Country\nC. Without Broad First Amendment Protections for Artistic Speech, The Lives and Businesses of All Artists Are at Stake\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Enforcing the First Amendment Will Ensure That Both Free Speech and Free Markets Can Flourish",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. REVIEW IS NECESSARY TO HARMONIZE THE DIVERGENT VIEWS OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES ON WHETHER PAGA CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO THE FAA\nA. Iskanian held that PAGA claims fall outside the FAA's coverage\nB. Ninth Circuit judges have questioned or disagreed with Iskanian\nII. CALIFORNIA COURTS' DEFENSE OF THE ISKANIAN RULE HAS EXPOSED OTHER TENSIONS IN THE CASE LAW, CEMENTING THE NEED FOR REVIEW\nA. [MISSING]\nB. California courts deny that qui tam claims are subject to the FAA, in tension with federal decisions",
        "reference": "A. California courts dispute whether this Court has already held that \"public\" claims are subject to the FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Restore the Statutory \"Make and Use\" Standard for Enablement\nA. Section 112 Provides a Practical Standard of Reasonableness\nB. Sanofi-Regeneron's \"Specific Undisclosed Embodiments\" Standard Is Unsupported\nC. Sanofi-Regeneron Cannot Prevail Under Its Own Test\nIII. The Government's Arguments Fail\nIV. Genus Claims Promote, Rather Than Stifle, Innovation",
        "reference": "I. The Federal Circuit Applied a Reach-the-Full-Scope Enablement Test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The history and traditions of universal assumpsit and jury trials provide a time-tested solution to civil rights conflicts in public accommodation cases.\nA. Public accommodation statutes declare ancient legal doctrines.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Except in per se cases, the reasonableness of exclusion is a jury question.\nD. The owner's intent in exclusion is also a fact question for the jury.\nII. Discriminatory intent, not disparate effect, is the historic standard of public accommodation regulation.\nA. Recent innovations in interpreting public accommodation statutes have departed from their historic standard.\nB. Colorado law is best interpreted as declaratory of the common-law rule prohibiting discriminatory intent rather than unintended disparate effects.\nIII. The lower courts invented both a legal standard and its violation.",
        "reference": "B. The owner's reason for exclusion controls.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-437_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. The text, history, and design of Section 1326(d)\n1. An immigration judge's application of governing law does not render administrative and judicial remedies unavailable\n2. A defendant who contends that his prior offense was not removable seeks to \"challenge the validity\" of his removal order\n3. [MISSING]\nB. The plain text of Section 1326(d) raises no significant constitutional or equitable concerns\n1. The straightforward application of Section 1326(d) raises no significant constitutional questions\n2. Respondent's reliance on this Court's actual-innocence case law is misplaced",
        "reference": "3. The rule of lenity does not apply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-499_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. It is Undisputed That This Case Squarely Presents a Circuit Split on an Important Issue of Bankruptcy Law\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Respondent's Arguments Do Not Diminish the Certworthiness of This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-565_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is warranted because legislator-led prayer is widely practiced across the nation\nA. Like many local governments, Pittsylvania County has opened its meetings with legislator-led prayer for centuries\nB. Across the country and at all levels of government, legislators open sessions by leading prayer\nII. Certiorari is warranted because the decision below conflicts with the Court's holdings that the content of prayer is a matter of conscience and may not be regulated by the state\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The identity of the prayer giver is constitutionally irrelevant",
        "reference": "A. In view of the long and widespread tradition of legislative prayer, this Court has repeatedly upheld the practice and affirmed that the content of prayers is a matter of conscience",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals' construction of the arbitration agreement in this case does not present an issue meriting review\nA. The lower court's decision that there is a contractual basis for class arbitration correctly applies both the FAA as construed in Stolt-Nielsen and the state contract-law principles that govern construction of arbitration agreements\nB. The court of appeals' decision does not conflict with this Court's precedents\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful\nIII. A range of additional considerations make this case a poor choice for review",
        "reference": "C. This case does not implicate any conflict among the circuits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1363_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TEXT AND STRUCTURE OF SECTION 1226(c) COMMAND DHS TO APPLY MANDATORY DETENTION \"WHEN THE ALIEN IS RELEASED\" FROM CRIMINAL CUSTODY, NOT AT WHATEVER TIME THE AGENCY DECIDES AFTER RELEASE\nA. The Text Imposes Mandatory Detention Only on Noncitizens Detained \"When\nB. The Government's Contrary Reading Turns a Specific Mandate into a General Invitation, and Cannot Be Squared With the Statute's Text and Structure\ni. An Alien Described in Paragraph (1) Means All of Paragraph (1)\nii. When the Alien Is Released Does Not Mean \"While\" or \"After\" She Is Released\nII. THE COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION ACCORDS WITH CONGRESS'S PURPOSE OF REQUIRING THE SECRETARY TO ENSURE AN IMMEDIATE TRANSFER OF NONCITIZENS FROM CRIMINAL TO IMMIGRATION CUSTODY\nA. The Legislative History Shows That Congress's Purpose Was to Ensure the Immediate Transfer to Immigration Custody of Noncitizens When Released from Criminal Custody\nB. The Government's Legislative History Arguments Lack Merit\nIII. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE REQUIRES READING SECTION 1226(c) NARROWLY\nIV. THE GOVERNMENT'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS LACK MERIT\nA. Chevron Deference Does Not Apply to the BIA's Interpretation of Section 1226(c)\nB. The Government's Arguments Regarding State and Local Compliance with Detainer Requests Are Unavailing\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The \"Loss of Authority\" Cases Are Inapplicable to Determining the Scope of Mandatory Detention Under Section 1226(c)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.77
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Grant Review To Clarify the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny When Disclosure Requirements Threaten Associational Rights\nA. This Court's Use of Exacting Scrutiny\nB. Confusion in the Lower Courts\nII. Review Is Necessary to Forestall Further Chilling of First Amendment Associational Rights from the Dramatic Increase in Retaliation Against Those with Disfavored Political Views\nA. Doxing by the Obama 2012 Reelection Campaign\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Members of Congress Endorse Harassment and Doxing\nD. Local Governments Endorse Retaliation Against Businesses Affiliated with Disfavored Views",
        "reference": "B. IRS Retaliation Against Tea Party Groups",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Auer Deference Harms The Business Community By Increasing Regulatory Uncertainty\nII. Seminole Rock And Auer Should Be Overruled\nA. Seminole Rock And Auer Are Contrary To The APA\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Seminole Rock And Auer Cannot Be Justified On Policy Grounds\nIII. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle To Reconsider Seminole Rock And Auer",
        "reference": "B. Seminole Rock And Auer Violate Separation Of Powers Principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. BACKGROUND\nII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REJECTION OF TRADEMARK LICENSES UNDER SECTION 365\nA. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code Does Not Mandate Termination of a Trademark License Upon Rejection of the Contract\n1. Rejection Under Section 365 Results in a Breach, and Applicable Non-Bankruptcy Law Determines the Parties' Rights\n2. The Need to Exercise Control Over a Trademark Licensee Arises Independently Under Trademark Law and Does Not Amount to a Debtor-Licensor Performing Under an Otherwise Rejected Contract\nB. Applying Non-Bankruptcy Law to Determine the Effect of Breach Will Allow Courts to Develop Equitable Treatment of Trademark Licenses in Bankruptcy\n1. Non-Bankruptcy Law Will Govern the Licensee's Continued Use of the Licensed Mark After Rejection\n2. [MISSING]\nIII.",
        "reference": "2. Non-Bankruptcy Law Occasionally Allows for the Termination of a Trademark License in the Absence of a Breach by the Licensee",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-340_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. The plain, ordinary meaning of \"and\" in 18 U.S.C. section 3553(f)(1) is \"and,\" not \"or.\"\n1. In a conjunctive negative proof, \"and\" ordinarily bears its joint meaning \u2014 \"and.\"\n2. The functionally disjunctive reading fails.\na. The government's reading is unordinary.\nb. [MISSING]\nc. The government twice inserts \"does not have\" into section 3553(f)(1).\nB. Context confirms that Congress used ordinary English in section 3553(f)(1).\n1. Context shows that Congress would have used \"or,\" not \"and,\" had it meant to limit safety-valve relief to defendants whose criminal history does not trigger section 3553(f)(1)(A), (B), or (C) \u2014 i.e., any of them.\n2. The surplusage canon does not help the government.\na. Text and context control.\nb. There is no surplusage anyway.\n3. Other statutes do not help resolve the question presented.\nC. Giving \"and\" its plain, ordinary meaning comports with the First Step Act.\nD. The rule of lenity prohibits reading section 3553(f)(1)'s \"and\" to mean \"or.\"",
        "reference": "b. The government functionally replaces the \"and\" in section 3553(f)(1) with \"or.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Government Takes Property Without Just Compensation When It Collects a Debt and Keeps More than It Is Owed\nA. [MISSING]\n1. This Court's decisions support the recognition of home equity as a property interest protected by the Taking Clause\n2. History and tradition confirm that equity in real estate is private property\n3. Current Minnesota law treats equity as private property in other contexts\nB. The County Violated the Takings Clause When It Confiscated Tyler's Equity\n1. The state may not use legislation or its lien to extinguish equity without just compensation\n2. The taking of equity violates the purpose of the Takings Clause\n3. Nelson v. City of New York does not apply here and its comments about the Takings Clause are dicta\nII. The Excessive Fines Clause Limits the Forfeiture of Tyler's Equity\nA. The County's Forfeiture Is a Fine Under This Court's Existing Precedents\nB. The History and Original Meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause Support Its Application Here",
        "reference": "A. Home Equity Is Private Property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established\nII. [MISSING]\nA. A collective bargaining system that includes exclusive representation and agency fees serves important State interests\nB. Montana has a strong interest in maintaining its system of exclusive representation",
        "reference": "II. Montana's longstanding reliance on its freedom to organize relations with its State labor force is constitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decision below conflicts with this Court's decision in Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Court should construe the AIA to respect due process and avoid constitutional infirmity\nIV. This Court should grant certiorari to ensure the IRS's pattern and practice of rule-of-law violations is subject to judicial review",
        "reference": "II. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Straying from the common law goes against this Court's precedents and does the law a disservice\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Grounding claims' prerequisites in the common law produces a stable, neutral rule of law\nII. The Eleventh Circuit's position in Laskar is the only approach consistent with the common-law history surrounding Section 1983\nA. The Laskar majority identified a well-settled common-law principle, which may exist without uniformity in the states\nB. The positions of the Laskar dissent and seven other circuits foretell instability and unpredictability in an indications-of-innocence approach",
        "reference": "A. Section 1983 should be read in harmony with common-law principles that were prevalent in 1871",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISION BELOW AND DECISIONS OF THIS COURT OR THE CIRCUIT COURTS\nA. In Implementing the Touch and Concern Test the Court Below Applied This Court's RJR Nabisco's Two-Prong Analysis\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Case is Not Ripe for Review\nII. THE COURT OF APPEAL'S CORPORATE LIABILITY HOLDING IS CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT AND DOES NOT CREATE A CIRCUIT SPLIT\nA. The Ruling is Consistent With this Court's Decisions\nB. All Circuits to Address the Issue But One Hold that Domestic Corporations May Be Held Liable\nIII. THERE ARE NO PRUDENTIAL OR SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS NECESSITATING REVIEW",
        "reference": "B. Review is not Justified by a Conflict Among the Circuit Courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Fan Creativity and Fair Use\nII. Two Fanworks Under Two Versions of Fair Use\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Two Fanworks Under Campbell\nC. The Two Fanworks Under Warhol\nIII. This Second Circuit's Disregard for Meaning Is Inconsistent with This Court's Decisions, Inconsistent with the Decisions of Other Circuits, Internally Inconsistent, and Unworkable",
        "reference": "A. Two Fanworks",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TOWNSHIP FAILS TO JUSTIFY WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S STATE COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT\nA. Williamson County's Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained as a Section 1983 Rule\n1. Williamson County Is Premised on an Incorrect Reading of the Just Compensation Clause, Not Section 1983\n2. Williamson County's State Compensation Requirement Is Wrong as a Section 1983 Rule\n3. Ms. Knick's Claims Expose Williamson County's Flaws\nII. THE TOWNSHIP HAS FAILED TO JUSTIFY THE JURISDICTIONAL CHAOS ARISING FROM WILLIAMSON COUNTY\nA. The Township Fails To Justify the Preclusion Barrier\nB. The Township Fails To Justify the Takings Removal Problem\nIII. THE TOWNSHIP HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT MS. KNICK'S CLAIMS ARE IMPROPER IN FEDERAL COURT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There Is No Pennsylvania Common Law Access Principle at Issue Here",
        "reference": "A. Ms. Knick Properly Raised Her Claims Under Section 1983 and the Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Deprives Alaska of Its Sovereign Right To Manage Its Navigable Waters To Benefit Alaskans\nA. Alaska's ownership of its lands and waters is an essential aspect of its state sovereignty\nB. [MISSING]\nC. ANILCA's requirement that state lands be treated differently from federal lands protects Alaska's sovereign rights\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Misapplies section 103(c) and the Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine\nA. ANILCA does not contain the required clear statement of congressional intent to divest Alaska of control over its navigable waters\nB. Alaska's navigable waters are not public lands\nC. Even if the government has a reserved water right in the State's waters, that right is to use a defined quantity of water, not to supersede Alaska's regulation of navigable waters\nIII. In Restoring Alaska's Sovereignty Over Its Navigable Waters, this Court Need Not and Should Not Disturb the Katie John Circuit Precedents\nIV. The Park Service's Attempt To Regulate Non-Federal Waters Within CSU Boundaries Cannot Be Alternatively Justified by 54 U.S.C. section 100751(b)",
        "reference": "B. Loss of Alaska's sovereign power to manage its own waters will inflict serious harm on ordinary Alaskans",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. SPECIAL NONDELEGATION CONCERNS ARE RAISED WHERE CONGRESS DELEGATES TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE NATION'S PROSECUTOR, UNGUIDED DISCRETION TO DEFINE WHETHER CRIMINAL LAW APPLIES IN THE FIRST PLACE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Nondelegation Doctrine Demands More Specific Legislative Guidance in the Criminal Context\nII. SORNA'S DELEGATION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO DECIDE WHO IS RETROACTIVELY SUBJECT TO ITS CRIMINAL OBLIGATIONS VIOLATES THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE",
        "reference": "A. Broad Delegation is Generally Permissible in the Administrative Setting, So Long As Congress Provides an Intelligible Principle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-938_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTORY TEXT PROVIDES THAT AN ORDER DENYING A MOTION FOR STAY RELIEF IS IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE\nA. Section 158(a) Authorizes Appeals From Orders Finally Resolving Stay-Relief Motions, Which Are Distinct \"Proceedings\" In The Bankruptcy Case\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE SERIOUS EFFECTS THAT FLOW FROM ORDERS DENYING STAY RELIEF SUPPORT APPEALABILITY\nA. The Overall Design Of The Automatic Stay And The Role Of Stay-Relief Motions Support Immediate Appealability Of Orders Denying Stay Relief\nB. Orders Denying Stay Relief Are The Bankruptcy Equivalent Of Orders Granting Permanent Injunctions\nC. An Order Denying Stay Relief Is Not Akin To An Order Denying Venue Transfer\nIII. TRADITIONAL FINALITY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT APPEALABILITY\nA. A Presumptive Finality Rule Does Not Risk Piecemeal Appeals\nB. A Presumptive Finality Rule Will Promote Judicial Economy\nIV. A PRESUMPTIVE RULE WILL PROMOTE CLARITY AND IMPROVE THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM\nA. A Rule Of Presumptive Finality Respects The Role Of Bankruptcy Courts And Appellate Courts Alike\nB. Petitioner's Proposed Standard Is Unworkable And Will Harm Consumer Debtors And Other Parties By Increasing The Cost, Uncertainty, And Burden Of Appellate Litigation",
        "reference": "B. Bullard Supports The Appealability Of Orders Resolving Stay-Relief Motions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. TO ESTABLISH STANDING, LAUFER MUST DEMONSTRATE A CONCRETE, PARTICULARIZED, AND FORWARD-LOOKING INJURY.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Laufer's alleged injury is not concrete.\nB. Laufer's alleged injury is not particularized.\nC. Havens Realty does not assist Laufer.\nD. This Court's \"informational standing\" cases do not support Laufer.\nIII. LAUFER CANNOT ESTABLISH STANDING BASED ON HER ALLEGED STIGMATIC INJURY.\nA. Laufer has not experienced, and will not experience, the type of discrimination that gives rise to Article III standing.\nB. Laufer's emotional injuries do not give rise to Article III standing.\nIV. LAUFER'S INTEREST IN ENFORCING THE ADA DOES NOT GIVE HER STANDING.\nV. AT A MINIMUM, THERE IS NO LONGER A CASE OR CONTROVERSY BECAUSE LAUFER HAS RECEIVED THE INFORMATION SHE SEEKS.",
        "reference": "II. LAUFER CANNOT ESTABLISH STANDING BASED ON HER ALLEGED INFORMATIONAL INJURY.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S NEW \"FULL SCOPE\" TEST IS A HIGHER BAR THAN WHAT CONGRESS CONTEMPLATED IN 35 U.S.C. section 112(A)\nA. CONGRESS-NOT THE COURTS-HAS THE AUTHORITY TO SET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PATENTABILITY\nB. 35 U.S.C. section 112(A) REQUIRES A DISCLOSURE SUFFICIENT \"TO ENABLE ANY PERSON SKILLED IN THE ART\" TO \"MAKE AND USE\" THE \"INVENTION.\"\nC. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S NEW \"FULL SCOPE\" GENUS CLAIM TEST IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE PRECEDENT CONGRESS ENDORSED IN THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT\nD. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF 35 U.S.C. section 112 DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S HEIGHTENED \"FULL SCOPE\" TEST\nE. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S NEW \"FULL SCOPE\" TEST DEPARTS FROM EARLIER FEDERAL CIRCUIT, COURT OF CUSTOMS AND PATENT APPEALS, USPTO, AND EVEN SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATIONS\nF. [MISSING]\nII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S NEW \"FULL SCOPE\" TEST FRUSTRATES INNOVATION\nA. THE PATENT SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO BALANCE THE INTERESTS OF INNOVATORS AND THE PUBLIC\nB. DRUG DISCOVERY IS EXPENSIVE AND TIME CONSUMING\nC. AFFIRMING THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT WILL CREATE AN IMPRACTICAL AND UNWORKABLE STANDARD",
        "reference": "F. THIS COURT HAS CAUTIONED THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT TO NOT ADD REQUIREMENTS TO PATENTABILITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The D.C. Circuit Will Address the Same Question\nB. The Tenth Circuit's Decision Will Not Cause the Economic Harm Imagined by Petitioners\nIII. OVERTURNING ON THE QUESTION PRESENTED WOULD NOT ALTER THE JUDGMENT\nIV. THE TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY CONSTRUED THE SMALL REFINERY TEMPORARY EXEMPTION",
        "reference": "II. THE PETITION DOES NOT PRESENT AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FEDERAL LAW THAT THE COURT NEEDS TO RESOLVE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Virginia's Ban on Uranium Mining Encroaches on the Field Preempted by the Atomic Energy Act\nA. The AEA Preempts State Laws Imposed for the Purpose of Regulating Radiological Safety\n1. The Text and Structure of the AEA Define the Field Preempted by the Act Based on the Purpose of State Regulation\n2. This Court's Precedent Confirms that the Scope of the AEA's Preempted Field Is Defined in Part Based on the Purpose of the State Law in Question\nB. Because Virginia Has Conceded that Its Ban Is Imposed for the Purpose of Regulating the Radiological Safety of Milling and Tailings Activities, It Is Preempted\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Virginia's Ban Is Also Preempted as an Obstacle to the Full Implementation of the AEA's Objectives",
        "reference": "C. The Approach to Preemption Adopted Below Would Threaten To Cripple the Atomic Energy Industry, Nullifying a Core Purpose of the AEA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Arbitration of PAGA Penalties Is Consistent with the FAA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Arbitration of PAGA Penalties Retains All the Expedition, Informality, and Flexibility Contemplated by the FAA\nII. Labor Arbitration, A Model of Expedition, Informality, and Flexibility, Regularly Remedies Wrongs to Third Parties on Facts Specific to Them",
        "reference": "A. A Bilateral Arbitration is One Brought by a Single Party Irrespective of Whether the Facts Involve Third Parties or the Remedies Sought Benefit Them",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-565_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Unqualified Safe-Port Clause In The Charter Party Is A Warranty\nA. The Plain Language Of The Safe-Port Clause Is A Warranty That The Charterer's Chosen Port Will Be Safe\nB. Industry Custom Supports Viewing The Unqualified Safe-Port Clause As A Warranty\nII. CARCO's Policy Arguments Are Misplaced\nA. [MISSING]\nB. CARCO's Arguments About Incentives Are Wrong\nC. CARCO Is Wrong That Adhering To The Industry's Standard Interpretation Of An Unqualified Safe-Port Clause Will Harm Maritime Commerce",
        "reference": "A. Parties To A Contract Are Free To Allocate Liability For Unknown Risks As They See Fit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE NLRA DOES NOT IMMUNIZE UNIONS FROM LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONALLY DESTROYING PROPERTY\nA. The NLRA Does Not Arguably Protect Intentional Property Destruction\nB. The Local Interest Exception Applies to Intentional Property Destruction\nC. [MISSING]\nII. A FACT DISPUTE ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF CLEARLY UNPROTECTED CONDUCT DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE COURT JURISDICTION\nA. Claims Alleging Clearly Unprotected Conduct May Proceed in State Court\nB. No Precedent Supports the Union's \"Jurisdictional Hiatus\" Theory\nC. The Union's Textual Arguments Fail",
        "reference": "C. Constitutional Avoidance Reinforces This Result",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Loan-Repayment Limit Is Constitutionally Suspect Because It Targets Funds That Are Used Exclusively for Political Speech or Speech-Facilitating Activities\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Practical Effect of the Loan-Repayment Limit Is To Deter Candidates of Limited Means From Spending Money in Advance of Raising Funds\nB. Incumbent Candidates Have a Greater Ability To Raise Money Early in Campaigns\nC. Candidates Who Are Limited in Their Ability To Spend Funds Early in a Campaign Are Less Likely To Succeed",
        "reference": "II. The Loan-Repayment Limit Provides an Advantage to Incumbents at the Expense of Challengers, Particularly Challengers of Limited Means",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1270_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code is not jurisdictional and was thus subject to Transform's waiver, estoppel, and forfeiture\nA. Only a clear statement from Congress can make a statutory requirement or limitation jurisdictional\nB. Congress has not clearly stated that Section 363(m) is jurisdictional\n1. The statutory text demonstrates that Section 363(m) is not jurisdictional\n2. The statutory scheme governing bankruptcy appeals supports that Section 363(m) is not jurisdictional\n3. Legislative history reinforces the conclusion that Congress did not \"clearly\" intend Section 363(m) to be jurisdictional\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The relief requested on appeal by MOAC was not barred by Section 363(m) even if that provision applied\nA. The court of appeals expanded the reach of Section 363(m) beyond what the statute provides\nB. As a substantive matter, reversing the Assignment Order would not affect the validity of the prior sale",
        "reference": "C. As a nonjurisdictional statute, Section 363(m) is subject to waiver, forfeiture, and estoppel, and Transform did each, rendering Section 363(m) inapplicable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Adequate Judicial Review After Unconstitutional Administrative Action Is Illusory",
        "reference": "I. The Grievous Injuries Resulting from Forcing Litigants to Endure Ongoing Constitutional Violations from Structurally Unconstitutional Agency Action Before They Are Allowed Access to an Article III Court Are Not Hypothetical",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government's Well-Established Authority to Determine and Enforce Its Own Contracting Requirements Should Govern the Outcome in This Case\nA. The Court Has Long Recognized that the Government's Exercise of Authority to Dictate and Enforce Its Own Contract Requirements Does Not Impede a Contractor's Liberty Interests\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Cases Addressing the Government's Authority as a Contracting Party and as the Manager of Its Own Internal Affairs Should Decide this Case\nII. Permitting Contractors to Alter or Ignore Lawful Government Contract Requirements Would Have Broad, Catastrophic Consequences\nA. The Federal Procurements Process Is Complex But Generally Structured to Ensure Government Needs Are Met as Efficiently as Possible\nB. The Petitioners' Proposed Regime Would Undermine the Government's Ability to Effectively Meet Its Needs Through the Procurement Process",
        "reference": "B. The Court Applied the Same Principle to Find that the Government Must Have \"Significantly Greater Leeway\" to Manage Its Internal Operations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. APJs ARE NOT PRINCIPAL OFFICERS\nA. Patent Trial And Appeal Board \u2014 Members\nB. Patent Trial And Appeal Board \u2014 Duties\nC. The Director Exercises Sufficient Control Over Inter Partes Review To Render APJs Inferior Officers\nII. IF APJs ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, THE COURT OF APPEALS CURE WAS EXCESSIVE\nA. This Court Could Sever The Statutory Requirement That The Director \"Shall\" Issue A Certificate Following Every Final Written Decision\nB. This Court Could Sever The Statutory Requirement That Three Judges Sit On Every Inter Partes Review Panel\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This Court Could Sever Just The Statutory Protections Afforded The PTAB's Executive Members",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-439_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. METHOD OF EXECUTION CLAIMS SOUND IN SECTION 1983, NOT HABEAS, UNDER LONGSTANDING DOCTRINES OF THIS COURT.\nA. This Court Has Articulated A Clear Divide Between Section 1983 And Habeas.\nB. Method Of Execution Challenges \u2014 Including Those That Allege Non Statutory Alternatives \u2014 Fall Plainly On The Section 1983 Side Of That Divide.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Holding That Certain Method Of Execution Claims Must Proceed through Habeas Will Sow Doctrinal Confusion.\nII. IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT NANCE'S CLAIM SOUNDS IN HABEAS, IT SHOULD HOLD THAT IT IS NOT SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE.",
        "reference": "C. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Vitiates Bucklew Itself.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Establishment Clause was intended to protect and accommodate diverse religious expression and beliefs including those of amicus curiae\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Establishment Clause was meant to accommodate diverse religious beliefs and expression by giving even-handed treatment to all religious faiths\nII. The Lemon test does not reflect the intent of the Establishment Clause and has an especially exclusionary effect on minority religious believers\nA. The Lemon test does not reflect the protective meaning and understanding of the Establishment Clause\nB. The Lemon test has an especially pernicious and disproportionate effect on minority religions by effectively excluding them from public speech and grounds entirely\nC. In contrast to the unworkable and ahistorical Lemon test, the test suggested by Petitioners is historically defensible, clearer in application, and more consistent in its results\nIII. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
        "reference": "A. The Establishment Clause was meant to encourage diverse religious exercise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-483_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Circuit Split on the Fetal Disposition Issue Is Real\nA. The Seventh Circuit's holding conflicts with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Planned Parenthood of Minnesota v. Minnesota\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Non-Discrimination Issue Is a Question of National Importance that Merits Resolution by this Court\nA. The stakes are too high to await further percolation\nB. Indiana is not asking the Court to revisit Roe, Casey, or any other abortion precedents",
        "reference": "B. This case is a proper vehicle to resolve the split over whether States have legitimate interests in human dignity of fetal remains",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "B. The merits of petitioners' constitutional challenges to Texas's Heartbeat Law are not at issue in this interlocutory appeal\nC. Petitioners' question presented was not passed upon below\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioners' \"Conflicts\" Are Imaginary\nA. Court clerks: the courts of appeals allow suits against court clerks acting outside their adjudicative capacity, but not within it\nB. State judges: absent state-law duties outside the adjudicatory function, a suit against a state judge to challenge the constitutionality of a law is not a case or controversy\nC. Attorneys general: Unlike the Minnesota Attorney General in Ex parte Young, the Texas Attorney General lacks a connection to the enforcement of SB 8 under Texas law",
        "reference": "D. Petitioners' argument for certiorari before judgment rests on numerous flawed premises",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Advances In Technology Now Provide A Straightforward, Judicially Manageable Standard For Recognizing Excessive Partisan Gerrymanders\nII. Excessively Partisan Gerrymanders Are Created By Using Computer Technology To Find Extreme Outliers\nIII. In Its 2016 Plan, North Carolina Sought To Create An Extreme Partisan Gerrymander\nIV. An Extreme Outlier Test Can Recognize Excessively Partisan Gerrymanders By Applying The Same Technology Used To Create Them\nV. The District Court Properly Applied An Extreme Outlier Standard To North Carolina's 2016 Plan\nVI. An Extreme Outlier Standard Is Not Susceptible To Criticisms That Have Been Levelled At Some Previously Proposed Approaches\nA. An extreme outlier standard is judicially discoverable and manageable\nB. An extreme outlier standard employs an objective mathematical approach, with a right answer\nC. An extreme outlier standard accounts for a State's actual political geography\nD. An extreme outlier standard does not expect or enforce proportional representation\nVII. The United States Relies On An Extreme Outlier Approach For A Wide Range Of Critical Needs, Including National Defense\nVIII. Over The Past Decade, Extreme Outlier Approaches Have Become Increasingly Applied To Assess Redistricting Plans\nIX. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IX. An Extreme Outlier Standard Would Provide Guidance To The Parties And Bolster Confidence In The Courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.46
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Eighth Circuit's decision deepens a circuit split\nIII. This case is an ideal vehicle",
        "reference": "I. The Eighth Circuit's decision conflicts with this Court's precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLES REINFORCE THE HEIGHTENED NEED FOR CONGRESS TO SPEAK CLEARLY TO AUTHORIZE STATE PROSECUTION\nA. Criminal Liability's Distinct Characteristics Confirm Why Congress Must Speak Clearly To Broaden Oklahoma's Prosecutorial Authority\nB. Separation Of Powers Principles Underscore Why Congress Must Speak Clearly In Order To Alter Criminal Jurisdiction Within Indian Country\nC. These Principles Make The Extension Of McBratney And Bracker Particularly Inappropriate In This Context",
        "reference": "I. STATES DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES INVOLVING INDIANS IN INDIAN COUNTRY UNLESS CONGRESS CLEARLY SAYS OTHERWISE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED IN THE PETITION ARE RIPE FOR \u2014AND IN NEED OF \u2014RESOLUTION\nA. This Case Properly Presents the Question Left Undecided in Denver Area\nB. The Second Circuit Has Created a Spurious and Untenable Distinction Between Leased Access Channels and Public Access Channels\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Minimal, Clearly Defined State Regulation of Speech Results in More Speech\nB. Careful Limitation of the Meaning of \"State Action\" to State Actors Likewise Encourages More Speech\nIII. THE ERRONEOUS DECISION BELOW COULD HAVE UNINTENDED FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR OTHER PLATFORMS AND MEDIA",
        "reference": "II. THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS COMMAND CAREFUL ADHERENCE TO THE \"STATE ACTION\" REQUIREMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1017_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners are not entitled to relief under 10 U.S.C. 973(b)\nA. [MISSING]\n1. A CMCR judgeship is not a \"civil office\" within the meaning of Section 973(b)\n2. Military officers are \"authorized by law\" to serve as CMCR judges\nB. Even if Section 973(b) prohibited military officers from serving on the CMCR, Congress expressly foreclosed the relief petitioners seek\nII. Simultaneous service on a CCA and the CMCR does not raise constitutional questions\nIII. This Court lacks jurisdiction in Dalmazzi and Cox, but has jurisdiction in Ortiz\nA. This Court lacks jurisdiction in Dalmazzi and Cox because Section 1259(3) does not authorize review of the CAAF's denial of discretionary review\nB. This Court has jurisdiction in Ortiz because 28 U.S.C. 1259 is a valid grant of appellate jurisdiction\nIV. Even if this Court has jurisdiction in Dalmazzi and Cox, it should not disturb the CAAF's discretionary denials of review",
        "reference": "A. Section 973(b) does not prohibit military officers from serving on the CMCR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-778_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner's Case Involves An Entrenched Circuit Split On Whether Criminal Intent Must Exist When A Trespass Begins\nB. The Circuit Split Implicates Numerous State Burglary Statutes\nII. The Sixth Circuit's Approach To Generic Burglary Has Widespread And Serious Practical Consequences\nA. Interpretation Of The \"Remaining In\" Element Of Generic Burglary Affects All State Burglary ACCA Predicates\nB. ACCA Mandatory Minimums Are Common And Are Frequently Predicated On State Burglary Offenses\nC. The Sixth Circuit's Approach Greatly Expands The Scope Of Conduct That Will Trigger Mandatory Minimum Sentences Under ACCA",
        "reference": "I. This Case Presents A Threshold Question Under The Categorical Approach: What Are The Elements Of Generic Burglary?",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Persons Employed by Rail Carriers to Load and Unload Cargo from Trains Are \"Railroad Employees\"\nII. Persons Employed by Air Carriers to Load and Unload Cargo from Planes Are \"Transportation Employees\"\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Persons Employed by Air Carriers to Supervise and Assist Cargo Handlers Are \"Transportation Employees\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Accepting the City of Austin's arguments would require this Court to overturn Reed\nIII. None of the factors for overturning this Court's precedent support overturning Reed",
        "reference": "I. Reed clarified this Court's analysis as to when a restriction on speech was content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-8255_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MCCOY'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY ALLOWING COUNSEL TO ADMIT GUILT OVER MCCOY'S OBJECTION\nA. McCoy Did Not Forfeit His Right To Maintain His Innocence At Trial By Accepting The Assistance Of Counsel\nB. English's Ethical Duties Did Not Permit, Much Less Require, Him To Admit McCoy's Guilt\nC. [MISSING]\nII. ENGLISH'S ADMISSION OF GUILT OVER MCCOY'S OBJECTION CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL",
        "reference": "C. The Trial Court's Error Entitles McCoy To A New Trial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. DEFERENCE TO DISCRIMINATING ENTITIES ON WHETHER DISCRIMINATION IS JUSTIFIED IS UNTENABLE AS AN EXERCISE IN STRICT SCRUTINY\nII. GRUTTER'S POTENTIAL ACCEPTANCE OF FALSE CONSENSUS\nA. No Record-Predicate for Existence of a Consensus at Grutter\nB. Demonstrable Consensus at the Time of Grutter Opposed Race-Based Admissions Policies\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Consensus Clear and Opposed to Racial Admissions\nIII. BALLOT INITIATIVE HISTORY OVER THE LAST CYCLE DEMONSTRATES THAT AMERICA'S BROAD-BASED, STABLE, NATIONAL CONSENSUS REMAINS STRONG (AND STRENGTHENING), EVEN IN AMERICA'S MOST DIVERSE REGIONS\nA. California 2020: Electorate Refuses to Reauthorize Public Discrimination by Defeating Prop. 16\nB. Washington State 2019: Electorate Refuses to Reauthorize Public Discrimination by Defeating Proposition 1000\nC. Consensus Clear and Opposed to Racial Admissions\nIV. PROPRIETY OF CONSIDERING AMERICAN PUBLIC'S BROAD-BASED, STABLE, NATIONAL CONSENSUS AGAINST RACIAL ADMISSIONS POLICIES",
        "reference": "C. Demonstrable Consensus Has Opposed Race-Based Admissions Policies Ever Since",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE CPP ILLEGITIMATELY CHANGES THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES\nIII. CONGRESS USED CATEGORICALLY DIFFERENT LANGUAGE WHEN EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZING GENERATION-SHIFTING FOR SO2 EMISSIONS; THIS FURTHER UNDERCUTS THE CLAIM THAT IT IMPLIEDLY AUTHORIZED GENERATION-SHIFTING FOR CO2 EMISSIONS",
        "reference": "I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT SHOWS THAT CONGRESS DID NOT DELEGATE THE AUTHORITY TO REDESIGN ENTIRE INDUSTRIES TO EPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Section 1514A does not require a whistleblower to prove that his employer acted with \"retaliatory intent\"\nA. Section 1514A's \"contributing factor\" test does not require proof of \"retaliatory intent\"\n1. \"Contributing factor\" is a term of art that has long been interpreted not to require a showing of retaliatory intent\n2. The term \"contributing factor\" is most naturally read not to require a showing of retaliatory intent\n3. The drafting history surrounding Congress's enactment of the \"contributing factor\" test confirms that it does not require a showing of retaliatory intent\nB. Section 1514A(a) does not alter the burden-shifting framework for adjudicating whistleblower claims under the \"contributing factor\" test\n1. Section 1514A(a) does not require proof of retaliatory intent\n2. [MISSING]\nC. The Secretary's interpretation of Section 1514A is entitled to deference",
        "reference": "2. Section 1514A's burden-shifting framework in any event would impose a legal presumption of retaliatory intent when the \"contributing factor\" test is met",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. Sufficient consensus on the beginning of human life has developed since Roe, requiring protection of agreed upon human life before viability\nA. Roe relied on the absence of consensus on the beginning of human life\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Consensus has developed since Roe that human life begins early in development, well before viability\n1. Fetal homicide laws and other similar laws now protect new human life in most states throughout human development\n2. The federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004 protects new human life throughout human development\n3. Well-established post-Roe definitions of death enable detection of death, and new human life, early in development\n4. Worldwide, only a handful of the world's nearly 200 nations permit abortion without restriction as to reason as late in development as viability\nII. Consideration of the claims of human dignity, even apart from any consensus analysis, requires protection of likely human life once indicia of human life are detectable",
        "reference": "B. Casey engaged in very limited review, but acknowledged that developments in facts or understanding of relevant facts could render Roe's central holding obsolete",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. A District Court's Grant of Assistance to an International Commercial Arbitral Tribunal Under Section 1782 Issues Upon Meeting Certain Factors\nA. An \"Interested Person\" Entitled to Invoke Section 1782 Can Only Mean a Party or a Prospective Party to the Arbitration Proceedings\nB. A Foreign or International Tribunal Under Intel Standards Includes an International Commercial Arbitral Tribunal\nC. The Scope and Nature of Assistance to Be Granted Should Itself Be Determined Via Arbitration\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Applicability of the Intel Tests in the Context of International Commercial Arbitral Tribunals\nA. The First Intel Factor \u2014 The District Court Should Not Substantively Re-Examine the Issue of the Nature and Extent of Discovery to be Granted to an Interested Person\nB. The Second Intel Factor \u2014 The Order of the Arbitral Tribunal with Respect to the Extent of Discovery Must Not Be Re-Evaluated by the District Court\nC. The Third Intel Factor \u2014 An Exhaustion Requirement Should Be Imposed as A Condition of The District Court Entertaining A Section 1782 Request\nD. The Fourth Intel Factor \u2014 \"Trimming\" of Discovery Requests Would Not Be Appropriate in The Context of An International Commercial Arbitral Tribunal\nIII. This Proposed Construction and Application of Section 1782 Would in Fact Limit Judicial Intervention in International Commercial Arbitrations, and Favor Arbitration",
        "reference": "D. Conditioning an Order Under Section 1782 on a Foreign Discoverability Requirement May Impinge Upon the Procedural Autonomy of the Arbitral Tribunal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Circuit Court Decision is Consistent with Longstanding Law that Alaska Native Corporations are Not Tribal Governments\nA. ANCs have never possessed the responsibilities, powers, or obligations of federally recognized Tribes\nB. Alaska Tribes have a government-to-government relationship with the United States and offer their Tribal citizens and community residents a wide variety of government services\nC. Alaska Native Corporations do not act on behalf of Tribes or perform Tribal government functions\nD. Title V money was directed to Tribal governments, and not to Alaska Natives generally\nIII. The Circuit Court Decision is Consistent with the Plain Language of the CARES Act, Its Statutory Context, and Legal Precedent\nA. Alaska Native Corporations are not recognized governing bodies of Tribes",
        "reference": "I. There is No Circuit Split That Warrants Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Plaintiffs' sex-blind reading is inconsistent with the original, unambiguous legal meaning of Title VII\nA. The Plaintiffs' reading would prohibit employers from adopting traditional, sex-conscious norms concerning marriage, sexual ethics, and appropriate attire\nB. Well before the adoption of Title VII, American law had long incorporated, in various ways, the norm proscribing adverse sex discrimination\nC. By word and deafening silence, legal authorities had long established that the anti-sex-discrimination norm in no way precluded the adoption of traditional sex-conscious rules as to marriage, sexual ethics, and appropriate attire\nII. This original legal meaning was coherent, but the Plaintiffs' reading would render the law absurd, as indicated by Plaintiffs' own conduct\nA. This original legal meaning was coherent insofar as the verb \"to discriminate\" had come to mean to distinguish so as to invidiously obstruct equal opportunity\nB. This original legal meaning was coherent insofar as the law prohibited only the employers' making a discrimination not their recognizing some distinction made anteriorly by nature, the ius gentium, or some other deep custom\nC. These two aspects of the meaning of \"to discriminate\" explain the leading disputes about the scope of the anti-sex-discrimination norm\nD. [MISSING]\nE. A law requiring human beings to be sex blind is absurd, as indicated by the Plaintiffs' own conduct\nIII. Plaintiffs' novel and partisan reading would do violence to the inclusive and bipartisan spirit of the Civil Rights Act",
        "reference": "D. This coherent original meaning is irreconcilable with Plaintiffs' analogy to interracial marriage \u2014a rehash and amplification of a specious segregationist argument",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Judicial Review Of The PTAB's Time-Bar Rulings Helps To Advance Congress's Objectives And Prevent The Harassment Of Patent Owners\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Power Integrations Litigation Demonstrates The Need For Judicial Review Of Time-Bar Rulings\nC. The Availability Of Ex Parte Reexamination Does Not Render The Time Bar Irrelevant",
        "reference": "A. Enforcing Congress's Limits On The IPR Process Will Encourage Innovation, Not Stifle It",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Government Agrees That The Court Should Grant Plenary Review Of The Constitutional Question, Including The Question Of The Proper Remedy\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Also Grant Review On The Statutory Question Which Is Logically Anterior And Independently Certworthy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Philadelphia violated the First Amendment\nA. Smith does not apply to all free exercise cases\nB. Smith never should have applied to this case\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Philadelphia's actions fail strict scrutiny\nII. Smith should be replaced with a standard that reflects the text, history, and tradition of the Free Exercise Clause\nA. Smith's predictions all proved wrong\nB. Smith is contrary to constitutional text and history\nC. Smith is a law unto itself\nD. Smith should be revisited and replaced with a standard that is true to the text, history, and tradition of the Free Exercise Clause",
        "reference": "C. Philadelphia's actions unconstitutionally compel speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Washington's Barrier Culverts Violate The Treaties By Blocking Fish Passage To Tribal Fishing Grounds And Substantially Degrading The Fisheries\nA. The \"Right of Taking Fish\" \"Secured\" By The Treaties Protects The Fishery Itself\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Washington's Complaints About The \"Moderate Living\" Standard Are Misplaced\nD. The State Fails To Identify Any Treaty Interpretation That Would Protect The Fishery From Destruction Without Also Requiring Affirmance Here\nII. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Washington's Insubstantial Equitable Defense\nA. Inaction By Government Employees Does Not Estop The United States\nB. The Federal Government Is Not Responsible For Washington's Treaty Violations\nIII. Washington's Fact-Specific Criticisms Of The Injunction Lack Merit\nA. The Record Demonstrates A Clear Connection Between The State's Barrier Culverts And Their Impact On Salmon\nB. The District Court Gave The State Sufficient Flexibility To Prioritize Culvert Repairs\nC. The State's Cursory Complaints About Cost And Equitable Balancing Are No Basis To Reverse",
        "reference": "B. The District Court Correctly Found The State In Violation Of The Treaties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The time has come for this Court to end overt government hostility to religion.\nA. Government decisionmakers throughout the Nation are inflicting wounds on religious liberty at an ever-increasing rate.\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Government animosity to religion is especially noxious where, as here, it arises in the employment context.\nA. Employees should never have to choose between the dignity of work and the dignity of religious liberty.\nB. Misuse of the government-speech doctrine creates a cudgel for religious-liberty opponents.\nIII. Admonitions from the Court have assuaged these wounds, but stronger medicine is necessary.",
        "reference": "B. Courts throughout the Nation are letting these constitutional wounds fester.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS INTENDED THAT APJS BE INFERIOR OFFICERS UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY\nII. THE TOTALITY OF CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORTS FINDING THAT APJS ARE INFERIOR OFFICERS BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTED AND SUPERVISED AT SOME LEVEL BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE USPTO\nA. Edmond Supports a Flexible Approach to Appointments Clause Cases\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Director's Lack of \"Unfettered\" Review and Removal Power Does Not Outweigh His Substantial Direction and Supervision over APJs\nIII. A FINDING OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WILL MOOT THE QUESTION OF REMEDY AND MINIMIZE DISRUPTION TO THE PATENT SYSTEM",
        "reference": "B. The Federal Circuit's Three-Factor Test Does Not Take into Consideration All Relevant Facts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "Under the AIA, a sale qualifies as prior art only if it makes the claimed invention available to the public\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The legislative history of the AIA supports the plain-text interpretation\nC. The structure of the AIA further supports the plain-text interpretation\nD. The arguments in support of the Federal Circuit's interpretation are invalid\nE. The plain-text interpretation, not the Federal Circuit's, better serves the broader purposes of the AIA and the patent system",
        "reference": "A. The plain text of 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) requires that a sale make the claimed invention available to the public",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ATDS PROVISION HAS BECOME A TREMENDOUS SOURCE OF MERITLESS LITIGATION\nA. Congress Targeted Random and Sequential Dialing Machines\nB. The FCC Creates Uncertainty and Chaos Ensues\nC. Meritless ATDS Litigation Still Plagues the Federal Courts\nII. THIS COURT SHOULD INVALIDATE THE PROHIBITION IF IT CONCLUDES THAT THE TCPA'S SCHEME IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. Precedent and Policy Require Striking the Ban, Not Severing the Exemption\nB. The Government's Arguments Are Wrong\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. CALLERS MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR CALLS PLACED UNDER AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIME",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1712_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES HAVE STANDING TO SUE BREACHING FIDUCIARIES FOR MONETARY AND OTHER EQUITABLE AND REMEDIAL RELIEF, GIVEN ERISA'S CLEAR STATUTORY LANGUAGE, SUPPORTED BY HUNDREDS OF YEARS OF TRUST LAW, EMPOWERING THEM TO DO SO\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. A PLAN'S FUNDING STATUS IS NOT A SENSIBLE MEASURE OF INJURY IN FACT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Second Circuit Flouted Campbell\nII. The Circuit Split Is Real\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE CRCA IS VALID LEGISLATION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AT LEAST INSOFAR AS IT CREATES A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST STATES FOR ACTUAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS, LIKE THOSE ALLEGED IN THIS CASE\nIII. THE CRCA IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BECAUSE IT REMEDIES AND PREVENTS CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS BY THE STATES\nIV. CONGRESS DID NOT NEED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO EFFECTIVELY ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY",
        "reference": "I. CONGRESS HAS BROAD ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-530_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Transfers Of Corporate Stock Are Not \"Money Remuneration\" Under The RRTA\nA. The Plain Meaning Of \"Money Remuneration\" Excludes Transfers Of Stock\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Recent Exemptions To Section 3231 Do Not Transform Stock Into \"Money\"\nD. The Plain-Language Interpretation Gives Meaning To The Limiting Word \"Money\" And Respects The Textual Differences Between The RRTA And FICA\nII. The IRS Regulation Does Not Support The Government And Does Not Deserve Deference",
        "reference": "B. The Broader Context Of The Internal Revenue Code Confirms That \"Money Remuneration\" Does Not Include Stock",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. A STATE TAX ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID ONLY WHERE THE STATE'S NEXUS STANDARD SCALES WITH ITS BURDEN, WHERE THE TAX IS NON-DISCRIMINATORY, AND WHERE THE STATE TAXES ONLY ITS FAIR SHARE OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE\nII. SOUTH DAKOTA'S LAW IS CONSTITUTIONAL, AS ITS NEXUS STANDARD SCALES WITH THE BURDEN IT IMPOSES, IT IS NON-DISCRIMINATORY, AND IT TAXES ONLY ITS FAIR SHARE OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE\nA. South Dakota is One of 23 States with Simplified Sales Tax Collection That Imposes Minimal Burden on Collecting Businesses\nB. South Dakota Requires Uniformity Between State and Local Sales Tax Bases, and Minimizes the Number of Local Sales Tax Rates\nC. South Dakota is One of Three States That Tax Nearly All Services Under Its Sales Tax, Minimizing Complexity and Demonstrating the Statute Has No Discriminatory Intent or Purpose\nD. South Dakota's Law Adopts a Meaningful De Minimis Threshold Likely to Exclude Interstate Activity Where State Burdens Exceed State Benefits\nE. [MISSING]\nF. South Dakota's Statute Applies Only to South Dakota's Fair Apportioned Share of Interstate Commerce\nIII. WITHOUT THIS COURT'S GUIDANCE, THE STATES WILL BRING ABOUT A COMPLEX PATCHWORK OF TAX LAWS HARMING INTERSTATE COMMERCE, EXACTLY WHAT THE FOUNDERS SOUGHT TO PREVENT\nA. 22 States Have Adopted New York-Style Click-Through Nexus Sales Tax Laws, Which Expand Physical Presence Beyond What This Court Described as Its Furthest Extent\nB. Ten States Have Adopted Colorado-Style Reporting Sales Tax Laws, Which Raise First Amendment Issues\nC. Three States Have Adopted Economic Nexus Sales Tax Provisions Which Ignore Physical Presence Completely\nD. States May Soon Consider Massachusetts-Style Cookie Taxes, Which Expand the State's Sales Tax Nexus to All Sellers Everywhere\nE. Three States Have Concluded that Physical Presence is Inapplicable for Business Taxes, Undermining the Spirit of the Quill Decision",
        "reference": "E. South Dakota's Statute Bars Retroactive Collection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Ability of Tribes to Exercise Their Sovereign Right of Self-Determination and Support Their Communities Depends Largely on the Ability of Tribal Businesses to Raise Revenue\nA. Federal Law and Policy Encourages Tribal Economic Development to Promote Tribal Self-Determination\nB. The Sovereign Status of Tribal Businesses Is Critical to Tribes' Economic Development Efforts\nIII. The First Circuit's Decision Constrains Tribal Economic Development for NAFSA Member Tribes and Deepens an Irreconcilable Circuit Split",
        "reference": "I. The Sovereign Authority of Tribes and Tribal Businesses Is Fundamental to Self-Government and May Only Be Diminished by Clear and Unequivocal Language from Congress.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle To Address an Important and Recurring Issue that Raises \"Fundamental Concerns\"",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Perpetuates a Conflict Among the Lower Courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. Contracting Parties Throughout Many Industries Need Clear Guidance From The Court\nB. The Best Reading Of The Statute Limits \"Foreign Or Interstate Commerce\" To Cross-Boundary Transportation\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Court Should Reject Respondent's Misplaced Reliance On History",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-530_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. STOCK DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF COMPENSATION UNDER THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT TAX ACT\nA. The Railroad Retirement System and Social Security System are Different in a Number of Ways, Including the Manner in Which the Payroll Tax is Levied\nB. The Historical Context of the Enactment of the Railroad Retirement and Social Security Statutes Explain the Difference in Each System's Payroll Tax\nII. RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY IS NOT THE ONLY AREA WHERE CONGRESS HAS CHOSEN TO ADDRESS RAILROADS DIFFERENTLY THAN OTHER INDUSTRIES\nA. The Railroad Industry's Industrial Dominance During the First Century of its Existence Led Congress to Enact a Series of Unique Railroad Statutes, Beginning with Economic Regulation\nB. Congress Has Chosen to Maintain Different Treatment for Railroads in the Areas of Safety and Employer Liability\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Congress Has Chosen to Utilize a Different Approach to Address Labor Relations in the Railroad Industry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1143_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The question presented is important and warrants review in this case",
        "reference": "A. There is a clear and intractable conflict",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1158_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner committed honest-services fraud by accepting bribes when selected as, and functionally serving as, a public official\nA. Section 1346 criminalizes schemes to defraud that involve bribes and kickbacks received in violation of a duty of honest services\nB. An individual may owe a duty of honest services to the public without a formal employment or agency relationship\nC. Section 1346 applies to individuals selected for formal government employment or actually exercising the functions of a government official\nD. The jury validly found that petitioner owed the public a duty of honest services\n1. Petitioner had been selected to be a public official when he carried out his corrupt agreement with Aiello and COR Development\n2. Petitioner was functionally a public official when he participated in the COR Development scheme\n3. [MISSING]\nE. Applying Section 1346 to petitioner's conduct is consistent with this Court's decisions and creates no constitutional problems\n1. Applying Section 1346 to incoming and functional public officials is consistent with the Court's decisions in Skilling and McDonnell\n2. The rule of lenity and the vagueness doctrine do not preclude Section 1346's application in this case\n3. Section 1346's application in this case does not invite First Amendment concerns\n4. Petitioner's conviction is consistent with principles of federalism",
        "reference": "3. The jury was adequately instructed on the COR Development count",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE BOARD MEMBERS ARE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES WHO WERE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPOINTED\nA. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"\nB. There Is No Article IV Exception To The Appointments Clause\nC. Historical Practice Confirms That The Board Members Are Officers Of The United States\nD. Territorial Home Rule Is Fully Compatible With The Appointments Clause\nII. THE PREVAILING PARTIES ARE ENTITLED TO APPROPRIATE RELIEF FOR THE BOARD'S VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. In All Events, The De Facto Officer Doctrine Cannot Validate The Board's Future Actions\nC. This Court Should Direct The Lower Court To Dismiss The Title III Proceedings",
        "reference": "A. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Cannot Validate Past Actions Of The Unconstitutional Board",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Military Chaplaincy Plays a Critical Role in Our National Defense by Fostering Servicemembers' Morale\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Leaves First Amendment Protections for Government Employees\u2014Such as Military Chaplains\u2014in a Deeply Uncertain State",
        "reference": "II. Military Chaplains Have Broad Job Responsibilities as Both Commissioned Officers and Spiritual Advisors for Servicemembers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Responding to the Devastating Housing Crisis of 2008, Congress Determined it was Necessary to Establish the FHFA as a Regulator with Some Degree of Independence. 13\nIII. Congress Acted Within Its Constitutional Authority in Conferring on the FHFA Director Some Degree of Independence from the President",
        "reference": "I. Congress Has Broad Authority To Shape the Structure of the Federal Government and To Confer on Certain Officers a Degree of Independence from the President 5",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Regulation of Second Amendment Rights Should Be Subject to a Heightened Standard of Review\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Historically, \"the People\" Denied Second Amendment Rights Have Disproportionately Been Minorities\nIV. The Right to \"Bear\" Arms Will Be Rendered Superfluous If New York's \"Proper Cause\" Requirement Stands",
        "reference": "II. New York Impermissibly Limits Second Amendment Rights of \"the People\" to Certain \"Special People\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1599_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuits are split, as the government concedes, and this case is an ideal vehicle.\nII. The question presented is important.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Sixth Circuit's decision is wrong.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's intervening decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller forecloses Petitioner's claim on the merits.\nII. Cummings aside, review is not warranted to address whether section 1415(l) requires exhaustion when plaintiffs seek damages for the denial of a free appropriate public education.\nA. The courts of appeals uniformly agree that plaintiffs seeking damages must exhaust the administrative process.\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Cummings aside, review is not warranted to address whether section 1415(l) includes a futility exception.\nA. This case does not implicate any circuit split over whether section 1415(l) contains \"any kind of a futility exception.\"\nB. There is no certworthy circuit split over whether section 1415(l) excuses exhaustion when plaintiffs settle their IDEA claims.\n1. The Ninth Circuit has not addressed whether an IDEA settlement excuses exhaustion.\n2. The First and Third Circuits do not excuse exhaustion when\u2014as here\u2014there is no administrative record.\n3. The Tenth Circuit's approach doesn't create certworthy conflict either.\nC. The futility question does not warrant this Court's intervention.\nD. This case is a poor vehicle because exhaustion would not have been futile.\nE. The Sixth Circuit's decision is correct.\n1. The Sixth Circuit correctly declined to write a futility exception into section 1415(l).\n2. Petitioner's counterarguments fail.",
        "reference": "B. The circuit consensus is correct.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED ON A THEORY THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT DEFEND\nII. THE GOVERNMENT'S NOVEL THEORY OF FRAUD IS WRONG\nA. The Fraud Statutes Require A Scheme That, If Completed As Intended, Would Harm A Traditional Property Interest\nB. The Government's Reformulation Of The Right-To-Control Theory Violates Core Requirements Of Fraud\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The government's theory would have untenably expansive consequences\n2. The government's proffered limiting principles are insufficient\n3. The government's theory would end-run McNally and Skilling\nIII. THE JUDGMENT BELOW SHOULD BE REVERSED AND PETITIONER ACQUITTED",
        "reference": "C. The Government's Novel Theory Has An Unbounded And Untenable Sweep",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Automobile Exception Does Not Apply Simply Because a Vehicle Was Uncovered in a Search\nB. The Automobile Exception Was Created To Address Concerns that Do Not Apply to this Type of Search",
        "reference": "I. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION APPLIES TO WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF A VEHICLE AND CANNOT JUSTIFY A SEARCH FOR A VEHICLE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text and Original Understanding of the Elections Clause Show that It Does Not Delegate Authority over Elections to \"Independent\" Legislatures.\nA. The Framers Specified that Federal Election Rules Would Be Written by State \"Legislatures\" to Prohibit Unilateral, Unchecked Executive Control over Elections.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Post-Ratification State Practice Confirms that the Elections Clause Was Never Understood to Free State Legislatures from State Constitutional Structures.\nD. Petitioners' Supposed Blockbuster Evidence Is Fraudulent.\nII. Subsequent Historical Practice Confirms that State Legislative Regulation of Elections Is Subject to State Constitutional Limits and Judicial Review.",
        "reference": "B. The Elections Clause Used Language Materially Identical to the Elections Provision of the Articles of Confederation, Which Unambiguously Contemplated State Constitutional Restrictions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-292_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. In Founding-Era Common Law, An Arrest Included Any Use of Physical Force to Subdue or Detain, Whether or Not the Subject Was Ultimately Captured\nIII. Applying the Common Law Rule Will Also Vindicate the Framers' Understanding that Civil Damages Actions Would Be a Key Deterrent Against Unreasonable Intrusions on Persons and Property",
        "reference": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A defendant who has waived appellate rights is not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to file an appeal unless he can show that it deprived him of substantive appellate review\nA. An ineffective assistance claim requires that any inadequacies in the judicial process be traceable to counsel's errors\nB. A defendant who has chosen to waive appellate rights may not automatically attribute the absence of substantive appellate review to counsel's errors\n1. A knowing and intelligent appeal waiver validly renounces rights to substantive appellate review\n2. A defendant who has signed an appeal waiver is not prejudiced unless his attorney deprived him of a right to appellate review that he did not renounce\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The lower courts correctly denied relief because petitioner failed to show that he sought to appeal any claim that he did not waive",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner's per se prejudice rule is unsound and would produce undesirable results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Estoppel as Applied by the Lower Courts in the Arbitration Context Involves None of the Doctrine's Traditional Elements\nA. The \"close relationship\" estoppel test departs from the common-law roots of equitable estoppel when it focuses exclusively on the closeness of the defendants and the similarity of the claims against them\nB. The \"concerted misconduct\" test is even further removed from traditional equitable estoppel in focusing on the allegations against the defendants rather than the plaintiff's wrongful acts",
        "reference": "I. Equitable Estoppel Has Traditionally Required a False Statement, Deceptive Act, or Material Omission by One Party On Which Another Party Detrimentally Relied",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Must Speak Clearly If It Wants To Assign To An Agency The Authority To Resolve A Major Policy Issue.\nA. The Major Questions Doctrine, Nondelegation, And Chevron Deference\n1. The Major Questions Doctrine\n2. The Nondelegation Doctrine\n3. Chevron Deference\nB. The Major Questions Doctrine Should Be A Threshold Inquiry To Any Chevron Or Nondelegation Analysis\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Whether The United States Should \"Shift\" Away From Coal-Fired Generation Is A Major Policy Question That Congress Did Not Clearly Assign To EPA To Resolve\nA. The Clean Power Plan Triggers The Major Questions Doctrine Under All Three Independently Sufficient Tests\n1. Vast Economic And Political Significance\n2. Assertion Of Enormous And Transformative Authority Never Before Claimed\n3. Trespassing On The Traditional Authority Of States And Other Agencies\nB. Section 111(d) Does Not Clearly Authorize The Clean Power Plan\nC. The Panel Majority's Contrary Conclusion Below Was Wrong",
        "reference": "C. This Court Should Hold That Three Independently Sufficient Tests Identify That A Rule Triggers The Major Questions Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.21
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decision below demonstrates the need for this Court to clarify its preemption standards in the area of immigration\nA. The lower courts are in disarray over how to analyze preemption under section 1324a(b)(5)\n1. The fractured and divergent lower-court decisions under section 1324a(b)(5) demonstrate the need for this Court to clarify its preemption standards\n2. The Kansas Supreme Court's holding is inconsistent with federal law and this Court's Whiting decision\nB. This Court should clarify how other canons of statutory construction overlap with the presumption against preemption\n1. A presumption against preemption continues to apply outside express preemption cases\n2. The clear statement rule and similar canons of statutory construction apply, even when the presumption against preemption does not\nII. Reading section 1324a(b)(5) broadly would unnecessarily raise questions under the Constitution\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress may not have the power to foreclose states' enforcement of immigration-neutral criminal laws",
        "reference": "A. Giving illegal aliens an exemption from facially neutral general laws would violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-646_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATE SOVEREIGNS EXCEPTION SHOULD BE OVERRULED\nA. The Separate Sovereigns Exception Is Inconsistent with the Plain Text, Original Meaning, and Purpose of the Constitution\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE",
        "reference": "B. The Separate Sovereigns Exception's Doctrinal and Factual Underpinnings Have Eroded",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-248_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners Need Not Overcome a Presumption of Adequate Representation\nA. The Court Should Apply Rule 24 in a Manner That Reflects the State's Weighty Interests in This Case and That Respects Its Designation of Agents\nB. Requiring Petitioners to Overcome a Presumption of Adequate Representation Is Inconsistent with Rule 24's Text and Precedent\nC. Practical Considerations Do Not Justify Requiring Petitioners to Overcome a Presumption of Adequate Representation\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Rule 24's Text and Structure Demonstrate That De Novo Review Applies\nB. Historical Practice Supports De Novo Review\nC. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Advisory Committee Notes Support Application of De Novo Review\nD. As a Matter of Sound Administration, Review Should Be De Novo\nIII. Petitioners Are Entitled to Intervene As of Right\nA. Petitioners Timely Filed Their Motion to Intervene\nB. Petitioners Have a Significantly Protectable Interest in the Subject of This Suit\nC. The Disposition of This Case May Impair Petitioners' Significantly Protectable Interest\nD. The State Board Respondents May Not Adequately Protect Petitioners' Significantly Protectable Interest",
        "reference": "II. Adequacy of Representation Is an Issue of Law That Should Be Reviewed De Novo",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6662_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) LISTS WELL-KNOWN OFFENSES, NOT \"ACTION WORDS\"\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH OFFERS NEITHER UNIFORMITY NOR SIMPLICITY",
        "reference": "II. THE GOVERNMENT'S RELIANCE ON KAWASHIMA IS MISPLACED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1252(f)(1) Does Not Preclude Judicial Review of the MPP Rescission, and It Manifestly Permits This Court to Issue Injunctions\nA. Section 1252(f)(1) does not strip the lower courts of subject-matter jurisdiction\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Itself Can and Should Enjoin the Rescission of MPP",
        "reference": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) does not limit the relief awarded by the lower courts in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Texas Legislature Did Not Engage In Intentional Discrimination When It Enacted Districts Imposed By The District Court Itself In 2012\nA. The Legislature Did Not Engage in Intentional Discrimination When It Adopted the Court-Ordered Districts as Its Own\nB. The District Court's \"Remove the Taint\" Theory of Intentional Discrimination Is Fundamentally Flawed\nC. The District Court Did Not and Could Not Find Intentional Discrimination on the Basis of Race\nIII. The Court-Imposed Plans Were Not Infected By Any \"Taint\" Of Intentional Discrimination\nA. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Moot Challenges to the 2011 Plans\nB. The Court-Imposed Maps Were Not \"Tainted\" by Intentional Discrimination\n1. CD35 Is Not and Never Was a Racial Gerrymander\n2. There Is Not and Never Was Intentional Vote Dilution In CD27\n3. The Legislature Did Not Engage in Intentional Vote Dilution in Bell County (HD54)\n4. The Legislature Did Not Intentionally Dilute Hispanic Voting Strength in Dallas County (HD103, HD104, and HD105)\n5. The Legislature Did Not Intentionally Dilute Hispanic Voting Strength in Nueces County (HD32 and HD34)\nIV. The Two Remaining Challenges To The 2013 Plans Are Meritless\nA. There Is No Vote-Dilutive Effect in Nueces County State-House Districts\nB. The Legislature Did Not Engage in Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymandering in Reconfiguring Tarrant County's HD90",
        "reference": "I. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the District Court's Orders Because They Have the \"Practical Effect\" of Enjoining the State's Redistricting Plans",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Language And Framework Of The CSA And This Court's Caselaw Imposing A Presumption In Favor Of Scienter Requires That The Government Prove A Medical Practitioner Charged Under section 841 Knowingly And Intentionally Acted \"Outside Of The Usual Course Of Professional Practice\"\nA. This Court's Long-Standing Case Law Imposing A Presumption In Favor Of Scienter Requires The Government Prove That A Practitioner Knew That Charged Prescriptions Were Outside The \"Usual Course\" Because \"Usual Course\" Is The Element That Distinguishes Between An Innocent And Guilty Act\n1. The Presumption In Favor Of Scienter Requires That The Government Prove That A Defendant Practitioner Issued A Prescription Knowing It To Be Outside The \"Usual Course\" Because \"Usual Course\" Is The Element That Distinguishes Between An Innocent And Guilty Act\nB. The Structure And Legislative History Of The CSA Suggest That Congress Intended To Shield Medical Practitioners From Criminal Liability In The Absence Of Knowledge\nII. Where A Medical Professional Is Charged With Acting Outside The Scope Of His Professional Practice, Good Faith Instructions Must Be Subjective\nIII. The \"Usual Course\" And \"Medical Purposes\" Prongs Must Be Read In The Conjunctive. When Unmoored From The Purpose For Which A Prescription Was Issued, \"Usual Course\" Becomes Unconstitutionally Vague\nA. Historically \"Medical Purpose\" And \"Usual Course\" Were Considered Related Or Identical Concepts\nB. Absent Medical Purpose \"Usual Course\" Is Unconstitutionally Vague\n1. When Unmoored From Medical Purpose, The \"Usual Course\" Prong Becomes Unconstitutionally Vague Because It Provides Little To No Guidance To Juries Or Prosecutors In Determining How \"Usual Course\" Should Be Measured\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. Defining The \"Usual Course\" Prong Exclusively Based On The Procedures A Doctor Utilizes Renders The Standard Indeterminate As To The Degree Of Compliance Necessary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-489_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A [MISSING]\nA. Good faith is irrelevant under this Court's longstanding rules for general civil contempt\nB. Good faith is irrelevant under a proper application of the Bankruptcy Code\n1. The Code's text and context confirm that subjective intent is irrelevant to remedying discharge violations\n2. The Code's purpose would be profoundly impaired if good faith excuses discharge violations\n3. The Code's history confirms that subjective intent is irrelevant to remedying discharge violations",
        "reference": "A creditor's good-faith belief does not preclude liability for discharge violations under the Bankruptcy Code",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "A. A court of appeals may review any ground for removal encompassed in a remand order where the defendant premised removal in part on the federal-officer or civil-rights removal statutes\n1. The plain text of 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits appellate review of any ground for removal\n2. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1447(d) is supported by precedent from this Court and the courts of appeals\n3. [MISSING]\nB. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
        "reference": "3. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1447(d) serves the provision's purposes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Religious accommodation is an essential facet of the protection of liberty afforded by the Constitution of the United States\nII. Mr. Holland's small business enterprise in the State of West Virginia emphasizes the protection and encouragement of religious expression, in any form\nIII. The \"more than de minimis\" standard set forth in Hardison has created a system of government-endorsed frustration of the free exercise of religion\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. The Court should use this opportunity to overturn Hardison, and replace it with the standard contemplated and codified by Congress",
        "reference": "IV. Notwithstanding Hardison, it remains in the public interest for an employer like Mr. Holland to accommodate the religious expression of its employees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE COURT HAS TRADITIONALLY LOOKED TO SEVERAL FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER PRECEDENT IS SETTLED\nIII. ROE V. WADE IS RADICALLY UNSETTLED\nIV. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY FAILED TO SETTLE ROE V. WADE AND THUS NEITHER IS ENTITLED TO STARE DECISIS RESPECT",
        "reference": "I. PRECEDENT IS ONLY ENTITLED TO STARE DECISIS RESPECT IF IT IS SETTLED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Kokesh's Characterization Of SEC Disgorgements As Penalties Is Not Confined To Limitations Of Actions. It Also Applies To Disgorgements Considered As A Form Of Court-Ordered Relief\nIII. The Court's Hands Are Not Tied Either By Its Own Precedents Or By Sarbanes-Oxley",
        "reference": "I. In Kokesh This Court Ruled That Disgorgement Is A Penalty Under Securities Law. From That Ruling It Follows That Disgorgement May Not Be Granted By A Court As An Equitable Remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RULINGS ON COPYRIGHTABILITY AND FAIR USE INVOLVE QUESTIONS OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE\nA. Copyrights on Software Interfaces Risk Lock-in and Holdup\nB. Affording Copyright Protection to Software Interfaces Will Cement Software-Based Monopolies\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Federal Circuit Failed to Consider Interoperability and Compatibility Concerns\nB. The Federal Circuit's Ruling on Transformativeness Guts the Fair-Use Doctrine as it Applies to Software",
        "reference": "II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RULINGS ON COPYRIGHTABILITY AND FAIR USE ARE INCONSISTENT WITH RULINGS BY THIS COURT AND OTHER COURTS OF APPEAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE \"AMERICAN RULE\" AND ITS EXCEPTIONS ARE STRICTLY APPLIED BY THIS COURT\nII. BEGINNING IN 2013, THE GOVERNMENT BEGAN SEEKING THE REIMBURSEMENT OF SALARIES OF ITS EMPLOYEES IN DISTRICT COURT CHALLENGES TO PTO DENIALS\nIII. CONGRESS HAS NOT \"SPECIFICALLY AND EXPLICITLY\" OVERRULED THE AMERICAN RULE IN 35 U.S.C. SECTION 145\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. THE PTO'S RECENT TREND OF SUING FOR ATTORNEYS' SALARIES UNDER 35 U.S.C. SECTION 145 AND 15 U.S.C. SECTION 1071(B)(3) WILL HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT ON LEGITIMATE APPEALS OF PTAB DECISIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-442_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. REED'S DILATORY LITIGATION TACTICS SHOULD NOT BE REWARDED\nII. THE LOWER COURTS LACKED JURISDICTION OVER REED'S SUIT\nA. THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE BARS REVIEW OF REED'S CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION\nB. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARS SUIT AGAINST THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY\nC. REED LACKS STANDING TO SUE THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY\nIII. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT REED IDENTIFIES IS NASCENT, NON-RECURRING, AND DOES NOT AFFECT REED'S SUIT\nIV. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION WAS CORRECT\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. REED'S CLAIMS ON THE MERITS FAIL UNDER THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5924_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE COURT FROM OVERTURNING APODACA\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Apodaca is poorly reasoned\n2. Apodaca was inconsistent with the Court's precedents at the time\n3. Subsequent legal developments support overruling Apodaca\n4. Reliance interests do not justify leaving Apodaca's fractured holding in place",
        "reference": "A. All Four Stare Decisis Factors Weigh in Favor of Overruling Apodaca",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-857_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. The saving clause preserves habeas relief for prisoners who show actual innocence based on an intervening statutory interpretation decision of this Court\n1. The habeas remedy provides the benchmark for determining whether the Section 2255 remedy is adequate and effective\n2. Habeas permits second or subsequent claims by prisoners who can show actual innocence in light of an intervening statutory interpretation decision of this Court\n3. Amicus's practical concerns do not justify a crabbed interpretation of the saving clause\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Amicus cannot justify the court of appeals' categorical preclusion of saving-clause relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Accepted Tort Principles Recognize a Duty to Warn Those Who Are Placed in Danger by the Defendant's Conduct\nB. Products Liability Law Recognizes a Manufacturer's Duty to Warn of Dangers Presented by a Component Part of the Manufacturer's Product, Even Where the Component Is Incorporated into the Product After Delivery\nC. Arguments Advanced Against the Decision Below Fail to Address the Products Liability Issue Before This Court\nII. The Availability of Insurance Covering Liability for Asbestos Caused Harm, Including Harm Caused By Long-Ago Exposure, Supports Recognition of the Manufacturer's Duty to Warn of Dangers of Asbestos Components\nA. Insurability of Loss Due to Negligence Is Not Essential to Duty to Exercise Due Care\nB. Liability Insurance for Harm Caused by Long-Ago Asbestos Exposure\nIII. This Court has Historically and Consistently Shown Special Solicitude for the Rights of Seamen",
        "reference": "I. Manufacturer Liability for Negligently Failing to Warn of Serious Danger to Users Due to the Installation or Replacement of an Integral Component of the Manufacturer's Product Falls Well Within Settled Principles of Tort and Products Liability Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. PRE-VIABILITY PROHIBITIONS ON ELECTIVE ABORTIONS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL\nA. The Declaration of Independence Affirms That The States Enjoy Police Power Which Carries With It The Power To Prohibit Abortion\nB. The Fourteenth Amendment Requires Only Procedural Due Process, Not Substantive Due Process\nC. Courts Are The Mere Instruments of The Law, And Can Will Nothing\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Judicial Decisions Articulating Substantive Due Process Rights Are Without Constitutional Textual Support\nII. ONLY THE STATES AND THE PEOPLE ENJOY THE LAWFUL AUTHORITY TO CONSTITUTIONALIZE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS \"IMPLICIT IN LIBERTY,\" OR \"DEEPLY ROOTED,\" OR \"INHERENT IN INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY.\"\nA. The People or The States May Amend Their Constitutions or State Law To Protect Their Rights\nB. The Federal Courts Possess No Article III Power To Discover or Constitutionalize Textually Unsupported Rights or Impose A Duty To Enforce Those Rights On The States",
        "reference": "D. According to The Law of Nature, Judicial Power Extends To Issuing Orders in Cases and Controversies, Not To Making Rules of General Applicability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6844_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fifth Circuit properly applied this Court's precedents (primarily Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012) and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)) under the mandates of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in concluding that initial review counsel was not ineffective\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The State's failure to provide funds for an expert mitigation investigator in state post conviction proceedings renders the state's corrective process ineffective",
        "reference": "II. The State's failure to provide funds for an expert mitigation investigator in state post conviction proceedings constitutes cause to excuse the procedural default of petitioner's claims of penalty phase ineffective assistance of counsel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Overlooks Congressional Limits On Federal CWA Authority And The Existing State And Federal Regulatory Regimes Governing Groundwater\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Expansion Of The Clean Water Act Creates Significant Uncertainty\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Court's Rejection Of A Similar Non-Legislative Expansion Of Regulatory Authority In UARG Compels The Same Result Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 227(a)(1)(A) is most naturally read as limited to devices with the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator\nB. The TCPA's predecessor state laws support the most natural reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A)\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
        "reference": "C. The government's reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is consistent with the TCPA's purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT, AS INFORMED BY HISTORY AND TRADITION, SUPPORTS CATEGORICAL PROTECTION THAT DOES NOT DEPEND ON INTEREST BALANCING.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Tiered Scrutiny Has Been an Abject Failure in Second Amendment Cases in the Lower Courts.\nB. Heightened Scrutiny Should Be Strict or Exacting at Worst.\nC. Any Claimed Government Interests Must Be Specific and Proven To Be Real.\nD. Narrow Tailoring Must Be Tested at the Outset and Must Involve at Least a Close Fit.\nE. Any Burden on Second Amendment Rights, Even if Narrowly Tailored, Still May Not Impose an Excessive Burden on the Rights.",
        "reference": "II. IF TIERED SCRUTINY IS USED, IT SHOULD BE STRICT OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, EXACTING AND INSULATED FROM LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL MANIPULATION.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-846_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Perceived Future Dangerousness, an Important Factor in Capital Case Jurors' Consideration of a Death Sentence, Is a Subjective Inquiry Necessarily Informed by Jurors' Implicit Biases\nA. Future Dangerousness Is One of the Most Important Factors Juries Consider in Imposing a Death Sentence\nB. Jurors' Misunderstanding of the Availability of Parole Has a Major Impact on Jurors' Concerns about the Defendant's Future Dangerousness\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Jurors Possess an Implicit Bias that Latino Males Are More Dangerous and Pose a Greater Threat of Future Criminality\nB. The Media Disproportionately Portrays Latinos as Violent Criminals in the Media\nC. Latinos Were Maligned in Public Affairs in Arizona and California in the Period Around Cruz's Trial and Death Sentence\nD. Without a Simmons Charge, Jurors' Misperceptions of Dangerousness and Mistaken Views on the Availability of Parole Combine to Heighten the Risk of a Death Sentence for Latinos and Other Minority Defendants",
        "reference": "II. Popular Culture and Media Contribute to Jurors' Heightened Fears of the Dangerousness of Black and Latino Defendants, Making Those Defendants More Vulnerable to a Death Sentence without a Simmons Instruction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO ESTABLISH UNIFORMITY AMONG THE CIRCUITS ON THE APPLICATION OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY TO LAND USE CLAIMS\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits Apply Williamson County's Exhaustion Requirement to Due Process Land Use Claims\nB. The Ninth and Second Circuits are Unable to Apply Williamson County in a Consistent and Fair Manner to Due Process and Equal Protection Claims\nC. Government Entities Utilize Williamson County to Evade Their Constitutional Obligations",
        "reference": "II. IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS COURT'S GUIDANCE, LOWER COURTS ARE CONFLICTED ON APPLICATION OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S STATE EXHAUSTION RULE TO CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS, INCLUDING DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "Costs Not Taxable Under 28 U.S.C. section 1920 Are Recoverable Under The Copyright Act\nA. Appropriate Enforcement Of Software Copyrights Is Important To The U.S. Economy\n1. Software innovations fuel the nation's economic growth\n2. Software R&D relies on copyright protection\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Section 505's Provision For \"Full Costs\" Includes Authority To Award Otherwise-Nontaxable Costs\n1. The statutory term \"full costs\" means an award of all litigation expenses, in accordance with prevailing practice at the time of its enactment\n2. Petitioners' reading of this Court's precedents is wrong",
        "reference": "B. Balanced Copyright Enforcement Requires District Court Discretion To Award Prevailing Copyright Litigants All Of Their Costs, Not Just Generally-Taxable Costs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Smith Was Wrong From The Moment It Was Decided\nA. Smith Repudiated Sherbert And Reverted To The Discredited Logic Of Gobitis\nB. Smith Abandoned Settled Law And Attempted To Craft A Pragmatic Solution\nC. Smith Met Widespread And Immediate Rebuke\nII. Stare Decisis Does Not Counsel This Court To Preserve Smith\nA. Smith Is Grievously Wrong And Should Be Reversed\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Smith Ignored The History Of Colonial Religious Liberty Protections\n3. Smith Departed From This Court's Free Exercise And First Amendment Jurisprudence\nB. Smith Has Caused Significant Negative Jurisprudential And Real-World Consequences\n1. Lower Courts Have Struggled To Apply Smith Consistently\n2. Federal And State Measures Enacted In Smith's Wake Have Discredited The Prediction On Which Smith Was Premised\n3. Smith Raised The Stakes In The Culture Wars, Thereby Eroding Liberty For All\nC. Overruling Smith Would Not Unduly Upset Reliance Interests",
        "reference": "1. Smith Gave Passing Attention To The Text Of The Free Exercise Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTORY TEXT MAKES CLEAR THAT THE COPYRIGHT OWNER MAKES REGISTRATION FOR PURPOSES OF section 411(a) BY COMPLYING WITH THE STATUTE'S REQUIREMENTS\nA. The Statute Employs the Phrase \"Make Registration\" and Its Variants To Refer to the Actions of the Copyright Owner\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE HISTORY OF section 411(a) FURTHER DEMONSTRATES THAT A COPYRIGHT OWNER MAY INSTITUTE A CIVIL ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT ONCE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ARE COMPLIED WITH\nIII. THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES FAVORS ALLOWING SUITS TO PROCEED ONCE THE COPYRIGHT OWNER HAS COMPLIED WITH REQUIRED FORMALITIES",
        "reference": "B. The Portion of section 411(a) Addressing the Consequences of Refusal of Registration Further Supports the Conclusion That \"Registration Been Made\" Refers to the Action of the Copyright Owner",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The Copyright Act does not authorize courts to award costs beyond those that are taxable under 28 U.S.C. 1920\nA. The Copyright Act's authorization of an award of \"full costs\" does not extend beyond costs that are taxable under Section 1920\nB. The history of cost-shifting under Anglo-American law, including under the copyright laws, supports limiting \"full costs\" in Section 505 to costs taxable under Section 1920\n1. The term \"full costs\" was understood in early American law as describing the amount, rather than the types, of costs that a court could tax\n2. English practice drew no distinction between statutes that authorized \"full costs\" and those that merely authorized \"costs\"\n3. The history of American copyright law confirms that \"full costs\" is best read as referring to the amount of compensation that may be awarded\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Limiting cost awards under Section 505 to costs that are taxable under Section 1920 reflects sound copyright policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner's scheme to obtain hundreds of millions of dollars by means of material misrepresentations violated 18 U.S.C. 1343 and 1349\nA. A defendant commits property fraud by scheming to obtain money or property, using a material misrepresentation, with intent to defraud\n1. Scheme to obtain money or property\n2. By means of material misrepresentation\n3. Intent to defraud\n4. No requirement of actual or intended financial harm\nB. The right-to-control theory, appropriately limited, identifies cases of property fraud involving fraudulent inducement to enter into a transaction\n1. The money or other consideration in the transaction at issue in a right-to-control case ordinarily satisfies the statute's \"money or property\" element\n2. The right-to-control theory seeks to identify actionable fraudulent inducements by requiring a showing of tangible economic harm\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Petitioner schemed to obtain Fort Schuyler's property by securing hundreds of millions of dollars in contract funds\n2. Petitioner's scheme relied on material misrepresentations, essential to the bargain, that his company was competitively and fairly identified as the best\n3. Petitioner's scheme was intended to defraud by inducing reliance on the false representations about the nature of his company's preferred status\n4. Petitioner's scheme contemplated economic harm to Fort Schuyler\nD. Petitioner's policy concerns are misplaced",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner committed property fraud by scheming to obtain money through lies about key features of the process that positioned his company to receive that money",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.07
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. SSI is a means-tested federal entitlement program intended to provide a guaranteed minimum income to adults who have difficulty covering their basic living expenses\nA. Eligibility Requirements\nB. Participation\nC. Funding and Expenditures\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The U.S. territories whose eligible residents are excluded from SSI continue to operate the categorical grant programs for the aged, blind, and disabled, which SSI replaced in the 50 States and the District of Columbia in 1974\nA. Funding and Expenditures\nB. AABD in Puerto Rico\nC. Participation\nD. Funding and Expenditures\nIII. The AABD program available in Puerto Rico provides significantly less assistance to eligible residents than the SSI program would provide to those same residents if they moved to a State, the District of Columbia, or the territory of the CNMI",
        "reference": "D. SSI and Children with Disabilities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.45
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. Since Shelby County, Section 2 is the Primary Provision Used to Challenge Election Laws that Have a Discriminatory Result\na. The VRA's Passage Came After Decades of States Implementing Facially Race-Neutral Election Laws That Interacted with the Socio-Economic Conditions of Black People to Deny Their Right to Vote\nb. Section 2's Broad Proscription of Discriminatory Voting Laws Has Become More Necessary Since This Court's Decision in Shelby County\nII. Section 2's Text, History, and Purpose Prohibit Voting Measures That Interact with Social or Historical Discrimination Outside the Electoral Sphere to Burden Black Voters' Access to the Franchise\na. This Court Has Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 2 to Broadly Prohibit Election Laws That Interact with Social and Historical Conditions to Deny the Right to Vote. 16\nb. [MISSING]\nc. An Expansive Totality of the Circumstances Analysis Does Not Threaten States' Election-Administration Autonomy",
        "reference": "b. Section 2 Examines All Circumstances Bearing on the Issue of the Causal Link Between Social and Historical Conditions and a Challenged Voting Practice's Discriminatory Result",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Standing as a Check on Abuse of Power\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The rule of law depends upon rules allowing individuals \"to claim the protection of laws.\" And it is undermined by policies capriciously reverse-engineered to prevent standing\nB. The Biden Administration is asking for a new directness rule for standing, a convenient switch in time, which would bar many future plaintiffs in civil rights, civil liberties, anti-corruption, and environmental protection cases\nC. MOHELA: The \"special solicitude\" of states is a vital check on executive power\nD. Brown: The late exclusion of private debt was a tacit concession and an arbitrary and capricious dodge of standing\nIII. A Parallel Major Problem: The \"Clear-Statement\" Major Question Doctrine\nA. Construing emergency statutes in light of context and purposes, and without deference, courts can provide an important check against executive abuse of emergency powers\nB. Recent COVID decisions form a coherent Emergency Question Doctrine\nIV. A Double Solution: An Emergency Questions Doctrine\nV. Pretext: The Means-Ends Mismatch, Statutory Misfit, and Public Missteps",
        "reference": "II. The Emergency Problem: The overreactions and pretextual uses of emergency powers lead to an Imperial Executive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A CREDITOR DOES NOT VIOLATE THE AUTOMATIC STAY BY RETAINING POSSESSION OF PROPERTY LAWFULLY OBTAINED BEFORE BANKRUPTCY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Debtors' Interpretation Turns The Role Of The Automatic Stay On Its Head\nC. The Automatic Stay's History Confirms That Section 362(a)(3) Does Not Compel Creditors To Turn Over Lawfully Repossessed Property\nII. THE DEBTORS' INTERPRETATION OF Section 362(a)(3) WOULD RENDER THE TURNOVER PROVISION SUPERFLUOUS AND DEPRIVE SECURED CREDITORS OF CRITICAL STATUTORY PROTECTIONS\nA. Section 542 Contemplates A Procedure Under Which Creditors May Raise Statutory Defenses To Turnover\nB. While Section 542 Imposes A Mandatory Duty To Turn Over, It Does Not Operate As An Injunction\nC. Reading Section 362(a)(3) To Compel Immediate Turnover Of Property Is Inconsistent With This Court's Decision In Strumpf\nIII. THE \"POLICY CONSIDERATIONS\" UNDERLYING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RULE ARE UNPERSUASIVE",
        "reference": "A. Section 362(a)(3)'s Plain Text Stays Acts That Alter The Status Quo As Of The Petition Date; It Does Not Require Such Acts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court lacks jurisdiction to recognize or create a Bivens claim for torts arising abroad\nA. Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to sue under the Fourth or Fifth Amendments\n1. Article III standing requires a legally protected right\n2. Boumediene does not create non-habeas rights for aliens abroad\n3. [MISSING]\nB. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad\nC. Constitutional avoidance counsels for requiring Plaintiffs to proceed under diversity jurisdiction and Mexican law before considering extraterritorial application of the U.S. Constitution\nII. Torts arising abroad fall under diversity jurisdiction\nA. The FTCA does not bar diversity actions for torts arising abroad\n1. The Westfall Act did not displace diversity jurisdiction\n2. Smith did not displace diversity jurisdiction\nB. Plaintiffs could sue\u2014or could have sued\u2014Agent Mesa in Texas under Mexico's substantive law\n1. Mexican substantive law applies to Plaintiffs' claims\n2. Mexican immunity law applies to Plaintiffs' claims\n3. Absent congressional action, this Court could adopt a federal choice-of-law rule for cross-border torts\nIII. This Court should not extend Bivens to torts arising abroad\nA. This Court lacks jurisdiction to invoke Bivens\nB. Bivens mandates a search for alternate remedies\nC. Special factors counsel against finding Bivens liability here",
        "reference": "3. Lacking a federal right means that Plaintiffs also lack a federal remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.37
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-340_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Must Be Presumed to Have Said In Section 402 What It Meant and Meant What It Said. \"And\" Means \"And\"\nII. \"And\" Is Not a Cryptic Synonym for \"Or\"\nIII. Taking Congress At Its Word \u2014 \"And\" \u2014 Allows Judges to Impose Individualized Sentences that Protect Public Safety, Also Tempering Justice With Mercy\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. It is Not the Province of This Court to Rescue Congress From Its Policy Choices",
        "reference": "IV. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Lingering Doubts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. It is necessary to consider whether administrative patent judges are directed and supervised when exercising authority Congress granted to the Board, irrespective of the Director's ability to oversee them when they are acting under his authority\nII. When the Board is exercising its congressionally granted authority, the Director cannot reverse its decision using his panel designation power because of due process concerns and his statutory obligation to perform his duties in a fair manner\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. When the Board is exercising its congressionally granted authority, the Director cannot reverse its decision by issuing new policy guidance that the Board would be required to apply because the Director lacks retroactive rulemaking authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Statute's Text and Structure Permit Judicial Review Of The Agency's Determination that Inter Partes Review Is Not Time-Barred Under Section 315(b)\nII. The Judicial Review Distinction Congress Established Between Sections 314 and 315 Is Consistent With Administrative Law Principles and this Court's Precedent\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Petitioner's Contrary Reading of the Statute Would Undermine the Predictability Necessary For Stakeholders in the Patent System",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-921_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Government's recommendation to GVR or grant plenary review of questions not presented is extraordinary and unpersuasive\nA. The Government identifies three significant vehicle obstacles that foreclose GVR or plenary review\nB. The Government is wrong on the merits\nC. The Court should not dramatically expand its limited GVR practice or decide questions unpresented by petitioners",
        "reference": "I. As the Government agrees, this case does not implicate the question presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. To further their non-adversarial and claimant-friendly systems, both the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Social Security Administration provide that final decisions infected by legal error may be reopened and revised\nA. Congress intended that VA and SSA claimants have similar standards governing collateral review of otherwise final decisions\nB. The SSA allows for collateral review to correct its own legal error based on clearly erroneous application or interpretation of the law existing at the time of the determination or decision\nII. Because principles of judicial construction establish that Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2004) simply stated what Section 1111 always meant, Mr. George's case involves a misapplication of a legal standard that CUE should correct\nIII. Habeas cases similarly inform the analysis and demonstrate why CUE must be found here\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Notions of fundamental fairness in the delay-filled and error-laden VA system support the application of CUE here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The NLRA, enacted to prevent industrial strife, does not protect intentional destruction of private property during a strike\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Expanding Garmon preemption to displace the Petitioner's claims would invite industrial strife and threaten constitutional and statutory interests",
        "reference": "II. The Petitioner's state tort claims fit squarely within the local interest exception to Garmon preemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "i. Congress's Commerce Clause Power Does Not Support SORNA's Sweeping Exercise of Police Power\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Broad Power Exercised in Enacting SORNA Upsets the Balance of State and Federal Authority",
        "reference": "II. The Registration Requirement Is Not Necessary and Proper to Congress's Exercise of Its Commerce Power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-199_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials\nA. The Text Confirms Reviewability\nB. The Statutory Structure Supports Reviewability\nC. The Presumption of Judicial Review and Statutory Policies Favor Review\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Government's Reliance On Section 355(c) Lacks Merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 13(b) OF THE FTC ACT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE MONETARY RELIEF\nA. Section 13(b) Authorizes a \"Permanent Injunction,\" but Injunctions Do Not Encompass Monetary Relief\nB. Congress Has Not Acquiesced to Lower-Court Decisions Accepting FTC's Interpretation of Section 13(b)\nC. \"Ancillary\" Relief Does Not Support the FTC's Asserted Power to Obtain Millions of Dollars by Injunction\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The FTC Followed the SEC's Lead to Grab Powers Not Granted to It by Congress and to Avoid the Procedures Congress Provided for Awards of Equitable Relief\nB. The FTC's Tactics Leave Its Targets without Due Process Protections and, Often without Adequate Counsel\nIII. THE MONEY DAMAGES HERE AWARDED ARE LEGAL DAMAGES, NOT EQUITABLE RELIEF, AND TO AVOID CONSTITUTIONAL DANGERS THE COURT SHOULD REJECT THE FTC'S ARGUMENTS\nIV. RULING AGAINST THE FTC HERE COMPORTS WITH OTHER PRECEDENTS OF THE COURT",
        "reference": "II. THE FTC OBTAINED ITS PRESENT \"EQUITABLE\" POWERS BY A CAREFUL STRATAGEM OF AVOIDING TEXTUAL OR ORIGINALIST EXAMINATIONS OF ITS CLAIM TO THEM",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Non-judicial foreclosure constitutes debt collection under the FDCPA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The FDCPA's context and purpose confirm that non-judicial foreclosure is subject to the Act\nC. The FDCPA's legislative history further confirms that non-judicial foreclosure qualifies as debt collection\nII. Respondents' remaining efforts to evade the FDCPA's basic safeguards are meritless",
        "reference": "A. According to the Act's plain and ordinary meaning, non-judicial foreclosure qualifies as \"debt collection\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1436_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The government's merits positions are incorrect.\nC. This is a proper vehicle.",
        "reference": "A. The circuits are split as to both questions presented.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Independent agencies that engage in legislative, executive, and judicial functions like the CFPB violate the separation of powers\nII. The CFPB's structure and funding violate the separation of powers\nA. The CFPB's structure improperly concentrates power in a single director with limited accountability to the Executive Branch and the people\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Congress further enhanced the CFPB's independence by allowing it to draw funding from one of the least transparent and accountable elements of the federal government: the Federal Reserve",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Judicial review of the Service's decision not to exclude an area from critical habitat is presumed\nB. Congress did not preclude judicial review of the Service's decision to not exclude an area from critical habitat\nII. The Fifth Circuit's denial of judicial review conflicts with Bennett v. Spear\nIII. Denying judicial review of habitat exclusion decisions violates separation of powers principles",
        "reference": "I. A strong presumption of reviewability supports judicial review of habitat exclusion decisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-882_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The question whether Section 633a(a) requires but-for causation warrants review\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The courts of appeals and federal agencies are divided over Section 633a(a)'s causation standard\nII. The question whether Section 2000e-16(a) requires but-for causation warrants review",
        "reference": "A. Section 633a(a) requires but-for causation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Under the Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of the Statute, Minor Offenders Will Enter Adulthood as Career Criminals.\nB. This Court Has Long Recognized that the Decisions of Child Offenders Are Not Indicative of \"Career Criminal\" Status.\nII. EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT CONTRAVENES CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND SHOULD BE NARROWED.\nA. ACCA was Only Intended to Apply to the Narrow Subset of Irredeemable Offenders Identified after Multiple Opportunities for Rehabilitation.\nB. The Act Requires a Narrow Interpretation of Temporal Separateness.",
        "reference": "I. AN EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT WOULD BE ESPECIALLY HARMFUL TO CHILD OFFENDERS.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. AT THE PLEADING STAGE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A LOW BAR TO ESTABLISH STANDING, BUT IT IS MATERIAL\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A Plaintiff's Injuries Need Not Be Significant\nII. THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR FACIAL AND FACTUAL CHALLENGES TO STANDING SHOULD NOT BE MERGED\nIII. THE ADA DOES NOT SUPPORT LAUFER'S CLAIMED INFORMATIONAL INJURY\nIV. LAUFER DISCLAIMED THE FACTS THAT PROVIDED HER STANDING\nV. LAUFER'S ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF LITIGATION FAIL TO PROVIDE A COGNIZABLE INJURY",
        "reference": "A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Article III Govern Standing Allegations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PARAMOUNT DUTY OF A FOSTER CARE AGENCY IS TO PROVIDE ITS ASSIGNED CHILDREN A PERMANENT HOME BECAUSE CHILDREN DETERIORATE EMOTIONALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY WHEN THEY LANGUISH IN FOSTER CARE\nII. EXCLUDING A VIABLE CLASS OF FAMILIES FROM AN AGENCY'S POOL OF FOSTER HOMES VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AGENCY'S ASSIGNED CHILDREN\nA. Excluding a viable class of foster parents from an agency's pool of available homes harms all the agency's assigned children by needlessly limiting their opportunities for a permanent home, violating their due process rights\nB. Excluding same-sex couples from an agency's pool of foster parents disproportionately harms LGBTQ children by limiting their opportunities for a permanent home, violating their due process and equal protection rights\n1. Discrimination and stigma force LGBTQ children into foster care at disproportionate rates\n2. [MISSING]\n3. When an agency excludes same-sex couples from its pool of foster parents, LGBTQ children suffer disproportionate harm, violating their due process and equal protection rights\nC. When the government sanctions an agency's discriminatory policies, it reinforces LGBTQ foster children's sense of inequity and has a chilling effect on LGBTQ children's expression, violating their constitutional rights\nIII. DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES VIOLATE NUMEROUS FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES INTENDED TO PROMOTE THE BEST INTEREST AND PERMANENCY OF FOSTER CHILDREN AND RUN CONTRARY TO THE BASIC TENETS OF EVIDENCE-BASED CHILD WELFARE POLICY",
        "reference": "2. Discrimination and stigma cause LGBTQ foster children to suffer disparately poor outcomes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5410_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A criminal offense that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act\nA. Under the plain meaning of the ACCA's force clause, a predicate offense that can be committed recklessly does not qualify as a 'violent felony'\n1. [MISSING]\n2. This Court's decision in Leocal supports the conclusion that reckless offenses do not qualify as 'violent felonies'\nB. The ACCA's context, structure, and history also support the conclusion that reckless offenses do not qualify as 'violent felonies'\nC. This Court's decision in Voisine does not support the contrary interpretation\nD. The contrary interpretation would distort the ACCA by sweeping in offenses that cannot be considered 'violent felonies'\nE. The rule of lenity requires interpreting the ACCA's force clause to exclude predicate offenses that can be committed recklessly",
        "reference": "1. The ACCA's force clause requires force targeted at another, and reckless offenses do not satisfy that requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Both Cases Suffer from Multiple Jurisdictional Defects\nA. The WWH petitioners failed to establish jurisdiction\n1. Executive officials cannot enforce SB 8\n2. State judicial officers are neutral adjudicators of SB 8 suits\n3. The district court did not have jurisdiction to enjoin a private would-be plaintiff\nB. The United States failed to establish jurisdiction\n1. The United States cannot sue indirectly those it cannot sue directly\n2. Texas and the federal government are not adverse merely by virtue of disagreeing as to SB 8's constitutionality\n3. Purported \"sovereign interests\" do not give the United States standing here\n4. The United States has not established standing based on purported interference with federal programs\nII. The United States Does Not Have an Equitable Cause of Action\nA. The United States has not identified any cause of action traditionally available in courts of equity\nB. Congress has displaced any equitable cause of action\nC. Raising a constitutional defense in state court is a traditional and adequate means of vindicating constitutional rights\nIII. SB 8 Is Constitutional\nA. SB 8 does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment\nB. SB 8 does not conflict with laws governing federal programs\nC. SB 8 does not violate principles of intergovernmental immunity\nIV. The Requested Remedy Is Improper\nA. A federal district court cannot enjoin the entire state judiciary, much less the world at large\n1. Enjoining judges is improper\n2. Enjoining unknown potential future litigants is improper\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. No injunction may be broader than the claims that justify it",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-7894_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court should decline to review Townes's claim that the process by which the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals corrected the trial transcript was improper\nA. This Court should deny certiorari because this claim does not create a federal question\nB. The underlying issue is not worthy of this Court's review\nC. [MISSING]\nII. This Court should decline to review Townes's claim that the jury was improperly instructed on the element of intent during the guilt phase of his trial",
        "reference": "C. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals properly ordered that the record be corrected pursuant to Rule 10(g) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE SECRETARY'S EXHAUSTED-DAYS POLICY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY HOSPITALS, DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT'S ASSERTIONS OF HOSPITAL SUPPORT",
        "reference": "I. THE SECRETARY'S EXHAUSTED-DAYS POLICY IMPROPERLY REDUCES DSH PAYMENTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Administrative agencies, including FDA, oversee highly technical regulatory frameworks, including the one governing medical devices\nA. Regulatory regimes in the healthcare industry are highly complex, and their enforcement requires the exercise of discretion by agency experts\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Classification of medical devices\n2. The 510(k) process\nII. Private enforcement of the FDCA through the FCA is inconsistent with congressional intent, especially when the United States opposes the litigation\nIII. The government must retain authority to dismiss FCA claims that undermine FDA's authority and hand decision-making authority to civil juries",
        "reference": "B. The regulation of medical devices is particularly complicated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS ALLEGE THE STATEMENTS OF TWO CITY OFFICIALS DEMONSTRATE RELIGIOUS HOSTILITY\nII. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RETAIN THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN\nIII. THE REMARKS COMPLAINED OF ARE NOT EVIDENCE THAT PHILADELPHIA'S ACTIONS WERE MOTIVATED BY RELIGIOUS HOSTILITY\nA. The statements of Mayor Kenney and Commissioner Figueroa are not relevant to the inquiry\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. NUMEROUS GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND POLICIES, ROOTED IN ANIMUS TOWARD ATHEISTS, WILL FACE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE IF PETITIONERS' POSITION IS ADOPTED BY THE COURT\nA. Government officials frequently attack atheists because of their beliefs\nB. \"In God We Trust\" was adopted as the national motto as a result of explicit hostility toward nonbelievers\nC. Atheists are subjected to unequal treatment when engaging in expressive activity",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' skewed reading of the Lukumi-Masterpiece line of cases would be unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1650_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Deepened a Clear Circuit Split\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decision Below Is Wrong",
        "reference": "II. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle for Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Majority Rule Correctly Interprets the Plain Language and Legislative Intent of the Bankruptcy Code.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Plain Language and Legislative History of Section 1306(b) Indicate that Property of the Estate must be Returned to the Debtor.\nII. Allowing a Creditor to Retain Possession of Property of the Estate Until the Debtor acts to Regain Possession Frustrates the Underlying Policies of the Bankruptcy Code.",
        "reference": "A. The Seventh Circuit Recognized that Section 362(a)(3) Applies to All Property of the Estate, Whether in the Debtor's Possession or Not.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE STANDARD DOES NOT EFFECTIVELY PREVENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL RE-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO EXECUTIVE AGENCIES\nA. The Constitution's Text and Original Meaning Bar the Re-Delegation of Legislative Power\nB. The Intelligible Principle Standard Frustrates Democratic Accountability\nC. [MISSING]\n1. General Judicial Deference Doctrines\n2. The \"No Law to Apply\" Doctrine Is Routinely Abused\nII. THIS COURT IS CAPABLE OF DRAWING A MORE EFFECTIVE LINE TO PREVENT UNCONSTITUTIONAL RE-DELEGATIONS\nA. The Void for Vagueness and Non-Delegation Doctrines Serve the Same Separation of Powers Purpose\nB. This Court Has Previously Invalidated Many Statutes under the Void for Vagueness Doctrine for Granting Impermissibly Broad Discretion\nC. Void for Vagueness Precedents Provide a Solid Basis for Drawing the Line in Non-Delegation Cases",
        "reference": "C. When Combined with Doctrines of Judicial Deference, the Intelligible Principle Test Leads to Arbitrary Individual Rights Violations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Proposition 12 is not an impermissible \"extraterritorial\" regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause\nA. Proposition 12 does not control out-of-state prices or directly regulate wholly out-of-state transactions\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The \"practical effects\" inquiry is not an appropriate constitutional standard\n2. Proposition 12 would satisfy any sensible understanding of a \"practical effects\" standard\n3. Petitioners' alternative extraterritoriality theory is inconsistent with precedent and States' broad police powers\n4. Petitioners' remaining arguments lack merit\nII. Petitioners have not stated a Pike claim\nA. Petitioners have not alleged a cognizable burden under Pike\nB. Petitioners have not plausibly alleged that any burden resulting from Proposition 12 is \"clearly excessive.\"",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' arguments for an expansive new extraterritoriality doctrine lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Real-world examples highlight that Austin's off-premises ordinance is content-based\nA. Austin's off-premises ordinance draws peculiarly content-based lines\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Austin's view of facial relief lacks merit",
        "reference": "B. Austin's arguments do not rehabilitate its law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-432_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. All members of the plaintiff class had live claims when this action was filed\nII. Rule 23 entitles plaintiffs with viable claims to bring them in a class action if they meet the Rule's standards for class certification\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The argument against tolling attempts to resurrect the preclusion arguments rejected by this Court in Smith v. Bayer",
        "reference": "III. This Court's holding in Shady Grove rests on basic principles of aggregate litigation and the Rules Enabling Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. REJECTION OF AN EXECUTORY CONTRACT DOES NOT RESCIND THE CONTRACT OR REVOKE INTERESTS IN PROPERTY THE DEBTOR GRANTED THE COUNTERPARTY PRE-BANKRUPTCY\nA. Rejection Under Section 365 \"Constitutes A Breach\" And Has The Same Consequences As Breach Outside Bankruptcy\nB. Rejection Is Not An Avoidance Power And Cannot Give The Bankruptcy Estate Any Greater Rights To An Asset Than The Debtor Had Outside Bankruptcy\nC. The First Circuit's Decision, And The Fourth Circuit Decision It Followed, Contravene These Basic Principles\nII. REJECTION OF THE LICENSE AGREEMENT DID NOT REVOKE MISSION'S RIGHTS UNDER THE AGREEMENT\nA. Rejection Did Not Revoke Mission's Non-Exclusive Trademark Rights\nB. Rejection Did Not Revoke Mission's Exclusivity Rights\nIII. THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S AND RESPONDENT'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS FAIL\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Licensors' Quality Control Obligations Under Trademark Law Do Not Warrant Treating Trademark Licenses Differently From Other Intellectual Property Licenses\nC. Chapter 11's Reorganizational Objective Does Not Justify Treating Rejection As An Avoidance Power",
        "reference": "A. Section 365(n) Does Not Give Rise To Any \"Negative Inference\" Regarding Trademarks",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Overview of Concealed Carry Law in the United States\nII. The Majority of Jurisdictions in the United States Provide a Clear and Objective Path to Carry a Firearm in Public\nA. Forty-one states have \"shall issue\" statutes\nB. Only nine states and D.C. have \"may issue\" statutes\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Connecticut\n2. Delaware\n3. Rhode Island\n4. Washington, D.C.\nIII. Like New York, the Five Other Restrictive \"May Issue\" States Unduly Limit the Rights of Individuals to Carry a Firearm in Public\nA. California\nB. Hawaii\nC. Maryland\nD. Massachusetts\nE. New Jersey",
        "reference": "C. Four of the ten \"may issue\" jurisdictions behave like \"shall issue\" states, so a decision for Petitioners would only affect six states",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit's decision violates not only the Religious Freedom Restoration Act but also the Free Exercise Clause\nA. This Court may consider the Free Exercise issue because it is inextricably linked with the issues raised by the parties\nB. Free Exercise of Religion is an unalienable right given by God and secured by the First Amendment\nC. The Free Exercise Clause authorizes the exemptions that the Trump administration created and the Little Sisters claimed in this case\nII. Nationwide injunctions violate the doctrine of separation of powers\nA. Nationwide injunctions overlook a fundamental difference between legislative power and judicial power\nB. The separation-of-powers violation is even worse when trial judges issue nationwide injunctions that contradict each other\nC. If this Court approves nationwide injunctions, then the abuse-of-discretion standard will insulate those injunctions from meaningful appellate review\nD. Nationwide injunctions exceed a trial court's geographical boundaries\nE. This Court should address whether nationwide injunctions are unconstitutional, not just whether the injunction in this case was unconstitutional\nF. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "F. Adopting Amicus's view of judicial power will not strip this Court of the power to have the final say in cases arising under the Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Copyright Protection Itself Is the Engine of Free Expression\nA. [MISSING]\nB. When Properly Applied, Fair Use Balances Authors' Exclusive Rights with the Constitutional Directive to Promote the Progress of Art\nII. Petitioner's \"Transformative Use\" Test Transmogrifies Fair Use from an Exception into a Rule\nA. A Boundless Transformative Use Test Usurps Publishers' Derivative Work Right\nB. Consideration of a \"New Meaning or Message\" Must Account for the Appropriation's \"Purpose and Character\"",
        "reference": "A. Publishers Rely on Copyright Protection to Foster a Vibrant and Diverse Landscape of Original Expression",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS' SPLIT IS ILLUSORY\nII. PETITIONERS' ATEXTUAL, AHISTORICAL, AND INCONSISTENT ATTACK ON THE DECISIONS BELOW IS MERITLESS\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THIS IS A POOR VEHICLE TO DECIDE THIS ISSUE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE\nA. Respondents Have Standing\nB. Respondents' Statutory Claims Are Reviewable\nC. Respondents' Constitutional Claims Are Reviewable\nII. EO-3 EXCEEDS THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY UNDER SECTIONS 1182(f) AND 1185(a)\nA. Sections 1182(f) And 1185(a) Permit The President To Temporarily Halt The Entry Of Aliens Whose Admission Would Be Harmful To The Interests Reflected In The Immigration Laws\nB. EO-3 Exceeds The Limits On The President's Suspension Authority\nC. The President's Exercise Of Sections 1182(f) And 1185(a) Raises Grave Constitutional Concerns\nIII. EO-3 VIOLATES SECTION 1152(a)(1)(A)\nIV. EO-3 VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. An Objective Observer Would Conclude That EO-3 Was Enacted For The Unconstitutional Purpose Of Excluding Muslims\nV. THE SCOPE OF THE INJUNCTION IS PROPER",
        "reference": "A. The Judicial Branch Must Enforce The Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.54
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONVENTION DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL\nA. The Convention Does Not Restrict Enforcement By Non-signatories\nB. [MISSING]\nII. RESPONDENTS' ATEXTUAL, UNWORKABLE CONSENT RULE DOES NOT HELP THEM\nIII. GERMAN LAW IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT",
        "reference": "B. The Convention Creates a Floor, Not a Ceiling",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5592_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner may well have satisfied the PLRA's exhaustion requirement for his audible-prayer claim\nII. The challenged policy imposes a substantial burden on petitioner's religious exercise\nIII. On the record below, Texas has not shown that the challenged policy is the least restrictive means of advancing its compelling interests\nA. Texas's restrictions on spiritual advisers' conduct during executions advance compelling interests\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. The preliminary equitable relief that petitioner seeks is injunctive in nature and should be reconsidered on remand",
        "reference": "B. The record below suggests that Texas can advance its compelling interests with measures less restrictive than a complete ban",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-248_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Rule 24's Text and History Do Not Support a Heightened Presumption Against Legislative Intervention.",
        "reference": "I. Federal Courts Must Give Due Respect for State Policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief051.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text and History of the Fourteenth Amendment Permit Governments to Enact Race-Conscious Measures to Ensure Equality of Opportunity to All Persons Regardless of Race\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Court Should Reaffirm Grutter",
        "reference": "II. This Court's Precedent Reflects the Reconstruction Framers' Judgment that Race-Conscious Measures Are Appropriate to Ensure Equal Educational Opportunity to All Persons Regardless of Race",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-979_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Questions of Fact Related to Denials of Discretionary Relief Are Unreviewable\nA. \"Any judgment\" sweeps broadly\nB. \"Regarding the granting of relief\" is expansive\nC. Context and history distinguish between questions of law and fact\nII. Any alternative interpretation is atextual\nA. \"Any judgment\" is not synonymous with \"any discretionary judgment\" or \"any subjective judgment\"\nB. Subparagraphs (B)(i) and (B)(ii) are harmonious, not superfluous\nC. Other context arguments do not support an alternative interpretation\nIII. Presumptions and anomalies are not a basis for ignoring the statutory text\nA. The presumption of reviewability is not unrebuttable\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Distinctions between removal and relief are not anomalous",
        "reference": "B. Congressional repudiation, not ratification",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Louisiana Burdens Access to Abortion for No Valid Health Reason and In Circumstances That Show Little Commitment to Protecting Life Or Women's Health\nA. The Act Deliberately Obstructs Access to Abortion Without Protecting Women's Health\nB. Louisiana's Policy Choices \u2014 as Contrasted with Comparator States Nationwide \u2014 Reflect an Anti-Abortion Bias, Not a Pro-Life Impulse\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Louisiana Could Reduce Abortions and Improve Women's Health By Reducing Unintended Pregnancies, But Has Chosen Not To Do So\nII. The Burdens of Inequality that the Act Imposes on Women are Undue",
        "reference": "1. The Louisiana Legislature Failed to Support Wanted Pregnancies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1086_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Res judicata promotes repose and the finality of judgments, discourages repetitive litigation, and preserves judicial resources\nB. Res judicata precludes not only claims, but also defenses\n1. Defense preclusion generally bars a former defendant from converting a neglected defense into a claim\n2. Defense preclusion also bars a defendant from raising in a second action a defense omitted from a first action addressing the same claims\nII. The Second Circuit correctly applied defense preclusion in this case\nA. This case and the 2005 lawsuit concern a common nucleus of operative facts\nB. Defense preclusion is flexible and discretionary, and its application in this case was manifestly fair\nIII. Lucky's remaining objections are not persuasive\nA. Davis does not control\nB. Defense preclusion is consistent with the federal rules and due process",
        "reference": "I. A defendant who loses in one lawsuit may not raise in a subsequent lawsuit involving the same cause of action a defense that was available in the first lawsuit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-863_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statute unambiguously defines \"a 'notice to appear'\" as a single document that includes all of the closely related information in section 1229(a).\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The statute's history unambiguously demonstrates that section 1229(a) requires a specific notice document.\nC. The Board's interpretation is inconsistent with the purposes behind the relevant statutory provisions.\nD. Other interpretive principles confirm the statute's plain meaning.\nII. Even if the statute contains some ambiguity, this Court should reject the Board's interpretation.",
        "reference": "A. The statute's text and structure require a specific notice document.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTORY TEXT DOES NOT LIMIT THE HARDSHIP EXEMPTION TO SMALL REFINERIES THAT HAVE BEEN CONTINUOUSLY EXEMPT\nA. EPA May Grant \"A Hardship Exemption\" To Any Small Refinery Experiencing Disproportionate Economic Hardship\nB. Even If The Statute Requires A Temporal Lengthening Of An Earlier Exemption, It Does Not Require Continuity\nC. [MISSING]\nII. A CONTINUITY REQUIREMENT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTE'S DESIGN AND PURPOSE\nA. A Continuity Requirement Produces Arbitrary Distinctions\nB. A Continuity Requirement Is Not Needed To Achieve Blending Mandates\nC. No Other Mechanism Exists To Protect Small Refineries From Disproportionate Economic Hardship\nIII. EPA'S 2014 ELIGIBILITY RULE REJECTED A CONTINUITY REQUIREMENT AND IS OWED DEFERENCE",
        "reference": "C. The Statutory Context Precludes A Continuity Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Establishment Clause Cannot Be Incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Because It Does Not Protect an Individual Right\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Establishment Clause does not protect an individual right\nC. Because the Establishment Clause does not protect an individual right, it cannot be incorporated\nII. If the Establishment Clause Protects an Individual Right, this Court Should Clarify Exactly What that Right Is\nA. The Court uses multiple tests to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated\nB. Courts, including this one, have applied Establishment Clause tests inconsistently\nC. The contradictory results demonstrate Establishment Clause jurisprudence's internal flaws\nD. Current Establishment Clause jurisprudence causes the harms it should protect against",
        "reference": "A. At the founding, states had established religions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Under Article III\nA. There is no justiciable case or controversy\nB. Petitioners failed to establish the elements of Article III standing\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Petitioners' Suit Against Ms. Clarkston is Barred by Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's Review Is Necessary to Ensure Uniform Vindication of Constitutional Deprivations Even When the Harm Is Unquantifiable.\nA. Constitutional violations are not always quantifiable.\nB. Minority faiths frequently experience unquantifiable burdens on religious exercise in the zoning and prison contexts.\nC. The ability to vindicate a constitutional deprivation should not depend upon the happenstance of geography.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. History and this Court's Precedent Compel the Rule That a Claim for Nominal Damages Can Preserve a Case Seeking to Vindicate Constitutional Rights.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1672_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Because the Tenth Circuit Is the First Circuit Court to Address the Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 3583(k), No Circuit Court Split Exists\nIII. Section 18 U.S.C. 3583(k) Appears To Be Used Only Rarely",
        "reference": "I. The Tenth Circuit Correctly Applied Longstanding Supreme Court Precedent Guaranteeing a Defendant A Right to a Jury Trial When Charged with a New Serious Offense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Decision Below Creates A Circuit Split\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Question Presented Is Important, And This Case Is An Appropriate Vehicle To Address It",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Executive Branch Has For Decades Interpreted \"Person\" To Include The Government And Has A Longstanding Practice Of Pursuing Post-Issuance Patent Review\nII. Allowing The Government To Pursue Post-Issuance Patent Review Helps Protect The Interests Of The Executive Branch\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Post-issuance patent review helps the Executive Branch resolve these conflicts and vindicate the public's interests\nIII. Permitting Agencies To Petition For Post-Issuance Patent Review Poses No Constitutional Concern",
        "reference": "A. Invalid patents often conflict with the regulatory objectives of the Executive Branch",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief041.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Disclosure requirements imposed as conditions on the receipt of governmental subsidies are not subject to exacting scrutiny\nC. The cases should be remanded for the court of appeals to reassess the as-applied burden on associational rights",
        "reference": "A. Compelled disclosure requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"favorable termination\" question does not warrant certiorari\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This case is a poor vehicle to explore malicious prosecution waters\nC. The nearly universal application of the indication-of-innocence standard is sound\nII. There is no reason for the Court to weigh in on the allocation of the burdens for warrantless entry claims",
        "reference": "A. This Court should allow the identified issue and other related questions to percolate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The major questions doctrine protects against expansions of executive branch authority through ambiguous language.\nA. Deferring to agency views of ambiguous statutory language raises separation of powers concerns.\nB. The major questions doctrine avoids separation of powers concerns in certain instances of statutory ambiguity.\nII. This Court's application of the major questions doctrine has reflected, and should continue to reflect, its significant purpose.\nA. The major questions doctrine is triggered whether an agency's assertion of authority is \"major\" in the particular application or more generally transformative.\nB. The major questions doctrine requires a court to assess whether a statute clearly grants an agency the claimed authority.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The CPP is exactly the kind of agency claim of authority for which the major questions doctrine exists.\nB. EPA is correct that the major questions doctrine can and does confirm its analysis of the statute at Chevron step one.",
        "reference": "III. The major questions doctrine confirms that EPA had no discretion but to repeal the CPP.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Commercial Speech Distinctions Can Only Survive Reed For Speech Incidental to Regulable Conduct\nA. \"Commercial\" or \"Noncommercial\" is a Conundrum the Court Should Address as Necessary to Full Resolution of this Case\nB. The Concurrence in Reed Does Not Immunize Rules That Rely on Content\nC. The Commercial Speech Doctrine is Often Misapplied to Excuse Broad Regulation of Speech\nD. [MISSING]\nII. Metromedia and Reed Can Be Reconciled, But Only Reed Controls Here\nA. Reed Requires the Content-Based Inquiry to be Addressed First and Strict Scrutiny to be Applied\nB. Metromedia, Which Holds that Noncommercial Speech Cannot Receive Less Protection Than Commercial Speech, Is Not Instructive Here\nC. Reed Did Not Need to Overrule Metromedia and Should be Applied Here",
        "reference": "D. Speaker-Based Distinctions Raise the Spector of Content Censorship",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THIS CASE PRESENTS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION PRESENTED\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG\nA. The State Fails To Refute That Katz Calls For Reexamination Of Congress's Authority Under The Intellectual Property Clause\nB. The State Fails To Engage How The CRCA's Legislative Record Implicates Congress's Enforcement Power Under The Fourteenth Amendment",
        "reference": "I. THE STATE DOES NOT DENY THAT INVALIDATION OF A FEDERAL STATUTE CUSTOMARILY TRIGGERS THIS COURT'S REVIEW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT WOULD VIOLATE SEPARATION OF POWERS\nA. The Constitution Vests the Right to Control Litigation in the Executive Branch\nB. [MISSING]\nII. PETITIONER'S APPEAL TO HISTORICAL PRACTICE IS MISGUIDED",
        "reference": "B. Divesting the Executive of Dismissal Authority Would Impermissibly Impede the Executive's Take Care Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Based in First Amendment Retaliation Theory Are Neither Judicially Manageable nor Justiciable\nA. First Amendment Retaliation Theory Does Not Provide a Judicially Manageable Standard for Determining How Much Partisanship Is Too Much\nB. Plaintiffs' Theory Impermissibly Assumes That Preexisting District Configurations Are the Constitutional Benchmark\nC. First Amendment Retaliation Principles Do Not Fit the Representational Interests Involved in Redistricting\n1. Retaliatory Intent Is a Less Manageable Standard Than Discriminatory Intent\n2. Requiring Causation Only Raises Further Problems for Justiciability\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The Three-Judge Court Appropriately Exercised Its Discretion in Denying Plaintiffs' Belated Preliminary Injunction Motion\nA. The Three-Judge Court Correctly Applied Its Own Definition of Injury\nB. The Burden-Shifting Framework of Mt. Healthy v. Doyle Does Not Apply to this Case\nC. Other Grounds Support the Denial of Preliminary Injunctive Relief",
        "reference": "D. Plaintiffs' Standard Would Call Into Question Political Considerations That this Court Has Previously Approved",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. English courts created the foundation for the system of constitutional accountability through common law remedies\nB. The founding generation embraced this English tradition and created a common law framework reflecting it\nC. For most of this nation's history, individuals could hold federal officers personally liable for violations of constitutional rights\nD. Bivens initially complemented common law remedies, but after the passage of the Westfall Act, it is the only generally available route to recovery\nII. Bivens poses no threat to the separation of powers, as Congress endorsed it in the Westfall Act\nA. The separation-of-powers critique of Bivens became prominent after the passage of the Westfall Act\nB. Bivens does not encroach on the separation of powers",
        "reference": "I. Bivens is the only generally available mechanism to keep federal officers accountable for violations of constitutional rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "Google's Argument Relies on an Incorrect and Overly Aggressive Invocation of the Fair Use Factors\nI. [MISSING]\nA. Non-Transformative Use\nB. Commercial Use\nII. Factor 2: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work\nIII. Factor 3: The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used\nIV. Factor 4: The Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value of the Copyrighted Work",
        "reference": "I. Factor 1: The Purpose and Character of the Use",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech\nIII. No State Interest Is Sufficient to Compel an Individual to Publish the Sentiments of Another Private Party",
        "reference": "I. Requiring a Common Carrier to Host Speech without Discrimination Is Fundamentally Different than Compelling an Individual to Speak a Message with which He Disagrees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Requirements for establishing standing to challenge a statute such as the one at issue are neither novel nor onerous\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The statutory contribution limit has not injured Senator Cruz",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. There Is No Circuit Conflict Warranting This Court's Review\nIII. The United States Is Wrong On The Merits",
        "reference": "I. The United States Largely Ignores Serious Vehicle Problems",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. GRUTTER'S POTENTIAL ACCEPTANCE OF FALSE CONSENSUS\nA. No Record-Predicate for Existence of a Consensus at Grutter\nB. Demonstrable Consensus at the Time of Grutter Opposed Race-Based Admissions Policies\nC. Demonstrable Consensus Has Opposed Race-Based Admissions Policies Ever Since\nD. [MISSING]\nII. BALLOT INITIATIVE HISTORY OVER RECENT CYCLES DEMONSTRATES THAT AMERICA'S BROAD-BASED, STABLE, NATIONAL CONSENSUS REMAINS STRONG (AND STRENGTHENING), EVEN IN AMERICA'S MOST DIVERSE REGIONS\nA. California 2020: Electorate Refuses to Reauthorize Public Discrimination by Defeating Prop. 16\nB. Washington State 2019: Electorate Refuses to Reauthorize Public Discrimination by Defeating Proposition 1000\nC. Revealing Preferences of Washington State's Backers of Discrimination: Retreat from Pursuit of Any Vote on Restoration of Racial Preferences\nD. Consensus Clear and Opposed to Racial Admissions\nIII. PROPRIETY OF CONSIDERING AMERICAN PUBLIC'S BROAD-BASED, STABLE, NATIONAL CONSENSUS AGAINST RACIAL ADMISSIONS POLICIES\nIV. DEFERENCE MODEL ADOPTED BY THE COURT IN ITS FISHER CASES IS UNWORKABLE AND UNTENABLE\nA. Deference Model Unworkable: Bifurcation of Deference, Under Different Standards, Invites Gamesmanship and Discrimination\nB. Deference Model Unworkable: Third-Party Actions Remove Decision-making Authority from Those the Grutter Court Held Worthy of Deference, Threatening a Closed Feedback Loop Only This Court Can Break\nC. Deference Model Untenable: Deference to Discriminating Entities on Whether Discrimination is Justified Incompatible with Strict Scrutiny",
        "reference": "D. Consensus Clear and Opposed to Racial Admissions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-419_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Courts Nationwide Consistently And Correctly Apply The Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine To State Tax Laws Regulating Government Retirement Income\nA. The decision below is consistent with the decisions of state courts of last resort striking down blanket tax exemptions for state retirees\nB. The decision below is consistent with previous state court decisions that correctly applied this Court's precedent to uphold tax exemptions for subsets of state employees\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below Correctly Applied The Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine And This Court's Precedent\nIII. Review Would Cause Unnecessary Litigation And Increased Uncertainty For State And Federal Retirees",
        "reference": "C. Review would not resolve purported confusion over application of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine to issues not raised below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "1. The State of Washington Undermines the Efforts of Others \u2014 Including Other State Agencies \u2014 By Failing to Protect and Restore Salmon Runs\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The State of Washington's Position Before This Court Conflicts With Its Responsibility To All the State's Citizens to Protect and Restore Salmon and Salmon Habitat",
        "reference": "2. The State of Washington's Recalcitrance to Comply With the Lower Court's Injunction Foments Unnecessary Social Unrest and Disrespect for the Rule of Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Federal Circuit Decision Is Inconsistent with the USPTO's Post-AIA View of the Scope of the On-Sale Bar\nIII. The Federal Circuit Decision in This Case Is Facially Inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's En Banc Decision in Medicines\nIV. This Case Presents a Unique Opportunity to Clarify the Application of the AIA's On-Sale Bar",
        "reference": "I. Proper Application of the Post-AIA On-sale Bar Is Critically Important to All Industries and Fields of Technology",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Title VII expresses a commitment that sex should play no role in denying an employment opportunity to a qualified worker\nII. Discriminating against an individual for being lesbian, gay, or bisexual constitutes discrimination \"because of sex.\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Discriminating against someone for being lesbian, gay, or bisexual is a form of sex stereotyping prohibited by Title VII\nC. The associational discrimination cases reinforce the conclusion that discrimination against lesbian, gay, or bisexual workers constitutes discrimination because of sex\nD. An employer's decision to discriminate against men who are attracted to men is not excused by its decision also to discriminate against women who are attracted to women\nIII. Title VII's protections extend to forms of sex discrimination (like firing someone for being gay) beyond those specifically contemplated by Congress in 1964\nA. This Court has repeatedly applied Title VII's prohibitions to forms of sex discrimination beyond those originally targeted by Congress\nB. Nothing Congress did after 1964 changes the conclusion that discrimination against lesbian, gay, or bisexual workers violates Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination",
        "reference": "A. Discriminating against individuals for being attracted to persons of their own sex, rather than a different sex, is discrimination \"because of sex.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Roe/Casey framework lies at the root of many religious liberty conflicts.\n1. Contraceptive and abortion mandates.\n2. Pharmacist regulations.\n3. Pregnancy center regulations.\n4. Sidewalk counselor regulations.\nB. The Roe/Casey framework has also made political solutions to religious liberty conflicts harder.\nII. Replacing the failed Roe/Casey framework will reduce the number and intensity of religious liberty conflicts.\nA. The pre-Roe American experience with abortion shows that religious liberty conflicts would likely decrease post-Roe/Casey.\nB. The experience of other countries shows that without the Roe/Casey framework, religious liberty conflict is reduced.",
        "reference": "I. The failed Roe/Casey framework has needlessly inflamed religious liberty conflicts.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STANDARD FOR SECTION 2 VOTE-DENIAL CLAIMS IS WELL ESTABLISHED\nA. Application of the Senate Factors Is Faithful to the Text and Purpose of Section 2 of the VRA\nB. Application of the Senate Factors Is Workable and Has Been Consistently Employed by the Courts in the Vote-Denial Context\n1. The Senate Factors Are Helpful for Analyzing Section 2 Claims\n2. The Senate Factors Apply in Vote-Denial Cases\n3. The Senate Factors Appropriately Implement the Statutory Text\n4. The Senate Factors Are Not Unpredictable\nII. THE SENATE FACTORS SAFEGUARD SECTION 2'S CONSTITUTIONALITY\nA. The Senate Factors Are a Constitutionally Valid Tool for Identifying Cognizable Discriminatory Harm\nB. Contrary to Petitioners' and Amici's Claims, the Impact-Plus Framework Is Constitutional Even If Analyzed Under City of Boerne\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Size of the Disparate Impact Is Not Dispositive, But Informs the Relative Importance of the Senate Factors\nB. The Senate Factors Sensibly Evaluate Whether a Challenged Practice Exploits Social and Historical Conditions\nC. The Extreme Limit Proposed by Private Petitioners Lacks Support and Is Unfaithful to the VRA",
        "reference": "III. THE LIMITS ON SECTION 2 PROPOSED BY PETITIONERS AND AMICI ARE UNSUPPORTED AND INAPPROPRIATE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.79
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Morris's allocution falls within the categorical prohibition of the Confrontation Clause because it was testimonial and offered against petitioner for the truth of what it asserted, and petitioner did not have an opportunity for confrontation\nII. In some circumstances, the accused may be estopped on equitable grounds from asserting the confrontation right. Such estoppel doctrines must be narrowly tailored and dependent on the accused's course of conduct\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. In some circumstances, a state may apply the rule of completeness to admit a testimonial statement despite the absence of an opportunity for confrontation. But merely raising a defense does not provide a basis for avoiding the confrontation right",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Broad Text of Section Three Applies to the Presidency and Presidents\nA. The Presidency Is an \"office under the United States\"\nB. The President Is an \"officer of the United States\"\nII. Excluding the Presidency and Presidents Would Be at Odds with Section Three's Purpose\nA. Section Three Applies to the Presidency\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Section Three Applies to Presidents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Injunction Issued Here Contravenes Basic Equitable Principles\nA. Courts Must Ensure that Injunctive Relief Is Tailored and Proportional to the Harm Shown\nB. Courts Must Also Take Nonparty Interests Into Account, Particularly Where a Subset of States Seeks to Enjoin a Federal Policy\nC. [MISSING]\nII. This Court Should Make Clear that No Nationwide Injunction Should Have Issued Here\nA. This Court Should Narrow the Injunction\nB. Modifying the Remedy Is Especially Important if This Court Agrees with Only One of the Opinion Below's Two Bases\nC. Remand Without Vacatur Would Also Be Appropriate",
        "reference": "C. There Was No Justification for a Nationwide Injunction Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Punitive Damages Analysis Defies Due Process and This Court\nIII. The Questions Presented Are Important",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Article III and Rule 23 Holdings Contradict This Court's Precedent and Conflict With Other Circuits' Caselaw",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "Indefinite [MISSING]\nA. Permanent legal authorization to physically invade real property is a per se physical taking\n1. Government-authorized physical invasions impose harms distinct from government restrictions on the use of property\n2. Permanent legal authorization to physically invade real property warrants per se treatment\nB. By imposing an indefinite access right, the access regulation grants permanent legal authorization to physically invade real property\nC. Other takings doctrines justify certain indefinite legal access rights, but none applies here",
        "reference": "Indefinite legal authorization to physically invade private property, even intermittently, is a per se taking, absent circumstances not present here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION CONTRADICTS RECENT JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGISLATION. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO ENFORCE ITS OWN PRECEDENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT\nII. IF THE DECISION BELOW STANDS, FEDERAL COURTS WILL BE UNABLE TO PREVENT FEDERAL POLICIES FROM BEING UNDERMINED AT THE STATE LEVEL\nIII. PUBLIC RECORDS OBTAINED BY PROPOSED AMICUS CURIAE AFFIRM THIS CASE BELONGS IN FEDERAL COURT\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. HISTORIC CONCERNS ABOUT STATE COURT BIAS ARE AMPLIFIED IN CASES OF THIS TYPE, SUCH THAT FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD STEP IN TO PROTECT FEDERAL INTERESTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1086_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Marcel Cannot Deny The Circuit Split\nII. Marcel Cannot Reconcile The Decision Below With This Court's Precedents Or With The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Marcel's Vehicle Objections Are Illusory",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Mr. Wooden's ministorage burglaries were committed on the same occasion\nA. Offenses are committed on the same \"occasion\" if they arise from a common criminal opportunity\nB. The ACCA's structure, history, and purpose confirm that different \"occasions\" are separate criminal opportunities\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Offenses are not committed on \"occasions different from one another\" merely because they are committed sequentially rather than simultaneously\nA. The \"occasions\" clause cannot be read to enact a simultaneity test\nB. The simultaneity test creates numerous anomalies and absurdities\nC. The simultaneity test cannot be applied consistently\nD. The rule of lenity supports Mr. Wooden's interpretation",
        "reference": "C. Mr. Wooden's ministorage burglaries all arose from the same criminal opportunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1712_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The second question presented also warrants review.\nIII. Alternatively, the Court should invite the Solicitor General's views.",
        "reference": "I. The clear and entrenched circuit conflict on the first question presented warrants review.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1436_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1252(d)(1)'s limitation on a court's power to \"review\" a removal order is jurisdictional\nA. The traditional tools of statutory construction establish that Section 1252(d)(1) is jurisdictional\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Section 1252(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement precludes a court from considering an issue until the agency has had an opportunity to address it\nA. Section 1252(d)(1) requires issue exhaustion\nB. Petitioner's contrary interpretation of Section 1252(d)(1) is incorrect\nC. Section 1252(d)(1) requires a noncitizen to file a motion to reconsider when she alleges that the Board has introduced a new error on appeal",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's arguments to the contrary lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The 1973 amendment to the FTC Act authorizes district courts to award restorative relief in FTC enforcement actions under section 13(b).",
        "reference": "I. Porter and Mitchell establish a district court's authority to award restorative relief in regulatory enforcement actions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The decision below is incorrect\n1. The Crow Tribe's hunting right under the 1868 Treaty survived Wyoming's admission to the Union\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The questions presented have generated disagreement in the lower courts\nC. This case is a suitable vehicle for resolving the questions presented",
        "reference": "2. The establishment of a National Forest, in and of itself, does not render the lands occupied within the meaning of the 1868 Treaty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Is Inconsistent with the Robust Constitutional Protections for Civil Liberties the Supreme Court Articulated in NAACP v. Alabama\nA. The NAACP v. Alabama Test Protects Supporter Lists to Ensure Freedom and Privacy of Association\nB. The Ninth Circuit's \"Exacting Scrutiny\" Standard Is Inconsistent with NAACP and Constitutionally Incorrect\nC. NAACP's Holding and Analysis Apply to All Circumstances of Potential Retribution for Exercising Freedom of Association\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Erodes Protections for Minority Opinions\nA. The Administrative State Has Gutted Much of the Constitution's Structural and Textual Protections for Minority Opinions\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Jeopardizes Protections for Minority Opinions by Undermining First Amendment Civil Liberties\nC. NAACP v. Alabama's Holding Should Be Reaffirmed to Restore Freedoms of Association and Speech\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The California Attorney General Lacks the Authority under California Law to Demand Charities' IRS Form 990 Schedule Bs\nA. The Attorney General Has Neither the Statutory Nor Regulatory Authority to Demand Charities' Form 990 Schedule Bs\nB. The Attorney General's Unlawful Demand Violates California's Separation of Powers Doctrine",
        "reference": "III. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Threatens the Religious Freedom of Those Who Wish to Practice Anonymous Charitable Giving",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The unambiguous text of Section 411(a) forecloses petitioner's application approach\nB. Many other provisions in the Act foreclose petitioner's application approach\nC. Petitioner's reliance on the phrase \"makes registration\" is misplaced\nD. Petitioner's scavenger hunt through the Act is unavailing at every turn\nII. The history of Section 411(a)'s enactment confirms that the Register must approve or refuse a claim before suit may be brought\nIII. If petitioner wants the law changed or more funding for the Copyright Office, it should address Congress or the Copyright Office, not this Court",
        "reference": "I. The Copyright Act clearly requires the Register of Copyrights to approve or refuse a claim before an infringement suit may be brought",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Faith is of the utmost importance to religious students.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Harvard treats religious diversity much differently than racial diversity.",
        "reference": "II. The educational benefits of religious diversity are substantial.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1259_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Miller's Substantive Rule Bans Life Without Parole For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Who Are Not Permanently Incorrigible\nII. Sentencing A Juvenile Homicide Offender To Life Without Parole Requires Finding Him Permanently Incorrigible\nIII. This Court Used The Phrase \"Permanent Incorrigibility\" To Mean Permanent Incorrigibility\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. At A Minimum, Petitioner Is Entitled To A Remand For A Finding As To Whether He Is Permanently Incorrigible\nVI. Petitioner Is Not Permanently Incorrigible",
        "reference": "IV. Mississippi's Position Would Burden State And Federal Courts And Disrupt Their Implementation Of Miller",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. BECAUSE THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT, THIS COURT SHOULD DENY REVIEW\nA. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable\nB. EO-3 Exceeds the Limits of Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)\n1. Section 1182(f) does not grant the President limitless power\n2. Section 1182(f) grants the President an interstitial power to exclude harmful aliens and respond to exigencies\n3. EO-3 exceeds the limits of Section 1182(f)\n4. [MISSING]\nC. EO-3 Separately Violates Section 1152\nD. EO-3 Violates the Establishment Clause\nE. The Scope of the Injunction Is Proper\nII. AT A MINIMUM, THIS COURT SHOULD HEAR THE CASE ON AN EXPEDITED SCHEDULE",
        "reference": "4. EO-3 lacks an adequate finding of detrimentality",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reconsider Grutter Because the Use of Race to Achieve Diversity Has Led Not to Cross-Cultural Intellectual Stimulation and Understanding But to \"Neo-Segregation.\"\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Historical Evidence that Harvard's Holistic Admissions Policies That Were Embraced in Bakke and Grutter Were Instituted to Exclude Jews, Who Were Stereotyped in Much the Same Way as Asians are Today, Shows That Those Decisions Were Founded on a Lie.",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Reconsider Grutter Because the Burden of Race-Conscious Admissions Now Falls Largely on Asian-Americans, Another Racial Minority Group Historically Victimized by Discrimination.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Assignor estoppel is in direct conflict with pro-innovation law and policy, which favors enforcement only of valid patents, and the doctrine must therefore be sharply limited\nII. Assignor estoppel directly conflicts with innovation at large, and with especially damaging effects to startups\na. Assignor estoppel protects invalid patents in a way that is uniquely harmful to startups\nb. Assignor estoppel restricts healthy employee mobility without justification\nc. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "c. The expansion of assignor estoppel infects other productive business activity in the startup ecosystem",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The temporary flag raisings do not implicate the permanence essential to Summum's government speech finding\nC. The City's Record of Approving All Flag Raisings Confirms It Intended to Designate a Public Forum on the Flag Poles\nD. The City's Minimal Application to Access the Flag Poles Forum Does Not Turn the Private Speech Into Government Speech\nE. Even if the Flag Poles Are a Nonpublic or Limited Public Forum, the City Unconstitutionally Discriminated Against the Religious Viewpoint of Private Speech",
        "reference": "A. 284 Private Flag Raisings With No Denials Proves They Are Compatible With the City's Use of Its Flag Poles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-984_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. Petitioners Fail to Establish Entitlement to the HCE Regulation Because They Did Not Prove They Paid Respondent on A \"Salary Basis\"\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Decision Creates No Split and Finds Support from the Sixth and Eighth Circuits\n1. No Conflict Exists with the First or Second Circuits\n2. The Fifth Circuit Prevented a Split\n3. The Fifth Circuit Correctly Interpreted 29 C.F.R. section 541.604(b), and Even if it was Wrong, Petitioners Still Lose\nC. Appeals To \"Common Sense\" and Grave Rolling are Unavailing\nD. [MISSING]\n1. Six States Argue Something Petitioners Did Not Raise Below\n2. Industry Briefs are no More Persuasive",
        "reference": "D. Amici Efforts to Change the Law via Judicial Fiat",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTION LIMITS THE STATES' SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT\nA. The States have surrendered their sovereignty through several constitutional provisions\nB. Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity through particular legislative acts.\nII. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOES NOT BAR ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER FEDERAL WAR POWERS LEGISLATION\nA. States have no sovereign immunity in matters of war\ni. [MISSING]\nii. History shows the States have no sovereign immunity in matters of war\niii. Precedent and practice also show the States have no sovereign immunity in military matters\nB. Even if the States retained sovereign immunity in matters of war, Congress may validly abrogate that immunity when it enacts legislation pursuant to its war powers.",
        "reference": "i. The structure and text of the Constitution establish that the States have no sovereign immunity in matters of war",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-742_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Permitting The Tenth Circuit's Decision To Stand Would Undermine Vital Law-Enforcement Objectives",
        "reference": "I. This Court's Review Is Needed To Resolve A Serious Conflict With This Court's Cases That Threatens Vital Law-Enforcement Interests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. No vehicle problems preclude this Court's review\nC. The decision below warrants review this Term",
        "reference": "A. The decision below is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-10_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The text of the aggravated identity theft statute does not encompass the incidental employment of another person's name while committing a predicate felony\nA. Section 1028A requires a nexus between the use of another person's name and the predicate offense\nB. Section 1028A requires the use of the other person's name to be without lawful permission\nII. The structure and aim of the aggravated identity theft statute confirm its limited reach\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1028A must not be automatically triggered whenever certain predicate offenses are committed\nC. Section 1028A's neighboring provision reinforces that the aggravated identity theft statute cannot cover all incidental uses of other persons' names\nIII. If any doubt remains, two narrow-construction canons require rejecting the Fifth Circuit's holding\nA. Constitutional avoidance\nB. The rule of lenity",
        "reference": "A. Section 1028A's title \u2014 \"Aggravated identity theft\" \u2014 indicates that it does not reach every incidental employment of someone's name while committing a predicate offense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-389_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Applying State Law On The Outer Continental Shelf Because It Is Not Preempted Within State Territory Leads To Perverse Results And Disrupts Settled Expectations\nA. Importing California's Outlier Wage and Hour Law Would Require Major Restructuring of Employment Relationships\nB. The Potential Disruptive Consequences of the Ninth Circuit's Upside-Down Preemption Analysis Extend Far Beyond Wage and Hour Law",
        "reference": "I. Preemption Analysis Has No Role To Play In Choosing Whether To Apply Enacted Federal Law Or Borrowed State Law In An Area Of Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNIQUE ROLE OF BROADCASTERS IN SPECTRUM POLICY\nA. Emphasis on Localism and Competition Distinct from Other Licensees\nB. Congress, the FCC, and the Courts Have Continued to Reinforce the Unique Role of Broadcasting Despite Constant Changes to the News and Entertainment Market\nC. With the Digital Transition, Congress Explicitly Reaffirmed the Quid Pro Quo of Free Spectrum in Exchange for Free Over the Air Broadcasting and Unique Regulatory Obligations\nD. Broadcasters Continue to Jealously Guard Their Privileges, While Simultaneously Seeking to Shed Their Responsibilities\nE. Online News Sources Do Not Replace Broadcasting and Newspapers for Local News\nII. THE INCENTIVE AUCTION ENHANCED SCARCITY AND REDUCED DIVERSITY\nA. Understanding the Incentive Auction Mechanics\nB. The Incentive Auction Highlighted the Value of the Broadcaster's Free Spectrum Subsidy, and Enhanced the Scarcity of Available Broadcast Channels\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The FCC's Refusal to Consider the Impact of the Incentive Auction on Minority and Women Ownership Was Arbitrary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief050.pdf",
        "text": "I. STUDENT BODY DIVERSITY AT SELECTIVE HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS BENEFITS STUDENTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIETY\nII. THE CONDITIONS THAT AFFECT STUDENT BODY DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION HAVE WORSENED\nA. School segregation has deepened\nB. Income and wealth inequality remains severe\nC. Gaps in parents' educational attainment persist\nD. COVID-19 reflected and deepened existing educational racial inequality\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Abandoning race-conscious policies greatly increases racial gaps\nB. Income-based policies cannot produce meaningful diversity\nC. Reliance on standardized testing and grades cannot produce meaningful diversity",
        "reference": "III. RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS POLICIES ARE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE MECHANISM TO PRODUCE MEANINGFUL STUDENT BODY DIVERSITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROHIBITS COMPELLED DONOR DISCLOSURE UNLESS NARROWLY TAILORED TO AN OVERRIDING GOVERNMENT INTEREST\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Exacting Scrutiny Requires Narrow Tailoring\nC. Disclosure Precedents In The Campaign-Finance Context Do Not Control Here\nII. CALIFORNIA'S DISCLOSURE DEMAND IS FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR LACK OF NARROW TAILORING\nA. The Attorney General Virtually Never Uses Schedule B For Fraud Investigations\nB. Targeted Audit Letters And Subpoenas Are More Tailored Tools To Police Fraud\nC. California Has Systematically Failed To Maintain The Confidentiality Of Schedule B Donor Information\nD. California's Disclosure Demand Fails Narrow Tailoring And Any Other Applicable Standard Of \"Fit\"\nE. The IRS's Collection of Schedule B Does Not Render the California Attorney General's Collection Constitutional\nIII. CALIFORNIA'S DISCLOSURE DEMAND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS-APPLIED TO AFPF\nA. California Has Not Shown That Its Demand for AFPF's Schedule B Satisfies Exacting Scrutiny\nB. Disclosing AFPF's Schedule B Would Expose AFPF And Its Donors To Threats, Harassment, and Reprisals",
        "reference": "A. Compelled Disclosure Of A Group's Donors Is Subject To Exacting Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1484_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NAVAJO NATION'S TREATIES MUST BE INTERPRETED HOW THE NAVAJO NATION WOULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD THEM\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Navajo Nation's Winters Rights\nII. THE NAVAJO NATION'S UNDERSTANDING OF ITS TREATIES IS GOVERNED BY PRE-EXISTING TRADITIONAL NAVAJO LAW\nA. Traditional Navajo Law Regarding Balance and Disharmony, and the 1868 Treaty\nB. Thinking and Planning in Finding Solutions\nC. Traditional Thinking Continues to Exist and Inform How They Conduct Themselves\nD. The Relief Sought by the Navajo Nation is Supported by Applying Traditional Navajo Law and this Court's Precedent\nIII. WINTERS DOCTRINAL RIGHTS AND TRADITIONAL WORLDVIEWS\nA. Winters Rights under Federal Law Must be Understood According to Rights to (\"Water\") and Nature's Elements under Natural Laws\nB. The State and Federal Petitioners' Proposed Indian Water Policy Results in Disparate Treatment, as Applied, to the Navajo Nation's Reserved Property Interests",
        "reference": "A. History of the Navajo Nation's Treaties with the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Disclosure Claims\nB. The Reasonable-Procedures Claim\nII. Ramirez Was Demonstrably Not Typical Of The Class He Sought To Represent",
        "reference": "I. Ramirez Failed To Prove That Any Absent Class Member, Let Alone All, Suffered An Article III Injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-96_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. ARGUMENT\nA. ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND FREE PRESS ARE RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF PUERTO RICO\nB. THE BOARD THREATENS THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF PRESS BY FORBIDDING ACCESS TO PUBLIC INFORMATION AND BY FOSTERING A CHILLING EFFECT THAT DISINCENTIVIZES PUBLIC INFORMATION REQUESTS",
        "reference": "II. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Trademark Issues in This Case Are Exceptionally Important to Mark Owners and Consumers.\nA. Consumers and Companies Depend on the Trademark Protection Provided by the Lanham Act.\nB. The Decision Below Is Already Wreaking Havoc on Trademark and Consumer Protection Under Federal and State Law.\nII. The Ninth Circuit Has Misinterpreted the Constitution to Significantly Undermine the Acts of Congress Protecting Trademark and Trade Dress Rights.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit Has Transformed the TDRA's \"Noncommercial Use\" Exception to Authorize Commercial Use of a Mark.",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit Has Rewritten the Lanham Act to Impose a Heightened Burden with No Basis in the Statutory Text or the Constitution.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The jurisdiction claimed by the government is grounded in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. \"Waters of the United States\" is not a sufficiently intelligible principle for federal jurisdiction.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "The Appointments Clause Is A Structural Constitutional Safeguard That Requires Judicial Relief For The Prevailing Party When A Court Determines It Has Been Violated\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
        "reference": "A. A Party Bringing a Successful Constitutional Challenge to the Validity of the Officer(s) Who Took Adverse Agency Action Against It Is Entitled to Judicial Relief from that Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court of Appeals's Interpretation of the \"Occasions\" Clause Undermines the Goals of the ACCA and the Broader Comprehensive Crime Control Act",
        "reference": "I. The Court of Appeals's Interpretation of the \"Occasions\" Clause Violates the Presumption of Consistent Usage",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS IMPORTANT\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. REVIEW WILL CLARIFY THE DUTIES OF DEFENSE COUNSEL",
        "reference": "II. APPELLATE WAIVERS RESULT FROM UNEQUAL BARGAINING POWER",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. ALABAMA'S NOVEL CONCEPTION OF section 2 IS INCORRECT\nA. The Gingles Test Has Long Provided A Workable Framework\nB. Alabama's Proposed Transformation Of Gingles Is Unsound\nC. Section 2 Applies To Single-Member Districts\nII. SECTION 2 IS CONSTITUTIONAL\nA. Section 2 Is Consistent With The Fifteenth Amendment\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Section 2 Is Consistent With The Fourteenth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1362_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE \"MOST NATURAL READING\" OF THE SECTION 213(b)(10)(A) EXEMPTION EXCLUDES SERVICE ADVISORS\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Under The Interpretive Rule Of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, The Section 213(b)(10)(A) Exemption Is Limited To Three Positions, Salesman, Partsman And Mechanic, And Two Duties, Selling Automobiles Or Servicing Automobiles, But Does Not Include Either \"Service Advisor\" Or The Duty Of \"Selling Servicing\"\nB. Under The Construction Canon Of Reddendo Singula Singulis, The Two Duties Of The Section 213(b)(10)(A) Exemption Are To Be Applied To Such Of The Three Exempt Positions As Are Related By Context And Applicability\nIII. ALTHOUGH THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT RELY ON IT, THIS COURT'S 70-YEAR-OLD PRECEDENT, THAT FLSA EXEMPTIONS ARE CONSTRUED NARROWLY AGAINST THE EMPLOYER, IS A VALID CANON OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION WITH APPROPRIATE APPLICATION TO THIS CASE, AND UNDER THAT NARROW CONSTRUCTION SERVICE ADVISORS ARE NOT EXEMPT\nA. The FLSA Is A Remedial Statute Enacted To Eliminate Conditions Detrimental To The Well-Being Of Workers\nB. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer\nC. Narrow Construction Of FLSA Exemptions Is Based On The Broad Interpretation Of Remedial Statutes, A Principle Long A Part Of This Court's Interpretive Canon, And Congress Legislates In The FLSA Realm With The Narrow Construction Rule As Backdrop\ni. This Court Has A Long History Of Construing Remedial Statutes Liberally\nii. Congress Has Long Been Aware Of The Court's Narrow Construction Of FLSA Exemptions, And In All The Many Revisions Of The Act Since A.H. Phillips Never Rejected That Interpretation\nD. If Section 213(b)(10)(A) Is Construed Consistent With The Remedial Law Canon, A Service Advisor Is Not Exempt From Overtime",
        "reference": "II. THIS COURT CAN AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS, WITHOUT APPLICATION OF THE \"NARROW CONSTRUCTION\" RULE, BY APPLYING OTHER CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION THAT PLAINLY EXCLUDE THE \"SERVICE ADVISOR\" FROM THE SECTION 213(b)(10)(A) EXEMPTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-177_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS THE POWER TO SET ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR GRANTEES\nA. There is a Crucial Distinction Between Permissible Eligibility Criteria and Unconstitutional Conditions\n1. The Policy Requirement Is a Legitimate Eligibility Requirement\n2. Eligibility Criteria Define Qualified Grantees, Not the Program Itself\n3. In the Context of a Discretionary Grant Program, There Is No Coherent Distinction between Selecting Grantees who Support the Government's Agenda and \"Imposing\" such Support on Grantees\nB. Eligibility Criteria for Competitive Funding of a Discrete, Limited, Discretionary Program Do Not Compel Speech\n1. The compelled speech doctrine\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Important doctrinal limits\n4. The need to cabin CLS v. Martinez\nII. THE POLICY REQUIREMENT IS CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENT OF THE \"GOVERNMENT SPEECH\" DOCTRINE",
        "reference": "2. Absence of speech compulsion here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Under Section 411(a), a copyright infringement suit may not be filed until the Register of Copyrights has either approved or refused registration of the work",
        "reference": "A. The question presented is the subject of an entrenched circuit conflict that warrants resolution by this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The classification established by Congress, excluding Puerto Rico residents from the SSI program, is in reality based on race and/or national origin; thus, the proper Equal Protection analysis is strict scrutiny and not rational-basis review\nII. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit correctly determined that, even under rational-basis review, the exclusion of residents of Puerto Rico from the SSI program violated their right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The opinions of this Court in Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) and Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) are not dispositive of this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. States can exercise their traditional regulatory power to curb PBM abuse without triggering ERISA preemption",
        "reference": "A. PBMs are engaged in abusive practices with serious consequences for consumers, industry stakeholders, and a functioning healthcare market",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Case Is Even Less Worthy of Certiorari than Its Predecessors.\nB. As the Government Acknowledges, No Question of Statutory Interpretation Is Presented.\nII. This Court's Intervention Is Unnecessary Because The Agency Has All The Tools It Needs To Fix Problems Of Its Own Making.\nA. The 2018 Quadrennial Review Now Underway Is Not \"Distorted\" by the Third Circuit's Decision.\nB. Further Backward-Looking Judicial Review Is Unnecessary.\nIII. The Third Circuit's Decision Is Correct.",
        "reference": "I. The Third Circuit's Fact-Bound Application Of Settled Administrative Law Standards Presents No Legal Question Warranting Review.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Defies More Recent Holdings of This Court and of the Seventh Circuit, and Fails to Implement Express Statutory Amendments Enacted by Congress\nII. THE DECISION BELOW MUST BE REVERSED TO PREVENT FEDERAL POLICIES FROM BEING UNDERMINED AT THE STATE LEVEL\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. HISTORIC CONCERNS ABOUT STATE COURT BIAS ARE AMPLIFIED IN CASES OF THIS TYPE, SUCH THAT FEDERAL COURTS MUST STEP IN TO PROTECT FEDERAL INTERESTS",
        "reference": "III. PUBLIC RECORDS OBTAINED BY AMICUS CURIAE ENERGY POLICY ADVOCATES AFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF HEARING \"CLIMATE NUISANCE\" CASES IN FEDERAL COURT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The D.C. Circuit's ruling should be reversed",
        "reference": "I. The Committee's arguments for why certiorari should be denied are unpersuasive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ATS does not authorize liability for domestic corporations\nA. Separation-of-powers principles foreclose domestic corporation liability\nB. Foreign policy considerations confirm that domestic corporations should not be held liable .. 15\nC. Additional considerations counsel against domestic corporation liability\nII. Respondents fail to state a claim of domestic aiding and abetting\nA. Aiding and abetting is not cognizable under the ATS\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Respondents' aiding-and-abetting claims are impermissibly extraterritorial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-108_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT APPLIES TO SERVICEMEMBERS\nII. PETITIONER'S POLICY ARGUMENTS DO NOT OVERRIDE RESPONDENTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS\nIII. CANONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION FAVOR RESPONDENTS\nA. Reading Articles 43 and 55 together, as required, invalidates the provision extending the statute of limitations for rape\nB. The Constitution and Article 55 supersede Article 120\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. If an ambiguity arises, the UCMJ should be interpreted with civilian law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9560_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES DEMONSTRATES THAT section 924(a)(2)'S \"KNOWINGLY VIOLATES\" PROVISION APPLIES TO BOTH OF section 922(g)'S SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS\nA. Section 924(a)(2) Criminalizes Knowing Violations of section 922(g)\nB. Mr. Rehaif's Reading is Consistent with the Statutory Scheme\nC. Mr. Rehaif's Reading is Consistent with Background Assumptions about Mens Rea in Criminal Statutes\nII. APPLYING A KNOWING MENS REA TO section 922(g)'S STATUS ELEMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT AND EASY TO APPLY\nA. Applying a Knowing Mens Rea to section 922(g)'s Status Element Does Not Require Knowledge of the Law\nB. Mr. Rehaif's Reading is Consistent with Old Chief\nC. Mr. Rehaif's Reading is Easy to Apply\nIII. MR. REHAIF'S READING IS CONSISTENT WITH FOPA'S HISTORY\nIV. THE RULES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AND LENITY SUPPORT MR. REHAIF\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. HARMLESS ERROR DOES NOT APPLY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. ALLOWING BELATED REQUESTS FOR ARBITRATION RESULTS IN INEFFICIENCY AND UNNECESSARY DELAY\nIII. AS A RULE, ARBITRATION REQUESTS SHOULD BE MADE EARLY BY MOTION BUT NO LATER THAN AS PART OF THE FILING OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, CONSISTENT WITH THE PROCEDURES IN PLACE IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT",
        "reference": "I. THIS COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT AN UNDERLYING BASIS FOR ITS ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE IS ARBITRATION'S SPEED AND EFFICIENCY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Where A Federal Court Finds Cause To Excuse The Procedural Default Of A Claim Pursuant To Martinez, section 2254(e)(2) Does Not Restrict Development Of That Claim\nA. Section 2254(e)(2) restricts federal evidentiary hearings only for claimants who are at fault for failing to develop evidence in state court\nB. A finding that a claimant was not at fault under Martinez for his counsel's failure to raise a claim also means the claimant is not at fault under section 2254(e)(2)\n1. A finding of cause under Martinez means the claimant was not at fault for his counsel's failure to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim\n2. A finding that a claimant is not at fault under Martinez for his counsel's failure to raise a claim means the claimant is not at fault under section 2254(e)(2) for his counsel's failure to develop that same claim\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Arizona's position contravenes AEDPA's design\n2. Arizona's position would undermine the Sixth Amendment right to effective trial counsel\nD. Arizona's policy arguments are unsupported and unavailing\nE. These cases highlight the wrongness and recklessness of Arizona's position\nII. Section 2254(e)(2) Does Not Limit Consideration Of Evidence Previously Admitted To Establish Cause and Prejudice\nA. Section 2254(e)(2) does not bar consideration of evidence admitted at a cause-and-prejudice hearing\nB. Arizona's atextual reading would wrongly bar consideration of properly admitted evidence of unlawful convictions and death sentences\nIII. Arizona Has Waived Its Argument In Mr. Ramirez's Case\nA. Arizona waived its section 2254(e)(2) argument\nB. This Court must respect Arizona's decision not to raise an objection under section 2254(e)(2)",
        "reference": "C. Arizona's position is inconsistent with AEDPA's design and undermines the Sixth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. No Circuit Has Held That the Government May Not Move to Dismiss a Qui Tam Suit in Which It Declined to Intervene at the Outset of the Case.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. All Courts of Appeals Give Broad Deference to the Government's Decision to Dismiss a Qui Tam Suit.\nB. Minor Differences in How Courts Articulate the Deference Owed to the Government Do Not Warrant This Court's Review.\nIII. This Petition Is a Poor Vehicle for Resolving the Alleged Split Because Relator's Case Was Properly Dismissed Under Any Circuit's Test.",
        "reference": "II. The Circuits Have Uniformly Affirmed the Government's Authority to Dismiss Qui Tam Suits.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1077_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The SEC's Argument that a Defendant Who Did Not Make a Misstatement Could Still be Liable Under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) and Section 17(a)(1) Undercuts the Holding in Janus\nA. The SEC Proposes a Very Limited Reading of Janus that Makes the Decision Meaningless\nB. The SEC Misconstrues The Common Law Backdrop For Section 10(b)\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The SEC Fails To Respond To Petitioner's and Amici's Statutory Analysis of Sections 10(b) and 17(a)\nB. The SEC Cites Inapposite Case Law and Statutes To Support Its Argument Regarding Petitioner's Section 10(b) Liability\nIII. The SEC's Argument that the Petitioner Has Taken a Different Factual Position in the Court Below is Without Merit\nIV. Affirming the D.C. Circuit Would Erase the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Liability\nV. Affirming the D.C. Circuit Would Result in Numerous Meritless Lawsuits",
        "reference": "II. The SEC Failed to Show that Petitioner's Own Conduct Falls Within the Text of Sections 10(b) and 17(a)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-419_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A Discrete, Narrow Tax Regime Benefiting A Small Number Of State Retirees Does Not Implicate The Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine's Concerns\nB. The Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine Is Not Violated Under Any Theory Because Mr. Dawson Is Not Similarly Situated To The Exempt State Retirees\nII. Any Heavier Burden Section 12(c)(6) Imposes On Federal Retirees Is Justified By Meaningful Differences Between The Classes Of Employees",
        "reference": "I. Section 12(c)(6) Does Not Discriminate Against The Federal Government Or Federal Employees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A State's preexisting authority to regulate mining within its borders does not fall within the preempted field\nA. Section 2021 as a whole has nothing to do with \u2014and does not preempt \u2014state regulation of uranium mining\nB. Section 2021(k) does not preempt anything\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Neither allegations about the state legislature's subjective motivations nor claims about what respondents have conceded warrants a different result\nII. There is no basis for finding obstacle preemption",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners repeatedly omit key language from both Pacific Gas and English that confirms the limited scope of the preempted field",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Intent Is a Fundamental Component of Causes of Action Rooted in Discrimination and Retaliation\nIII. An Interpretation of Section 1514A Without Retaliatory Intent Leads to Inconsistency, Unreasonable Results, and an Unbalanced Burden",
        "reference": "I. The Statute's Plain Meaning Dictates the Need for a Plaintiff to Prove Retaliatory Intent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. PROBLEMATIC AGENCY BEHAVIOR ENCOURAGED BY AUER DEFERENCE\nIII. THE PERVASIVE IMPACT OF AUER",
        "reference": "I. VETERAN SERVICES OFFICER SGT. MJR. HOWARD'S (RET.) EXPERIENCE WITH AGENCY VAGARIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "The Park Service may regulate activities on the navigable waters within the National Park System in Alaska\nA. Park Service rules governing conduct on navigable waters are valid without regard to whether the United States holds a property interest that supports classification of those waters as \"public lands\" under ANILCA\n1. The 1976 Act authorizes the Park Service to regulate activities occurring on navigable waters within the National Park System\n2. Section 103(c) does not strip the Park Service of its 1976 Act authorities on navigable waters in Alaska\n3. Petitioner's contrary arguments are incompatible with ANILCA's text\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Park Service's regulations of navigable waters are regulations of \"public lands\" under ANILCA because of the federal interest in those waters\n2. Congress has ratified the Secretary's construction of \"public lands\"\nC. Surrounding provisions of ANILCA confirm that Section 103(c) did not strip the Park Service of authority to regulate activities on navigable waters within the National Park System\n1. Surrounding provisions demonstrate that the Park Service retains authority to regulate navigable waters within the National Park System\n2. Neither petitioner nor Alaska persuasively accounts for these provisions\nD. The placement and history of Section 103(c) confirm that the provision does not rescind Park Service authorities over navigable waters\nE. Petitioner errs in urging a clear-statement rule as a basis for rescinding the Park Service's authorities over navigable waters\nF. The Secretary's interpretation would warrant Chevron deference if there were ambiguity in the statutory scheme",
        "reference": "B. In any event, the Park Service may enforce regulations of \"public lands\" on navigable waters within the National Park System in Alaska",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies here\nA. The automobile exception is categorical and applies in cases where, as here, a vehicle is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe that a search will uncover evidence of a crime\n1. Multiple rationales justify the automobile exception\n2. The automobile exception permitted the search here because Officer Rhodes had ample probable cause, before entering the property, to believe that Collins's readily mobile motorcycle was evidence of a crime\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Officer Rhodes did not need a warrant to walk up the open driveway to reach a motorcycle that the automobile exception authorized him to search\nD. Collins's fears of roving police searches are not justified: a warrantless automobile search must be supported by probable cause, limited in scope, and reasonable\nII. The automobile exception and its supporting rationales do not automatically disappear inside a home's curtilage, and it would undermine the utility of the exception to restrict its application there\nA. The Court's case law demonstrates that a vehicle's location inside or outside the curtilage does not drive the analysis\n1. Scher and Labron refute Collins's position\n2. Carney and Coolidge do not support Collins's position\nB. The justifications for the automobile exception still apply when a vehicle is parked on a driveway close to a home\nC. Police officers need bright-line rules when they confront inherently exigent circumstances, so any limitations to the exception should depend on unambiguous physical distinctions, not on indeterminate curtilage analyses\n1. Requiring case-by-case curtilage determinations would undermine the utility and purpose of the automobile exception\n2. The automobile exception should apply at least up to the threshold of an enclosed physical structure in the curtilage \u2014a defined line that is easy to understand and adequately protects privacy and property interests\nIII. If the curtilage determination matters, the case should be remanded",
        "reference": "B. There is no separate exigency requirement to the automobile exception \u2014regardless of the vehicle's location \u2014but even if there were, it would be satisfied here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Not Expand the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine in the Ways Proposed by Petitioners\nA. The Court's Precedent Exhibits Deference to Congress When Addressing Dormant Commerce Clause Challenges\nB. The Court Should Exercise the Same Cautionary Deference Here\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Congress Has Repeatedly Rejected Proposals To Regulate This Subject Matter And Thereby Preempt State Laws Like Proposition 12",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. CERTIORARI IS PREMATURE\nII. THERE IS NO CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT OR ANY OTHER DECISION\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW WILL NOT LEAD TO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF SECRET INFORMATION\nIV. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1806(f) Displaces the Dismissal Remedy of the State Secrets Privilege\nC. The Individual Capacity Respondents' Seventh Amendment and Due Process Concerns are Premature and Lack Merit.",
        "reference": "A. FISA Establishes Mandatory Procedures for Courts to Utilize When Litigation Involves Secret Information Relating to Electronic Surveillance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. MS. TAYLOR'S EXPERIENCE IN THIS CASE ILLUSTRATES THE RISK OF ERROR AND UNFAIRNESS POSED BY NON-UNANIMOUS VERDICTS\nA. Unanimity Substantially Reduces the Risk of Erroneous Convictions\nB. Unanimity Ensures that the Participation of Black Jurors Counts\nII. LOUISIANA OFFICIALS HAVE ALWAYS RECOGNIZED (AND DISREGARDED) THE HARMS OF NON-UNANIMOUS VERDICTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Unanimity Has Always Implicated Fundamental Fairness\nIII. MS. TAYLOR'S JURY SERVICE SHOULD NOT REMAIN MEANINGLESS",
        "reference": "A. Unanimity Has Always Assured Greater Accuracy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-826_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. State courts and federal courts share jurisdiction over federal questions and their judgments are entitled to mutual respect from the other\nA. The coequal state courts\nB. State courts and harmless error\nII. AEDPA demands deference to be given to federal claims adjudicated on the merits in state court\nA. Collateral review and harmless error\nB. Davis v. Ayala\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Order of decision rules\nB. Order of decision and AEDPA",
        "reference": "III. Section 2254(d) should be regarded as a threshold question and decided at the beginning of the habeas case, absent a strong reason in judicial efficiency to do otherwise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. DATA JOURNALISM IS A VITAL FORM OF JOURNALISM.\nII. THE MARKUP USES DATA JOURNALISM TECHNIQUES TO REPORT ON THE TECHNOLOGY SHAPING OUR SOCIETY.\nA. The Markup Gathers News by Observing What Can Be Done on Online Platforms.\nB. Data Scraping Is a Vital Tool for Data Journalists.\nIII. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS THE ONLINE NEWSGATHERING PRACTICES OF DATA JOURNALISTS.\nA. Routine Newsgathering Activities Cannot Be Criminalized Under the First Amendment Just Because They Were Conducted Online.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The CFAA Should Be Interpreted to Avoid Violating the First Amendment.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is No Existing Basis Under Board of Regents or Other Supreme Court Precedent to Grant the Petitioners a Broad, Threshold-Level Exemption from the Antitrust Laws\nII. Granting Antitrust Immunity to the Petitioners in this Case Would Repeat the Same Mistakes of Toolson v. New York Yankees and Flood v. Kuhn\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Granting Antitrust Immunity to the Petitioners in this Case Would Disrupt the Ongoing Legislative Process Surrounding College Athletic Reform",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Administration Lacks the Statutory Authority Needed to Implement its Student Debt Cancellation Program\nA. The plain text of the HEROES Act does not authorize the administration to carry out its student debt cancellation program\nB. The major questions doctrine reinforces the notion that the administration lacks the authority needed to carry out its plan\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This outrageously costly program will further damage an already weak economy\nB. The debt cancellation program is inherently unfair and regressive\nC. The program harms future borrowers and the very people it claims to help",
        "reference": "II. The Administration's Student Debt Cancellation Plan is Inherently Unfair and Will Harm the Economy and the People it Purportedly Benefits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Uncertain regulation can make wetlands a liability for landowners and complicate conservation efforts\nIII. Uncertain federal regulation can also crowd out state innovation",
        "reference": "I. Wetlands provide valuable benefits that can encourage conservation and restoration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1042_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Plain Text and Legislative History of the RRTA Establishes Congress's Intent to Exclude Damages Awarded for Lost Wages on Account of Personal Injury\nB. The Definition of \"Compensation\" in the Railroad Retirement Act Does Not Alter the Definition Congress Set Out in the RRTA\nC. The IRS Regulation Is Not Entitled to Deference in this Case\nD. To the Extent the RRTA Definition of Compensation is Ambiguous, this Court Should Construe the Provision in Respondent's Favor\nII. DAMAGES AWARDED IN FELA ACTIONS ON ACCOUNT OF PHYSICAL INJURY ARE NOT \"INCOME\" AND THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO EMPLOYMENT TAXES, INCLUDING RAILROAD RETIREMENT TAXES\nB. Exclusion of awards for lost income from both federal income tax and federal employment taxes, including the RRTA, supports the policy underlying section 104(a)(2)\nC. The Non-Taxability of Plaintiff's Award for Lost Income on Account of Personal Injury under the RRTA Is Consistent with the Non-Tax Treatment of Personal Injury Awards Under FICA Employment Taxes. 25\nIII. PERMITTING RAILROADS TO WITHHOLD RRTA TAXES ON FELA AWARDS FOR LOST WAGES WILL IMPEDE FAIR SETTLEMENTS OF FELA CLAIMS\nA. Congress Intended FELA to Provide Fair Compensation to Injured Workers and Financial Incentive for Railroads to Invest in Workplace Safety\nB. RRTA Taxation of FELA Awards Will Impede Fair Settlement Negotiations and Reduce Funding for Railroad Retirement Benefits",
        "reference": "I. THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD THAT AN AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY, INCLUDING LOST WAGES, IS NOT \"COMPENSATION\" TAXABLE UNDER THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT TAX ACT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. POLICE OFFICERS MUST BE PERMITTED TO CONDUCT BRIEF, INVESTIGATORY TRAFFIC STOPS TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC AND THE OFFICER\nA. Enforcement of Highway and Traffic Safety Laws Protects the Public\ni. Unlicensed and uninsured drivers\nii. Drivers with warrants\nB. [MISSING]\nII. POLICE OFFICERS MUST BE ABLE TO CONDUCT BRIEF, INVESTIGATORY TRAFFIC STOPS UNDER A CLEARLY DEFINED REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD\nA. The Reasonable Suspicion Standard Utilized by Police Officers to Conduct Traffic Stops is Well-Established and Practical\nB. There are Sufficient Protections in Place for Citizens Such that Privacy Interests and the Right to be Free from Unreasonable Seizure are Preserved",
        "reference": "B. Brief, Investigatory Traffic Stops Promote Officer Safety",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1259_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. As a sentence eligibility factor, \"irreparable corruption\" or \"permanent incorrigibility\" would be unconstitutionally vague.\nA. Eligibility factors and vagueness\nB. Factors mandated by case law\nII. Montgomery contradicts both Miller and itself, and it should be limited to its core holding.\nA. Montgomery contradicts Miller\nB. Montgomery contradicts Montgomery\nIII. The arc of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should bend back toward the original understanding, not further away from it.\nIV. Miller is best understood as importing the Woodson rule from capital cases plus the Eddings rule as applied to youth-related mitigation, and nothing more.\nA. Miller and the capital cases\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Preserving Montgomery's core holding, if necessary",
        "reference": "B. The excessive breadth of Lockett",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit's decision aligns with Section 112's text\nA. Section 112 requires a patent to teach both how to \"make\" and \"use\" the \"invention,\" which is defined by the scope of the claims\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Amgen's textual argument lacks merit\nII. The Federal Circuit's decision aligns with the Patent Act's structure and purpose and with this Court's precedent\nA. The Federal Circuit's interpretation of Section 112(a) aligns with Section 112(f)\nB. The Federal Circuit's interpretation of Section 112(a) aligns with the Patent Act's purpose\nC. The Federal Circuit's interpretation of Section 112(a) aligns with this Court's precedent\nIII. Adopting Amgen's theory would inhibit competition in the pharmaceutical industry",
        "reference": "B. The specification in Amgen's patents does not enable a skilled artisan to make and use its claimed invention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's System of Public Sector Labor-Management Relations Serves Important State Interests\nA. California Adopted a System of Exclusive Representation to Address Serious Management Challenges in Public Workplaces\nB. Collective Bargaining with One Counterparty, Representing and Funded by All Employees, Provides Significant Benefits to California Public Employers\nII. Agency Fees Are Permissible Because They Support a Specialized Forum That Serves Important Government Interests Without Burdening the Expressive Interests of Individual Employees\nA. Agency Fees Support Specialized Activities That Are Not Analogous to General Lobbying or Political Advocacy\nB. The Court Has Previously Permitted Use of Mandatory Fees Where Government Interests Can Only Be Served by Creating a Limited Forum That Includes Non-Government Speech\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Overruling Abood Would Unnecessarily Disrupt California's Longstanding System of Labor Relations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INTERNET SALES TAX DEBATE IS AN ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO MILLIONS OF AMERICANS AND SMALL BUSINESSES\nII. IT IS AN UNDUE BURDEN FOR RETAILERS TO COMPLY WITH STATE SALES TAX AND USE REQUIREMENTS IN STATES WHERE THEY DO NOT HAVE A PHYSICAL PRESENCE\nA. South Dakota Has No Factual Record Upon Which to Base an Argument for Overturning Quill\nB. The 'Evolution of the Retail Industry' Has Not Mitigated the Inherent Burdens of Compliance with Multiple Foreign-State Tax and Regulatory Regimes\nC. South Dakota and Other States Have Not Sufficiently Simplified Tax Collection and Will Impose Undue Burdens on Collecting Businesses\nIII. WHETHER TO REQUIRE TAX COLLECTION BY OUT-OF-STATE RETAILERS IS AN ISSUE OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THEREFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CONGRESS\nA. Congress Has the Exclusive Authority to Regulate Interstate Commerce Under Article I\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Congress Is Responsibly Exercising Its Legislative Powers with Respect to Internet Taxation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Free Speech Clause protects elected officials from formal punishments for their extra-legislative speech\nII. Wilson has stated a claim for a violation of his right to free speech\nA. Formal censures adopted in exercise of official disciplinary powers are always punitive\n1. Founding-era history\n2. Modern practice\nB. The censure here was especially punitive in that it revoked Wilson's privileges of office\nC. Because the censure was demonstrably punitive, Wilson has stated a claim\nIII. The censure is not protected by the government speech doctrine\nIV. HCC's remaining arguments are not persuasive\nA. Affirming the judgment below will not stifle local political debate\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The judgment below is consistent with history and tradition and implicates a very narrow range of official censures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.45
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief039.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should not disturb State and local governments' longstanding ability to tailor firearm carry regulation to local conditions and needs, within constitutional constraints\nA. [MISSING]\nB. State and local governments' diverse approaches to carry regulation reflect evolving judgments about how best to protect public safety\n1. Different approaches to carry regulation appropriately reflect differences in conditions and needs across States and localities\n2. State and local concealed carry regulations reflect important public safety concerns\n3. State and local governments use carry regulation and other firearms restrictions to protect victims of domestic violence\nII. Respecting State and local government reliance interests is fully compatible with the Second Amendment",
        "reference": "A. Consistent with their longstanding authority, State and local governments have taken diverse approaches to carry regulation and these approaches have evolved over time",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-935_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Standard-Of-Review Issue Does Not Warrant This Court's Attention.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There Is No Conflict Warranting This Court's Review.\nC. The Habitual Review Issue Does Not Arise With Sufficient Frequency To Warrant This Court's Attention.\nD. The Court Below Correctly Applied A Clear-Error Standard.\nII. The Lower Courts' Holding That Subjective Agreement Between Parents Is Not A Necessary Prerequisite To Finding Habitual Residence Does Not Warrant Review.",
        "reference": "A. The Standard Of Review For A Mixed Question Of Fact And Law Depends On The Particular Context In Which The Question Arises.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1435_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Compelling Government Interests Justify Limits on Political Expression in the Polling Place\nII. Any Burdens on Speakers Are Exceedingly Minimal\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Possibility of Unconstitutional Applications of the Statute Does Not Justify Holding It Facially Overbroad",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under This Court's Most Recent Decisions, History Is the Dispositive Factor in the Establishment Clause Analysis.\nII. Voluntary Public Prayer Is Deeply Rooted in This Nation's History and Traditions.\nA. The History of Public Prayer in America.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The History of Prayer and Football.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "THERE [MISSING]",
        "reference": "THERE IS NO COMPELLING JUSTIFICATION FOR OVERRULING NEVADA V. HALL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1471_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT HOME DEPOT IS CORRECT IN ITS ANALYSIS, HOME DEPOT WOULD STILL NOT BE ABLE TO REMOVE THIS CASE TO FEDERAL COURT; AS SUCH, ANY DECISION BY THIS COURT WOULD AT BEST BE ADVISORY\nA. Home Depot, Even as a \"Defendant,\" Would Not Have Been Entitled to Remove this Action Under the Law as it Existed Before the Enactment of CAFA\nB. Even if Home Depot is Considered To Be a \"Defendant,\" CAFA Would Still Not Provide Home Depot With an Alternate Basis for Successful Removal\nC. Ultimately It Will Be Proven That this Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Hear this Case and Any Opinion Will Accordingly Be Merely Advisory\nII. CONTRARY TO THE PROTESTATIONS OF HOME DEPOT AND ITS AMICI, ALL PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS WEIGH IN FAVOR OF THIS CASE PROCEEDING IN NORTH CAROLINA STATE COURT\nA. Home Depot and Its Amici Recite Rote Descriptions About Class Actions Absent Case or Documentary Support, Ignoring That this is the Prototypical Class Action That Congress, When Enacting CAFA, Intended Would Remain in State Court\nB. In Contrast to the Protestations of Amici Chamber, When Congress Passed CAFA, It Expressly Did Not Show a Desire to Enhance the Coverage of MDL Jurisdiction\nC. The State Courts Are Necessary Courts of General Jurisdiction and the Much Smaller Federal Court System Is Limited in Its Jurisdiction\nD. Amicus DRI Is Categorically Wrong in Its Characterization of State Judges as Being Biased Due to Their Elections Being Dominated by Contributions from the Plaintiffs' Bar\nIII. ITS TEXT AND HISTORY MAKE IT CLEAR THAT CONGRESS NEVER MEANT TO INCLUDE \"THIRD-PARTY COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANTS\" WHEN IT GRANTED REMOVAL RIGHTS TO \"DEFENDANTS.\"\nA. Congress Intended to Grant Removal Rights Only to Traditional Defendants\nB. This Court's Long-Established Tradition to Strictly Construe Removal Under section 1441 Was Not Changed By CAFA and section 1453 in Order to Extend Removal Rights to Third-Party Counterclaim Defendants\nC. Home Depot Cannot Use Congress' Silence on Its Idiosyncratic Interpretation of \"Defendant\" To Support That Unique Interpretation\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Home Depot's Concerns Are Grossly Overblown; There Have Been Relatively Few Third-party Counterclaim Class Actions in the Thirteen Years Since CAFA Became Law\nB. If This Court Rules As Home Depot Wishes, the Much Greater Risk Will Be That Some Defendants Will Attempt to Game the System In Order to Gain Their Preferred Jurisdiction\nC. History Shows That Certain Defendants Have Used Such Loopholes to Gain Their Preferred Federal Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "IV. IF THIS COURT CONCLUDES THAT \"THIRD-PARTY COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANTS\" MAY REMOVE ACTIONS TO FEDERAL COURT, INSTEAD OF LIMITING GAMESMANSHIP, IT WILL USHER IN A NEW ERA OF A VASTLY ENLARGED FEDERAL DOCKET",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution's Separation of Powers Prohibits the Current Structure of the CFPB\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Remedial Cure Adopted By This Court in Free Enterprise Fund Would Be Inappropriate Here",
        "reference": "II. Humphrey's Executor Is Distinguishable, But Also Wrongly Decided And Should Be Overruled",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1270_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Assignment of the MOAC Lease did not destroy jurisdiction, and the courts can order effective relief\nA. Sears' assignment of the MOAC Lease did not divest the appellate courts of jurisdiction to review the Assignment Order\n1. Bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction is not exclusively in rem, and Transform voluntarily consented to the courts' jurisdiction\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The appellate courts can grant MOAC effective relief, without resort to Section 549\nII. Section 363(m) is not jurisdictional and is therefore subject to estoppel, waiver, and forfeiture\nA. Section 363(m) is not a jurisdictional limitation, even when it applies\nB. Estoppel, waiver, and forfeiture preclude Transform's reliance on Section 363(m)\nIII. The relief requested by MOAC is not precluded by Section 363(m) even if it were jurisdictional",
        "reference": "2. Even if the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction were initially in rem, the property's transfer would not destroy that jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1484_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE NATION HAS A WATER RIGHT IN THE MAINSTREAM\nA. The Consolidated Decree Retains Jurisdiction in this Court\nB. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Precludes the District Court from Exercising Jurisdiction\nC. The Ninth Circuit Opinion undermines the security and reliability of the established Mainstream water rights\nD. The Ninth Circuit Opinion imposes upon the Secretary of Interior the duty to make an ex parte allocation of Mainstream water to the Nation, thereby circumventing the exclusive and retained jurisdiction of this Court\nII. THE COMMON LAW \"WINTERS DOCTRINE\" CANNOT CREATE A FIDUCIARY DUTY OF THE UNITED STATES TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE THE NATION'S UNPROVEN CLAIM TO THE MAINSTREAM\nA. The judicially created Winters doctrine cannot give rise to a federal fiduciary obligation to assess, quantify and protect the Nation's unproven claim to Mainstream water\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The \"Law of the River\" imposes no affirmative fiduciary obligation on the Secretary of the Interior to manage the Mainstream for the benefit of the Nation's claimed Winters right. The injunctive relief sought by the Nation cannot address the harm alleged, as the Nation's only avenue available to attain a reserved right to Colorado River water is the reopening of the Decree, which is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1284_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's Vehicle Argument Is Baseless\nA. Petitioners Squarely Presented The Issue Below\nB. The Tenth Circuit Is An Outlier In Considering Outdoor Exercise In A Vacuum\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Tenth Circuit Disregarded This Court's Qualified Immunity Jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-857_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The saving clause preserves habeas relief for prisoners who can show actual innocence based on an intervening statutory decision of this Court\nA. The saving clause safeguards against leaving federal prisoners with an \"inadequate or ineffective\" substitute for habeas\nB. The saving clause permits consideration of second or subsequent habeas petitions raising a limited set of statutory claims based on intervening decisions of this Court\n1. The habeas remedy allows statutory claims based on an intervening decision of this Court establishing that a prisoner is imprisoned for a non-criminal act\n2. Pre-AEDPA habeas principles generally require a prisoner who seeks to present a statutory claim in a second or subsequent collateral attack to show actual innocence\n3. AEDPA's restrictions on second or subsequent collateral attacks foreclose factual and constitutional claims under the saving clause, but not pure statutory claims\nII. Petitioner cannot rely on the saving clause because he cannot show actual innocence\nA. The Court's decision in Rehaif is a change in the interpretation of a substantive federal criminal law\nB. Petitioner cannot satisfy the threshold requirement that he establish his actual innocence\nIII. The court of appeals erred in interpreting the saving clause to categorically foreclose statutory claims\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner's approach cannot be squared with the text\nB. Petitioner's asserted constitutional concerns are insubstantial",
        "reference": "IV. Petitioner's interpretation of the saving clause is atextual and overbroad",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Push For Uncritical Acceptance Of Unproven \"Gender Affirming\" Therapies Should Be Rejected, Especially In Light Of The Discredited Foundations Of The Organizations Advocating Against Free Speech Here\nA. WPATH \u2014 A Political Organization Pre-committed to Advocating \"Gender Affirming\" Care \u2014 Relied on Flawed Studies to Advance an Agenda that Other Countries are Now Rejecting\nB. [MISSING]\nII. History Likewise Shows The Consequences Of An Uncritical Acceptance Of Unproven Medical Treatments And Practices\nA. The American Medical Association Has Repeatedly Shown the Dangers of Endorsing Misguided Policies and Treatments that Harm Patients\nB. Experimental Medical Approaches Often Prove Harmful and Thus Require Higher Justifications, Explanations, and Transparency",
        "reference": "B. The American Academy of Pediatrics \u2014 Known to Promote Recommendations Lacking Scientific Support \u2014 Partnered with Activists to Create Guidelines for Gender-Distressed Children",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. The President of the United States is a public fiduciary\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Unfit persons are disqualified from serving as trustees or executors\nB. Unfit persons may be disqualified from serving as corporate officers or directors\nIII. Section Three is best interpreted as a fiduciary-disqualification provision and should be enforced accordingly",
        "reference": "II. Unfit persons are commonly disqualified from serving as private fiduciaries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Ruling Goes Well Beyond the Scope of Established Caselaw Regarding the Reserved Water Rights Doctrine\nC. Had Congress Intended to Empower the NPS to Regulate Activity on Waterways Within National Preserves, It Could Have Done So\nD. The NPS's Exercise of Authority Over Waters Within CSU Boundaries Deprives Hunters of Access to Hunting Opportunities",
        "reference": "A. The Reserved Water Rights Doctrine is Inapposite to Sturgeon's Challenge to the Hovercraft Ban",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The plain text of the statute decides this case\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Court should ignore UBS's request to affirm on alternative grounds",
        "reference": "II. UBS's arguments for ignoring the burden-shifting framework prescribed by SOX are unpersuasive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
        "reference": "I. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Open the Floodgates to Third-Party Discovery in Domestic Litigation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Introduction\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Congress developed the Act to remedy decades of inadequate federal pollution control authority and prevent air pollution from worsening in the future\nB. Congress designed the Act to comprehensively address contemporaneous and future impacts to health and welfare\nC. Congress designed Section 111(d) as an integral gap-filling component of this comprehensive framework\nIII. Congress granted EPA the authority to craft effective regulatory actions to implement the Clean Air Act's public health and welfare protections\nA. Congress designed the Act to be technology-forcing where necessary to protect public health and welfare\nB. Congress designed the Act, including Section 111, to encompass a range of potential pollution control strategies based on EPA's empirical, practical assessment of the best system of emission reduction adequately demonstrated in each case\nC. Congress appropriately granted EPA significant rulemaking authority to limit emissions of dangerous air pollution, including where doing so might have a significant social or economic impact",
        "reference": "II. Congress designed the Clean Air Act as a comprehensive federal framework to address the impacts of air pollution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. LOWER COURTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY IGNORED HELLER AND MCDONALD\nII. LOWER COURTS' INTEREST-BALANCING TESTS CONTRAVENE HELLER AND ITS PROGENY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment\nC. Heller's List of \"Presumptively Lawful\" Measures Has Encouraged Lower Courts to Flout the Second Amendment\nD. The Slipshod Way Courts Have Approached the Second Amendment Has Left a Jurisprudence of Doubt\nIII. LAWS INFRINGING ON THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS REQUIRE A MEANINGFUL STANDARD OF REVIEW THAT ESCHEWS BALANCING TESTS",
        "reference": "A. A Minority of Courts Have Followed Heller and Use Only Text, History, and Tradition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. English Common-Law and Early American Courts Strictly Limited the Admission of Out-of-Court Statements in Criminal Trials\nIII. There Were Only Two Exceptions to the Confrontation Right in the Founding Era, Neither of Which Supports Adoption of the \"Open the Door\" Exception",
        "reference": "I. The Framers Adopted the Confrontation Clause to Enshrine in the Constitution the Common-Law Protections that Were Viewed as Fundamental at the Founding",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DUKE MEMORANDUM IS REVIEWABLE\nA. The Non-Discretionary Rescission of DACA Is Not Committed to Agency Discretion by Law\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE DUKE MEMORANDUM IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS\nA. The Duke Memorandum Offers No Reasoned Explanation for Rescinding the DACA Memorandum\nB. The Solicitor General's Arguments Do Not Explain Why DACA Is Unlawful\nIII. THE NIELSEN MEMORANDUM'S \"POLICY\" RATIONALES DO NOT RENDER THE DUKE MEMORANDUM EITHER UNREVIEWABLE OR LAWFUL\nA. The Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Should Be Disregarded\nB. Even if the Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Are Considered, They Do Not Justify Upholding the Duke Memorandum",
        "reference": "B. Additionally, General Enforcement Policies Are Not Committed to Agency Discretion by Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Respondents' Merits and Policy Arguments Are Not Reasons to Deny Certiorari",
        "reference": "I. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Appropriate Scienter Standard in False Claims Act Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. For Many Years, Norfolk Southern Rwy. Co. Has Invoked the Benefits and Protections of Pennsylvania.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Being Authorized to do Business in Pennsylvania Has Provided Norfolk Southern with Various Benefits.",
        "reference": "A. There is No Burden on Norfolk Southern Being Subjected to Jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT MISUNDERSTOOD THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ON- AND OFF-PREMISE SIGNS AND MISAPPLIED THE FIRST AMENDMENT\nA. Overview Of The Outdoor Advertising Industry And Regulations\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THIS CASE DOES NOT CONCERN THE HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION ACT\nIII. THIS CASE PRESENTS SERIOUS QUESTIONS OF STANDING",
        "reference": "B. This Case Is Distinguishable From Reed v. Town Of Gilbert, Ariz.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT OF ENABLEMENT AS A LEGAL QUESTION WARRANTS REVIEW\nA. The Federal Circuit's Rule Defies This Court's Precedents and History\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Federal Circuit's \"Reach the Full Scope\" Standard Warrants Review\nIII. This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle",
        "reference": "B. The Government's Arguments Support Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Government Has Both The Power And The Obligation To Expand The Religious Exemption To The Contraceptive Mandate\nA. The Religious Exemption To The Contraceptive Mandate Is the Most Straightforward Means of Satisfying RFRA\nB. The Third Circuit's Analysis Misunderstands RFRA\nC. The \"Accommodation\" Violates RFRA\nD. The Religious Exemption Is Independently Authorized By The ACA\nIII. The Third Circuit's APA And Remedial Holdings Are Equally Flawed\nA. The Religious Exemption Is Fully Consistent With The APA\nB. The Nationwide Injunction Is Both Improper And Harmful",
        "reference": "I. The Little Sisters Have Appellate Standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief062.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON\nIII. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES TO BOTH CIVIL MATTERS AND TO ACTIONS BY PRIVATE ACTORS THAT ARE COMPELLED BY LAW\nIV. ABORTION RIGHTS FIT WITHIN THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK",
        "reference": "I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IS NOT A VALID SOURCE FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF ABORTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1672_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The district court's administration of respondent's previously imposed sentence under Section 3583(k) was constitutionally valid\nA. The constitutional right to a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to postjudgment revocation of a defendant's conditional liberty\n1. Administering a sentence by revoking a defendant's conditional liberty is not part of a \"criminal prosecution\" that requires jury factfinding\n2. The Sixth Amendment-based Apprendi rule applies only to the imposition of a sentence\n3. [MISSING]\nB. The right to a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt did not apply to the revocation of respondent's supervised release\nC. The court of appeals erred in deeming Section 3583(k) constitutionally invalid\nII. At a minimum, 18 U.S.C. 3583(k) is not facially unconstitutional",
        "reference": "3. Historical practice confirms that juries have no role in the revocation of conditional liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners Seek To Dramatically Expand the Dormant Commerce Clause Beyond Its Text and Origins\nA. Text and History Confine the Commerce Clause Principally to Eliminating Discrimination and Protectionism\nB. Petitioners Would Radically Expand the Dormant Commerce Clause\nII. Petitioners' \"Extraterritoriality\" Challenge Fails\nA. Petitioners' Proposed Theory of Extraterritoriality Defies Law and Logic\nB. Petitioners Never Plead Facts Plausibly Showing Proposition 12's Invalidity\nC. Proposition 12 Regulates In-State Sales for Legitimate, In-State Purposes\nIII. Proposition 12 Is Constitutional Under Pike\nA. Petitioners Allege No Cognizable Burden on Interstate Commerce\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Proposition 12's Local Benefits Are Amply Sufficient",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION BELOW, WHICH PERMITS THE IMPOSITION OF SECTION 1981 LIABILITY EVEN WHERE RACE IS NOT THE BUT-FOR REASON FOR THE CHALLENGED ADVERSE DECISION, IS DIRECTLY CONTRARY TO THE STATUTE'S PLAIN TEXT AND THIS COURT'S RULINGS IN GROSS AND NASSAR\nA. Section 1981 Does Not Authorize Mixed-Motive Claims\n1. Congress has never amended Section 1981 to include an explicit \"motivating factor\" test or to otherwise authorize mixed-motive causation\n2. This Court has characterized Section 1981 as prohibiting discrimination \"because of\" race, meaning that race must be the, not merely a, reason for the challenged action\nB. [MISSING]\nII. ALLOWING SECTION 1981 LIABILITY TO ATTACH EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF BUT-FOR CAUSATION WOULD FRUSTRATE WORKPLACE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION EFFORTS\nA. Title VII's Detailed Administrative Enforcement Scheme Is Designed To Promote Prompt And Informal Resolution Of Discrimination Claims . 20\nB. Applying A Motivating Factor Causation Standard To Section 1981 Claims Would Encourage Applicants And Employees Alleging Race Discrimination To Bypass Title VII Entirely",
        "reference": "B. The Rationale Of Gross And Nassar Confirms The Impropriety Of Allowing Mixed-Motive Causation In Section 1981 Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The inter partes review regime has failed to provide a satisfactory forum for adjudicating patent rights\nA. Patent infringers frequently abuse the inter partes review process to conduct multiple attacks on the validity of patents, thereby depriving patent owners of quiet title over their inventions\nB. The Board's extraordinarily high claim cancellation rates confirm that the inter partes review process is not a neutral alternative to adjudication of patent rights in federal court\n1. Contrary to the suggestion of several amici, the Board's claim cancellation rates are much higher than those of district courts\n2. The high affirmance rate of Board decisions reflects the forgiving standard of review on appeal \u2014 not necessarily accuracy on the part of the Board\nII. The Federal Circuit's removal of administrative patent judges' tenure protections exacerbates the problems inherent in the inter partes review regime\nA. The court of appeals' remedy undermines the independence of administrative patent judges, contravening longstanding principles of administrative adjudication\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The task of remedying the Appointments Clause violation properly belongs with Congress, not the courts",
        "reference": "B. Subjecting administrative patent judges to at-will removal magnifies problematic structural biases already present in the inter partes review process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Defining the Relevant Product Market in This Context Requires Recognizing the Two-Sided Nature of Payment Networks\nA. The Rule of Reason Requires the Factfinder to Weigh All of the Circumstances of a Case\nB. The Relevant Product Market Must Be Defined Based on the Commercial Realities Faced by Consumers\nC. Both Interrelated Sides of Credit Card (and Other Payment) Networks Must Be Taken into Account\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. This Court Should Exercise Justified Caution in Imposing Antitrust Liability on Two-Sided Products",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE EMPLOYEES STATE A VALID AND STRAIGHTFORWARD CLAIM OF DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX UNDER TITLE VII\nA. The minority opinions cannot evade the result dictated by the differential treatment analysis by changing the question or recasting plainly sex-based actions in ostensibly sex-neutral phrasing\n1. The question before the Court is not whether \"sex\" means \"sexual orientation,\" but whether discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of discrimination based on sex\n2. The minority opinions err by imposing statutory prerequisites to a valid Title VII claim that are not found in the text of the statute\na. Title VII broadly prohibits sex-based distinctions in employment decisions\nb. The validity of a Title VII claim does not turn on whether a favorable resolution will assist in tearing down barriers to equal employment opportunity for women\nc. A valid Title VII claim is established when the discrimination would not have occurred but for the worker's sex\nB. The Wittmer concurrence's \"favoritism\" approach has been directly rejected by this Court\nII. THE EMPLOYEES' CLAIMS ARE VALID SEX STEREOTYPING CLAIMS UNDER PRICE WATERHOUSE\nIII. THE EMPLOYEES' CLAIMS ARE ANALOGOUS TO TITLE VII INTERRACIAL ASSOCIATION CASES\nIV. THE MINORITY OPINIONS' APPROACH TO THE PROPER ROLE OF CONGRESS AND THE RELEVANCE OF PRIOR CASE LAW CANNOT UNDERMINE THE EMPLOYEES' CLAIMS UNDER A PRINCIPLED, TEXT-BASED INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The minority opinions correctly cabin the relevance of prior circuit court opinions while misconstruing this Court's constitutional jurisprudence regarding the LGBT community",
        "reference": "A. Congressional inaction to amend the statute cannot control what the text of Title VII does or does not mean",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Circuits Are Divided Over the Tenth Circuit's Diversion-of-Foreign-Sales Theory\nII. The Issue Is Important\nIII. The Decision Below Is Wrong\nIV. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle",
        "reference": "I. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE DIVIDED OVER THE LANHAM ACT'S EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Gingles Test Imposes Burdens Not Justified by Current Needs.\nA. The Nation Has Experienced Dramatic Increases in Diversity and Minority Participation and Representation Since the Gingles Test Was Created.\nB. Due to Demographic Shifts Over the Preceding Decades, the First Gingles Factor No Longer Makes Sense.\nII. Section 2's Requirement that any Violation Be \"On Account of Race or Color\" Forecloses the Continued Use of Gingles to Address Vote Dilution Claims Without First Proving Causation.\nA. The Second and Third Gingles Preconditions Are an Atextual Interpretation of Section 2.\nB. Rucho, Brnovich, and Recent Circuit Court Decisions Highlight Gingles's Flaws.\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Modern Vote Dilution Claims Have Been Used as a One-Way Ratchet To Elect Democrats, Not To Remedy Minority Underrepresentation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's Case Law Implies That Laws Compelling Viewpoint-Based Speech are Per Se Unconstitutional, but Some Cases Have Instead Referred to the Strict Scrutiny Test\nII. This Court's Statements on Viewpoint Discrimination Have Also Been Ambiguous\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Certiorari is Appropriate to Clarify That State Interests Connected to Viewpoint Discrimination Can Never Be Compelling",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Courts' long-recognized power to order restitution in appropriate Section 13(b) cases is vitally important to protecting consumers and the economy\nII. Section 13(b) is not properly read as withholding courts' historic power to order, in appropriate cases, return of profits obtained through the unlawful practices the court enjoins\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 19 does not \u2014 and could not \u2014 supply a basis for interpreting Section 13(b) to withhold judicial power to award restorative relief\nIII. Disabling Section 13(b) enforcement would result in real and far-reaching consumer and market harm",
        "reference": "A. The text of Section 13(b) may not be construed as withholding restorative relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Reject The Rule Proposed By Chicago Access Corporation\nA. The Actions of Private Contractors Performing Correctional Functions Are Fairly Attributable to The State\nB. Chicago Access Corporation's Proposal Would Reverse the Established Rule that the Constitution Extends to Prison Contractors\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Chicago Access Corporation's Proposal Would Cause Sweeping, Catastrophic Results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"full-scope\" enablement requirement imposes a heightened standard inconsistent with the statute\nII. The full-scope requirement jeopardizes the ability of clinical-stage companies to obtain adequate patent protection\nIII. The full-scope requirement creates uncertainty and discourages innovation\nA. Clinical-stage companies like Instil require patents to secure investments needed to develop new therapies and bring them to patients\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Genus claims promote innovation",
        "reference": "B. Attempting to satisfy the full-scope requirement diverts limited resources of small companies away from their life-saving missions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Colorado Supreme Court Wrongfully Decided A Non-Justiciable Political Question\na. Determining The Requirements For The Presidency Is Exclusively Within The Purview Of The Legislature\ni. [MISSING]\nii. A Basic Understanding Of The Electoral Process Reinforces Congress's Role in Guarding the Presidency Against Unqualified Candidates\nb. The Contours of Disqualification under Section Three are Murky and Give no Manageable Standards for Courts to Apply.\n2. The Colorado Supreme Court's Decision, If Allowed To Stand, Will Create Political Chaos\na. States Will Continue to Unevenly Apply Section Three to Former President Trump\nb. If the Majority Opinion Stands, Section Three Will Be Ripe for Leveraging as a Tool to Strike Political Opponents from the Ballot\ni. Representative Tlaib\nii. President Biden and Vice President Harris\niii. Governor Whitmer\niv. The Potential Application of Section Three is Endless",
        "reference": "i. The Plain Language Of Section Three Confirms That Congress Alone Has The Power To Determine If A Person Is Disqualified From Holding Office Under Section Three",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1576_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Question Presented Has Divided The Courts of Appeals\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important And The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Wrong",
        "reference": "II. This Case Provides An Excellent Vehicle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Affordable Care Act Has Helped HCA's Patients Access Needed Care And Fulfilled Other Important Congressional Objectives\nA. HCA's Exchange Patients Used Emergency Rooms At Dramatically Reduced Rates, And Had Better Access To Outpatient Services\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Exchange Enrollees Took Personal And Financial Responsibility For Their Health Care\nII. The ACA Has Continued To Achieve Congressional Objectives Even Without An Enforceable Penalty For Failing To Maintain Minimum Coverage\nIII. The Affordable Care Act Has Operated As Intended Without An Enforceable Individual Mandate, So Under Clear Precedent Any Constitutional Defect Must Be Severed",
        "reference": "B. Women Received Care That Might Otherwise Be Unavailable To Them",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT EMPLOYS BOTH PROPERTY AND PRIVACY PRINCIPLES TO INTERPRET THE FOURTH AMENDMENT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Privacy and property serve complementary functions in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence\nC. Recognizing that property and privacy are complementary theories is consistent with Katz\nII. BOTH PROPERTY AND PRIVACY CAN BE USED TO RESOLVE FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDING QUESTIONS\nA. Fourth Amendment standing traditionally was tied to property rights\nB. Property rights continue to be important factors for determining whether a person has standing under the reasonable expectation of privacy test\nIII. UNDER TRADITIONAL PROPERTY RULES, MR. BYRD IS A BAILEE ENTITLED TO FOURTH AMENDMENT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDING\nA. Traditional bailment principles that are still in place today would have been understood to apply at the time of the Fourth Amendment's drafting\nB. Byrd became a bailee once he had possession and exercised control over the rental automobile\nC. Mr. Byrd also has standing under the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test",
        "reference": "A. When there is a physical intrusion into a person's personal property, this Court first considers an individual's rights from a property-based perspective",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The American Rule does not support respondent's atextual construction of Section 145",
        "reference": "A. Respondent's interpretation of \"expenses\" defies the plain meaning of the term and is inconsistent with the structure, purpose, and history of Section 145",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-210_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The minority rule serves no purpose and is merely a trap for the unwary",
        "reference": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Copyright Law Should Not Be Transformed Into An Anticompetitive Weapon For The Benefit Of Software Incumbents.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. There Is A Strong Public Interest In Promoting Interoperability And Portability.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The decision below is incorrect\nC. The question presented is exceptionally important and warrants review in this case",
        "reference": "A. The decision below implicates a recognized conflict among the courts of appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-292_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S CONSISTENT CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S CORRECT CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT SEIZED FOR PURPOSES OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT\nA. Under This Court's Mendenhall Test, Petitioner was Not Seized\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Court's Decisions Comport With The Historical, and Common Sense, Understanding of The Term \"Seizure\"\n2. Without a Seizure, There Can Be No Fourth Amendment Violation\nII. HODARI D. DOES NOT DICTATE THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE\nA. The Tenth Circuit Properly Evaluated Contradictory Statements in Hodari D. Nearly a Decade Before Issuing Its Opinion In This Case\nB. The Hodari D. Language Relied Upon By Petitioner is Dicta\nIII. THOSE CASES THAT CONSIDERED SEIZURE BY PHYSICAL FORCE, PARTICULARLY BROWER, CONTROL THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE\nA. The Search Clause Jurisprudence Cited by Petitioner Has No Bearing on the Issue Raised in This Case\nB. The Common Law Principles Espoused by Petitioner Do Not Control This Court's Analysis of Whether a \"Seizure\" Occurs for Purposes of the Fourth Amendment\nIV. PETITIONER HAS NOT IDENTIFIED ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR OVERRULING THIS COURT'S USE-OF-FORCE FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURE CASES",
        "reference": "B. This Court's Fourth Amendment Standards Show That There Can Be No Seizure Without Acquisition of Control",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SOLE PURSUIT OF PARTISAN ADVANTAGE IS NOT A LEGITIMATE BASIS FOR REDISTRICTING\nA. There is agreement that \"excessive\" partisanship is not a legitimate basis for redistricting\nB. Identifying partisan advantage as an illegitimate basis for redistricting would address the concerns expressed in Vieth\nII. REDISTRICTING SOLELY TO ACHIEVE A PARTISAN ADVANTAGE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE LONGSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL NORM AGAINST GOVERNMENT PARTISANSHIP AS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY\nA. The Court's First Amendment decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate\nB. The Court's Fourteenth Amendment decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate\nC. The Court's Elections Clause decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. A constitutional standard based on a requirement that an acceptable plan be designed to further legitimate state interests would provide a manageable and meaningful check on the redistricting process\nB. Requiring the government to ground its decisions in a legitimate purpose would provide essential support for well-established constitutional norms",
        "reference": "III. REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PARTISAN EFFECTS OF REDISTRICTING WERE THE INCIDENTAL RESULT OF ITS PURSUIT OF LEGITIMATE STATE INTERESTS WOULD PROVIDE A CLEAR AND ADMINISTRABLE STANDARD AND A MEANINGFUL CHECK ON ILLEGITIMATE PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Heller was mistaken about 18th-century linguistic usage.\nB. Other corpus analyses of the Second Amendment are consistent with amicus's conclusions.\nC. Gun-rights advocates have not seriously disputed amicus's analysis (or any of the other corpus analyses showing Heller to have been mistaken).\nII. The petition should be denied, and the Court should temporarily abstain from hearing claims under the Second Amendment.",
        "reference": "I. The corpus data shows that the Court in Heller was mistaken about the Second Amendment's original meaning.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "A claim for nominal damages based on past injury-in-fact satisfies Article III independent of any other claim for relief\nA. [MISSING]\nB. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress\nC. A nominal damages claim for a past legal violation supports an Article III suit regardless of whether it is accompanied by other claims for relief\nD. The practical impact of recognizing stand-alone claims for nominal damages",
        "reference": "A. Nominal damages are a long-established judicial remedy for invasions of personal legal rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Applying these principles to the word \"induce\" compels adopting the narrower, established criminal law meaning",
        "reference": "I. Well-established principles, beyond the constitutional avoidance canon, support narrow construction of criminal statutes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. An Admissions System that Relies on Self-Identified Race is Inherently Flawed and Unreliable",
        "reference": "I. Harvard and UNC's Racial Categories are Arbitrary and Irrational",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "The Forest Service has authority under 30 U.S.C. 185 to grant a pipeline right-of-way through federal lands in National Forests that are traversed by the Appalachian Trail\nA. The Forest Service has authority to grant a pipeline right-of-way through federal lands in National Forests\nB. The Trails Act does not convert National Forest lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail into \"lands in the National Park System\"\n1. Congress's designation of a national scenic trail does not transfer administrative authority over National Forest \"lands\" crossed by that trail\na. The Trails Act, which distinguishes between a \"trail\" and the \"lands\" it traverses, charges the Secretary of the Interior only with administration of \"a trail\"\nb. The Trails Act's allocation of authority recognizes that federal lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail remain under the administrative jurisdiction of other federal agencies\ni. Selection of the Trail's right-of-way\nii. Protection of the Trail's surrounding environment\niii. Overall administration of the Trail\n2. The broader legal and practical context confirms that National Forest lands traversed by the Trail remain under the Forest Service's administrative jurisdiction\nC. The court of appeals misinterpreted the Trails Act and Mineral Leasing Act\n1. The court of appeals ignored the Trails Act's distinction between a trail and the lands that it traverses\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. The court of appeals misunderstood the Mineral Leasing Act's definition of \"agency head\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.46
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1011_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE IOIA IS INCORRECT BECAUSE IT FAILS TO EFFECTUATE A CLEAR WAIVER OF IMMUNITY\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S DECISION, WHICH GRANTS IMMUNITY TO THE IFC, IS CONTRARY TO THE REMEDIAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY",
        "reference": "II. THE D.C. CIRCUIT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THAT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF FUNCTIONAL IMMUNITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1472_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tax Court Needlessly Expends Considerable Judicial Resources Each Month Incorrectly Policing Petition Filing Deadlines as a Jurisdictional Issue\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Equitable Tolling Would Be Highly Beneficial to Taxpayers in Typically Recurring Situations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Act Compels Pro-life Pregnancy Centers' Speech\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Abortion Referral forces Petitioners to facilitate abortion in violation of their conscience\nC. The Unlicensed Mandate is inaccurate and onerous\nD. It does not matter whether the compelled speech endorses beliefs, is attributed to Petitioners, or forbids Petitioners' other speech\nII. No Basis Exists to Apply Commercial or \"Professional\" Speech Standards\nA. Petitioners' compelled speech is not subject to review under Zauderer\nB. Licensed centers' claims are not subject to a \"professional speech\" doctrine\nC. Licensed centers' claims are not subject to informed-consent principles\nD. Protecting Petitioners' rights will not undermine routine disclosure requirements\nIII. The Act's Compelled-Speech Provisions Fail Any Level of Review\nA. The Abortion Referral does not satisfy strict or intermediate scrutiny\nB. The Unlicensed Mandate does not satisfy strict or intermediate scrutiny",
        "reference": "A. The Act targets Petitioners as disfavored speakers, and subjects them to disfavored treatment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit Correctly Determined That The American Rule Prohibits The PTO's Request For Attorneys' Fees\nA. The American Rule Applies Whenever A Litigant Seeks To Have Another Pay His Attorney's Fees\nB. The American Rule Prohibits The PTO's Request For Attorneys' Fees Because section 145 Does Not \"Specifically And Explicitly\" Authorize Attorneys' Fees\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Fourth Circuit Incorrectly Determined That The American Rule Applies Only When A Statute Awards Fees To A Prevailing Or Substantially Prevailing Party",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent Barely Tries To Square National Parks With FOIA's Plain Text And This Court's Cases\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. There Is No Vehicle Problem",
        "reference": "II. The Circuit Splits Regarding Application Of National Parks Are Not Illusory And Can Be Resolved Through This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS WRONG",
        "reference": "I. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CFPB JUSTIFIES CONCERNS ABOUT CREEPING ENCROACHMENTS\nII. \"THE EXECUTIVE POWER IS VESTED IN \"A\" PRESIDENT WHO \"SHALL TAKE CARE THAT THE LAWS BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED\"\nA. The President \u2014 and Only the President \u2014 Is Authorized and Obligated To \"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed\"\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Constitution Contemplates Presidential Assistants\n2. Executive Officers Work in the Executive Branch and Are Subordinate to the President\nC. To Faithfully Execute the Laws, the President Must Have Control Over His Officers \u2014 By Removal, If Necessary\nD. The President's Control Over His Administration Makes the President Accountable for the Faithful Execution of the Laws \u2014 and Thereby Helps To Secure Individual Liberty\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER HUMPHREY'S EXECUTOR",
        "reference": "B. To \"Take Care\" That the Laws Be Faithfully Executed, the President Must Have Agents \u2014 Executive-Branch \"Officers of the United States\" \u2014 Whose Offices Are Lodged in the Executive Branch",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1312_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron Deference Violates the Separation of Powers and Threatens Individual Liberty\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Chevron Deference Threatens Individual Liberty By Transferring Legislative and Judicial Powers to the Executive\n1. Chevron Stacks the Deck Against the American People\n2. Chevron Transfers Legislative Powers to Unelected Executive Officials\n3. Chevron Transfers Judicial Authority to Unelected Executive Officials\n4. Chevron and Its Constitutionally Challenged Companion, Brand X, Are At Odds with Due Process\nII. Chevron Violates the APA",
        "reference": "A. The Separation of Powers and Our Constitution's Promise of an Independent Judiciary Protect Individual Liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FTC'S UNRESTRAINED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 13(B) IMPOSES SUBSTANTIAL COSTS ON LEGITIMATE COMPANIES AND DETERS LAWFUL COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME ESTABLISHED BY CONGRESS IS SUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS THE GOVERNMENT'S ENFORCEMENT CONCERNS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Amendment Does Not Bar Schools from Regulating Off-Campus Speech When It Is Directed at Campus and Is Substantially Disruptive\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Tinker Did Not Divest Schools of Their Authority To Regulate Off-Campus Speech\nC. Closely Related Doctrinal Contexts Confirm that Schools Can Regulate Off-Campus Speech Based on Its On-Campus Effects\nD. Existing Law Already Prohibits Viewpoint Discrimination and Intrusions into Students' Private Lives\nII. Abrogating Tinker for Off-Campus Speech Risks Potentially Calamitous Consequences\nA. The Third Circuit's Rule Would Undercut State and Federal Laws Protecting Students\nB. The Third Circuit's Rule Would Prevent Schools from Protecting Basic School Operations\nC. The Third Circuit's Rule Would Produce Extreme Arbitrariness",
        "reference": "A. Public Schools Have Always Disciplined Off-Campus Speech To Prevent On-Campus Disorder",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-111_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "D. Strict Scrutiny Is Not Satisfied\nII. The Court Should Follow its Compelled-Speech Decisions Rather Than Respondents' New Theory\nA. Phillips's Free-Speech Arguments Are Constitutionally Based, Limited, and Workable\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. Respondents' Attempts to Reduce or Eliminate Constitutional Scrutiny Fail\nA. Laws Applied to Compel Speech Cannot Evade First Amendment Scrutiny Because of Their Facial Scope or Target\nB. CADA Is Content Based When Applied to Speech\nC. The O'Brien Test Does Not Apply\nIV. The Free Exercise Clause Condemns the Commission's Bias and its Order Compelling Art That Celebrates Weddings",
        "reference": "B. Accepting Respondents' Theory Will Compel Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. USE OF CY PRES AWARDS IN CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS COMPELS CLASS MEMBERS TO SUPPORT SPEECH WITH WHICH THEY MAY DISAGREE\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. REQUIRING CLASS MEMBERS TO AFFIRMATIVELY OPT OUT VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not permit a litigant to serve a foreign state by requesting that process directed to the foreign minister be mailed to the state's embassy in the United States\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Certiorari is warranted, but Kumar presents a better vehicle for the Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress abandoned the requirement of \"excepting\" to adverse trial court rulings because it serves no purpose in the modern era other than needlessly frustrating meaningful appellate review\nII. Experience in the Fifth Circuit confirms that its post-sentence objection rule suffers from the same flaws as the discarded \"exceptions\" requirement\nA. The Fifth Circuit's rule does not enhance judicial decisionmaking\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Fifth Circuit's rule thwarts meaningful appellate review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief039.pdf",
        "text": "A. Public accommodations laws comply with the First Amendment even when they incidentally burden speech\nB. This Court has invalidated public accommodations laws only in unusual cases where they were applied to directly burden speech by forcing a speaker to convey an unwanted ideological message\nC. Petitioners are not entitled to a categorical exemption from the Accommodation Clause\n1. The Accommodation Clause ordinarily imposes only an incidental burden on petitioners' speech\n2. The Accommodation Clause easily satisfies the O'Brien standard\n3. Some potential applications of the Accommodation Clause could raise novel and difficult questions, but those questions are not presented here\nD. Petitioners' remaining arguments lack merit\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. Petitioners are not entitled to an exemption from the Communication Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Many Federal and State Statutory Schemes Do Not Distinguish Between Common Law Employees and Independent Contractors\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Reality of the Working Relationship, Not the Face of the Contract, Determines Worker Status Under Federal Employment Statutes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1252(f)(1) is Limited to Removal Orders\nA. The Statutory Context\nB. Subsection 1252(f)(1) Does Not Limit Relief In This Case\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. It Is Unnecessary to Address Forfeiture\nIV. This Court Has Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "II. Subsection 1252(f)(1) Does Not Apply to Texas's APA Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Must Restrict Application of the Major Questions Doctrine to Assertions of Agency Power that Are Genuinely \"Extraordinary\"\nII. The HEROES Act Unambiguously Provides that the Debt Relief Plan is a Valid Exercise of the Secretary's Delegated Authority\nA. The text of the Act grants the Secretary broad authority\nB. The breadth of authority assumed here is consistent with the context in which the Act was enacted, amended, and made permanent\nC. The Secretary's Plan is consistent with other pandemic-related invocations of the Act\nIII. The Major Questions Doctrine Does Not Bar the Secretary's Plan\nA. The Secretary's Plan is not unheralded\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Secretary's Plan is justified by clear congressional authorization",
        "reference": "B. The Secretary's Plan is not a \"transformative expansion\" of the Department's regulatory authority",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A Court Presented With An As-Applied Method Of Execution Claim Must Consider The Objectively Known Risks That Arise From How An Execution Protocol Will Impact An Inmate With A Particular Medical Condition\nB. An Inmate Asserting An As-Applied Challenge Is Entitled To Discovery Into The Training And Experience Of Medical Members Of The Execution Team To Establish The Full Extent Of The Risk Of Suffering He Faces\nII. THE \"KNOWN-AND-AVAILABLE-ALTERNATIVES REQUIREMENT\" HAS NO PLACE IN AN AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE BASED ON AN INMATE'S UNIQUE MEDICAL CONDITION\nA. An As-Applied Challenge Based On An Inmate's Unique Medical Condition Will Not, In Effect, Ban Capital Punishment\nB. An Inmate With A Unique Medical Condition Can And Should Be Permitted To Establish That A Given Method Of Execution, As Applied To Him, Would Be Cruel And Unusual Irrespective Of The Available Alternatives\nIII. THE RECORD AS A WHOLE ESTABLISHES THAT A LETHAL GAS EXECUTION WILL SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE RISKS BUCKLEW FACES FROM MISSOURI'S LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL\nIV. PETITIONER MET THE EVIDENTIARY BURDEN TO DEFEAT RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE COMPARISON GLOSSIP REQUIRES OF LETHAL GAS AND LETHAL INJECTION\nA. Respondents Did Not Dispute That Lethal Gas Was A Feasible And Readily Available Alternative Method When Moving For Summary Judgment\nB. An Inmate Challenging His Method Of Execution Need Not Design The Protocols For His Own Execution",
        "reference": "I. COURTS SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT AN EXECUTION WILL GO AS INTENDED WHEN CONSIDERING AN AS-APPLIED CHALLENGE TO A METHOD OF EXECUTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT TRUSTEES, AND THE TRUST ASSETS THEY OWN, IS EXERCISED BY THE STATE IN WHICH THE TRUST IS MANAGED AND ADMINISTERED, NOT THE STATES IN WHICH BENEFICIARIES RESIDE\nII. STATES MAY ONLY EXERCISE TAXING POWER OVER NONRESIDENT ENTITIES WHO HAVE A DEFINITE LINK OR MINIMUM CONNECTION TO THE TAXING STATE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A Nonresident Trustee Does Not \"Purposefully Avail\" Himself, or the Trust He Manages, of the Jurisdiction of a Foreign State Simply Due to the Presence of an In-State Beneficiary\nIII. THE TRUSTEE IN HANSON HAD FAR MORE CONTACTS WITH FLORIDA THAN THE KAESTNER TRUSTEE HAD WITH NORTH CAROLINA, YET FLORIDA LACKED PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE TRUSTEE\nA. The Settlor-Beneficiary's Retention of Control Over Certain Aspects of the Trust's Operation Was Insufficient for Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Over the Trustee in Hanson, Because the Trustee Did Not Purposely Avail Himself of Florida\nB. Ms. Kaestner's Contingent Interest Was Far More Limited Than That of the Settlor-Beneficiary in Hanson Due to the Legal Authority Granted to the Trustee and that She Was Only One of Several Potential Recipients of Distributions from the Trust\nC. The Due Process Limits On The Extra-territorial Exercise of State Power Recognized In Hanson Counsel Against Extension Of North Carolina's Taxing Jurisdiction In This Case\nIV. CONNECTICUT'S TAX POLICY CHOICE DOES NOT EXPAND NORTH CAROLINA'S TAXING POWER BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE",
        "reference": "A. South Dakota v. Wayfair Underscores the Due Process Clause's Requirement that a Taxed Entity Must Have \"Purposefully Availed\" Itself of the Taxing State",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals failed to give due respect to the district court's management of voir dire.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The questions presented warrant review.",
        "reference": "B. The Waltham evidence did not justify the court of appeals' vacatur of respondent's sentence.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-315_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. El Salvador's continuing struggle with the impact of natural disasters has made the country unsafe for the return of TPS holders.\nA. Environmental disasters have increased food insecurity and poverty in El Salvador.\nB. Salvadoran TPS holders would face the threat of violent crime.\nII. Haitian TPS holders would return to a state of increasing violence and a lack of food and vital healthcare infrastructure.\nA. Violent crime and civil unrest in Haiti have intensified in recent years.\nB. Ten years after the 2010 earthquake, Haiti still lacks sufficient healthcare infrastructure.\nC. Haitians continue to struggle with poverty-related conditions such as scarcity of food, water, housing, and economic opportunities.\nIII. Honduras continues to be ravaged by natural disasters that have exacerbated dangerous living conditions.\nA. Honduras has yet to recover from the 1998 hurricane.\nB. Honduras is plagued by extreme violence and impunity.\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Ongoing armed conflict in South Sudan makes safe return impossible.\nB. Violence targeting civilians, and in particular women and children, is prevalent.\nC. There is a humanitarian crisis in South Sudan due to the desperate need for aid and difficulty in providing it.\nV. Yemeni TPS holders would return to violent civil war and severe shortages of food and healthcare.\nA. Yemen continues to suffer from chronic violence, especially against civilians.\nB. The civil war has exacerbated food insecurity.\nC. The conflict has weakened Yemen's healthcare infrastructure.",
        "reference": "IV. South Sudanese TPS holders would return to rampant violence and a humanitarian crisis.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5924_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT'S JURY TRIAL CLAUSE DOES NOT REQUIRE UNANIMITY\nA. A \"Trial By Jury\" Under the Sixth Amendment Does Not Require Every Feature of the Common Law Jury\nB. A Unanimous Verdict Is Not an Indispensable Component of a \"Trial By Jury.\"\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Louisiana law fulfills all of the purposes animating the jury trial requirement\n3. A unanimity rule is not ingrained in this Court's Sixth Amendment precedent\nII. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICT TO CONVICT\nIII. APODACA V. OREGON SHOULD NOT BE OVERRULED",
        "reference": "1. There is inadequate historical support for unanimity being indispensable to a jury trial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Appellees Have Standing to Challenge Particular Districts on Partisan Vote-Dilution Grounds\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Court Has Recognized the Justiciability of Partisan Gerrymandering for More Than Thirty Years\nB. The Court Should Reject Appellants' Radical Elections Clause Argument\nC. The Court May Decide This Case Without Addressing the General Justiciability of Partisan Gerrymandering\nIII. The District Court's Test for Partisan Vote Dilution Is Discernible and Manageable\nA. The District Court's Intent Prong Is Limited and Precise\nB. The District Court's Effect Prong Is Limited and Precise\nC. The District Court's Justification Prong Is Limited and Precise",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Adhere to Its Consistent Holdings That Partisan Gerrymandering Is Justiciable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act serves important law enforcement purposes\nA. PAGA's origins and operation\nB. PAGA actions are state law enforcement actions\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. PAGA is integral to the adequate enforcement of the State's labor laws",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FAA cannot, and does not, require a court to enforce any arbitration agreement unless the court determines that the FAA applies to that agreement\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. New Prime's invocation of its delegation clause and the principle of \"severability\" cannot justify application of the FAA to a contract to which the FAA does not apply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-290_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The standard stated by this Court in Wyeth governs the preemption analysis here\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Where factual disputes exist, juries in tort actions have long been tasked with considering the actions of regulators",
        "reference": "II. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 does not alter the preemption analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The reasonable observer test undermines the government's right under the government speech doctrine to control the content of its own messages by allowing a hypothetical third party to decide whether a passive and historically grounded acknowledgement of religion violates the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "I. The Establishment Clause protects free exercise by precluding the government from coercing religious observance and discriminating against religions, not by prohibiting the government from recognizing the important role that religion continues to play in our country's history",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Question Presented Warrants Review This Term\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Case Is a Better Vehicle Than Birt",
        "reference": "II. Crack Offenders Sentenced Under 21 U.S.C. section 841(b)(1)(C) Are Eligible for Section 404 Relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED BY ADOPTING A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD FOR SHAREHOLDER CLAIMS UNDER section 14(e) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Negligence Standard Is Inconsistent with the Plain Text of the Statute\nB. Congressional Intent Confirms That section 14(e) Claims Require Scienter\nII. A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD WILL FURTHER ENCOURAGE AND FEDERALIZE MERGER OBJECTION LITIGATION\nA. Trulia Eliminates Delaware as a Friendly Forum for Merger Objection Suits\nB. The Plaintiffs' Bar Shifts Merger Objection Suits to Federal Court\nC. The Plaintiffs' Bar Forum Shops Within the Federal Court System\nIII. OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS STRONGLY FAVOR A SCIENTER STANDARD FOR section 14(e) CLAIMS\nA. A Negligence Standard for section 14(e) Increases the Risk of Over-Disclosure\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A Negligence Standard for section 14(e) Undercuts Settled Mergers and Acquisitions Law",
        "reference": "B. A Negligence Standard for section 14(e) Violations Will Chill Tender Offers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Convention's plain terms exclude enforcement of an agreement against nonparties to the agreement\nB. The Convention's provisions differ significantly from those of Chapter 1 of the FAA, which permit enforcement of arbitration agreements by or against nonparties if and when allowed by state contract law\nII. Equitable estoppel is a means of binding nonparties to a contract's requirements and therefore cannot provide a basis for compelling arbitration under the Convention\nIII. Policy considerations cannot justify extending the Convention's reach beyond its terms",
        "reference": "I. The New York Convention does not authorize courts to compel arbitration by or at the behest of persons who are not parties to an arbitration agreement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. TransUnion Is a Major Player in this Information Economy\nIII. Congress Enacted the FCRA's Maximum Possible Accuracy Requirements Precisely Because Inaccurate Information Poses a Material Risk of Harm\nIV. Each Member of the Class Suffered Actual, Concrete, and Particularized Injury from TransUnion's Willful Violation of the FCRA's Maximum Possible Accuracy Requirements\nA. The Material Risk that Harmful False Information Will Be Disseminated Is Sufficient, Without More, to Create an Actual Concrete Injury\nB. TransUnion Misconstrues the Stipulation to Underestimate the Number of Class Members Whose Inaccurate OFAC \"Match\" Information Was Disseminated\nC. Though No Additional Injury Need Be Proven, the Facts the Jury Knew About the Class Supported Reasonable Inferences of Additional Concrete Injuries",
        "reference": "I. Buying and Selling Consumer Data Is a Multi-Billion-Dollar Industry that Permeates Every Corner of Modern Commercial Life",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 2(a)'s \"Scandalous\" Provision Targets Speech Based on Viewpoint\nA. Viewpoint Discrimination Is An Egregious Form Of Content Discrimination\nB. The \"Scandalous\" Provision Discriminates Based On Viewpoint\nII. If The Court Finds The \"Scandalous\" Provision Of Section 2(A) To Be Constitutional, This Court Should Clarify Whether An Applicant Who Has Been Denied Federal Registration On The Basis Of That Provision In Section 2(A) May Nevertheless Invoke Protection Under Section 43(A)\nA. The Legislative History Supports That Section 43(a) Was Intended To Apply Broadly Even To Marks Not Entitled To Federal Trademark Registration\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Purpose Of Section 43(a) Supports That Two Pesos Should Not Limit Section 43(a)'s Availability By \"Registrability\" Under Section 2(a)",
        "reference": "B. This Court's Statement In Two Pesos Does Not Preclude Availability Of Section 43(a) To Marks Refused Under Section 2(a)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decision to terminate DACA is subject to judicial review\nA. The termination decision is not \"committed to agency discretion by law\"\nB. New rationales advanced by petitioners after the termination decision do not make it unreviewable\nC. Section 1252 does not bar review\nII. The termination decision is invalid under the APA\nA. The agency's stated premise that DACA is unlawful is incorrect\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Class-based deferred action policies are a permissible policy tool\n3. DACA is a permissible class-based deferred action policy\n4. The agency's assertion that DACA is illegal rests on a mistaken legal premise\nB. The agency's explanation for its decision does not satisfy the APA's requirements for reasoned decisionmaking\nC. Alternative rationales advanced by petitioners during this litigation cannot save the termination decision\n1. \"Litigation risk\"\n1. Former Secretary Nielsen's policy rationales\nIII. The judgments of the courts below should be affirmed",
        "reference": "1. Deferred action is lawful",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-43_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The wiretap orders at issue were facially insufficient\nB. Title III requires the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a facially insufficient wiretap order\n1. The government's 'fundamental defect' test is deeply flawed\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) does not contain an implicit 'severance' principle",
        "reference": "2. Even if Title III imposed a 'fundamental defect' test, suppression would still be required because the orders at issue were fundamentally defective",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS LIKE TWITTER PROVIDE CRUCIAL RESOURCES FOR TERRORISTS AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS\nA. Terrorist Organizations Use Social Media Platforms to Disseminate Their Propaganda Widely and Rapidly\nB. Terrorist Organizations Use Social Media Platforms to Recruit Terrorist Operatives\nC. Terrorist Organizations Use Social Media Platforms to Organize, Inspire, and Finance Terror Attacks\nII. SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS' ACTIONS AMPLIFY TERRORIST CONTENT AND TARGET IT TOWARDS VULNERABLE USERS\nIII. SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS ARE AWARE THAT THEIR CONDUCT AIDS TERRORISTS, YET TAKE LITTLE MEANINGFUL ACTION\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY IS NOT LIMITED TO ASSISTING THE COMMISSION OF THE SPECIFIC TERROR ATTACK THAT INJURED A UNITED STATES NATIONAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVIDIOUSLY TO DISCRIMINATE IN A SECULAR BENEFITS PROGRAM AGAINST ANOTHER WISE ELIGIBLE ENTITY SOLELY BECAUSE OF ITS RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR ACTIVITIES\nII. LOCKE v. DAVEY PROVIDES NO SOLID FOOTING FOR A CONTRARY RESULT\nA. THE LOCKE DECISION IS ITSELF QUESTIONABLE\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. THE LOCKE DECISION WAS UNNECESSARY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Establishment Clause was intended to protect, not inhibit, religious exercise and to accommodate diverse religious beliefs\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Establishment Clause was meant to accommodate diverse religious beliefs and expression by giving even-handed treatment to all religious faiths\nII. The Lemon test does not reflect the intent of the Establishment Clause and has an especially exclusionary effect on minority religious believers\nA. The Lemon test does not reflect the protective meaning and understanding of the Establishment Clause\nB. The Lemon test has an especially pernicious and disproportionate effect on minority religions by effectively excluding them from public speech and grounds entirely\nC. In contrast to the unworkable and ahistorical Lemon test, the test suggested by Van Orden (and urged by Petitioners) is historically defensible, clearer in its application, and thus more consistent in its results\nIII. Offended observer standing and the resulting \"heckler's veto\" it permits have a particularly injurious effect on minority religious communities",
        "reference": "A. The Establishment Clause was meant to encourage religious exercise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-58_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The government's notion that section 706(2) does not authorize vacatur is contrary to the APA's text, its history, and the long-held view of the courts.",
        "reference": "I. Section 1252(f)(1) poses no barrier to entry of relief under 5 U.S.C. section 706.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Arizona's Unconstitutional Causal Nexus Test Deprived Capital Defendants of a Fair Sentencing Hearing\na. Consistent with Arizona Law, Sentencing Courts Refused to Consider Non-Causally Connected Mitigation\nb. The Arizona Supreme Court's Causal Nexus Test Deprived Defendants of the Investigation and Presentation of Mitigating Evidence\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Arizona Juries Regularly Find Non-Causally Connected Mitigation Sufficiently Substantial to Call for Leniency",
        "reference": "II. The Arizona Supreme Court Continues to Fail to Give Meaningful Consideration to Non-Causally Connected Mitigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The lower court erred when it ruled that Section 111 obligates EPA to promulgate the Clean Power Plan\nB. The Clean Power Plan is a major rule requiring clear congressional authorization\nII. EPA cannot use Section 111 of the Clean Air Act to regulate coal burning power plants when they are regulated under Section 112",
        "reference": "I. The major rules doctrine precludes EPA from issuing and enforcing the Clean Power Plan",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1471_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. HOME DEPOT IS INCORRECT TO ALLEGE FORUM SHOPPING\nA. Despite the growth in debt collection lawsuits, counterclaim class actions are rare\nB. When a defendant asserts class counterclaims, they vindicate actual harms that are closely related to the merits of the initial action\nC. [MISSING]\nII. CONSPIRATORS SHOULD NOT HAVE TWO OPPORTUNITIES TO CHOOSE FEDERAL OR STATE JURISDICTION",
        "reference": "C. Holding additional counterclaim defendants to their co-party's choice of forum furthers principles of substantial justice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. Requiring All Employees To Share In The Cost Of Developing And Implementing Their Contracts Does Not Trigger Strict Scrutiny\nA. The Strict Scrutiny Petitioner Invokes Only Applies When The Government Burdens A Worker's Right To Lobby As A Citizen Outside His Job\nB. Fair Share Fees Finance Workplace Speech, Not Lobbying, And Therefore Do Not Trigger Strict Scrutiny\n1. The Contracting Process Routinely Requires Limitations On Employees' Speech Within The Workplace Without Giving Rise To Substantial Constitutional Concern\n2. Soliciting Employee Input During Contracting, And Passing The Cost Of That Participation On To Employees As A Whole, Does Not Trigger Strict First Amendment Scrutiny\n3. [MISSING]\nII. The History Of Labor-Management Cooperation In Public Education Illustrates How Collective Bargaining Is An Essential Part Of State Agencies' Internal Process For Contracting With Teachers And Improving Education\nA. States Have A Compelling Interest In Preserving The Educational Benefits Made Possible By The Labor-Management Collaboration Collective Bargaining Facilitates\n1. Collective Bargaining Is Essential To The Effective Implementation Of Innovative Programs To Improve Education\n2. Collective Bargaining Promotes Health And Safety Within Our Schools\n3. Collective Bargaining Provides A Framework For Myriad Other Labor-Management Collaborations As Well\n4. The Labor-Management Collaboration Made Possible Through Collective Bargaining Improves Educational Outcomes\nB. Eliminating Fair Share Fees Would Seriously Disrupt The Management Of Thousands Of Schools, To The Detriment Of Education Nationwide\nIII. Petitioner's Facial, All-Or-Nothing Challenge To All Aspects Of Every Fair Share Fee Ever Charged Anywhere, On The Basis Of No Record At All, Is Itself Facially Defective\nA. Petitioner's Bare-Record Facial Challenge Ignores The Substantial Variation In The Uses Of Fair Share Fees And The Resulting First Amendment And Government Interests At Stake\nB. Petitioner's Facial Challenge Defies Ordinary Principles Of Sound Judicial Administration And Restraint",
        "reference": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Arbitration Objections Should Be Treated Like Other Venue Objections",
        "reference": "I. Non-Jurisdictional Venue Objections Can Be Waived Without A Showing Of Prejudice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Court has long held that the Fifth Amendment does not require that compensation be paid before or at the same time as a taking\nB. This Court's longstanding interpretation is consistent with the text of the Takings Clause and with historical evidence\nC. Congress and the Executive Branch have relied on this Court's longstanding interpretation\nII. The existence of an adequate state-law mechanism for obtaining just compensation for a taking by a local government does not prevent the owner from vindicating her Fifth Amendment rights in federal court\nA. Williamson County does not prevent local takings claimants from seeking just compensation in federal court under their state-law causes of action\n1. Williamson County rested on an understanding of the cause of action in Section 1983\n2. Owners asserting a Fifth Amendment right to compensation may bring their state inverse-condemnation actions in federal court under Section 1331\nB. This Court also could revisit and reject Williamson County's understanding of Section 1983\n1. There are special justifications for reconsidering Williamson County's understanding of Section 1983\n2. Williamson County's understanding of Section 1983 is incorrect",
        "reference": "I. The failure to provide contemporaneous compensation for a taking does not violate the Fifth Amendment if the government has provided an adequate mechanism for obtaining just compensation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief060.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text and History of the Fourteenth Amendment Protect Personal, Individual Rights Essential to Liberty\nA. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment Ensures the Full Promise of Liberty and Equality for All\nB. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects the Full Scope of Liberty, Not Merely Rights Enumerated Elsewhere in the Constitution\nC. This Court's Precedents Establish Broad Protections for Substantive Liberty and Equality\nII. This Court Should Reaffirm Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Roe and Casey Establish a Workable Framework for Enforcing Fundamental Rights Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment\nC. The Viability Line Established in Roe and Reaffirmed in Casey Should Be Reaffirmed Once Again",
        "reference": "A. The State's Arguments for Overruling Roe and Casey Are Based on a Fundamentally Flawed Form of Originalism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-199_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Reopening decisions are not subject to judicial review\nA. Section 355(f) is limited to final decisions under Section 355(c)\n1. The text of Section 355(f) limits judicial review to final decisions under Section 355(c)\n2. The structure of Section 355 confirms that review is limited to Section 355(c) determinations\n3. Petitioner's counterarguments lack merit\nB. Section 231g reinforces that reopening decisions are not judicially reviewable\nC. Additional structural features of both statutes confirm this interpretation\n1. Reopening is a matter of agency grace\n2. Judicial review of reopening denials would undermine other statutory constraints\nII. Petitioner's remaining counterarguments lack merit\nA. The presumption of judicial review does not dictate a contrary conclusion\nB. The government's interpretation does not broadly foreclose review of other Board determinations\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Board has not conceded that reopening denials are subject to judicial review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.46
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Administration Lacks the Statutory Authority Needed to Implement its Student Debt Cancellation Program\nA. The plain text of the HEROES Act does not authorize the administration to carry out its student debt cancellation program\nB. The major questions doctrine reinforces the notion that the administration lacks the authority needed to carry out its plan\nII. The Administration's Student Debt Cancellation Plan is Inherently Unfair and Will Harm the Economy and the People it Purportedly Benefits\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The debt cancellation program is inherently unfair and regressive\nC. The program harms future borrowers and the very people it claims to help",
        "reference": "A. This outrageously costly program will further damage an already weak economy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION RESULTS IN A DIRECT COLLISION BETWEEN SCA WARRANTS AND EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY LAWS\nA. EU Law Recognizes the Protection of Personal Data and Privacy as Fundamental Individual Rights\nB. [MISSING]\n1. SCA Warrants May Not Supply an Adequate Legal Basis for EU Companies to Process the Personal Data Sought by the Warrant\n2. EU Companies May Be Prohibited from Transferring Personal Data to the United States in Response to an SCA Warrant\n3. Preclusion of Notice Orders Create Further Conflicts with Other Provisions of EU Law\n4. Preclusion of Notice Orders Also Threaten Substantive Privilege Protections\n5. EU Companies Face Significant Monetary Penalties and Potential Civil or Criminal Liability for Violating EU Privacy Laws\nII. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN RECOGNITION OF THE GRAVE COMITY CONSIDERATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISCORD THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION CREATES\nA. The Same Comity Concerns that Help Inform This Court's Extraterritoriality Jurisprudence Also Underlie Aerospatiale\nB. Balancing Under Aerospatiale Means Affording Genuine Respect for Foreign Sovereignty and Foreign Law",
        "reference": "B. The Government's Position, If Adopted, Would Trigger Serious and Unresolvable Conflicts between SCA Warrants and European Data Protection and Privacy Rules",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT'S CURRENT PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY SHOULD BE APPLIED TO DETERMINE THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE LANHAM ACT\nA. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes\nB. Stare Decisis Does Not Preclude Applying the Current Presumption in This Case\nII. THE LANHAM ACT APPLIES TO USE OF A TRADEMARK ABROAD THAT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE CONFUSION IN THE UNITED STATES\nA. Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) Have No Clear Indication of Geographic Scope\nB. The Focus of Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) Is Consumer Confusion\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The Court Has Required Domestic Conduct When the Focus of the Provision Is Conduct\n2. The Court Has Not Required Domestic Conduct When the Focus of the Provision Is Something Other Than Conduct\n3. When the Focus of a Provision Is Something Other Than Conduct, a Domestic-Conduct Requirement Would Frustrate Congressional Intent",
        "reference": "C. When Use of a Trademark Abroad Is Likely To Cause Consumer Confusion in the United States, Conduct in the United States Is Not Required",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONSTRUING ANILCA TO TAKE OVER ALASKA'S WATERWAYS CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S OPINIONS REGARDING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. CONSTRUING ANILCA TO TAKE OVER ALASKA'S WATERWAYS IMPERMISSIBLY EXPANDS THE IMPLIED RESERVED WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. AGENCY FEES ARE EXTRACTED FROM EMPLOYEE WAGES\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Contrary to precedent\n2. Contrary to law\n3. Contrary to common sense\n4. Contrary to logic\n5. Contrary to religious education cases . . 8\nB. The Collectivist Wealth Hypothesis Fails . 9\nII. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT, IN THE NAME OF STARE DECISIS, EXALT ERRONEOUS COURT PRECEDENT OVER THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF",
        "reference": "A. The Conduit Hypothesis Fails",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau violates the separation of powers\nA. The CFPB's structure violates the rule against restrictions on the President's ability to remove executive officers\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court should not extend the Humphrey's Executor exception to the CFPB\n1. The CFPB's structure is a historical anomaly\n2. The CFPB's structure lacks an important check against governmental tyranny\n3. The CFPB's structure unduly limits presidential control over the exercise of the executive power\nD. In the alternative, Humphrey's Executor should be overruled\nII. The Court should reverse the judgment below and, if it reaches the question of severability, invalidate Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act\nA. The Court should reverse the judgment below\nB. The Court should not address the question of severability in this case\nC. The limitation on the President's ability to remove the Director of the CFPB is not severable from the remainder of Title X",
        "reference": "B. No exception to the rule applies to the CFPB",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.42
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. Congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity must be unequivocal\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The statutory text unequivocally abrogates tribal sovereign immunity\n2. The statutory structure confirms the unequivocal meaning of the text\n3. History does not undermine the unequivocal meaning of the text",
        "reference": "B. The Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates tribal sovereign immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief046.pdf",
        "text": "I. PREGNANCY HELP ORGANIZATIONS\nA. The Early Years: A Fledgling Pregnancy Help Network Begins To Form\nB. 1992: The Pregnancy Help Network Continues To Grow But Its Scope And Services Remain Limited\nC. 2021: Modern Pregnancy Help Organizations Are Ubiquitous, And Offer A Wide Variety Of Resources To Empower Women To Thrive During and After Pregnancy\nII. THE PREVALENCE OF PREGNANCY HELP ORGANIZATIONS MOOTS STARE DECISIS CONCERNS\nA. The Services And Resources Provided By Pregnancy Help Organizations Help Address The \"Reliance\" Concerns Asserted By The Casey Plurality\n1. Empowering Success in Education\n2. Equipping for Success in the Workplace\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Lived Experiences\nB. Other Stare Decisis Factors Should Not Deter The Court From Ensuring That It Correctly Answers The Important Constitutional Question Presented By This Case\nIII. STARE DECISIS IS NOT A MATERIAL ISSUE TO THE EXTENT THE COURT DETERMINES MERELY TO MODIFY ITS APPROACH TO ABORTION CASES",
        "reference": "3. Enabling Success in Society",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5639_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Conflicts With Multiple Circuits That Require District Courts to Provide Some Explanation When Declining to Grant Proportional Sentence Reductions Pursuant to section 3582(c)(2)\nII. The Issue Presented is Narrow, Focused, and Suitable for Review\nA. The Decision Below Was Not Factbound\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Issue Presented Is Important and Recurring",
        "reference": "B. The Record Does Not Indicate the Reasons for the District Court's Decision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-8369_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"[D]ismissed on the Grounds That It to State a Claim for Which Relief May Be Granted\" Covers All Such Dismissals, Including Those With, and Without, Prejudice\nA. The Plain Meaning of \"Dismissed\" Includes All Types of Dismissals\nB. \"Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted\" Has a Distinct Meaning That Includes Both Types of Dismissals\nC. Other Types of Dismissals Under section 1915(g) Include Dismissals With and Without Prejudice\nD. Excluding \"Without Prejudice\" Dismissals from section 1915(g) Would Create Conflict with Other Sections of the PLRA. 21\nE. [MISSING]\nF. The Limited Legislative History Supports the Plain Meaning of section 1915(g)\nII. The Plain Meaning of \"Dismiss\" in section 1915(g) Does Not Create the Harms Claimed by Mr. Lomax\nA. Courts Commonly Employ Screening Processes to Review and Improve Prisoner Complaints Before Any Type of Dismissal\nB. The Three-Strikes Provision Covers Only Certain Claims and Does Not Bar Any Prisoner from Filing\nC. Many Dismissals Without Prejudice Do Not Present Claims with Temporary and Curable Procedural Flaws\nD. The Plain Meaning of \"Dismissed\" in section 1915(g) Poses No Constitutional Concerns",
        "reference": "E. In Other Statutes, Congress Specifies When It Attaches Consequences Just to Dismissals With Prejudice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.42
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Circuit Improperly Applied the De Facto Officer Doctrine to Excuse a Violation of the Structural Protections in the Appointments Clause\nA. The de facto officer doctrine does not apply where the issue is the validity of an office rather than the appointment of a particular officer\nB. The Court should reaffirm that Buckley v. Valeo's aberrant use of the de facto officer doctrine (or something like it) has been limited to its facts\nC. The Court should reverse the First Circuit's application of the de facto officer doctrine\n1. The decision undermines important constitutional protections\n2. The decision disincentivizes Appointments Clause challenges and fails to deter violations\nII. The First Circuit Erred in Allowing the Board to Continue to Act After It Was Determined to Be Unconstitutional\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Allowing unconstitutional agencies to retain authority creates perverse incentives and discourages constitutional challenges\nC. There are remedial alternatives that protect reliance interests while still vindicating a plaintiff's right to a meaningful remedy",
        "reference": "A. The decision to allow ongoing unconstitutional decisionmaking is contrary to precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-546_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FTCA's Judgment Bar Incorporates Common Law Res Judicata Principles and Does Not Extend to Dismissals for Lack of Jurisdiction\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Court's Decision in Simmons Supports Affirmance",
        "reference": "II. The Government's Proposed Interpretation Would Undermine Key Purposes of the FTCA by Channeling Litigation to Federal Employees and Encouraging Duplicative Litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. Montana's Student-Aid Program Is Constitutional Under the Religion Clauses\nA. The Religion Clauses Afford \"Wholesome Neutrality\" Protections\n1. The Establishment Clause Requires Neutrality\n2. The Free Exercise Clause Requires Neutrality\n3. The Interplay Between The Religion Clauses Does Not Negate Their Neutrality Protections\nB. Montana's Blaine Amendment Does Afford Wholesome Neutrality Protections\nC. Montana's Student-Aid Program Affords Wholesome Neutrality Protections\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Montana's Blaine Amendment Harms Montanans Who Benefit From Montana's Student-Aid Program",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A distinction must be made, among the materials used to determine foreign law, between what may count as applicable law and the subsidiary means for determining applicable law, and the interpretation or characterization of Chinese trade law by MOFCOM counts as applicable law\nIII. The Pink precedent demands that binding deference be given to the interpretation or characterization of Chinese trade law by MOFCOM as the authoritative decision-maker in this area\nIV. The act of state doctrine as reflected in Sabbatino also supports binding deference to the interpretation or characterization of Chinese trade law by MOFCOM as the authoritative decision-maker in this area\nV. Alternatively and subsidiarily, the interpretation or characterization of Chinese trade law by MOFCOM as the highest administrative authority on trade law in China should be given substantial deference analogous to Chevron deference\nVI. The alleged inconsistency between China's representations to the WTO and its position in this case, even assumed to exist, does not affect the validity of its position in this case as a matter of domestic law and therefore the binding deference due to it",
        "reference": "I. Rule 44.1 addresses only what materials may be used in determining foreign law, not what effect to give to these materials, which effect must be determined on considerations outside the Rule, and is consistent with whatever effect properly derived, including \"binding deference\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The standard of First Amendment scrutiny that applies to laws compelling speech depends on the context\nA. Laws that require professionals to make disclosures related to their own services generally are subject to review under Zauderer or heightened scrutiny\nB. The parties' categorical arguments for different standards of scrutiny lack merit\nII. The Licensed Notice violates the First Amendment\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court need not decide whether the Licensed Notice discriminates on the basis of viewpoint\nIII. The Unlicensed Notice does not violate the First Amendment",
        "reference": "A. The Licensed Notice fails under heightened scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT EACH OF THE \"PEOPLE\" VOTING SHOULD HAVE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE POWER TO EFFECT THE SELECTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES\nII. A METHODOLOGY DOES EXIST FOR DRAWING CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WHICH WILL SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE POWER OF VOTERS IN THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. MAKING THE PROVIDING OF VOTING POWER TO ALL TO THE EXTENT PRACTICABLE A CRITERIA SECOND ONLY TO THE REQUIREMENT OF EQUAL POPULATION IN EACH DISTRICT WOULD PROPERLY LIMIT BUT NOT ELIMINATE HONORING TRADITIONAL DISTRICTING CONSIDERATIONS\nV. THE SUBSTANTIAL LIMITATION OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING WHICH WOULD BE THE RESULT OF MAXIMIZING THE POWER OF EACH VOTER WOULD AVOID THE ADOPTION OF ALTERNATIVE UNSATISFACTORY SOLUTIONS",
        "reference": "III. FOLLOWING THE MANDATE OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 THAT THE POWER OF VOTERS SHOULD BE MAXIMIZED LIMITS BUT DOES NOT ELIMINATE PARTISANSHIP AND MAKES UNNECESSARY THE DETERMINATION OF THE INTENT OF THE BODY DISTRICTING AND ITS PARTISAN EFFECT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT AND DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS\nA. A Per Se Rule Banning Crosses Conflicts With This Court's Precedent\nB. The Decisions of the Second, Fifth, And Tenth Circuit Cannot Be Distinguished\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Will Have Dramatic Consequences\nII. THE MATERIAL FACTS HAVE NEVER BEEN IN DISPUTE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Only Relevant \"Government\" Is The Commission\nC. Crosses Were A Well-Recognized Means to Commemorate The Fallen Of WWI\nD. Prayers At Commemorative Veterans' Events Are Unremarkable And Do Not Transform Those Events Into Religious Services\nIII. THE CASE IS RIPE FOR REVIEW\nIV. A TEST FOCUSED ON NATIONAL TRADITIONS AVOIDS ABSURD RESULTS",
        "reference": "A. The Private Builders' Motivations Are Not Relevant, And, In Any Event, Were Entirely Secular",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit's Treatment of Enablement as a Legal Question Warrants Review\nA. The Federal Circuit's Rule Defies Precedent and History\nB. The Issue Is Important\nII. The Federal Circuit's \"Reach the Full Scope\" Standard Warrants Review\nA. The Standard Defies Text, Precedent, and Policy\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle",
        "reference": "B. The Issue Is Exceptionally Important",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Loan Repayment Prohibition Places a Significant Burden on First Amendment Rights\nA. The loan repayment prohibition intrudes into the candidate's decision-making and inhibits speech\nB. The loan repayment prohibition frustrates the RNC's First Amendment activities, as well as those of other non-candidates\nC. The First Amendment value of contributions does not diminish after an election\nII. The Loan Repayment Prohibition Fails to Withstand First Amendment Scrutiny\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Congress passed the loan repayment prohibition to \"level the playing field\" rather than to prevent corruption\n2. Post hoc polls and academic studies are not a valid substitute for record evidence of quid pro quo corruption\n3. The Government's claim that funds going \"into the candidate's pocket\" changes the traditional analysis lacks merit\nB. The Government has not narrowly tailored the loan repayment prohibition",
        "reference": "A. The First Amendment requires the Government to prove actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is an imperative need for the court to consider fully the concept of viability as a temporal line for purposes of review of abortion regulations.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The use of fetal viability as a bright line for reviewing abortion regulations is vague and indeterminate.\nIV. The state's interest in preserving fetal life becomes predominant when the biological humanity of the fetus becomes manifest.",
        "reference": "II. The use of fetal viability as a bright line for reviewing abortion regulations is logically incoherent.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Categorical exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement are disfavored and should be avoided. Warrantless entry into the home is the chief evil for which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect against. Allowing warrantless entries for all criminal offenses, including minor misconduct such as failure to wear a mask in public or honking a horn, are examples of why categorical exceptions are overbroad and unreasonable\na. [MISSING]\nII. Modern electronic warrant procedures are legal, efficient, effective and should be encouraged. Restrictions to warrantless entries should be the path moving forward. Judicial permission prior to entry should be encouraged and not diminished\na. The availability of an electronic warrant process is relevant to determining whether a per se rule is overbroad\nb. The electronic warrant process is now available in virtually every state, rendering the expansion of warrantless entries into the home for every misdemeanor offense unnecessary and overbroad\nIII. The risk of great bodily harm or death that can occur to law enforcement and innocent bystanders, when a forceful and perhaps unannounced warrantless entry into the home occurs, outweighs the benefits of forgoing the warrant overview process\nIV. A workable rule is available to guide law enforcement: for nonfelony hot pursuits, get a warrant before entering the home. The only exception should be where the facts establish that loss of life or limb is at risk",
        "reference": "a. The Warrant Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The decision below is correct\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Board's censure of Wilson for his extra-legislative protected speech violated the First Amendment\n3. HCC's contrary position is untenable\nB. The petition does not present a conflict warranting the Court's review\nC. This case is not a suitable vehicle",
        "reference": "1. Wilson has Article III standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE ELIMINATED\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's Decisions Fully Support Abandoning Assignor Estoppel\nC. Congress Has Never Assumed Assignor Estoppel Is Part Of The Patent Act\n1. Assignor Estoppel Was Not Well Established When Congress Enacted Any Version Of Section 282(b)\n2. Common-Law Estoppel Doctrines Offer No Support For Assignor Estoppel\nD. Assignor Estoppel Thwarts Federal Patent Policy\nII. IF ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL SURVIVES, IT SHOULD BE CONSTRAINED\nA. Assignor Estoppel Cannot Protect Patent Claims Issued After Assignment\nB. Assignor Estoppel Cannot Bar Section 112 Defenses\nC. Assignor Estoppel Cannot Bar An Assignor Who Made No Representation About Patent Validity On Which The Assignee Reasonably Relied From Challenging Validity",
        "reference": "A. The Patent Act's Text Precludes Assignor Estoppel",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. Mandating Violation of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Ensuring Coverage of All Shifts and Fairly Allocating Undesirable Shifts Would Impose an Undue Hardship on the Conduct of the Employer's Business\nA. The Plain Text of Title VII Makes Clear That Interference With Arrangements for Managing Employees Burdens the \"Conduct\" of an Employer's Business and is Relevant to the Undue Hardship Analysis\nB. Federal Labor Policy and the Unchallenged Portion of the Holding in Hardison Require that Violation of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Fairly Allocating Job Shifts Be Considered an Undue Hardship on the Conduct of the Employer's Business\n1. Federal Labor Policy Requires that a Breach of a CBA Fairly Allocating Job Shifts Be Considered an Undue Hardship on the Conduct of the Employer's Business\n2. Hardison's Unchallenged Holding is Dispositive\nC. [MISSING]\nII. In the Alternative, the Court Should Decline to Answer the Second Question Presented and Remand for Further Consideration by the Court of Appeals",
        "reference": "C. Accepting Petitioner's Argument Would Be Inconsistent With This Court's Express Holding that Co-Workers' Interests Are Relevant Under the ADA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION VIOLATES THIS COURT'S MANDATE THAT DEFENDANTS BE AFFORDED A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT THE BASIC PRESUMPTION AT CLASS CERTIFICATION\nA. Defendants Must be Permitted to Offer at Class Certification \"Any\" Evidence that \"Severs the Link\" Between an Alleged Misrepresentation and Share Price\nB. Plaintiffs' Invocation of the Inflation Maintenance Theory Significantly Increases the Burden on Defendants to Rebut the Basic Presumption and Has Recently Led to a Number of Substantial Settlements Against Retailers\nC. The Court of Appeals Contravened Halliburton II in Prohibiting Petitioners' Evidence that Generic and Aspirational Statements Could Not Have Artificially Maintained Share Price\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. AS SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCLOSURES EXPAND, SO TOO DOES LIABILITY RISK UNDER THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. APPELLEES' INJURIES ARE FAIRLY TRACEABLE TO SECTION 304 AND ARE LIKELY TO BE REDRESSED BY A FAVORABLE DECISION\nA. Appellees Establish Traceability by Showing that Section 304 Was at Least a But-for Cause of Their Injury\nB. [MISSING]\nII. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
        "reference": "B. Adopting FEC's Theory of Standing Would Significantly Restrict Judicial Challenges to Unlawful Federal Government Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split, to correct the First Circuit's erroneous holding, and to prevent unprecedented and improper expansion of the injury-in-fact requirement\na. The First Circuit incorrectly held that Ms. Laufer has standing\nb. [MISSING]\ni. Harm to businesses caused by unwarranted litigation\nii. Harm to domestic and international travelers\niii. Opening the litigation floodgates and judicial economy",
        "reference": "b. The First Circuit's holding could adversely affect small businesses, domestic and international travel, and federal court judicial economy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Statutory Text Makes Plain That Crack Offenders Sentenced Under Section 841(b)(1)(C) Have a \"Covered Offense\"\nA. Section 2(a) \"Modified\" the Statutory Penalties for Crack in Section 841(b)(1)(C)\nB. The Government Replaces \"Modified\" with \"Amended\" in Section 404(a)\nC. Section 404(c)'s \"Limitations\" Could Have Easily Excluded Section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders But Did Not\nII. Covering Section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders Accords with Section 404's History\nA. Crack Offenders Have Always Been Regulated as One Cohesive Group\nB. Congress Adopted the Commission's View that Section 2 Should Apply to Section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders\nC. Section 2 and Amendments 750/759 Were Successful Policy, But Some Crack Offenders Were Unable to Benefit\nIII. Covering Section 841(b)(1)(C) Crack Offenders Accords with Congress's Purposes\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 404 Made Section 2 Retroactive for All Crack Offenders\nC. Excluding the Lowest-Level Crack Offenders Would Be Anomalous",
        "reference": "A. Section 2 Reduced the Crack-to-Powder Disparity for All Crack Offenders",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.42
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Due Process Does Not Permit a State to Tax Undistributed Trust Income Based Solely on the Residence of a Discretionary Trust Beneficiary in the State\nA. A Discretionary Trust Beneficiary's Residence In a State Does Not Justify That State's Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income That Is Earned In Another State\nB. The Analysis of the Court Below Is Neither Formalistic Nor Rigid and Comports With the Due Process Clause\nC. The Court Below Did Not Create A Tax Shelter\nIII. North Carolina's Tax Violates the Commerce Clause\nA. The Four Factors For the Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis Cannot Be Met\nB. In the Alternative, the Matter Should be Remanded for Commerce Clause Consideration",
        "reference": "I. A Trust Is Separate and Distinct from Its Beneficiaries, and Should Be Treated as Such for Purposes of State Income Taxation of Undistributed Trust Income",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "The courts below correctly held that the NCAA's rules are subject to traditional rule-of-reason review, and they properly applied that framework to the facts found by the district court\nA. Petitioners' restraints on student-athlete compensation are subject to fact-intensive scrutiny under the rule of reason\nB. The courts below properly applied the rule of reason\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The lower courts' step-three analyses were sound\n3. Petitioners' critiques regarding particular restraints provide no basis for reversal",
        "reference": "1. The courts below correctly applied step two of the rule of reason",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING\nA. The Memorandum Will Reduce Representation and Federal Resources in States where Plaintiffs' Members Reside\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE MEMORANDUM VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS TO INCLUDE ALL PERSONS IN EACH STATE IN THE APPORTIONMENT REGARDLESS OF IMMIGRATION STATUS\nA. The Constitution Requires Including Undocumented Immigrants Residing in Each State in the Apportionment Base\nB. The Census Act and Apportionment Act Require Including Undocumented Immigrants Residing in this Country in the Apportionment Base\nC. The Government Does Not Have Discretion to Exclude Usual Residents of a State from the Apportionment\nIII. THE MEMORANDUM VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS TO BASE APPORTIONMENT ON THE DECENNIAL CENSUS ALONE\nA. The Constitution Requires Using the Decennial Census Enumeration as the Apportionment Base\nB. The Text of the Census and Reapportionment Acts Require Apportionment Based on the Decennial Census\nC. The Memorandum Bases Apportionment on Data Other Than the Decennial Census in Violation of the Constitution and Federal Statutes",
        "reference": "B. The Memorandum Injured Plaintiffs by Chilling Participation in the Census",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The question presented is too narrow to resolve the constitutionality of the encouragement provision.\nB. This case is a poor vehicle to resolve the question presented because the government is defending a construction of the statute that was not presented to the jury that convicted Mr. Hansen.\nII. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Conflict With Any Decision of This Court or Another Court of Appeals.\nIII. The Court of Appeals' Decision Does Not Raise an Issue of Exceptional Importance.\nIV. The Decision of the Court of Appeals Is Correct.\nA. The Court of Appeals Correctly Construed the Encouragement Provision.\nB. The Court of Appeals Correctly Held That The Encouragement Provision is Facially Overbroad.",
        "reference": "I. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle To Address the Constitutionality of the Encouragement Provision.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. General Tax Jurisdiction Must Be Limited To An Entity's Domicile\nB. Specific Tax Jurisdiction Requires The Entity To Actually Be Conducting Business In The Forum Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "I. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE REQUIRES DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING TAX BASED ON GENERAL JURISDICTION VERSUS SPECIFIC JURISDICTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL THEORY IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT FRAUD REQUIRES \"OBTAINING MONEY OR PROPERTY\"\nA. The Object Of A Wire Fraud Scheme Must Be \"Obtaining Property\" From Another\nB. The Fraud Statutes Protect Only \"Property\" That Is Obtainable \u2014 Meaning Transferable From Victim To Defendant\nC. Lower Courts Adopting The Right-To-Control Doctrine Have Obliterated The Obtaining Property Requirement\nII. THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL DOCTRINE CRIMINALIZES COMMON BUSINESS PRACTICES\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. Faith is of the utmost importance to many religious students.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Notwithstanding the myriad of benefits provided by religious diversity, Harvard utterly disregards the importance of religious diversity while proclaiming that racial diversity is absolutely essential to its educational mission.\nIV. Forgoing religious diversity harms college students by depriving them of the ability to better understand minority faiths while allowing antisemitism to blossom, including at institutions like Harvard.\nA. Antisemitism in early America.\nB. Antisemitism at American colleges.\nC. Antisemitism generally today.",
        "reference": "II. The educational benefits of religious diversity are substantial.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tenth Circuit correctly held this case is justiciable.\nA. The Tenth Circuit rightly held that Lorie showed a credible enforcement threat.\nB. Lorie's self-censorship creates an ongoing injury that Colorado fails to address.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the free-speech question and review the indefensible rule allowing the government to compel speech.\nIII. This Court should resolve the circuit split on free-exercise comparability and overturn Smith.\nIV. Colorado's response underscores the need for this Court's review.",
        "reference": "C. The Tenth Circuit correctly held this case is ripe.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The major-party requirement violates the First Amendment\nA. Laws imposing severe burdens on the right to associate must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest\nB. The major-party requirement imposes a severe burden on the right to associate\nC. The major-party requirement is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest\nD. The major-party requirement does not survive even \"closely drawn\" scrutiny\nII. By itself, a bare-majority limitation would not violate the First Amendment\nA. A bare-majority limitation is not a severe burden on the right to associate\nB. Operating alone, a bare-majority limitation would be closely drawn to serve the substantial interest in maintaining political balance on Delaware's courts without unnecessarily abridging associational freedoms\nIII. Whether judges are \"policymakers\" is irrelevant to the questions presented here\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The \"policymaker exception\" does not apply to laws disqualifying citizens from judicial office based on political affiliation\nC. The First Amendment does not prevent consideration of political affiliation in judicial appointments\nIV. The Third Circuit's holding that the unconstitutional major-party requirement is not severable is controlled by state law",
        "reference": "A. The \"policymaker exception\" is limited to patronage-based employment decisions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE VIABILITY STANDARD IS ARBITRARY AND OUTMODED WITH CURRENT MEDICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD ABANDON IT\nA. Justices and Commentators Have Correctly Criticized the Viability Standard as Arbitrary and Outmoded, and Therefore, the Suggested Alternative Standard Should Be Used\nB. A Myriad of Advances in Science and Technology Have Occurred Since Roe Requiring the Court to Re-examine the Outmoded Viability Standard\nC. Viability in the Abortion Context Creates a Conflict with Other Areas of the Law, and Therefore, the Law Should Be Uniform in Protecting the Unborn Child\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Health Issues Are Complex Issues That Are Fact Bound and Involve National and State Policy and Are Best Left to the Legislative Branches of Government\nB. The HB 1510 Provisions Are Within This Court's Constitutional Framework and Should Be Upheld",
        "reference": "II. THIS COURT HAS RECOGNIZED THAT BROAD DEFERENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND ENACTMENTS, AND THEREFORE, THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision does not conflict with Otto\nB. The Ninth Circuit's decision does not conflict with any other decision\nC. This case would be a poor vehicle to consider the constitutionality of conversion therapy restrictions\nD. The Ninth Circuit's decision is correct\nII. The Court Should Deny Certiorari as to Petitioner's Free Exercise Claim",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Deny Certiorari as to Petitioner's Free Speech Claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1471_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. NOT PERMITTING DERIVATIVE DEFENDANTS TO REMOVE A CIVIL ACTION IS CONSISTENT WITH SHAMROCK OIL'S REASONING, WHILE HOME DEPOT'S APPROACH WOULD GREATLY EXPAND FEDERAL JURISDICTION\nA. Shamrock Oil's Analysis Applies with Equal Force to Derivative Defendants\nB. The Text of section 1441(a) Does Not Authorize Additional Counterdefendants to Remove Civil Actions\nC. The History and Statutory Context of section 1441(a) Further Support the Conclusion that Additional Counterdefendants Cannot Remove\nD. Congress Has Declined to Amend section 1441(a) to Permit Removal by Derivative Defendants\nE. Accepting Home Depot's Position Would Lead to Absurd Results\nII. CAFA DID NOT CHANGE THE LONGSTANDING RULE THAT COUNTERDEFENDANTS CANNOT REMOVE COUNTERCLAIMS\nA. \"Any,\" Standing Alone, Does Not Upend the Meaning of \"Defendant\" for Purposes of Removal\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Use of \"Any Defendant\" in Other Statutes Does Not Encompass Parties Added to Civil Actions by Counterclaims\nD. CAFA Did Not Alter the Rule that Only Civil Actions that Fall Within the Federal Courts' Original Jurisdiction May Be Removed\nIII. THE POLICY ARGUMENTS OF HOME DEPOT AND ITS AMICI ARE MERITLESS\nIV. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DECISION BELOW ON THREE ADDITIONAL GROUNDS",
        "reference": "B. Congress' Specific Objectives in Passing CAFA Did Not Include Allowing Removal of Class Counterclaims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Overview of the OPPS and the 340B Program\nA. The Medicare Outpatient Prospective Payment System\nB. The 340B Program\nC. OPPS Payment Policy for 340B Drugs\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Prior Payment Policy Was Inefficient and Inequitable to Medicare Providers and Beneficiaries\nB. The Current Payment Policy Reallocates Savings to All Hospitals\nIII. There Is No Reason for This Court to Review the D.C. Circuit's Decision",
        "reference": "II. The Current Payment Policy for 340B Drugs Furthers Congress's Goals in Enacting the OPPS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1059_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RIGHT TO CONTROL AND THE SELF-DEALING PRONG OF HONEST SERVICES ARE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Development of the Immorality Standard of Fraud\nC. Development of Honest Services and Right to Control\nD. Re-adoption in Wallach\nII. THE LOWER COURTS FAIL TO DEFINE THE RIGHT TO CONTROL PROPERTY STRAND IN AN INTELLIGIBLE WAY\nA. How Courts Define the \"Right to Control\"\nB. The Lower Courts Improperly Delegate the Power to Define the Crime to Dissatisfied Complainants\nIII. THE APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO CONTROL DOCTRINE VIOLATES THE PEOPLE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO FAIR WARNING AND LIMITED FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT",
        "reference": "A. The Origins of the Right to Control Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Pursuit of Felons\nB. \"Dangerous Woundings\" Creating a Risk of Felony\nC. \"Hue and Cry\" to Capture Felons\nD. Violent Affrays and Breaches of the Peace\nII. Because Warrantless Arrest Authority Has Expanded Far Beyond What the Framers Conceived, this Court Should Not Depart from the Common Law by Extending that Power Further",
        "reference": "I. Founding-Era Common Law Prohibited Forcibly Entering Homes to Make Warrantless Arrests, Except in Defined Circumstances Based on Specific Exigencies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Because Granting Review Is Not Likely To Alter The Judgments Below, This Case Is Not The Proper Vehicle For Deciding The Question Presented\nII. The Seventh Circuit's Decision Is Correct\nA. The City's Argument And Third Circuit's Contrary Decision Are Based On An Incorrect Reading Of Section 542(a)\n1. The Text Of Section 542(a) Compels The Conclusion That Section 542(a) Is Self-Executing\n2. Whiting Pools Holds That Section 542(a) Is Self-Executing\n3. Section 542(a)'s Legislative History Supports The Conclusion That Section 542(a) Is Self-Executing\nB. By Retaining Respondents' Cars In Violation Of Section 542(a), The City Engaged In An Act That Exercised Control Over Respondents' Cars In Violation Of Section 362(a)(3)\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Seventh Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Strumpf",
        "reference": "C. The Purpose, History, And Structure Of The Bankruptcy Code Demonstrate That The Seventh Circuit's Decision Was Correct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-887_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1415(l) requires exhaustion only if a non-IDEA action seeks relief available under the IDEA\nB. Petitioner's ADA action seeks \"relief\" not available under the IDEA\nC. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect\nD. Policy concerns provide no reason to depart from Section 1415(l)'s plain text\nII. Petitioner satisfied Section 1415(l)'s exhaustion requirement because further exhaustion would be futile or unnecessary\nA. Section 1415(l) does not require further administrative exhaustion after IDEA claims are settled because such proceedings would be futile\n1. IDEA actions are subject to an exhaustion requirement with a futility exception\n2. Section 1415(l) incorporates the IDEA's exhaustion requirement and its futility exception\n3. Petitioner's further exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative procedures would be futile\nB. Alternatively, petitioner's settlement of his IDEA claims exhausted the IDEA's administrative process",
        "reference": "I. Section 1415(l)'s exhaustion requirement does not apply because petitioner's ADA action seeks relief that is not available under the IDEA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief047.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Implicit Racial Bias and Stereotypes Taint the Administration of Justice and Public Policy\nB. Admissions Policies That Consider Race as Only One of Many Factors Help Produce Lawyers Who Can Overcome Racial Bias and Stereotypes\nII. Admissions Policies That Consider Race as One Factor Among Many Help Provide the Racial Diversity in the Legal Profession That Is Essential to the Legitimacy of Our Legal and Democratic Institutions\nA. Diversity in the Legal Profession Is Important for the Legitimacy of Our Legal and Democratic Institutions\nB. Admissions Policies That Consider Race as Only One of Many Factors Help to Increase Minority Representation in the Legal Profession",
        "reference": "I. Diverse Educational Institutions Are Needed So That All the Lawyers They Produce Are Better Able to Administer Justice and Public Policy Without Bias",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-9526_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decision below rests on independent and adequate state grounds\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. This Court's decision in Sharp v. Murphy will render this Petition moot, and the arguments raised by the State in Murphy demonstrate that Petitioner's arguments are incorrect on the merits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S RELIGION CLAUSES PREVENT CIVIL COURTS FROM ADJUDICATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS BROUGHT BY AN EMPLOYEE AGAINST HER RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER, WHEN THE EMPLOYEE CARRIES OUT IMPORTANT RELIGIOUS FUNCTIONS\nA. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades\nB. This Court Affirmed the Ministerial Exception in Hosanna-Tabor and Set Forth Nonrigid Guidelines in Applying It\nC. Both Biel and Morrissey Are \"Ministers\" According to Hosanna-Tabor and Their Employment Discrimination Claims Must Be Barred\n1. Kristen Biel Was a Minister Within the Hosanna-Tabor Meaning\n2. Agnes Morrissey-Berru Was a Minister Within Hosanna-Tabor Meaning\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE EEOC'S INTERFERENCE WITH NINTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT EVIDENCES A DANGEROUS VIOLATION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Drafters of the Constitution Sought to Remedy the Problem of State Interference in Indian Affairs\nA. The Articles of Confederation Disastrously Attempted to Divide What the Framers Described as the \"Indivisible\" Set of Powers over Indian Affairs\nB. The Constitution Gave the Federal Government Primary Authority to Regulate Indian Affairs and Preempt State Interference\nC. Ratification and Immediate Post-Ratification History Confirm That the Founders Understood that the Federal Government, not the States, Would Govern Indian Affairs\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Early Federal Government Routinely Directed States' Actions as Part of Its Supremacy Over Indian Affairs\nIV. The Revisionist Argument for State Authority Has Repeatedly Failed and Lacks Evidence\nA. States Have Long Challenged Federal Authority over Indian Affairs\u2014and Repeatedly Lost\nB. The Current Revisionist Challenge to Federal Authority Rests on Doctrinal Confusion and Incomplete Scholarship",
        "reference": "II. The Early Federal Indian Affairs Power Encompassed the Authority to Determine the Status of Indian Children",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1599_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. Statutory text, structure, and purpose all show that the section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) exception applies only when the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the summonsed account.\n1. Statutory text and structure show that the phrase \"in aid of the collection\" requires a direct connection between a summons and obtaining payment, not merely the possibility of obtaining information.\n2. Reading section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to refer only to summonses for records of accounts in which the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest gives effect to section 7609(c)(2)(D)(ii).\n3. Section 7609's purpose also supports reading section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to require the delinquent taxpayer to have an interest in the summonsed account.\nB. Statutory history, purpose, and policy support construing section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to require the delinquent taxpayer to have a legal interest in the summonsed account.\n1. Congress enacted section 7609 in response to concerns that failing to allow challenges to IRS summonses would infringe important privacy rights.\n2. Reading section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) broadly is anathema not only to Congress' purpose but also to our legal tradition, and it creates the same opportunity for government abuse that Congress sought to curtail.\n3. Reading section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to require the delinquent taxpayer to have a legal interest in the summonsed account will not tie the IRS's hands.\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Construing section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to require only an assessment of some delinquent taxpayer violates basic interpretive principles.\n2. The government's and courts of appeals' statutory history and policy arguments fail.\nD. Petitioners had the right to notice and to petition to quash under section 7609(a) and (b).",
        "reference": "C. The court of appeals' decision and the government's arguments are wrong.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. ADA Tester Plaintiff Standing Would Violate Article II.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. ADA tester plaintiffs unconstitutionally wield unsupervised executive power.\nII. Upholding ADA Tester Standing Would Compound Already Growing Problems with Private Parties Wielding Executive Power.",
        "reference": "A. Article II bars private citizens from exercising unsupervised executive power.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Court of Appeals Decided the Case on the Assumption that Its Decision Changed the Content of the Statutory Law, Transforming a Principal Office into an Inferior Office\nB. Invalidation, Severance of Unconstitutional Statutory Provisions, and the Activation of Statutory Fallback Systems, Are Brought About by the Constitution and the Statutes Involved, and Are Not Remedies by Which Courts Change the Content of the Law\nC. The Possibility that Lower Courts May Resolve the Same Question Differently Demonstrates that Courts Do Not Give Remedies that Change the Content of Statutory Law, But Rather Set Precedents, the Scope of Which is Limited for Courts Other than this Court\nII. Because Invalidity Arises, and Statutory Fallbacks Are Effective, Ab Initio, If the Court of Appeals Was Correct on the Constitutional and Fallback Issues, the Appointments of APJs at Issue In this Case Were Valid When Made and Did Not Become Valid Only After the Lower Court's Decision",
        "reference": "I. The Court of Appeals Relied on the Mistaken Assumption that Courts Give Remedies that Change the Content of Statutory Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under The Constitution, Private Parties May Not File A Condemnation Lawsuit Against A Nonconsenting State In Federal Court\nA. There Is No Condemnation Exception To State Sovereign Immunity\nB. States Retain Sovereign Immunity From Suits Against Their Property\nII. Under The NGA, Private Parties May Not File A Condemnation Lawsuit Against A Nonconsenting State In Federal Court\nIII. The Courts Below Had Jurisdiction To Consider These Questions\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. PennEast Misstates The Impacts Of New Jersey's Sovereign Immunity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Overrule Roe and Casey Because They Fail Both The Glucksberg And Obergefell Tests For Identifying Implied Fundamental Rights\nII. There Is No Fundamental Right To Elective Abortion Under The Reasoned-Judgment Test\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Roe Ignored The Implications Of Our Legal Tradition Regarding Abortion For The Original Meaning Of The Fourteenth Amendment\nC. Roe's Extension Of Procreative Liberty From Contraception To Elective Abortion Lacks Any Basis In Reasoned Judgment\nD. Even If The Right To Elective Abortion Were Prima Facie Fundamental, The State Has A Compelling Interest In Protecting Fetal Life Throughout Pregnancy\n1. Roe And Casey Ignored The Evidence From Which The State Can Reasonably Conclude That A Fetus Is A Human Life From Conception\n2. There Is No Principled Basis For Roe's Disparate Treatment Of Pre-Viable Fetuses, Viable Fetuses, And Newborn Infants",
        "reference": "A. The Lessons Of History And Tradition Support A Judgment That There Is No Fundamental Right To Elective Abortion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Arizona's Issue-Specific Finality Resembles The Approach This Court Jettisoned In Griffith. It Would Create A Mess In The Adjudication Of Guilt And Punishment Following Habeas Relief, And In Downstream Review Of Those Proceedings",
        "reference": "I. Arizona's Approach Would Muddle The Clear Line This Court Has Drawn",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MCDONOUGH'S SECTION 1983 FABRICATION CLAIM DID NOT BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL FAVORABLE TERMINATION UNDER THIS COURT'S \"ANALOGOUS TORT\" ANALYSIS\nA. The Analogous Tort At Common Law Provides The Proper Limitations Rule\nB. The Most Analogous Tort At Common Law Is Malicious Prosecution\nC. The Statute Of Limitations For Malicious Prosecution Governs McDonough's Section 1983 Fabrication Claim\nII. MCDONOUGH'S CLAIM IS ALSO TIMELY UNDER THE \"STANDARD\" RULE FOR ACCRUAL\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court Should Adopt Favorable Termination As An Element Of McDonough's Section 1983 Claim\nIII. BECAUSE MCDONOUGH HAS ALLEGED A CONTINUING VIOLATION, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGAN TO RUN AT FAVORABLE TERMINATION\nIV. PRACTICAL AND POLICY CONCERNS STRONGLY MILITATE IN FAVOR OF STARTING THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD AT FAVORABLE TERMINATION",
        "reference": "A. Because Preiser And Heck Foreclose Section 1983 Suits Before Favorable Termination, Such Suits Should Not Accrue Until That Point",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. SEILA LAW REQUIRES INVALIDATION OF THE FHFA REMOVAL RESTRICTION\nA. Seila Law Recognized Only Two Limited Exceptions to the General Rule Barring Removal Restrictions and Neither Is Applicable Here\nB. There Are No Meaningful Distinctions Between the FHFA Removal Restriction and the One Invalidated in Seila Law\nC. The FHFA Removal Restriction Lacks Any Historical Pedigree\nD. Non-jurisdictional Objections to Addressing the Shareholders' Separation-of-Powers Claims Are Not Properly Before the Court\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE SHAREHOLDERS ARE ENTITLED TO A MEANINGFUL REMEDY FOR THE INJURY THEY INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Constitution Requires a Count of Persons, Not Citizens\nB. A Decennial Census Count That Excludes Non-Citizens Is Disconsonant with Constitutional and Statutory Mandates\nII. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES THAT ALL PERSONS BE COUNTED EQUALLY\nIII. THE MEMORANDUM HAS THE PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF DECREASING THE REPRESENTATION OF BLACK PEOPLE AND OTHER COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, THEREBY IMPEDING THE OBJECTIVE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT\nA. The Memorandum Continues a Pattern of Discriminatory Targeting of Immigrants of Color\nB. The Memorandum Represents an End-Run Around This Court's Decision Rejecting the Use of Citizenship Status Question to Manipulate Redistricting\nC. The Memorandum's Proposal to Exclude Undocumented Persons from Apportionment Counts Would Have Devastating Repercussions for Black Communities\nD. The Presidential Memorandum Undermines the Fourteenth Amendment's Objective to Provide Black Persons with Equal Representation",
        "reference": "I. THE CONSTITUTION HAS ALWAYS MANDATED THE COUNT OF ALL \"PERSONS,\" WITHOUT REGARD TO CITIZENSHIP STATUS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Construing the CFAA to Extend Beyond Computer Hacking Creates a Major Overcriminalization Problem\nA. Section 1030(A)(2) of the CFAA: A Recipe for Overcriminalization\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A Case Study in \"Exceeding Authorized Access\" Overcriminalization\nD. \"Exceeding Authorized Access\" Should not be Construed to Criminalize the Innocuous Everyday Actions of Millions of Unsuspecting Americans\nII. Broadly Construing Section 1030(A)(2) of CFAA to Criminalize Breaches of Private Contracts Violates Due Process\nA. Extending \"Exceeding Authorized Access\" Liability to Breaches of Contracts Violates Due Process for Failure to Give Fair Notice\nB. Danger of Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement\nIII. Allowing Private Parties to Create Federal Crimes by Contract Violates the Private Nondelegation Doctrine\nIV. The Rule of Lenity and the Constitutional Avoidance Canon Counsel in Favor of a Limiting Construction",
        "reference": "B. The Government's Interpretation of the CFAA Wrongly Criminalizes a Broad Swath of Innocent Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. If Applied Nationwide, The Decision Below Will Reverse The Recent Boom In Natural Gas Production\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Interstate Pipelines Are Essential to the Natural Gas Supply Chain\nC. If Applied Nationwide, the Third Circuit's Rule Will Devastate the Complex Commercial Web that Provides the Equipment, Labor, and Infrastructure to Build Pipelines\nII. The Decision Below Ignores The Relevant Historical Landscape And Would Cause The Very Effects Congress Sought To Avoid\nA. The Decision Below Ignores the Relevant Historical Context\nB. The Drastic Consequences of the Decision Below Highlight the Wisdom Behind the Congressional Scheme",
        "reference": "A. The Natural Gas Industry Is Critical to the Nation's Economy and Energy Supply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter and Bakke's Allowance of the Use of Race in Admissions Based on the So-Called Diversity Rationale is Grievously Wrong.\nA. The Diversity Rationale Is Fundamentally Contrary to Principles of Equal Protection.\nB. From the Beginning, Even the Supporters of Affirmative Action Understood that the Diversity Rationale Was Unpersuasive.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Fostering \"Diversity\" By Focusing on Race Has Profoundly Negative Consequences.\nA. Race-Based Diversity Policies Instrumentalize Racial Minorities for the Purported Benefit of Other Students.\nB. Race-Based Diversity Policies Stigmatize Racial Minorities By Calling Into Question Whether They Were Admitted On Their Merits.\nC. Race-Based Diversity Policies Harm Racial Minorities' Educational Achievement.\nD. Race-Based Diversity Policies Disproportionately Benefit Wealthy Members of Favored Races.",
        "reference": "C. The Diversity Rationale Has Become Even Less Persuasive in the Intervening Years.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Diverse International Community is Critical to NYU's Identity and Mission\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Proclamation Has the Same Unlawful Policy Outcomes as Its Predecessors, In Violation of the Constitution and the Immigration and Nationality Act\nA. The Proclamation Violates the Establishment Clause\nB. The Immigration and Nationality Act Limits Executive Authority to Engage in Discriminatory Conduct\nC. The Proclamation's Context and History Reveal that the Proclamation Violates the Constitution and the INA",
        "reference": "II. The Proclamation Significantly Harms NYU and Its Constituents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Google Did Not Commit Copyright Infringement\nA. Copyright Protection Does Not Extend To Any System Or Method Of Operation, Or To One Of Only A Few Ways To Express Or Embody The System Or Method\nB. Google's Reuse Of The Declarations Did Not Infringe Any Interest Protected By Copyright\n1. Google reused only the material that was required by the Java language to perform the function of responding to the developers' calls\n2. The merger doctrine provides that Google has the right to reuse the declarations\n3. The merger doctrine applies to computer software interfaces designed to invoke the functions of a program\n4. The number of declarations that Google reused does not change the merger analysis\n5. The Federal Circuit's rationales for rejecting the merger doctrine lack merit\n6. The merger doctrine also resolves Oracle's claims that copyright protection applies to the structure created by the declarations\nII. There Is No Basis To Overturn The Jury's Finding That Google's Reuse Of The Declarations From The Java SE Libraries Was Fair Use\nA. The Jury's Verdict Is Reviewed For Substantial Evidence\nB. Substantial Evidence Supported The Jury's Overall Finding That Google's Conduct Was Fair Use\nC. Substantial Evidence Supported The Verdict With Respect To Each Of The Illustrative Statutory Fair-Use Factors\n1. Factor one: The purpose and character of the use\n2. Factor two: The nature of the copyrighted work\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Factor four: The effect on the market for, or value of, the original work",
        "reference": "3. Factor three: The amount and substantiality of the reuse",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5279_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text of the 'Occasions' Clause Supports Mr. Wooden's Reading\nA. Offenses are 'committed on occasions different from one another' when they arise from distinct criminal opportunities, not when their final elements are distinct points in time\nB. The Government views simultaneous offenses as having been committed on the same occasion only if they are \"intertwined\"\nC. Congress targeted criminals who reoffend after changed circumstances, not split-second intervals\nII. A Circumstance-Based Approach Makes More Practical Sense Than a Simultaneity Test\nA. The Government proposes a simultaneity test that is different from the courts of appeals' test\nB. The Government's proposed simultaneity test is incompatible with the categorical approach\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. A circumstance-based approach facilitates consistent, sensible outcomes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Damages for emotional distress are not available in the implied right of action to enforce the Rehabilitation Act or the Affordable Care Act\nA. Recipients of federal funding lack notice that they may be subject to damages for emotional distress because that remedy is not traditionally available in actions for breach of contract\nB. The personal contracts' exception to the general rule against the award of emotional-distress damages for breach of contract does not provide the requisite notice\nC. The power of federal courts to award 'appropriate' relief under a federal cause of action does not require the availability of damages for emotional distress\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Permitting damages for emotional distress would subject funding recipients to significant and unpredictable liability for unverifiable harms\nF. Meaningful remedies for discrimination in federal programs would exist in the absence of damages for emotional distress",
        "reference": "D. Prior precedent does not provide recipients of federal funding with notice of the availability of damages for emotional distress",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Title VII's exhaustion requirement is subject to waiver and forfeiture because Congress has not clearly stated that it is jurisdictional\nA. A statutory requirement is subject to waiver and forfeiture unless Congress clearly states that it is jurisdictional\nB. Congress has not clearly stated that Title VII's exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional\n1. Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s text shows that the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional\n2. Title VII's structure confirms that the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional\n3. This Court's decisions reinforce the conclusion that the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional\nC. Petitioner's arguments based on Title VII's purpose do not supply the clear statement that is absent from the statutory text\n1. Petitioner's purpose-based arguments are unpersuasive\n2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation\nII. There is no special exception to the clear-statement rule for exhaustion requirements\nA. Petitioner's \"fairly discernible\" standard is drawn from decisions addressing an entirely different issue\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner identifies no other basis for departing from the clear-statement rule or treating exhaustion requirements as presumptively jurisdictional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1094_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Section 1608(a)(3) does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process directed to the foreign minister to the foreign state's embassy in the United States\nA. The text of Section 1608(a)(3) is best read to require that service be mailed to the ministry of foreign affairs in the country concerned\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The FSIA's legislative history confirms that Congress intended the Act to bar service by mail to a foreign state's embassy in the United States",
        "reference": "B. The United States' treaty obligations and diplomatic interests further demonstrate that the FSIA does not permit service on a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state's embassy in the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The New York Rule Chills Vital Defense Arguments\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The New York Rule Undermines the Institution of the Criminal Trial",
        "reference": "II. The New York Rule Forces Defendants Into a Hobson's Choice Between Constitutional Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Confrontation Clause is a shield, not a sword: it does not give a defendant the right to present a misleadingly incomplete evidentiary picture\nB. A criminal defendant can be deemed to have waived his Confrontation Clause rights\nC. Testimonial hearsay is admissible under this rule based on a defendant's strategic waiver, not an exception to the Confrontation Clause\nII. A waiver finding would be permitted only when (1) the defendant strategically creates an evidentiary misimpression by disclosing only a partial evidentiary picture on a particular point, (2) testimonial hearsay is reasonably necessary to complete the picture and thus correct the misimpression, and (3) the hearsay declarant is unavailable\nIII. Other jurisdictions' approaches to addressing strategically created evidentiary misimpressions are insufficient to guarantee a court's ability to safeguard the integrity of a trial's truth-finding purpose\nIV. The arguments from Petitioner and his amici against a waiver-based rule are unpersuasive",
        "reference": "I. Constitutional rights can be waived. A criminal defendant waives his Confrontation Clause rights by words or action when he strategically distorts the evidentiary picture, undermining the integrity of his trial's truth-seeking function",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Resolve Whether District Courts Can Hear Constitutional Challenges to the FTC's Structure in the First Instance\nA. The Decision Below is Wrong\nB. The Jurisdictional Question Is Exceptionally Important and Squarely Presented\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Also Resolve the Constitutionality of Multi-Layer ALJ Tenure Protections",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. Bilateral arbitration is a favored choice for many, offering economic advantages for both parties to a dispute, streamlined procedures, and speedy resolution of claims\nB. The Ninth Circuit decision eliminates vital benefits of bilateral arbitration that are not present in class arbitration\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. An arbitration clause which contracts for \"arbitration\" in the context of resolving individual disputes between the claimant and defendant should not be interpreted to authorize class arbitration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The procedural posture of Hellerstedt limits the breadth of its holding\nB. Hellerstedt's narrow factual basis is clear in the text of the opinion\nC. The Fifth Circuit properly found that Louisiana's admitting privileges have not caused closures like those identified in Texas by Hellerstedt\nII. The Constitution and this Court's precedents permit States to legislate to protect the quality of medical care in abortion clinics, and the Fifth Circuit's decision properly upheld Louisiana's statute",
        "reference": "I. This Court's decision in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt was a fact-based, as-applied ruling to avoid the barrier created by the doctrine of res judicata. Petitioners cannot now broaden that opinion into a sweeping precedent that would have been procedurally improper",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENT'S DRAGNET SCHEME VIOLATES THE REQUIREMENT THAT CHARITABLE SOLICITATION REGULATION BE NARROWLY TAILORED\nII. RESPONDENT'S ACTS CREATE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION ON OBTAINING A LICENSE TO ENGAGE IN FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS\nIII. RESPONDENT'S ACTS VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY VIOLATING FEDERAL LAW PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL TAX RETURN INFORMATION\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. SPECIAL RULES FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS STILL PROTECT DONOR CONFIDENTIALITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1442_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PRECLUDES AN ADMINISTRATIVE-ISSUE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT HERE\nA. Only the Judicial Branch is vested with judicial power\nB. The doctrine of Separation of Powers precludes application of administrative-issue exhaustion for questions of constitutional law\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Due Process guarantees that an aggrieved person be provided an opportunity to put on evidence in support of his claims\nII. GIVING AGENCY DECISIONS BROAD PRECLUSIVE EFFECT CREATES AN UNTENABLE CATCH-22",
        "reference": "C. The Separation of Powers and the allied guarantees of due process guard against arbitrary power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Application Of Hosanna-Tabor Violates The Free Exercise Clause\nA. The laity's active participation in carrying out the Church's mission is a core element of Catholic doctrine\nB. The Ninth Circuit's approach effectively penalizes the Catholic Church for exercising its theological belief in active lay participation\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Application Of Hosanna-Tabor Violates The Establishment Clause's Principle Of Denominational Neutrality\nA. The Ninth Circuit's framework favors religious groups with Lutheran-style hierarchies\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Catholic Church exemplifies numerous religious groups who face discriminatory treatment under the Ninth Circuit's approach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Government's Understanding of Alvarez Is Wrong and Does Not Justify the Piecemeal Overbreadth Doctrine the Government Requests\nB. Apprendi Is a Shield Protecting Against Increased Sanctions for Facts not Found by a Jury, not a Sword Allowing the Government to Evade the First Amendment with Sentencing Enhancements\nC. Even the Government's Most Radical Rewrite Fails to Prevent the Chilling Effects Respondents Describe\nII. CRIMINALIZING ENCOURAGEMENT AND INDUCEMENT FOR FINANCIAL GAIN CHILLS A BROAD SWATH OF PROTECTED COMMERCIAL SPEECH",
        "reference": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S MERGER OF THE PREDICATE OFFENCE AND THE SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT DOES NOT THAW THE CHILLING EFFECT OF section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-432_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. EQUITABLE TOLLING UNDER AMERICAN PIPE APPLIES ONLY TO PREVIOUSLY ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS' INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS AND SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO OTHERWISE UNTIMELY CLASS ACTIONS\nA. Statutes of Limitations Are Strictly Enforced, Subject Only to Narrow Equitable Tolling Principles\nB. American Pipe Recognized That Statutes of Limitations Are Equitably Tolled During the Pendency of a Class Action for Subsequent Individual Actions\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Extending American Pipe to Follow-On Class Actions Is Inconsistent with Fundamental Principles of Equitable Tolling, Class Actions, and the Separation of Powers\n1. Extending American Pipe to Class Actions Would Impermissibly Allow Tolling Absent Diligence\n2. The Extraordinary Circumstances Articulated in American Pipe to Justify Tolling for Individual Actions Do Not Apply to Tolling for Class Actions\n3. Extending American Pipe to Follow-On Class Actions Is Inconsistent with Basic Separation-of-Powers Principles\nD. Extending American Pipe to Follow-On Class Actions Would Undermine the Policies Embodied in Statutes of Limitations and Result in Significant Adverse Practical Consequences\nE. The Ninth Circuit Erred in Relying on this Court's Precedents to Extend American Pipe to Follow-On Class Actions\nII. [MISSING]\nA. It Would Be Inequitable to Toll a Limitations Period to Allow Relitigation of Class Certification\nB. This Class Action Is Untimely Under That Principle",
        "reference": "II. AMERICAN PIPE AT THE VERY LEAST DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE PROPRIETY OF CLASS TREATMENT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADJUDICATED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. States Did Not Assent to Private-Party Employment-Discrimination Suits by Conferring War Powers on the Federal Government\nA. States retain their immunity absent compelling evidence they surrendered it\nB. Constitutional history, congressional practice, and constitutional structure confirm that the States did not surrender their immunity\n1. History reveals no \"Plan of the Convention\" waiver\n2. Early congressional practice reveals no evidence that the States surrendered their immunity\n3. Constitutional structure confirms that the States did not surrender their immunity\nII. This Court's Precedents Foreclose Abrogating State Sovereign Immunity Through Article I \"War Powers\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Neither Katz nor PennEast supports undermining sovereign immunity\nIII. DPS Retains Its State-Law Immunity in Texas Courts",
        "reference": "A. Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity through the exercise of Article I powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-155_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 3582(c)(2) DEMONSTRATES THAT CONGRESS PRIORITIZES SUBSTANTIVE SENTENCING CONCERNS OVER FINALITY WITH RESPECT TO FEDERAL PRISON SENTENCES\nII. SENTENCE-MODIFICATION PROCEEDINGS PROMOTE SENTENCING FITNESS AND FAIRNESS IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM\nA. The Passage Of Time, Though Often Justifying A Stronger Commitment To The Finality Of A Conviction, Can Sometimes Justify Modifications Of A Sentence\nB. Sentence-Modification Proceedings Comport With And Enhance The Government's Legitimate Penological Interests .. 8\nC. Sentence-Modification Proceedings Foster Respect For The Criminal Justice System\nD. Sentence-Modification Proceedings Can Save Long-Term Institutional Costs Associated With Incarceration\nIII. THE STATUTORY TERM \"BASED ON\" SHOULD BE INTERPRETED BROADLY TO ACCOMPLISH CONGRESS' REASONABLE GOALS\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. PETITIONER IS ELIGIBLE FOR A SENTENCE MODIFICATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Timely Rule 59(e) Motion Is Not Subject To AEDPA's Restrictions On \"Second Or Successive\" Habeas Applications Because It Is Part Of A Habeas Petitioner's Initial Habeas Application\nA. AEDPA Is Structured To Provide Habeas Applicants With At Least One Full And Fair Opportunity For Federal Collateral Review\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Gonzalez's Holding That Some Rule 60(b) Motions Are Subject To Section 2244(b) Has No Bearing On The Treatment Of Timely Rule 59(e) Motions\nD. Subjecting Rule 59(e) Motions To Section 2244(b) Fails To Advance AEDPA's Goals And Produces Anomalous Results At A Minimum, A Timely Rule 59(e) Motion That Does Not Raise A New Claim Should Not Be Treated As A Second Or Successive Habeas Application\nA. A Rule 59(e) Motion That Does Not Raise New Claims Is Not \"Inconsistent\" With Section 2244(b)\nB. Petitioner's Rule 59(e) Motion Was Timely And Did Not Raise New Claims\nIII. Nothing In AEDPA Or Gonzalez Supports The Fifth Circuit's Decision To Treat Petitioner's Notice Of Appeal As Untimely",
        "reference": "B. A Timely Rule 59(e) Is Part Of The First Habeas Proceeding",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1268_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Following 200 years of precedent, the Court in Altmann held that Landgraf's presumption against retroactivity does not apply to the FSIA\nA. Foreign sovereign immunity is a matter of comity and grace, as determined by the political branches, and not a right held by a foreign nation\nB. Altmann held that the FSIA's current text controls in all matters and applies retroactively absent contraindications\nII. The D.C. Circuit failed to apply Altmann and the judgment of the political branches as embodied in the text of the FSIA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The FSIA defies categorization as a substantive or procedural Act and intertwines matters of substantive federal law and procedure as part of a comprehensive approach to matters of foreign sovereign immunity\n1. Altmann expressly addressed the \"general applicability\" of the FSIA to pre-enactment conduct\n2. Altmann rejected efforts to parse the FSIA on a provision-by-provision basis and identify some provisions as procedural and others as substantive\nIII. Even if the Landgraf presumption were applicable, the 2008 amendments to the FSIA clearly state that punitive damages are available for conduct occurring before 2008\nA. The 2008 NDAA provides clear statements that punitive damages may be recovered for pre-2008 conduct\nB. The language in \u00a7 1083(c) mirrors the language that Landgraf identified as an example of a clear statement that overcomes the presumption against retroactivity\nC. Congress clearly provided that punitive damages were retroactively available by striking the terrorism exception from \u00a7 1605 and inserting the terrorism exception into \u00a7 1605A\nD. The legislative history and text resulting from the President's veto of the initial version of the 2008 NDAA demonstrate that Congress and the President understood that \u00a7 1605A, including the allowance for punitive damages, would apply retroactively\nIV. A state law cause of action under \u00a7 1605A(a) is not subject to the restriction upon punitive damages set forth at \u00a7 1606",
        "reference": "A. Congress was not required to provide Sudan advance notice before its withdrawal of immunity from punitive damages",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.79
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. California's Unique Problem With Home Equity Theft",
        "reference": "I. Government Profiteering From Seized Home Equity Funds Violates The Fifth And Eighth Amendments Of The United States Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-272_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The circuits agree that an employer cannot pay a woman less than her male counterparts solely on the basis of what she earned in her prior job\nB. In the face of changes to state law, the legality of policies like SOP 1440 under the Equal Pay Act has only minimal practical importance\nC. The Court of Appeals' decision was correct\nII. This case does not raise petitioner's second question presented\nA. Nothing about the composition of the en banc panel warrants this Court's review\nB. A judge's participation in a case ends when he has voted and finalized his opinion",
        "reference": "I. The question whether reliance on an employee's prior salary, standing alone, can serve as an affirmative defense under the Equal Pay Act does not warrant this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Adopt the Rapanos Plurality's Analysis\nA. The Rapanos plurality followed established principles of statutory interpretation that this Court has often reiterated\nB. The significant nexus test produces unpredictable and highly questionable results\nC. The significant nexus test fails multiple clear-statement rules\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Predictability and efficiency are necessary for key infrastructure and other economically beneficial projects to move forward\nB. Other legal and regulatory tools are better suited to protecting the water quality of transitory and ephemeral waters\nC. A decision from this Court adopting the Rapanos plurality's test would provide significant and needed clarity to all businesses and landowners",
        "reference": "II. A Clearly Delineated Understanding of \"Waters of the United States\" Is Critical for Business and Consistent with Environmental Protection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court of Appeals' Decision Creates No Tension with Decisions of This Court or Any Circuit Court\nA. The Court of Appeals' Application of Sears's Pragmatic \"Working-Law\" Standard to the Particular Facts in This Record Does Not Warrant Certiorari\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court of Appeals' Decision Creates No Tension with the Decisions of Any Other Circuit\nII. The Court of Appeals' Decision Correctly Concluded, Based on the Facts in the Record, that the 2013 Jeopardy Opinions Were Not Predecisional\nIII. Review Would Require Resolution of a Second, Equally Fact-Bound Question: Whether the 2013 Jeopardy Opinions Were \"Deliberative\"\nIV. This Case Implicates No Interests Warranting Review",
        "reference": "B. The Court of Appeals' Recognition of the Services' Decisional Authority Creates No Tension with Grumman Aircraft",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Sex, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity Are Analytically Distinct Concepts\nII. No One Is Excluded from Title VII's Sex Protections, But Title VII Does Not Protect Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity\nIII. Respondents Ignore that Double Standards Based on Sex Were at the Heart of Phillips v. Martin Marietta\nIV. Title VII Does Not Simply Forbid Any Action \"Causally Linked\" To Sex\nV. No Sex Stereotyping Is Taking Place in These Cases\nVI. [MISSING]\nVII. Analogy Between Religious Conversion and Sex Reassignment is Little More than Wordplay\nVIII. Opposition to Interracial Marriage Was Race Discrimination, Support for Conjugal Marriage Is Not Sex Discrimination\nIX. \"Race\" and \"Sex\" Are Not Interchangeable in Our Nation's Nondiscrimination Laws\nX. There Will Be Severe Public Consequences if the Court Redefines Sex and Embraces a Simplistic Account of Discrimination",
        "reference": "VI. No \"Neutral\" Sex Stereotypes Are Taking Place",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8995_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPEALS COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT PETITIONER'S PRETRIAL DETENTION IN STATE COURT TOLLED THE SUPERVISED RELEASE TERM BY ANALOGIZING PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT WITH IMPRISONMENT IN CONNECTION WITH A CONVICTION, PRIOR TO ANY CONVICTION, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE LANGUAGE OR HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. section 3624(e)\nA. For Tolling of Supervised Release under section 3624(e), a Defendant must be Imprisoned on a Criminal Conviction Contemporaneous to Tolling\nB. [MISSING]\nII. TO PRESERVE THE ABILITY TO REVOKE SUPERVISED RELEASE AFTER EXPIRATION OF THE TERM IMPOSED, A DISTRICT COURT IS REQUIRED TO FILE A WARRANT OR SUMMONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 18 U.S.C. section 3583(i)\nA. 18 U.S.C. section 3583(i) Provides Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Expired Supervised Release Terms\nB. The Sixth Circuit Erred by Failing to Address the District Court's Failure to Invoke its Jurisdiction under section 3583(i): the District Court was Without Jurisdiction to Impose any Sentence on Petitioner's Expired Term of Supervised Release",
        "reference": "B. The Sixth Circuit's Tortured Reasoning in Applying section 3624(e) is Unsupported by the Rules of Statutory Interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter Should Be Overruled Because Its Diversity Rationale Does Not Vindicate First Amendment Principles As Presumed\u2014Rather, It Violates Them\nA. Justice Powell Adopted Harvard's Argument That A Diverse Student Body Promoted A \"Robust Exchange Of Ideas.\"\nB. Five Justices In Grutter Accepted Justice Powell's First Amendment Academic Freedom Rationale.\nC. The Diversity Rationale Conflicts With Basic First Amendment Doctrine In Multiple Respects.\nD. These Cases Offer An Ideal Opportunity To Overrule Grutter On The Diversity Rationale\nII. Contrary To The Theory Of Bakke And Grutter, College Campuses Have Systematically Suppressed Freedom Of Thought And Speech In The Name Of \"Diversity.\"\nA. Far From Promoting A Robust Exchange Of Ideas, Universities Cultivate Campus Environments That Pressure Students And Faculty To Conform To Governing Orthodoxy, Particularly On Matters Of Race.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Survey Data Show That College Students Censor Themselves Rather Than Dissent From Orthodoxy And That Increasing Numbers Of Students Will Participate In Censoring Others' Speech.\n3. High-Profile Examples Demonstrate How The Diversity Orthodoxy Is Enforced.\nB. Many Universities Enforce Conformity Of Thought Through Formal Policies.",
        "reference": "1. Prominent Harvard Insiders Are Speaking Out Against The Orthodoxy Of Thought Being Imposed In The Name Of \"Diversity.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TCPA'S CORE AUTOMATED-CALLING RESTRICTIONS ARE INSEPARABLE FROM ITS CONTENT-BASED EXCEPTIONS\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. BECAUSE CONGRESS WOULD NOT HAVE ENACTED THE TCPA'S AUTOMATED-CALLING RESTRICTION WITHOUT THE AVAILABILITY OF CONTENT-BASED EXCEPTIONS, THE GOVERNMENT-DEBT EXCEPTION MAY NOT BE SEVERED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The SuperValu majority distorted Congress's straightforward and comprehensive statutory text in favor of a narrow and implausible alternative.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The majority improperly reasoned that Congress intended the separate categories of scienter as subsets of one another.\nD. Courts have a history of judicial activism that has erected improper barriers to the FCA.",
        "reference": "B. The majority created its new scienter test from whole cloth.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief044.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Diverse Workforce is Essential for Successful Business Outcomes\nA. Diverse Companies are More Competitive, Innovative, and Profitable\nB. Fostering Diverse and Inclusive Workplaces Attracts and Maintains Talent and Investment\nC. American Companies are Committed to Diversity and Inclusion\n1. Increased Transparency\n2. Linking Executive Pay to Diversity\n3. Recruiting and Outreach\n4. Fostering Inclusive Cultures\nII. American Businesses Need Diversity-Conscious Admissions Programs to Recruit and Retain Diverse Talent\nA. Minorities Remain Underrepresented in the American Workforce and in Corporate Leadership Positions\nB. Diversity-Conscious Admissions Programs are Critical to Creating a Pool of Diverse Qualified Individuals from Which Employers Can Recruit and Hire and Promote to be Future Leaders\nC. The Court Should Not Prohibit Diversity-Conscious Admissions Programs\n1. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "1. Narrowly Tailored Diversity-Conscious Admissions Programs Can Survive Strict Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.46
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-442_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The courts of appeals are split 1-2 over when the statute of limitations begins to run on a section 1983 claim seeking DNA testing.\nA. [MISSING]\nII. This case is an excellent vehicle.\nIII. The question presented is exceptionally important and recurring.\nIV. The decision below is wrong.",
        "reference": "A. Split conceded, Goertz claims that \"it is unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit would reach the same outcome if it decided the issue today.\" Opp. 26.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "The USPTO's determination whether a petition for inter partes review is time-barred under 35 U.S.C. 315(b) is not judicially reviewable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's decision in Cuozzo confirms that the USPTO's Section 315(b) determinations are not reviewable\nC. Precluding review of the USPTO's Section 315(b) determinations is consistent with the AIA's purposes",
        "reference": "A. The text, structure, and history of the AIA demonstrate that the USPTO's Section 315(b) determinations are not reviewable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Cannot Support Continued Adherence to Erroneous Interpretations of the Constitution",
        "reference": "I. Mississippi Has a Compelling Interest in Protecting the Lives of Unborn Children Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY PORTION OF GROWERS' PROPERTIES VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED\nIII. A PHYSICAL OCCUPATION OF ANY DURATION VIOLATES GROWERS' RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND IS A CATEGORICAL TAKING FOR WHICH JUST COMPENSATION IS OWED\nIV. EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE DEFINITION OF PROPERTY PROTECTED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION",
        "reference": "I. UNDER BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW, UNION ORGANIZERS HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENTER PRIVATE PROPERTY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-984_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Plain Language of the Department of Labor's Regulations Makes Clear that Helix Did Not Pay Hewitt on a Salary Basis\nA. The Salary Basis Test Requires Guaranteed Payment of a Predetermined Amount of Compensation for the Employee's Normal Workweek\nB. Helix Did Not Pay Hewitt on a Salary Basis Within the Plain Meaning of the Regulations\nII. Helix's Contention that Paying Hewitt Only for Days Worked Constituted Payment on a Salary Basis Is Flatly Inconsistent with the Regulations\nA. Helix's Argument Cannot Be Reconciled with the Regulatory Text\nB. The Highly Compensated Employee Regulation Does Not Conflict with the Reasonable Relationship Test Applicable to Day-Rate Employees\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. Helix's Policy Arguments Are Unpersuasive",
        "reference": "C. The Salary Basis Test's Regulatory History Supports the Plain Reading of the Text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES, THERE IS A CLEAR SPLIT WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER COURTS MUST APPLY CURRENT LAW WHEN CORRECTING A SENTENCE OR RESENTENCING\nII. THERE IS A CLEAR SPLIT WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER EDDINGS ERROR REQUIRES RESENTENCING IN THE TRIAL COURT\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO ADDRESS THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS PRESENTED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. section 5000A's \"requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance [still] may reasonably be characterized as a tax,\" because \"the shared responsibility payment amount is [not] set at zero\" for all tax years and is revenue-producing\nA. The Fifth Circuit overlooked that \"the shared responsibility payment amount is [not] set at zero\" for all tax years\nB. section 5000A as amended is revenue-producing for the tax years for which \"the shared responsibility payment amount is [not] set at zero.\"\n1. section 5000A as amended is clearly revenue-producing in that it undisputedly produced revenue collected by the IRS under unamended portions of the statute\n2. [MISSING]\n3. section 5000A as amended is also currently still applicable to produce revenue from delinquent taxpayers\n4. Texas et al.'s response to Amicus that \"the United States has used accrual accounting for decades\" overlooks that \"[n]on-exchange revenue, including taxes, duties, fines, and penalties, are recognized when collected.\"\nII. \"section 5000A [still] need not be read to do more than impose a tax\" that sunsets because, analogously to NFIB, \"the individual mandate .. need not be read to declare that failing to [purchase health insurance] is unlawful\" even if \"individuals who are subject to the mandate are nonetheless [effectively] exempt from the penalty\" for some tax years because it is zero dollars",
        "reference": "2. Contra Texas et al.'s response to Amicus, it is improper to disregard revenue collected under unamended portions of the statute which have continuously been in effect since \"before the amendment took effect.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress Specified the Types of Relief Available under the Securities Laws\nB. The SEC Rejects Congress's Statutory Scheme\nC. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language\nII. The SEC's Extra-Textual Precedent Has Spread to Other Agencies, Further Undermining Separation of Powers\nA. The FTC Leads the Way with Extra-Textual Monetary Demands Under a Statute that Allows Only for Injunctions\nB. The FDA Has No Statutory Authority for Equitable Monetary Relief but Pursues it Anyway\nC. The EPA Has Secured Extra-Textual Monetary Awards in Reliance on SEC Caselaw\nD. FERC Also Relies on Porter to Pursue Monetary Awards\nE. The CFTC Secures Legal Damages in the Name of Equity\nF. The CFPB Relies on SEC Caselaw to Enlarge Its Already Expansive Power\nIII. Transference of Judicial Equitable Powers to Agencies to Bypass Limited Statutory Remedies Threatens Individual Rights\nIV. Separation of Powers Principles Necessitate Restriction of Agency Authority to Those Set by Congress",
        "reference": "I. The SEC's \"Expansion\" of Sections 77t and 78u Violates the Separation of Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-826_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Brecht's independent harmlessness standard serves different considerations and does not account for AEDPA's highly deferential requirements\nA. Before AEDPA, harmless-error review under Brecht in habeas cases was independent and de novo\nB. Congress then enacted AEDPA, which demands deference to state court decisions\nC. This Court has affirmed that AEDPA forms a \"precondition\" to habeas relief \u2014 even when reviewing for harmlessness\nII. AEDPA's deferential limitations are not contemplated by the Brecht standard\nA. AEDPA limits applicable law to clearly established Supreme Court holdings\nB. AEDPA does not allow circuit precedent to form the basis for relief\nC. AEDPA gives state courts substantial leeway when applying general principles of constitutional law\nD. AEDPA limits review to the record before the state court\nE. The differences between Brecht and AEDPA matter\nIII. Because fair-minded jurists could agree with the Michigan courts' harmlessness determinations, the Sixth Circuit should have denied habeas relief\nA. The Michigan Court of Appeals' harmlessness determination was not objectively unreasonable\nB. The Michigan Supreme Court's harmlessness determination was not objectively unreasonable\nC. The Sixth Circuit's Brecht-only approach ignored AEDPA's limitations and confirmed that the differences between the two standards matter\n1. Contrary to AEDPA, the Sixth Circuit failed to limit its focus to this Court's holdings\n2. Contrary to AEDPA, the Sixth Circuit relied on circuit court precedent\n3. Contrary to AEDPA, the Sixth Circuit conducted an independent review of the record\n4. [MISSING]\n5. The Sixth Circuit's decision is inconsistent with AEDPA and Ayala",
        "reference": "4. Contrary to AEDPA, the Sixth Circuit considered social-science studies outside the state court record",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.79
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1519_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 3663A(b)(4)'s plain text unambiguously excludes independent internal investigations and separate civil litigation\nB. Section 3663A(b)(4)'s statutory context and history confirm that restitution is unauthorized for these expenses\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The government's new argument under Section 3663A(b)(1) is improperly presented and meritless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Sexual orientation is not immutable. The word \"immutable\" appears twice in Obergefell v. Hodges but Obergefell does not find or hold that sexual orientation is immutable. The plaintiffs do not argue that sexual orientation is immutable\nII. The 2019 American Psychological Association (APA) amicus brief does not argue that sexual orientation is immutable. Only two of the plaintiffs' 44 amicus briefs argue that sexual orientation is immutable\nIII. The best-selling nonfiction book of the 1970s was a sex education book by a psychiatrist who said homosexuality is mutable and can be cured if the patient wants to renounce homosexuality. The book infuriated LGBT activists. LGBT activists lobbied to declassify homosexuality as a mental illness in 1973\nIV. The plaintiffs ask this Court to carve out an exception to the employment-at-will rule where Title VII does not\nV. [MISSING]\nVI.",
        "reference": "V. If Title VII gives a male employee the right to be treated as female, Title VII gives a white employee the right to be treated as black",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The legislative subpoenas are outside the Committees' power\nA. The canon of constitutional avoidance compels this Court to resolve these issues on non-constitutional grounds\nB. The Committees lack the authority to subpoena these presidential records\n1. The Committees lack authority for the subpoenas under House rules\n2. The House lacks authority for these subpoenas under the Constitution\nII. Impeachment is the only process that a sitting president can face on criminal allegations\nA. The House's implied subpoena power cannot displace the Constitution's express impeachment provisions\nB. The President is immune from the Vance subpoena and proceedings\nIII. The congressional subpoenas lack any legitimate legislative purpose\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The lack of historical precedent should guide this Court to reject these intra-branch disputes as political questions",
        "reference": "A. The Committees' claims of a legislative purpose for the subpoenas is pretextual",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-8255_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. BEFORE 1791: COUNSEL PLAYED A LIMITED, MODEST ROLE IN REPRESENTING CLIENTS FACING CRIMINAL CHARGES; ONLY THE DEFENDANT COULD DETERMINE AND ARGUE HIS DEFENSE\nII. [MISSING]\nA. England and Wales\nB. Other Common Law Jurisdictions Adhere to this Approach",
        "reference": "II. IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS TODAY COUNSEL MAY NOT CONCEDE GUILT AGAINST INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE CLIENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Intervention as of Right Is Not Warranted in the Circumstances Presented Here\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Permissive Intervention in the Circumstances Presented Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Paid Expression is Protected by the First Amendment.\nA. Commercial Trappings do Not Strip Creative Work of First Amendment Protection.\nB. Professional Speech is Protected.\nII. An Imported and Misplaced Theory of Monopoly Regulation Cannot Displace Established Rules Against Compelled Performance.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Uniqueness of a Product Does Not Make Its Seller A \"Monopolist.\"\nIII. The Tenth Circuit's Theories Have No Limiting Principle.\nA. People Cannot be Conflated With Places and Things.\n1. An Artist is Not a Common Carrier.\n2. A Customer is Not a Product.\nB. Artists Need Not Open the Door Before Speech Can Be Compelled, Putting Their Unique Contributions at Risk.",
        "reference": "A. Compelled Speech Enjoys the Highest Protection.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION TO REVISIT SMITH AND RESTORE FULL FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT STATUS TO THE UNALIENABLE LIBERTY PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's Post-Smith Cases Point Toward Restoring the Free Exercise of Religious Conscience as an Unalienable Fundamental Right\n1. Significance of Post-Smith First Amendment Cases\n2. Significance of Obergefell",
        "reference": "A. Employment Division v. Smith Erroneously Diminished the Free Exercise of Religious Conscience as a Fundamental Right",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Case Presents No Circuit Split\nB. The Court of Appeals Correctly Found Oracle's Software Protected\nC. The Petition Has a Fatal Vehicle Defect\nII. Google's Request For Error Correction On Fair Use Does Not Warrant Review\nIII. Google's Policy Arguments Are Meritless",
        "reference": "I. The Court Of Appeals' Copyrightability Decision Is Still Not Cert-Worthy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-801_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN SHAMMAS BY HOLDING THAT THE AMERICAN RULE IS OF LIMITED APPLICABILITY\nIII. THE USPTO'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 IS AN EXCEPTIONAL DEPARTURE FROM THE AMERICAN RULE\nIV. SECTION 145 IS UNCLEAR AND AMBIGUOUS WITH RESPECT TO FEE SHIFTING AND FAILS TO OVERCOME THE AMERICAN RULE'S PRESUMPTION AGAINST FEE SHIFTING\nV. THAT CONGRESS MIGHT HAVE CHOSEN AMONG SEVERAL DISINCENTIVE SCHEMES FURTHER SUPPORTS FINDING AMBIGUITY IN 35 U.S.C. section 145 AND PRECLUDES AWARDING THE USPTO FEES IN THE FORM OF A PRO RATA SHARE OF ITS LEGAL TEAM'S SALARIES",
        "reference": "I. THE AMERICAN RULE IS A BEDROCK PRINCIPLE OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE WITH GENERAL APPLICATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SEC ALJs ARE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. SEC ALJs Have All The Characteristics Of Officers\n1. Offices Established By Law\n2. Significant Federal Authority\nC. The D.C. Circuit Panel Erred In Holding That SEC ALJs Are Not Officers\n1. Final Decision-Making Authority\n2. Standard Of Review\nD. Congress Provided That SEC ALJs Are Executive Officers\nII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION REQUIRES A MEANINGFUL REMEDY\nA. An Entirely New Proceeding Is Necessary\nB. Dismissal Is Warranted",
        "reference": "A. The Category Of Constitutional Officers Is Expansive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.42
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6819_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. WHEN A HABEAS PETITIONER PRESENTS COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS SENTENCED TO DEATH BECAUSE OF HIS RACE, NO JUDGE-MADE PROCEDURAL DOCTRINE SHOULD PREVENT MERITS REVIEW",
        "reference": "I. KEITH THARPE'S CERTIORARI PETITION DEMONSTRATES THAT THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A COA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Court Of Appeals Opinion Is Consistent With This Court's Precedent\n1. States have broad authority to regulate the practice of medicine consistent with the First Amendment\n2. The opinion below is consistent with precedent concerning regulations of professional conduct and the First Amendment\n3. [MISSING]\nB. There Is No Meaningful Disagreement In The Lower Courts About The Constitutionality Of State Licensing Laws Like Washington's\nC. Accepting Petitioner's Argument Would Upend State Laws And The Authority Of States To Regulate Professionals\nD. This Case Is A Poor Vehicle To Address The Question Presented Because The Court Of Appeals Offered An Independent Basis For Its Ruling And Petitioner Lacks Standing\nE. This Case Is Not The Vehicle To Reconsider Employment Division v. Smith",
        "reference": "3. The panel opinion scrupulously followed this Court's precedent in rejecting Petitioner's free exercise claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. During The Founding Era, Political Advocacy That Did Not Disclose The Speaker Was Common\nII. The Pendulum Swings Towards Disclosure, Back To Privacy, and To Disclosure Again\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Beginning In The McCarthy Era, This Court Recognized That Disclosure Infringes Rights That The First Amendment Guarantees\nIII. The Origins and Bases Of Exacting Scrutiny\nA. Lower Courts Infused Exacting Scrutiny With A Balancing Test\nB. Lower Courts Purporting To Apply Exacting Scrutiny Are In Fact Applying Rational Basis Scrutiny\nIV. The Risks Of Disclosure In The Age Of The Internet Require Courts To Review Disclosure Statutes Under More Restrictive Means\nA. States That Promise To Keep Donor Information Confidential Frequently Fail To Do So\nB. The Internet Has Exacerbated The Harms To Disclosure",
        "reference": "A. At The Beginning Of The Twentieth Century, Congress Enacted Disclosure Statutes That This Court Upheld",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-272_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This case implicates an acknowledged circuit split\nB. The question presented is important\nC. Prior pay is a \"factor other than sex.\"\nII. DECEASED JUDGES CANNOT DECIDE CASES",
        "reference": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER EMPLOYERS MAY CONSIDER PRIOR SALARY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Defendants Should Not Bear the Ultimate Burden of Persuasion to Rebut the Basic Presumption",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Will Chill Companies from Making Positive Statements of Principle That Promote Progress in Areas Such as Corporate Governance, Diversity, the Environment, and Other Social Issues",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. The National Labor Relations Act protects the right to strike, but strikers' conduct is unprotected to the extent they fail to take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, imminent damage to property\nB. Accepting the allegations in Glacier's complaint as true, the truck drivers failed to take reasonable precautions\nC. The issuance of the NLRB complaint independently establishes Garmon preemption, but that issue is not before this Court\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Glacier's remaining arguments lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Statutory Structure and Early Cases Support Reading the AIA as Broadly Protecting the System of Assessments and Collections\nII. History of Tax Administration Since 1867 Supports Broad Scope\nA. Shift in Payment Obligation\nB. Shift from Individual to Collective Engagement\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Role of Statutory Exceptions\nIII. The TIA and AIA Are Cousins, Not Twins\nIV. Petitioner Has Statutory Remedies",
        "reference": "C. The Centrality of Information Reporting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The Commission's ALJs can bind the government and third parties on important matters\n2. The Commission's ALJs also exercise significant authority apart from their authority to bind\nB. This Court should address the constitutionality of the statutory removal restrictions for ALJs\nC. The case should be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings",
        "reference": "A. The Commission's ALJs are \"Officers of the United States\" under the Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. IMPOSING A \"MORE LIKELY\" PLEADING STANDARD IS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S \"PLAUSIBILITY\" STANDARD AND WITH THE PROTECTIVE PURPOSE OF ERISA\nA. The Proposed \"More Likely\" Standard Is Not Consistent With This Court's Plausibility Standard\nB. Congress Enacted ERISA To Require Plan Administrators To Meet High Standards of Skill, Prudence, and Diligence in the Sole Interest of Participants and Beneficiaries\nII. PLAINTIFFS PLAUSIBLY ALLEGED THAT THE NORTHWESTERN PLAN ADMINISTRATORS BREACHED THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO PARTICIPANTS AND BENEFICIARIES.\nA. Plaintiffs Alleged Specific Facts Giving Rise To Plausible Inferences of Breach of Fiduciary Duty\n1. Excessive administrative fees for recordkeeping services\n2. Excessive management fees for individual investment offerings\n3. Plan structure with costly and confusing number of investment options\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Breach of duty regarding administrative fees\n2. Breach of duty regarding management fees of certain investment options\n3. Breach of duty regarding the number of options\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADOPT THE HEIGHTENED PLEADING STANDARD ADVOCATED BY THE U.S. CHAMBER.\nA. The \"More Likely\" Standard Is Inconsistent with the Principle that Courts Must Assume the Truth of Pleaded Facts and Construe them Most Favorably To the Nonmoving Party\nB. The \"More Likely\" Standard Is Inconsistent with Other Civil Rules.\nC. The \"More Likely\" Standard Is Not Appropriate for Assessing the Sufficiency of Pleadings Prior to Discovery.\nD. Arguments for Adoption of a More Stringent Pleading Standard Are More Appropriately Addressed to Congress.",
        "reference": "B. The Lower Court Did Not Find the Complaint Deficient in Factual Pleading but Legally Deficient Based on the Court's Lenient View of the Duties Under ERISA.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A federal court determining foreign law is not bound by the views expressed in a submission from the relevant foreign government\nA. Rule 44.1 grants federal courts broad latitude to decide questions of foreign law based on any relevant material or source\nB. A foreign government's characterization of its own law is ordinarily entitled to substantial weight, but is not binding on federal courts\nC. The court of appeals erred by treating the Ministry's amicus brief as binding and by disregarding other relevant materials\n1. The court of appeals' rule of binding deference is inconsistent with the policies embodied in Rule 44.1\n2. The court of appeals' rule of binding deference is inconsistent with this Court's treatment of analogous submissions from U.S. States\n3. This Court's decision in Pink does not support the court of appeals' rule of binding deference\n4. [MISSING]\nD. This Court should vacate the decision below and remand the case to allow the court of appeals to apply the correct legal standard",
        "reference": "4. Considerations of reciprocity and comity do not support the court of appeals' rule of binding deference",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND OPERATION OF 403(b) PLANS PROVIDE IMPORTANT CONTEXT FOR EVALUATING THE PLAUSIBILITY OF PETITIONERS' ALLEGATIONS\nA. TIAA's Annuities Were Established To Provide Educators With Portable Income Streams For Life\nB. 403(b) Plans Differ From 401(k) Plans In Important Respects\nC. ERISA's Enactment Altered 403(b) Plans In Certain Ways But Left Key Features Intact\nII. THE CHALLENGED CONDUCT WAS NOT IMPRUDENT\nA. The Recordkeeping Costs Were Not Imprudent\nB. Retaining TIAA's Services Without Consolidating To One Recordkeeper Was Not Imprudent\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Offering Retail-Class Shares Rather Than Institutional-Class Shares Was Not Imprudent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "Under the Clean Water Act, a release of pollutants to groundwater is not subject to NPDES requirements, even if the pollutants subsequently migrate to jurisdictional surface waters\nA. The NPDES regime protects only surface waters and does not regulate releases of pollutants to groundwater\nB. The release of a pollutant to groundwater is not a \"discharge of a pollutant\" under Section 1311, even if the pollutant eventually migrates to jurisdictional surface waters\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This Court need not address the application of the NPDES program to circumstances where pollutants do not travel through groundwater",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-248_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Grant Review to Determine Whether a State-Designated Agent Must Overcome a Presumption of Adequate Representation When Seeking to Intervene Alongside Another State Official and Whether Petitioners Are Entitled to Intervene as of Right in This Case.\nA. The Circuits Are Split Over Whether a Presumption of Adequate Representation Applies.\nB. Northeast Ohio Coalition Did Not Apply a Presumption of Adequate Representation.\nC. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Was Incorrect.\nD. Petitioners Are Entitled to Intervene in This Case.\nII. The Court Should Grant Review to Determine What Standard of Review Applies to a Decision on a Motion to Intervene as of Right.\nA. Petitioners Have Not Forfeited This Question.\nB. The Circuits Are Split on What Standard of Review Applies.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. No Vehicle Issues Prevent This Court From Granting Review.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. State Action Is Not Limited to Duty or Authority\n1. Duty\n2. Authority\nB. The Solicitor General's Property-Based Approach Is Flawed on Multiple Levels\nC. No Sound Reason Exists to Exclude Appearance and Function from the State-Action Inquiry\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Freed's Facebook Activity Constituted State Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1252(f)(1) barred the injunctive relief granted by the lower courts\nA. The scope of Section 1252(f)(1) is properly before the Court\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Respondents' assertion that Section 1252(f)(1)'s exception allows classwide relief is incorrect\nII. Section 1231(a)(6) does not require bond hearings\nA. Respondents' reading of Section 1231(a)(6) is not plausible\nB. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
        "reference": "B. Section 1252(f)(1)'s prohibition applies here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The traditional Judeo-Christian view of marriage has occupied a favored position in American law\nII. Because religious freedom is the first and foremost right of the Bill of Rights, infringements upon free exercise of religion should be accorded \"strict scrutiny.\"\nIII. Employment Division v. Smith does not do justice to the Framers' vision of religious liberty\nIV. The Pennsylvania policy should be accorded strict scrutiny because it is aimed at religion\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. The Pennsylvania policy also violates CSS's free speech and freedom of association rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Expropriation Exception Argument Does Not Merit Certiorari\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition",
        "reference": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5410_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. Under the plain meaning of the ACCA's force clause, a predicate offense that can be committed recklessly does not qualify as a 'violent felony'\nB. This Court's decision in Voisine does not support the contrary interpretation\nC. The ACCA's context, structure, and history also support the conclusion that reckless offenses do not qualify as 'violent felonies'\nD. [MISSING]\nE. The rule of lenity requires interpreting the ACCA's force clause to exclude predicate offenses that can be committed recklessly",
        "reference": "D. The government's interpretation, not petitioner's, would distort the ACCA's reach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Auer Deference In Action: A Litany of \"Greatest Misses.\"\nIII. Seminole Rock And Auer Should Be Overruled\nA. Auer and Seminole Rock Violate Separation of Powers Principles\nB. Auer and Seminole Rock Are Contrary To The APA\nC. Auer and Seminole Rock Cannot Be Justified On Policy Grounds",
        "reference": "I. Auer Deference Increases Regulatory Uncertainty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S \"LEAST COMMON DENOMINATOR\" APPROACH TO CLASS CERTIFICATION VIOLATES RULE 23 AND THE RULES ENABLING ACT",
        "reference": "I. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH ARTICLE III STANDING FOR ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Harvard is violating existing precedent, and the First Circuit's misapplications of strict scrutiny warrant review.",
        "reference": "I. Grutter is wrong, and this case against Harvard is an ideal vehicle to overrule it.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit Failed to Enforce the Statutory Requirement That An Inventor's Sale Must Make the \"Claimed Invention\" Public for Prior Art Effect\nA. Pre-AIA section 102 Included \"Loss of Right\" Forfeiture Provisions\nB. The AIA's \"First Inventor to File\" System Replaced Forfeiture as the Incentive for Prompt Filing\nC. The Federal Circuit Erroneously Interpreted AIA section 102\n1. The Plain Language of AIA section 102(a)(1) Imposes a Requirement of Public Availability on Prior Art\n2. Congress Intended to Change the Law Developed Under Pre-AIA Court Decisions\n3. AIA section 102(b) Confirms that Public Uses and Sales Now Create Prior Art, Not Forfeiture Events\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Legislative History Supports the Public Availability Requirement\nB. The PTO's Reasonable Interpretation Supports the Public Availability Requirement\nC. The \"Public Availability\" Requirement Advances Congress's Policy Objectives",
        "reference": "II. The Legislative History, USPTO Interpretation, and Public Policy Each Provide that \"On Sale\" Must Make the \"Claimed Invention\" Publicly Available for Prior Art Treatment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-437_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The question presented is not sufficiently important to warrant this Court's attention\nA. The question presented rarely arises\nB. The Government itself has signaled that the question presented lacks pressing importance\nII. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing Section 1326(d)'s requirements\nIII. The Ninth Circuit's ruling is correct\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1326(d)'s administrative exhaustion prong is satisfied here\nC. Section 1326(d)'s judicial review prong is satisfied here\nD. The Government's policy arguments lack merit\nIV. There is no ripe circuit conflict over the question presented",
        "reference": "A. The Ninth Circuit does not \"excuse\" compliance with Section 1326(d)'s first two prongs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-601_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court has jurisdiction\nII. The Attorney General should have been permitted to intervene on behalf of the Commonwealth\nA. Kentucky's sovereign interests cannot be irrelevant to the timeliness inquiry\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. EMW's other arguments provide no basis to deny intervention",
        "reference": "B. The ordinary timeliness factors overwhelmingly favor the Attorney General",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Supreme Court Has Endorsed the Doctrine of Assignor Estoppel in Patent Cases but Has Provided Limited Guidance Regarding Its Application\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Assignor Estoppel is a Doctrine of Limited Application and Scope\nIV. Assignor Estoppel Should Be Implemented as a Rebuttable Presumption That Can Be Overcome on the Equities Considering the Totality of the Circumstances\nV. Privity and Its Equitable Factual Considerations Are the Backstop That Avoid the Parade of Horribles Raised by Those Who Would Abolish Assignor Estoppel\nA. Privity where the inventor assignor is the employee of the infringer\nB. Privity in business-to-business transactions\nVI. An Equitable Application of Assignor Estoppel Is Consistent with this Court's Abolishment of Licensee Estoppel",
        "reference": "II. The Federal Circuit Law of Assignor Estoppel Follows and Fairly Implements This Court's Jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. In Neither Portsmouth Harbor Nor Causby Did The Taking Depend On The Economic Harm Caused By The Government; In Both, The Servitude Was Treated As Directly Physically Imposed And As Per Se\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Kaiser Aetna Was Not Decided As A Penn Central Regulatory Taking; The Easement Was Treated As An Imposed Physical Invasion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. It is critical that plan fiduciaries maintain flexibility to select a range of investment options, including retail share classes of funds and actively managed funds\nA. A fiduciary must have flexibility to select a variety of investment options based on a process that considers a wide variety of factors for an individual plan, not just total expense ratio\nB. Petitioners' condemnation of respondents' selection of retail share classes of funds over institutional share classes ignores well established recordkeeping fee practices\n1. Petitioners incorrectly focus on expense ratio, rather than actual \"all-in\" expense\n2. Restricting plans to offering only institutional shares could limit investment options\nC. By offering both index (passive) and active funds, plans can hedge risk and enhance investment choice for plan participants\nII. Petitioners' proposed pleading standard expands this Court's plausibility framework and harms plan participants\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' permissive pleading standard harms plan participants\n1. Enhanced Litigation Risk Leads Fiduciaries to Eliminate Important Investment Options for Plan Participants, Leading Plan Participants to Access Fewer Diverse and More Tax Disadvantaged Investment Opportunities\n2. Enhanced Litigation Risk Leads to Higher Insurance Premiums to the Detriment of Plan Participants",
        "reference": "A. Petitioners' pleading standard disregards Iqbal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrying a defendant on a charge of which he has previously been acquitted\nA. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial on charges of which a defendant has been acquitted, even if the verdict was erroneous\nB. The Georgia Supreme Court's distinction between repugnant verdicts and merely inconsistent verdicts does not change the Double Jeopardy Clause analysis\nII. The Georgia Supreme Court's repugnancy exception conflicts with the purpose and history of the Double Jeopardy Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. History confirms that repugnancy is not a basis for permitting retrial on a charge of which the defendant has been acquitted",
        "reference": "A. The values underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause do not support an exception for repugnant verdicts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-984_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Hewitt Is Not Exempt Pursuant To The Clear Text Of The HCE Regulation\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Petitioners' Expansive Interpretation Of The HCE Exemption Would Negatively Impact Both The Nursing Profession And Public Health",
        "reference": "II. Petitioners' Brief Fundamentally Misunderstands The Apparent Purpose of The FLSA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-542_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Does Not Warrant This Court's Review Because It Will Not Alter The Election Result.\nII. Ballots Cast In Reasonable Reliance On Governing Election Rules Cannot Be Retroactively Invalidated.\nIII. This Case Is A Poor Vehicle Because There Are Substantial Questions Whether Any Petitioner Has Standing.\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. There is no federal constitutional flaw in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution\n1. The Elections and Electors Clauses do not unmoor state legislative power from ordinary constitutional constraints\n2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision is consistent with the Elections and Electors Clauses\nB. Pennsylvania law comports with Congress's selection of a nationwide federal Election Day",
        "reference": "IV. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Decision Comports With Federal Law.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RULE JEOPARDIZES STUDENTS' ALREADY PRECARIOUS ABILITY TO VINDICATE THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.\nA. Nominal-Damages Claims Are Often Students' Sole Path to Relief from Unconstitutional Speech Restrictions.\nB. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Threatens Students' Access to Relief for Past Violations of Their Constitutional Rights.\nC. The Decision Below Disregards the Distinctive Role Nominal Damages Play in Remedying Past Constitutional Violations.\nII. PUBLIC COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ROUTINELY INFRINGE STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS.\nA. Unconstitutional Speech Policies Are Prevalent on Campuses Nationwide.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Colleges and Universities Often Reinstitute Unconstitutional Policies after Revoking Them to End Litigation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. State sovereign immunity does not bar actions brought under federal legislation enacted pursuant to the war powers.\nA. The Constitution limits the States' sovereign immunity from suit.\nB. States have no sovereignty in military matters.\n1. History shows the States relinquished sovereignty in military matters.\n2. Precedent and practice show the States relinquished sovereignty in military matters.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Because Congress validly enacted USERRA pursuant to its war powers, States have no sovereign immunity against actions brought under that Act.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Plain Language Of Sections 365(g) And 365(n) Precludes A Construction Of \"Rejection\" Of Trademark Licenses As The Equivalent Of Termination Under Which Licensees Would Lose Their Rights To Use The Licensed Marks\nA. The Plain Language Of Section 365 Treats Rejection Of An Executory Contract As A Breach, Not Termination, Of The Contract\nB. Congress Recognized How To Treat Rejection As Termination In Four Subsections Of Section 365, None Of Which Applies To Trademark Licenses Or Grants A Right Of Termination To The Bankruptcy Trustee Or Debtor\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Judicial Equation Of Rejection Of A Trademark License With Termination Improperly Engrafts A New Exception Onto The Statutory Effect Of Rejection Of Such Licenses\nII. Rejection Of A License Agreement That Has Granted The Licensee All Substantial Rights In A Trademark Cannot Prevent The Licensee From Using That Trademark\nIII. The Quality Control Requirements Of Trademark Licensing Law Do Not Preclude The Non-Debtor's Continued Use After Rejection By The Licensor",
        "reference": "C. Absent Treatment Specifically Mandated Under Another Provision, The Effect Of Rejection Of A Trademark License Is Determined Under Section 365(g)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The October Memorandum is a legally effective agency action, not a post hoc rationalization\nA. The October Memorandum is an agency action \"of its own\" terminating MPP\nB. The October Memorandum is not a post hoc rationalization under Regents\nC. Regents' distinction between new actions and new explanations serves important values that strongly favor the Government here\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. This Court should take care not to implicitly endorse the Fifth Circuit's aggressive application of Regents to the initial agency action in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1143_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction Over FAA Motions If Jurisdiction Exists Over the Parties' Underlying Controversy\nA. FAA Motions Are Adjuncts to the Parties' Underlying Controversy\nB. FAA Motions Require Federal Courts to Look to the Underlying Controversy\nC. Section 4 Does Not Transform Other FAA Motions into Freestanding Suits\nD. The Same Jurisdictional Test Should Apply to All FAA Motions\nII. Petitioner's Approach Is Untenable\nA. Section 1337 Supplies Federal Jurisdiction If FAA Motions Are Freestanding Suits\nB. Petitioner's Reliance on Sections 4 and 8 Is Flawed\nC. Petitioner's Settlement Analogy Is Flawed\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Petitioner's Approach Undermines the FAA",
        "reference": "D. Petitioner's Approach Produces Implausible Results",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the \"Plain Language\" of the Statute, Male-bodied and Female-bodied is the Proper Framework from which to Center the Analysis of Title VII\nII. Congress Clearly Understood Title VII as Not Covering Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity\nIII. The Price Waterhouse Plurality Opinion Does Not Support the EEOC's Interpretation or the View that Stereotyping Theory is Distinct from Title VII; Manhart and Prior Cases Affirm the Strong Value of Stereotyping Evidence, Irrespective of Intent\nIV. This Court Rejected the Opportunity to Adopt the Extended Price Waterhouse Theory in Oncale\nV. Errors in the EEOC's Approach Demonstrate the Wisdom of Oncale\nA. Bundling Disparate Claims Together Making them Impenetrable to Claim Specific Review and Using the Mixed-Motive Test and Stereotyping Claims to Eliminate Legitimate Motives\nB. Ignoring Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders and Subjugating Claims That were Congress' Principal Concern to Claims that are Derivative\nC. Creating New Rights\nD. Ignoring the Need for Mutuality\nE. [MISSING]\nF. Replacing One Set of Social Norms With Another\nVI. Oncale Provides the Proper Standard for Derivative Claims\nA. Under Oncale and Title VII, the Court Must Ask Whether Each Claim Concerns an \"Evil\" that is \"Reasonably Comparable\" to the \"Principal Evil Congress was Concerned With.\"\nB. Under Oncale and Title VII, Courts Must Inquire into the Motives for the Actions\nC. Under Oncale and Title VII, Courts Must Consider Whether Recognizing the Derivative Claim Would Be Inconsistent With Title VII Goals; If So, the Claim Should Be Denied or the McDonald Douglas Burdens Test Should Apply\nD. The Verdict in Altitude Express Should Stand",
        "reference": "E. Attempting to Use Title VII To Answer Constitutional Questions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Compulsory union fees are subject to exacting scrutiny\nA. This Court's cases require exacting scrutiny of compulsory union fees regardless of the Government's role as public employer\nB. Exacting review advances the First Amendment's purposes\nC. History confirms the propriety of exacting review\nII. Compulsory agency fees are unjustifiable on any standard of review\nA. \"Labor peace\" does not justify compulsory union fees\nB. Concerns about \"free riding\" do not justify compulsory union fees\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. If the Court overrules Abood, it should also clarify that unions may collect fees from nonmembers only with their affirmative consent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Appellees lack Article III standing\nA. Appellees' injury is not traceable to, and would not be redressed by restraining the enforcement of, BCRA's loan-repayment limit\n1. [MISSING]\n2. An FEC regulation currently precludes the committee from repaying the remaining $10,000 of Senator Cruz's loan, but that regulatory bar does not give appellees standing to challenge the statutory loan-repayment limit\nB. Appellees lack standing because their injury is self-inflicted\n1. Self-inflicted injury does not create standing\n2. The injury in this case was self-inflicted\nII. The loan-repayment limit complies with the First Amendment\nA. The loan-repayment limit imposes at most a modest burden on speech\n1. On its face, the loan-repayment limit imposes at most a modest burden on speech\n2. As applied in this case, the loan-repayment limit does not burden speech at all\nB. Congress's compelling interest in preventing actual and apparent corruption justifies the burden imposed by the loan-repayment limit\n1. The loan-repayment limit serves the compelling interest in preventing actual and apparent corruption\n2. The loan-repayment limit is properly tailored\nC. The district court's contrary analysis is flawed\n1. The district court erred in concluding that the loan-repayment limit does not help to prevent actual and apparent corruption\n2. The district court erred in finding the loan-repayment limit to be inadequately tailored",
        "reference": "1. Appellees have not shown that their injury is fairly traceable to BCRA's loan-repayment limit or that restraining its enforcement would redress the injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-542_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A RECENT EIGHTH CIRCUIT DECISION HAS CREATED A SPLIT IN AUTHORITY\nII. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE\nA. RPP Has Standing\nB. [MISSING]\nC. PDP's Reliance Argument Is Unfounded And Irrelevant\nIII. RESPONDENTS' MERITS ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT AND WRONG",
        "reference": "B. The Case Is Not Moot",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Hardison Standard Is Irreconcilable with the Text of Title VII\nA. Hardison's Standard Does Not Comport with the Natural or Ordinary Meaning of \"Undue Hardship\"\nB. Hardison's Departure from the Text Causes Grave Constitutional Problems\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Hardison Standard Is Irreconcilable with the Purpose of Title VII\nA. Hardison Embraced Precedents That Congress Rejected\nB. Hardison Disregarded the 1967 Guidelines the \"Undue Hardship\" Standard Validated",
        "reference": "C. Hardison Has Been Eroded by Subsequent Legislation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-778_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "Forming the intent to commit a crime while unlawfully remaining inside a building or structure qualifies as ACCA \"burglary\"\nA. An intruder who decides to commit a crime while remaining in a dwelling is \"remaining with intent\"\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Legal authority at the time of the ACCA supports the plain meaning of \"remaining\"\na. State burglary law indicated that criminal intent could be formed while \"remaining\"\nb. The additional sources that Taylor consulted are consistent with the ordinary meaning of \"remaining\"\nB. The normal understanding of \"remaining\" is the only definition consistent with the ACCA's design\nC. Petitioner's \"initial moment\" rule is unsupported and unsound\n1. Petitioner's state survey is misguided\n2. Petitioner's position overcomplicates Taylor and invites substantial additional ACCA litigation\nD. The court of appeals correctly upheld petitioner's sentence",
        "reference": "1. The plain meaning of \"remaining\" refers to continuous, not instantaneous, activity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Proper Application of the Post-AIA On-Sale Bar Is Critically Important to All Industries and Fields of Technology\nII. The Post-AIA On-Sale Bar Provision Should Be Interpreted to Exclude Secret Sales\na. Statutory Construction Principles Confirm That Congress Intended to Exclude Secret Sales from the On-Sale Bar\nb. The Legislative History of the AIA Confirms That Secret Sales Were Meant to Be Excluded\nIII. Excluding Secret Sales Is Consistent with Congress' Intent for the AIA to Harmonize United States Patent Laws with Other Countries\nIV. The Federal Circuit Decision Is Inconsistent with Other Interpretations of the On-Sale Bar\na. The Federal Circuit's En Banc Decision in Medicines Compels a Result That the Invention Was Not On-Sale in the Present Case\nb. The Federal Circuit's Decision Does Not Square with Pfaff's Requirement That the Invention Be Public to Be On Sale\nc. [MISSING]\nd. The Concurrence Misapprehends IPO's Medicines Argument",
        "reference": "c. The USPTO's Post-AIA View of the Scope of the On-Sale Bar Excludes Secret Sales",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATE COURTS MAY NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST FEDERAL DEFENSES .. 4\nA. The Supremacy Clause Requires State Courts to Adjudicate Federal Law When Applicable\nB. Where State Courts Have Attempted to Escape Their Constitutional Duty to Apply Federal Law, This Court Has Repeatedly Held Them Accountable\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. FEDERAL DEFENSES BASED ON INCORPORATION ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM THE NON-DISCRIMINATION RULE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-290_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner's preemption defense turns on the meaning and effect of FDA's 2009 Complete Response Letter, which are legal questions that a court must resolve\n1. Courts, not juries, determine the meaning of federal agency decisions\n2. Factual findings necessary to interpret a federal agency decision are also matters for courts to resolve\nB. The court of appeals erred in holding that, under Wyeth v. Levine, a jury must resolve petitioner's preemption defense as a factual matter subject to a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard\n1. Wyeth did not address whether courts or juries should construe an actual FDA decision\n2. Any factual findings necessary to resolve a preemption defense need only rest on a preponderance of the evidence\n3. Resolving this case does not require factual findings\nC. FDA's May 2009 decision rejected a change to Fosamax's warnings and precautions because the data at that time was insufficient to justify a change",
        "reference": "The court of appeals erred in rejecting petitioner's preemption defense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. ARTICLE III REQUIRES CONCRETE AND PARTICULARIZED HARM THAT CANNOT BE PRESUMED\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE INJURIES TO THE ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS TO BE PRESUMED\nIII. BY ALLOWING A PRESUMPTION OF INJURY, THE NINTH CIRCUIT HAS OPENED THE FLOOD GATES TO SIMILAR CLASS ACTIONS\nA. Several Recent FCRA Class Action Complaints Cite Ramirez or Otherwise Rely on Its Erroneous Holdings\nB. The Decisions of the Ninth and Third Circuits Avert the Protections that Article III Was Intended to Provide\nIV. ALLOWING CONSUMERS TO PURSUE CLASS CLAIMS IN THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE AND PARTICULARIZED HARM PUTS INNOCENT SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED BUSINESSES AT AN UNACCEPTABLY HIGH RISK WHEN THEY HAVE DONE NOTHING WRONG\nA. Resellers Are a Vital Part of the Consumer Reporting Industry\nB. Claims Asserted on Behalf of Uninjured Absent Class Members Are a Major Source of Risk for Resellers\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Outcome of This Case Will Also Impact Small and Medium Sized Businesses Outside of the Consumer Reporting Industry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. NEUTRAL AND GENERALLY APPLICABLE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS DO NOT AND SHOULD NOT PERMIT A FIRST AMENDMENT EXCEPTION.\nII. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED CIRCUMVENTION OF THE LAW WOULD CAUSE GRAVE HARM TO SAME-SEX COUPLES, AND BY EXTENSION TO THE LGBTQIA+ COMMUNITY.\nA. Petitioner seeks to discriminate on the basis of identity, not message.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The LGBTQIA+ community includes Black Americans who will face especially harmful intersectional discrimination should Petitioner prevail.",
        "reference": "B. Refusing to provide business services to individuals celebrating same-sex weddings denies gay and lesbian persons equal treatment under the law and imposes significant dignitary harms on those couples and the broader LGBTQIA+ community.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. ERISA IMPOSES FIDUCIARY DUTIES DERIVED FROM THE COMMON LAW OF TRUSTS TO SELECT AND MONITOR INVESTMENTS PRUDENTLY AND TO INCUR ONLY REASONABLE EXPENSES\nA. ERISA's Duties Are Derived From The Common Law Of Trusts\nB. Trust Law Imposes A Duty, Incorporated Into ERISA, To Act Prudently When Selecting And Monitoring Investments, Incurring Expenses, And Delegating Investment Functions\n1. Plan fiduciaries have a duty to act prudently when incurring expenses, so as to incur only reasonable expenses\n2. Plan fiduciaries have a duty to act prudently when delegating investment functions to vendors, such as investment managers\n3. Plan fiduciaries have a duty to monitor investments prudently and remove imprudent investments\nII. PETITIONERS PLEADED VIOLATIONS OF RESPONDENTS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES\nA. Respondents Imprudently Selected And Retained Retail-Class Mutual Funds With Unnecessary Fees\nB. Respondents Imprudently Incurred Excessive Recordkeeping Fees\nC. Respondents Imprudently Offered Many Duplicative Investment Options, Leading To Higher Fees, Participant Confusion, And Fiduciary Inability To Monitor\nD. Information Revealed In Discovery Confirms That Dismissal Was Improper\nIII. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S REASONS FOR AFFIRMING DISMISSAL WERE ERRONEOUS\nA. The Seventh Circuit Failed To Consider The Proper Fiduciary Duty That Respondents Owed To Petitioners\nB. The Seventh Circuit Failed To Apply The Applicable Pleading Standard And Assume The Truth Of Petitioners' Allegations\nC. [MISSING]\nIV. ALLOWING WELL-PLEADED ERISA CLAIMS TO ADVANCE SERVES ERISA'S REMEDIAL PURPOSES",
        "reference": "C. The Seventh Circuit Misinterpreted ERISA To Immunize Fiduciaries For Offering Many Options",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-846_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should deny review to permit further consideration of the issue in the courts of appeals.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The court of appeals' decision is correct.",
        "reference": "II. This case is a poor vehicle for review of the question presented.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 2703 focuses on domestic conduct\n1. Section 2703 focuses on the disclosure of stored communications, not the storage of stored communications\n2. Even if Section 2703 focuses on the privacy of stored communications, any privacy invasion occurs here\nB. Section 2703 reflects the common-law principle that subpoena recipients must produce documents within their control\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Practical consequences favor reversal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Blaine Amendments Were Born of Anti-Catholic Bigotry\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Current Application of Article X, Section 6(1) Violates Federal Constitution",
        "reference": "II. Montana's Blaine Amendment Was Forced As a Condition of Statehood",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review\nA. There Is No Circuit Conflict\nB. The Second Circuit's Decision Is Correct\nC. [MISSING]\nD. This Case Is A Poor Vehicle\nII. The Second Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review\nA. There Is No Circuit Conflict\nB. The Second Circuit's Decision Is Correct\nC. The Second Question Is Of No Recurring Importance\nD. This Case Is A Poor Vehicle",
        "reference": "C. The First Question Presented Is Of No Recurring Importance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Proclamation Violates The First Amendment's Establishment Clause Because Its Purpose And Effect Are To Discriminate Against A Religious Minority\nA. [MISSING]\ni. EO-3's avowed purpose is a \"sham\"\nii. The stated presidential purpose is clear, unambiguous and oft repeated\nB. The primary effect is government discrimination against Muslims\nII. The President's General Authority On Immigration, Although Expansive, Cannot Be Used To Circumvent Constitutional Mandates\nIII. The Executive Order Unconstitutionally Creates A \"Religious Test for Office or Public Trust\" That Violates Article VI\nA. Article VI Clause 3 proscribes a religious test for office or public trust\nB. Article VI Clause 3 necessarily extends to rights of citizenship and visitors",
        "reference": "A. EO-3's purpose is to discriminate against the Muslim faith",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief044.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Courts Limit Conflicting Constitutional Rights, and an Overly Broad Right to Bear Arms Conflicts with the Right to Live Safely\nA. The Right to Live Safely Is a Foundational Constitutional Right\nB. Courts Routinely Limit Conflicting Constitutional Rights\nC. An Overly Broad Right to Bear Arms Conflicts with the Right to Live Safely\nIII. Politically Accountable Branches Should Weigh Competing Constitutional Rights to Guns and to Safety\nA. Legislatures Have Long Weighed Competing Rights When Individuals Seek to Carry Firearms in Public\nB. Legislatures Are Best Suited to Harmonize Public Safety and Second Amendment Rights\nC. Courts Routinely Uphold Reasonable Regulation of the Right to Bear Arms to Ensure Public Safety\nD. Heller Reaffirmed Longstanding Constitutional Guardrails on the Second Amendment",
        "reference": "I. Petitioners Seek a Right to Decide Who Lives and Who Dies in the Public Square",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ASSERT THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF WOMEN SEEKING ABORTIONS\nA. Third-Party Standing Is Properly Treated As A Component Of Article III Jurisdiction\nB. Whether Third-Party Standing Is Jurisdictional Or Prudential, Plaintiffs Challenging Abortion Regulations Should Be Held To The Same Standing Requirements As Other Litigants\nC. Plaintiffs' Patients Are Not Hindered In Pursuing Their Own Rights\nD. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish Third-Party Standing In Light Of Conflicts Of Interest And An Insufficiently Close Relationship With Their Patients\n1. The record illustrates several conflicts between Plaintiffs and their patients\n2. The record does not establish a \"close\" doctor-patient relationship between Plaintiffs and their patients\nII. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS PLAINTIFFS' STANDING\nA. Objections To Third-Party Standing May Not Be Waived Or Forfeited\nB. This Court Should Reach Plaintiffs' Third-Party Standing\nIII. PLAINTIFFS' INTERPRETATION OF HELLERSTEDT IS CONTRARY TO PRECEDENT AND UNWORKABLE\nA. Plaintiffs' Expansive Legal Theory Is Inconsistent With Hellerstedt And Other Cases\n1. Hellerstedt necessitates a fact-intensive analysis\n2. Hellerstedt did not dispense with the requirement that plaintiffs prove a substantial obstacle to obtaining abortions\nB. Plaintiffs' Interpretation of Hellerstedt Violates Other Important Legal Principles\n1. Regulations of abortion procedures that do not impose a substantial obstacle are examined under a rational basis standard\n2. All facial challenges to abortion regulations should satisfy the Salerno standard\n3. A \"substantial obstacle\" means a near impossibility of obtaining an abortion\nIV. UNDER ANY PLAUSIBLE READING OF HELLERSTEDT, THE FIFTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED ACT 620 WOULD NOT UNDULY BURDEN ABORTION\nA. The Fifth Circuit Did Not Err In Its Review Of The District Court's Evaluation Of Act 620's Burdens\n1. Louisiana abortion providers are able to obtain privileges under Act 620\n2. At least three Louisiana abortion providers failed to seek privileges in good faith\n3. No substantial obstacle would result if Doe 1 left practice as a result of Act 620\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Act 620 improves credentialing\n2. Act 620 improves safety\n3. Act 620 is consistent with other Louisiana laws",
        "reference": "B. The Fifth Circuit Did Not Err In Its Review Of The District Court's Evaluation Of Act 620's Benefits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.52
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Secretary of Education, Miguel Cardona's Distorted Reading of the HEROES Act Also Violates the Major Questions Doctrine.\nA. The HEROES Act Has a Noble But Limited Purpose that Does Not Clearly Authorize the Secretary's Program.\nB. Democrat Leaders in Congress and Then-Candidate Biden Conceded that Loan Forgiveness Is an Issue of Immense Economic and Political Significance that Congress Alone May Regulate.",
        "reference": "I. The Secretary of Education, Miguel Cardona's Twisting of the HEROES Act Violates Separation of Powers, Which Prevents the Executive Branch from Dictating National Policy by Administrative Fiat.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "AUER ENCOURAGES AN AGENCY TO TEST THE BOUNDARIES OF ITS POWER; TO GRAB AUTHORITY OUTSIDE ITS AREA OF EXPERTISE; TO SHIFT POSITIONS UNPREDICTABLY; TO BYPASS NOTICE-AND-COMMENT RULEMAKING; TO SPURN DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY; AND TO HARASS DISFAVORED GROUPS\nA. The Board of Immigration Appeals\nB. The Department of Labor\nC. The Environmental Protection Agency\nD. The Department of Education\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. The Federal Trade Commission",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE'S TEXT LACKS A CLEAR ABROGATION OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\nA. Neither Respondent Nor The Government Can Rationalize The Conspicuous Omission Of Indian Tribes (Or Similar Reference) In Section 101(27)\n1. Congress's unbroken practice of referring to Indian tribes informs the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.\n2. Petitioners' position does not run afoul of any \"magic words\" prohibition.\nB. \"Other Domestic Government\" Is (At Least) Ambiguous\n1. Respondent repeats the First Circuit's misstep of relying on dictionary definitions of component words.\n2. \"Other domestic government,\" as used in the context of section 101(27), can be interpreted readily not to include Indian tribes.\nII. THE STRUCTURE, CONTEXT, AND HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DO NOT CONFER THE MISSING CLEAR STATEMENT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Bankruptcy Clause Has No Bearing Here\nC. This Court Should Reject The Invitation To Usurp Congress's Policymaking Role",
        "reference": "A. Bankruptcy Policy Cannot Drive The Result",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1414_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. INHERENT TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY DOES NOT INCLUDE POLICE POWER OVER NON-INDIANS ON A RIGHT-OF-WAY\nA. Oliphant, Wheeler, and Montana limit the criminal enforcement power of tribes over non-Indians on non-Indian land\nB. The government resurrects a readily distinguished, and expressly rejected, analysis to try to create retained inherent sovereignty\nC. Tribal police power cannot exceed its regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction\nII. THIS COURT DEFERS TO CONGRESS'S PLENARY AUTHORITY TO REMEDY ANY JURISDICTIONAL VOIDS, INCLUDING ALLEGED VOIDS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS\nA. This Court rejects jurisdictional voids as a basis for finding tribal authority and expressly defers to Congress's plenary authority\nB. Congress has addressed the alleged void by providing for cross-deputization and is best situated to remedy practical obstacles that remain unaddressed\nIII. THE \"BAD MEN\" CLAUSE IN THE 1868 TREATY DOES NOT RECOGNIZE OR CREATE TRIBAL POLICE AUTHORITY OVER NON-INDIANS\nA. This argument was not raised or passed on in the lower courts\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The text and history of the \"bad men\" clause establishes this interpretation\n2. Lower court opinions have consistently read the \"bad men\" provision as a private right of redress and a reservation of federal authority\n3. A review of the \"bad men\" provisions reveals the different interests of the parties\nIV. OFFICERS AYLOR EXCEEDED HIS AUTHORITY IN VIOLATION OF ICRA\nA. ICRA is a restraint on tribal police power, not a grant of authority over non-Indians\nB. The exclusionary rule applies in this case",
        "reference": "B. The \"bad men\" clause creates a private right of action for damages to the person or property of individual Indians",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-248_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TEXT OF RULE 24 IS COUNTER TO THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION\nII. THE HISTORY OF INTERVENTION SUPPORTS A MORE ACCOMMODATING STANDARD\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S STANDARD IS CONTRARY TO JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AND CREATES PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR INTERVENORS",
        "reference": "III. THE PRESUMPTION OF ADEQUACY OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATION IS INVALID",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1042_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no Circuit split. The Federal courts all agree FELA satisfactions are not taxable under the RRTA\nA. There is no Circuit split\nB. The District Courts agree FELA satisfactions are not taxable\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Internal Revenue Service has not ruled that satisfaction of FELA judgments are subject to RRTA taxes\nIII. The Eighth Circuit's decision does not conflict with this Court's decisions\nA. There is no conflict with Nierotko and Quality Stores\nB. The court below properly applied Chevron\nIV. This is not an ideal vehicle for the Court to address the question presented because the court below did not address the many other reasons why FELA satisfactions are not subject to RRTA taxes\nA. IRC section 104(a)(2) excludes FELA judgments from taxation\nB. FELA awards of lost wages are not necessarily \"pay for time lost.\"",
        "reference": "C. There is only an illusory State court split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-9526_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Eastern Oklahoma is not an Indian reservation\nA. Creek country was not established as a reservation\nB. Creek country lost its communal status as Indian country via allotment and removal of federal restrictions\nC. The history of criminal jurisdiction in former Creek country confirms it was not a reservation at statehood\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Congress removed jurisdictional distinctions in the Territory between Indians and non-Indians\nB. The Enabling Act did not reimpose race-based jurisdiction\nIII. Congress disestablished Creek borders by divesting the land of tribal interests\nA. Text\nB. Historical context\nC. Subsequent history and demographics\nIV. Turning eastern Oklahoma into reservations would transform the State",
        "reference": "II. Congress gave Oklahoma jurisdiction over its eastern half \"irrespective of race\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Through The Copyright Act, Congress Intended To Incentivize And Protect Original Work, In Keeping With The Founders' Design\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Copyright Act's Text And Structure Include Broad Protection Against Use Of Copyrighted Material In Derivative Works\nC. The Copyright Act's Legislative History Confirms Congress's Intent To Incentivize And Protect Original Work\nII. The Second Circuit's Application Of The Copyright Act Properly Protects Creators Of Original Work",
        "reference": "A. Throughout American History, Copyright Law Was Crafted To Protect Original Creative Works",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-984_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS ENACTED THE FLSA TO PROTECT \"BLUE COLLAR\" WORKERS MAKING SUBSTANDARD WAGES\nII. THE HCE EXEMPTION WAS INTENDED TO PROVIDE EMPLOYERS WITH A SIMPLER OVERTIME SAFE HARBOR FOR THEIR HIGHEST-PAID EMPLOYEES\n1. The Longstanding EAP Regulations Were Exceedingly Complex\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The HCE Exemption Was Meant to Streamline the Regulatory Structure for the Highest-Paid Employees\nIII. THE HCE EXEMPTION, PROPERLY INTERPRETED, AVOIDS WASTEFUL OVERTIME LITIGATION AND WINDFALLS FOR HIGHLY PAID EMPLOYEES",
        "reference": "2. The 2004 Amendments Moderated the Duties, Salary-Level, and Salary-Basis Tests for the Highest-Paid Employees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court's Application of Assignor Estoppel is Grounded in Equity\nIII. The Federal Circuit's Rigid Application of Assignor Estoppel Ignores Equity",
        "reference": "I. The Equitable Principles of Assignor Estoppel Remain Vital Today",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Below Had Jurisdiction\nII. The Decision Below Defies This Court's Precedents Interpreting The FAA\nIII. The Decision Below Conflicts With The Decisions Of Several Other Circuits\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Varela's Other Asserted Obstacles To Review Are Baseless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A [MISSING]\nA. Analogous common-law torts support requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim\nB. This Court's decision in Hartman supports requiring proof of the absence of probable cause as an element of a typical retaliatory arrest claim\nC. A damages remedy is not essential to deter police officers from making retaliatory arrests supported by probable cause",
        "reference": "A typical damages claim of retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment requires the plaintiff to plead and prove the absence of probable cause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. AMPLE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE GOVERNMENT'S COMPELLING INTEREST IN APPLYING ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS TO THOSE WHO CHOOSE TO OFFER PRODUCTS AND SERVICES TO THE PUBLIC\nA. Common Law and Statutory History and Tradition Long Support the Legal Maxim that a Place of Commerce Open to the Public Must be Open to All Free to Discrimination\nB. Several States Have a Long History of Supporting Both Common Law and Statute in Insuring That Their Commercial Spaces Are Free of Discrimination and Open to All\nII. THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT'S ACCOMMODATIONS CLAUSE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE\nA. The Anti-Discrimination Act's Accommodations Clause does not restrict protected speech\nB. To elevate Petitioners' argument above the state's interest under the circumstances of this case would bar the application of anti-discrimination law in a wide range of other settings\nIII. THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ACT'S COMMUNICATIONS CLAUSE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE\nA. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "A. The First Amendment poses no bar to the government's regulation of commercial speech incidental to, or in furtherance of, a priori illegal acts, such as discrimination",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The travel ban does not violate the Establishment Clause\nA. The Establishment Clause has a narrower application to foreign affairs than to domestic matters\nB. Proclamation 9645 clearly passes the \"Lemon test\"\n1. Secular Purpose\n2. The principle or primary effect of the Proclamation neither advances nor inhibits religion\n3. The Proclamation does not foster \"excessive entanglement\" of government with religion\nII. The teaching of the Bible is compatible with limiting the immigration of foreign nationals who may be seeking entry into a country to harm its people\nA. God ordained governments to protect people from evildoers\nB. Although the Bible forbids oppression of foreigners, it does not require a country to have open borders\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. The universal injunctions issued in these cases violate Article III of the Constitution\nA. This case is not a class action\nB. A court has no power to issue a decree for the benefit of a nonparty\nC. The lower courts' practice of issuing universal injunctions violates the limits on judicial power stated in Article III\nD. The meager reasoning offered by the Ninth Circuit in justification of its universal injunction is unpersuasive\nE. Collateral damage: the nullification of Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P\nF. The practice of deliberately selecting venues perceived as amenable to the issuance of universal injunctions undermines the reputation of the federal judiciary for fair and neutral adjudication\nG. This case offers the Court the opportunity for a long overdue course correction in the use of equitable power by the lower courts",
        "reference": "C. The President's Proclamation is compatible with Biblical teaching",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Meaning Of \"Critical Habitat\" Is Of Immense And Immediate Public Importance.\nIII. The Panel's Erroneous Holding That FWS's Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 From Designation Is Judicially Unreviewable \"Play[s] Havoc With Administrative Law.\"",
        "reference": "I. The Fifth Circuit Misinterpreted The ESA's Critical Habitat Provisions, In Conflict With The Ninth Circuit.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Why This Court Should Reject Hardison's \"More-Than-De-Minimis-Cost\" Test in Title VII Religious Accommodation Cases and Restore the Meaning of \"Undue Hardship\" That Congress Intended\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. If Employers Could Establish \"Undue Hardship\" Under Title VII Merely By Showing That the Requested Accommodation May Inconvenience The Religious Employee's Co-Workers, It Would Enshrine the Very Forms of Discrimination Title VII Was Meant To Alleviate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. section 1257(a)\nB. This Case Is an Unusually Bad Vehicle\nC. The Decisions Below Are Correct\nD. There Is No Division of Authority\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. Petitioners' Theory Would Fundamentally Alter the Balance of State and Federal Power Over Election Administration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S \"FULL SCOPE\" TEST FRUSTRATES THE GOALS OF PATENT LAW.\nA. The \"Full Scope\" Test Chills Investment and Innovation.\nB. The \"Full Scope\" Test Is Disconnected from the Purpose of the Enablement Requirement.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S \"FULL SCOPE\" TEST IS CONTRARY TO THE TEXT AND STRUCTURE OF THE PATENT ACT.\nIII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S \"FULL SCOPE\" TEST IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S LONGSTANDING PATENT PRECEDENT.",
        "reference": "C. The \"Full Scope\" Test Should Not Be Engrafted on Top of the Wands Factors Framework.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. AMEX'S LACK OF MARKET POWER IN THE CREDIT CARD MARKET PRECLUDES LIABILITY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Amex's Nondiscrimination Provisions Share the Procompetitive Attributes of Other Vertical Restraints\nC. Given the Vertical Nature of the Nondiscrimination Provisions, Plaintiffs Could Not Establish Liability Absent a Showing of Market Power\nD. The Second Circuit's Unchallenged Holding That Amex Lacks Market Power Is Correct\nII. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING HARM TO MARKET-WIDE COMPETITION\nA. Plaintiffs Failed To Demonstrate That the Nondiscrimination Provisions Produced Anticompetitive Effects\n1. Plaintiffs Introduced No Evidence of Reduced Output or Quality\n2. Plaintiffs Introduced No Evidence of Supracompetitive Prices\n3. The Unproven Claim That Credit Cards Raise Prices for Consumers Who Do Not Use Them Cannot Establish Anticompetitive Effects\nB. Theoretical Claims of \"Harm to the Competitive Process\" Cannot Substitute for Evidence of Actual Harm to Competition",
        "reference": "A. Vertical Restraints, Unlike Horizontal Agreements, Intensify Competition When Used by Firms Without Market Power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text of Section 1782(a) Includes Commercial Arbitral Tribunals within the Phrase \"Foreign or International Tribunals\"\nA. The Court Must Interpret Section 1782(a) Based on its Unambiguous Plain Meaning\nB. The Plain Meaning of Section 1782(a) Includes Commercial Arbitral Tribunals\nC. Even if the Court were to Determine that the Plain Meaning of \"Foreign or International Tribunal\" is Ambiguous, there is No Clearly Expressed Legislative Intent to Exclude Arbitral Tribunals\nII. The Distinction Drawn by Courts between \"Governmental\" or \"State Sponsored\" Arbitrations and \"Private\" Arbitrations is False and, in any Event, is Irrelevant under Section 1782(a)\nA. Commercial Arbitration Operates Under National and International Legal Authority\nB. Efforts to Distinguish Investor-State Arbitration from Commercial Arbitration for Purposes of Section 1782(a) Fail\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Court's Functional Determinations in Intel are Sufficient to Conclude that All Arbitral Tribunals are Included in the Phrase \"Foreign or International Tribunal\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5410_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner's third Tennessee aggravated-assault conviction is a conviction for a violent felony under the ACCA's elements clause\nA. An offense that requires reckless causation of bodily injury requires the \"use of physical force against the person of another.\"\n1. Voisine makes clear that the language of the ACCA's elements clause includes reckless conduct\n2. The elements clause was specifically designed to cover prototypically violent reckless crimes\nB. Petitioner's reading of the ACCA's elements clause to exclude all reckless conduct is textually and practically unsound\n1. The logic of Voisine applies no differently to the ACCA\n2. Petitioner's knowledge-plus requirement would contravene Congress's objectives and produce illogical results\na. Petitioner's knowledge-plus requirement would exclude from the ACCA many of the very crimes that it was designed to cover\nb. Petitioner's knowledge-plus requirement could lead to additional nonsensical results under other similarly worded provisions\nc. Petitioner's knowledge-plus requirement lacks any sound practical justification\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The rule of lenity does not apply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION AS PETITIONERS ONLY ASSERT RIGHTS HELD TO BE ULTRA VIRES TO\nA. THE COURT ORDERED THAT DISTRICTS\nB. THE ORDER OFFERED PARTISAN CRITERIA\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THE NO. CAROLINA EQUAL PROTECTION\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD NARROW RUCHO'S EXCEPTION TO GRALIKE'S BAN ON PARTISAN FAVORITISM IN ELECTION STATUTES\nA. ARTICLE I DISFAVORS A WIDE EXCEPTION\nB. TRADITIONAL CRITERIA LIMIT INTRUSION",
        "reference": "C. THE ORDER ONLY REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO MODIFY THE ENACTED MAP TO CONFORM WITH TRADITIONAL CRITERIA, NOT TO MAKE GREATER CHANGES TO ACHIEVE PARTISAN PARITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit analyzed the wrong crime.\nA. The Ninth Circuit improperly ignored the commercial-advantage and financial-gain element of the crime.\nB. The Ninth Circuit analyzed a lesser included offense.\nII. The crime defined by section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is not overbroad.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court has approved a narrowing interpretation that applies here.\nC. Properly understood, section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) does not pose a risk of chilling speech protected by the First Amendment.\nIII. The crime defined by section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i) is not overbroad.\nA. When this Court properly considers the commercial-advantage and financial-gain element of the crime, no instances of chilled speech protected by the First Amendment remain.\nB. Commercial speech is inherently less protected than the speech that the Ninth Circuit analyzed.",
        "reference": "A. The canon of constitutional avoidance counsels for a narrowing interpretation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not govern the selection of territorial officers\nA. The Appointments Clause by its terms does not govern territorial offices\nB. The Territory Clause confirms that the Appointments Clause does not govern territorial offices\nC. Constitutional structure confirms that the Appointments Clause does not govern territorial offices\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The members of the Board are officers of the territorial government of Puerto Rico\nA. The Board's members qualify as territorial officers\nB. Respondents' contrary arguments lack merit",
        "reference": "D. Historical practice confirms that the Appointments Clause does not govern territorial offices",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. AIA section 102(a)(1) has a specific structure and content: two \"or's,\" an \"otherwise,\" and a '\"claimed' invention\" as its subject\nII. The specific structure and content of AIA section 102(a)(1), i.e., its two \"or's,\" \"otherwise,\" and '\"claimed' invention,\" give it a specific meaning\nIII. The legislative history thoroughly and consistently affirms the structure, content, and meaning of AIA section 102(a)(1)\nIV. The \"Federico of the AIA\" thoroughly and consistently affirmed the structure, content, meaning, and legislative history of AIA section 102(a)(1)\nV. Debate over AIA section 102(a)(1) is a regressive, after-the-fact, academic manufacture\nVI. The essence of the Federal Circuit panel's Helsinn decision under review is its conclusion to the opposite of AIA section 102(a)(1)\nVII. [MISSING]\nVIII. Small-group academic arguments against the right interpretation of AIA section 102(a)(1) are flawed\nIX. The Court should not concern itself that some future inventors might take benefit of both trade secrecy and later patenting; the matter is already handled",
        "reference": "VII. The Federal Circuit panel's conclusion is a Pfaff-like mistake. It is a dramatically odd and wrong interpretation for the AIA based not only on the specific structure, content, and meaning of AIA section 102(a)(1), but also the consistent statements from Congress, all those involved in the passage of the AIA, and the \"Federico of the AIA,\" from 2007 to the present, that are contrary to the interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1672_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Determination Subsection (k) Calls For Is One The Constitution Requires Be Made By A Jury, Based On Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt\nII. The Revocation Label Does Not Place The Subsection (k) Regime Beyond The Reach Of The Fifth and Sixth Amendments\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Government's Remedial Proposal Should be Rejected",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1263_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MEDICAID ACT PERMITS THE STATE TO RECOVER THIRD-PARTY PAYMENTS FOR BOTH PAST AND FUTURE \"MEDICAL CARE.\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The history and structure of the Medicaid Act confirm that States may obtain the assignment of rights to payments for past and future medical care\nC. Medicaid's role as the payer of last resort supports permitting the program to recover costs from all medical damages\nII. IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT THE STATUTE IS AMBIGUOUS, IT SHOULD APPLY THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION AND AFFIRM",
        "reference": "A. Sections 1396k and 1396a(a)(45) permit States to obtain the assignment of rights to payments for medical care, past or future, from any third party",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "I. Investors Would Have Been Interested in Goldman's System for Managing Conflicts Given Its History",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Regardless of the validity of the incorporation doctrine, the doctrine of selective incorporation is subject to manipulation and abuse\nA. Non-incorporation\nB. Total Incorporation\nC. Selective Incorporation\nII. The Excessive Fines Clause is at least as deserving of incorporation as other portions of Bill of Rights\nA. Its placement with Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Excessive Bail in the Eighth Amendment\nB. The other clauses of the Eighth Amendment are applied to the states\nC. Civil forfeitures violate property rights\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. Civil forfeiture wrongfully comingles criminal and civil law",
        "reference": "D. Civil forfeitures operate as punishments",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-489_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A bankruptcy court should not hold a creditor in contempt for violating a discharge order when the creditor has a reasonable, good-faith belief that the order does not prohibit his conduct\nA. Under Section 105 and traditional principles of contempt, a reasonable, good-faith belief precludes contempt sanctions\n1. Section 105 authorizes bankruptcy courts to impose contempt sanctions when \"necessary or appropriate\" to enforce court orders\n2. [MISSING]\na. Contempt is a severe sanction, designed for deliberate disobedience of a court order\nb. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct\nc. Good faith and bad faith matter in contempt proceedings\n3. Respondents' rule is fair and administrable\n4. The court of appeals correctly found contempt sanctions inappropriate, and its language about \"unreasonable\" good-faith beliefs is dictum\nB. The federal government's rule is substantially the same and leads to the same result here\n1. The government advocates an objective reasonableness rule that permits consideration of good faith\n2. Any differences between the government's rule and respondents' rule do not matter here\nC. The Court should not adopt petitioner's proposed rule\n1. Petitioner proposes a near-strict-liability rule\n2. Petitioner's near-strict-liability rule is inconsistent with Section 105 and traditional equitable principles\n3. Petitioner's justifications for his rule are mistaken\n4. Petitioner's requirement that creditors seek advance determinations is misguided\nD. This Court should affirm rather than remand",
        "reference": "2. It is neither \"necessary\" nor \"appropriate\" to hold a person in contempt for violating a court order when he has a reasonable, good-faith belief that his conduct is allowed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFECTIVE MERGER OF THE PREDICATE OFFENSE AND THE SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT DOES NOT THAW THE CHILLING EFFECT OF section 1324.\nA. The Government's Understanding of Alvarez is Wrong and Does Not Justify the Piecemeal Overbreadth Doctrine the Government Suggests.\nB. Apprendi Is a Shield Protecting Against Increased Sanctions for Facts not Found by a Jury\u2014not a Sword Allowing the Government to Evade the First Amendment with Sentencing Enhancements.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. CRIMINALIZING ENCOURAGEMENT AND INDUCEMENT FOR FINANCIAL GAIN CHILLS A BROAD SWATH OF PROTECTED SPEECH.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE LOWER COURT'S DEFINITION OF \"KNOWING\" WOULD UNDERMINE THE PUBLIC INTEREST",
        "reference": "I. SUBJECTIVE INTENT IS AT THE HEART OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT'S SCIENTER REQUIREMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 5.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1599_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i)'s notice exception applies to \"any summons\" that is \"issued in aid of the collection of\" a taxpayer's assessed liability, even when the taxpayer does not have a legal interest in the object of the summons\nA. The text of Section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i)'s notice exception does not require the taxpayer to have a legal interest in the records or accounts that are summoned\n1. Section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies when a third-party summons is issued \"in aid of the collection of\" a taxpayer's assessed liability\n2. Petitioners' asserted legal-interest limitation has no textual basis\nB. The plain-text reading of Section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) fits naturally within the context of Section 7609 as a whole\n1. Clause (ii) creates an exception from Section 7609's requirements that is distinct from Clause (i)\na. Clause (ii) applies to a summons issued in aid of collection from a transferee or fiduciary where the government cannot collect directly from the taxpayer\n2. Any overlap between Clauses (i) and (ii) would reflect a standard belt-and-suspenders approach to legislative drafting\n3. Section 7609(c)(2)(D) fits seamlessly with the rest of Section 7609\nC. The statutory history and purpose confirm that Section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies even when the taxpayer lacks a legal interest in the summoned records or accounts\n1. Congress struck a balance between protecting privacy rights during tax-liability investigations and ensuring effective tax-collection efforts\n2. [MISSING]\nD. Any ambiguity should be construed against a waiver of federal sovereign immunity\nE. Petitioners' policy arguments are misplaced\nF. If the Court adopts petitioners' legal-interest limitation, it should vacate and remand for further proceedings",
        "reference": "2. Petitioners misconstrue the statutory history and purpose",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FROM CRITICISM BY A GOVERNMENT ENTITY AND THE RECOGNITION OF SUCH A PROTECTION DIMINISHES FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS\nA. The Power of Government to State Its Own Views and to Disagree with Private Actors Is a Cornerstone Component of Free Expression\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Holding Undercuts the Government's Power to Censure and Upends the Balance of First Amendment Protections to Chill Government Speech\n1. Allowing a Private Constitutional Claim in Response to Censure is Contrary to the Long History of the Legislative Power to Censure\n2. The Fifth Circuit's Decision Relegates Government Speech to Inferior Status and Chills the Expression of Government Viewpoints\nC. The Direct and Indirect Consequences of Silencing Government Speech Further Support a Rule Promoting Robust Government Discourse\nII. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION UNDERMINES THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO ACT BY IMPROPERLY ERODING THE LINE BETWEEN CENSURE AND CENSORSHIP\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Censure of Senator Joseph McCarthy Could Support a Claim Against Witnesses and Counsel Under the Fifth Circuit Standard\nC. Even Pro-Democracy Messaging Published by the U.S. Government Could Create a Risk of Litigation",
        "reference": "A. Dr. Fauci's Public Comments Promoting Public Health Could Support a Claim Under the Fifth Circuit Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. ANCs Are Not 'Indian Tribes' Under ISDA and the CARES Act\nA. An ANC Qualifies as an 'Indian Tribe' Under ISDA Only If It Satisfies the Recognition Clause\nB. No ANC Presently Satisfies the Recognition Clause\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Plain-Text Interpretation of ISDA Does Not Create a Superfluity Problem\nB. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation\nC. Later-Enacted Statutes Do Not Conflict With the Plain-Text Interpretation of ISDA\nIII. Adherence to Text Would Protect Both Tribal Governmental Authority and Services for Alaska Natives",
        "reference": "II. Petitioners' Efforts to Avoid the Plain Language Interpretation of the 'Indian Tribe' Definition Are Unavailing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-826_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Sixth Circuit's Brecht-only approach ignores Ayala's reaffirmation that AEDPA forms a \"precondition\" to relief\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Because the outcome would have been different had AEDPA deference been applied, this case is an \"ideal vehicle\" for review\nA. The state court decisions are entitled to AEDPA deference\nB. The Brecht-only approach changed the outcome here, making this case an \"ideal vehicle\" for review",
        "reference": "II. Five federal courts of appeals would have decided this case differently; there is a circuit split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is a Common Law Discovery Rule\nII. Congress Did Not Foreclose Application of the Common Law Discovery Rule to FDCPA Claims\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner's Allegations Should Be Accepted as True at This Stage\nB. Petitioner's Dismissed Claim Sounds in Fraud\nC. Questions About the Merits of Petitioner's Claim Should Be Addressed by the District Court After Remand",
        "reference": "III. Petitioner's Claim Fits Within the Established Contours of the Common Law Discovery Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The court of appeals erred by mandating the consideration of ameliorative measures after a determination that return to the country of habitual residence would place a child at grave risk\nA. The Hague Convention does not require consideration of ameliorative measures\n1. The text of the Hague Convention and ICARA does not require consideration of ameliorative measures\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The mandatory consideration of ameliorative measures is inconsistent with the Hague Convention's negotiation and drafting history\n4. The mandatory consideration of ameliorative measures is inconsistent with the views of the State Department\n5. The practices of other signatories confirm that the Convention does not mandate consideration of ameliorative measures\nB. The Hague Convention imposes limits on the discretionary consideration of ameliorative measures\nC. The ameliorative measures adopted by the district court were inappropriate and inadequate",
        "reference": "2. The mandatory consideration of ameliorative measures is inconsistent with the Hague Convention's purposes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A Robust Marketplace of Ideas Is an Optimal Environment for the Emergence of True and Superior Ideas\nB. State Interference Distorts the Marketplace of Ideas Through Coercion\nC. Private Actors Must Have Freedom to Control Speech Within Their Spheres of Influence\nII. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS IS BEST PRESERVED WHEN PRIVATE ACTORS, WHO ARE NOT DOING THE BIDDING OF THE STATE, RETAIN THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS\nA. A \"State Actor\" Requirement that Focuses on Meaningful State Control Over Speech Content Correctly Distinguishes Between State and Private Actors in the Marketplace of Ideas\nB. The Decision Below Failed to Consider Whether Petitioners Exercise Meaningful State Control\nIII. FAILURE TO ENFORCE THE \"STATE ACTOR\" REQUIREMENT PROPERLY COULD HAVE UNINTENDED FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES FOR OTHER PLATFORMS AND MEDIA",
        "reference": "I. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS FUNCTIONS BEST WHEN STATE ACTORS CANNOT IMPAIR THE SPEECH AND EDITORIAL RIGHTS OF PRIVATE ACTORS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-58_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENTS TEXAS AND LOUISIANA ARE SOVEREIGN STATES WITH STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE FINAL MEMORANDUM\nA. Respondent States Have Asserted Real and Particularized Harm More than Sufficient to Establish Standing to Challenge the Final Memorandum\nB. States Have a Duty to Resist and Challenge Unlawful Federal Actions\nC. \"Special Solicitude\" Is an Imperative of a Federalist Structure\nD. Respondent States Also Have Parens Patriae Standing\nII. THE GOVERNMENT'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE FINAL MEMORANDUM ARE A PRETEXT FOR THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION POLICY TO THROW OPEN THE NATION'S BORDERS\nA. The Final Memorandum Is Just One Component of the Biden Administration's Policy to Open the Nation's Borders\nB. The Government's Justifications for Its Final Memorandum Are Pretextual\nIII. THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION'S NON-ENFORCEMENT POLICIES VIOLATE THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE AND CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED BY CLAIMS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Prosecutorial Discretion",
        "reference": "A. The Take Care Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-391_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The petition should be denied because the decision of the Court of Appeals does not present questions that raise a serious Fourth Amendment issue of national importance or that involve a division of authority among the Circuits requiring attention from this Court, but rather the decision of the Court of Appeals is a straightforward review of summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The petition should be denied, because the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct as a matter of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on the record presented, which demonstrated the paradigm tense, rapidly evolving emergency situation requiring split-second reaction by officers at the scene, and which fell far short of showing any unreasonable use of force by officers under the circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. If doctrinal judicial deference to agency interpretations of legislative statutes or regulations \"undermines [the judicial branch's] obligation to provide a judicial check on the other branches,\" then it cannot be justified simply as a judicial choice to defer to agency expertise, and instead must be justified based on agency exercise of executive, judicial, or legislative power\nII. Doctrinal judicial deference to agency interpretations of legislative statutes or regulations cannot be justified based on agency exercise of judicial power\nA. It is not clear that Congress has the authority to assign binding judicial interpretive power to administrative agencies\nB. Even assuming arguendo that Congress has the authority to assign binding judicial interpretive power to administrative agencies, Congress has chosen not to do so, instead explicitly prescribing that a \"reviewing court shall .. interpret .. statutory provisions, and determine the meaning .. of the terms of an agency action.\"\nIII. While judicial deference to an agency interpretation of a legislative statute or regulation can be justified based on agency exercise of delegated legislative power, the current doctrine of broad Auer deference cannot\nA. Granting Chevron deference to agency interpretations of statutes can be, and has been, justified based on agency exercise of delegated legislative power\nB. Granting broad Auer deference to agency interpretations of an agency regulation cannot be justified based on agency exercise of delegated legislative power\ni. Even assuming arguendo that legislative intent may properly be considered in interpreting a regulation, broad Auer deference cannot be justified based on agency \"special insight into its intent when\" it exercised its delegated legislative power to promulgate a regulation\na. Broad Auer deference has been applied where there was clearly no \"special insight into [agency] intent,\" and where agency intent appears to have changed\nb. Subsequent agency views regarding a prior regulation enacted with delegated legislative power should be given no more deference than subsequent congressional views regarding a prior statute enacted with that same legislative power\nii. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "ii. Broad Auer deference cannot be justified based on subsequent agency \"exercise of delegated lawmaking powers .. [to] lawmak[e] by interpretation\" because it allows post hoc agency interpretations to have retroactive effect even where Congress did not delegate legislative \"power to promulgate retroactive rules.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-438_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "An alien fails to establish his eligibility for discretionary relief from removal if he has a conviction under a divisible statute and the record is inconclusive as to whether the alien was convicted of a disqualifying offense\nA. An alien with a criminal conviction under a divisible statute bears the burden of proving that he was not convicted of a disqualifying crime under the statute\n1. An alien seeking cancellation of removal must prove that he was not convicted of a disqualifying offense\n2. An alien with a conviction under a divisible statute must prove that he was not convicted of an offense under that statute that renders him ineligible\n3. Petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving his eligibility for cancellation of removal in this case\nB. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\n1. The least-acts presumption bears on what the elements of an offense establish, not on which offense under a divisible statute an alien was convicted of committing\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. The burden of proving eligibility imposed by the INA and regulations applies to the issue of whether an alien was convicted of a crime that renders him ineligible",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The interpretive principle that petitioners invoke applies only when context indicates that Congress adopted the well-settled meaning of a term of art.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The phrase had no well-settled meaning under the earlier statute.\nB. Statutory language and context confirm that the Clean Water Act does not mirror section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.",
        "reference": "II. The meaning of \"waters of the United States\" in the Clean Water Act is not controlled by the Rivers and Harbors Act.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "Under Section 411(a), a copyright-infringement suit may not be filed until the Register of Copyrights has either approved or refused registration of the work\nA. The text and structure of the Copyright Act support the court of appeals' interpretation of Section 411(a)\nB. The history of the Copyright Act supports the court of appeals' interpretation of Section 411(a)\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Petitioner's contrary arguments are unavailing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause\n2. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory\nB. The Insular Cases are undermined by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine",
        "reference": "A. The Insular Cases have no application to national legislation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FCC possesses broad discretion to regulate media ownership in the public interest\nII. Respondents identify no sound basis for the court of appeals' vacatur of the challenged FCC orders\nA. The court of appeals disregarded the statutory text\nB. The court of appeals substituted its judgment for that of the agency\n1. The court of appeals ignored relevant context\n2. [MISSING]\n3. In the Reconsideration Order, the FCC adequately explained its reasons for departing from the 2016 Order\nC. The court of appeals disrupted the proper functioning of Section 202(h) reviews\nD. The court of appeals' remedy was overbroad",
        "reference": "2. The court of appeals' specific critiques of the Commission's analysis were misplaced",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Act 900 Governs Central Matters Of Plan Administration\nB. Act 900 Interferes With Nationally Uniform Plan Administration\nC. Act 900 Is Contrary To ERISA's Purpose Of Protecting Plan Participants And Ensuring Receipt Of Benefits",
        "reference": "I. ACT 900 IS EXPRESSLY PREEMPTED BY ERISA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. State courts cannot circumvent tribal sovereign immunity by exercising in rem jurisdiction over tribal property\nA. Sovereign immunity bars suits against the sovereign's property\nB. County of Yakima does not provide a basis for an in rem exception to tribal sovereign immunity\nC. The Washington Supreme Court's joinder analysis under Civil Rule 19 failed to overcome its erroneous adoption of an in rem exception to tribal sovereign immunity\nII. An exception to immunity for suits to determine rights in immovable property that applies to other sovereigns does not apply to Indian tribes\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Court should not adopt an immovable-property exception to tribal sovereign immunity",
        "reference": "A. An immovable-property exception to sovereign immunity from suit has been adopted with respect to foreign sovereigns, and sovereign immunity does not bar a suit against sister states",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "A. Free Exercise Decisions of the Third and Ninth Courts Have Created a Split Among the Circuits That the Court Should Resolve in This Case\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Rather Than Continue to Limit Smith, the Court Should Expressly Overrule It to Eliminate Confusion About the Scope of the Free Expression Clause\nD. By Compelling Catholic Social Services on Family Values, the City Has Amendment Rights",
        "reference": "B. Prior Decisions of the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits Are More Faithful Free Exercise Jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court of Appeals' Conclusion about Reviewability of FWS's Decision Not to Exclude Unit 1 is Correct and Does Not Conflict with Any Other Court\nIII. The Court of Appeals' Conclusion that the Designation of Critical Habitat is Constitutional is Correct and Consistent with All Other Appellate Decisions\nIV. FWS Found the Gopher Frog Critical Habitat Designation Would Have Several Benefits, and Petitioners' and Amici's Claims Regarding the Costs are Exaggerated",
        "reference": "I. Designation of Gopher Frog Critical Habitat was a Fact-Specific Exercise of the Agency's Scientific Expertise, Which the Court of Appeals Correctly Upheld",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief046.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Copyright In Java SE Does Not Extend Protection To The Declarations\nA. The Declarations Are A \"Method Of Operation\" Excluded By Section 102(b)\nB. The Merger Doctrine Forecloses Copyright Protection For The Declarations\nC. There Is No Merit To Oracle's Reliance On Section 101\nD. Oracle Errs In Arguing That Google Used Both Too Few And Too Many Of The Java SE Declarations\nE. Copyright Protection Does Not Extend To The Java SE Filing System\nII. There Is No Basis To Overturn The Jury's Finding That Google's Reuse Of The Declarations Was Fair Use\nA. The Federal Circuit Applied The Wrong Standard Of Review\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Oracle Fails to Grapple with Evidence of Industry Practice and Its Own Prior Positions Supporting the Reasonableness of Google's Conduct\n2. The Jury Could Reasonably Have Found That Google's Reuse Was Transformative\n3. The Jury Was Entitled to Find No Market Harm to Java SE",
        "reference": "B. Substantial Evidence Supported The Jury's Fair-Use Verdict",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. Public officials who deny access to private property engage in state action only if they exercise government authority or perform a traditional and exclusive public function\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner's contrary reasoning is unpersuasive\nD. An overly expansive theory of state action in this context would undermine, not promote, First Amendment values",
        "reference": "B. Respondent's blocking of petitioner was not state action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1249_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eleventh Circuit's Flawed Decision In Arthur Fundamentally Infected The Proceedings Below\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Court should grant, vacate, and remand in light of Bucklew",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1268_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND CLEAR STATUTORY LANGUAGE PERMIT THE RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING SUDAN'S FORFEITED ARGUMENTS ABOUT PUNITIVE DAMAGES WHERE SUDAN INTENTIONALLY DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATES ARE OBLIGATED TO CONFORM TO FEDERAL LAW AND POLICY IN THE REGULATION AND TAXATION OF INTERNET SALES\nA. The Internet Is A Global System, And The Regulation And Taxation Of Internet Sales Implicates The Foreign Commerce Of The United States\nB. Where The Foreign Commerce Of The United States Is Implicated, State Action Must Conform To Federal Policy And Practice\nC. The United States And The International Community Do Not Recognize The Availability Of A Website As Creating A \"Fixed Place of Business\" (A \"Presence\") Within The Jurisdiction Of A Sovereign State\nII. ASSERTION OF STATE TAX JURISDICTION BY REASON OF THE \"ACCESSIBILITY\" OF A WEBSITE WOULD UPSET THE FEDERAL SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE\nA. The Virtual Capabilities Of The Internet And Its Related Technologies Are In Their Infancy\nB. The Assertion Of State Jurisdiction On The Bases Of Virtual Technologies Will Eliminate Boundaries On State Sovereignty And Create 50 Subordinate Federal Governments\nIII. IN THE ABSENCE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION GOVERNING TAXATION OF REMOTE SALES, THE REQUESTED ABROGATION OF QUILL THREATENS THE VIABILITY OF THE DIRECT MARKETING INDUSTRY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Imposition Of State Regulatory And Tax Obligations Occasioned By The Abrogation Of Quill Would Unduly Burden Catalog, Direct Mail, And Other Traditional Forms Of Solicitation, As Well As The Consumers That Purchase Through These Sale Methods\nC. States Have No Authority To Impose On Internet Sales Regulatory And Tax Obligations Not Borne By More Traditional Means Of Direct Marketing",
        "reference": "A. Remote Sales By Direct Marketers Is A Historical Business Model That Pre-Dates The Formation Of The Republic",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. The CWA Is Not an Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Power to the Agencies\nA. The Act Provides an Intelligible Principle to Guide its Interpretation\nB. Finding a Nondelegation Issue Would Undo the Act's Preclusive Effect, Subjecting Regulated Entities to Significant Burdens\nII. This Court Should Provide Clarity On Certain WOTUS Exclusions\nA. The Court Should Clarify That Groundwater Is Not a WOTUS\nB. The Court Must Preserve the Agencies' Ability to Exclude Waste Treatment Systems from CWA Jurisdiction\nC. The Exclusion Of Stormwater Control Features from the Scope of CWA Jurisdiction Is Necessary For the Work of Clean Water Agencies\nD. Congress, the Agencies, and the States Have Recognized the Importance of the Innovative Water Management Strategies Fostered by WOTUS Exclusions\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. Agency Discretion to Exclude Features From the WOTUS Definition Promotes Innovative Water Management Strategies And Affordability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Post-declination, the government lacks the unilateral authority to dismiss a relator's FCA case under Section 3730(c)(2)(a)\nA. The FCA's text and structure establish that the government cannot invoke Section 3730(c)(2)(a) after \"declin[ing]\" to \"proceed with the action\"\nB. The FCA's history and purpose confirm that the government cannot invoke Section 3730(c)(2)(a) after \"declin[ing]\" to \"proceed with the action\"\nC. Respondents' efforts to distract away from the Act's plain and ordinary meaning fall short\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Respondents' \"unfettered discretion\" standard fails for multiple reasons\nB. The Third Circuit's Rule 41 standard is inapposite in this context\nC. The FCA instead imposes rationality review on government requests to dismiss FCA actions\nD. This Court should remand for the Third Circuit to apply the correct standard",
        "reference": "II. At a minimum, the government is subject to ordinary baseline checks on executive action \u2014 and cannot seek dismissal for irrational or arbitrary reasons",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1356_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court has Jurisdiction to Review the Denial of Kaushal's Motion\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Designation of Indiana Appellate Decisions as Unpublished Strengthens Kaushal's Argument for Intervention by this Court",
        "reference": "II. The Facts are Simple and Undisputed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-480_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNIFORMED-SERVICES EXCEPTION APPLIES TO DUAL-STATUS TECHNICIANS\nA. The plain text of the exemption covers a pension for dual-status technician employment\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE SSA'S INTERPRETATION DOES NOT WARRANT DEFERENCE",
        "reference": "B. The text does not support the SSA's contrary interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-340_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Conjunctive Reading of section 3553(f)(1) Does Not Yield Absurd Results.\nII. The Conjunctive Reading of section 3553(f)(1) Does Not Lead to Surplusage.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Manufactured Ambiguity Must Yield to the Rule of Lenity.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "PROHIBITION ON REGISTRATION OF IMMORAL OR SCANDALOUS MARKS VIOLATES FIRST AMENDMENT\nA. The Prohibition Is an Impermissible Viewpoint-Based Restriction\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Even If the Prohibition Is Merely a Content-Based Restriction, It Cannot Survive Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Both Foreign-Policy and Separation-of-Powers Concerns Shaped Sosa, Kiobel, and Jesner\nII. Corporate Liability For Intentionally Facilitating Child Slavery And Trafficking Abroad Is Entirely Consistent With United States Foreign Policy\nA. United States Foreign Policy Emphasizes Human Rights And The Rule Of Law\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. In The Absence Of Diplomatic Concerns, Separation-Of-Powers Principles Present No Obstacle To ATS Liability In This Case",
        "reference": "B. Failing To Hold Americans Liable For Outsourcing Child Slavery Undermines U.S. Foreign Policy And The Rule Of Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS ADOPTED THE SCA TO ENHANCE PRIVACY OF STORED COMMUNICATIONS, NOT TO INCREASE GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO THEM\nII. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY IS UNREBUTTED AND REQUIRES A FINDING THAT THE SCA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE GOVERNMENT TO ACCESS COMMUNICATIONS STORED IN IRELAND\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The SCA Has a Single Focus; the Section-by-Section Focus Analysis Urged by Petitioner Is Inappropriate\nC. Petitioner's Section-By-Section Approach to Determining \"Focus\" Is Unworkable and Leads to Inconsistent Results\nIII. INTERPRETING THE SCA AS AUTHORIZING GOVERNMENTS TO DEMAND PRODUCTION OF COMMUNICATIONS STORED OVERSEAS RAISES SERIOUS FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS",
        "reference": "A. A Statute's Application Is \"Extraterritorial\" When, as Here, the Statute Focuses on Subject Matter Associated with Overseas Locations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1165_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' Suit Fails To State A Claim Because ESOP Fiduciaries Generally Have No Obligation To Use Inside Information Obtained In A Corporate Capacity When Making Fiduciary Decisions\nA. Congress Authorized Corporate Officers to Serve as ESOP Fiduciaries Even Though the Two Roles Involve Different and Frequently Conflicting Duties to Different Stakeholders\nB. Obliging ESOP Fiduciaries to Use Inside Corporate Information Increases Conflicts Between ERISA and the Securities Laws\nC. Requiring ESOP Fiduciaries to Use Inside Corporate Information Creates Other Anomalies\nII. Respondents' Suit Fails Because A Prudent Fiduciary Could Have Concluded That Disclosure Of The Inside Information Here Would Do More Harm Than Good To The Fund\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Respondents' Generalized Allegations Fail to Plausibly Allege a Breach of the Duty of Prudence\nIII. Allowing The Decision Below To Stand Would Eviscerate Dudenhoeffer And Threaten Serious Practical Consequences",
        "reference": "A. Plaintiffs Must Plausibly Allege That a Prudent Fiduciary in the Defendants' Position Could Not Have Concluded That an Alternative Action Would Do More Harm Than Good to the Fund",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE AND ORIGINAL INTENT\nIII. IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT\nIV. POTENTIAL CONCERNS WITH A REQUIREMENT OF IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE",
        "reference": "I. IDEOLOGICAL BALANCE AND DUE PROCESS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court lacks jurisdiction because the district court's orders were not appealable\nA. The FAA precludes appeals of orders compelling arbitration\nB. Lamps Plus lacks standing to appeal the district court's dismissal order, which it sought and does not challenge\nII. The FAA does not preempt application of state contract-law principles to determine whether an agreement permits class proceedings\nA. The FAA is premised on state contract law\nB. This Court's decisions recognize that state contract law governs the determination whether an arbitration agreement authorizes class proceedings\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Interpretive principles of California contract law seek to ascertain the parties' objectively manifested intent\nB. The FAA does not preempt California's principles of contract interpretation\nIV. Lamps Plus's claim that the courts below misinterpreted the agreement does not establish a violation of the FAA\nA. The correctness of the courts' contract interpretation is a state-law question\nB. The lower courts correctly applied neutral California contract law\nV. Both Lamps Plus's policy arguments and its waived request that the Court require a heightened standard of clarity for agreements to class arbitration are unavailing\nA. Lamps Plus did not preserve an argument for a \"clear and unmistakable\" standard\nB. Lamps Plus's policy arguments for a stricter standard are unconvincing\nC. Lamps Plus's new theory that class arbitration is a matter of \"arbitrability\" does not support its position",
        "reference": "III. The California contract-law principles applied by the lower courts in this case are consistent with the FAA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Democratic Gerrymander of the Sixth District Violated the First Amendment\nA. The gerrymander was content-based and viewpoint-discriminatory\nB. Intentional vote dilution is a \"manageable standard\" for identifying the burden on Appellants' First Amendment rights\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The District Court Erred in Holding That Appellants Had Failed to Prove That the Gerrymander Burdened Their First Amendment Rights\nA. The district court erred in holding that the First Amendment permits a \"de minimis\" amount of intentional vote dilution\nB. The district court erred in holding that intentional dilution of Appellants' votes is not an injury unless it altered the outcome of an election\nC. The district court erred in placing the burden of proof on Appellants to prove the outcome of the election was not the result of other factors\nIII. The Democratic Gerrymander of the Sixth District was also Prohibited by Article I, section 2 and by Article I, section 4 of the Constitution",
        "reference": "C. The State failed to prove that the burden on Appellants' First Amendment rights was justified by a compelling state interest",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Child placement proceedings are not the exclusive province of the states\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Constitutional powers over Indian affairs grant Congress authority to implement the federal trust responsibility to Indian people and tribes through legislation like ICWA\nIV. The political status of Indian tribes, the constitutional Indian affairs powers, and the status of Indians as beneficiaries of the trust responsibility create a political\u2014not racial\u2014Indian classification subject to rational basis review\nV. Individual stories do not overcome established law or provide a basis for this Court to overturn Congress' legislative judgment",
        "reference": "II. ICWA builds on existing child welfare law to protect the rights of Indian children and parents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The decisions below misappropriate the limited Martinez pathway around procedural default to evade AEDPA's restrictions on federal evidentiary development\nA. Section 2254(e)(2) precludes federal evidentiary development on a claim that a prisoner or counsel failed to develop in state court\nB. Procedural default is a court-created bar to habeas relief, untethered to AEDPA, and Martinez is an exception to that bar\nC. The Martinez exception to procedural default does not excuse Respondents' non-compliance with the separate procedural barrier of section 2254(e)(2)\n1. [MISSING]\n2. This Court's \"limited\" and \"narrow\" Martinez decision does not support ignoring section 2254(e)(2)\n3. The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Martinez undermines procedural default and creates equitable imbalances\nII. Because Respondents did not develop their claims in state court and cannot meet section 2254(e)(2)'s exceptions, their claims fail",
        "reference": "1. The decisions below resurrect an equitable rule Congress intentionally abolished through AEDPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "V. The Elections Clause Allocates the Authority To Draw Congressional Districts to State Legislatures, Not State Courts\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures\nVI. The State Court Decisions Below Invalidating Petitioners' Map and Imposing a Map of Their Own Making Violates the Elections Clause\nA. Only the General Assembly Has Authority To Draw Congressional Districts\nB. The State Court Decisions Below Unconstitutionally Usurped the General Assembly's Authority To Regulate Congressional Elections",
        "reference": "A. The Elections Clause Assigns the Power To Regulate the Time, Place, and Manner of Congressional Elections Specifically to State Legislatures",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Jurisdiction\nII. Section 113 Requires Reversal\nIII. Section 122(e)(6) Requires Reversal\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Respondents Are Not \"Contiguous Landowners\"\nC. Remand Is Pointless\nIV. Preemption Principles Require Reversal\nA. Impossibility Preemption Applies\nB. Obstacle Preemption Applies\nC. CERCLA's Savings Clauses Do Not Bar Preemption",
        "reference": "A. Respondents Are PRPs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. President Trump's opponents have resorted to antidemocratic methods because they doubt that they can beat him in a fair election.\nA. In judicial silence, President Trump's political opponents have sensed opportunity.\nB. The decision below incentivizes inconsistent partisan determination of Section 3 ballot access decisions.\nC. Adopting the Colorado Supreme Court's theory will require this Court to adjudicate political questions.\n1. Presidents Carter and Reagan.\n2. [MISSING]\n3. President Obama.\nII. The President is not an \"officer of the United States\" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\nA. Neither the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment nor this Court have addressed whether the Disqualification Provision of Section 3 applies to former Presidents.\nB. The Constitution's plain text demonstrates that the President is not an \"officer.\"\nC. Traditional canons of construction support the plain reading of Section 3's text.\n1. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.\n2. Noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.\n3. Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes.\nD. Structural considerations further support the President's unique constitutional status.",
        "reference": "2. President Clinton.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "This Court Should Overrule Auer and Seminole Rock\nA. APA notice-and-comment procedures are fundamental for protecting administrative due process\nB. Auer Deference undermines the APA's due process protections by causing instability in the law and promoting excessive agency oscillation\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Overruling Auer and Seminole Rock is an essential first step for restoring the rule of law to the administrative state",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5410_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Crimes With a Mens Rea of Recklessness Are Not Violent Felonies Under the ACCA.\nII. Expanding the ACCA's Definition of \"Violent Felony\" to Encompass Crimes With a Mens Rea of Recklessness Would Unnecessarily Expose Undeserving Defendants to Harsh Mandatory Minimum Sentences.\nA. Statutes Criminalizing Reckless Driving Resulting in Physical Harm Illustrate the Fundamental Flaw of the Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of the Force Clause.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Classifying Crimes With a Mens Rea of Recklessness as Violent Felonies Would Lead to Unfair and Absurd Outcomes.\nD. These Examples Illustrate Why Crimes With a Mens Rea of Recklessness Are Not Violent Felonies Under the ACCA.",
        "reference": "B. Construing \"Violent Felony\" to Include Reckless Conduct Would Significantly Increase the Number of Qualifying Offenses.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. PAGA Is Designed to Incentivize Labor Code Compliance by Large Employers Who Are Bad Actors\nII. Not Every Employer Is Eligible for, or Can Afford, Private Justice Under the FAA\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Arbitration Is Consistent with Representative Claims\nV. A Blanket Waiver of Representative Rights Is Not a Written Provision to Settle by Arbitration a Future Controversy\nVI. The Story of Desme and Congressional Intent",
        "reference": "III. A Ruling that the FAA Preempts PAGA Will Make Things Worse for Small Businesses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. AN UNAUTHORIZED DRIVER HAS A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN A RENTAL VEHICLE WHEN THE DRIVER HAS PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHORIZED RENTER TO OPERATE THE VEHICLE\nA. An Unauthorized Driver Is Similar To An Overnight Guest\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Drivers Must Not Be Precluded From Claiming Fourth Amendment Protection Merely Because The Place Searched Was An Automobile\nII. PEOPLE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS MUST NOT HINGE ON CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS\nA. A Bright Line Rule That Prevents Unauthorized Drivers From Challenging Fourth Amendment Violations Because Of Contractual Agreements Conflicts With This Court's Jurisprudence\nB. Courts Have Recognized That A Breach Of Contract Does Not Affect The Rights Of A Third Party\nC. A Rule That Strips A Driver Of His Or Her Constitutional Right To Privacy Merely Because The Driver Is Not Named On The Rental Agreement Would Contradict This Court's Own Fourth Amendment Doctrine\nD. The Third Circuit's Approach Would Lead To Absurd Results\n1. The Third Circuit's Approach Conflicts With What \"Society Is Prepared To Accept As Reasonable\"\n2. If A Driver Of A Rental Vehicle Has No Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy Merely Because The Driver Is Unauthorized, Then Many Originally Authorized Drivers Lack A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy",
        "reference": "B. Automobiles Are Vital To Society",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "South Dakota Senate Bill 106 and similar state tax collection requirements are permissible regulations of interstate commerce under the dormant Commerce Clause\nA. The \"safe harbor\" rule adopted in Quill and Bellas Hess cannot be reconciled with this Court's broader dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Senate Bill 106 and similar state tax collection requirements should be analyzed and sustained under the Pike balancing framework\nB. This Court should not extend Quill's rule to e-commerce\nC. If this Court construes Quill to hold that only retailers with a physical presence in the taxing State can be required to collect state sales taxes from their customers, Quill should be overruled\nD. Congress's authority to legislate in this area should not dissuade the Court from limiting or overruling Quill",
        "reference": "1. The Quill Court's \"substantial nexus\" analysis reflected a misapplication of the Complete Auto framework",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Government Employees Who Use Social Media Only Act \"Under Color of Law\" When They Have a Governmental Duty or Authority\nA. [MISSING]\n1. State Action Can Only Result from an Exercise of State Authority\n2. State Action Can Only Exist When a Party Is a State Actor\nB. Congress Was Intentional When It Selected the Phrase \"Under Color\" of Law, Which Does Not Include the \"Pretense\" of Authority\nC. The Sixth Circuit's Duty or Authority Test Properly Balances Competing Interests\nD. Government Employees' First Amendment Rights Will Be Impacted If Personal Social Media Pages Are Subject to Section 1983 Liability Without the Invocation of Governmental Duty or Authority\nII. State Action Cannot Be Determined Simply By Evaluating The Appearance and Function of a Social Media Page\nA. Evaluating the Appearance of a Social Media Page Proves Shallow\nB. Petitioner Has Not Demonstrated That an Appearance Test Is Supported by Precedent\nC. Analyzing Whether a Government Employee Engaged in a Public Function Is an Incorrect Analysis\nIII. Freed Blocking Lindke and Deleting Lindke's Comments on Freed's Personal Facebook Page Was Not State Action\nA. Freed Was Not Performing Any Government Duties or Using Government Authority When Operating His Personal Facebook Page\nB. Petitioner's Attempts to Show that Freed's Facebook Page \"Appeared\" to Be an Official Page Fall Short\nC. This Action has Already Negatively Impacted Free Expression\nD. Remand Is Redundant",
        "reference": "A. The State Action Doctrine Strikes a Balance Between Governmental Liability and Individual Liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Early American Customs Forfeitures Were Considered Punishment\nII. Both Civil And Criminal Actions Were Used to Punish Offenses Against the Public\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Excessive Fines Clause Provides Critical Protection Against Abusive Tax Schemes",
        "reference": "III. Forfeitures Are Fines If They Have A Punitive Purpose, Even In Part, While Remedial Qualities Are Relevant To the Question of Excessiveness",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Text Forecloses Rogers\nB. The First Amendment Does Not Justify Rogers\nC. Rogers Undermines the Lanham Act\nD. Rogers at Least Does Not Protect Use of Marks to Identify the Source of Utilitarian Products\nII. Humorous Expression Does Not Trigger the Noncommercial Use Exclusion to Dilution\nA. \"Noncommercial Use\" Does Not Encompass Using Marks to Sell Goods or Services\nB. Reliance on Legislative History Is Misplaced\nC. Purported First Amendment Concerns Do Not Justify the Ninth Circuit's Holding",
        "reference": "I. The First Amendment Does Not Require Rogers' Heightened Standard for Infringement under the Lanham Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution does not recognize disparate impact claims, and any congressional recognition of such claims is subject to constitutional limits\nA. Section 2 must be restrained in order to satisfy constitutional standards\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit's application of Section 2's results test fails these standards\n1. Gingles and the 1982 Senate Factors should not be transferred to the vote denial context\n2. If applicable to vote denial claims, any totality of the circumstances analysis must focus on current conditions\nII. The Ninth Circuit erred in rejecting Arizona's justifications for its generally applicable, race-neutral voting regulations as tenuous\n1. Arizona law's discarding of out-of-precinct ballots provides an equal opportunity to all voters and protects the precinct system\n2. Arizona's law limiting the range of people who may lawfully handle another person's ballot deters vote fraud",
        "reference": "B. The text of Section 2 creates only a results test of limited scope",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-8369_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The courts below correctly held that a dismissal without prejudice under Heck constitutes a strike under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g)\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. This case is not an appropriate vehicle to resolve the lopsided split because the outcome here would be the same under either standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACA AUTHORIZING PCORI ARE SEVERABLE FROM ANY UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE ACT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. None Of The General Or Specific Concerns About ACA Severability Applies To The ACA Provisions Authorizing PCORI",
        "reference": "A. Under This Court's Established Approach, Congress's Intent That PCORI Continue To Operate Is Clear",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Mississippi Has a Compelling Interest to Proscribe Pre-Viability Abortions",
        "reference": "I. Roe v. Wade Was Wrongly Decided, and It Continues to Tear at the Fabric of Our Nation and Corrupt Our Judicial System",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The First Amendment forbids a State from burdening citizens for their voting histories or political-party affiliations\nB. The First Amendment retaliation doctrine provides a principled and rational framework for judging challenges to partisan gerrymanders\nC. Partisan gerrymanders can inflict concrete burdens in multifarious ways\nD. The First Amendment approach harmonizes the law of partisan and racial gerrymandering\nE. The State's rejoinders are unpersuasive\n1. The First Amendment approach does not mean \"zero tolerance\" for politics in redistricting\n2. The First Amendment approach does not entail a right to electoral success\n3. The prevalence of gerrymandering in American political history is no answer to its unconstitutionality\nII. The denial of injunctive relief was based on legal and factual errors\nA. Plaintiffs proved a constitutional burden\nB. The Mt. Healthy burden-shifting framework required the State to disprove but-for causation",
        "reference": "I. Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim is justiciable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9560_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Mens Rea Is a Foundational Safeguard Against Punishment for Unknowingly Unlawful Conduct\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. That the Crucial Element of the Offense Is the Status of the Accused Himself Does Not Permit Dispensing with Mens Rea",
        "reference": "II. A \"Knowing\" Violation of 18 U.S.C. section 922(g) Requires Knowledge of the Status Element Making the Possession of Firearms or Ammunition Illegal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Cy Pres -Only Settlements Ensure that the Objectives of Class Actions are Met and Preserve the Viability of Class Actions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Availability of Cy Pres Awards Advances the Value and Objectives of Class Actions\nII. The Availability of Cy Pres Settlements Does Not Motivate Attorneys to Bring Class Actions, Act in Bad Faith, or Disregard Ethical Rules\nA. There is no incentive for attorneys to take cy pres-only settlement cases\nB. There is no evidence that class counsel act in bad faith or disregard ethical rules in cases involving cy pres-only settlements\nIII. Cy Pres -Only Settlements Improve Access to Justice for Class Members",
        "reference": "A. The Value and Objectives of Class Actions Extend Beyond Monetary Compensation Alone",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Plain Text of 28 U.S.C. section 1605(a)(3) Deprives the Prussian Foundation of Sovereign Immunity\nA. The Takings Clause Provides Jurisdiction over Claims for Nazi Takings During the Holocaust\ni. An amendment to the FSIA confirms that the takings clause provides jurisdiction in this case\nB. Other Interpretative Authorities Confirm that the Takings Clause Applies\ni. The drafting history of the FSIA shows that claims based upon Nazi takings were understood to state claims under the FSIA takings clause\nii. By the time the FSIA was enacted, Nazi takings had been recognized as takings in violation of international law for decades\niii. [MISSING]\niv. The domestic takings rule does not apply to genocidal acts\nC. The Text of the FSIA Can Only Be Amended by Congress\nD. The Policy of the FSIA Is Not Under Review\nE. Petitioners Distort and Minimize the Holocaust\nII. The FSIA Has Already Provided the Appropriate Comity to Petitioners\nA. The FSIA Expresses the Comity that the United States Provides to Foreign Sovereigns and Instrumentalities Like the Prussian Foundation\nB. Petitioners' New Comity-Based Abstention Proposal Rehashes Their Un-Appealed Forum Non Conveniens Argument\nC. Comity-Based Abstention Is Rare and Controversial\nD. If the Defense Were Available, Discretionary Abstention Would Not Apply Here",
        "reference": "iii. Congress has repeatedly confirmed its condemnation of Nazi property takings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.31
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-155_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Mr. Hughes Is Eligible For Relief Under section 3582(c)(2) Because His Sentence Was Based On The Guidelines\nA. A sentence is \"based on\" the Guidelines when the Guidelines bear a reasonably close connection to it\nB. The Government's rule is inconsistent with section 3582(c)(2)'s purposes\nC. Mr. Hughes is eligible to seek relief\nII. The Court Of Appeals Erred By Treating The Freeman Concurrence As Binding\nA. The government's criticisms of the logical-subset test lack merit\nB. The government's approach to Marks is untenable\nC. The Freeman concurrence is neither a logical subset nor a \"middle ground.\"\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Judicial administration would be better served by abandoning Marks than by adopting the government's approach",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court\nIII. This Court should hold that June Medical lacks third-party standing to assert the claim before the Court in this case\nA. June Medical lacks a close relationship with the patients whose rights it seeks to assert\nB. There is nothing hindering June Medical's patients from prosecuting their own claims\nC. June Medical cannot fairly and adequately represent the interests of its patients in this case",
        "reference": "I. Abortion providers cannot manufacture their standing by their own misconduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Reciprocity And Proportionality Of A Non-Resident's In-State Rights And Obligations That Are At The Heart Of International Shoe Require This Result\nB. A Defendant's Due Process Right To Predictability Of The Jurisdictional Consequences Of Its Conduct Requires The Same Result\nC. Principles of Federalism And Territorial Sovereignty Inherent In Due Process Also Require This Result\nD. This Result Is Beneficial For Businesses And Consumers Alike\nII. THE MINNESOTA AND MONTANA SUPREME COURT DECISIONS VIOLATE DUE PROCESS\nA. The Decision In Bandemer Violates Due Process\nB. The Decision In Gullett Violates Due Process",
        "reference": "I. DUE PROCESS PROHIBITS THE EXERCISE OF SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER A NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT UNLESS IT ENGAGED IN IN-STATE CONDUCT THAT FORMS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ITS ALLEGED LIABILITY TO PLAINTIFF",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court would have to seize legislative power to grant facial relief because it is indisputable that the challenged statute has thousands of lawful applications\nA. Under the large fraction test, Plaintiffs must prove that the statute is unlawful nearly all of the time\nB. Legislatures alone have authority to change the statutory rights for people who have no legal claim\nIII. After Gill v. Whitford, Plaintiffs lack standing to seek facial relief under the large fraction test",
        "reference": "I. Invoking third-party standing here improperly shifts legislative authority to courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Conflicts With Twombly And Iqbal, As Well As The Decisions Of Other Courts Of Appeals",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Grant Review To Decide Whether Section 1981 Requires But-For Causation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Claimed Split in Authority Is Illusory.\nII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Considering Petitioners' Sweeping Constitutional Claims.\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. History and tradition show that state public carry laws like New York's are consistent with the Second Amendment.\nB. New York's law advances the State's compelling interests in public safety and crime prevention.",
        "reference": "III. The Decision Below Is Correct.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter Was an Unprincipled Departure from this Court's Rule that Racial Preferences Are Unacceptable\nA. This Court has recognized in every context save higher-education admissions that the Constitution forbids racial discrimination\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Experience Demonstrates That the Grutter Standard Is Unworkable\nA. Texas's experiences with affirmative action demonstrate that Grutter is unworkable\nB. The experience of petitioner's members further demonstrates the theoretical problems behind Grutter\nIII. This Court Has Undermined Grutter in Subsequent Case Law\nIV. Purported Reliance Interests Are No Basis to Retain Grutter",
        "reference": "B. Higher-education admissions is the only context where a party accused of discrimination may determine whether discrimination is necessary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief042.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Gestational Age Act rationally furthers the State's interest in protecting maternal health given the Act's empirical support.\nA. This Court gives deference to findings supporting laws protecting maternal health.\nB. The legislature made multiple findings that the Act protects maternal health.\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Published, peer-reviewed studies show that later-term abortions are significantly tied to abortion-related deaths.\n2. Published, peer-reviewed studies show that later-term abortion raises the risk of later premature births.\n3. Published, peer-reviewed studies show that abortion raises breast-cancer risks, which rise with gestational age.\n4. Published, peer-reviewed studies show that later-term abortion raises the risk of depression, drug abuse, and suicide.\nII. The Act's rationality is confirmed by its exceptions, which exceed the demands of medicine and traditional medical ethics.",
        "reference": "C. The legislature's findings are supported by extensive empirical evidence.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT REQUIRES A PLAINTIFF TO PROVE RETALIATORY INTENT\nA. \"Discrimination\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner's Arguments For Eliminating The Intent Requirement Are Unpersuasive\nII. THE WPA DOES NOT COMMAND A DIFFERENT RESULT\nA. The Text And Context Of The WPA And SOX Are Materially Different\nB. The WPA's Legislative History Is Inapposite And Unedifying\nC. The Pre-SOX Case Law Does Not Justify Elimination Of The Intent Requirement\nIII. THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD'S POSITION DOES NOT MERIT CHEVRON DEFERENCE\nIV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT CORRECTLY HELD IN THE ALTERNATIVE THAT THE \"CONTRIBUTING FACTOR\" INSTRUCTION WAS FATALLY FLAWED",
        "reference": "B. AIR-21's Burden-Allocation Framework Does Not Eliminate The Intent Requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Federal courts are not authorized to use the cy pres remedy in class action litigation unless that use is specifically authorized by the controlling substantive law\n1. Federal courts have used their equitable powers to import the cy pres remedy into the administration of class action litigation\n2. The Rules Enabling Act prevents Rule 23 from being used to modify the remedies authorized by substantive law\n3. The use of cy pres in class action litigation substitutes charitable payments for the remedies available under the substantive law\nC. This Court should find that federal courts may only use the cy pres remedy when the substantive law allows the use of this remedy",
        "reference": "A. American state courts having jurisdiction over charitable trusts are expressly authorized by state statutes to use the cy pres remedy in a limited set of circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1077_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner's conduct falls squarely within the charged prohibitions on securities fraud\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)\nC. Imposing liability for petitioner's active deception preserves the distinction between primary and secondary liability\nD. No canon of construction supports departing from the text, history, and purpose of the charged antifraud provisions\nE. Petitioner's policy arguments provide no sound basis for reversing the court of appeals' judgment",
        "reference": "A. Petitioner's conduct falls within the plain meaning of Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The USERRA provision at issue is constitutional\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. This Court's review would be premature",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. ALL CLASS MEMBERS SUFFERED A LONG-RECOGNIZED COMMON LAW HARM\nA. Every Class Member Was Falsely Labeled a Terrorist\nB. The Jury Could Have Reasonably Found Third-Party Publication\nII. DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL HARMS ALREADY SUFFERED ARE ACTIONABLE UNDER ARTICLE III\nA. Clapper Does Not Control\nB. FCRA Statutory Damages Were Appropriate Because TransUnion's Misconduct Was Willful\nC. Article III Is Satisfied Where Private Retrospective Rights Are Asserted\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. TRANSUNION'S TYPICALITY ARGUMENT HAS NO SUPPORT",
        "reference": "III. JURISDICTION CANNOT TURN ON TRIAL OUTCOMES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Public Safety Unions Must Be Fairly Funded to Serve and Protect the Interests of Fire Fighters, Paramedics, Emergency Response Personnel, and the Communities They Serve\nA. Fair Share Fees Are Necessary to Fund Efforts to Obtain Essential Health and Safety Protections for All Bargaining Unit Members that IAFF Affiliates Are Obligated by Law to Represent\ni. Adequate Staffing Levels and Training For All Bargaining Unit Members\nii. Improvements to Personal Protective Equipment, Fire Equipment, and Apparatus to Safeguard All Fire Fighters and the Public\niii. Specialized Equipment and Training for Specialty Areas, such as Wildfire Response\niv. [MISSING]\nB. Prohibiting Fair Share Fees Would Reduce Safety, Health, and Welfare Protections for Fire Fighters, Harming the Communities They Serve, Contrary to Essential Government Interests\ni. Collective Bargaining Requires the Expenditure of Much Time and Money, Which Benefits All Members of the Bargaining Unit\nii. Prohibiting Fair Share Fees Will Harm Public Safety\nII. The Collection of Fair Share Fees Is Constitutional\nIII. Significant Reliance Interests by Fire Fighter Unions and the Emergency First Responders They Represent Require Abood to Be Upheld",
        "reference": "iv. Enhanced Health and Welfare Benefits, Annual Medical Examinations, and Employee Wellness Programs for All Fire Fighters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief044.pdf",
        "text": "I. The stipulations make the outcome clear.\nII. CADA violates the First Amendment by compelling Smith to speak against her convictions.\nA. CADA's application to Smith compels speech, not merely sales.\nB. CADA's application to Smith directly burdens her speech.\nC. CADA's regulation of Smith does not depend on third-party perceptions.\nD. CADA regulates Smith's content selection, not client selection.\nIII. This Court should follow its compelled-speech decisions, not Colorado's novel theory.\nIV. CADA's application to Smith fails any level of heightened scrutiny.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Colorado fails to refute numerous alternatives to compelling speech.\nC. Alternatively, the Court could apply a historical rule prohibiting government-compelled speech.\nV. The Publications Clause also violates the First Amendment.",
        "reference": "A. Censoring Smith's speech does not serve an important or compelling interest.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.58
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. Historical parallels between Executive Order No. 9066 and EO-3 should inform the Court's analysis so that history is learned from, not repeated\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Then, as now, the exclusion's under-inclusivity cast additional doubts on the proffered justification\nC. Then, as now, the Government invoked the specter of an ill-defined threat to national security to justify the exclusion\nD. Then, as now, the purported threat to national security was illusory\nE. Then, as now, the Government was unwilling to reveal its own intelligence agencies' views of the purported threat 17\nF. Then, as now, intolerance and bigotry, not a genuine concern for national security, animated the sweeping exclusion\nG. Then, as now, the perceived threat was cast in religious terms\nH. Then, as now, the Government insisted that the Court abdicate its core responsibilities and do no more than accept at face value the Government's invocation of national security\nII. Especially in this historical context, any measure of meaningful scrutiny should lead the Court to conclude that the President failed to fulfill the statutory requirement to \"find\" that admission of a class of aliens \"would be detrimental to the interests of the United States\"\nA. Unlike with Executive Order No. 9066, the Court must meaningfully review whether EO-3 complies with the statutory constraints on the President's authority\nB. Under any measure of meaningful scrutiny, the President has failed to comply with the law in enacting EO-3 and excluding whole classes of aliens",
        "reference": "A. Then, as now, the Government pursued a mass exclusionary measure of sweeping and senseless scope",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The decision below conflicts with the decision of another court of appeals\nC. The question presented warrants review in this case",
        "reference": "A. The decision below is incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review\nA. The D.C. Circuit Applied the Plain Text of the FSIA\nB. Certiorari Is Unnecessary When This Interpretation Is Consistent With Recent Congressional Action and U.S. Policy\nC. Certiorari Is Unnecessary When the Decision Below Is Consistent With Long-standing Foreign Policy Regarding Property Crimes of the Holocaust\nD. Defendants' Arguments Attack the FSIA Itself\nE. Restraints Already in Place Assure That the Decision Below Will Not Open Floodgates\nF. This Case Is Not an Appropriate Vehicle for Review\nII. [MISSING]\nA. A Decision That Followed the FSIA and This Court's Precedent Does Not Merit Certiorari\nB. One Circuit Misreading the Restatement Does Not Warrant Certiorari\n1. The Seventh Circuit's Error Does Not Justify Review of a D.C. Circuit Decision\n2. Any Circuit Split Is Resolving\nC. There Is No Novel Holding\nD. The Amicus Brief Does Not Provide a Justification for Certiorari\nE. Defendants' Attempt to Cast Prudential Exhaustion as a Non-Sovereign Defense Does Not Merit Consideration\nF. This Case Is Not a Suitable Vehicle Because These Defendants Could Not Invoke Prudential Exhaustion\n1. Plaintiffs Did Pursue the Only Local Option\n2. Exhaustion Is Not Required When, as Here, it Would Be Fruitless\n3. Exhaustion Is Not Required When, as Here, the Sovereign Denies Wrongdoing\n4. There Is No Exhaustion Requirement Where U.S. Interest Is Strong",
        "reference": "II. The Second Question Presented Does Not Warrant Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1484_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The court of appeals' decision is correct.\nB. The question is not important for this Court to resolve.\nII. The second question presented does not warrant review.",
        "reference": "I. The first question presented does not warrant this Court's review, as the Solicitor General observes.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Individual-capacity damages are necessary to give meaning to RFRA's text and purpose\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that \"appropriate relief\" was meant to exclude compensatory and nominal damages\nII. Individual-capacity damages play a critical role under RFRA in protecting vulnerable religious minorities\nA. Damages prevent government defendants from strategically mooting out meritorious claims\nB. Damages will not create disruption because appropriate safeguards are already in place\nIII. The sovereign immunity analysis applied in Sossamon and other cases is not the proper analysis to apply in this case",
        "reference": "A. RFRA's text demonstrates an intent to provide broad protection, including damages",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Significant Conflict Among the Circuits\nA. There Is No State Action When the Activity Cannot Be Fairly Treated as That of the State\nB. The Sixth Circuit's Test Is Compatible with the Other Circuits' Tests\nC. The Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits Would Decide This Case the Same Way\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Sixth Circuit Correctly Found Freed's Action Did Not Involve State Action",
        "reference": "II. This Is Not an Ideal Case to Address This Question",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Congress validly authorized private damages suits against state employers under USERRA\nA. USERRA is an exercise of Congress's powers to raise and support Armies and provide and maintain a Navy\nB. Principles of state sovereign immunity do not bar suits against state employers under USERRA\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The decision below and respondent's supporting arguments are incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' complaint fails to plausibly allege lack of any local benefit, and Petitioners' brief provides no support for this unpleaded allegation\nA. Petitioners' argument that States can have no legitimate interest in banning products of animal cruelty is supported by no authority and is directly at odds with States' rights to protect public morals\nB. Unless prohibited from doing so by Congress, States have a Tenth Amendment right to ban the sale of products that harm public morals\nII. Petitioners erroneously conflate Pike balancing with the inapplicable per se rule against discriminatory laws\nIII. Petitioners rely on inapplicable caselaw prohibiting discrimination against out of state businesses\nIV. Voters are aware of the extreme confinement now commonly used in pork production, and requiring California to allow the sale of such products inflicts moral injury on the State\nV. [MISSING]\nVI. The complaint does not plausibly allege excessive extraterritorial effects and is internally inconsistent",
        "reference": "V. There are also legitimate health and safety concerns with the sale of products of extreme animal confinement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1432_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE STATUTES ARE A VALID EXERCISE OF STATES' SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY OVER DIVORCE\nA. Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes Are an Exercise of the State's Regulatory Authority Over Divorce Courts, Which a Spouse Cannot Nullify Through a Private Contract\nB. History Confirms That the Contracts Clause Does Not Restrict a State's Ability to Determine the Effect of a Divorce Decree\nC. Practical Considerations Support Upholding States' Sovereign Authority to Regulate Divorce\nII. STATUTES AFFECTING THE DONATIVE COMPONENT OF A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY DO NOT VIOLATE THE CONTRACTS CLAUSE\nA. Statutes Affecting Life Insurance Beneficiary Designations Do Not Impair Contractual Obligations\nB. Beneficiary Designations in Nonprobate Transfers Should Be Treated the Same Way as Beneficiary Designations in Wills\nC. Practical Considerations Support Upholding States' Authority to Regulate Beneficiary Designations\nIII. REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE STATUTES DO NOT IMPAIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS; RATHER, THEY CONSTRUE DIVORCE AS AN EXERCISE OF CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS\nIV. REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE STATUTES DO NOT \"SUBSTANTIALLY\" IMPAIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS\nA. Only \"Substantial\" Impairments of Contractual Obligations Violate the Contracts Clause\nB. Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes Do Not Substantially Impair Contractual Obligations\nC. [MISSING]\nV. EVEN IF THEY SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIR CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE STATUTES SERVE A LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE\nA. Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes Easily Satisfy the Modern Reasonableness Test\nB. Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes Present None of the Political Process Concerns Underlying the Contracts Clause",
        "reference": "C. Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes Do Not Interfere With Reliance Interests\u2014but Invalidating Them Would",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. No National Security Concern Provides a Compelling Interest Justifying Race-Based Admissions.\nA. The National Defense Has Been Carried Out Effectively with a Meritocratic, \"Colorblind\" Military Culture.\nB. There is No Competent Evidence That Race-Conscious Admissions Are Essential for Military Effectiveness.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Racial Preferences Reduce Military Effectiveness.\nB. The Service Academies' Experience With Racial Preferences Illustrates This Threat To National Security.",
        "reference": "II. National Security Is Better Served When Military Officer Accessions Are Race-Neutral and Exclusively Merit-Based.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FTC's \"Expansion\" of Section 13(b) Violates the Separation of Powers\nA. Congress Created a Multi-Step Process for the Recovery of Money Damages\nB. The FTC Rejects Congress's Statutory Scheme\nC. The FTC Uses Test Cases to Expand Its Section 13(b) Powers\nD. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language\nII. The FTC's Actions Seeking Monetary Awards Violate Constitutional Rights\nA. Collateral Damage: A Case Study\nB. The FTC's Abuse of Section 13(b) Threatens Constitutional Rights\n1. The FTC Uses Section 13(b) to Circumvent the Fourth Amendment\n2. Pursuing Damages Under the Guise of Equity Deprives Defendants of their Seventh Amendment Jury Trial Right\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The FTC's Misuse of Section 13(b) Is Contrary to Values Protected by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments\nIII. Separation of Powers Principles Necessitate Review",
        "reference": "3. The FTC's Pursuit of Money Damages Undermines the Sixth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.31
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1356_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Review the Denial of Kaushal's Motion\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Even If the Court Has Jurisdiction, There Is No Justification to Hear This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-292_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE IS A POOR CANDIDATE FOR CERTIORARI BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY COMPELLING REASONS FOR REVIEWING THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S UNANIMOUS DECISION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. THIS COURT DOES NOT STRICTLY IMPOSE COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES IN SECTION 1983 CASES\nII. AS AN ALTERNATIVE GROUND FOR AFFIRMANCE, THE FORCE USED BY THE OFFICERS WAS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES\nIII. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE\nIV. PETITIONER AND HER AMICI IMPROPERLY DEMAND THAT THIS COURT OVERRULE DECADES' WORTH OF FOURTH AMENDMENT AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY PRECEDENTS",
        "reference": "A. THE TENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT TORRES WAS NOT \"SEIZED\" FOR PURPOSES OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The District's decision to shackle all defendants at all non-jury proceedings presented an appealable collateral order\nA. The district court's decisions to shackle Respondents at all non-jury proceedings were effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment\nB. The district court's decisions resolved an important issue separate from the merits of the action\n1. The right to appear in court free of unwarranted shackles protects particular values of high order\n2. No alternative means exist to protect the defendant's liberty and the dignity and decorum of the court\n3. The decisions to shackle Respondents are entirely separate from the merits\nC. In upholding the constitutionality of the District's policy requiring five-point shackling of all pretrial detainees at all non-jury proceedings, the district court conclusively determined the disputed issue\nII. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The right to the issuance of the writ was \"clear and indisputable.\"\nC. The use of mandamus review, but withholding of the writ, was \"appropriate under the circumstances.\"\nIII. Respondents' claims are not moot because the dispute over the District's indiscriminate shackling policy is capable of repetition, yet evading review",
        "reference": "A. Respondents had no \"other adequate means\" to obtain appellate review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. There is no conflict\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This case raises no issue of general or urgent importance",
        "reference": "B. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing preemption under the AEA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. First Amendment Safeguards Will Curb Misuse of the Lanham Act and Protect Free Expression\nA. Robust protection for political, social, and artistic expression requires latitude to draw on trademarks, even in the commercial context\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Colleges and Universities Regularly Use Trademark Law to Bully Students and Faculty Engaging in Disfavored Speech\nA. Public colleges and universities selectively enforce trademark policies against registered student organizations\nB. Public universities and colleges attempt to block students, alumni, and faculty from using trademarked names to criticize their schools\nIII. A robust threshold inquiry for expressive uses of trademarks is needed to guard against the Lanham Act chilling speech",
        "reference": "B. The usual tests for trademark infringement and dilution are more likely to chill free speech than protect it",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1495_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE HISTORICAL PRACTICE AT THE TIME OF THE FOUNDING CONFIRMS THAT THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE IS VIOLATED WHEN COERCED, INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS ARE INTRODUCED AT PRE-TRIAL PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGS",
        "reference": "I. THE TEXT, STRUCTURE, AND DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE IS VIOLATED WHEN COERCED, INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS ARE INTRODUCED AT PRE-TRIAL PROBABLE CAUSE HEARINGS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The President Is Not an \"Officer of the United States\" Under Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment\nA. The Text of the Constitution Confirms That the President is Not an \"Officer of the United States\"\nB. The Oath the President Takes Is Distinct From the Oath Officers of the United States Take, Further Confirming He Is Not an Officer of the United States Under Section Three\nII. Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment Vests Enforcement Authority in Congress and Does not Give Individuals or State Officials a Self-Executing Authority to Seek Disqualification\nA. This Court's Precedent Repeatedly Confirms That the Fourteenth Amendment is Not Self-Executing\nB. Griffin's Case Confirms That, in Accordance with Due Process, Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment is Not Self-Executing\nC. Empowering State Courts or State Secretaries of State to Decide Disqualification under Section Three Is Inconsistent with the Constitutional Design\nIII. Section Three Only Disqualifies Certain Categories of People From Holding Office, Not From Seeking It\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The First Amendment Protects a Political Party's Right to Select Its Own Nominees and to Participate in the Elective Process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent's Desperate Attempts At A DIG Are Weak\nA. Respondent's Late-Breaking Confusion As To The Claim The Court Recognized In Manuel Is Manufactured\nB. Respondent's Repetition Of The BIO's Vehicle Arguments Is Meritless\nII. The Second Circuit Erred By Requiring \"Affirmative Indications Of Innocence.\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court's Understanding Is Correct: In 1871, Favorable Termination Was About Finality And Consistency, And Not About \"Innocence.\"\nC. Respondent's Position That Section 1983's Favorable-Termination Rule Evolves With \"Modern Law\" Is Wrong\nIII. The Indications-Of-Innocence Standard Is Arbitrary And Unworkable",
        "reference": "A. Respondent Cannot Reconcile The Court's Precedent With The Indications-Of-Innocence Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-441_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Congress did not exceed its constitutional authority in enacting Section 1004(a) of the 2017 Bankruptcy Judgeship Act\nA. The bankruptcy uniformity requirement does not restrict Congress's authority to set user fees for the U.S. Trustee Program\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Even if the fee disparity could be attributed to Congress, that disparity did not violate the uniformity requirement\nD. If unequal fees are unconstitutional, refunding the fee increase that Congress imposed in the vast majority of districts is not the appropriate remedy",
        "reference": "B. The statutory regime for quarterly fees was at all relevant times facially uniform throughout the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Schools May Regulate Substantially Disruptive Off-Campus Speech\nA. History Supports Schools' Authority\nB. Tinker Applies to Off-Campus Speech\nC. Tinker Already Checks Schoolhouse Tyranny\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Respondents' Alternative Approach Is Nonsensical",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT, STRUCTURE, HISTORY, AND PRECEDENT DEMONSTRATE THAT STATE LEGISLATURES MUST ABIDE BY STATE CONSTITUTIONS WHEN REGULATING CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS\nA. The Text Of The Elections Clause Refutes Petitioners' Theory\nB. The Constitution's Structure Refutes Petitioners' Theory\nC. Founding-Era Practice And The Convention Debates Refute Petitioners' Theory\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Petitioners' Remaining Arguments Are Meritless\nII. EVEN UNDER PETITIONERS' THEORY, BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL LAW INDEPENDENTLY AUTHORIZE THE DECISIONS BELOW\nA. The North Carolina Legislature Specifically Authorized Judicial Review Of Congressional Redistricting Plans\nB. Congress Has Mandated That Congressional Redistricting Plans Abide By State Law\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW DOES NOT WARRANT FEDERAL INTERVENTION\nIV. PETITIONERS' THEORY WOULD UPEND ELECTION ADMINISTRATION NATIONWIDE AND EMBROIL FEDERAL COURTS IN STATE-LAW DISPUTES",
        "reference": "D. A Century Of Precedent Refutes Petitioners' Theory",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter should be overruled\nA. Grutter is grievously wrong\nB. Grutter has spawned significant negative consequences\nC. Grutter has generated no legitimate reliance interests\nII. Harvard's admissions process fails strict scrutiny\nA. Harvard penalizes Asian Americans\nB. Harvard engages in racial balancing\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Harvard has workable race-neutral alternatives\nIII. UNC's admissions process fails strict scrutiny",
        "reference": "C. Harvard does not use race as a mere plus to achieve overall diversity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-281_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The House has no authority to appeal on behalf of Virginia\nIII. The House has no standing to appeal that is separate from the State of which it is a part\nIV. Like the Federal Government, States should speak with one voice before this Court\nV. States have ample measures to ensure their laws are appropriately defended, including on appeal",
        "reference": "I. This appeal is the first time the House has needed to establish its own standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. NO ONE HAS AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO BE FREE OF OFFENSE IN GENERAL OR RELIGION IN PARTICULAR\nII. THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT ADVOCATING A MESSAGE OF ITS OWN\nA. This case is not about a government message\nB. A monument on public land does not necessarily represent the government's own message\nC. The government may acknowledge the nation's religious heritage \u2014 including Christianity\nD. The government may accommodate religion\nIII. THE GOVERNMENT PRESERVES AND RESPECTS A COMMEMORATIVE MESSAGE CREATED BY PRIVATE CITIZENS\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. THIS COURT SHOULD CRAFT A TEST TO BRING CLARITY TO CASES INVOLVING RELIGIOUS SYMBOLISM ON PUBLIC PROPERTY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Free Speech And Free Exercise Clauses Doubly Protect Coach Kennedy's Religious Exercise\nA. The First Amendment Robustly Protects the Religious Exercise and Expression of Public-School Employees\nB. Kennedy's Religious Exercise Was Not the District's Speech\nII. The Establishment Clause Does Not Compel Public Schools To Purge From Public View All Religious Exercise Of Coaches And Teachers\nA. Declining to Prohibit Private Religious Exercise Does Not Create Establishment Clause Concerns\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Contrary Conclusion Distorts the Record, This Court's Cases, and the Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A False Claim Presented Without Honest Belief in its Truth Is a \"Fraudulent\" Claim Presented With \"Actual Knowledge\"\nB. A Defendant Who Presents a False Claim Without Honest Belief in its Truth Is Acting \"Knowingly\" Under the False Claims Act's Three-Part Scienter Standard\nII. The Seventh Circuit Erroneously Created a Novel and Unfounded Exception to the False Claims Act's Scienter Standard\nIII. Under the Correct Legal Standard, This Court Should Reverse the Decisions Below",
        "reference": "I. The False Claims Act Imposes Liability on Defendants Who Present False Claims Without an Honest Subjective Belief in the Claims' Truth",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. ANILCA Struck a Balance Between Competing Interests\nB. [MISSING]\n1. No Party Seeks to Overturn Katie John and its Progeny\n2. The Katie John Doctrine is Restricted to ANILCA's Subsistence Preference\n3. ANILCA's Use of \"Public Lands\" Was Employed in Different Parts of the Act with Different Intent",
        "reference": "B. The Katie John Doctrine Effectuates the ANILCA Balance and Should Not Be Disturbed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The VRA Operates As A Prohibition On Voting Rules Abridging Or Denying Voting Rights \"On Account Of Race,\" Not An Affirmative Obligation To Redistrict \"On Account Of Race.\"\nA. \"Equally open\" districting is districting without discrimination \"on account of race.\"\nB. \"Equally open\" requires a race-neutral benchmark.\nII. Plaintiffs Misconstrue This Court's Decision In Gingles.\nA. Gingles is a judicially created threshold inquiry, not the ultimate standard for assessing a section 2 violation.\nB. Illustrative maps drawn on account of race cannot satisfy the first Gingles precondition.\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Stare decisis is irrelevant to the resolution of this case.\nIII. Plaintiffs' New Attempt To Decouple Remedy From Their Theory Of Liability Is Unavailing.\nIV. Section 2 Cannot Constitutionally Require States To Replace Race-Neutral Redistricting Plans With Racial Gerrymanders.\nA. No \"compelling interest\" justifies Plaintiffs' proposed racial gerrymanders.\n1. HB1 does not \"crack\" the Black Belt.\n2. Plaintiffs' contrived \"community of interest\" does not support an inference of discrimination.\n3. Racially polarized voting is not legally actionable.\n4. The Senate Factors cannot show discrimination in districting.\nB. A statute that required States to replace neutrally drawn plans with racially gerrymandered plans would exceed Congress's constitutional authority.",
        "reference": "C. Plaintiffs' arguments about \"communities of interest\" and compactness cannot justify their race-based illustrative maps.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.81
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The challenge to the 2019 Rule could not become moot while the Seventh Circuit appeal is pending\nB. The challenge to the rescission of the 1999 Field Guidance is not moot\nII. Even if this action were moot, this Court need not dismiss on mootness grounds\nA. There is no \"unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy\" on the bases for dismissal\nB. The plaintiffs lack Article III standing\n1. The Ninth Circuit improperly relied on plaintiffs' pleadings to support interim relief\n2. The state and local plaintiffs lack parens patriae standing against the federal government\n3. The funding injuries are self-inflicted and speculative\n4. Plaintiffs' injuries fall outside the zone of interests\n5. Plaintiffs' injuries are insufficient for an action in equity\nC. The federal respondents' norm-breaking conduct warrants dismissal as a friendly lawsuit\nIII. Under the circumstances, denying intervention was untenable",
        "reference": "I. This action is not moot",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief046.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Attorney General Has a Vital Interest in Protecting Public Trust in the Nonprofit Sector\nA. State Attorneys General have primary responsibility for nonprofit-sector oversight within the U.S. federalist system\nB. Protecting the public's trust in the nonprofit sector is an interest of vital importance\nII. California's Schedule B Reporting Requirement Is Substantially Related to the State's Important Interest in Preventing Charitable Fraud and the Misuse of Charitable Funds\nA. Access to Schedule B substantially aids the Attorney General in its efforts to protect the public's trust in the nonprofit sector\nB. Ex-post retrieval of Schedule B is no substitute for ex-ante reporting\nIII. The Low Risk that the Identities of Large-Dollar Donors Will Be Disclosed Inadvertently Does Not Impose a Substantial Burden on Petitioners' First Amendment Rights\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Schedule B reporting requirement affects only a small number of large-dollar donors to Petitioners",
        "reference": "A. The fact that Petitioners' expert gained access to less than 1% of the Registry's confidential documents ought to be understood",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"REGISTRATION\" IS \"MADE\" FOR PURPOSES OF section 411(A) BY THE COPYRIGHT OWNER\nA. The Statute Uses the Phrase \"Make Registration\" and Its Variants To Refer to Compliance with the Requirements of section 408(a)\nB. Allowing a Copyright Owner To Sue for Infringement Once the Copyright Owner Has Complied with the Registration Requirement Comports with the Structure of section 411(a) and the Rest of the Copyright Act\nII. THE ACT'S HISTORY CONFIRMS THAT A COPYRIGHT OWNER MAY INSTITUTE AN ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT AFTER COMPLYING WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE COPYRIGHT ACT'S SCHEME OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES FAVORS ALLOWING SUITS TO PROCEED ONCE THE COPYRIGHT OWNER HAS COMPLIED WITH REQUIRED FORMALITIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-480_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Civil service pension payments based on work performed as a civilian dual status technician do not qualify for the uniformed services exception to the Social Security Act's windfall elimination provision\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The definition of \"uniformed service\" that is cross-referenced in the uniformed services exception confirms that it does not apply to work performed in the dual status technician role\nII. Petitioner's contrary interpretation runs afoul of the text and context of the uniformed services exception\nA. Petitioner misconstrues the plain meaning of the text of the uniformed services exception\nB. Petitioner does not account for the inherently civilian nature of dual status technician employment\nC. Petitioner's remaining arguments do not undermine the plain-text meaning of the uniformed services exception",
        "reference": "A. The plain text of the uniformed services exception establishes that it does not apply to work performed in the dual status technician role",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATE \"NO-AID\" PROVISIONS RESULTED IN THE COERCIVE INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION OF BLACK STUDENTS\nA. In the Antebellum Period, at Risk of Severe Punishment, African Americans Placed a High Value on Educating Their Children\nB. From 1865 to 1900, Black Religious Leaders Emphasized the Importance of Promoting Classical Liberal Education That Would Empower Blacks to Pursue Political, Economic, and Social Equality\nC. From 1868 to 1900, Samuel C. Armstrong and Booker T. Washington Promoted an Industrial Education Model as Suitable for Adjusting Blacks to a Subordinate Economic, Social, and Political Role in the New South\nD. The Blaine Amendments Cemented the Primacy of the Hampton-Tuskegee Idea of Industrial Education and Barred Public Aid for the Classical Liberal Education of Blacks in Denominational Schools\nE. Because Denominational Schools Serving Black Students Could Not Receive Public Aid, from 1900 to 1930, Rural Black Parents Resorted to Paying an Additional \"Voluntary\" Tax to Educate Their Children in the Segregated Common Schools\nF. The Ban on Public Funds for the Education of Children in the Religious Schools of Their Parents' Choice Has Had a Devastating Impact on the Social and Emotional Attitudes, Skills, and Behaviors and Learning Outcomes of Black Children\nII. SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL LEARNING AS PRACTICED IN MONTANA AND ELSEWHERE IS CONSISTENT WITH RELIGIOUS NATURALISM\nIII. THE ENFORCEMENT OF MONTANA'S NO-AID PROVISION AGAINST PETITIONERS VIOLATES THEIR FREEDOM OF SPEECH, THOUGHT, DUE PROCESS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS\nA. Conditions on Generally Available K-12 Student Aid Must Not Violate the Right to Freedom of Speech\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Conditions on Generally Available K-12 Student Aid Must Not Violate the Rights to Due Process and Equal Protection",
        "reference": "B. Conditions on Generally Available K-12 Student Aid Must Not Violate the Right to Freedom from Compelled Thought",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Awarding Foreign Lost Profits Does Not Impermissibly Extend U.S. Law Extraterritoriality\nA. This Court's framework for analyzing extraterritoriality\nB. Section 271(f) infringement actions are always permissible domestic applications of U.S. law even though foreign conduct is relevant\nC. Including harm from foreign conduct for full compensation under section 284 does not impermissibly extend U.S. law extraterritoriality\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Section 284 patent damages require full compensation for harm proximately caused by the infringing conduct\nB. Section 284 applies uniformly to all types of infringement actions\nC. Providing Full Compensation Under Section 284 For Foreign Harm Proximately Caused by Domestic Patent Infringement Is Essential To The U.S. Patent System\nIII. The Court's Decision Here Should Be Narrowly Tailored With Guidance For Case Law To Develop The Proximate-Cause Standard",
        "reference": "II. Section 284 Of The Patent Statute Provides Uniformly \u2014 For All Infringement Actions \u2014 Full Compensation For Any Harm Proximately Caused By The Domestic Infringing Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. Presumptions about Expected Applications of Title VII in 1964 Cannot Trump the Text of the Statute Congress Enacted\nII. The Employers Confuse the Court's Decisions in Arguing that Title VII Permits Sexual Orientation Discrimination\nA. Sexual Orientation Discrimination is \"But For\" Sex Discrimination\nB. Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Associational Discrimination\nC. \"Equal Application\" is not a Defense to Sex Stereotyping\nIII. The Statutory History Requires Expansive Interpretation of Title VII to Include Sexual Orientation Discrimination\nIV. The Employers' Efforts to Resist the Statutory History are Meritless\nA. The Court's Cases do not Support Drawing a Conclusion From Subsequent Unenacted Legislative History\nB. Congress did not Ratify Lower Court Decisions Regarding Sexual Orientation Discrimination\nC. [MISSING]\nV. The Court Should Ignore the Employers' Parade of Horribles",
        "reference": "C. Later Different Statutes Cannot Control the Meaning of Title VII",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief043.pdf",
        "text": "A. A legal consensus existed from the Constitution's Framing to Reconstruction that a constitutional insurrection occurred when two or more persons by force and violence resisted the execution of any law for a public purpose.\n1. A legal consensus existed from the Constitution's Framing to Reconstruction that a constitutional insurrection did not require an effort to overturn the government.\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The Supreme Court of Colorado relied on the correct historical understanding of insurrection when determining whether the events of January 6 were an insurrection.\nC. A legal consensus existed when Section Three was framed and ratified that persons engaged in insurrections whenever they knowingly incited, assisted, or participated in an insurrection.\n1. The history of the Second Confiscation Act demonstrates that Republicans during the Civil War thought persons who incited insurrections engaged in insurrections.\n2. Even a purely textual analysis demonstrates the absurdity of treating \"incite\" and \"engage\" as having distinctive meanings.\nD. The Supreme Court of Colorado relied on the correct historical understanding of engaging in an insurrection when determining whether Trump engaged in an insurrection on January 6.\nE. The constitutional standards in place for engaging in an insurrection when Section Three was framed did not and will not create slippery slopes.",
        "reference": "2. A legal consensus existed from the Constitution's Framing to Reconstruction on the four elements of an insurrection.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADA violates the First Amendment by compelling artists to speak against their convictions.\nA. The First Amendment protects artists' speech, while still allowing public-accommodation laws to stop status discrimination.\nB. The Accommodation Clause unlawfully alters an artist's speech when she makes a message-based decision.\n1. Smith's websites and her work creating them are pure speech.\n2. The Accommodation Clause affects Smith's speech by compelling her to speak against her conscience.\nC. The Court should reject Colorado's invitation to overturn settled First Amendment law protecting speaker autonomy.\n1. CADA compels speech, not commercial conduct.\n2. CADA compels speech, not speech incidental to conduct.\n3. CADA regulates Smith's speech, not her clients' speech.\nII. The Accommodation Clause compels speech based on content and viewpoint.\nIII. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Colorado lacks a compelling interest in how it applies CADA.\n1. Marketplace access.\n2. Dignitary interests.\nB. The uniqueness of an artist's speech does not lessen First Amendment protection.\nC. Colorado has many, less intrusive alternatives to achieving its asserted goals.",
        "reference": "IV. As applied to artists like Smith, CADA violates the First Amendment and cannot satisfy strict scrutiny.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.35
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Tenth Circuit Failed to Consider Each Distinct Element of Mr. Obduskey's FDCPA Claim and Instead Focused on an Erroneous Construction of the Term \"Debt Collector.\"\nA. Mr. Obduskey's Promissory Note Was a \"Debt\" Under 15 U.S.C. section 1692a(5)\n1. A Mortgage Is an Obligation to Pay Money\n2. A Mortgage Note Is Owed by the Consumer Borrower\n3. Equating \"Debt\" With \"Money\" Under the FDCPA Conflicts with the Plain Language of section 1692a(6), Which Defines a Debt Collector as Someone Who \"Directly or Indirectly\" Collects Debts\nB. The McCarthy Law Firm is a \"Debt Collector\" Under 15 U.S.C. section 1692a(6)\n1. McCarthy Regularly Engages in Direct and Indirect Collection of Debts for Others \u2014 the Beneficiaries of Mortgage Notes\n2. Section 1692a(6)'s First Sentence Subjects a Law Firm that Regularly Collects Mortgage Debts to the FDCPA's Broad Coverage\n3. Section 1692a(6)'s Third Sentence Covers Repossessors of Personal Property Who Are Not Involved in Demands for Payment or Liquidation Sales\n4. The FDCPA's Definition of \"Debt Collector\" Does Not Turn on the Type of Remedy the Entity Exercises\nC. Mr. Obduskey Stated a Valid Claim for Violation of 15 U.S.C. section 1692g\nIII. Compliance with the FDCPA Does Not Impede Compliance with Colorado Foreclosure Law\nA. The FDCPA Debt Validation Process Under 15 U.S.C. section 1692g Furthers Effective Use of the Right to Cure Under Colo. Rev. Stat. section 38-38-104\nB. The Tenth Circuit's Concerns About Conflicts Between the FDCPA and Colorado Foreclosure Law Are Unfounded\nIV. The FDCPA Addresses Pervasive Problems in the Residential Mortgage Industry\nV. At a Minimum, Security Interest Enforcers Are Liable for Violations of Section 1692f(6)",
        "reference": "I. Introduction \u2014 the Role of Nonjudicial Foreclosures and Deficiency Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chapter 2 of the FAA and the New York Convention Authorize Non-Signatories to Enforce International Arbitration Agreements\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Chapter 1's Third-Party Enforcement Principles Apply in the International Context Unless Specifically Barred by Chapter 2\nC. Contrary to the Decision Below, the New York Convention Does Not Bar the Enforcement of an Arbitration Agreement By a Third Party Via Equitable Estoppel\nII. International Commerce Will Suffer if Non-Signatories Cannot Enforce International Arbitration Agreements\nA. International Arbitration Provides Numerous Benefits to Contracting Businesses\nB. If Left Uncorrected, the Decision Below Will Deprive Contracting Parties of the Benefits of International Arbitration and Thereby Harm International Commerce",
        "reference": "A. The National Policy Favoring Arbitration Has Special Force in the Context of International Commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-10_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Prosecutors Routinely Use Section 1028A to Coerce Guilty Pleas\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Section 1028A Should Be Interpreted in Accordance With its Title, Just Like the Armed Career Criminal Act",
        "reference": "II. This Court's Case Law Interpreting and Limiting Section 924(c) Is Instructive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. REPUGNANT VERDICTS UNDER GEORGIA LAW\nA. Burden of Proof for a Defendant's Special Plea of Insanity\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Special Instructions to the Jury: Punishment\nD. \"Both Verdicts Must be Vacated and a New Trial Ordered\"\nE. McElrath's Second Bite at the Apple\nF. McElrath's Third Bite at the Apple\nII. DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT APPLY HERE, WHERE THE JURY NEVER REACHED A VERDICT\nIII. INCONSISTENT VERDICTS ARE ALMOST ALWAYS A WIN FOR THE STATE",
        "reference": "B. Special Instructions to the Jury: Form of the Verdict",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondents Abandon the Principle Underlying the Decisions Below\nB. The Court Should Decline to Consider Respondents' Alternative Theories\nC. Even if the Court Considers and Accepts One of Respondents' Alternative Theories, It Should Remand, not Affirm\nD. Respondents' Alternative Theories Lack Merit in Any Event\n1. Respondents' Alternative Theories Are Unsupported by History and Understanding\n2. Respondents' Alternative Theories Are Unsupported by Treaty Text\n3. Respondents' Alternative Theories Are Unsupported by Precedent\nE. [MISSING]\nF. If the Court Orders Further Proceedings on Respondents' Alternative Theories, It Should Also Order Consideration of the State's Equitable Defenses\nG. The Court Should At Least Remand the Overbroad Injunction",
        "reference": "E. The Treaty-Based Protections the State Recognizes Differ Dramatically from Respondents' Alternative Theories",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Recognizing a First Amendment claim based on legislative censure would be inconsistent with history, tradition, and robust local practice\nIII. Allowing an elected legislator to use the Free Speech Clause to suppress responsive government speech would undercut, not advance, First Amendment values\nA. A legislative censure is core government speech\nB. A speech conflict between an elected body and one of its members is a matter for the voters, not the courts",
        "reference": "I. There is no First Amendment claim for \"retaliatory censure\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Overlooked Senate Diary and the House Debates Show a Broad Majority of the First Congress Rejected Exclusive Presidential Removal\nA. The Foreign Affairs Bill and the Four Camps\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A Head Count of the House Shows a Wide Majority Rejected Exclusive Presidential Removal\nD. Maclay's Diary Records Strategic Ambiguity, Confusion, and Retreat by the Presidentialists\nII. The First Congress's Other Debates and Statutes Demonstrate the Rejection of Exclusive Presidential Removal\nA. The First Congress Voted Against \"At Pleasure\" Removal\nB. Madison Proposed a Comptroller Who Would Serve \"During Good Behaviour,\" and the First Congress Understood That a Term of Years Limited Presidential Removal\nC. The First Congress Enacted Removal by the Judiciary\nIII. What this New 1789 Evidence Tells Us About the Constitution's Text, the Convention, and Ratification\nA. Madison, Hamilton, and the Convention\nB. The Executive Vesting Clause Did Not Mean \"Indefeasible\" or Exclusive Removal",
        "reference": "B. Maclay's Diary Indicates Senate Opposition and House Retreat",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Two-Step Framework for Wetlands Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act\nA. Step 1: Is There a Continuous Surface-Water Connection to a \"Water\" Such That It Is Difficult to Say Where the \"Water\" Ends and the Wetland Begins?\nB. Step 2: Is the Wetland Among \"the waters of the United States\", i.e., subject to Congress's authority over the channels of commerce?\n1. \"[T]he waters of the United States\": a traditional statutory shorthand for those waterbodies subject to Congress's power to regulate the aquatic channels of interstate commerce\n2. Statutes and judicial precedent prior to the Clean Water Act concerning the aquatic channels of interstate commerce and activities affecting those waters\n3. The Clean Water Act's \"the waters of the United States\": traditional navigable waters as well as intrastate navigable waters that serve as links in an interstate channel of commerce\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The Significant Nexus Test Should Be Abandoned\nIII. The Sacketts' Lot Contains None of \"the waters of the United States,\" and thus the Sacketts Are Entitled to a Declaration That EPA Lacks Authority Over Their Homebuilding Project",
        "reference": "C. The Two-Step Framework's Consistency With the Court's Precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A defendant cannot claim immunity to make violent threats under the First Amendment based on his subjective mindset\nA. A \"true threat\" is defined by how a reasonable person would understand a statement's content and context, not the ability to disprove a defendant's unreasonable views of how a statement would be perceived\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The definition of a true threat, like the harms that it causes, is based on how a reasonable person would understand it\n3. Threats have historically been prohibited without requiring proof of a defendant's subjective intent or knowledge\n4. Other forms of unprotected speech are likewise defined in objective terms\nB. Petitioner's arguments for a specific intent or knowledge requirement lack merit\n1. Petitioner misinterprets the historical sources\n2. Petitioner overreads this Court's decisions\n3. Petitioner's chilling concerns are unfounded\nC. If the Court requires a subjective mindset in true threats cases, it should adopt recklessness",
        "reference": "1. A statement that, based on its content and context, is threatening to a reasonable person has minimal expressive value and is inherently harmful irrespective of the speaker's private views",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-776_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE CAN BE RESOLVED NARROWLY WITHOUT DETERMINING THE FULL SCOPE OF THE SAVINGS CLAUSE\nA. For Centuries, This Court Has Treated Due Diligence As A Question Of Law\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court Can Reverse On The Ground That A Claim That The BIA Applied The Wrong Legal Standard Is Necessarily A Question Of Law\nII. THE SAVINGS CLAUSE PROVIDES REVIEW OVER ALL LEGAL CLAIMS\nIII. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
        "reference": "B. Alternatively, The Court Can Resolve This Case Based On The Fifth Circuit's Plainly Erroneous Holding That Diligence Is A Question Of Fact",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ALLOWS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE, WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF THE HOME, AND, AS REASONABLENESS IS THE TOUCHSTONE OF THE COMMUNITY CARETAKING DOCTRINE, THERE IS NO REASON TO EXCLUDE CARETAKING ENTRIES INTO THE HOME\nII. ALLOWING CARETAKING FUNCTIONS IN THE HOME IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTION, PRECEDENT AND THE PRACTICAL NEEDS OF THE COMMUNITY\nA. Community Policing Is Not At Odds With The Fourth Amendment\nB. This Court Has Consistently Recognized The Necessity Of Allowing Police Officers And Other First Responders To Enter The Home To Render Aid\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Officers Need Not Wait Until Serious Injury Or Death Occurs Before Entering A Home To Perform A Bona Fide Caretaking Function\nE. When The Scope Of The Intrusion Into The Home Is, On Balance, Reasonable, No Fourth Amendment Violation Has Occurred\nIII. THERE IS NO NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S WARRANT REQUIREMENT IN ORDER TO ALLOW COMMUNITY CARETAKING FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED IN THE HOME, NOR ARE EITHER THE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES OR THE EMERGENCY AID DOCTRINES A GOOD FIT FOR PURE CARETAKING CASES\nIV. RESPONDENTS WERE PERFORMING A BONA FIDE COMMUNITY CARETAKING FUNCTION, THEIR ACTIONS WERE OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE BASED ON SPECIFIC, ARTICULABLE FACTS AND THE ENTRY INTO THE HOME WAS REASONABLE IN SCOPE\nA. Specific, Articulable Facts Existed To Allow Officers To Send Petitioner To The Hospital, Enter The Home And Seize His Handguns\nB. The Scope Of The Search Was Reasonable And Commensurate With Circumstances Presented\nC. Respondents Chose A Reasonable Response To The Circumstances Presented, Especially Given The Price Of Choosing Wrong",
        "reference": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. Proposition 12 Is Likely to Lead to Differentiation and Segregation of Products in the Pork Supply Chain, Rather than the Uniformity Petitioners Allege.\nA. Differentiated Products Are Common in the Agricultural Industry and Create Opportunities for Smaller Suppliers.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Steps Required for Compliance with Proposition 12 Are Consistent with Those for Other Food Products.\nII. Proposition 12's Restrictions Are Unlike Those in Southern Pacific.",
        "reference": "B. The Dairy Industry and Other Agricultural Industries Routinely Segregate and Trace Differentiated Products.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-340_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The \"and\" in 18 U.S.C. section 3553(f)(1) means \"and.\"\n1. The plain meaning of \"and\" is \"and.\"\n2. Context confirms that \"and\" means \"and.\"\n3. Giving \"and\" its plain meaning is consistent with the First Step Act\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The functionally disjunctive reading lacks merit\n2. The surplusage canon does not help the government\n3. The absurdity doctrine does not apply\n4. Other statutes do not help resolve the question presented\nC. The rule of lenity prohibits reading the \"and\" in section 3553(f)(1) to mean \"or.\"",
        "reference": "B. The arguments for reading \"and\" in section 3553(f)(1) to mean \"or\" fail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle\nII. Insofar As Petitioner Has Not Waived Her Arguments, the Eighth Circuit's Decision Faithfully Applies This Court's Precedent\nIII. The Circuit Split Petitioner Asserts Is Illusory\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Petitioner's Claims Of Importance Fail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. RFRA, Like The Free Exercise Clause, Is Especially Concerned With Protecting Religious Minorities\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress Enacted RFRA To Safeguard Religious Liberty And Adequately Compensate Victims\nII. The Government's Watchlisting System Is Fundamentally Broken\nA. Structural Flaws In The Watchlisting System Ensure That It Is Inaccurate and Overinclusive\nB. Once Individuals Have Been Swept Up Into The System, It Is Almost Impossible For Them To Escape It\nC. Watchlisted Individuals Suffer Profoundly\nIII. The Muslim Community Disproportionately Suffers The Effects Of The Government's National Security Practices\nA. Muslims Are Routinely Targeted By The Government's National Security Practices, Including Watchlisting\nB. Muslims Are Targeted And Stigmatized Because Of Their Religious Affiliation. 19",
        "reference": "A. Religious Liberty Is A Bedrock American Principle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1712_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING\nA. Plaintiffs Cannot Show Injury-In-Fact\nB. Plaintiffs' Claimed Intangible Injuries Are Not Concrete Or Particularized\na. Trust law did not make harmless fiduciary breaches actionable\nb. ERISA grants plan participants no right to plan investment\n2. Defined-benefit plan participants have no interest in plan assets\n3. Plaintiffs cannot invoke the Plan's injury\n4. Plaintiffs face no risk of loss\n5. Plaintiffs' policy argument fails\nC. Plaintiffs Cannot Seek Non-Monetary Relief\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. PLAINTIFFS LACK STATUTORY STANDING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. COURTS MAY PROPERLY USE EVIDENCE FROM WELL-CONSTRUCTED SURVEYS IN ASSESSING GENERICNESS",
        "reference": "I. COURTS FACE A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE IN DISTINGUISHING PROTECTABLE DESCRIPTIVE MARKS FROM GENERIC TERMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the AIA, \"on sale\" requires public availability to bar a patent\nII. The Federal Circuit's decision undermines the balance that Congress achieved through the AIA\nA. Congress expanded the rights of the public by extending the territorial reach of the on-sale bar\nB. Congress balanced the rights of the patentee by restricting the types of sales that would trigger the bar\nIII. The Federal Circuit's decision jeopardizes many patents and is detrimental to innovation across many industries\nA. The Federal Circuit's decision eviscerates the public's reliance on the USPTO's interpretation and the shared understanding of the AIA within the patent bar\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. The Federal Circuit's interpretation would defeat the AIA's goal of harmonizing the U.S. patent system with those in other developed countries",
        "reference": "B. The Federal Circuit's decision if affirmed would have a huge impact across a wide spectrum of industries and is especially detrimental to solo inventors and small companies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-196_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court's precedent establishes that whether the introduction of a non-testifying codefendant's out-of-court confession violates the Sixth Amendment requires a contextual inquiry\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Courts consider the number of defendants, how many participants the confession or evidence identifies, and the complexity of the facts\n2. Courts consider the frequency and type of redactions\n3. Courts consider the strength of the inferences from a confession, and how those inferences relate to other evidence\n4. Courts consider the prosecution's questioning and arguments\nC. Considering trial context in Bruton challenges will not disrupt the jury system\n1. Procedures for resolving Bruton issues are well-established\n2. Considering context gives effect to the Sixth Amendment without unduly constraining prosecutors' ability to pursue joint trials",
        "reference": "B. The lower courts' experience shows that analyzing Bruton issues in light of a trial's context is an administrable rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Establishment Clause Does Not Require Petitioners to Take Down the Peace Cross\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Existing Establishment Clause Tests Best Protect Religious Freedom in a Pluralistic Society",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Prohibition Against Slavery is a Specific, Universal, and Obligatory International Law Norm That Applies to Corporations\nA. The Slavery Prohibition is Among the Oldest Specific, Universal, and Obligatory Norms\nB. The Slavery Prohibition Applies to Corporations\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Forced Labor Prohibition is a Specific, Universal, and Obligatory Norm\nB. The Forced Labor Prohibition Applies to Corporations\nIII. The Prohibition Against Human Trafficking is a Specific, Universal, and Obligatory International Law Norm That Applies to Corporations\nA. The Human Trafficking Prohibition is a Specific, Universal, and Obligatory Norm\nB. The Human Trafficking Prohibition Applies to Corporations",
        "reference": "II. The Prohibition Against Forced Labor is a Specific, Universal, and Obligatory International Law Norm That Applies to Corporations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court can afford complete relief without reaching the issue of severability\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The serious constitutional concerns that the modern severability doctrine raises should be avoided",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-515_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The ordinary contract principles relied upon below to find, for the third time, that these benefits are vested are consistent with this Court's decision in Tackett\nB. The array of decisions in the Sixth Circuit following Tackett are the natural result of the application of Tackett to complex and varied facts, not a failure to correctly apply Tackett\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. There Is No Evident Conflict Among the Circuits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is No Important Question to Consider: This Court Has for Decades Reaffirmed Williamson County's Prudential State Litigation Requirement, has Denied Certiorari in Response to the Same Williamson County Arguments, and this Case Would be Particularly Inappropriate for Any Reconsideration of Williamson County. A. Petitioner is not making a \"facial\" challenge; rather, her claim is \"unavoidably\" a claim for compensation\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Court has rejected other recent petitions making the same arguments against Williamson County\nII. There is no Conflict Among the Lower Courts Regarding the Application of Williamson County Ripeness Requirements to Claims for Compensation\nIII. There is no Conflict Between the Third Circuit's Decision and this Court's Decision in Williamson County",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's criticisms of Williamson County misstate the reach of that case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "A. The CWA's main purpose is to protect water quality, but previous cases, rulemakings, and guidance on the test for determining CWA jurisdiction have created confusion and resulted in regulatory overreach, especially with respect to ephemeral drainages in the arid West.\n1. The Rapanos decision and the Rapanos Guidance\n2. Application of the Rapanos decision and Rapanos Guidance in arid West resulted in confusion and overbroad jurisdictional determinations.\n3. [MISSING]\nB. The Court should adopt a test for determining WOTUS that can apply to ephemeral drainages found in the arid West to resolve regulatory confusion and overreach, while positioning the CWA to play its proper role in ensuring water quality.",
        "reference": "3. Post-Rapanos rulemaking whiplash did not solve the confusion over whether arid West ephemeral drainages were jurisdictional.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES AN INSANITY DEFENSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Eighth Amendment prohibits criminally punishing the insane\n1. Criminally punishing the insane would have been cruel and unusual at the Founding\n2. Criminally punishing the insane is grossly disproportionate and serves no legitimate purpose\nC. Either of these constitutional bases prohibits the abolition of the affirmative insanity defense\nII. KANSAS'S OUTLIER SCHEME VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION BY ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE\nA. Kansas has abolished the insanity defense\nB. Kansas's scheme is unconstitutional because it ignores an insane defendant's lack of moral culpability",
        "reference": "A. The Due Process Clause requires some mechanism to excuse a non-culpable, mentally ill defendant",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1184_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The administrative record contains \"substantial evidence\" supporting the ALJ's factual finding that suitable jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy\nA. The substantial-evidence test measures only the sufficiency of the evidence actually contained in the agency record\nB. The sufficiency of the evidence in the administrative record, as measured by the substantial-evidence test, is distinct from procedural questions concerning the creation of that record\nC. Petitioner misreads Richardson v. Perales and identifies no decision of this Court supporting his view of the substantial-evidence test\n1. Petitioner's reliance on Perales is misplaced\n2. [MISSING]\nD. The vocational expert's hearing testimony in this case constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's factfinding\nII. The administrative proceedings in this case were fair and did not violate any procedural requirements imposed by law\nA. Vocational experts' expertise and impartiality make their testimony presumptively reliable\nB. Claimants can effectively probe the testimony of vocational experts through cross-examination\nC. Claimants can submit rebuttal evidence, including from a vocational expert\nD. Petitioner's proposed rule would be impractical and unduly burdensome",
        "reference": "2. No other decision of this Court supports petitioner's understanding of substantial-evidence review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-493_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "II. The Fifth Circuit Departed from Supreme Court Precedent When It Failed to Interpret Statutory Text Involving an Issue of Indian Sovereignty\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. That This Case Over Tribal Sovereignty Could Never Present a Circuit Split Favors Review\nB. Congress Already Intervened to Define the Pueblo's and State's Regulatory Roles Over Indian Gaming in the Restoration Act\nC. There is No Pending Legislation Concerning the Restoration Act\nD. The Issue Presented Is One of Law, Not Fact",
        "reference": "III. This Case Presents a Significant Issue Concerning Tribal Sovereignty and Self-Sufficiency That Is Ripe for Review and Will Evade Correction Absent This Court's Intervention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not silently displace the state-secrets privilege\n1. Section 1806(f) does not speak to the continuing viability of the state-secrets privilege\n2. Any ambiguity in Section 1806(f) must be resolved in favor of retaining the constitutionally based state-secrets privilege",
        "reference": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Apply Strict Scrutiny To Content-Based Limitations Regardless Of The Medium Used To Communicate Protected Speech\nA. Medium-Specific Standards Of Review Have Significant Potential To Undermine First Amendment Freedoms\nB. Reed Requires Applying Strict Scrutiny To Content-Based Distinctions, Regardless Of Medium Employed\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Technological Distinctions Are Better Drawn In Evaluating Narrow Tailoring",
        "reference": "C. Applying Medium-Specific Standards To Content-Based Limitations Would Undermine Free Speech And Prove Unworkable In Practice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Proclamation Violates The First Amendment\nA. The First Amendment forbids the government to disfavor and denigrate one faith\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The Proclamation is the government's latest in a series of unconstitutional attempts to ban Muslims\n2. The governmental review process does not cure the constitutional violation\nII. The Public Interest Favors Enjoining The Proclamation",
        "reference": "B. The Proclamation unconstitutionally disfavors and denigrates Muslims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-725_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner has committed an offense referred to in 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2) that renders him inadmissible and that therefore triggers the stop-time rule\nA. Under a straightforward application of the statutory text, petitioner has committed an offense referred to in Section 1182(a)(2) that renders him inadmissible\nB. An alien need not be seeking admission for an offense referred to in Section 1182(a)(2) to render him inadmissible\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Petitioner's preferred interpretation lacks merit\n2. Petitioner's fallback interpretation lacks merit",
        "reference": "C. Neither of petitioner's alternative interpretations has merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The statutory text precludes damages actions against federal employees in their personal capacities\n2. Congress did not intend to dramatically expand existing remedial options\n3. RFRA lacks the requisite clear indication that damages are available against federal officials\n4. This Court has rejected the availability of damages under identical statutory language\nB. Respondents' atextual counterarguments lack merit\n1. Franklin does not require the Court to presume the availability of damages in this case\n2. Respondents' policy arguments do not overcome RFRA's text and context",
        "reference": "A. Personal-capacity damages awards are not \"appropriate relief against a government\" under RFRA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Appellants Have Identified First Amendment Harms Caused By Maryland's 2011 Congressional Redistricting\nII. Maryland's 2011 Redistricting Violates The First Amendment Under The Gill v. Whitford Test\nA. The Three-Factor Test Proposed In Whitford Captures Extreme Gerrymanders\nB. The Additional Factors Identified By The Brennan Center In Whitford Help Detect Extreme Gerrymanders\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Maryland's Extreme Partisan Gerrymander Burdened Republicans' First Amendment Rights On A Statewide Basis",
        "reference": "C. The Whitford Test And Other Relevant Indicia Show That Maryland's 2011 Redistricting Is An Extreme Partisan Gerrymander",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. APJ S ARE INFERIOR OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. APJs Are Directed And Supervised By The USPTO Director\nC. The Federal Circuit Erred In Holding That APJs Are Principal Officers\n1. The Federal Circuit Rewrote Edmond\n2. APJs Would Be Inferior Officers Even If Removability And Reviewability Were Paramount\n3. The Decision Below Calls Into Question Other Executive Branch Adjudicators\nD. The Co-Equal Branches Have Always Treated APJs And Their Predecessors As Inferior Officers\nII. THE COURT NEED NOT REACH THE SEVERANCE AND REMEDIAL ISSUES",
        "reference": "A. Inferior Officers Are Directed And Supervised At Some Level By Another Officer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-483_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court should review the Seventh Circuit's distortion of the rational-basis test and resolve the split in authority over fetal-remains statutes\nA. The Seventh Circuit misapplied the rational-basis test\nB. States have a legitimate interest in fetal remains\nC. The rational-basis test applies because Planned Parenthood lacks third-party standing to enforce Roe-Casey rights\nIII. This Court should reject the Seventh Circuit's allowing this litigation to proceed facially under Roe-Casey rights without any evidence that Indiana infringed Roe-Casey rights",
        "reference": "I. This Court should reject the principle that abortion cases operate under different rules than any other litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Petition Suffers From Fatal Vehicle Problems\nA. The Petition does not challenge the lower courts' holding that terminating MPP on June 1 violated the APA\nB. The Government fails to challenge multiple independent grounds for the Fifth Circuit's holdings\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Section 1225 Mandates Detention, and DHS Must Use Available Tools, Including MPP, to Fulfill That Mandate\nIII. The Case Does Not Warrant Expedited Review",
        "reference": "C. The Government's Second Question Presented Is Meritless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1449_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. GARMON DOES NOT IMPLIEDLY PREEMPT STATE TORT CLAIMS FOR INTENTIONAL PROPERTY DESTRUCTION\nA. The NLRA Does Not Arguably Protect Intentional Property Destruction\nB. Intentional Property Destruction Falls Within the Local Interest Exception\nC. The Decision Below Misapplied Both Prongs of Garmon\n1. The Lower Court Misapplied the \"Arguably Protected\" Test\n2. [MISSING]\nII. GARMON SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO COVER INTENTIONAL PROPERTY DESTRUCTION\nA. Ordinary Preemption Principles Counsel Against Extending Garmon to Intentional Property Destruction\nB. Constitutional Avoidance Counsels Against Preemption",
        "reference": "2. The Lower Court Misapplied the \"Local Interest\" Exception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. An automatic stay protects contract rights and prevents or deters litigation burdens, costs, and harms\nIII. An automatic stay conserves judicial economy and promotes consistency",
        "reference": "I. Strong, well-established federal policy liberally favors arbitration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. AFFIRMING THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING WOULD HAVE DISRUPTIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ON-PREMISES SIGN INDUSTRY AND ITS CUSTOMERS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Eliminating Reasonable On-Premises/Off-Premises Distinctions Will Chill Protected Speech And Cause Severe Economic Harm To On-Premises Sign Owners And Their Customers\nII. REGULATORS DO NOT CONSIDER THE CONTENT OF SIGNS WHEN ENFORCING OFF-PREMISES PERMIT REQUIREMENTS\nIII. THE REGULATIONS ARE NARROWLY TAILORED\nA. The Regulations Are Not Under-inclusive\nB. On-Premises/Off-Premises Distinctions Are The Most Effective And Workable Content-Neutral Means Of Regulating Signs",
        "reference": "A. Regulatory Certainty Is Good For Business And Should Be Preserved",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari is not appropriate because this case is not justiciable\nA. The Company has not shown a credible threat of enforcement\nB. The Company has not established key factual assertions necessary to establish ripeness\nII. The Company overstates the conflicts in the courts\nIII. This is not the appropriate case to reconsider Smith\nA. Colorado has a religious exception to its public accommodations laws that may prevent review of the Smith question\nB. The Act meets the Fulton standard\nC. Colorado has enhanced free exercise protections since Masterpiece\nD. [MISSING]\nIV. Colorado's antidiscrimination law satisfies constitutional requirements\nA. The antidiscrimination law is a straightforward regulation of commercial conduct\nB. A customer's message about their wedding is not attributed to the Company\nC. The Act prohibits only speech that proposes illegal commercial activity\nD. Even if strict scrutiny applies, the Act meets that standard here",
        "reference": "D. The Company does not address the stare decisis factors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Elections Clause's text and historical context make clear that it does not authorize state legislatures to ignore state constitutional constraints\nB. Longstanding practice confirms that the Elections Clause does not authorize state legislatures to ignore state constitutional constraints\nC. For more than a century, this Court has recognized that the Elections Clause does not authorize state legislatures to ignore state constitutional constraints\nD. Petitioners' contrary arguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' distinction between procedural and substantive state constitutional constraints has no support in text, history, or precedent\n2. Petitioners' distinction between specific and general state constitutional provisions is unsupported and unworkable\n3. Petitioners' focus on state courts' remedial authority is misplaced\n4. Petitioners' theories would severely disrupt the sound administration of our Nation's elections\nII. At a minimum, nothing in the Elections Clause prohibited the North Carolina General Assembly from authorizing judicial review of its congressional districting maps",
        "reference": "I. State legislation regulating federal elections is subject to judicial review by state courts for compliance with the state constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. ILLINOIS BRICK'S PROHIBITION OF INDIRECT PURCHASER DAMAGE ACTIONS DOES NOT EXTEND TO RESPONDENTS' PURCHASES FROM APPLE\nII. APPLE'S USE OF AN \"AGENCY MODEL\" SHOULD NOT INSULATE IT FROM MONOPOLIZATION CLAIMS BY ITS CUSTOMERS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Apple's Distribution Services Argument Lacks Merit\nC. Apple's Single-Plaintiff Argument Lacks Merit\nD. Apple's Agency Argument Lacks Merit\nIII. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING HANOVER SHOE AND ILLINOIS BRICK MILITATE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS' STANDING\nA. Denying Standing to Consumer Victims of Distribution Monopolies Would Undermine Effective Private Enforcement\nB. Apple Is Not Exposed to Duplicative Recoveries\nC. Respondents' Proof of Damages Would Not Be Unmanageable\nIV. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVISIT ILLINOIS BRICK AND HANOVER SHOE",
        "reference": "A. Monopolization of Distribution Has the Same Economic Effect Regardless of Whether the Monopolist Uses an Agency or Wholesale Model",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "THE [MISSING]\nA. Veterans face massive hurdles in navigating the disability-benefits system\nB. The Federal Circuit's decision exacerbates these difficulties. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THE PRO-VETERAN CANON. THIS COURT'S REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO CORRECT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ERROR AND ENSURE THAT VETERANS RECEIVE THE BENEFITS TO WHICH THEIR SERVICE HAS ENTITLED THEM",
        "reference": "THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE CUE STANDARD PLACES INTOLERABLE BURDENS ON VETERANS SEEKING DISABILITY BENEFITS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-443_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Pretrial publicity must be assessed differently when the elements of the offense are not in genuine dispute\nA. The meaning of \"prejudicial\"\nB. Application to the case\nII. There was no \"manifest error\" in this case under this Court's precedents to date\nA. Standard of review\nB. This Court's precedents\n1. Extent of voir dire\n2. Pretrial publicity\n3. Mu'Min and Skilling\nC. Application to the present case\nIII. Rules under the supervisory power should be made rarely, if ever, and none is called for in this case\nA. This Court's supervisory power\nB. The Court of Appeals' supervisory power\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Exclusion of evidence under the criterion of section 3593(c) is constitutional.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus\nB. Off-campus student speech that threatens the school community or intentionally targets certain individuals, groups, or discrete school functions may qualify as school speech potentially subject to discipline by school officials\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This Court should vacate the judgment below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Assignor estoppel is in direct conflict with the foundational principles and purpose of the patent system, which should only enforce valid patents, and the doctrine must therefore be sharply limited\nII. Assignor estoppel directly conflicts with innovation at large and has especially damaging effects to startups\na. Assignor estoppel enables the use of invalid patents to block disruptive technologies and nascent companies\nb. Assignor estoppel restricts healthy employee mobility without justification\nc. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "c. The expansion of assignor estoppel infects other productive business activity in the startup ecosystem",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 3 DISQUALIFICATION DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY PREVIOUS CRIMINAL CONVICTION, MUCH LESS A CONVICTION EXCLUSIVELY PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. section 2383\nA. A Determination as to Whether an Individual Has Engaged in Insurrection Under Section 3 Does Not Require a Prior Criminal Conviction\nB. If No Criminal Conviction is Required, then a Conviction Under 18 U.S.C. section 2383 Cannot Possibly be Required\nII. THE COLORADO COURTS DID NOT VIOLATE MR. TRUMP'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Colorado Courts Used the Appropriate Standard of Proof\nC. Mr. Trump was Not Deprived of Due Process by the Evidence Presented to the District Court",
        "reference": "A. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to Section 3 Disqualification",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "The general waiver of immunity from suit in the TVA Act's sue-and-be-sued clause does not extend to claims based on TVA's performance of discretionary functions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The TVA Act's sue-and-be-sued clause, read in light of separation-of-powers principles, does not waive sovereign immunity from suits based on the performance of discretionary functions\n1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles\n2. Courts have uniformly held, based on separation-of-powers principles, that the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the SIAA does not extend to actions based on discretionary functions\n3. Tort suits against TVA for damages arising from the agency's performance of discretionary functions would raise significant separation-of-powers concerns\nC. TVA's immunity from suit based on performance of discretionary functions is necessary to avoid interference with important governmental functions\nD. Petitioners' arguments for reading the TVA's sue-and-be-sued clause to abrogate immunity for discretionary functions are without merit",
        "reference": "A. Sue-and-be-sued clauses embody limitations on the waiver of sovereign immunity applicable in appropriate circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Because S.B. 8 Is Unlike Any Other Law, This Is The Rare Case In Which Clerks Are Proper Defendants\nA. Exercising jurisdiction over state-court clerks who effectuate the State's scheme is not only proper but imperative\nB. S.B. 8's unique features make it distinct from private torts and other laws\nC. Failing to exercise jurisdiction in the unique circumstances here would invite States to eviscerate constitutional rights they disfavor\nII. Respondents Are Properly Sued Under Young\nA. Young permits equitable relief against court clerks' commencement of a suit to enforce an unconstitutional law\nB. State judges may be sued under Young\nC. Petitioners' suit against the attorney general and other state-agency officials is also proper under Young\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Petitioners Have Article III Standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. This case is an exceedingly poor vehicle for further review.\nA. The case does not present the questions that the petition poses.\nB. To grant Kennedy relief, the Court would have to overturn decades of law under multiple First Amendment clauses.\nII. The rulings here do not conflict with decisions of this Court or any other.\nA. The decision does not conflict with this Court's precedents.\n1. Government Speech\n2. [MISSING]\nB. There is no circuit split.\n1. Government Speech\n2. Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "2. Establishment Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Challenges to Plaintiffs' Standing Have Been Rejected at Every Stage of This Litigation and Are Not Certworthy\nII. This Court Should Grant Certiorari on the Merits Questions Addressed by the En Banc Fifth Circuit\nA. Adopting the United States' and Tribes' narrow questions presented will create vehicle problems\nB. The en banc Fifth Circuit's opinion establishes erroneous precedent on key constitutional issues\n1. The Fifth Circuit erroneously found that Congress could rely on a \"bundle\" of powers to pass ICWA\n2. The Fifth Circuit misapplied the equal-protection doctrine\n3. The Fifth Circuit erred in allowing Congress to use state courts to commandeer state agencies and officials\n4. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "4. The Fifth Circuit improperly allowed Indian tribes to set the content of federal law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-43_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. TITLE III EVOLVED AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PUBLIC CLAMOR FOR EFFECTIVE LIMITS ON ELECTRONIC INTERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS\nII. AS GROWING PUBLIC DEMAND FOR PROTECTION FROM WIRETAPPING FUELED LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE-BRANCH RESPONSES, THIS COURT ALSO SHAPED ITS DOCTRINE TO PROTECT INDIVIDUALS FROM IMPROPER INTERCEPTION OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Title III Was the Product of Years of Increasingly Impassioned Opposition to Wiretapping in the House and Senate\nB. Congress Designed a Comprehensive Scheme for Regulating Wiretapping at Federal and State Levels, Assigning a Geographically Limited Gatekeeping Role to Judges",
        "reference": "III. CONGRESS ENACTED TITLE III TO LIMIT WIRETAPPING, RELYING ON JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT TO SHARPLY CURTAIL INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1363_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The statutory text and structure confirm the BIA's interpretation that mandatory detention depends on the alien's criminal history, not when he was arrested\nII. This Court's precedents confirm that the BIA's interpretation is correct\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The canon of constitutional avoidance does not provide a basis for creating a new gap-in-custody exception\nV. The BIA's decision warrants Chevron deference",
        "reference": "III. Respondents' position would contravene the basic purpose of Section 1226(c)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN ITS CURRENT POSTURE, THIS IS NOT A STRICT-LIABILITY PRODUCTS CASE BUT A MARITIME NEGLIGENCE CASE\nII. THIS COURT ESTABLISHED A SINGLE STANDARD OF LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE UNDER THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW ALMOST SIXTY YEARS AGO\nA. Kermarec Established the Standard of \"Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances of Each Case,\" Thus Making Defendants Liable for the Consequences of Their Own Negligence\nB. The Kermarec Court Expressly Rejected Arguments for Special-Purpose Bright-Line Rules That Would Impose Different Duties in Different Contexts\nC. This Court Has Applied the Kermarec Standard of \"Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances of Each Case\" Broadly to Negligence Claims Under the General Maritime Law\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court Has Already Adopted a Foreseeability Test in Product-Defect Cases Under Maritime Law\nB. This Court's Adoption of Many Open-Ended Tests Demonstrates That Maritime Law's Traditional Need for Uniformity Does Not Require Bright-Line Rules of the Kind Proposed by Petitioners\nIV. THE RADICAL RULE ADVOCATED BY PETITIONERS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW AND WITH THIS COURT'S PRIOR DECISIONS",
        "reference": "III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION BELOW IS CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S MARITIME DECISIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1414_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THE POWER OF TRIBAL POLICE TO DETAIN PERSONS, INVESTIGATE CRIMES, AND EXTRADITE AND/OR BANISH NON-INDIANS FROM THEIR TERRITORY\nA. In the Eighteenth Century, Federal Officials Recognized Tribal Authority to Detain and Expel Non-Indian Criminals\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE UNITED STATES NEGOTIATED TREATIES WITH THE CROW AND OTHER TRIBES THAT ACKNOWLEDGED TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND DETAIN \"BAD MEN\" WHO, UPON PROPER PROOF, WOULD BE PROSECUTED BY THE UNITED STATES",
        "reference": "B. In the Nineteenth Century, Many Southeastern Tribes Created Lighthorse Guards to Detain, Expel, and Extradite Non-Indian Criminals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. CONGRESS HAS NOT CLEARLY STATED THAT TITLE VII'S EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT IS JURISDICTIONAL",
        "reference": "I. THIS COURT HAS ADOPTED A CLEAR STATEMENT RULE TO DETERMINE WHETHER STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ARE JURISDICTIONAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. The demographics of Montana mean that the only religious schools eligible to benefit from the State's tax-credit program are Christian\nA. Operation of the Montana program\nB. The religious schools that receive funds from the Montana program incorporate Christian religious doctrine in their curricula\n1. All private religious schools in Montana are Christian\n2. The Montana Christian schools that participate in the tax-credit program incorporate religious doctrine in their curricula\n3. Material taught in Montana's Christian schools may be inconsistent with the beliefs of Judaism and other non-Christian religions\nII. If used to benefit sectarian schools, the Montana tax-credit program violates the First Amendment\nA. The tax-credit program imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit\nB. As applied by petitioners and the United States, the program discriminates on the basis of taxpayers' religious status, violating the Free Exercise Clause\nC. As applied by petitioners and the United States, the program violates the Establishment Clause\n1. The program has a discriminatory purpose\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The program can be expected to produce \"continuing political strife.\"",
        "reference": "2. The program has a discriminatory effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "A. A defendant in a securities class action may rebut the Basic presumption of classwide reliance by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements\nB. The plaintiffs in a securities class action retain the ultimate burden of persuasion when invoking the Basic presumption\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 2 Prohibits Any Voting Practice that Results in a Denial of the Right to Vote on Account of Race\nA. Section 2's Results Test Follows the Plain Text\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Properly Read, Section 2 Raises No Constitutional Issues\nII. No Petitioner Has Standing to Appeal the Decision on the OOP Policy, Which the Court Below Correctly Held Violates Section 2\nA. Petitioners Lack Standing to Appeal the Decision Below on the OOP Policy\nB. The OOP Policy Violates Section 2\nIII. The Court Below Correctly Held that Arizona's Statute Criminalizing Non-Fraudulent Ballot Collection Violates Section 2 and the Fifteenth Amendment\nA. H.B. 2023 Violates Section 2's Results Test\nB. H.B. 2023 Violates Section 2's Intent Test and the Fifteenth Amendment",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners Depart from Section 2's Text by Inventing Restrictions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. When Congress banned the registration of immoral trademarks, there were many other areas of law in which judges and other officials restricted speech they considered immoral\n1. Copyright\n2. The Comstock laws\n3. Film censorship\nB. The Lanham Act's \"immoral .. or scandalous\" clause is the last remnant of federal law authorizing the restriction of immoral but non-obscene speech\nC. The only interest advanced by the ban on registering immoral trademarks is the now-impermissible Victorian aim of insulating the public from offensive speech",
        "reference": "The ban on registering immoral trademarks is the last vestige of a Victorian legal culture in which government officials routinely restricted speech to promote morality",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Hellerstedt's balancing test is inconsistent with Casey's articulation and application of the undue burden standard\nB. The balancing test has proven to be unworkable, relying on a highly speculative pre-enforcement assessment of a regulation's impact that enables lower courts to reach conclusions that conflict with Casey's holdings\nII. By introducing a weighing of potential benefits and burdens, Hellerstedt impermissibly limits the States' authority to regulate the medical profession under Casey and Whalen",
        "reference": "I. Hellerstedt's formulation of the undue burden test contradicts Casey and further entrenches this Court as the nation's ex officio medical board with the exclusive ability to determine whether an abortion regulation is constitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22o142_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Florida Has Abandoned Any Challenge to Metro Atlanta's Water Use\nII. Metro Atlanta's Water Use Is Reasonable\nA. Metro Atlanta's Water Use Creates Enormous Benefits\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Remedy Florida Seeks Would Provide No Benefit",
        "reference": "B. Metro Atlanta's Water Use Is Highly Efficient",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Presents a Live Case or Controversy That Satisfies the Requirements of Article III\nA. The Memorandum Threatens Concrete and Imminent Harm to Government Appellees' Representation and Federal Funding\nB. The Memorandum's Harms to the Census Count Provided the District Court with Jurisdiction and Fall Within the Evading-Review Exception to Mootness\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Constitution's Inclusion of All \"Persons in Each State\" in the Apportionment Base Encompasses Undocumented Immigrants Who Reside in a State\nB. The Census Act Independently Prohibits Appellants from Excluding Usual Residents from the Apportionment Base Due Solely to Their Immigration Status\nC. Appellants' Arguments in Support of the Memorandum Are Meritless\nIII. The Memorandum Violates the Constitutional and Statutory Requirements to Base Apportionment Solely on the Census's Enumeration",
        "reference": "II. Appellants' Reliance on Immigration Status Alone to Subtract Residents from the Apportionment Base Violates Both the Constitution and the Census Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. FHFA's Novel Structure Renders It Unaccountable And Encourages Inequitable Action\nII. The Government Has Taken Steps To Block Public Accountability For The Net Worth Sweep\nA. In Defending The Ultra Vires Appropriation Of Private Property Under The Net Worth Sweep, FHFA Has Tried To Block Accountability In Court\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The Fifth Circuit Was Wrong To Deny The Petitioners A Meaningful Remedy For The Unprecedented Confiscation Of Their Wealth",
        "reference": "B. Nationalizing Fannie Mae And Freddie Mac While Keeping Them Off The Federal Balance Sheet Further Dilutes Accountability To The Public",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Data shows that Harvard engages in racial balancing throughout its admissions process\nB. Other elite colleges and universities appear to engage in racial balancing\nC. Even without the data, practices by the admissions department show that Harvard is \"obsessed with race\"\nII. The Grutter decision wrongly conflates diversity of color with diversity of thought as campuses become increasingly tribalistic and closed to different viewpoints",
        "reference": "I. Grutter is grievously wrong because it allows colleges to unconstitutionally consider applicants' race in the admissions process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondent Concedes the Existence of a Broad Split\nII. Respondent and Business Amici Agree that the Split Involves an Issue of Great Importance\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Respondent's Sole Argument for Denial \u2014 That the Broad, Longstanding Split May Dissolve \u2014 is Fundamentally Flawed\nV. The Decision Below is Incorrect",
        "reference": "III. Respondent Agrees that this Case is a Better Vehicle to Address the Issue than Cooper Tire",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-776_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The government would eviscerate meaningful judicial review.\nB. The Saving Clause provides judicial review over the application of law to settled historical fact.\n1. The statutory text accommodates application of law to fact.\n2. Effectuating the Saving Clause's manifest purpose requires our construction.\n3. The whole code confirms our reading.\n4. The government's additional contentions lack merit.\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The Saving Clause does not require the rough approximation of Lakeridge.\n2. The Court has conclusively held that reasonable diligence is a question of law.\nD. Petitioners challenge the governing legal standard.",
        "reference": "C. The Court should not require fact-law determinations for the dozens of different questions that arise under Section 1252(a)(2)(D).",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should review and resolve what test will guide lower courts' analyses of abortion regulations\nA. The Court's June Medical decision holds that the governing test for reviewing abortion regulations is Casey's \"undue burden\" standard\nB. The circuits have divided over June Medical's meaning and the test that decision instructs lower courts to follow\nII. The Court should also grant certiorari to resolve the contradictions in its own decisions over use of \"viability\" as a bright line for measuring abortion regulations\nA. An inflexible viability standard conflicts with this Court's recognition that States have legitimate interests throughout pregnancy\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Casey's \"undue burden\" standard should apply to all abortion regulations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Courts May Rely On Evidence Such As Expert Testimony To Address Whether Statements Were So Generalized That They Did Not Affect The Market Price\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Courts Should Rely On Evidence, Not Personal Intuition, About How The Statements' Generality Affected The Market Price\nC. This Court Should Affirm The Second Circuit's Judgment\nII. Defendants Bear The Burden Of Persuasion On Price Impact\nA. Basic And Halliburton II Assigned Defendants The Burden Of Persuasion\nB. Federal Rule Of Evidence 301 Does Not Preclude This Court From Assigning Defendants The Burden Of Persuasion On Price Impact",
        "reference": "A. Goldman Fails To Account For How Price Impact Is Actually Litigated In Securities Fraud Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-935_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT LOOKS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DETERMINING THE SHARED EXPECTATIONS OF TREATY PARTIES\nII. THE CHILD ABDUCTION CONVENTION EMPLOYED THE HABITUAL RESIDENCE CONCEPT TO PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY AND DISCRETION\nIII. UNDER WELL-ESTABLISHED INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE FLEXIBLE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION PERMITS A FINDING OF NO HABITUAL RESIDENCE\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. THE COURT SHOULD CONDUCT A PLENARY REVIEW OF THE FACTUAL RECORD AND HOLD RESPONDENT DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN HERE",
        "reference": "IV. THESE DECISIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE NOTION THAT THE HABITUAL RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT ESTABLISHES A THRESHOLD EVIDENTIARY SHOWING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Allowing private contracts to dictate Fourth Amendment rights is a recipe for chaos\nA. A contract-based approach to Fourth Amendment rights cannot be readily administered by the police\nB. A contract-based approach to Fourth Amendment rights will inordinately prejudice the rights of minorities\nC. A contract-based approach to Fourth Amendment rights opens a Pandora's box of digital privacy problems\nII. Private contracts should not be used to delineate Fourth Amendment rights\nA. Private parties use contracts to order their rights as against each other \u2014 not as against the government\nB. Consent to a private contract may be found based on conditions that fall well short of those needed to waive Fourth Amendment rights\nC. Adhesion contracts are particularly ill-suited to delineating Fourth Amendment rights\nIII. A path forward\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Any contract-based analysis of Fourth Amendment rights should steer clear of non-parties to a contract",
        "reference": "A. Public laws, not private contracts, should control analysis of Fourth Amendment rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Introduction\nII. Student Loan Borrowers are contractually bound to repay their loans\u2014in full\u2014by the terms of their Master Promissory Notes and the Code of Federal Regulations\nIII. The Department's Loan Forgiveness Program violates the Appropriations Clause and the Property Clause by spending money and disposing of property belonging to the United States Treasury without congressional approval\nA. Congress did not appropriate any funds for the Loan Forgiveness Program\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. The Secretary's invocation of the HEROES Act without an express directive from the President in accordance with the National Emergencies Act exceeds the Secretary's statutory authority\nV. The term national emergency in the HEROES Act must be read in light of the surrounding language of the Act and the Act's legislative purpose. Because the HEROES Act relates to military operations and military personnel, COVID-19 is not a national emergency under the HEROES Act",
        "reference": "B. Only Congress can dispose of the student loan accounts receivable owned by the Treasury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The original public meaning of Title VII does not cover employment decisions based on sexual orientation\nA. The original public meaning of Title VII forbids employers from treating members of one sex better than the other sex with the motive of disfavoring certain employees because of their sex\nB. Title VII does not cover employment decisions based on sexual orientation\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Zarda's theories for reading sexual orientation into Title VII are unpersuasive\nA. Title VII's text prohibiting sex discrimination does not cover employment decisions based on sexual orientation\n1. Title VII does not include as a protected classification everything that is a function of sex\n2. Sex-plus comparator analysis undermines Zarda's attempt to rewrite Title VII\n3. Title VII's mixed-motive provision does not help Zarda\nB. Price Waterhouse's discussion of sex stereotyping did not write sexual orientation into Title VII\nC. The associational-discrimination theory provides no support for reading sexual orientation into Title VII\nIII. Zarda's interpretation of Title VII produces significant ambiguities, indefensible outcomes, and troubling results",
        "reference": "C. Other tools of statutory construction confirm that Title VII does not cover employment decisions based on sexual orientation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "Respondent's convictions under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i) are constitutionally valid\nA. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases\nB. The text, context, and history of Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) illustrate that it is a conventional prohibition on soliciting or facilitating illegality\n1. The terms \"encourage\" and \"induce\" in criminal law refer to facilitation and solicitation\n2. Context and history confirm that Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) targets facilitation and solicitation\n3. [MISSING]\nC. Respondent's crime of conviction has a plainly legitimate sweep and is not substantially overbroad\n1. The plainly legitimate sweep of the statute encompasses significant real-world criminal activity\n2. The court of appeals' parade of hypotheticals does not justify facially invalidating the statute\n3. As-applied challenges, not facial overbreadth claims, are the appropriate way to address any constitutional concerns with the prohibition\nD. The court of appeals erred in reaching out to facially invalidate Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)",
        "reference": "3. The canon of constitutional avoidance would come into play if the statute could be read to create doubts about its constitutional validity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT HAS THE LEGITIMATE POWER TO GRANT CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT\nII. BEYOND THE TEXT OF RULE 11, THE COURT HAS NOT ARTICULATED THE STANDARDS BY WHICH IT DECIDES TO GRANT CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT AND THERE IS A DEARTH OF SCHOLARSHIP ON THIS ISSUE\nIII. IN REVIEWING THE IMPORTANT CASES DECIDED BY THIS COURT BEFORE JUDGMENT IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, IT CAN BE DEDUCED THAT THE COURT WILL CONSIDER GRANTING CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT WHEN THERE IS A NEED TO AVOID ACTION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OR WHEN THERE IS A NEED FOR A FINAL AUTHORITATIVE DECISION ON THE MERITS NOT SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW OR BOTH\nA. The Court will consider granting certiorari before judgment when there is a need to avoid action in the court of appeals\nB. The Court will consider granting certiorari before judgment when there is a need for a final authoritative decision on the merits not subject to further review\nIV. THE COURT HAS NOT STATED ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO GRANTING CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT AND AFTER A DECISION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS\nV. THE COURT SHOULD MAKE THE IMPLICIT STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT EXPRESS WITH REASONS AND ANALYSIS IN THESE CASES\nVI. THE PROPOSED STANDARD APPLIES TO THIS CASE\nVII. [MISSING]\nVIII. AMICUS TAKES NO POSITION ON THE OTHER CASES WHEN THIS COURT GRANTS CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, SUCH AS CASES INVOLVING THE SAME OR SIMILAR ISSUES TO CASES IN WHICH IT ALREADY HAS BEEN GRANTED OR WHEN A CASE COMES BEFORE THE COURT ON CERTIORARI AFTER IT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN BEFORE THE COURT\nIX. AMICUS TAKES NO POSITION ON ANY OTHER ISSUE IN THIS CASE, SUCH AS THE MERITS OR THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES.",
        "reference": "VII. ARTICULATING THIS OR ANY OTHER STANDARD WILL NOT PREVENT THE COURT FROM ADJUSTING THE STANDARD, INCLUDE ADDITIONAL FACTORS, OR PROVIDING EXCEPTIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.45
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1043_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Exists A Robust International System To Protect United States Holders of Trademark Rights Abroad\nII. European Union And German Law Implement The International System And Provide Relief For United States Rightsholders For Infringement That Occurs in Germany\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Extraterritorial Application Of The Lanham Act Risks Disrupting The International Trademark Regime, And Violating The United States' Obligations Under International Law",
        "reference": "III. The International Trademark System Works, And It Has Worked Specifically In This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-776_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Fifth Circuit's approach on the due diligence standard for equitable tolling conflicts with that of the Ninth Circuit.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This case is an appropriate vehicle to resolve the question presented.",
        "reference": "B. The Fifth Circuit's overly rigid per se approach is difficult to reconcile with general equitable principles.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE ARKANSAS LAW AT ISSUE SEEKS TO MITIGATE THE PUBLIC HEALTH HARMS OF PBM PRACTICES\nIII. THE ARKANSAS LAW IS A TRADITIONAL EXERCISE OF STATE POWER TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND PREVENT THE SPREAD OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES AND IS NOT PREEMPTED BY ERISA",
        "reference": "I. THE DISTORTED MARKET POWER AND ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES OF PBMS RESULT IN PRACTICES THAT HARM PUBLIC HEALTH",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Mr. Kluge requested and received a reasonable Title VII accommodation that the school district erased based on complaints of ideological offense.\nB. Mr. Kluge sues and the district court grants summary judgment to the school district, citing Hardison.\nC. The district, the United States, and other amici use Hardison as a bludgeon against Mr. Kluge on appeal.\nD. Hardison's demolition of Title VII's religious-accommodation mandate harms Muslim, Sikhs, Jews, and Rastafarians, not just Christians like Mr. Kluge.\nII. Hardison's test for reasonable religious accommodations is divorced from, and opposed to, Title VII's language, with devastating results for Mr. Kluge and other people of faith.\nIII. This Court should overrule Hardison \u2014 stare decisis is no impediment.",
        "reference": "I. Hardison arose in the Sabbatarian context but its corrosive effects on Title VII and religious liberty extend far beyond, as Mr. Kluge's experience makes clear.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-10_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner violated 18 U.S.C. 1028 A(a)(1) when he applied Patient L's limited Medicaid reimbursement rights to a fictitious three-hour exam by a psychologist\nA. Section 1028 A's text encompasses petitioner's conduct\n1. Petitioner used Patient L's means of identification \"in relation to\" healthcare fraud\n2. Petitioner used Patient L's means of identification \"without lawful authority\"\n3. Petitioner's reading adds elements that the statute's text does not contain\nB. Application of Section 1028 A to petitioner's conduct is consistent with the statutory and section titles\nC. Application of Section 1028 A to petitioner's conduct furthers the statutory design\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Petitioner fails to identify any rule of statutory construction that supports his view of the statute",
        "reference": "D. Petitioner's assertion of statutory overbreadth is unfounded",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Not all content-based speech regulations are subject to strict scrutiny\nA. This Court has rejected strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions in the related context of commercial speech\n1. The Court has applied intermediate scrutiny to content-based commercial speech restrictions\n2. Content-based commercial disclosure requirements are subject to relaxed scrutiny\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Strict scrutiny for every content-based regulation would have significant adverse consequences\nII. Strict scrutiny should not apply to disclosure requirements for providers of professional services",
        "reference": "B. Reed and Sorrell do not mandate strict scrutiny for all content-based speech regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Excessive Fines Clause applies to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Austin v. United States was correctly decided and should not be overruled\nII. The Excessive Fines Clause applies to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause",
        "reference": "A. The Clause applies to the States in the same way it applies to the federal government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. ESTOPPEL IS AN INDISPENSABLE COMPONENT OF THE AIA'S STRUCTURE\nA. AIA Administrative Reviews Were Intended To Serve The Twin Goals Of Efficiency And Finality\nB. Government Initiation Of AIA Proceedings Without Estoppel Undermines Both Of These Goals\nC. No Sound Reason Exists Why Congress Would Have Given The Government An Estoppel Exemption\nD. The Estoppel Exemption Created By The Federal Circuit Would Exacerbate Existing Imbalances In AIA Reviews\nII. PERMITTING ONE FEDERAL AGENCY TO CHALLENGE DETERMINATIONS BY ANOTHER AGENCY IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE FORUM WOULD BE ANOMALOUS\nA. One Agency's Participation In The Adjudicative Processes Of Another Is Disfavored\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The United States Has Criticized Similar Systems In Other Countries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. ANCs are defined as \"Indian Tribes\" for purposes of ISDA and the CARES Act\n1. Congress expressly and deliberately included ANCs in the ISDA definition\n2. The ISDA definition has long been understood to mean that ANCs are eligible to be treated as Indian tribes under ISDA\n3. Congress incorporated the settled meaning of the ISDA definition into the CARES Act and therefore made ANCs eligible to be treated as Indian tribes\n4. Reading the ISDA definition to exclude ANCs would contradict the text of other federal statutes\nB. The court of appeals erred in reading ANCs out of the ISDA definition and the CARES Act\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. If the recognition clause applies to ANCs, then Congress deemed ANCs to satisfy it by including them in the ISDA definition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Below Erroneously Reversed The District Court's Denial Of Respondent's Rule 50 Motion\nA. The Court Below Impermissibly Weighed Evidence For Itself In Reviewing the Jury's Verdict\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court of Appeals Relied On Its Prior Legal Error Concerning Copyrightability of Application Program Interfaces When It Overturned the Jury Verdict\nII. The Law of This Case, That Application Interfaces Are Copyrightable, Should Not Survive Reversal\nA. More Than Twenty-Five Years Of Innovation In Computer Software Was Endangered Under the Law of This Case\nIII. This Court Should Therefore Reaffirm Strongly the Federal Circuit's Responsibility to Follow the Decisional Law of the Regional Courts of Appeals When Exercising Ancillary Jurisdiction",
        "reference": "B. The Court Below Failed To Draw Inferences in Petitioner's Favor From the Evidence Concerning the Licensing of Java under the GPL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS THE GOVERNMENT EXPLAINS, SECTION 14(e) DOES NOT CREATE ANY PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AT ALL\nA. Respondents' Waiver Argument Fails\nB. Respondents Do Not Come Close To Meeting The Sandoval Test\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Respondents' efforts to conjure up another basis for inferring a private remedy should be rejected\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN EXPANDING ITS PREVIOUSLY INFERRED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 14(e) TO NEGLIGENCE\nA. Once Again, Respondents Ask This Court To Disregard The Restraint Demanded In Implying And Expanding Private Rights\nB. Respondents Identify No Affirmative Evidence That Congress Intended A Private Cause Of Action For Negligence\n1. The text of Section 14(e) does not specify a negligence standard\n2. Other provisions refute the notion that Congress intended a private right of action for negligence\n3. Respondents' resort to statutory purpose and policy is unavailing",
        "reference": "1. Respondents essentially concede that they cannot meet the Sandoval test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. STRONG GOVERNMENT INTERESTS JUSTIFY AGENCY FEES\nA. Whether To Permit Agency Fees Constitutes A State Policy Choice\nB. The Exclusive Representation Designation Requires Agency Fees\nC. States Have A Legitimate Interest In Avoiding The Free-Rider Problem\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Banning Agency Fees Would Create Significant Contradiction in First Amendment Jurisprudence\nB. Abood Is \"workable\" As New York City's Public-Sector Unions Provide Services (Funded By Agency Fees) That Are Undeniably Non-Political And Non-Ideological",
        "reference": "II. THERE IS A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN BARGAINING WITH GOVERNMENT ON EMPLOYMENT MATTERS AND LOBBYING GOVERNMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. The Practical Burdens of Compliance Formed the Foundations of Bellas Hess and Quill\nB. The Streamlined States Have Eliminated Any Undue Burdens On Sellers\n1. State and Local Taxes Are Administered at the State Level\n2. Tax Rates Are Standardized at the State Level\n3. Exemptions Are Standardized at the State Level\n4. State and Local Tax Bases Are Standardized\n5. Administrative Requirements Are Standardized Across All Member States\na. Uniform Definitions\nb. Simplified Electronic Returns\nc. Centralized Registration\nd. Other Uniform Procedures\n6. Certified Service Providers Are Made Available to Remote Sellers at No Charge\nC. Stare Decisis Provides An Insufficient Basis to Uphold Obsolete Precedent",
        "reference": "The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement Has Eliminated Any Undue Burden on Interstate Commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court should take the opportunity to clarify the standard of review applicable to review of Second Amendment claims.\nA. This Court should apply strict scrutiny.\nB. If intermediate scrutiny is to be applied, that application must be rigorous.\n1. Good cause regimes like that of New York operate as total bans on the public bearing of arms and cannot stand constitutional scrutiny.\n2. The results in the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits reflect an improperly relaxed application of intermediate scrutiny.",
        "reference": "I. The right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment is an individual right grounded in the inherent right of self-defense.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. KANSAS HAS ABOLISHED THE INSANITY DEFENSE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW IS WRONG\nIV. THIS ISSUE IS IMPORTANT AND RECURRING\nV. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE",
        "reference": "II. THE SPLIT IS CLEAR AND ENTRENCHED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The CFPB's structure and funding exceed the Humphrey's Executor standard and violate the separation of powers\nA. The CFPB's structure improperly concentrates power in a single director with broad regulatory power but limited accountability to the Executive Branch and the people\nB. Congress further enhanced the CFPB's independence by allowing it to draw funding from one of the least transparent and accountable elements of the federal government: the Federal Reserve System",
        "reference": "I. Independent agencies that engage in legislative, executive, and judicial functions like the CFPB violate the separation of powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Title 8 U.S.C. section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) should be read as a ban on solicitation\nII. [MISSING]\nA. To be solicitation governed by Williams, rather than abstract advocacy governed by the Brandenburg incitement test, speech must be highly specific\nB. Solicitation may be criminally punished only if it consists of solicitation of crime\nC. Solicitation of crime may be punished even if it purposefully solicits conduct that would happen months in the future\nD. Solicitation may be punished even when the solicited crime is nonviolent",
        "reference": "II. Defining solicitation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "A. Because the Takings Clause and the Excessive Fines Clause are mutually exclusive, the Court should first address which of the two Clauses is implicated by Minnesota's law\n1. [MISSING]\n2. As a first step, the Court should address which Clause is implicated by Minnesota's law\nB. Traditional civil penalties offer an instructive contrast with equity forfeitures like Tyler's\nC. The lower courts' understanding of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments was flawed\n1. The Takings Clause cannot be circumvented by abrogating traditional property rights\n2. The Excessive Fines Clause cannot be circumvented by styling noncompensatory penalties \"remedial.\"",
        "reference": "1. The Takings Clause and the Excessive Fines Clause are mutually exclusive",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. Legislative Delegations Were Uncontroversial at the Founding\nII. Constitutional Text and Structure Permit Broad Delegations of Rulemaking Authority\nIII. The First Congresses Routinely Delegated Major Policy Questions to the Executive Branch\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Delegations of Authority by Later Congresses\nIV. Attempts to Reconcile Early Statutes with Modern Proposals for Strict Delegation Limits Hinge on Distinctions that the Founders Rejected\nA. Private Rights\nB. Military and Foreign Affairs\nC. \"Important Subjects\"\nV. The Post-Ratification Efforts of a Small Minority of Politicians to Create a Non-Delegation Doctrine Were Unsuccessful",
        "reference": "A. Delegations of Authority by the First Congress",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Puerto Ricans Are Entitled To The Constitutional Protection Of The Appointments Clause\nII. The Appointments Clause Applies Only To \"Officers Of The United States,\" i.e., To Offices Established Within The Federal Government, Whose Officers Exercise Or Administer Federal Powers\nA. By Its Text, The Appointments Clause Applies Only To Officers Of The United States And Not To Officers Of The Territories\nB. The Constitution's Structure Confirms That The Appointments Clause Applies Only To Officers Within The Federal Government And Not To Territorial Officers\nC. Historical Practice Confirms That The Appointments Clause Applies Only To Offices Within The Federal Government And Not To Territorial Officers\ni. Puerto Rico\nii. Northwest Territory\niii. Other Early Territories\nD. Prior Executive and Judicial Decisions Hold That The Appointments Clause Applies Only To Offices Within The Federal Government\nE. The First Circuit's Contrary Holding Would Work An Unprecedented Expansion Of The Appointments Clause To Cover A Vast Range Of Non-Federal Offices Established Pursuant To Federal Law\nIII. Because The Oversight Board Is A Territorial Authority Whose Members Are Territorial Officers, Not Officers Of The United States, The Appointments Clause Does Not Govern Their Appointment\nA. Oversight Board Members Do Not Exercise Significant Federal Powers\nB. The Oversight Board Is An Independent Agency Within The Government Of Puerto Rico And Is Not Subject To Federal Control\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Oversight Board's Authority Relates Entirely To Puerto Rico And Does Not Extend Beyond Local Matters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.93
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. As used by nineteenth century constitutions, the adjective \"sectarian\" designated only disfavored religions\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Nineteenth century American and Montana newspapers confirm that \"sectarian\" designated only those religions the mainstream viewed pejoratively \u2014including, but not limited to, Roman Catholicism\nIV. Later dictionary and newspaper usages show the 1972 Montana Constitution also used the word \"sectarian\" in a pejorative manner\nV. The drafters and ratifiers of the 1972 constitution consciously retained the 1889 meaning of \"sectarian\"\nVI. The Montana Constitution's \"No Sectarian Aid Clause\" violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution",
        "reference": "II. As shown by nineteenth century dictionaries, \"sectarian\" was a pejorative term for religions viewed negatively",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1268_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE AVAILABLE UNDER SECTION 1605A(C)'S FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION TO PUNISH PRE-ENACTMENT ACTS OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM\nA. The Landgraf Presumption Does Not Apply To The FSIA\nB. Even Under Landgraf, Section 1605A(c) Applies Retroactively As Provided In The 2008 Amendments\nII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE AVAILABLE UNDER STATE LAW TO PUNISH PRE-2008 ACTS OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. SUDAN'S \"THRESHOLD\" ARGUMENTS ARE NOT BEFORE THE COURT AND LACK MERIT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. When Congress Enacted The FAA, \"Employment\" Was A Broad And General Term That Did Not Connote A Master-Servant Relationship\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Word \"Employee\" Gradually Influenced\u2014and Limited\u2014the Meaning Of The Term \"Employment,\" But Only Well After The FAA Was Enacted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 5.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS HAS NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZED DISGORGEMENT PENALTIES\nII. THE COMMISSION'S APPROACH TO DISGORGEMENT IS UNPREDICTABLE, INEFFICIENT, AND UNFAIR\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Disgorgement Itself Is a Shape-Shifting Punishment",
        "reference": "A. Unauthorized Disgorgement Is a Microcosm of SEC Civil Penalties Generally",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-938_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THERE IS NOT A MATERIAL CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT SUPPORTS A GRANT OF CERTIORARI.\nIII. EVEN IF THERE IS A MATERIAL CIRCUIT SPLIT, THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DID NOT APPLY THE PER SE RULE THAT PETITIONER ARGUES IS THE BASIS FOR A CIRCUIT SPLIT.\nIV. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE RELIEF IS FUTILE BASED ON PETITIONER'S STAY RELIEF REQUEST.\nV. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT WOULD LEAD TO UNFAIR RESULTS AND ALLOW STAY RELIEF MOVANTS TWO BITES AT THE APPLE.\nVI. PETITIONER'S POLICY ARGUMENT IS NOT PERSUASIVE AND GRANTING CERTIORARI WILL NOT IMPACT THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.\nVII. OBJECTION TO PETITION BASED ON SUPREME COURT RULE 15.",
        "reference": "I. THE BULLARD DECISION CONTAINS A PROPERLY STATED RULE OF LAW AND SHOULD NOT BE REVISITED PURSUANT TO RULE 10.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-442_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Reed's section 1983 claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation, after the Court of Criminal Appeals authoritatively construed Article 64.\nA. The federal courts have jurisdiction over Reed's section 1983 claim.\n1. Reed's due process claim challenges a state law, not a state-court judgment.\n2. Ex parte Young authorizes Reed's claim for prospective equitable relief.\n3. Reed has Article III standing.\nB. Reed's section 1983 claim accrued at the end of state-court litigation.\n1. The accrual analysis for section 1983 claims starts with the specific constitutional right and the context for invoking it.\n2. General accrual rules and common sense show that Reed's claim accrued only after the CCA's construction of Article 64 became final.\n3. Osborne, Skinner, and the nature of Reed's claim show that accrual occurred at the end of state-court litigation.\n4. Reed's accrual rule promotes due process purposes and values.\n5. [MISSING]\nC. Reed's accrual rule promotes core accrual principles.\n1. Accrual may also turn on federalism, comity, judicial economy, fairness, and practical reality.\n2. Those core principles show that Reed's claim did not accrue before the end of state-court litigation.\nII. The decision below is wrong, and Goertz's counterarguments lack merit.\nA. Goertz's jurisdictional complaints fail.\n1. Rooker-Feldman does not bar Reed's section 1983 claim.\n2. Goertz doesn't have Eleventh Amendment immunity.\n3. Goertz's standing arguments fail.\nB. Reed's claim did not accrue before the state-court litigation ended.\nC. The decision below contravenes core principles of federalism, comity, judicial economy, and fairness.",
        "reference": "5. Analogous claims show that Reed's claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.24
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fourteenth Amendment bans second-class citizenship.\nII. The Fourteenth Amendment requires creedal and viewpoint equality.\nIII. Excluding traditionalists from wedding professions resembles the anti-Catholic Test Acts.\nIV. Unique talents do not justify restrictions on civil rights.\nA. The Tenth Circuit properly focused on tangible access to the market.\nB. Reconstruction Republicans embraced English distinctions between the ius privatum and ius publicum.\nC. Singer's account of public accommodations neglects the long history of scarcity-based justifications.\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. A professional's unique talents, without more, do not move her from the ius privatum to the ius publicum.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. DAMAGES ARE NEEDED TO REMEDY EXTREME MISCONDUCT Many Muslim Americans have experienced violations of their religious rights similar to those inflicted on Respondents. RFRA damages can compensate victims and deter extreme violations.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Federal officials rarely contribute to resolving claims for monetary damages against them.\nB. These empirical findings confirm that there is nothing \"inappropriate\" about individual monetary liability under RFRA.",
        "reference": "II. THE COMMON PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENT INDEMNIFICATION UNDERCUTS THE GOVERNMENT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING DISRUPTION AND OVER-DETERRENCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals erred in holding that ERISA preempts Arkansas's regulation of the rates at which pharmacy benefit managers reimburse pharmacies\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Arkansas statute does not have an impermissible \"connection with\" ERISA plans\nB. The court of appeals' decision conflicts with the decisions of other courts of appeals on an important question of federal law\nC. This case is a suitable vehicle for this Court's review",
        "reference": "1. The Arkansas statute does not make \"reference to\" ERISA plans",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Religious Freedom Was Fundamental to the Americans Who Won the Revolution and Ratified the Constitution\nII. The Free Exercise Clause Was Originally Understood as an Unqualified Right Against the Federal Government\nA. Securing religious freedom from the federal government was a condition of ratifying the Constitution\nB. Its Text and Drafting History Demonstrate That the Free Exercise Clause Grants an Unqualified Right to Exercise Religion\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. An Unqualified Right to Exercise Religion Is the Constitutional Baseline to Guide the Choice of a Standard to Replace Smith\nA. As originally understood, the Fourteenth Amendment protects the same right to free exercise as in the First Amendment\nB. The Free Exercise Clause carries the same force in claims against local, state, or federal government\nC. An unqualified right to the free exercise of religion \u2014not judicial balancing \u2014is the constitutional baseline",
        "reference": "C. An original understanding of the free exercise of religion as an unqualified right takes account of historical evidence not considered by rival interpretations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Rules and Relevant Statutes Do Not Prohibit Cy Pres Settlements\nA. The Text, Structure, and History of Rule 23 Do Not Support Petitioners' Prohibition on Cy Pres Settlements\n1. Petitioners' Categorical Ban Defies Rule 23(e)'s Clear Text\n2. Petitioners' Categorical Ban Ignores Rule 23(e)'s Structure and History\nB. Federal Courts Have Identified the Limited Contexts Where Cy Pres Settlements Might Satisfy Rule 23(e)\nC. Rule 23(b)(3)'s \"Superiority\" Requirement Does Not Preclude Cy Pres Resolution\nD. Petitioners' and Their Amici's Remaining Arguments Fail\n1. Petitioners' First Amendment Argument Is Waived and Meritless\n2. Cy Pres Raises Neither Redressability Nor Rules Enabling Act Concerns\nII. Petitioners' Proposed Attorney's Fees Rules Are Misplaced and Unfounded\nA. Petitioners' Attorney's Fees Proposals Are Not Properly Before the Court\nB. Petitioners' Fee Rules Defy Text and History\nIII. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Fail\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' Accusations Are Unfounded\nIV. This Settlement Complies with Rule 23\nA. The Settlement Provides Valuable Prospective Relief To Prevent Violations\nB. The District Court Properly Found the Cash Component Adequate and Non-Distributable\nC. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Approving Recipients\nV. The Government's Jurisdictional Argument Counsels Dismissing the Petition as Improvidently Granted",
        "reference": "A. Existing Standards Address Petitioners' Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-315_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 3731(b)(2) applies to relators regardless of the government's subsequent decision to intervene or to decline\nA. The Bedrock Rule that This Court Does Not Interpret Unambiguous Statutory Language Begins and Ends the Inquiry into section 3731(b)\n1. The Absurd Results Exception Does Not Apply\n2. Permitting Relators to Invoke section 3731(b)(2) According to Its Plain Terms Is Not \"Impossible\" to Square with Congressional Intent\nB. Even if section 3731(b)(2) Were Ambiguous, that Ambiguity Is Resolved in the Relator's Favor by the FCA's Statutory Structure, Statute of Limitations Defaults, and the FCA's Purpose\n1. Reading section 3731(b)(2) to Cover All Qui Tam Actions Advances the FCA's Coherent Structure and Procedural Plan\na. Consistent with the FCA's Procedural Scheme, section 3731(b) Equates the Government and Relators\nb. Nothing in section 3731(b) Supports Distinguishing Between Intervened and Non-Intervened Actions\nc. [MISSING]\n2. Against the Backdrop of Default Statute of Limitations Rules, (b)(2) Must Be Read to Encompass Non-Intervened Actions\n3. The Relator's Critical Role in Recouping Government Funds from Fraudsters Requires Equal Access to the Act's Limitations Periods\na. Relators and the Government Are Synergistic Partners in the Fight Against Fraud\nb. As Partial Assignees of the Government's FCA Damages Claim, Relators \"Stand in the Government's Shoes\" for Suit-Bringing Purposes, Including the Applicable Statute of Limitations\nc. Because the FCA's 1986 Amendments Promoted Relator-Driven Suits, the Discovery-Based Limitations Rule Added by Those Amendments Must Be Read Accordingly\nC. Petitioners' Policy Arguments Ignore the Realities of FCA Litigation and Undercut the Language and Purpose of the Act\nII. RELATORS ARE NOT AND DO NOT AT ANY POINT BECOME \"OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES\" UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE ACT",
        "reference": "c. Petitioners' Strained Reading of Subsection (b)(2) Reads the Relation-Back Provision out of the FCA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.81
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Review Is Timely To Stem The Real-World Effects Of The Decision Below\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decision Below Is Wrong",
        "reference": "II. The D.C. Circuit's \"No Limits\" Interpretation Is Worthy Of Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-357_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. A CREDITOR DOES NOT VIOLATE THE AUTOMATIC STAY BY RETAINING POSSESSION OF PROPERTY LAWFULLY OBTAINED BEFORE BANKRUPTCY\nA. Debtors' Construction Of section 362(a)(3) Renders section 542(a) A Nullity\nB. Debtors' Construction Of section 362(a)(3) Contravenes The Automatic Stay's Plain Language And Aim Of Preserving The Status Quo\nC. Congress Did Not Intend The 1984 Clarifying Amendment To section 362(a)(3) To Upend Existing Bankruptcy Practice\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Section 542(a) Permits Creditors To Raise Defenses To Turnover, Including Lack Of Adequate Protection\nB. The City Had Good-Faith Defenses To A Turnover Action",
        "reference": "II. SECTION 542(a) PERMITS CREDITORS TO RAISE DEFENSES TO TURNOVER, AND THE CITY HAD GOOD-FAITH DEFENSES HERE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT DOES NOT PENALIZE ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE UNDERSTANDINGS OF AMBIGUOUS LEGAL OBLIGATIONS\nA. The FCA's Text Establishes that An Objectively Reasonable Interpretation of Ambiguous Legal Obligations Cannot Be \"Knowingly\" False\n1. Safeco's Reasoning Tracks the FCA's Scienter Provision\n2. The Statutory Term to Which \"Knowingly\" Attaches \u2014\"the Information\" \u2014Confirms The Need for an Objectively Falsifiable Threshold\n3. Subjective Belief About the Accuracy of an Ambiguous Legal Position Cannot Make an Objectively Reasonable View \"Knowingly\" False\n4. Relators and the Government Fail to Distinguish Safeco\nB. The Common Law Would Not Treat A Party Acting Consistent with an Objectively Reasonable View of the Law As Having Knowingly Violated Law\n1. The Common Law Would Not Support Fraud Liability Here\n2. The Common-Law Authorities Cited by Relators and the Government Are Not to the Contrary\nC. Relators' and the Government's Remaining Contrary Arguments Are Meritless\nII. THE BURDEN OF RESOLVING REGULATORY AMBIGUITY AND PROVIDING FAIR NOTICE RESTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT\nA. The Government Must Provide Regulated Parties Fair Notice of the Scope of Ambiguous Laws\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Relators' Interpretation Would Upend Settled FCA Safeguards\nIII. THE COURT OF APPEALS' JUDGMENTS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED",
        "reference": "B. The Safeco Standard Ensures That Regulated Entities Have the Requisite Fair Notice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.13
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. Gaos's difficulty in prevailing on the merits does not defeat standing\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Google's arguments for limiting the legislative power fail",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Physical-Presence Rule Requires This Court's Correction\nA. As this case shows, the physical-presence rule is squarely inconsistent with Complete Auto's \"substantial nexus\" test\nB. The physical-presence rule is an outlier\nC. The application of the physical-presence rule has become both arbitrary and unclear, causing unintended and harmful effects\nII. The Concerns That Animated Quill's Decision To Retain Bellas Hess's Rule Are No Longer Present\nA. South Dakota's statute serves Quill's own goals better than the physical-presence rule\nB. Eliminating the physical-presence rule does not require this Court to hold that Bellas Hess and Quill were wrong when decided\nC. The burden of sales-tax collection is now marginal\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. Stare Decisis Does Not Justify Retaining The Physical-Presence Rule",
        "reference": "D. Abrogating the physical-presence rule in this case raises no special problems of retroactive taxation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's \"Traceability Theory\" Unconstitutionally Rewrites the Act\nA. The Act's Plain Language Does Not Authorize Regulation of Releases via Groundwater\nB. The Ninth Circuit's \"Traceability Theory\" Represents a Significant Departure from Established Precedent\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Holding Misapplies Case Law to Support the \"Traceability Theory\"\nD. The Ninth Circuit's \"Traceability Theory\" Contravenes Legislative History and Usurps Congressional Authority\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The \"Traceability Theory\" Presents Profound Practical Problems",
        "reference": "II. Congress Intended for State Programs and Other Federal Programs to Address Groundwater Protection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-846_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW FLOUTS FEDERAL LAW\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS CASE IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE",
        "reference": "II. STATE HIGH COURTS ARE DIVIDED ON THE QUESTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-546_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. Respondent fails to rehabilitate the court of appeals' rationale\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The district court's judgment triggered the judgment bar regardless of how the judgment is characterized\nB. The court of appeals' decision cannot be affirmed on alternative grounds\n1. The judgment bar precludes individual claims brought in the same lawsuit with FTCA claims\n2. The judgment bar precludes individual claims based on the same facts but different legal theories",
        "reference": "1. The district court's judgment rejected respondent's FTCA action on the merits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTION GUARDS AGAINST EXECUTIVE INTRUSIONS INTO LEGISLATIVE POWER\nA. \"Fill Up the Details\"\nB. The Non-Delegation Doctrine and the Intelligible Principle Exception\nII. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION'S LOAN CANCELLATION PROGRAM IS UNPRECEDENTED AND NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE HEROES ACT\nA. The Secretary Has No Authority to Cancel Student Debt under the HEROES Act\n1. There is no qualifying national emergency\n2. The Secretary has no authority to \"waive\" entire loans for entire classes of borrowers\nB. The Unprecedented Nature of the Program Demonstrates that It Is Not Statutorily Authorized\nC. If the Waiver Program Is Found to Be Statutorily Authorized, the HEROES Act Is an Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO USURP LEGISLATIVE POWER REQUIRE GUIDANCE FROM THIS COURT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTION SHARPLY LIMITS JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO CREATE OR EXTEND PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN EXTENDING ITS PREVIOUSLY INFERRED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 14(e) TO NEGLIGENCE\nA. The Text Of Section 14(e) Does Not Support, Much Less Compel, Inference Of A Private Negligence Remedy\n1. Section 14(e) lacks any affirmative evidence of a negligence standard\n2. Instead, the text indicates that Congress intended to require scienter\n3. The Court's interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 strongly supports this reading\nB. The Structure And Surrounding Provisions Confirm That Congress Did Not Intend A Private Negligence Remedy\n1. Where Congress authorized private suits based on negligence, it provided additional procedural protections absent from Section 14(e)\n2. Allowing private recoveries under Section 14(e) based on negligence would circumvent the express cause of action in Section 18 of the 1934 Act\nC. Aaron v. SEC Does Not Compel Extending Any Inferred Cause Of Action Under Section 14(e) To Negligence\nD. Practical Considerations Counsel Strongly Against Extending Any Inferred Cause Of Action Under Section 14(e)\nIII. EVEN MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, THE NINTH CIRCUIT NEVER SHOULD HAVE INFERRED ANY RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 14(e) TO BEGIN WITH\nA. If Section 14(e) Really Did Proscribe Negligent Conduct, Then It Plainly Could Not Be Privately Enforceable\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Section 14(e) lacks \"rights-creating\" language\n2. Section 14(e) reflects no congressional intent to create a private remedy\nC. There Is No Basis To Recognize, Or Acquiesce In, An Inferred Private Right Based On The History Of Section 14(e)",
        "reference": "B. This Court's Recent Precedent Clearly Forecloses Inference Of A Private Right Of Action Under Section 14(e)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1363_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"When The Alien Is Released\" Clause Of 8 U.S.C. section 1226(c)(1) Is Not Surplusage\nII. Respondents' Interpretation Of \"When The Alien Is Released\" Is Not Supported By The Purpose Or Legislative History Of IIRAIRA\nA. IIRAIRA: Tightening Control, Closing Loopholes, and Preventing Windfalls\nB. The Legislative History of section 1226(c) and Congress's Concern That Criminal Aliens Be Detained\nC. The Transition Period Custody Rules Rulemaking Process Supports a Finding that the \"When The Alien Is Released\" Clause Has Been Properly Interpreted by the Board Of Immigration Appeals\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. DHS Often Lacks The Ability To Accomplish Immediate Detention Of An Alien Under section 1226(c) Because State And Local Cooperation Is Withheld",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Properly Defined, Hot Pursuit Justifies Warrantless Home Entry On The Basis Of A Suspect's Flight\nA. The Hot Pursuit Doctrine Requires No More Than An Arrest That Is Set In Motion In Public And A Suspect's Attempted, Expedient Escape To A Private Dwelling, Which Results In No Time To Secure A Warrant\nB. The Fact Pattern Common To All Hot Pursuit Cases Justifies Warrantless Home Entry For All Crimes, Whether Misdemeanors Or Felonies\nC. Treating Misdemeanor Offenses Differently Under The Hot Pursuit Doctrine Would Present An Unworkable Standard For Police Officers\nII. Drunk Driving Is Especially Pernicious And Officers Should Be Empowered To Detain Fleeing Drunk Drivers Regardless Whether The Crime Is A Misdemeanor\nA. Allowing The Hot Pursuit Of Drunk Drivers Empowers States To Better Combat Drunk Driving\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Applying The Hot Pursuit Doctrine To All Drunk-Driving Offenses Squares With Mitchell",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Decision Below Is Wrong\nB. This Case Presents The Best Vehicle To Resolve The Circuit Split\nC. Recent Developments Do Not Moot This Case\nII. THE REMOVAL ISSUE IS NOT PROPERLY PRESENTED",
        "reference": "I. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO DECIDE WHETHER SEC ALJs ARE OFFICERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S STATE-SECRETS PRECEDENT SUPPORTS DISMISSAL\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Dismissal Is Consistent With Reynolds\nII. FISA SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO THREATEN THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL-CAPACITY DEFENDANTS",
        "reference": "A. Totten's Animating Principle Is Not Limited To Government-Contract Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1435_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. MINNESOTA'S RESTRICTION IS LIMITED TO APPAREL AN OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE OBSERVER WOULD RECOGNIZE AS POLITICAL\nA. Section 211B.11(1)'s Meaning is Plain\nB. Section 211B.11(1) Has Been Applied Consistently With This Construction\nII. SECTION 211B.11(1) REGULATES SPEECH IN A NONPUBLIC FORUM, AND IT IS THEREFORE CONSTITUTIONAL IF IT IS REASONABLE AND VIEWPOINT-NEUTRAL\nA. Forum Analysis Governs the Constitutionality of Section 211B.11(1)\n1. Burson establishes that speech regulations of polling places should be analyzed under forum doctrine\n2. Section 211B.11(1) regulates speech in a nonpublic forum and is therefore constitutional if reasonable and viewpoint-neutral\n3. Petitioners' contention that Section 211B.11(1) should be subject to strict scrutiny is irreconcilable with this Court's precedent\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. MINNESOTA'S POLITICAL APPAREL RESTRICTION IS REASONABLE AND VIEWPOINT-NEUTRAL\nA. Section 211B.11(1) Reasonably Advances the State's Interests in Safeguarding the Polling Place\nB. Section 211B.11(1) Does Not Discriminate On The Basis Of Viewpoint\nIV. MINNESOTA'S POLITICAL APPAREL RESTRICTION IS NOT FACIALLY OVERBROAD\nV. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT SHOULD CERTIFY A QUESTION TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' Overbreadth Argument Provides No Independent Basis For Relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1348_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. NO WAIVER OCCURS WHEN A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IS FORCED TO SACRIFICE ONE IMPORTANT RIGHT TO SECURE ANOTHER\nA. This Court Has Long Refused to Find Waiver Where a Defendant Is Put to a Hobson's Choice\nB. Jeffers Indicates That Sacrificing Double Jeopardy Rights to Avoid a Prejudicial Trial Is an Unfair Hobson's Choice\nII. A DEFENDANT DOES NOT WAIVE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS BY CHOOSING SEVERANCE TO AVOID AN UNFAIR TRIAL\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Allowing Prosecutors to Re-litigate Issues They Lost Is Antithetical to the Double Jeopardy Clause",
        "reference": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Major Questions Doctrine Is Inapposite in the Circumstances of These Cases\nA. Application of the Doctrine Here Would Be Based on Speculation and Yield an Advisory Opinion Because There Is No Agency Action in Effect or Proposed to Go Into Effect That Adopts Any Purportedly Overbroad Statutory Interpretation\nB. Application of the Doctrine Absent an Agency Action Claiming Overbroad Authority Would Depart from Precedent and Pose Administrability Problems\nC. Sections 7411(a) and 7411(d) Do Not, on Their Face, Implicate the Major Questions Doctrine\nD. The Emission Reduction Envisioned by the CPP Rule Occurred a Decade Early Without the Rule Taking Effect, Defeating Any Major Questions Concern\nII. The Clean Air Act Does Not Unambiguously Require That, in Determining the BSER, EPA Consider Only Measures Applied \"at and to\" an Individual Plant\nA. The Statute's Use of \"System\" in Section 7411 Demonstrates That EPA's BSER Determination Is Not Limited to Measures \"at and to\" an Individual Plant\nB. The Statutory Text Requiring That EPA Determine the BSER That Is \"Adequately Demonstrated\" Establishes That EPA Looks to Means Already Used for the Source Category and, for Fossil Fuel-Fired Plants, Those Are Not Limited to \"at and to\" Measures\nC. The ACE Rule's Interpretation Would Undermine the Statutory Purpose of Emission Reduction\nD. The ACE Rule's Grammatical Theory of \"Application\" Is Unsound\nE. The ACE Rule Compounded Its Erroneous Reading by Unnecessarily Expanding It to Eliminate the Flexibility Congress Accorded States and Power Plants\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Court Need Not Adopt an Artificially Narrow Reading of Section 7411 to Avoid Violation of the Nondelegation Doctrine",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. SEC ALJs ARE NOT OFFICERS UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE FINAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY\nII. CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND TO ESTABLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AS OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES\nA. Congress Did Not Refer to ALJs as Officers a Single Time in section 11 of the APA, Which Provided for the Appointment of Examiners to Preside Over Administrative Proceedings\nB. If Congress Wanted to Establish Examiners as Officers of the United States, It Would Have Included Express Language to that Effect\nC. Given a Reasonable Option, Any Statutory Ambiguity Within the APA Should be Resolved in a Manner That Avoids Constitutional Issues\nIII. PETITIONERS' POSITION RENDERS THE \"ESTABLISHED BY LAW\" PROVISION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE SUPERFLUOUS AND WOULD PRODUCE AN ABSURD RESULT\nA. \"Established by Law\" Should Be Limited to Offices Directly Created by Congress\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. EVEN IF SEC ALJs ARE OFFICERS, REMAND, RATHER THAN DISMISSAL, IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' Overly Broad Definition of Officers Would Produce an Absurd Result",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Best Way To Police Cy Pres Settlements Is At The Front End, By Denying Certification Of Unmanageable Classes\nA. Lower Courts Continue To Certify Classes Where Some Or All Of The Absent Class Members Suffered No Actual Injury\nB. Lower Courts Continue To Circumvent The Commonality And Predominance Requirements\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Cy Pres Settlements Should Be Subject To Close Scrutiny\nA. Cy Pres Settlements Are A Response To Meritless But Costly Class Actions\nB. Conflicts Between Class Counsel And The Absent Class Are Inherent In Cy Pres Settlements\nC. Cy Pres Settlements Should Be Subject To Strict Standards",
        "reference": "C. Lower Courts Increasingly Permit The Use Of Unrebuttable Presumptions Of Injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. It Would Be Unethical for a Physician to Assist a Court or Executioner in Devising a Method of Capital Punishment by Testifying About the Comparative Levels of Pain a Condemned Prisoner Would Likely Suffer Under Alternative Execution Scenarios\nA. Physicians Are Ethically Prohibited from Participating in Execution by the Historic and Prevailing Standards of the Medical Profession\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Physician Participation in Executions Would Falsely Suggest that Capital Punishment can be Effectuated Humanely, with the Endorsement of the Medical Profession\nII. Amicus Takes No Position on the Substantive Issues, Including the Medical Questions that Underlie this Case",
        "reference": "B. Physician Assistance in the Design of Executions Would Undermine the Physician-Patient Relationship",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Historical Record Demonstrates That In Ohio, The Northwest Territory, And The Rest Of The Nation, To \"Bear Arms\" Meant To Be Armed In Public\nII. The Discretionary Nature Of New York's \"Proper Cause\" Requirement Is Constitutionally Suspect\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Infringements On the Right To Self-Defense Should Be Reviewed Under Truly Heightened Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-432_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Equitable Considerations That Supported the Application of Tolling in American Pipe (and Crown Cork) Do Not Support Application of the Ninth Circuit's Tolling Rule in the Instant Case\n1. Securities Class Actions are Subject to Procedural Rules That Eliminate Any Prospect That a Large Number of Class Members Would Be Compelled to Make Protective Filings in the Absence of Tolling\nB. There are Equitable Considerations in PSLRA-Governed Securities Class Actions That Weigh Heavily Against the Tolling of Securities Class Actions\n1. The Ninth Circuit's Extension of the American Pipe Tolling Rule Encourages Plaintiffs' Lawyers in Securities Litigation to Serially File Duplicative Class Actions\n2. The Ninth Circuit's Tolling Rule Increases Opportunities for Plaintiffs' Lawyers to Seek the \"Extortionate Settlements\" and File the Meritless Securities Class Actions That Congress Specifically Sought to Curb Through Passage of the PSLRA\n3. The Ninth Circuit's Tolling Rule Would Undermine PSLRA Requirements for a Regimented, Coordinated, and Streamlined Approach to the Litigation Process for Securities Class Action Litigation That Reflects Important Public Policy and Fairness Considerations",
        "reference": "I. THE EQUITIES WEIGH HEAVILY AGAINST APPLYING THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S TOLLING RULE IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9560_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 922(g)'s regulatory prohibition of firearm-related conduct by certain categories of people applies irrespective of a regulated person's mens rea\nB. A person \"knowingly violates\" Section 922(g) if he is covered by that provision and knowingly engages in the conduct that it prohibits\n1. Statutory text, structure, and context illustrate that Section 924(a)(2)'s knowledge requirement applies only to a defendant's conduct\n2. This Court has understood that a prosecution for violating Section 922(g) requires knowledge only as to conduct\n3. Congress enacted the \"knowingly violates\" requirement to codify the preexisting interpretation of the firearm laws in the courts of appeals, which did not require proof of knowledge of status\nC. Congress had sound reasons for requiring proof of a Section 922(g) defendant's knowledge only as to his conduct, not his personal history or legal status\nD. Petitioner's arguments lack merit\nII. The judgment below can be affirmed on the alternate ground that any error was harmless",
        "reference": "I. The knowledge requirement of 18 U.S.C. 924(a)(2) applies to a defendant's offense conduct, not his legal status",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A State has authority to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against Indians in Indian country\nA. Absent federal preemption, a State has authority to prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country\nB. Federal law does not preempt a State's authority to prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Public Law 280 and its predecessors\n3. The Constitution\nC. A State's exercise of prosecutorial authority over non-Indians within Indian country does not interfere with tribal or federal interests",
        "reference": "1. The General Crimes Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1140_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DEFINITION OF \"PROFESSIONAL SPEECH\" IS OVERBROAD\nA. \"Professional Speech\" Must Be Limited to a Profession's Specialized Knowledge\nB. \"Professional Speech\" Must Be Tailored to a Particular Client's Circumstances\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Compelled Recitation of Selective Facts Allows the Government to Impermissibly Promote Its Agenda\nB. Compelled Speech Violates Freedom of Conscience, Regardless Whether a Speaker Wishes to Enter a Public Debate\nIII. THE FACT ACT, WHICH COMPELS SPEECH AND DISCRIMINATES BASED ON CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT, MUST BE ANALYZED UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY, WHICH IT CANNOT SURVIVE",
        "reference": "II. COMPELLED SPEECH IN A DOCTOR'S OFFICE IS JUST AS DANGEROUS AS COMPELLED SPEECH IN ANY OTHER CONTEXT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Agency Fees Cannot Be Attributed to Employees Because Employees Have No Choice in the Fees\nB. The ACLJ's Examples Do Not Involve Pass-Through Payments and Are Inapposite to the Agency Fee Context",
        "reference": "II. AGENCY FEES ARE NOT COMPELLED SPEECH OF THE EMPLOYEE BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEE HAS NO GENUINE CHOICE IN THE FEES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "Respondents' claims for restoration damages should be dismissed\nA. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257\nB. The Montana state courts lacked jurisdiction over respondents' claims for restoration damages\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Respondents' claims for restoration damages cannot proceed without EPA authorization under CERCLA Section 122(e)(6)",
        "reference": "C. Even if the Montana state courts had jurisdiction, respondents' claims for restoration damages are preempted",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "2. Petitioners' State-Law Arguments Underscore Why the Petition Should Be Denied\nB. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Given the Ongoing State-Court Proceedings\nC. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Given the State Court's Forfeiture Holding\nII. The Absence of Any Split Underscores Why the Court Should Deny the Petition\nIII. The Decision Below Is Correct\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Elections Clause Does Not Free State Legislatures from Limits in State Constitutions",
        "reference": "A. The Legislature Authorized State Courts to Review and Remedy Congressional Redistricting Plans that Violate the State Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "A. Congress's Decision Not To Extend The SSI Program To Puerto Rico Is Supported By A Rational Basis\nB. Congress's Decision Not To Extend The SSI Program To Puerto Rico Does Not Trigger Heightened Scrutiny\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Respondent Fails To Provide A Special Justification For Overruling Torres and Rosario",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION WILL HAVE A CHILLING EFFECT ON NONPROFIT DONATIONS NATIONWIDE\nA. Indirect Restrictions on Speech and Association Have a Substantial Chilling Effect on the Exercise of First Amendment Rights\nB. Recognizing a Chilling Effect Is Necessary To Protect the Right to Anonymous Association\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Any Loss of Anonymity Creates a Significant Chilling Effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1348_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A [MISSING]\nA. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not relieve a defendant of the consequences of his own litigation choices\nB. A defendant who has consented to two trials cannot rely on the outcome of the first trial to prohibit or limit the second proceeding\n1. The double-jeopardy implications of a defendant's consent to two trials do not depend upon conviction at the first trial\n2. The issue-preclusion component of the Double Jeopardy Clause does not create a right distinct from the right against multiple trials for the same offense\n3. Waiver doctrine does not control the double-jeopardy implications of a defendant's consent to multiple proceedings\nC. Petitioner's double-jeopardy claim is foreclosed by his consent to severance of the charges",
        "reference": "A defendant who consents to two trials cannot invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar or limit the second trial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT SAFEGUARDS PETITIONERS' RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH\na. [MISSING]\nb. This Court's Precedent Interpreting the Conflict Between the First Amendment and Public Accommodation Laws Requires Reversal",
        "reference": "a. The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause Requires Reversal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. ICWA VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION\nA. Classifications Based On \"Indian\" Or Tribal Status Generally Constitute Racial Classifications Subject To Strict Scrutiny\nB. ICWA's Classifications Fall Far Outside Mancari's Limited Exception And Are Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n1. ICWA's \"Indian Child\" Classification Is Subject To Strict Scrutiny\n2. ICWA's Placement Preferences Are Subject To Strict Scrutiny\nC. ICWA's Classifications Cannot Survive Any Standard Of Review\nII. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS\nA. The Indian Commerce Clause Cannot Sustain ICWA's Placement Preferences\nB. Neither The Treaty Clause Nor Other Constitutional Powers Authorize Congress To Enact ICWA's Placement Preferences\nC. ICWA's Placement Preferences Impermissibly Commandeer State Courts And State Agencies\n1. [MISSING]\n2. ICWA's Placement Preferences Commandeer State Courts And State Agencies\n3. ICWA's Placement Preferences Cannot Be Viewed As A Form Of Preemption",
        "reference": "1. Congress May Not Compel The States To Regulate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ESTABLISH PREVIABLE FETUSES ARE HUMAN PERSONS, RENDERING ROE AND ITS PROGENY OBSOLETE.\nA. State interest in protecting life is the most fundamental and important government duty\nB. In Roe, the Court based its \"viability\" standard on: (a) lack of a scientific consensus on when human life begins, (b) absence of uniform legal protection of fetuses, and (c) maternal burdens of pregnancy and child-rearing\nC. Scientific, legal, and social developments have robbed Roe's viability standard of its original justification\n1. Principles of stare decisis do not foreclose review and reassessment of Roe; Casey recognizes that evaluation of changes in fact and law require revaluation of prior precedent\n2. A consensus of biologists now acknowledges that a human fetus is, biologically speaking, a human being\na. The scientific literature has established that fertilization initiates a new human being.\nb. An overwhelming majority of biologists recognize that a human's life begins at fertilization\nc. [MISSING]\nd. Even doctors who perform abortions and proponents of abortion rights admit fetuses are human beings\ne. Views opposing the position that human life starts at fertilization are unscientific and ideological\n3. Changes in the law have further eroded the underpinnings of Roe. Those changes recognize the human fetus as a human being\na. Enactment of fetal homicide laws in almost 80% of states demonstrates that, outside of the abortion context, a human fetus is legally recognized as a human being\nb. States are increasingly proposing and enacting laws protective of unborn human beings even when abortion is curtailed as a result\n4. Protective legislation has ameliorated many detriments associated with pregnancy\nD. The Court should not continue to follow Roe's viability standard since it ignores the fact that a human fetus is a biological human being and legal person at all stages of the human life cycle\nII. SINCE A HUMAN FETUS IS A HUMAN BEING, H.B. 1510 SHOULD BE SUSTAINED AS A REASONABLE PROTECTION OF A PREBORN PERSON UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT\nA. The Fourteenth Amendment covers all human beings, including preborn humans, and guarantees the due process right to life and equal protection\n1. The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect every human being within the jurisdiction of the U.S.\n2. Overwhelming evidence now exists that human fetuses are human beings and therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment\n3. The Court has a constitutional duty to recognize the right of human fetuses to legal protections as persons, and to begin to build a consensus favoring protection of fetuses under law\nB. Mississippi is entitled to pass legislation that protects prenatal humans from abortion",
        "reference": "c. Legislative hearings on when life begins marshalled scientific evidence that life begins at fertilization",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.68
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-846_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. AS INTERPRETED BELOW, RULE 32.1(g) VIOLATES AND DISCRIMINATES AGAINST FEDERAL LAW\nA. The Decision Below Discriminates Against This Court's Decisions\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Decision Below Nullifies A Federal Right\nD. The Decision Below Perpetuates Arizona's Hostility To Simmons And Lynch\nII. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT'S NOVEL INTERPRETATION OF RULE 32.1(g) IS NEITHER FIRMLY ESTABLISHED NOR REGULARLY FOLLOWED\nIII. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF RULE 32.1(g) IS INTERWOVEN WITH FEDERAL LAW\nIV. THE STATE'S FORFEITURE AND POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE MERITLESS",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Discriminates Against Federal Law By Creating A Catch-22",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Is Important Because the Approach Used by Texas Could Be Used Against Numerous Other Constitutional Rights\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Tempnology Admits The Clear Circuit Split\nB. The First Circuit's Decision Is Wrong\nC. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle For Resolving The Question\nII. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW OF THE QUESTION WHETHER AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL PATENTED PRODUCTS IS A \"RIGHT TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY\" UNDER section 365(n)",
        "reference": "I. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW OF THE QUESTION WHETHER REJECTION TERMINATES A LICENSEE'S RIGHTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9560_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES AND THIS COURT'S PRESUMPTIONS REGARDING CRIMINAL MENS REA CONCLUSIVELY DEMONSTRATE THAT section 924(a)(2)'S \"KNOWINGLY VIOLATES\" PROVISION APPLIES TO BOTH THE STATUS AND POSSESSION ELEMENTS OF A section 922(g) VIOLATION\nA. The Plain Text and Structure of the Provisions Make Clear That \"Knowingly Violates\" Applies to Both the Status and Possession Elements of section 922(g)\nB. This Reading of the Plain Text is Consistent with this Court's Treatment of Mens Rea Requirements in Criminal Statutes\nII. ADDITIONAL TOOLS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT MR. REHAIF'S INTERPRETATION\nA. Mr. Rehaif's Reading of \"Knowingly Violates\" is Consistent With the History and Purpose of the Firearm Owners' Protection Act\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Ambiguity in Mr. Rehaif's Favor\nIII. THE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE DECISION BELOW ARE NOT PERSUASIVE\nA. Whether the \"Knowingly Violates\" Requirement Applies to the \"Interstate Commerce\" Element of section 922(g) Has No Bearing on the Resolution of the Issue Presented\nB. The Presumptive Requirement of a Mens Rea for All Substantive Elements of a Crime That Distinguish it From Innocent Behavior Extends to a Defendant's Status Under section 922(g)\nC. The Eleventh Circuit's Speculation About Congress's Purposes is not Grounded in Either the Text or Specific Legislative Statements of Purpose",
        "reference": "B. Requiring the Government to Prove that a Defendant Knew His or Her Status at the Time of the Firearm Possession Avoids Due Process Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. RAMOS ANNOUNCED A \"NEW RULE.\"\nA. Ramos Broke New Ground By Overruling Precedent.\nB. The Rule Established In Ramos Was Not Apparent To \"All Reasonable Jurists\" When The State Courts Considered Edwards' Unanimity Claim.\nC. Edwards' Attempt To Characterize Ramos As Applying An Old Rule Lacks Merit.\nII. RAMOS DID NOT ANNOUNCE A \"WATERSHED\" RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.\nA. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Unanimity Is Not A Previously Unrecognized Bedrock Procedural Rule.\nD. The States' Significant Finality Interests Remain Unimpaired.\nE. The Racial Issues Cited By Edwards And His Amici Provide No Basis To Make Ramos Retroactive.\nIII. AEDPA'S RELITIGATION BAR INDEPENDENTLY FORECLOSES RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF RAMOS.\nA. If Ramos Applied An \"Old Rule,\" AEDPA Bars Relief Because That Rule Was Not Clearly Established.\nB. Edwards' Conviction Was Not Contrary To Clearly Established Federal Law Even If Ramos Announced A New \"Watershed\" Procedural Rule.",
        "reference": "B. Allowing Convictions By A 10-2 Or 11-1 Vote Does Not Seriously Diminish The Accuracy Of Criminal Convictions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-382_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 113(f)(3)(B) DOES NOT REACH NON-CERCLA SETTLEMENTS\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The Statutory Text And Context Tie Section 113(f)(3)(B) To The Liability Imposed By CERCLA\n2. Traditional Contribution Principles Confirm That Section 113(f)(3)(B) Requires The Resolution Of CERCLA Liability\n3. Interpreting Section 113(f)(3)(B) To Reach Only CERCLA-Based Settlements Comports With CERCLA's Regulatory Scheme\n4. Section 113(f)(3)(B)'s Statutory History Reinforces The Requirement Of A CERCLA-Based Settlement\n5. Limiting Section 113(f)(3)(B) To CERCLA-Based Settlements Accords With The Presumption Of Fair Notice\nB. The D.C. Circuit's Contrary Interpretation Is Fundamentally Flawed\nC. The 2004 CWA Consent Decree Did Not Resolve CERCLA Liability\nII. SECTION 113(f)(3)(B) DOES NOT REACH SETTLEMENTS THAT DISCLAIM ANY DETERMINATION OF LIABILITY AND PRESERVE FUTURE LIABILITY\nA. To \"Resolve[] Its Liability,\" A Settling Party Must Conclusively Decide A Preexisting Liability In The Settlement Agreement\nB. Guam Did Not \"Resolve[] Its Liability\" In The 2004 CWA Consent Decree\nC. The D.C. Circuit's Contrary Conclusion Flouts The Statutory Text And The 2004 CWA Consent Decree's Terms",
        "reference": "A. Section 113(f)(3)(B) Requires The Resolution Of CERCLA Liability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1657_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "1. The Split of Authority Is Neither Deep Nor Long-Standing\n2. Congress Acted Purposefully in Enacting Section 365(n) in the Wake of the Fourth Circuit's Lubrizol Decision\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Section 365(n) Does Not Provide a Mechanism to Protect Non-Intellectual Property Distribution Rights",
        "reference": "3. The Present Case is Not an Appropriate Vehicle for the Court to Establish New Standards",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Kansas Supreme Court's Decision Is Irreconcilable with the Decisions of 16 State Supreme Courts and Federal Circuit Courts.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decision Below Misapplied the Fourth Amendment to Prohibit Commonsense Investigations.",
        "reference": "II. The Division Among State Supreme Courts and Federal Circuit Courts Warrants Review in this Case.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The First Amendment shelters good-faith reporting - like other valuable speech - by requiring proof of intent to threaten.",
        "reference": "I. The prospect of a meritless threat or harassment prosecution can chill journalism on matters of public concern.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT GIVE CONGRESS BROAD ENFORCEMENT POWER TO PROHIBIT LAWS THAT MAKE IT HARDER FOR VOTERS OF COLOR TO EXERCISE THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THERE IS NO \"TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER\" EXCEPTION TO THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT'S GUARANTEE OF EQUAL POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY",
        "reference": "II. THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT GIVES CONGRESS THE POWER TO PROHIBIT STATE VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS THAT RESULT IN RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AS A MEANS OF EFFECTUATING THE AMENDMENT'S EQUALITY MANDATE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 5.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Question Presented Is Important, Recurring, and Squarely Presented\nIII. The Decision Below Is Wrong",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Creates an Acknowledged Split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Because the Exemption at Issue Is a Rational Attempt to Comply with RFRA, It Also Substantively Complies with the Administrative Procedure Act\nIII. The Affordable Care Act Gives the Agency Separate Authority to Grant this Religious Exemption",
        "reference": "I. RFRA Requires Federal Agencies to Grant Certain Religious Exemptions, And It Authorizes Them to Grant Exemptions Broader Than the Minimum That RFRA Requires",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5716_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Reading Section 3582(c)(2) in Favor of Applying Mandatory Minimums Runs Counter to Congressional Intent and Contributes to an Unjust Sentencing Policy\nA. Mandatory Minimums Interfere with the System of Guided, Flexible Discretion Established by the Sentencing Reform Act\nB. By Shifting the Power to Decide Sentences to Prosecutors, Mandatory Minimums are Inconsistent with Traditional Notions of Fairness\nC. Mandatory Minimums Are Largely Ineffective at Deterring Offenders, Reducing Crime, or Inducing Cooperation\nD. Mandatory Minimums Are Detrimental to Communities and How They View the Criminal Justice System",
        "reference": "I. Defendants Who Are Granted Relief from Mandatory Minimum Statutes Because of Their Substantial Assistance to the Government Are Eligible for Sentence Reductions Under Section 3582(c)(2)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Indian Child Welfare Act Imposes Substantial Hurdles Before Non-Indian Parents Who Wish To Adopt Indian Children\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Gila River Indian Community intervenes to assert its collective interests, which were contrary to C.J.'s best interests under Ohio family law\nC. ICWA grants extraordinary power and jurisdiction to tribal courts\nD. ICWA imposes race-matched placement \"preferences\" that discriminate against non-Indian foster parents\nE. Foster Parents \u2014 finally \u2014 prevail\nII. The Placement Preferences Unconstitutionally Discriminate Against Non-Indian Foster and Adoptive Placements\nIII. ICWA Demotes the Interest of Individual Children and the Adults They Have Bonded With",
        "reference": "A. C.J. became closely bonded with his Foster Parents and foster siblings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-315_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE FCA'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS MUST BE READ IN HARMONY WITH THE FCA'S SEAL PROVISION\nA. The FCA's Seal Provision Creates Due-Process Concerns\nB. The FCA's Statute Of Limitations Should Not Be Read To Exacerbate The Due-Process Concerns Created By The FCA's Seal Provision",
        "reference": "I. THE SECOND OF THE FCA'S TWO LIMITATION PERIODS SERVES A DISTINCT END FOR A DISTINCT PARTY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Constitutional Right for Abortion Clinics to Externalize Their Costs\nA. The Complication Rate from Abortion is Significant, and Costly\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Beneficial Effect of Requiring Malpractice Insurance Justifies Louisiana Act 620\nII. Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt Does Not Preclude Louisiana Act 620",
        "reference": "B. Requiring Abortion Clinics to Pay for Their Negative Externalities is Constitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The ACA is invalid in its entirety",
        "reference": "I. The District Court correctly held that the ACA is unenforceable nationwide",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1184_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS A CLEAR CONFLICT OF AUTHORITY ON THE QUESTION PRESENTED.\nII. THE NON-BINDING SSA VOCATIONAL EXPERT HANDBOOK HAS NO RELEVANCE TO THE QUESTION PRESENTED.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS INCORRECT.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The President is absolutely immune from state criminal process while in office\nA. The sitting President has immunity from criminal process\nB. The President's immunity applies with special force to state and local criminal process\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Mazars subpoena violates the President's immunity from criminal process\nII. Clinton and Nixon do not undermine the President's claim of immunity\nIII. The District Attorney has not established a heightened need for the records that this subpoena demands",
        "reference": "C. State grand jury subpoenas are the kind of criminal process to which immunity should apply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Should Vacate the Third Net Worth Sweep\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Separation of Powers Requires Relief that Remedies Plaintiffs' Injury\nII. The Government's Construction of HERA Would Violate the Nondelegation Doctrine\nIII. This Court Should Address the Root of the Separation-of-Powers Problem: Humphrey's Executor\nA. Stare Decisis Provides No Cover for Humphrey's Executor\nB. Humphrey's Executor Was Wrongly Decided on both the Law and the Facts and Should be Overruled",
        "reference": "A. The Blue-Pencil Remedy Exceeds the Judicial Power Under Article III",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plain error review does not apply to petitioner's challenge to the length of his sentence\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Amicus's alternative argument for applying plain error review is wrong as well\nC. Amicus's \"facts and circumstances\" argument has no bearing on the proper standard of review\nII. Petitioner's sentence is substantively unreasonable",
        "reference": "A. The Fifth Circuit's post-sentence objection requirement is wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. By incorporating the \"undue burden\" abortion standard, the Third Circuit inverted the notion of least restrictive means to conclude that the presence of third party harm invalidates RFRA\nIII. The Third Circuit's wildly disparate administrative deference standards demonstrate it substituted its own policy decisions for the rule of law",
        "reference": "I. By impermissibly evaluating the rationality of the employers' sincere religious belief, the Third Circuit converted RFRA's substantial burden analysis into a search for theological truth",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. Axon's Merits Allegations Are Empirically Deficient\nB. Axon Relies on Disproven Evidentiary Claims and Mischaracterizes the FTC's Voting Record\nC. Axon Ignores Practical Realities of Administrative Process",
        "reference": "The Merits of Axon's Constitutional Claims Do Not Support Its Jurisdictional Argument",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Jury Unanimity is Necessary to Prevent \"An Impermissibly Large Risk\" of an Inaccurate Conviction.\nB. Ramos Differs from Past New Rules Concerning the Sixth Amendment Jury Guarantee.\nII. The Racist Design and Operation of Louisiana's and Oregon's Non-unanimous Jury Rules Support Retroactive Application of Ramos.\nA. Louisiana's Non-Unanimous Jury Provision Was Designed to Undermine the Accuracy of Criminal Convictions.\nB. Louisiana's Non-Unanimous Jury Provision Functioned as Intended.",
        "reference": "I. Ramos Clears Teague's Nonretroactivity Bar.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-389_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no split of authority\nA. The Circuits to have addressed the question presented are all in agreement\nB. Continental Oil does not set forth the Fifth Circuit's OCSLA test in non-maritime cases\nII. The Ninth Circuit's decision is correct\nA. California wage-and-hour laws are applicable on the OCS\nB. California minimum wage and overtime laws are not inconsistent with federal law\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Employers have long acknowledged that California wage-and-hour laws apply on the platforms off its coast\nA. Legislative history shows that the offshore drilling industry knew California law applied to OCS platforms since 1999\nB. OCS Employers' labor contracts contradict Petitioner's argument that only FLSA applies on OCS platforms",
        "reference": "III. Petitioner vastly overstates the impact of the decision below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1432_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. INTRODUCTION\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. HISTORY OF REVOCATION-UPON-DIVORCE LAWS\nIV. THE IMPORTANCE OF REVOCATION-UPON-DEATH LAWS IN SETTLING ESTATES\nV. APPLYING THESE PRINCIPLES TO THIS CASE",
        "reference": "II. WHAT ARE REVOCATION-UPON-DEATH LAWS AND HOW DO THEY WORK?",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Commission's ALJs are Officers of the United States rather than employees\nB. The ALJs' status as Officers has implications for both their selection and removal that the Court should address\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This case is the preferable vehicle for resolving the division among the courts of appeals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Question Before the Court Is Whether the Excessive Fines Clause, Via the Due Process Clause, Imposes a Proportionality Requirement on State In Rem Forfeitures\nA. The Court should ask whether a proportionality requirement for in rem forfeitures is a fundamental and deeply rooted feature of American law\nB. [MISSING]\nII. History Shows That In Rem Forfeitures Were Not Originally Understood to Be Subject to an Excessive Fines Clause Proportionality Requirement\nA. In rem forfeitures antedate constitutional ratification and have continued for more than two centuries\nB. The historical rationale for in rem forfeitures explains why they were not understood to be subject to a proportionality requirement\nIII. History Establishes That Either the Excessive Fines Clause Does Not Apply to In Rem Forfeitures or the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Incorporate the Clause Against the States\nA. The better interpretation reads the Excessive Fines Clause not to apply to in rem forfeitures\nB. If the Court interprets the Excessive Fines Clause to extend to in rem forfeitures, history shows that the Clause does not apply to the States",
        "reference": "B. The Court should not revisit whether incorporation should occur via the Privileges or Immunities Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-387_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. A State has in rem jurisdiction over actions involving land within its sovereign territory\nB. This case involves the ownership of land within the sovereign territory of the State of Washington\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Foreign nations are not immune from actions relating to immovable property in the United States\n2. States are not immune from actions relating to immovable property in other States\n3. The Tribe errs in relying on cases involving land held by a sovereign within its own territory\nD. The unavailability of sovereign immunity in cases involving immovable property applies to Indian tribes as it does to other sovereigns\nE. This Court should not expand tribal sovereign immunity\n1. This Court's precedents do not support expanding immunity\n2. Tribal interests do not require expanding immunity\n3. Expanding immunity would impair important state interests\n4. Expanding immunity would leave landowners like the Lundgrens without a meaningful remedy",
        "reference": "C. Sovereign immunity does not bar actions relating to immovable property held by one sovereign in the territory of another sovereign",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eleventh Circuit's Interpretation Of The CFAA Is Contrary To The Statute's Text And Congress' Intent, And Violates The Rule Of Lenity\nA. It Is Crucial That The Court Continue To Construe The Text Of Criminal Statutes Narrowly\nB. Congress Could Not Have Intended An Expansive Reading Of The CFAA\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Expansively Construing The CFAA Raises Vagueness Concerns\nB. Expansively Construing The CFAA Invites Arbitrary Enforcement\nIII. Expansively Interpreting The CFAA Would Further Overcriminalization",
        "reference": "II. Expansively Construing The CFAA Raises Constitutional Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-988_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Varela's Renewed Jurisdictional Argument Is Meritless\nII. The Decision Below Conflicts With The FAA And Defies This Court's Precedents\nA. Determining Whether An Arbitration Agreement Authorizes Class Arbitration Requires Application Of Both Federal Law And State Law Standards\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Inference Of An Agreement To Authorize Class Arbitration Lacks Any Contractual Basis\n1. Varela has no persuasive response to the Agreement's text clearly contemplating bilateral arbitration\n2. The contract provisions relied upon by the Ninth Circuit do not reflect consent to class arbitration\n3. The additional provisions Varela relies upon do not authorize class arbitration\n4. [MISSING]\nC. An Arbitration Agreement Should Not Be Construed To Authorize Class Procedures Unless The Text Clearly And Unmistakably Does So",
        "reference": "4. The state-law contra proferentem doctrine cannot supply the requisite contractual basis for consent to class arbitration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION REFLECTS THE RIGOR THAT CLOSELY DRAWN SCRUTINY REQUIRES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Lacking evidence of actual quid pro quo corruption, the FEC improperly rests on a showing of its appearance\nC. Some lower courts fail to apply closely drawn scrutiny with the same rigor as the District Court\nII. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS DOES NOT SAVE THE LOAN REPAYMENT LIMIT\nIII. THIS COURT SHOULD CAUTION AGAINST OVERRELIANCE ON BUCKLEY'S SOFT DISTINCTIONS AND EMPHASIZE THAT A COURT MUST FOCUS PRIMARILY ON THE REAL WORLD EFFECT ON POLITICAL SPEECH",
        "reference": "A. The purported analogy between the Loan Repayment Limit and gift bans does not support an additional layer of contribution restrictions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL DOCTRINE IS DEPLOYED IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT TO PROCURE CONVICTIONS WITHOUT PROOF OF PROPERTY FRAUD\nA. Prosecutors Rely On The Elastic Doctrine When There Is Deceit But They Cannot Prove Contemplated Economic Harm\nB. Jury Instructions On The Right To Control Demonstrate The Doctrine's Elasticity And Incoherence\nII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S RULING UNDULY EXPANDS HONEST SERVICES FRAUD TO NON-GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND INTRODUCES UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHO OWES A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO THE PUBLIC\nA. [MISSING]\nB. To Prevent The Punishment Of Ordinary Advocacy, The Court Should Clarify That A Defendant Must Have An \"Official Position\" To Owe A Duty Of Honest Services To The Public.",
        "reference": "A. This Court Has Repeatedly Limited The Doctrine Of Honest Services Fraud.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The assertion of Pennsylvania's general jurisdiction over foreign corporations that choose to register with the Department of State is not unreasonable or unjust\nIII. Pennsylvania's long history of requiring corporations to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts underscores that its current jurisdiction scheme comports with Due Process",
        "reference": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Gave No Indication That The Stored Communications Act Should Apply Extraterritorially\nII. A Warrant Requiring The Copying And Importation Of Communications Stored Overseas Is An Impermissible Extraterritorial Application Of The Stored Communications Act\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Section 2703 is part of an interlocking trio of substantive provisions focused on protecting \"communications in electronic storage.\"\n2. Even in isolation, section 2703 focuses on protecting \"communications in electronic storage.\"\n3. A focus on \"disclosure\" would have left gaps in coverage in 1986 that are inconsistent with Congress's clear intention\nB. The conduct that the SCA compels is a law-enforcement seizure, which occurs where the private correspondence is stored\nC. The international discord that has erupted, and the potential for conflict with foreign laws, confirm that the warrant entails an impermissible extraterritorial application of the SCA\nIII. Pre-Morrison Cases Addressing A Subpoena's Global Reach Shed No Light On The Focus Of The SCA's Warrant Provision\nIV. The Government's Policy Concerns Are Properly Addressed To Congress",
        "reference": "A. The SCA, including section 2703, covers only communications stored in the United States because its focus is protecting \"communications in electronic storage,\" not \"disclosure.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. State Tort Rules May Be Borrowed To Fill in the Gaps of Section 1983 Only When Those Rules Are Compatible with the Statute's Purpose\nIII. Because the Torts of False Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution Are Not Analogous to a Claim of First Amendment Speech Retaliation, It Would Undermine Section 1983 To Impose the Rules of Those Torts Here",
        "reference": "I. Section 1983 Was Meant To Vindicate the Unique and Fundamental Rights Guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, Not the Interests Protected by State Tort Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE CFAA WHICH ONLY FOCUSES ON THREATS FROM OUTSIDE \"HACKERS\" IGNORES THE REALITY OF HOW MODERN COMPUTER SYSTEMS, INCLUDING THOSE USED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT, OPERATE\nA. Computerized Systems Used by Federal Law Enforcement Agents and Officers Are Repositories of Massive Amounts of Highly Sensitive Information\nB. Law Enforcement Systems and Databases are Legitimately and Regularly Accessed by a Large Number of Users\nII. THREATS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT DATABASES AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS ARE THREATS TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE\nIII. THE CFAA IS A PROVEN METHOD OF PROTECTING GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS FROM INSIDER THREATS\nA. The Threat of Data Theft\nB. [MISSING]\nIV. A PURELY \"OUTSIDE HACKER\" INTERPRETATION OF THE CFAA WOULD LIMIT ITS UTILITY AND IMPOSE SUBSTANTIAL COSTS ON ITS USE",
        "reference": "B. The Threat of Data Manipulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The USPTO's Concerns Regarding Monopoly Power Are Misplaced",
        "reference": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Monetary Relief Such as Restitution\nA. Section 13(b)'s Plain Text Authorizes \"Injunction[s],\" Not Restitution and Other Monetary Relief\nB. The Commission's Contrary Reading Destroys the FTC Act's Structure and Defies Its History\nC. The Commission's Construction Contravenes Precedent\n1. \"Injunction\" in section 13(b) Means \"Injunction\" Under the Textual Analysis That Porter and Mitchell Require\n2. This Case Is Controlled Not by Porter and Mitchell, but by Text and Meghrig\nD. Limiting section 13(b) to Its Text Enforces \u2014 Rather Than Impairs \u2014 the Statutory Regime\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Monetary Award Here Is Improper Even if section 13(b) Authorizes Equitable Monetary Remedies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS HAS RATIFIED THE DIRECT-PURCHASER RULE VIA FOUR DECADES OF LEGISLATIVE ACQUIESCENCE\nA. Congress Has Steadfastly Refused to Alter or Repeal the Direct-Purchaser Rule\nB. Since Illinois Brick, Congress Has Twice Amended section 4 of the Clayton Act, Without Giving Indirect Purchasers Standing to Sue\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE MERITLESSNESS OF THIS LAWSUIT \u2014 AND THE ABSENCE OF A LAWSUIT BY APP DEVELOPERS \u2014 CONFIRMS THE WISDOM OF ILLINOIS BRICK",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-846_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Sections 1681n and 1681o unambiguously authorize civil actions against federal agencies for FCRA violations.\nII. USDA has not identified a plausible basis for interpreting \"person\" in sections 1681n and 1681o as if the term were undefined.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Applying FCRA's definition of \"person\" to sections 1681n and 1681o is consistent with Seminole Tribe.\nC. Section 1681u does not call into question the clarity of sections 1681n and 1681o.\nD. The Privacy Act does not limit FCRA's remedies.\nE. The legislative history is consistent with FCRA's clear text.\nIII. FCRA's cause of action is sufficient to waive federal sovereign immunity.\nA. Congress waives immunity when it creates a cause of action against a federal defendant.\nB. Employees do not control here.",
        "reference": "A. FCRA's definition of \"person\" is not \"context dependent.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Developers rely on intellectual property law to both protect their independent work and promote their ability to work collectively\nIII. Control of APIs and software interfaces will have a fundamental influence on the future of software innovation\nIV. Current case law has left it unclear how and when a developer's work is protected intellectual property",
        "reference": "I. Software interfaces are the universally accepted mechanism allowing developers to write software that is interoperable and independent of the underlying hardware",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A court of appeals may review any ground for removal encompassed in a remand order where the defendant premised removal in part on the federal-officer or civil-rights removal statutes\nA. The plain text of 28 U.S.C. 1447(d) permits appellate review of any ground for removal where removal is premised in part on the federal-officer or civil-rights removal statutes\nB. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1447(d) is supported by precedent from this Court and the courts of appeals\nC. The plain-text interpretation of Section 1447(d) serves the provision's purposes\nD. The court of appeals' contrary interpretation is incorrect\nII. The Court should reverse the judgment below\nA. [MISSING]\nB. If the Court does not reverse, it should vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the court of appeals",
        "reference": "A. Removal was proper because respondent's claims necessarily arise under federal law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-961_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Four Judges' Dual Officeholding Violated section 973(b)(2)(A)\nII. The Four Judges' Dual Officeholding Terminated Their Military Service\nIII. The Government's Position Raises Serious Constitutional Questions\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. This Court Can\u2014and Should\u2014Reverse All Eight Judgments Below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Petitioner Has Not Plausibly Alleged a Compensable Taking Under the Takings Clause\nA. The Petitioner Did Not Have a Property Interest Protected by the Takings Clause at the Time Hennepin County Sold the Property\nB. A Compensable Taking Did Not Occur When Respondents Obtained Petitioner's Real Property\n1. Petitioner did not have a protected property interest in the value of the property above its debts\n2. [MISSING]\n3. The purpose of the Takings Clause does not support finding a compensable taking under these circumstances\nC. This Court's Prior Precedents Support Respondents\nD. This Court Should Avoid Finding a Protected Property Interest in \"Equity\" Independent of State Law\nII. This Case Does Not Implicate the Excessive Fines Clause",
        "reference": "2. If Petitioner did have a protected property interest in \"equity,\" Petitioner forfeited that interest through her own neglect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Establishment Clause Does Not Require Eradication of the Passive Display of All Religious Symbols from Public Property\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Establishment Clause Prohibits the Government from Favoring Nonreligion and Requires the Government to Accommodate Religious Expression",
        "reference": "B. Requiring Desecration of the Bladensburg Peace Cross Would Create the \"Religiously Based Divisiveness\" That the Establishment Clause Seeks to Avoid",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari Should Be Granted To Check the Lower Courts' Expansion of the Clean Water Act's Already Overbroad Scope, Which Expansion Has Been Effected Through a Misreading of Justice Scalia's Plurality Opinion in Rapanos v. United States\nA. The Rapanos Plurality Sought To Narrow the Scope of the Clean Water Act\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Certiorari Should Be Granted To Check the Lower Courts' Expansion of the Clean Water Act's Already Overbroad Scope and Thereby Protect the Property and Due Process Rights of Landowners Throughout the Country",
        "reference": "B. The Lower Courts' Conclusion That the Rapanos Plurality Supports Clean Water Act Regulation of Groundwater Misconstrues That Opinion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. At the Time of the FAA's Enactment, \"Contracts of Employment\" Referred to Traditional Employer\u2014Employee Relationships, Not Independent Contractor Arrangements\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Contemporaneous State Statutes Used Terms Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to \"Employees,\" Not Independent Contractors\nC. Courts Applying Common Law Consistently Limited Employers' Obligations to Employees, Excluding Independent Contractors\nD. Contemporaneous Dictionaries and Treatises Reflect that Legal Language Distinguished Between \"Employees\" and \"Independent Contractors,\" Just as We Do Today\nII. Statutory History Confirms that the FAA's \"Contract of Employment\" Exemption Is Limited To Traditional Employer\u2014Employee Relationships\nA. The Historical Context in Which the FAA Was Enacted Confirms that the Exemption's Scope Is Limited to Certain Employees\nB. The Statutory History of the FAA Confirms the Exemption's Limited Scope",
        "reference": "A. The Congress that Enacted the FAA Was Well Aware that Courts Construe Words Such as \"Employment\" To Refer Only to Traditional Employer\u2014Employee Relationships",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-863_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should grant certiorari to resolve the acknowledged circuit conflict on a frequently recurring issue of vital importance to immigrant families\nA. Without this Court's intervention, the circuit conflict will not resolve and will continue to cause significant inequities\nB. The government's vehicle argument is baseless because the agency and the court of appeals decided only the eligibility question that has split the circuits\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The government's merits arguments provide no reason to deny certiorari",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS CASE IMPACTS EVERY COURT IN THE NATION, AND IS ALONE SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT REVIEW\nA. [MISSING]\nII. RESPONDENT CONCEDES THAT A CIRCUIT SPLIT EXISTS REGARDING WHETHER A \"COMMERCIAL NEXUS\" IS REQUIRED FOR TCPA LIABILITY\nIII. THERE IS A CIRCUIT SPLIT AS TO THE MEANING OF THE 2006 FCC RULE THAT WARRANTS THIS COURT'S REVIEW\nIV. THIS APPEAL HAS IMMENSE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE BEYOND THIS DISPUTE",
        "reference": "A. There Is A Circuit Split Concerning The Interplay Between The Hobbs Act And Chevron Deference When The \"Validity\" Of An Agency Order Has Not Been Challenged",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. Generic And Biosimilar Drug Companies Serve a Critical Role in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace by Providing Affordable Access to Medicines\nII. The On-Sale Bar Promotes Disclosure of Inventions by Limiting the Time in Which Inventors Must Seek Patent Protection After They Have Commercialized Their Inventions\nA. The On-Sale Bar Has Applied to Confidential Sales for Nearly 200 Years\nB. The Policies Justifying the On-Sale Bar Are Served by Treating Confidential Sales as Sales\nC. The Policies Underlying the On-Sale Bar Are Consistent with Treating Sales to Distributors as Sales \"to the Public.\"\nIII. A Narrow On-Sale Bar as Proposed by Helsinn Would Promote Manipulation in the Commercial Drug Market and Disrupt Congress's Carefully Balanced Scheme\nA. Under Helsinn's Position, Patent Owners Will Enjoy a Double Benefit During FDA Proceedings\nB. Helsinn's Rule Would Open the Door to Manipulation by Patent Owners and Yield Particularly Pernicious Consequences for Drug Consumers\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Upending Traditional On-Sale Principles Will Infuse Uncertainty into the Commercial Marketplace for Both Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 2 \"Modified\" the Penalty Statute for Petitioner's Crack-Cocaine Offense\nB. \"Statutory Penalties\" Refers to the Penalty Statutes That Section 2 \"Modified,\" Not the Sentencing Ranges That Section 2 Left Undisturbed\nII. Covering Low-Level Crack Dealers Aligns With Section 404's History and Purpose\nA. Section 404 Made Section 2 Retroactive to All Crack Offenders Who Were Subject to the 100-to-1 Ratio\nB. Amicus Cannot Explain Why Congress Would Have Wanted to Single Out Low-Level Crack Dealers for Exclusion",
        "reference": "I. Petitioner Has a \"Covered Offense,\" and Amicus's Textual Argument lacks Merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-459_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Service on an alien of a notice to appear stops his accrual of continuous physical presence irrespective of whether the notice states a date and time certain for the initial hearing\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The statutory text, context, and structure support the Board's interpretation of the stop-time rule\n2. The stop-time rule's history and purpose support the Board's interpretation\nB. The Board's reasonable interpretation of the stop-time rule is entitled to deference\n1. The Board's interpretation of the stop-time rule is at a minimum reasonable\n2. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit",
        "reference": "A. The Board's conclusion that the omission in a notice to appear of a date and time certain for a hearing does not nullify the stop-time rule reflects the best reading of the statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-108_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Development of the Articles of War\nA. The Initial Developments\nB. The 1806 Amendments\nC. Amendments from 1806\u20131916\nD. Amendments from 1916\u20131949\nE. The Uniform Code of Military Justice\nII. The Courts' Recognition of Constitutional Rights Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice\nIII. Comparison of Individual Articles\nA. Servicemembers' Constitutional Rights are Only Curtailed for Military-Specific Reasons.\n1. Fourth Amendment\n2. Grand Jury\nB. Congress has Enshrined, and even Expanded, Constitutional Protections for Servicemembers, Absent Military Necessity.\n1. Double Jeopardy Rights\n2. Speedy Trial Rights\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. The Eighth Amendment applies to servicemembers\nB. Congress codified Eighth Amendment equivalent protections through Article 55, thereby mandating Eighth Amendment protections for servicemembers",
        "reference": "IV. Article 55 and the Eighth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.18
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Establishment Clause was intended as a federalism protection for the states.\nB. If it includes an individual right, the Establishment Clause protects against coercion of individuals and religious institutions.\nII. The Free Exercise Clause Prohibits State Hostility Toward Religion",
        "reference": "I. The Establishment Clause Neither Compels nor Permits Discrimination Against Religious Exercise by Public Employees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Pipeline Threatens Virginia's Natural Resources Without Clear Corresponding Benefits\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Writ of Certiorari Should Be Dismissed",
        "reference": "II. The Challenged Permitting Decision Violated Numerous Federal Statutes and Regulations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-459_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari To Resolve The Acknowledged Circuit Conflict On An Important And Frequently Recurring Issue.\nA. The Government Concedes That The Question Presented Is Certworthy.\nB. The Courts Below Decided Only The Eligibility Question That Has Split The Circuits, Preventing Mr. Pereira From Building A Record On Whether He Will Win Relief If Eligible.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Government's Merits Arguments Provide No Reason To Deny Certiorari And Cannot Overcome The Clear Statutory Text.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "1. Respondent Agrees That Certiorari Should Be Granted\n2. Serial Litigant Arguments Are Unwarranted\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Two Types Of Statutes\nA. Real World Harm\nB. Havens Realty\nC. Informational Injury\nD. Stigmatic Injury, Dignitary Harm, Unequal Treatment And Other Downstream Consequences\nE. Locus Of Injury\nF. Griffin, Brintley and Carello\nG. Havens Realty Should Not Be Overturned",
        "reference": "3. The Statute And Regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.45
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court's review of the questions presented by the United States will disturb expectations of finality that benefit both Indian Tribes and the States\nIII. Should this Court grant review, this case presents deeper legal issues than the limited application of Mille Lacs urged by the United States",
        "reference": "I. This case presents a poor vehicle to answer the questions presented by the United States because the Petitioner has defaulted on an independent, alternative ground sufficient to sustain his conviction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Introduction - Non-Judicial Foreclosures and FDCPA\nII. On Its Face, the Act Does Not Apply to Non-Judicial Foreclosures\nA. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "A. Mortgage indebtedness defined as \"debt\" per the Act is not a forgone",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-8332_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fairness Principle Is a Fundamental Right Our System of Jurisprudence Has Recognized For Over a Century\nII. The Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause Was to Protect Rights Such as the Fairness Principle\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. If This Court Permits Due Process Violations Such as Tennessee's to Continue, Citizens Could Lose Their Ability to Vindicate Constitutional Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "THE DEFINITION OF \"EXCEEDING UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS\" CANNOT BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE ACCESSING DATA PUBLICLY DISCLOSED ON THE INTERNET\nA. The CFAA Must Be Construed Narrowly\nB. Publishing Information on the Internet Grants Authority to Access That Information\nC. The Automated Scraping of the Internet for Publicly Posted Data, for Whatever Purpose, Is Not Prohibited by the CFAA\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Automated Scraping Is an Invaluable Tool for Information Technology Professionals",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1498_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Washington State Constitution expressly states that motor vehicle fuel excise tax revenues are to be used exclusively for the maintenance of public roads. The Yakama Treaty guaranteed that the Yakama Nation would not be charged for the maintenance of public roads\nB. Accepting the arguments of the State and the United States which place Yakama Indians on the same basis as all State citizens would render their treaty right meaningless\nC. The State should be estopped from repeatedly relitigating the applicability of taxes on Yakama's use of public roads and should be bound by its own contrary statements in previous cases in this Court\nD. Petitioner State of Washington's and the United States' arguments that affirming the Washington Supreme Court will create an enormous loophole or result in the widespread transport of tax exempt fuel to other States is unfounded\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. Equitable principles disfavor Courts extricating litigants from problems created by themselves",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The View That the APA Does Not Allow Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations Conflicts with the Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Review of Agency Action\nIII. Treasury Has Strayed from the APA's Rulemaking Requirements and Must Be Brought Back into the Fold",
        "reference": "I. This Court Should Resolve the Interpretive Split Between the Anti-Injunction Act and the Tax Injunction Act to Allow Lower Courts to Properly Adjudicate Challenges to Tax Regulations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. OPENNESS IN ADOPTION AND CONNECTION TO FAMILIES AND TRIBES IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF CHILDREN\nA. Openness in Adoption\nB. Sam and Aubrey's Adoption Story\nC. Openness in Adoption Benefits Indian Children\nII. THE ICWA DOES NOT PREVENT NONINDIANS FROM ADOPTING OR FOSTERING INDIAN CHILDREN\nA. The ICWA does not exclude non-Indians from placement\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Good Cause Exception Facilitates the Protection of Indian Children's Best Interests in Specific Cases",
        "reference": "B. Nearly All States Have Laws Similar to the ICWA's Preference for Extended Family",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion Is Inconsistent with the Robust Constitutional Protections for Civil Liberties the Supreme Court Articulated in NAACP v. Alabama\nA. NAACP v. Alabama Protects Supporter Lists to Ensure Freedom and Privacy of Association\nB. The \"Exacting Scrutiny\" Standard Is Inconsistent with NAACP and Flips the Burden to Americans to Justify Their Right to Privacy in Their Associations\nC. NAACP's Holding and Analysis Apply to All Circumstances of Potential Retribution for Exercising Freedom of Association\nII. The Court Should Not Erode Protections for Minority Opinions\nA. The Administrative State Has Gutted Much of the Constitution's Structural and Textual Protections for Minority Opinions\nB. [MISSING]\nC. NAACP v. Alabama's Holding Should Be Reaffirmed to Restore Freedoms of Association and Speech\nIII. The Court Should Not Threaten the Religious Freedom of Those Who Wish to Practice Anonymous Charitable Giving\nIV. The California Attorney General Lacks Proper Authority under California Law to Demand Charities' IRS Form 990 Schedule Bs\nA. The Attorney General Does Not Have Statutory Authority to Demand Charities' Form 990 Schedule Bs\nB. The Attorney General's Unlawful Demand Violates California's Separation of Powers Doctrine",
        "reference": "B. The Court Should Protect Minority Opinions and First Amendment Civil Liberties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. Establishment Clause Precedents, Starting With Lemon, Should Be Clarified To Permit Long-Standing War Memorials To Remain\nA. Confusion Exists in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence\nB. The Peace Cross Is a Historic Display, Equivalent to an Outdoor Museum, and the Establishment Clause Does Not Forbid Such a Display\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Court Of Appeals' Decision Is An Affront To Our Nation's Military Families",
        "reference": "II. The Court Of Appeals' Decision Threatens The Widespread Use Of The Cross To Recognize Valor And Memorialize Sacrifice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS MAY BE WAIVED, AND IN MOST CONTRACTUAL CONTEXTS, WAIVER FOCUSES EXCLUSIVELY ON THE ACTIONS OF THE WAIVING PARTY WITHOUT REGARD TO THEIR EFFECTS ON OTHERS\nA. The Contract Law of the Vast Majority of States Treats Waiver as a Unilateral Concept that Does Not Require Prejudice to the Other Contracting Party\nB. [MISSING]\ni. Waiver Differs from Estoppel in that the Latter, but Not the Former, Requires that Another Party Suffer Prejudice from the Estopped Party's Inconsistent Acts\nii. Laches Is an Unreasonable Delay in Enforcing a Known Right, Which, Like Estoppel, Requires Prejudice\niii. In the Vast Majority of Jurisdictions, Arbitration Is the Only Contractual Context in Which Courts Require Prejudice to Prove Waiver IMPOSING A PREJUDICE REQUIREMENT SPECIFIC TO WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO ARBITRATE IS CONTRARY TO THE FAA\nA. The FAA's Equal-Treatment Principle Prohibits Engrafting a Prejudice Requirement onto the Waiver Standard Where Arbitration Rights Are at Stake\nB. There Is No Other Textual Basis in the FAA for a Prejudice Requirement\ni. \"Default\" Was and Is a Unilateral Term Connoting a Failure to Perform Under a Contract\nii. Other Provisions of the FAA Confirm that There Is No textual Basis for a Prejudice Requirement\nIII. THE HEIGHTENED STANDARD FOR PROVING WAIVER THAT MANY COURTS REQUIRE INTERFERES WITH FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTES OF ARBITRATION WHILE ENCOURAGING GAMESMANSHIP AND DELAY",
        "reference": "B. Courts Distinguish Contractual Waiver from Other Doctrines Requiring Prejudice, but Collapse the Distinction When Agreements to Arbitrate Are at Issue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Properly Apply the Clear Statement Doctrine\nB. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Conduct the \"Careful Examination\" Necessary to Determine Whether and to What Extent the United States Held an Implied Federally-Reserved Water Right in the Nation River\nC. An Implied Federally-Reserved Water Right Does Not Give Any Right to a Particular Waterway Beyond a Priority to Use a Designated Quantity of Water\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Even if the United States Holds an Implied Federally-Reserved Water Right, Such a Right Does Not Give the United States \"Title\" in the Nation River",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS IMPERMISSIBLY SEEK TO APPLY THE ATS EXTRATERRITORIALLY\nA. The ATS's Focus Is Where The Plaintiffs' Injury Occurred, And Here All Of Plaintiffs' Injuries Occurred Overseas\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Policies Underlying The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Weigh Against Entertaining This Suit\nII. DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE ATS\nA. There Is No Specific, Universal, Obligatory International-Law Norm Of Corporate Liability\nB. Congress, Not The Judiciary, Must Be The One To Create Domestic Corporate ATS Liability",
        "reference": "B. Under Any Reasonable Focus Inquiry, Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged Sufficient Domestic Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-248_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners Assert Interests Only as Agents of an Existing Party and thus Cannot Intervene Under Rule 24\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners Seek to Join This Case as Agents of an Existing Party, Not as Third Parties\nII. The Attorney General Is Entitled to a Presumption that He Adequately Represents the State's Interests\nA. This Court's Precedent and Rule 24's Text, History, and Context Establish a Presumption of Adequacy in Identity-of-Interest Cases\nB. The Presumption of Adequacy Applies With Greater Force Where the State Represents the Proposed Intervenors' Interest\nC. Eliminating the Presumption Would Burden the Judiciary and Existing Parties and Draw Courts into Political Disputes\nD. Petitioners' Remaining Arguments Lack Merit\nIII. Adequacy Determinations Are Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion\nA. This Court's Precedent Requires Abuse-of-Discretion Review\nB. Rule 24(a)(2)'s Text, Structure, and History Support Abuse-of-Discretion Review\nC. District Courts Are Best Positioned To Assess Adequacy\nIV. The Court Should Affirm the Denial of Intervention or, at Minimum, Remand\nA. If the Court Reaches the Question, It Can Affirm Denial of Intervention With or Without a Presumption of Adequacy\nB. Rule 24(a)(2)'s Interest Prong Requires Remand",
        "reference": "A. Rule 24(a) Applies to Third Parties, Not Existing Ones",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.87
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Immediate Review Is Not Warranted.\nA. The Petition Presents No Legal Issue Warranting This Court's Immediate Review.\nB. Petitioners Have Not Shown That Immediate Review Is Warranted.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Government Does Not Dispute That Three Of The Four Preliminary Injunction Factors Overwhelmingly Favor Respondents.\nB. The Rescission Of DACA Is Subject To Judicial Review.\nC. Respondents Are Likely To Prevail On The Merits Of Their APA Claims.",
        "reference": "II. The Decision Of The Court Of Appeals Is Correct.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. MARITIME LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT LIABILITY FOR INJURIES ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY PRODUCTS THE DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE, SUPPLY, OR DISTRIBUTE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There Is No \"Integrated Product Rule\" In Maritime Law\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S RULE NEEDLESSLY CREATES INCONSISTENCY AND UNPREDICTABILITY\nA. Maritime Law Does Not Support Liability Based Solely On \"Foreseeability.\"\nB. The Third Circuit's Rule Is Neither Limited Nor Workable\nC. A \"Clear Majority\" Of States Has Not Adopted Plaintiff's Proposed Rule\nIII. MARITIME LAW'S SPECIAL SOLICITUDE FOR SAILORS DOES NOT WARRANT MASSIVELY EXPANDING LIABILITY HERE\nIV. RESPONDENTS' PROPOSED EXPANSION OF LIABILITY IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE NAVY'S PLENARY CONTROL OVER NAVAL SHIPS AND EQUIPMENT",
        "reference": "A. GE Provided Turbines To The Navy For The USS Turner Without Insulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-200_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. COURTS ARE ILL-SUITED TO MAKE POLICY DECISIONS CONCERNING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF DIRECT LISTINGS",
        "reference": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION THREATENS THE VIABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE OFFERING METHODS AND, IF UNCORRECTED, WILL HAVE BROAD ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Commission's ALJs are constitutional officers subject to the Appointments Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Commission's ALJs exercise \"significant authority\"\n1. An ALJ who adjudicates a dispute on behalf of the Commission performs important executive functions\n2. In presiding over proceedings of the Commission, an ALJ serves a role comparable to that of a trial judge\nC. The reasons given below for treating the Commission's ALJs as employees are unpersuasive\nD. The appointment of the ALJ in this case did not comply with the Appointments Clause\nII. Statutory restrictions on removal of the Commission's ALJs must be narrowly construed in light of serious separation-of-powers concerns\nA. The President's constitutional responsibility to faithfully execute the laws requires adequate authority to remove subordinate officers\nB. To avoid serious constitutional concerns, this Court should narrowly construe \"good cause\" restrictions on removing ALJs",
        "reference": "A. The Appointments Clause prescribes the manner for selecting officials who exercise \"significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "The Court Should Expressly Overrule Pennsylvania Fire\nA. Expressly overruling Pennsylvania Fire would comport with the Court's stare decisis principles\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Expressly overruling Pennsylvania Fire would help preserve interstate federalism",
        "reference": "B. Expressly overruling Pennsylvania Fire would help deter forum shopping",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 2's Text Requires Inquiry into Voter Opportunity, Not Outcomes\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Construction Would Enlist the Courts in a Partisan Project of Maximizing Minority Voting Rates\nC. Section 2 Was Not Aimed at Race-Neutral Time, Place, or Manner Rules\nD. The Ninth Circuit's Construction Would Render section 2 Unconstitutional\nII. ARIZONA'S BALLOT-HARVESTING LAW IS NOT INTENTIONALLY DISCRIMINATORY",
        "reference": "I. ARIZONA'S ELECTION RULES COMPLY WITH section 2'S RESULTS TEST BECAUSE THEY PROVIDE EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO ALL VOTERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. In Brutus Trading, the District Court Gave No Scrutiny to the Government's Justification for Dismissal, Utterly Ignoring the Relator's Competing Evidence\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. In Brutus Trading, the District Court Abandoned Basic Procedural and Evidentiary Norms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-437_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\nA. The plain language of section 1326(d) creates mandatory requirements that an alien must establish to assert a right to bring a collateral attack on a prior removal proceeding\nB. Legislative history supports overturning the Ninth Circuit's approach to collateral attacks\nII. NINTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENTS CONFLICT WITH THE ACCEPTED UNDERSTANDING OF FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AND USURP CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY OVER IMMIGRATION",
        "reference": "1. NINTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENTS CONFLICT WITH THE INA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE FRAMERS WERE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH THE DANGER TO DEMOCRACY POSED BY VIOLENT INSURRECTION AND EXECUTIVE DESPOTISM.\nIII. PETITIONER POSES AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO OUR DEMOCRATIC ORDER.",
        "reference": "I. OUR DEMOCRACY REQUIRES ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION, EVEN WHEN INCONSISTENT WITH MAJORITY WILL.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. ANCs Are \"Indian Tribes\" Under ISDEAA And The CARES Act\nA. Congress Plainly Meant What It Said When It Expressly \"Includ[ed]\" ANCs in ISDEAA's Definition of \"Indian Tribe\"\nB. The Court of Appeals' Contrary Construction is Untenable\n1. The construction adopted below renders Congress' express inclusion of ANCs a nullity\n2. Subsequent Acts of Congress confirm that ANCs are \"Indian tribes\" under ISDEAA\n3. [MISSING]\nII. Because ANCs Are \"Indian Tribes\" Under ISDEAA, They Are Eligible For Relief Funds Under Title V Of The CARES Act\nIII. Respondents' Construction Of ISDEAA And The CARES Act Would Be Disastrous For Alaska Native Communities",
        "reference": "3. The construction adopted below rests on a fundamentally mistaken \"term-of-art\" premise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. AMAZON'S THIRD-PARTY MERCHANT PROGRAM MUST BE CONSIDERED IN EVALUATING SOUTH DAKOTA'S STATUTE\nA. Amazon Controls All Aspects Of Transactions On Its Marketplace\nB. [MISSING]\nII. SOUTH DAKOTA'S STATUTE IS UNWORKABLE AND DISCRIMINATORY IN ITS APPROACH TO SMALL BUSINESSES WHOSE PRODUCTS ARE SOLD ONLINE BY AMAZON\nA. South Dakota's Law Violates The Due Process Rights Of Amazon's Third-Party Merchants\nB. South Dakota's Law Substantially And Unduly Burdens Interstate Commerce Of Small Online Businesses\nC. South Dakota Uses Its Law To Impermissibly Discriminate In Favor Of Amazon And Against Third-Party Merchants",
        "reference": "B. Under Existing Laws In Every State, Amazon Should Be The Sole Party Responsible For Collecting Any Sales Tax Due On Sales Of Products Supplied By Third-Party Merchants",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Atextual National Parks Standard Has Caused Numerous Circuit Splits, Creating Substantial Uncertainty Regarding The Proper Application Of Exemption 4\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. National Parks Is Extraordinarily Burdensome And Affects A Wide Range Of Industries A. Adhering To Exemption 4's Plain Language Would Alleviate The Substantial Burdens National Parks Imposes B. National Parks Risks Deterring Companies From Sharing Information With The Government And Participating In Government Programs C. Exemption 4 Affects A Wide Range Of Industries And Types Of Information",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit Erred in Concluding That PTAB APJs Are \"Principal\" Officers Under the Appointments Clause\nII. This Is an Important Issue That This Court Should Address\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. There Are Good Reasons Not to Wait for Another Case to Remedy This Error",
        "reference": "III. Answering the U.S. Government's First Question Can Potentially Resolve All Issues Raised by the Erroneous Federal Circuit Decision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no empirical evidence that exclusive representation in the public sector is dependent on agency fees\nA. Harris v. Quinn and state-interest arguments for agency fees\nB. The CPS methodology for examining union membership in right-to-work environments\nC. The payroll-deduction methodology\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Union Viability, State Interest, and Constitutional Standards in Light of the Data\nII. Michigan's experience suggests this Court should provide a clear and simple process for public workers to end financial support for a union if they so choose\nA. Membership and dues and fee income for the Michigan Education Association, the state's largest public-sector union filing an LM-2, in a new right-to-work environment\nB. Michigan public-sector unions' response to right to work\nC. National implications of Michigan's right-to-work transition",
        "reference": "D. Briefly Assessing the CPS Data and Union Membership Rates",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SERVICE VIOLATED THE TEXT AND INTENT OF THE ESA BY DESIGNATING UNIT 1 CRITICAL HABITAT\nA. [MISSING]\n1. \"Habitat\" Must Be Habitable; Otherwise, It Is Not Habitat\n2. Unit 1 Is Not Essential to the Conservation of the Species\n3. Courts Must Give Effect to Unambiguous Intent of Congress as Expressed in the ESA\nB. Legislative History Demonstrates the Service Exceeded Its Authority When It Designated Unit 1 as Critical Habitat\nC. The Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine Requires Court To Reject the Service's Interpretation of the Act\nII. THE SERVICE'S DECISION NOT TO EXCLUDE UNIT 1 FROM CRITICAL HABITAT DESPITE THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE DESIGNATION IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW\nA. That the APA Commits Some Decisions to Agency Discretion Not Subject to Judicial Review Does Not Mean This Decision Is Unreviewable\n1. Challenging Agency Action: When Agency Action Is Committed to Agency Discretion and Unreviewable by Law\na. The \"No Law To Apply\" Standard Should Be Limited\nb. Justice Scalia Offers a Better Approach Than the \"No Law To Apply\" Standard\n2. Applying the Scalia Test, the Service's Decision Weighing Economic Impact with Conservation Benefits Should Be Subject to Judicial Review\n3. Objections to Judicial Review Do Not Hold Up to Scrutiny\na. Permissive Language of section 4(b)(2) Does Not Mean That Decisions Made Pursuant to That Power Are Unreviewable\nb. The ESA May Provide No \"Meaningful\" or \"Substantive\" Standard by Which To Measure a Decision Not To Exclude, But Both the Constitution and the APA Do\nB. The Lower Court's Decision Conflicts Plainly with Bennett v. Spear",
        "reference": "A. The ESA Requires Critical Habitat Be Habitable and Essential for the Conservation of a Species",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.59
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Innovation and Patent Protection are Key to Sustainability\nA. Pioneering Innovation Lies at the Heart of Sustainable Technologies\nB. Nature's Fynd is a Pioneering Innovator of Sustainable Protein Sources\nII. Broad, Reliable Patent Protection is Consistent with the Constitution's Objective of Promoting the Useful Arts\nA. Broad Patent Protection and a Reasonable Application of the Enablement Requirement Incentivize and Reward Technological Pioneers for Their Creative Efforts\nB. Broad Patent Protection Encourages Follow-On Innovators to Invent\nC. Reliable Patents Protecting the Quid Pro Quo Encourage Investments in Sustainable Technologies\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Imposing an Unduly Burdensome Enablement Standard Will Impede Innovation by Encouraging Innovators to Resort to Trade Secrets",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Section 1324a(b)(5) does not expressly preempt the State's prosecutions of Respondents\nIII. Through IRCA, Congress has not occupied any field that impliedly preempts these prosecutions\nIV. These prosecutions do not conflict with federal law and pose no obstacle to any federal interest",
        "reference": "I. Respondents were convicted of using stolen social security information on state and federal tax withholding forms, not fraud on the employment verification system",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Whole Woman's Health Cannot Establish Jurisdiction\nA. Fear of private lawsuits does not create standing to sue executive officials or judges\nB. Any risk of fee-shifting under section 4 of SB 8 is entirely speculative\nC. \"Indirect enforcement\" does not create standing or avoid sovereign immunity\nD. [MISSING]\nII. The United States Failed to Establish Jurisdiction\nA. The United States is not legally adverse to Texas\nB. The United States cannot use a suit against Texas as a proxy to sue those whom it cannot sue directly\nC. The United States has no injury-in-fact to support a Fourteenth Amendment claim\nD. The United States faces no injury for its preemption and intergovernmental-immunity claims\nIII. The United States Cannot Proceed in Equity\nA. The United States has no equitable cause of action\nB. Texas is not undermining any congressional enforcement scheme\nIV. Neither Injunctive nor Declaratory Relief Is Permissible\nA. Suing Texas does not permit the district court to enjoin private individuals, judges, and local officials\n1. The district court erred in enjoining Texas's judicial officials\n2. Private citizens do not become the State's agents by filing lawsuits\n3. The injunction cannot bind local government officials\nB. An award of declaratory relief is not before the Court and is unavailable regardless\nV. SB 8 Is Constitutional",
        "reference": "D. The Attorney General \u2014who does not enforce SB 8 \u2014cannot be an appropriate defendant",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO PRACTICAL REASON TO DENY A REMEDY MERELY BECAUSE THE FATAL SHOT STRUCK SERGIO HERNANDEZ ON THE MEXICAN SIDE OF THE BORDER\nII. THE DECISION BELOW MISUNDERSTOOD THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD, THE NATURE OF THE HERNANDEZ FAMILY'S CLAIMS, AND MEXICO'S INTEREST IN FAIR TREATMENT OF ITS NATIONALS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. An Excessive Force Claim Against a Law Enforcement Officer Is Not a Diplomatic or Foreign Policy Question\nC. This Case Does Not Involve National Security Concerns\nD. This Case Does Not Involve Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law\nIII. THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDERTAKEN AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE A REMEDY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO INDIVIDUALS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER",
        "reference": "A. An Excessive Force Claim Against a Law Enforcement Officer Is Not a \"New Context\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit had authority to issue a decision, and a controversy still exists\nA. The All Writs Act provided jurisdiction for the decision below\nB. The case falls within the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness\nC. This case presents a poor vehicle to address mandamus jurisdiction\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The decision below does not warrant this Court's review",
        "reference": "II. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that shackling every pretrial detainee in every non-jury proceeding without any showing of need denies due process of law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 1117(a)'s Text Forecloses a Willfulness Requirement\nB. The Statutory Structure Forecloses a Willfulness Requirement\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Lanham Act's Policies Counsel Against a Willfulness Requirement",
        "reference": "C. Fossil's Reliance on Background Legal Principles Lacks Merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. A GENERIC TERM COMBINED WITH A GENERIC TOP-LEVEL DOMAIN IS NOT PER SE GENERIC\nA. TOP-LEVEL DOMAINS AND TRADEMARK LAW\n1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF gTLDs\n2. PROTECTABLE MARKS\n3. GENERIC TERMS\n4. THE PTO'S TREATMENT OF gTLDs\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE COURT SHOULD BE MINDFUL OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONCERNS",
        "reference": "B. GENERICNESS OF A MARK SHOULD BE EVALUATED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals' decision conflicts with this Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez\nB. This Court's review is warranted\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This case is a good vehicle for deciding the question presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit's decision is grounded in the text of Section 2 and Thornburg v. Gingles\nB. There is no circuit split on the Section 2 vote denial test\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE HOLDING DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW\nIII. THIS CASE IS NOT A PROPER VEHICLE FOR REVIEW",
        "reference": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE SECTION 2 VOTE DENIAL TEST DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN A LEADER HISTORICALLY ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROHIBITION OF TORTURE\nA. Commitment To The Laws Of War And A Revulsion To Torture Existed At The Founding Of The Republic\nB. The Union's Lieber Code And The U.S. Government's Post-World War II Recommitments Confirmed That Torture Has No Place In The Republic\nII. THE UNITED STATES IS OBLIGATED UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW TO REFRAIN FROM AND PROHIBIT TORTURE.\nA. The Geneva Conventions Bind The United States\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE DOES NOT PROHIBIT DISCOVERY IN THIS CASE\nA. The RDI Program Represented A Significant Break From The Past\nB. The RDI Program Alienated Allies And Undermined The Global Human Rights Regime\n1. The United States Faced Significant Blowback from Allies\n2. The RDI Program Undermined U.S. Military and Intelligence Efforts\nC. The Government's Claim For Secrecy Is Not Supported By The Facts\nD. The Court Need Not Rule On The Scope Of The State Secrets Doctrine In General, As It Is Unlawful To Rely On It To Prevent Disclosure Of Evidence Of Torture\nE. If The Court Decides To Address The Scope Of The State Secrets Privilege, It Should Bar The Privilege's Application In Cases Involving Torture",
        "reference": "B. The United States Has Obligations To Refrain From And Prohibit Torture Under The CAT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-419_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Adopting West Virginia's Incorrect Interpretation Of 4 U.S.C. section 111 And Davis Would Risk Unfair Tax Treatment For 2.6 Million Federal Annuitants Nationwide, Not Just Retired Federal Marshals In West Virginia\nII. Adopting West Virginia's Incorrect Interpretation Of 4 U.S.C. section 111 And Davis Would Cause Serious Hardship For 2.6 Million Federal Annuitants\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. State Retirees Often Receive More Generous Retirement Benefits Than Federal Retirees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "A. Goodyear remains good law and resolves the question presented here\nB. Sound trademark policy supports the conclusion that adding a top-level domain to a generic term does not create a protectable mark\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Respondent's survey evidence does not provide a sound basis for treating BOOKING.COM as a registrable trademark",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Due process requires permitting pre-enforcement review of Notice 2016-66\nIII. This Court should construe the AIA to respect due process and avoid constitutional infirmity.\nIV. The IRS's pattern and practice of rule-of-law violations must be subject to judicial review",
        "reference": "I. The decision below conflicts with this Court's decision in Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Brohl",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED SPEECH IS NOT \"PREFERRED\" OVER OTHER SPEECH\nA. An employee's subjective motivations cannot transform government speech into private, protected speech\n1. Whether a matter is of public concern is not contingent on the employee's subjective beliefs or motivations\n2. Employee speech in the course of their duties falls beyond the scope of the First Amendment, regardless of subjective beliefs or motivations\n3. Expanding protection of government employees' speech to matters of public or private concern does not resolve the Petitioner's paradoxical theory\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Governmental examination of a speaker's motivations or beliefs has no place in the application of content-neutral restrictions on speech\n2. Petitioner's interpretation would require the government to impose a prior restraint on any and all expressive activity\nII. EFFORTS TO GROUND A SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN THIS COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE ARE FATALLY FLAWED\nIII. PRIVILEGING RELIGIOUS SPEECH WOULD HAVE WIDESPREAD HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES\nA. Privileging government employees' religious speech would be harmful in numerous and unforeseeable contexts\nB. Privileging religious speech inevitably forces the government to select between speakers expressing conflicting beliefs\nC. Privileging religious speech will conflict with other constitutional obligations\nIV. HEIGHTENED PROTECTION FOR RELIGIOUSLY MOTIVATED SPEECH MUST NECESSARILY EXTEND TO THOSE EXPRESSING EQUIVALENT NONTHEISTIC WORLD VIEWS",
        "reference": "B. Granting heightened protection to religiously motivated private speech undermines basic principles of the freedom of speech and expression",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.79
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Post-declination, the government lacks the unilateral authority to dismiss a relator's FCA case\nA. The FCA's text and structure establish that the government cannot invoke Section 3730(c)(2)(a) after \"declin[ing]\" to \"proceed with the action\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. EHR's constitutional arguments are insubstantial and no excuse for rejecting a proper interpretation of the statute\nII. At a minimum, the FCA imposes ordinary constitutional baselines that preclude seeking dismissal for irrational or arbitrary reasons",
        "reference": "B. The FCA's history and purpose confirm that the government cannot invoke Section 3730(c)(2)(a) after \"declin[ing]\" to \"proceed with the action\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PATENT IS A PUBLIC RIGHT, NOT PRIVATE PROPERTY\nII. THE PTAB IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM\nA. Patent Examiners Make Mistakes\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The PTAB Saves Millions of Dollars in Litigation Costs\n2. The PTAB is a Useful Tool Against Anticompetitive Patent Trolling",
        "reference": "B. The PTAB is an Economically Efficient Means of Eliminating Bad Patents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The inseverability clause continues to declare the individual mandate essential\nB. Under Barr and Seila Law, the inseverability clause controls the proper scope of remedy\nII. The District Court Properly Declared the ACA Unenforceable Anywhere\nA. The ACA injures States, and there is no basis to limit the remedy to the individual plaintiffs\nB. Because the district court did not order an injunction, many of the United States' arguments are not before the Court\nC. The United States should not be permitted to contest the portions of the judgment it agreed to below",
        "reference": "I. The District Court Properly Declared the ACA's Major and Minor Provisions Invalid",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Copyrightability of Portion of a Work Must Not Be Considered in Isolation; Infringement Analysis Is the Better Course\nA. Copyrightability Applies to Whole Works Only; the Statute Limits Copyrightability and Exclusive Rights to the \"Work\"\nB. Unless the Entire Work Is Copied, \"Uncopyrightable\" Scope Limitations Should Be Considered Only During Infringement Analysis\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Bodily Appropriation\n2. Non-literal Infringement\n3. Noninfringing Reuse of Unprotectable Expression\nD. Isolating the Copyright Inquiry Rather than Considering Infringement Leads to Confusion; Myopic Focus on Copyrightability Loses Context\nII. When Viewed Through the Context of Infringement, Google's Use of the Software Interface Is Not Within the Scope of Oracle's Copyright Protection\nA. The District Court Improperly Narrowed the Scope of the Work for Comparison\nB. The District and Appellate Courts Improperly Separated Copyrightability from the Infringement Inquiry\nC. Separating Copyrightability and Infringement Was both Improper and Unhelpful; Analyzing the Question in Terms of Filtered Infringement Allows for Straightforward Analysis\nD. In the Context of Google's Compatible Compiler, Reuse of the API Declarations Is Noninfringing; Even if Copyrightable Expression Were Used, It Is Incidental to Use of Ideas and Methods of Operation\n1. Java May Be Copyrightable as a Whole, but the Court Need Not Decide About the Declarations\n2. Google's Use of Comment-Free Declaring Code Was Necessary to Effectuate a Compiler that Used the Same Commands as Java\n3. Necessary Reuse Should Be Filtered Out; When the Use of the Declarations Is Filtered Out, Google Did Not Infringe as a Matter of Law",
        "reference": "C. Properly Framing the Inquiry on Infringement Rather than Copyrightability Is Vital in Complex Cases Because It Shifts Focus to Why Reuse Was Necessary",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Cable Operators Have First Amendment Rights That Are Burdened by the PEG-Channel Requirement\nA. Cable Operators Have First Amendment Rights in the Selection and Transmission of Cable Programming\nB. When This Court Last Considered the PEG-Channel Requirement, It Did Not Decide the Provision's Constitutionality\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Regardless of How It Resolves the Dispute in This Case, This Court Should Make Clear in Its Opinion That It Is Neither Holding Nor Implying That the PEG-Channel Requirement Is Constitutional",
        "reference": "C. The PEG-Channel Requirement Significantly Burdens the First Amendment Rights of Cable Operators",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FAA does not require enforcement of agreements to waive representative, private attorney general claims\nA. Viking's DRP prohibits Moriana from asserting a PAGA cause of action in any forum\nB. Nothing in the FAA's text, structure, or stated purposes requires enforcement of agreements to waive statutory claims\n1. The FAA favors enforcement of agreements to arbitrate claims, not to preclude them\n2. Nothing in the FAA's purposes requires enforcement of agreements to waive claims\nC. [MISSING]\nII. A PAGA claim does not involve procedures incompatible with arbitration\nA. The FAA does not authorize waivers of claims just because they are complex and involve potentially large stakes\nB. PAGA claims are compatible with arbitration's \"bilateral\" nature\nC. Viking's claim that representative proceedings are inconsistent with arbitration contradicts Congress's contemporaneous understanding\nIII. The FAA's saving clause provides further support for California's anti-waiver rule\nIV. The State did not consent to waive its statutory right to civil penalties under PAGA\nV. Viking's policy arguments are meritless",
        "reference": "C. Viking's assertion that PAGA claims are subject to waiver under the FAA because they arise under state law and are \"procedural\" rather than \"substantive\" is meritless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.77
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Statutory Text of ISDA and CARES Includes ANCs\nB. Congress Either Uses the ISDA Definition to Include ANCs or Sharply Different Language to Exclude Them\nC. [MISSING]\nD. According ANCs Only Lesser \"Tribal Organization\" Status Frustrates the Self-Determination of Alaska Natives and Their Participation in Specific ISDA-Based Federal Programs",
        "reference": "C. The D.C. Circuit's Ruling Denies CARES Tribal Relief Funding Entirely for Some Alaska Natives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Background On The Inter Partes Review Process\nA. Inter partes review was intended to be efficient and limited\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Court's Decision Will Impact PTAB Stakeholders And Inter Partes Review Practice Going Forward\nA. The Court's decision may affect reviewability of time-bar determinations beyond the facts of this case\nB. The Court's decision could have major implications for inter partes review practice more generally\nIII. PTAB Bar Association Stakeholders Have Differing Views About How This Court's Decision May Affect The Inter Partes Review Balance",
        "reference": "B. The inter partes review process balances the interests of patent owners and patent challengers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. A proportionality rule is essential to give Rule 23(e)'s \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" requirements meaning\nA. This Court should resolve the circuit split over the meaning of \"fair\" and \"reasonable\" \"with the interests of absent class members in close view.\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit's decision is ahistorical\nII. The Court should reject the Ninth Circuit's holdings, which create perverse incentives\nA. \"Feasible\" means \"feasible.\"\nB. The appearance of impropriety precludes the cy pres recipients here\nIII. The Court has jurisdiction",
        "reference": "B. The proportionality rule makes the most economic and policy sense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Medicare Outpatient Prospective Payment System\nB. The 340B Program\nC. OPPS Payment Policy for 340B Drugs\nII. The Current Payment Policy For 340B Drugs Furthers the Goals of the OPPS\nA. The Prior Payment Policy Was Inefficient and Inequitable to Medicare Providers\nB. The Current Payment Policy Reallocates Savings to All Hospitals\nIII. The D.C. Circuit's Decision was Correctly Decided\nIV. The Secretary's Budget Neutrality Adjustment is Not an Issue in this Case",
        "reference": "I. Overview of the OPPS and the 340B Program",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court Has Never Articulated A Principled Basis For The Narrow-Construction Canon\nII. There Is No Basis For The Narrow-Construction Canon\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because The Narrow-Construction Canon Has A Significant Impact In Lower Courts",
        "reference": "III. The Narrow-Construction Canon Is Especially Pernicious As Applied To Unambiguous Statutes Like Exemption 4",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-489_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. There is no conflict among the circuits warranting the Court's attention\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This case is a poor vehicle for reaching the question presented\nD. Petitioner's attempt to conflate a violation of the automatic stay with a violation of the discharge injunction is unpersuasive",
        "reference": "B. The question presented is unimportant",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. IN THE ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL SCRUTINY, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ABUSE THEIR POWER TO IMPOSE FINES FOR MINOR VIOLATIONS OF LAW\nA. Daily Fines in Florida\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Fines for Residential Landscaping Choices\nII. WITHOUT EXCESSIVE FINES PROTECTION, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WILL EXPAND FORFEITURE ABUSES TO INCLUDE MORE NON-CRIMINAL ACTIVITY",
        "reference": "B. Fines for Violating an Unusable Easement in California",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. CountryMark, as a farmer-owned cooperative, has long advanced the cause of renewable fuels\nII. Because it is a farmer-owned small refinery in Indiana, CountryMark faces unique challenges to increasing renewable fuels\nA. Ethanol\nB. Diesel and Biodiesel\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Tenth Circuit's decision threatens financial ruin for CountryMark",
        "reference": "III. CountryMark requires an SRE in some years even though it has been able to comply with its RVO obligations without an SRE in other years",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENTS' NON-CAUSAL APPROACH DISTORTS PRECEDENT\nA. Under The Proper Defendant-Focused Inquiry, Specific Jurisdiction Requires A Causal Connection\nB. A Causal Test Furthers The Principles Behind Due-Process Limits On Specific Jurisdiction\nII. RESPONDENTS' TEST WOULD UPEND SETTLED PERSONAL-JURISDICTION PRECEDENT\nA. A Relatedness Test Is Formless\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. THERE IS NO CAUSAL LINK BETWEEN RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS AND FORD'S MONTANA OR MINNESOTA CONDUCT",
        "reference": "B. Policy Concerns Do Not Warrant Departing From Clear Due-Process Rules",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Congress Enacts PROMESA, Which Includes Title VI's Consensual Restructuring Process For Puerto Rico Instrumentalities And Their Bondholders\nIII. The Puerto Rico Legislature Creates The Debt Recovery Authority To Restructure GDB Debts Under Title VI\nIV. The DRA Issues \"New Bonds\" That Resolve The GDB's $4.7 Billion In Debt\nV. Aurelius' Position Risks Harming Puerto Rico And Undermining Hard Negotiated Compromises",
        "reference": "I. The Government Development Bank For Puerto Rico Falls Victim To The Puerto Rico Fiscal Crisis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ministerial exception protects the courts from exercising governmental authority to review religious determinations\nII. [MISSING]\nA. If discovery is needed to decide if the ministerial exception applies, discovery should be limited to that issue\nB. If trial is necessary, courts should consider bifurcating trial on the ministerial exception from trial on the merits\nC. Orders denying the application of the ministerial exception should be immediately appealable",
        "reference": "II. Because of the protections afforded by the ministerial exception, its application should be determined before courts reach the merits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Java SE's Declaring Code And Organization Are Copyrightable.\nA. Java SE's declaring code and organization, which Google conceded are original, are protected under section 102(a).\nB. Section 102(b) codifies the idea/expression dichotomy, and Oracle seeks protection only for its particular expression, not ideas.\nC. Google's merger argument is meritless.\n1. Merger is inapplicable because Java SE's authors had countless ways to express the ideas embodied in the platform.\n2. Copying Java SE's exact words and organization was not necessary for Google to express the ideas.\n3. Google's proposed interoperability exception is misplaced and inconsistent with the Act.\nII. Google's Superseding Use Of Oracle's Copyrighted Work Was Not Fair Use.\nA. The Court of Appeals applied the correct standard of review.\nB. Google's copying is an unfair superseding use.\n1. Factor one: Google's use was commercial and for the same purpose as Oracle's.\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Factor three: Google's copying was substantial.\n4. Factor four: Google's concededly \"competing\" product harmed Java SE in actual and potential markets.\nC. Google's additional considerations cannot establish fair use.\nIII. Google's Policy Arguments Are Misplaced And Misguided.",
        "reference": "2. Factor two: Google copied creative and expressive portions of Oracle's work.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Grafting the FDCPA onto Michigan's Non-judicial Foreclosure Statute Created an Actual and Material Conflict\nC. The Definition of \"Debt Collector\" Should Not Be Construed to Include Attorneys Effecting Non-judicial Foreclosures",
        "reference": "A. Michigan's Non-judicial Foreclosure Statute Protects Michigan Consumers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Glover's arguments are inconsistent with this Court's reasonable suspicion precedents\nA. There was no need for Deputy Mehrer to explain his training, experience, or subjective motivations for this stop\nB. Reasonable suspicion does not require statistical evidence\nC. When an officer has reasonable suspicion, the officer is not required to obtain additional evidence before making an investigatory stop\nD. Glover's \"balancing\" argument is contrary to this Court's precedents",
        "reference": "I. Reasonable suspicion here was based on the totality of the circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-43_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Title III orders in this case were overbroad, not \"insufficient\"\nB. Suppression is unwarranted because the mistake in the orders is not a fundamental defect\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The legal mistake in the orders here did not prevent the government from relying on them to intercept communications over the tapped phones\nC. Any insufficiency arising from the overbreadth of the orders in this case would be severable",
        "reference": "1. Title III requires suppression for facial errors only when they are sufficiently fundamental to prevent the government from relying on the order to conduct interception",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Neither the Convention nor ICARA requires consideration of ameliorative measures upon a finding that return poses a grave risk of harm\nA. The court of appeals erred in requiring courts to consider ameliorative measures in every case involving a finding of grave risk\n1. The text of the Convention and ICARA does not require courts to consider ameliorative measures\n2. A discretionary approach to ameliorative measures accords with the longstanding view of the State Department, which finds support in international understandings of the Convention\nB. A court's discretion to consider ameliorative measures should be guided by the principles of the Convention, not by inflexible rules\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The case should be remanded to allow the lower courts to properly exercise their discretion in the first instance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-389_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATE LAW APPLIES ON THE OCS IF IT IS \"APPLICABLE\" AND \"NOT INCONSISTENT\" WITH FEDERAL LAW\nA. Under The Ordinary Meaning Of \"Applicable,\" State Legal Standards Apply On The OCS If They Are Relevant, Suitable, Or Fit\nB. Under The Ordinary Meaning Of \"Not Inconsistent,\" State Law That Is Not Incompatible With Or Not Contradictory To Federal Law Applies On The OCS\nII. CALIFORNIA'S WAGE-AND-HOUR LAWS ARE RELEVANT AND NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FLSA\nA. California's Wage-And-Hour Laws Are \"Applicable\" Because They Are Relevant To The Pertinent Subject Matter\nB. California's Wage-And-Hour Laws Are \"Not Inconsistent\" With Federal Law Because Both The FLSA And OCSLA Contemplate Application Of More Protective State Labor Laws\nIII. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS LACK MERIT\nA. Accepted Principles Of Statutory Interpretation Preclude Petitioner's Reading Of \"Applicable\"\n1. The statutory text lends no support to petitioner's contention that \"applicable\" should be interpreted to require a gap in federal law before state law applies\n2. Petitioner misunderstands how law applies on federal enclaves\n3. Petitioner ignores important distinctions Congress established between \"jurisdiction,\" \"administration and enforcement,\" and \"applicable\" law\n4. Any purported ambiguities in the legislative history cannot override the text's plain meaning\nB. Petitioner's Attempt To Manufacture Inconsistency Between California's Wage-And-Hour Laws And The FLSA Ignores Both Statutes' Text And Purpose\n1. \"Not inconsistent\" does not mean \"not different\"\n2. Nothing in OCSLA requires ignoring the FLSA's savings clause\nIV. PETITIONER'S APPROACH CREATES ADMINISTRABILITY PROBLEMS\nA. Sound Policy Counsels For Making The Same Legal Standards Apply To Employees Working Onshore Or Offshore\nB. Petitioner's Interpretation Disrupts Established Methods Of Applying State Laws On Federal Enclaves\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Other Policy Considerations Argue For Rejecting Petitioner's Interpretation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.74
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The County's appropriation of title to Ms. Tyler's condominium is a taking for public use requiring just compensation.\nA. The \"private property\" is the condominium.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The County's taking satisfies the \"public use\" requirement.\nD. The \"just compensation\" owed is the fair market value of the condominium less the amount of the tax debt and related expenses.\nII. The government's interest in tax collection does not excuse it from paying just compensation when it takes property worth more than the taxes owed.\nIII. Permitting the government to take property to collect a tax debt without compensating the owner for the value exceeding the debt creates skewed incentives that disproportionately harm vulnerable people.",
        "reference": "B. The County's acquisition of title to the condominium is a \"taking.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Extraterritorial Taxation Would Burden Internet Services, and the Startups and Small Businesses That Rely on Them\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Online Tools That Facilitate Tax Compliance Do Not Fully Resolve the Burden on Small Businesses Using the Internet to Operate Nationally\nII. Departing from Precedent Could Have a Significant International Impact, and Encourage Protectionist Policies Abroad\nIII. E-Commerce Retailers Do Not Live a Tax-Free Existence",
        "reference": "A. The Digital Economy Has Thrived Under a Limited Regulatory Framework",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress' Progressive Expansion of Servicemembers' Employment Protections Was Intended To Facilitate Effective Warfighting.\nB. Full Application of USERRA is Necessary to Protect the United States' Military Recruitment and Retention Efforts.\nC. Veterans Constitute a Great Number of State and Local Government Employees and, Upon Return from Service, Increasingly Face Workplace Discrimination.\nII. USERRA's Alternative Enforcement Provision is Ineffective.",
        "reference": "I. The Court of Appeals' Invalidation of a Federal Statute Hinders the United States' Warfighting Ability.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. INDEFINITE DETENTION AT GUANTANAMO BAY\nA. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COLLAPSE OF GUANTANAMO MYTHMAKING\n1. Judicial Rejection of Government's Assertion of Total Executive Prerogative\n2. Exposure of Central Untruths Undergirding Guantanamo Detentions\nB. OTHER EXAMPLES OF EXECUTIVE OVERCLASSIFICATION AND EXAGGERATION CAUSED SERIOUS HARM\n1. Deaths at Guantanamo\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Secrecy Around \"Targeted Killing\" Law and Policy\n4. Rendition to Torture\nC. THE DISTRICT COURTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED EXPERTISE AND COMPETENCE IN MANAGING HABEAS CASES WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE GOVERNMENT'S ASSERTED INTEREST IN NATIONAL SECURITY.",
        "reference": "2. Hunger Strikes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. New York has chosen to designate its public access channels as public forums\nA. State and local governments possess discretion to designate public forums\nB. New York\u2014unlike most other states\u2014has designated its public access channels as public forums\nC. [MISSING]\n1. New York City owns and controls its public access channels\n2. Alternatively, there is a public easement\nD. Congress vested local governments with discretion to experiment\u2014and the wisdom of establishing public forums is properly a local decision\nE. This case does not address other public access structures, cable operators, the Internet, or private property\nII. Administering a public forum is a public function\nA. The Constitution governs the performance of public functions\nB. Administering a public forum is a public function\nC. The public function doctrine precludes circumvention of the First Amendment",
        "reference": "C. New York's choice is consistent with the underlying property rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners' \"Circuit Split\" Is Illusory\nA. The Circuits Agree on the Applicable Test for Section 2 Vote-Denial Claims\nB. The Test that the Circuits Have Applied Is Fact-Intensive and so Yields Different Results in Different Circumstances\nII. The Decision Below Was Correct\nA. The Decision Below Followed the Statute's Plain Text\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Decision Below Correctly Found Discriminatory Intent\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Addressing the Questions Presented\nA. The ARP Petitioners Lack Standing\nB. The Brnovich Petitioners Lack Standing to Appeal the OOP Policy Against the Secretary's Wishes\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Constitutional Ruling Makes H.B. 2023 a Poor Vehicle for Reviewing Section 2's Results Test",
        "reference": "B. The Decision Below Correctly Applied Section 2's Results Test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit has improperly rewritten Section 102(b)\nA. The Federal Circuit Improperly Deleted Important Exclusions from Copyright Protection\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Courts can and should determine when computer functionality is copyrightable; Several non-exclusive factors can help\nA. Does the Work in Question Meet the Definition of a Computer Program That Does Not Fall Within the Statutory Exclusions?\n1. A System for a Language Used to Write Computer Programs vs. a Program Written With That Language\n2. A Computer Interface vs. a Program That Implements That Interface\n3. The \"Certain Result\" of a Program vs. the Program Itself\n4. Does the Work in Question Define a Method of Operating a Machine?\nB. Does the Primary Value of the Work Derive from Network Effects Created by the User's Learning and Investment in the Subject Matter?\nC. Could a Separate Copyright Registration Have Been Obtained on the Subject Matter?\nD. Is the Work a \"Necessary Incident\" to the System?\nE. Not Coincidentally, Some of These Factors Also Militate in Favor of Fair Use\n1. Strong Network Effects Militate in Favor of Fair Use\n2. Fair Use Favors the Borrowing of a Small, Functional Component of a Work\nIII. The Federal Circuit has improperly usurped Congress' role in ensuring that copyright serves its constitutional purpose",
        "reference": "B. The Federal Circuit Effectively Added Language to Section 102(b) That Doesn't Appear in the Statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief036.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Establishment Clause Does Not Compel Public Schools to Purge From Public View All Religious Exercise of Coaches and Teachers",
        "reference": "I. The Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses Doubly Protect Kennedy's Religious Exercise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE PROTECTION UNDER THE CATEGORICAL RULE, AS THEY HAVE IN CALIFORNIA\n1. Practical Considerations Already Limit Police Use of Warrantless Entries and the Potential for Abuse of the Categorical Rule\na. Nature of the Crime\nb. Public Safety\nc. Officer Safety\nd. Public Scrutiny\ne. Civil Liability\n2. Department Policy, Officer Training, and Internal Review Deter Potential Police Overreach\na. Warrantless Entries\nc. Vehicle Pursuit Policies\nd. Foot Pursuit Policies\ne. Internal Review\n3. [MISSING]\nB. REJECTING THE CATEGORICAL RULE WILL INCREASE THE STRAIN ON LIMITED POLICE RESOURCES BY ENCOURAGING MISDEMEANANTS TO FLEE INTO RESIDENCES, WHICH WILL REQUIRE A MUCH LARGER POLICE RESPONSE\nIV.",
        "reference": "3. Existing Law Provides Civil and Criminal Judicial Remedies to Address Unlawful Entries by Police onto Private Property",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.07
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Belated Motions to Dismiss Risk Undermining the Purposes and Objectives of the False Claims Act",
        "reference": "I. The False Claims Act Does Not Permit the Government to Belatedly Move to Dismiss a Qui Tam Action Without First Intervening and Showing Good Cause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1215_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I.A debtor's statement describing a single asset or debt is a \"statement respecting the debtor's financial condition.\"\nA.The plain text governs\n1.\"Respecting\" is a broadening term\n2.The Court gives effect to broadening terms\n3.The phrase as a whole compels the Eleventh Circuit's construction\n4.Lamar cannot account for the term \"respecting\" \u2014 and its position yields bizarre and arbitrary results\nB.Lamar disregards three decades of Fourth Circuit experience\nC.The [MISSING]\nII.Section 523(a)(2)'s lineage confirms the Eleventh Circuit's construction\nIII.The Eleventh Circuit's construction advances Section 523(a)(2)'s express purposes\nA.Congress expressly designed the debtor protections in (2)(B) to apply to statements that do not reveal overall net worth\nB.Writing promotes accurate transactions and reliable dispute resolution\nC.This case exemplifies the problems inherent in reconstructing the details of decade-old oral conversations\nIV.Appling prevails under Lamar's new rule",
        "reference": "C.The statutory text undermines Lamar's \"honest debtor\" maxim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Louisiana's Act 620 Advances the State's Interest in Women's Health by Bringing Outpatient Abortion Clinics Into Conformity With Preexisting Law\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Act 620's admitting privileges requirement ensures that physicians are credentialed and equipped to provide continuity of care\n1. Admitting privileges requirements are a widely recognized, congressionally sanctioned means of protecting all patients\n2. The admitting privileges requirement enhances continuity of care\nII. The Record Shows Plaintiff Abortion Providers Cannot Demonstrate Third-Party Standing, Because Their Interests Diverge From Those of Their Patients, Including Black Women",
        "reference": "A. Louisiana's interest in women's health furthers racial equality, because black women obtain most abortions and thus face the most health risks from abortion, in Louisiana and nationwide",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-177_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION PROPERLY REMEDIES THE VIOLATION OF RESPONDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Injunction Implements The Constitutional Prohibition Against Compelled Speech\nC. The Record Substantiates The Harm To Respondents\nII. LEGAL SEPARATION DOES NOT PREVENT CONSTITUTIONAL HARM BECAUSE SPEECH BY CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AFFILIATES IS ATTRIBUTED TO RESPONDENTS\nIII. THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY ARGUMENTS FAIL",
        "reference": "A. This Court's Reasoning In AOSI Confirms That Imposing The Policy Requirement On \"Clearly Identified\" Affiliates Violates Respondents' Freedom Of Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-8369_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Dismissal For \"Failure To State A Claim\" Entered Without Prejudice Is Not A Strike Under Section 1915(g)\nA. \"Dismissed On The Grounds That Relief May Be Granted\" Is A Legal Term Of Art That Refers To With-Prejudice Dismissals\nB. The PLRA's Structure Confirms That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For \"Failure To State A Claim\" Do Not Count As Strikes\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Respondents' Approach Punishes Litigants Who Have Meritorious Claims That Merely Suffer From Technical, Curable Defects\nB. Petitioner's Interpretation Provides Courts With Ample Tools To Deter Vexatious Prisoner Suits",
        "reference": "II. Respondents' Interpretation Does Not Further The PLRA's Objectives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. NOMINAL DAMAGES SERVE TO VINDICATE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS MINORITIES\nA. Nominal Damages Are A Vital Tool For The Vindication Of Absolute Rights When No Actual Damages Are Available\nB. The Lower Court's Decision Provides Insufficient Protection For Religious Minorities",
        "reference": "I. SPEECH ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES MUST BE PROTECTED WITH PARTICULAR VIGOR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Specific jurisdiction over a defendant is permissible where a plaintiff has been injured in the forum by a product that the defendant has systematically marketed, sold, and serviced in the forum\nII. Ford's proposed causation test runs contrary to decades of this Court's personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence and would undermine the values of federalism, fairness, and predictability that it serves\nA. Ford's proposed causation test runs contrary to this Court's cases\nB. Ford's proposed causation rule would deprive states with the strongest interest in the controversy of their ability to protect their injured citizens\nC. [MISSING]\nD. In even the simplest cases, Ford's proposed rule would be unworkable, unpredictable, and inefficient\n1. Ford's causation test is subjective, difficult to apply, and would lead to unpredictable and inconsistent results\n2. Ford's rule would lead to wasteful preliminary and duplicative litigation\nIII. The consequences Ford attributes to a non-causal relatedness standard are hyperbolic and avoidable",
        "reference": "C. Depriving injured forum residents of access to their own courts would be manifestly unfair",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE \"ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.\" FROM WHICH THE CLAIM ARISES\nA. The Statute's Text And Structure Require Substantial Assistance To The \"Act Of International Terrorism\"\nB. Plaintiffs' Reliance On JASTA's Preamble Is Misguided\nC. Plaintiffs Fail To Address The Common Law Jurisprudence And Misread Halberstam\nII. SECTION 2333(d) REQUIRES \"KNOWINGLY\" PROVIDING SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE\nA. Plaintiffs Do Not Allege The Requisite Knowledge Regardless Of Whom Or What Defendants Must Have Substantially Assisted\nB. Plaintiffs Wrongly Seek To Replace Section 2333(d)'s Knowledge Requirement With Recklessness\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. TWITTER'S CONSTRUCTION CAPTURES GENUINE WRONGDOERS WITHOUT TRANSFORMING ORDINARY BUSINESSES INTO INDEMNITORS FOR TERRORISM",
        "reference": "C. Plaintiffs' Criticisms Of The Statutory Knowledge Standard Are Incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "THE REGISTRABILITY ISSUE IN THIS CASE COMPELS THE GRANT OF CERTIORARI ON THE AWARDABILITY OF LEGAL COSTS IN NO. 18-1309\nI. Options For Judicial Review Of The USPTO's Adverse Rulings On Trademark / Service Mark Applications\na. Direct Appeal To The Federal Circuit\nb. De Novo Adjudication By Civil Action In District Court\nII. The BOOKING.COM Service Mark\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Split of Authority in the Circuits Compels the Grant of Certiorari in No. 18-1309",
        "reference": "III. The Singularity Of The Legal Costs And Registrability Issues In This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-949_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A NILCA Excludes Alaska's Navigable Waterways from the National Park Service's Regulatory Authority\nA. A NILCA's Plain Text Prohibits NPS from Regulating Navigable Waters Within Alaska's CSUs\nB. Subjecting Alaska's Navigable Waters to NPS Regulatory Authority Would Be Contrary to the Purpose, Structure, and History of ANILCA\nC. At a Minimum, Nothing in ANILCA Reflects a Clear Congressional Intent to Subordinate State Regulation to NPS Regulation with Respect to Navigable Waters in Alaska CSUs\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Reserved Water Rights Do Not Constitute a \"Title\" Interest Under Section 103(c)\nB. The Hovercraft Ban Exceeds the Scope of any Reserved Water Rights the United States Might Hold\nIII. NPS's Alternative Arguments Lack Merit",
        "reference": "II. The Reserved Water Rights Doctrine Provides No Basis for Upholding the Hovercraft Ban",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-315_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Sections 1254a and 1255 Allow Eligible TPS Recipients To Adjust Status\nA. TPS Recipients Are \"Inspected and Admitted\" for Purposes of Adjusting Status\nB. The Third Circuit's Contrary Reasoning Is Flawed\nC. The Government's Alternative Interpretation of Section 1254a(f)(4) Is Incorrect\nII. The Overall Statutory Scheme Confirms the Plain-Text Interpretation\nA. The Act's Purpose Confirms That TPS Recipients May Adjust Status\nB. The Act's History Confirms That TPS Recipients May Adjust Status\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Statute Is Unambiguous\nB. The Agency Adjudications Do Not Warrant Deference",
        "reference": "III. The Court Should Not Defer to the Agency Adjudications Invoked by the Government",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. STATE-LED NIMBYISM HISTORICALLY HAS BEEN A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO NATURAL GAS PIPELINE EXPANSION\nIII. THE DECISION BELOW CREATES A SIGNIFICANT HOLD-UP PROBLEM FOR PIPELINE COMPANIES WITH FERC-APPROVED ROUTES, AS COLUMBIA'S EXPERIENCE SHOWS",
        "reference": "I. CONGRESS INTENDED STATES TO VET THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS PROJECTS THROUGH THE FERC PROCESS, NOT VETOING PIPELINE COMPANIES' EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-601_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Kentucky's sovereignty interests predominate the timeliness analysis\nA. The States decide who speaks for them in court\nB. Intervention to hand off litigation to another state official is timely if it does not otherwise delay the case\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Attorney General is otherwise entitled to intervene",
        "reference": "II. Sovereignty aside, the Attorney General timely moved to intervene",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lower courts have incorrectly applied the Establishment Clause\nA. Lemon provides a poor foundation for deciding Establishment Clause claims\nB. All nine Justices in Town of Greece employed a history-based approach instead of Lemon\nC. The Proclamation does not violate the Establishment Clause\n1. The Proclamation does not create state control over doctrine, governance, and personnel of a church\n2. The Proclamation does not compel church attendance\n3. The Proclamation provides no financial support to any church\n4. The Proclamation does not prohibit worship\n5. The Proclamation does not cede important public functions to church institutions\n6. The Proclamation does not restrict political participation to members of any church\nII. Respondents' religious-targeting claim should be evaluated under the Free Exercise Clause instead\nA. Targeting of a particular religious group has historically been viewed as a Free Exercise, not an Establishment Clause, problem\nB. Lukumi provides the proper framework for using the Free Exercise Clause to combat claimed religious targeting\n1. Does the law facially target religion?\n2. Does the law, in its general operation, result in a religious gerrymander?\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Does the law give the government open-ended discretion to make individualized exemptions?\n5. Has the law been selectively enforced?\n6. Does the law's historical background show that the lawmaker's purpose was to discriminate based on religion?\n7. Does the law discriminate between religions?\nC. Because Free Exercise claims are usually subject to strict scrutiny and relief is plaintiff-specific, the choice of Clause matters\nD. A proper Free Exercise analysis would focus on the facts concerning specific plaintiffs",
        "reference": "3. Does the law fail to apply analogous secular conduct?",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-389_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FLSA, Not California Wage-and-Hour Law, Supplies The Applicable Federal Law On The OCS\nII. California Wage-and-Hour Law is Inapplicable on the OCS Because the FLSA Provides the Applicable Federal Wage-and-Hour Rules\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Applying California Wage-and-Hour Law on the OCS Produces Results Congress Never Intended",
        "reference": "III. California Wage-and-Hour Law Does Not Extend to the OCS Because It is Inconsistent With the FLSA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5554_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "FLORIDA UNARMED ROBBERY IS NOT A \"VIOLENT FELONY\" UNDER THE ELEMENTS CLAUSE OF THE ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT\nA. In the ACCA, \"Physical Force\" Means \"Violent Force\"\n1. \"Violent Force\" Requires a \"Substantial Degree of Force\"\n2. The Government's \"Capable\" Test Disregards that \"Violent Force\" Requires a \"Substantial Degree of Force\"\n3. A \"Minor\" Use of Force Is Not \"Violent Force\"\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Florida Robbery Can Be Committed by Any Degree of Force, Provided it Overcomes Resistance\n2. Physical Resistance by the Victim May Be Slight\n3. Florida Robbery May Be Committed by Only the Slight Degree of Force Necessary to Overcome Slight Resistance\n4. The Government Acknowledges That Conduct Materially Indistinguishable From, and Even Less Forceful Than, Conduct Criminalized in Florida Does Not Involve \"Violent Force\"\nC. Treating Florida Robbery as an ACCA \"Violent Felony\" Would Conflict with Congress' Purpose of Targeting Only Those Offenders Likely to Commit Gun Violence",
        "reference": "B. Florida Robbery Lacks \"Violent Force\" as an Element Because the Offense Requires Only a Slight Degree of Force",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Review This Case Because the Circuit Split Presents Significant Article II Problems.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. By holding that ADA tester plaintiffs have Article III standing, two courts of appeals currently allow private citizens to exercise executive power.\nII. This Court's Review is Needed to Prevent the Rapidly Growing Problems with Private Parties Wielding Executive Power.",
        "reference": "A. Article II bars private citizens from exercising unsupervised executive power.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1269_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. FDIC'S EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ARE UNAVAILING\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THIS CASE IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT",
        "reference": "II. FDIC DOES NOT ATTEMPT TO DEFEND THE BOB RICHARDS RULE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, Prejudice Is Presumed If An Attorney Disregards An Instruction To File A Notice Of Appeal\nB. This Court Should Not Create An Exception For Cases In Which A Defendant Has Signed An Appeal Waiver\n1. An attorney's failure to file an appeal at the direction of his client results in the forfeiture of an entire proceeding\n2. An attorney's failure to file an appeal requested by his client usurps a decision committed to the client alone\n3. It would be profoundly unfair to require defendants to make an individualized showing of prejudice\nII. A Test That Requires A Defendant To Prove Prejudice In The Presence Of An Appeal Waiver Is Impractical And Inefficient\nA. The State's Rule Is Unworkable\nB. The State's Rule Wastes Judicial Resources",
        "reference": "I. The Presumption Of Prejudice Applies When An Attorney Fails To Notice An Appeal At The Direction Of A Defendant Who Has Signed An Appeal Waiver",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1348_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioner's pre-trial consent to have a criminal charge severed solely for his benefit waives his right to argue that an acquittal obtained during the initial trial on the non-severed charges bars the later trial on the severed charge\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Criminal defendants can waive their double-jeopardy right against successive prosecutions by taking certain actions before and during trial, and they should be able to waive the right to issue preclusion in the same manner\n1. Issue preclusion is one aspect of the right against successive trials, which is waived when the defendant takes an action, unrelated to culpability and prior to an acquittal, that results in the need for a second prosecution\n2. Even if issue preclusion is to be analyzed separately from the right against successive trials, Petitioner's consent to severance waived his right to argue the issue-preclusive effect of the acquittals at the second trial\n3. Defendants like Petitioner have a meaningful choice in deciding whether to sever charges or to have all charges tried together\nII. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia should be affirmed because Petitioner cannot establish that the jury necessarily determined an issue of ultimate fact in his favor\nA. Issue preclusion does not prevent the government from introducing evidence of basic facts litigated in a previous trial\nB. Petitioner cannot carry his burden of showing that the jury at the burglary trial necessarily decided that he never possessed the firearms",
        "reference": "A. Issue preclusion has limited application in the criminal context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Because ACA Was Not Enacted in Accord with the In Toto Requirement of the Presentment Clause, ACA Is Void Ab Initio\nA. The Bicameral and Presentment Clauses Set Forth the Exclusive Procedure for Enacting Federal Legislation\nB. The In Toto Component of the Presentment Clause Requires the Enactment of Every Provision in a Presented Bill, Not a Subset of the Bill's Provisions\nC. Because ACA's Operative Provisions Are a Subset of HR 3590's Provisions, the In Toto Component of the Presentment Clause Was Violated\nII. Because ACA's Text Confirms That the Individual Mandate Is Indispensable to ACA, It Is Not Severable from ACA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Individual Mandate Should Not Be Severed from ACA Because the Severability Doctrine Needs Revision\nIII. The Individual Mandate Does Not Comply with the \"Other Requirements in the Constitution,\" Namely the Origination Clause",
        "reference": "A. As an Essential Part of ACA, the Individual Mandate Is Inseverable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court Compromises Its Legitimacy When It Jettisons Neutral Principles to Reach a Desired Outcome",
        "reference": "I. A Clear Policy Preference Has Emerged for Denying Citizens Their Day in Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The phrase \"person acting under color of law\" authorizes individual-capacity actions\nB. \"[A]ppropriate relief\" against a person acting under color of law includes monetary damages\nC. Reading RFRA in light of Section 1983 confirms these",
        "reference": "I. RFRA AUTHORIZES MONEY DAMAGES AGAINST INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal common law governs the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses\nA. Raiders's new theory is waived\nB. Raiders's new theory is wrong\n1. Before Wilburn Boat, federal law governed the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses\n2. Since Wilburn Boat, federal law has governed the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses\nII. The federal presumption of enforceability can be overcome only by federal public policy\nA. The prevailing rule in federal courts supports applying federal policy\nB. Congressional judgments support applying federal policy\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The core values of maritime law support applying federal policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. This case involves only censure\nII. Wilson's historical arguments lack merit\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Allowing retaliation claims like Wilson's would entangle courts while undermining First Amendment values",
        "reference": "III. The permissibility of legislative censure does not turn on Wilson's \"punishment\" label",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. COLORADO EQUIVOCATES ON PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION\nA. Plaintiff Below and Amicus are not \"Public Accommodations\"\nB. Colorado Fails to Rightly Distinguish True Public Accommodations\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Essence of the First Amendment is To Protect Speech Disfavored by the State or the Majority.\nB. No End Can Justify the Unconstitutional Means Chosen by Colorado.\nC. The First Amendment's Role in Our Constitutional Structure Underscores the Prohibition",
        "reference": "II. THE FUNDAMENTAL DUTY OF THE COURT IS TO PROTECT SPEECH OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE MAJORITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS FAVOR THE CENSUS BUREAU PROVIDING THE PRESIDENT AND THE PUBLIC WITH INFORMATION \u2014 NOT SUPPRESSING INFORMATION\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. PERMITTING THE CENSUS BUREAU TO REPORT THIS INFORMATION IS IMPORTANT FOR REDISTRICTING PURPOSES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-587_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. DACA's rescission was not arbitrary and capricious because DACA is unlawful\nA. DACA violates the APA because it did not go through notice-and-comment\nB. DACA violates the INA, the Constitution, and international treaty law\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Courts cannot unilaterally expand the APA's standard of review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Administrative Procedure Act Itself Does Not Answer the Question Presented; the Administrative Procedure Act Applies to Both Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Adjudications\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Initial Decisions of SEC ALJs Become Administratively Final Only After the Commission Takes Action; Likewise, Some Decisions of SSA ALJs Become Administratively Final Only After SSA's Appeals Council Takes Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The relief awarded fails to satisfy Article III's requirements\nA. The \"chilling effect\" injury supporting the judgment is now moot and has always been too speculative\nB. Any alternative apportionment-based injuries are also too speculative\nII. The Presidential Memorandum is lawful under the statutory and constitutional provisions governing apportionment\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Reapportionment Act does not require the President to include all illegal aliens within the apportionment base\nC. Appellees' constitutional claims should be rejected for the same reasons",
        "reference": "A. The Census Act permits the President to direct the Secretary, when taking the census and tabulating the population, to consider administrative records and include two sets of numbers in his report",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-863_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. \"A notice to appear\" is unambiguously a specific notice document.\nA. The statute's text and structure require a specific document.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The government's interpretation is inconsistent with the purposes behind the relevant statutory provisions.\nD. Other interpretive principles confirm the statute's plain meaning.\nII. The Board's decision is not entitled to deference.",
        "reference": "B. The government's interpretation is irreconcilable with the statute's history.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court should grant certiorari because the holding in Grutter has allowed colleges to unconstitutionally consider applicants' race in the admissions process\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Other elite colleges and universities appear to engage in racial balancing\nC. Even without the data, practices by the admissions department show that Harvard is \"obsessed with race\"\nII. This Court should grant certiorari because the Grutter decision conflates diversity of color with diversity of thought in a way that harms college students",
        "reference": "A. Data shows that Harvard engages in racial balancing through its admissions process",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. BASED ON FOLSOM, THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S FAIR USE RULING\nA. Prior to Folsom, Courts Did Not Consider Abridgments of Original Works To Constitute Copyright Infringement\nB. In Folsom, Justice Story Held That a Secondary Work Reliant on Verbatim Copying from a Copyrighted Original Work Infringed the Original Work's Copyright\nC. Under Folsom, Google's Use of Oracle's Copyrighted Code Was Unfair as a Matter of Law\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. GOOGLE'S PROPOSAL TO EXPAND FAIR USE TO REQUIRE FORCED SHARING WITH COMPETITORS IS UNJUSTIFIED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Certiorari Is Warranted To Clear Up Persistent Confusion Over The Scope Of Trinity Lutheran",
        "reference": "I. This Court's Review Is Needed To Resolve A Serious Conflict Over When The Establishment Clause Can Justify Religious Discrimination",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 5.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-827_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court of Appeals Correctly Reversed the District Court's Dismissal of the Application, Which Seeks Discovery of Nonprivileged Information.\nA. As They Have Done Twice Before, Mitchell and Jessen Can Testify to What They Saw, Did, and Heard at Black Sites, Without Mentioning Their Locations.\nB. The Historical Fact of a Polish Black Site Is Not a State Secret.\nC. Mitchell and Jessen Cannot \"Officially Confirm or Deny\" Anything.\nD. Under Reynolds, Abu Zubaydah's Strong Showing of Necessity Required More Careful Judicial Review.\nE. There Is No Heightened Risk from Transmitting Nonprivileged Information Abroad.\nII. There Is No Basis for Replacing the Reynolds Doctrine with a Standard of Blind Deference, as the Government Seems to Suggest.\nIII. The Government's Abuse-of-Discretion Argument Is Not Properly Before this Court and, In Any Event, Is Without Merit.\nA. The Government's New Argument Was Not Raised in Its Petition for Writ of Certiorari or in the District Court.\nB. The Government's Abuse-of-Discretion Argument Mischaracterizes the District Court Proceedings.\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. In Any Event, There Was No Abuse of Discretion by the District Court.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. VA's Defiance Of A Statute's Plain Terms Is \"Clear And Unmistakable Error,\" Whether Or Not The Error Is Enshrined In A Regulation\nA. CUE includes misinterpretations of unambiguous statutes\nB. The legislative history of the CUE provisions supports that scope\nC. Analogous standards of error include misinterpretations of unambiguous statutes\nII. There Is No Basis For Reading Into CUE An Exclusion For Errors That Arise From VA's Application Of Its Own Invalid Regulations\nA. The pro-veteran canon counsels against adopting an atextual reading of the CUE statutes that harms veterans\nB. Neither the Government nor the Federal Circuit has provided a sound justification for reading in an exclusion for errors that arise from VA's application of invalid regulations\n1. Correcting VA's misapplication of an unambiguous statute involves no change in legal interpretation\n2. That VA adjudicators are bound to adhere to the agency's own unreasonable interpretations does not make those interpretations reasonable\n3. [MISSING]\nIII. Under A Proper Statutory Construction, Mr. George Is Entitled To CUE Relief",
        "reference": "3. The CUE statutes expressly displace default finality principles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Statutory Text and Structure Establish That \"Full Costs\" Means Taxable Costs\nB. Historical Practice Confirms That \"Full Costs\" Means Taxable Costs\nII. CONSTRUING \"FULL COSTS\" TO INCLUDE NON-TAXABLE EXPENSES WOULD MAKE BAD POLICY",
        "reference": "I. THE COPYRIGHT ACT'S AUTHORIZATION FOR \"FULL COSTS\" IS LIMITED TO TAXABLE COSTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. A GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED OCCUPATION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, EVEN WHEN PERIODIC OR INTERMITTENT, \"CHOPS\" THROUGH THE \"BUNDLE OF RIGHTS\" AND EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING\nC. AN APPROPRIATED EASEMENT EFFECTS A PER SE TAKING, REGARDLESS OF THE FREQUENCY OR INTERMITTENCY OF THE EASEMENT'S USE",
        "reference": "A. THE ACCESS REGULATION VIOLATES THE \"PUBLIC USE\" REQUIREMENT OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. There is a 2-1 circuit split over who qualifies as an exempt \"transportation worker\" under Section 1 of the FAA.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. These important and recurring issues warrant the Court's review now.\nD. This case is an excellent vehicle.",
        "reference": "B. Respondent's implausible claim that this Court has already decided the question presented reflects her incorrect view of the merits.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. JUDAISM IS THE ORIGINAL PRO-LIFE RELIGION. IT WAS THE FIRST RELIGION IN HUMAN HISTORY TO SANCTIFY HUMAN LIFE FROM CONCEPTION TO NATURAL DEATH AND TO PROHIBIT CHILD SACRIFICE\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. ABORTION IS ANTITHETICAL TO TORAH PRINCIPLES, ALL OF WHICH PROVIDE SENSIBLE, EFFECTIVE, AND WHOLESOME GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN THRIVING AND HUMAN INTERACTION, BOTH PERSONALLY AND PROFESSIONALLY, THE ACT OF ABORTION, AND THE INDUSTRY THAT PROMOTES AND BENEFITS FINANCIALLY FROM IT, VIOLATE ALL JEWISH ETHICS AND MORALS\nIV. JEWISH EXPERIENCES HISTORICALLY AS STATE SPONSORED TARGETS OF GENOCIDE AND EUGENICS GIVE US A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO RECOGNIZE THE INJUSTICES WROUGHT ON OUR INNOCENT BROTHERS AND SISTERS IN THE WOMB",
        "reference": "II. THE PROHIBITION OF ABORTION IN JUDAISM HAS ONE NARROW EXCEPTION, TO SAVE THE LIFE OF THE MOTHER IN EXTREMELY RARE CIRCUMSTANCES. THIS EXCEPTION IS REFLECTED IN EVERY PRO-LIFE LAW AND SHOULD NOT BE USED TO JUSTIFY UNLIMITED LEGAL ABORTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6943_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. A submission presented under Rule 59(e) is subject to AEDPA's limitations on second or successive habeas applications\nA. Rule 59(e) provides no exception to AEDPA's general bar on relitigating the denial of habeas relief\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner's arguments for allowing second or successive habeas applications under Rule 59(e) are unsound\nII. An unauthorized second or successive habeas application does not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal simply because the applicant invokes Rule 59(e)",
        "reference": "B. A Rule 59(e) exception to AEDPA's relitigation bar would flout congressional design",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS ENACTED THE APA AND CREATED THE ALJ POSITION TO PROVIDE FOR OPEN AND FAIR DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PUBLIC\nII. CURRENT ALJ SELECTION, APPOINTMENT, PROTECTIONS, AND INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE APA\nIII. THE REMEDIAL RAMIFICATIONS IF THE SEC ALJ APPOINTMENT PROCESS IS FOUND TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nA. Final Judgments\nB. Pending Cases Not Yet Final\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Prospective Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Establishment Clause should be interpreted in accordance with historical practices and understandings.\nII. Respondent's view of coercion is unmoored from history and inconsistent with the best of our traditions.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Offense and endorsement standards can lead to discrimination against religious viewpoints.\nC. The proper, historical standard would involve legal penalties or privileges not at issue here.",
        "reference": "A. Establishment Clause coercion requires something more than a feeling of discomfort.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Extraterritoriality is not a \"Special Factor\" Counseling Hesitation in Finding a Bivens Remedy\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality is a statutory canon of construction\n2. The reasons behind the presumption \u2014concern about conflicts with foreign law, concern for U.S. sovereignty, and an assumption that Congress acts domestically \u2014are not implicated here\n3. The presumption against extraterritoriality runs in the opposite direction for constitutional cases\nB. This Court has long recognized remedies for unconstitutional actions taking place outside the United States\nC. The cases relied on by the lower court are incorrect and distinguishable\nII. This Case Does not Implicate Extraterritoriality Under This Court's Tests\nA. The \"focus\" of the Fourth Amendment is action by federal agents\nB. The shooting took place in an area under U.S. control",
        "reference": "A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality is Inapplicable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Natural Gas Act Does Not Strip District Courts Of Jurisdiction To Hear As-Applied Challenges To Condemnations\nA. The text of the Natural Gas Act is clear\n1. Nothing in the Act's text strips district courts of jurisdiction to resolve as-applied arguments\n2. The government's argument disregards the Act's command that district courts follow the \"practice and procedure\" of state courts hearing condemnation cases\nB. The government's reading of the Natural Gas Act ignores other exclusive-jurisdiction statutes\nC. None of this Court's precedents require a contrary reading of the statute\nII. Canons Of Statutory Construction Also Counsel Against Adopting The Government's Position\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The government's reading of the law would lead to absurd results\nC. The government's reading of the statute would create constitutional problems",
        "reference": "A. Eminent-domain statutes must be strictly construed against a condemnor",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. A Pre-Enforcement Suit Against the Threatened Enforcement of S.B. 8 Can Proceed Under a Variety of Approaches",
        "reference": "II. The Approach Used by Texas Could Be Used Against Numerous Other Constitutional Rights and With Even More Abusive Deterrents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1275_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Atomic Energy Act occupies the field of nuclear safety regulation, and it preempts any state uranium mining ban that is motivated by concerns about the radiological safety of federally regulated uranium milling and tailings management\nA. The federal government has exclusive authority to regulate nuclear safety except to the extent that it has delegated that authority to States\nB. State laws that are grounded in nuclear safety concerns about AEA-regulated activities are preempted\nC. [MISSING]\nII. If Virginia's uranium mining ban was motivated by radiological safety concerns, it is barred by conflict-preemption principles because it is inconsistent with the judgment of federal authorities that uranium milling and tailings management can be safely conducted if performed in accordance with federal requirements.",
        "reference": "C. Because petitioners have credibly alleged that Virginia's uranium mining ban was motivated by nuclear safety concerns about federally regulated milling and tailings management, their complaint should not have been dismissed.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Copyright Act Itself Precludes Petitioner's Approach\nB. Petitioner's Approach Misreads Campbell\nII. Keeping \"Purpose And Character\" At The Heart Of The First Factor Facilitates Proper Analysis Of The Third And Fourth Factors Too",
        "reference": "I. The First Fair Use Factor Is The \"Purpose and Character of the Use\" \u2014 Not Petitioner's Watered-Down \"Meaning or Message\" Standard",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-381_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Smagin's Response To Petitioners' Textual Analysis Of Section 1964(c) Fails\nB. Smagin's Response To The Common-Law Location-Of-Injury Rules Fails\nII. At Minimum, Injuries To \"Intangible\" Property Are Suffered At The Plaintiff's Domicile\nIII. Smagin's Conduct-Based Test Is Meritless\nIV. Smagin's Remaining Arguments Are Unpersuasive",
        "reference": "I. A RICO Plaintiff Is Injured At Its Domicile",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1170_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL THEORY FAILS TO STATE A VALID BASIS FOR LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL WIRE FRAUD STATUTE\nI. [MISSING]\nA. The Mail And Wire Fraud Statutes Extend Solely To Schemes To Obtain Money Or Property\nB. The Right-To-Control Theory Impermissibly Extends Beyond Traditional Property Interests\n1. No property right exists to make informed economic decisions\n2. Withholding potentially valuable economic information does not automatically deprive the victim of property\nC. The Right-To-Control Theory Transgresses The Statutory Requirement That The Scheme Aim To Obtain Money Or Property\nII. THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL THEORY DEFIES THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL FRAUD LAWS\nA. The Right-To-Control Theory Runs Counter To The Statute's Limited Protection Of Intangible Rights\nB. The Right-To-Control Theory Undermines This Court's Holding In Skilling\nC. The Right-To-Control Theory Collapses Discrete Statutory Elements, Thereby Lightening The Government's Burden\nIII. UPHOLDING THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL THEORY WOULD HAVE UNTENABLE CONSEQUENCES\nA. Prosecutions Based On The Right-To-Control Theory Violate Fair Notice Principles And Raise Vagueness Concerns\nB. The Right-To-Control Theory Offends Principles Of Federalism By Upending The Federal-State Balance\nC. Upholding The Right-To-Control Theory Would Run Contrary To The Rule Of Lenity\nIV. PETITIONER'S CONVICTION MUST BE REVERSED",
        "reference": "I. THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL THEORY CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH THE STATUTORY TEXT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1435_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Court Should Explicitly Reject the \"Civic Conception\" of Free Speech and Make Clear that Individual Rights Take Precedence\nB. The Constitution Protects Free Speech to Secure Individual Freedom, Not Primarily to Serve Public Goals\nII. The Minnesota Statute Cannot be Justified on the Basis of Maintaining Order or Preventing \"Influence\"\nA. Preventing \"Persuasion\" or \"Influence\" by Speech is Not a Legitimate Government Interest and Attempting to do so Inherently Amounts to Content-Based Censorship\nB. Maintaining Order is a Legitimate Government Interest, But the Minnesota Ban Does not Appropriately Serve that Interest",
        "reference": "I. Freedom of Speech Belongs to the Individual, Not to Society",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-489_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. STRICT CONTEMPT SANCTIONS UNJUSTIFIABLY INCREASE RISK OF MALPRACTICE\nIII. THE BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL'S BALANCED ANALYSIS WILL NOT LEAD TO THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES ARGUED BY APPELLANT\nIV. THE AMBIGUITY OF THE \"RETURN TO THE FRAY\" DOCTRINE FURTHER SUPPORTS THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING",
        "reference": "I. SUBJECTING ATTORNEYS TO CONTEMPT SANCTIONS FOR ADVANCING REASONABLE AND ZEALOUS LEGAL THEORIES CHILLS LEGAL ADVOCACY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Review is unnecessary because this Court has already answered the question presented\nII. There is no split of authority that warrants this Court's review\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This case is an unsuitable vehicle to address any confusion there might be about the transportation-worker exemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1249_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Price's petition is due to be denied because there is no circuit split",
        "reference": "I. Price's petition is due to be denied because he failed to meet his burden under Baze and Glossip",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-508_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. AN ORDER TO PAY MONEY IS NOT AN \"INJUNCTION\"\nA. Injunctions Operate In Defined Circumstances At Equity\nB. Injunctions Provide Forward-Looking Relief\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Restitution Isn't An Injunction\nII. THE TEXT AND STRUCTURE OF THE FTC ACT CONFIRM THAT SECTION 13(B) DOES NOT AUTHORIZE MONETARY RELIEF\nA. The Text Of Section 13(b) Authorizes Injunctions And Nothing More\nB. The Structure Of The FTC Act Demonstrates That Congress Knew How To Authorize Monetary Relief\nC. It Would Be Unsound For An Implied Remedy To Have Greater Scope Than An Explicit Remedy\nD. The FTC's Reading Of Section 13(b) Is Unsupported By This Court's Precedents\nIII. LIMITING SECTION 13(B) TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BEST SERVES CONGRESSIONAL POLICY\nA. Requiring the FTC To Proceed Through Rulemaking Or A Cease-And-Desist Order Gives Fair Notice To Regulated Entities\nB. The FTC's Atextual Interpretation Of Section 13(b) Leads To Further Uncertainty For Regulated Entities And Courts\nC. Consumers Are Protected By Robust State-Law Remedies\nIV. THE MONETARY JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE IS UNAUTHORIZED\nA. Section 13(b) Does Not Authorize Legal Remedies\nB. The Monetary Judgment Does Not Comply With The Requirements For Equitable Restitution Or Disgorgement",
        "reference": "C. Injunctions Repair Irreparable Harm When Legal Remedies Are Inadequate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.59
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT DISREGARDED ITS CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN DECLINING TO RESOLVE THE MERITS OF THE INCORPORATION QUESTION",
        "reference": "I. THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE APPLIES TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS THROUGH THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Principles that the Court Established in Its \"Plan of the Convention\" Decisions\nA. States Necessarily Surrender Immunity from Suits Brought by the United States or by Other States\nB. On Rare Occasions, a Private Party Suit May Be Treated As a Suit Brought by the United\nC. The Court Has Concluded There Is a Strong Presumption that States Did Not Surrender Immunity from Purely Private Suits\nD. [MISSING]\nE. States' Surrender of Sovereign Policymaking Power Does Not Equate to a Surrender of Sovereign Immunity\nII. Under This Current Doctrine, Texas Retains Its Immunity from Petitioner's Suit\nIII. Petitioner's Arguments Raise Significant Federalism Concerns\nIV. The Court Has Identified Appropriate Mechanisms for Holding States Accountable",
        "reference": "D. The Court Found that Bankruptcy Suits Present a Unique Circumstance",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Subpoenas Should Be Quashed Because of the Plausible Risk They Will Cause Serious Distraction and Diversion From Presidential Duties\na. Any Competent Attorney Would Recognize The Implications of These Broad-Ranging Subpoenas and Would Demand The Client's Immediate and Ongoing Attention \u2014 Confirming Their Serious and Ongoing Distraction\nb. [MISSING]\nc. The Rationales Employed by the Second and D.C. Circuits are Misplaced\nd. This Court Has Recognized the Need for Complete Presidential Immunity To Prevent the Type of Distraction These Subpoenas Portend\ne. The Present Subpoenas Violate the Spirit of Article II and Undermine a Significant Aspect of the 2016 Presidential Election\nf. The Issue Raised by the Petitions is Not a Partisan or Political Issue, But an Institutional Issue Upon Which the Integrity of the Presidential Office Depends\nII. In 19-635, The Subpoena Should Be Quashed Also Because State and Local Authorities May Not Issue Process Which Impairs The President's Ability to Perform His Official Duties",
        "reference": "b. The Virtually Limitless Scope of the Present Subpoenas Distinguishes Them From the Narrow and Discrete Incursions This Court Has Permitted Into the Presidential Sphere",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-438_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Merely Ambiguous Conviction Does Not Trigger Immigration Consequences Under The Categorical Approach\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Mr. Pereida's conviction is ambiguous, so it does not \"necessarily\" establish a disqualifying crime involving moral turpitude\nII. The INA's Burden Of Proof Provisions Do Not Bear On The Categorical Analysis\nA. Burdens of proof do not affect the operation of the categorical approach\n1. Burdens of proof resolve uncertain factual questions only\n2. The categorical approach involves no uncertain question of fact, which is why burdens of proof have not played a role in this Court's cases\nB. Applying the categorical approach to a divisible statute does not depend on any burden of proof either\n1. The modified categorical approach answers the same binary question as the categorical approach\n2. The modified categorical inquiry is not a \"factual\" one\nC. The text, context, and history of section 1229a(c)(4)(A) do not support the Eighth Circuit's contrary interpretation\nD. The Eighth Circuit's inversion of the categorical approach would produce grave practical difficulties",
        "reference": "A. A conviction is not disqualifying unless the record of conviction \"necessarily\" establishes all the elements of a corresponding federal offense",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief055.pdf",
        "text": "I. Constitutional Protection for an Unenumerated Liberty Right Is Properly Analyzed Under a Four-Part Framework\nA. Does the Due Process Clause Provisionally Recognize the Unenumerated Liberty Right at Issue?\nB. Is the State Exercising a Police Power to Secure and Protect Individual Rights or Merely to Promote a Preferred End?\nC. What Level of Scrutiny Applies to Provisional Unenumerated Liberty Rights?\nD. When Tested Against the Provisional Unenumerated Liberty Right, Does the Purported State Interest Pass Scrutiny?\nII. Roe and Casey Should Be Upheld on Stare Decisis Grounds Because Their Holdings Were Correct When Limited to Their Facts\nA. Petitioners Fail to Distinguish Provisional Constitutional Rights from Protected Constitutional Rights\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The States in Roe and Casey Were Asserting Their Weaker Police Power to Promote Fetal Life, Not Their Stronger Police Power to Protect Fetal Rights\nD. The Undue Burden Test and the Viability Rule Are Good Faith Constitutional Constructions of Heightened Scrutiny for States that Do Not Recognize Fetal Rights\nE. Roe and Casey Should Be Re-Affirmed Because They Were Correctly Decided When Limited to Their Facts\nIII. The Decision Below Should Be Affirmed Because Mississippi Does Not Recognize Fetal Rights. Its Position Is Therefore Governed and Rejected by Roe and Casey",
        "reference": "B. Abortion Is a Provisional Unenumerated Liberty Right Because It Is Implied by Ordered Liberty in the Absence of Conflicting Fetal Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. A \"REASONABLE SUSPICION\" MUST BE SUPPORTED BY SPECIFIC, ARTICULABLE, AND INDIVIDUALIZED EVIDENCE OF WRONGDOING\nII. REASONABLE SUSPICION DOES NOT EXIST WHEN A STOP IS SOLELY PREDICATED ON THE FACT THAT THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A VEHICLE IS UNLICENSED\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE CATEGORICAL RULE SOUGHT BY THE STATE IS INIMICAL TO THE FACT-INTENSIVE, CIRCUMSTANCE-SPECIFIC ANALYSIS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 5.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-984_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Circuit Split Is Real And Entrenched\nIII. The Fifth Circuit's Decision Is Wrong\nIV. The Question Presented Is Important",
        "reference": "I. The Fifth Circuit's Decision Was Based On section 541.604, Not section 541.602 Or Anything Else",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-9526_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Creek Nation Expressly Conveyed \"All\" of Its \"Interest\" in Its Former Land\nB. The Creek Territory Was Not a \"Reservation\" under Section 1151 \u2014 It Was a \"Dependent Indian Community\"\nC. The Creek Nation's Territory Ceased to Be a \"Dependent Indian Community\" When It Allotted Its Land and Congress Transferred Jurisdiction to Oklahoma\nII. The History of State and Municipal Regulation Confirms That Congress Gave Oklahoma Authority over the Five Tribes' Former Land",
        "reference": "I. The Creek Nation Conveyed Its Own Interest in Its Land, And Oklahoma Took Jurisdiction Over It",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. Wholesale Invalidation Of The ACA Would Result In Massive Disruption To Patients And Other Health Care Stakeholders\n1. The ACA is sweeping in its scale and scope\n2. Invalidation of the ACA would have serious consequences in disparate areas wholly untethered to the individual mandate\na. Individual Market\nb. Group Plans\nc. Medicaid\nd. Medicare\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The ACA's Preexisting-Condition Provisions Would Continue To Function Properly Without The Mandate In Today's Individual Market",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-897_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INA TASKS IMMIGRATION JUDGES, NOT IMMIGRATION OFFICERS, WITH REINSTATING PRIOR ORDERS OF REMOVAL\nA. The INA's Unambiguous Text Requires Immigration Judges to Make Reinstatement Decisions\nB. Administrative Practice Confirms that Congress Required Immigration Judges to Address Reinstatement\nC. The Justice Department's Contrary Regulation Is an Unreasonable Interpretation of section 1229a and 1231(a)(5)\nD. [MISSING]\nII. SECTION 1226 GOVERNS RESPONDENTS' DETENTION BECAUSE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS REINSTATED THEIR REMOVAL ORDERS WITHOUT STATUTORY AUTHORITY",
        "reference": "D. The Courts of Appeals Have Erred in Deferring to the Agency's Regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION DEEPENS A SPLIT AMONG THE COURTS ABOUT WHETHER GOVERNMENT EFFECTS A TAKING WHEN IT CONFISCATES MORE THAN IT IS OWED TO SATISFY A DEBT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. State courts and federal district courts also split on the question\nC. The Eighth Circuit's decision departs from this Court's takings precedents\nII. THE COUNTY'S FORFEITURE SCHEME IMPOSES A FINE: AN ECONOMIC SANCTION THAT CANNOT FAIRLY BE SAID TO SERVE A SOLELY REMEDIAL PURPOSE\nA. None of the older in rem cases noted in Bajakajian answer the question presented here\nB. A forfeiture that goes beyond compensating the government for loss is punishment despite opportunities to avoid it\nC. The County's scheme is punitive even if it does not yield a windfall for the government in every case",
        "reference": "A. The Eighth Circuit decision here directly conflicts with the Sixth Circuit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-547_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The draft documents were staff recommendations to agency decisionmakers, not final decisions\n1. The relevant decisionmakers did not sign or adopt the December 2013 draft biological opinions\n2. The ESA and its implementing regulations confirm that the draft biological opinions are pre-decisional\n3. [MISSING]\nB. The decision below is incorrect",
        "reference": "3. Respondent's reliance on the purported effect of the draft opinions on EPA is misplaced",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A Key Function of the Excessive Fines Clause is to Ensure Equity in the Imposition of Fines\nIII. Empirical Evidence Confirms that Excessive Fines Undermine Equal Justice\nA. Excessive Fines Disproportionately Burden the Poor\nB. Excessive Fines Disproportionately Burden Communities and Persons of Color\nIV. The Excessive Fines Clause Protects the Fundamental Right to Equal Justice",
        "reference": "I. It Is a \"Fundamental Right\" in a Free Society that Justice Be Equal in Substance and Availability, Without Regard to Economic Status",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Purported Conflict Does Not Exist\nB. The Purported Issue Lacks Recurrent Importance Because Cy Pres-Only Settlements Are Sharply Declining And Reserved For Exceptional Cases\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Class members were unharmed and unlikely to receive anything from further litigation\n2. This case implicates none of the cy pres abuses that petitioners decry\nD. The Decision Below Is Correct",
        "reference": "C. This Case Is An Exceedingly Poor Vehicle To Consider Unprecedented Limitations On Cy Pres Settlements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Genus claiming is especially important for chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology inventions.\nII. The Federal Circuit's shift in enablement doctrine threatens existing genus claims and upends incentives.\nIII. \"Full scope\" enablement is an unduly rigid rule that the Patent Act does not envisage.\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The court should restore rationality to enablement.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES GOVERNING FORA APPLY ONLY TO STATE ACTORS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. State Action Doctrine Preserves The First Amendment Rights Of Private Entities\nC. The Second Circuit Erred In Holding That Operating A Public Forum Generally Constitutes State Action\nII. APPLYING FORUM ANALYSIS TO PRIVATE ENTITIES DISTORTS FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE AND THREATENS HARM TO BUSINESSES AND THE PUBLIC\nA. First Amendment Doctrine Is Ill-Suited For Application To Private Entities\nB. The Policy Consequences Will Be Equally Severe\n1. Subjecting companies to First Amendment scrutiny will inflict financial and reputational costs on affected businesses\n2. Applying forum analysis to private companies will lead to fewer outlets for speech\n3. Inflicting these harms is unnecessary because market forces will lead to more openness by themselves\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S APPROACH ALSO DISTORTS STATE ACTION DOCTRINE\nA. This Court Applies A Stringent State Action Standard\nB. The Second Circuit's Approach Lowers The Bar And Threatens Dire Results",
        "reference": "A. The First Amendment Protects Private Entities, Including Those That Open Fora For Speech, From Government Regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.77
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-882_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation\nB. Petitioner's textual arguments are unpersuasive\nII. Neither the history of the ADEA's federal-sector provision nor the EEOC's interpretation of the statute supports a diminished causation standard\nA. Petitioner's historical arguments lack merit\nB. Petitioner misconstrues the EEOC's regulations and adjudications, which are not in any event entitled to deference\nIII. Petitioner's interpretation of the federal-sector ADEA provision would create serious anomalies in federal anti-discrimination law",
        "reference": "I. The federal-sector provision of the ADEA requires but-for causation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Seminole Rock and Auer are wrong\nA. Auer deference is inconsistent with the APA\n1. Auer deference circumvents the APA's safeguards governing agency rulemaking\n2. Auer exceeds the scope of any congressional delegation of lawmaking authority\nB. Auer injects intolerable unpredictability into agency action\n1. Auer invites vague regulations, which limit the public's ability to conform conduct to law\n2. [MISSING]\n3. There is no policy-based justification for Auer deference\nC. Auer deference is inconsistent with separation-of-powers principles\nD. Chevron deference confirms the flaws of Auer deference\nII. Stare decisis does not require the Court to retain Seminole Rock and Auer\nA. Special justifications warrant overruling Seminole Rock and Auer\nB. Stare decisis applies with less force to judicially-created interpretive principles\nC. Private reliance interests favor overruling Seminole Rock and Auer\nD. The administrative state has evolved substantially since 1945\nIII. Section 3.156(c) entitles petitioner to retroactive benefits",
        "reference": "2. Auer deference is especially suspect when the agency is self-interested",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioners stated a claim for relief under ERISA by plausibly alleging that respondents imprudently caused the plans' participants to pay excessive investment-management and administrative fees\nA. ERISA plan fiduciaries have an ongoing duty to control expenses and remove imprudent investments\nB. The court of appeals erred in concluding that none of petitioners' counts states a claim for relief\n1. Petitioners plausibly allege that respondents imprudently offered higher-cost investment funds when identical lower-cost funds were available\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. Petitioners plausibly allege that respondents imprudently failed to use any of several methods to reduce recordkeeping fees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER FEDERAL ALJS ARE INFERIOR OFFICERS, THEY MUST CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS INDEPENDENT ADJUDICATORS\nA. The Remarkable History of the APA Shows Clear Congressional Intent for Independent Initial Adjudication\nB. For Decades, This Court Has Recognized That ALJs Have Independent Adjudication Authority\nC. Independent ALJ Adjudication Balances Several Constitutional Interests\nII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE ALJ TENURE PROTECTIONS ESTABLISHED BY CONGRESS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Eliminating ALJ Independence Would Cause \u2014 Not Solve \u2014 Constitutional Problems\nC. This Case Is Readily Distinguished from Free Enterprise Fund",
        "reference": "A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Address ALJ Tenure Protections Because There Is No Case or Controversy About That Issue Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-315_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 3731(b)(2) applies to a relator's action under Section 3730(b) even if the United States declines to intervene in the action\nA. The text of Section 3731(b) does not distinguish among FCA suits commenced by the United States, qui tam suits in which the United States intervenes, and qui tam suits in which the United States declines to intervene\n1. A civil action brought by a relator for a violation of Section 3729 is \"[a] civil action under section 3730\"\n2. This Court's decision in Graham County confirms that Section 3731(b)(2) applies to this case\n3. Petitioners' textual arguments lack merit\nB. The structure, purpose, and history of the statute confirm that Section 3731(b)(2) applies even when the United States declines to intervene\n1. Where the FCA distinguishes between relators and the government, it does so clearly\n2. Petitioners' reading would frustrate the purpose of the tolling provision\n3. The legislative history of the statute supports giving effect to its plain meaning\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Under Section 3731(b)(2), a private relator is never \"the official of the United States\" whose knowledge of fraud triggers the commencement of the three-year tolling period",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners' policy concerns are unfounded",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-587_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ADEA defines the term \"employer\" to encompass political subdivisions of any size\nA. The text of Section 630(b) makes plain that political subdivisions are an independent category of \"employer\"\n1. The phrase \"also means\" defines an additional category of eligible \"employer\"\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Petitioner fails to justify departing from the ordinary meaning of the phrase \"also means\"\nB. The statutory and legislative history confirm the ordinary meaning of Section 630(b)\nC. Canons of construction do not require a contrary interpretation\nII. The application of the ADEA will not threaten small political subdivisions",
        "reference": "2. Congress eschewed an obvious alternative formulation for extending the minimum-employee requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "A. The constitutionality of the removal restriction is properly presented\nB. The removal restriction is unconstitutional\n1. The text and history of Article II require the President to retain the unrestricted ability to remove principal executive officers\n2. [MISSING]\nC. The removal restriction should be severed from the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act",
        "reference": "2. The Humphrey's Executor exception should not be extended to single-headed agencies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Had Authority To Enact ICWA\nA. This Court Has Held That Congress Has Broad Power Over Indian Affairs\nB. Congress's Broad Indian-Affairs Powers Include Protecting Indian Tribes, Families, And Children From Unwarranted Removals\n1. Multiple Enumerated Powers Confirm That Congress Has Power To Fulfill Its Trust Duties\n2. Plaintiffs' Counterarguments Lack Merit\nC. Congress's Powers Contain No Indian-Children Exception\nII. Plaintiffs' Equal-Protection Claims Fail\nA. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs' Equal-Protection Claims\n1. The Individual Plaintiffs Cannot Show Redressability\n2. No Individual Plaintiff Has Injury-In-Fact\n3. Texas Lacks Standing To Pursue Equal-Protection Claims\nB. ICWA Comports With The Fifth Amendment\n1. Classifications Based On Tribal Affiliation Are Political Classifications Subject Only To Rational-Basis Review\n2. Plaintiffs' Gerrymandered Limits Are Invented\n3. ICWA Draws Political Classifications\na. ICWA's \"Indian Child\" Definition Draws Political Classifications\nb. ICWA's Placement Preferences Are Not Racial\n4. [MISSING]\n5. ICWA Does Not Impermissibly Discriminate Based On National Origin\nC. If The Court Determines Strict Scrutiny Applies, It Should Remand\nIII. ICWA Does Not Impermissibly Commandeer\nA. ICWA's Substantive And Procedural Requirements Do Not Commandeer\n1. ICWA Protects Private Rights Via Federal Standards\n2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit\n3. ICWA Does Not Commandeer Because It Applies Evenhandedly\nB. Recordkeeping Requirements Are Not Commandeering\nC. Alternatively, ICWA Does Not Commandeer Because It Is A Proper Exercise Of Congress's Spending-Clause Authority\nIV. Texas's Nondelegation Arguments Fail",
        "reference": "4. ICWA Rationally Fulfills Congress's Unique Obligations Toward Indians",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Has The Potential To Further Open The Floodgates To A Multitude Of New \"No Injury\" Class Actions\nA. The FCRA's Statutory Framework Demonstrates The Importance Of Rigorous Enforcement of Article III's \"Concrete Harm\" Requirement\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Likely Will Result In A Marked Increase In FCRA Class Actions Where Plaintiffs and Class Members Suffered No Concrete Harm\n1. Section 1681b(b)(1) of the FCRA, Which Requires A Certification or Promise By an Employer to a Consumer Reporting Agency\n2. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Exacerbates Ongoing And Unjustified Harm For Businesses and Consumers",
        "reference": "2. Section 1681e(b) of the FCRA, Which Requires a CRA to Have Reasonable Procedures to Assure Maximum Possible Accuracy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Mandate Is Arguably Merely Precatory at This Point, and Perhaps Not Worthy of Being Struck Down. (And: Some \"Conscience\" Issues of Respondents)\nA. Individual Respondents Could Possibly Have Contacted the IRS and Said They Are Paying the Zero Tax Penalty, Rather Than Filing Suit Against the Act\nB. Refusal to Buy Insurance Could Be Deemed a Martin Luther King-Style Form of Civil Disobedience \u2014 Though Without Financial Penalty\nC. The Kennesaw, Georgia Gun-Purchase Mandate: An American Precatory Purchase Mandate Which Allows Anyone to Opt Out of It Who Wants to Opt Out, Sans Financial or Other Penalty\nD. Other Precatory Gun-Purchase Mandates\nE. New Jersey's 2008 Precatory Mandate to Buy Health Insurance for Children\nF. Even If the Mandate Is No Longer Supported by a Tax Above Zero, That May Not Mean That the Mandate Must Be Overturned, If It Is Now Merely Precatory\nII. In Case the Mandate Is Struck Down: It Should Be Held Severable from the Act As a Whole, or Any Subparts of It, Such As Community Rating and/or Guaranteed Issue\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Mandate Is Only One Funding Mechanism Among Many for the Act, and Is Quite Replaceable\nC. Pace the False Claim That the Mandate Was Inseverable from Guaranteed Issue and Community Rating, Obama Administration Officials Backtracked on, or Contradicted, That Claim\nD. A Simple Way to Save the Act If the Mandate Disappears, Is to Subsidize Insurance Companies to the Amount the Mandate Would Have Provided \u2014 Much as the Government Massively Subsidizes Anti-COVID-19 Efforts\nE. The Court Did Not Definitively Find in King v. Burwell That the Mandate Is Absolutely Necessary to Guaranteed Issue/Community Rating; and the Court Should Clearly Find the Mandate Non-Necessary\nF. The Eleventh Circuit in 2011 Argued Well for Severability\nG. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Placidyl Addiction and His Need for Health Care\nH. One \"Ripeness\" Issue: If the Lack of a Mandate Is Really Going to Put the Act into a \"Death Spiral\", the Court Can Simply Let That Happen Gradually over Time, Instead of Rushing to Destroy the Act",
        "reference": "A. The Mandate Is Not Absolutely \"Essential\" to the Act or Any of Its Subparts; Nor Has the Act Any \"Inseverability Clause\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Provide Guidance on the Statutory Construction of the 2011 Amendments to 35 U.S.C. section 102(a)\na. The Court of Appeals' Atextual Interpretation of the AIA Sends Conflicting Messages\nb. The Court of Appeals' Concerns Over Abrogation of its On-Sale Jurisprudence are Overstated\nc. Judge O'Malley's Proposed Statutory Construction Has No Bearing on the Scope of \"On-Sale\" Prior Art After the AIA\nII. The Federal Circuit's Holding Is Inconsistent with the Government's Statutory Interpretation, Casting Doubt on Thousands of Patents\na. Patents Examined and Issued by the USPTO After the AIA May be Susceptible to Validity Challenges Based on Secret Prior Art\nb. [MISSING]\nc. The Legislative History Supports the USPTO's Statutory Interpretation\nIII. The Lower Court's Decision May Have Extraordinary Extraterritorial Implications That Were Likely Unintended by Congress\nIV. The Negative Policy Ramifications of the Federal Circuit Decision are Contrary to the Purposes of the AIA and Make Meaningless Explicit Protections that Congress Wrote Into the Statute",
        "reference": "b. Guidance is Needed So that Innovators Can Pursue Patenting, Commercial Transactions, and Business Activities Without Fear of Inadvertently Losing Their Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Warrants A Deferential Standard of Review Because Section 304 Does Not Meaningfully Burden Protected First Amendment Interests\nA. Section 304 does not meaningfully restrict the political speech of candidates\nB. Section 304 does not pose a competitive burden for any candidates\nC. Section 304 does not burden contributors' associational rights\nII. The Government's Interest In Preventing Corruption And Its Appearance Is Undisputed And Furthered By Section 304\nA. The government has a profound interest in the prevention of corruption and its appearance that includes prevention of quid pro quo corruption and broader efforts to protect the integrity of government\nB. Section 304 plainly furthers the government's anti-corruption interests, which was the primary goal of its passage\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Section 304 is not under-inclusive",
        "reference": "C. It is not necessary that the government provide a record of actual quid pro quo corruption or other forms of corruption for the law to stand",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1454_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "The facts found by the district court establish a prima facie case that the anti-steering rules unreasonably restrain trade\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The facts found by the district court establish that the anti-steering rules have severely impaired competition among credit-card networks\n1. The anti-steering rules stifle price competition\n2. The anti-steering rules raise merchant fees and inflate retail prices\n3. The anti-steering rules block low-fee rivals and suppress the development of innovative payment models\nC. The court of appeals' alternative market definition departed from established antitrust principles and provided no sound basis for reversal in any event\n1. Services to merchants and services to cardholders do not belong in the same antitrust market because they are not substitutes\n2. The facts found by the district court established a prima facie case even under the court of appeals' market definition\nD. The additional showings demanded by the court of appeals were not required\n1. The United States and the States were not required to negate the anti-steering rules' potential benefits for cardholders in order to establish a prima facie case\n2. The United States and the States were not required to calculate Amex's \"two-sided\" price in order to establish a prima facie case\nE. The district court properly considered and rejected, at the second step of the burden-shifting inquiry, Amex's arguments about the benefits of the anti-steering rules for cardholders",
        "reference": "A. A plaintiff may carry its initial burden in a rule-of-reason case with direct evidence that a restraint has an actual adverse effect on competition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.08
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-776_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "Whether petitioners exercised reasonable diligence for purposes of equitable tolling of the deadline for filing a motion to reopen is not a \"question of law\" under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D)\nA. The phrase \"questions of law\" in Section 1252(a)(2)(D) does not encompass mixed questions of law and fact\nB. Even if the phrase \"questions of law\" encompassed some mixed questions, it could not reasonably be construed to encompass the primarily factual mixed question here\n1. \"Questions of law\" cannot reasonably be construed to encompass mixed questions that are primarily factual\n2. The mixed question at issue here is primarily factual\nC. Petitioners' counterarguments lack merit\n1. Petitioners' contention that the phrase \"questions of law\" encompasses all mixed questions, including primarily factual ones, lacks merit\n2. Petitioners' contention that the mixed question at issue here is primarily legal lacks merit\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Petitioners' case-specific grounds for resolving these cases are not properly before the Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The circuit conflict does not presently warrant review\nA. This Court recently declined to address this circuit conflict, and the unpublished decision below does not deepen it\nB. The issue that divides the circuits is narrow and not likely to recur with any frequency\nC. Most of the circuits have not squarely or definitively answered the question presented\n1. Just four circuits have squarely answered the question presented\n2. Five circuits have not answered the question presented\n3. [MISSING]\nII. This case has vehicle problems\nIII. The decision below is correct",
        "reference": "3. Four circuits have not settled on a definitive answer to the question presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1052_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. There is a square and intolerable conflict\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The question presented warrants review in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "1. Introduction\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. SFFA v. Harvard provides four clear opportunities for the Court to bridge the \"form versus substance\" gap on the permissible use of race in higher education admissions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. New Jersey's \"Justifiable Need\" Requirement\nB. Examples of New Jersey's Egregious Treatment of Law Abiding Citizens\n1. Thomas Rogers\n2. Dr. Joseph Racanelli\n3. Israel Albert Almeida\n4. Richard Andrew Miller\n5. Greg Gallagher\nC. \"Justifiable Need\" is Not Justifiable.\nII. The Third Circuit has Given New Jersey an Engraved Invitation to Disregard the Constitution.",
        "reference": "I. New Jersey's Extreme Suppression of the Constitutional Right to Lawfully Carry Handguns Demonstrates How Egregious Abuses of the Type at Issue in this Case Can Become.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The American Rule Does Not Govern The Interpretation Of \"Full Costs\" Under section 505 Of The Copyright Act\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Congress Properly Balanced Public Policy Considerations When It Authorized The Discretionary Award Of Full Costs Under section 505\nIV. \"Full Costs\" Under section 505 May Include Costs Associated With E-Discovery",
        "reference": "II. In section 505, Congress Exercised Its Authority To Shift Attorney's Fees and \"Full Costs\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The court of appeals' decision was a straightforward application of this Court's cases on Article III standing and Rule 23\nB. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court\nII. The award of punitive damages does not warrant this Court's review",
        "reference": "I. The award of statutory damages does not warrant this Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lower Courts Correctly Construed Section 1231(a)(6) to Require a Bond Hearing to Authorize Detention Beyond Six Months\nA. Section 1231(a)(6) is ambiguous as to the procedures required to justify prolonged detention\nB. Section 1231(a)(6)'s text, structure, and regulatory construction demonstrate Congress required custody hearings to justify prolonged detention\nC. The court of appeals properly construed the statute to avoid constitutional concerns\n1. The Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged executive detention without a hearing\n2. Petitioners' authorities are inapposite\n3. Petitioners' existing custody review procedures fail to provide vital protections required by the Due Process Clause\n4. Section 1231's text, the implementing regulations, and this Court's precedent demonstrate the lower court's statutory construction is \"fairly possible.\"\nII. 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1) Does Not Preclude Lower Courts from Enjoining the Unlawful Implementation of a Statute\nA. Petitioners forfeited any argument that Section 1252(f)(1) precludes classwide injunctive relief for claims against statutory violations\nB. Section 1252(f)(1) applies only to injunctions that enjoin the operation of the referenced sections of the Act\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Section 1252(f)(1) does not bar classwide injunctive relief for persons who are already in removal proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Does Not Properly Present the Questions the Petition Asserts for Review\nA. This Case Presents No Question Regarding Limits on Baldwin's Scope\nB. The Petition Rests on an Erroneous Depiction of Proposition 12 and Its Effects\nC. This Case Presents No Circuit Conflict on the Scope of the Extraterritoriality Principle\nII. The Decision Below Applies Baldwin Consistent with This Court's Precedent and the Decisions of Other Courts of Appeals\nA. Petitioners Misread This Court's Precedents\nB. This Case Presents No Circuit Conflict on Baldwin's Scope\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Application of Pike Balancing to the Facts Here Does Not Warrant Review\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Is Correct",
        "reference": "III. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Applied Pike",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8995_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 3624(e) tolls a term of supervised release during presentencing confinement that is credited toward a criminal sentence\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Prolonged incarceration for a separate criminal offense cannot meaningfully substitute for federal supervised release\n1. Imprisonment for a separate crime interrupts the function of supervised release\n2. The rationales for tolling supervised release when a defendant is incarcerated in connection with a conviction apply equally to all imprisonment credited toward a prison sentence\nC. Petitioner's interpretation of Section 3624(e) is flawed\nII. The district court had authority to adjudicate petitioner's supervised release violations because his term was tolled under Section 3624(e)\nA. Petitioner's supervised release term did not run during the presentencing state imprisonment that was credited against his state sentence\nB. At a minimum, petitioner's supervised release term tolled when he pleaded guilty to the state charges",
        "reference": "A. Incarceration that is deemed part of the sentence for a crime is \"imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Bucklew Failed to Provide Evidence Creating a Genuine Dispute of Fact Under Either Glossip Element\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Bucklew failed to identify any known and available \"method\" or \"procedure\" for lethal nitrogen\n2. Bucklew failed to provide evidence of the severity and duration of pain caused by nitrogen gas\n3. The State did not \"concede\" that nitrogen hypoxia is a feasible and readily available method\nB. Bucklew failed to provide evidence showing that he is \"sure or very likely\" to suffer \"severe pain\" during lethal injection\n1. Pentobarbital will render Bucklew insensate to pain within 20 to 30 seconds, and probably sooner\n2. Bucklew forecasts only accidents and isolated mishaps that would not violate the Eighth Amendment\n3. Missouri has legitimate penological justifications to use pentobarbital\nII. An Inmate Raising an As-Applied Challenge Must Prove an Alternative, Feasible, Readily Available Method of Execution\nA. The alternative-method requirement is a \"substantive element\" of all method-of-execution claims\nB. When no alternative method is feasible and available, the State is not inflicting \"pain for the sake of pain.\"\nC. Eliminating the alternative-method requirement would encourage meritless claims and delay many executions\nIII. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Considerable Discretion When It Denied Bucklew's Discovery Request\nA. Isolated mishaps, such as failed attempts to access veins, do not violate the Eighth Amendment\nB. The district court had dismissed the only count to which the execution team's training was relevant\nC. Bucklew's request was disproportional to the needs of the case because existing evidence refuted Bucklew's claim\nD. Any error was harmless because Bucklew failed to prove an alternative method of execution\nIV. Bucklew's Claim Is Barred by the Statute of Limitations and Res Judicata",
        "reference": "A. Bucklew failed to establish a known and available, readily feasible alternative method of execution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.37
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-984_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION IS CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION\nA. The U.S. Code establishes a duties requirement for the white-collar exemptions, not a salary requirement\nB. The DOL recognizes that the white-collar exemptions do not include a salary requirement and that it does not have the power to establish a salary requirement for the white-collar exemptions\nC. The Fifth Circuit failed to look at the controlling statute in interpreting the regulation\nII. HEWITT IS EXEMPT UNDER THE HIGHLY COMPENSATED EMPLOYEE EXEMPTION 29 C.F.R. section 541.601\nA. Hewitt Satisfies 29 C.F.R. section 541.600\nB. Hewitt Satisfies 29 C.F.R. section 541.602\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. EXCLUDING section 541.604(b) FROM THE HIGHLY COMPENSATED ANALYSIS IS CONSISTENT WITH DOL POLICY CONCERNS\nV. THE HOLDING IN FAVOR OF HEWITT WOULD NEGATIVELY IMPACT A VITAL INDUSTRY",
        "reference": "III. WHEN AN EMPLOYEE SATISFIES THE EXEMPTION TEST UNDER 29 C.F.R. section 541.601, FURTHER ANALYSIS UNDER 29 C.F.R. section 541.604 WOULD BE ERROR",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fifth Amendment Defines a Preexisting Natural Right to Own and Use Property to the Exclusion of Others\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The California regulation strips landowners of their right to exclude others\nII. There is No \"Public Use\" Here Under Either the Original Meaning of the Keepings Clause or Court's Doctrine\nA. The Union's Activities Here Do Not Qualify as a \"Public Use\" According to the Original Meaning of the Keepings Clause\n1. Justice Thomas's originalist research in Kelo\n2. Recent corpus linguistic scholarship on \"public use\"\n3. The lack of a \"public use\" here\nB. The Union's Activities Here Do Not Qualify as a \"Public Use\" under Kelo v. New London",
        "reference": "A. The place of the Keepings Clause in the scheme of constitutional liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Williams Packing established that the Anti-Injunction Act applies only where the taxes involved in the suit are taxes that are \"alleged to be [currently] due\"\nB. Bob Jones University and \"Americans United\" substantially expanded the scope of the Anti-Injunction Act far beyond suits involving \"taxes alleged to be [currently] due,\" without either acknowledging or justifying this expansion\nC. Direct Marketing requires a return to the test from Williams Packing that the Anti-Injunction Act applies only to suits involving taxes that are \"alleged to be [currently] due.\"\nD. Florida Bankers ignored the reasoning in Direct Marketing\nII. The existence of the Tax Court as a forum where taxpayers are able to contest a tax liability asserted against them by the IRS, without first having to pay the amount of the contested tax, very substantially undercuts the traditional rationale for the Anti-Injunction Act that has been invoked in support of a broad application of the Act\nIII. The broad interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act that was adopted in Bob Jones University and \"Americans United,\" as applied to bar pre-enforcement challenges to the validity of tax regulations, causes substantial hardship to taxpayers that are adversely affected by particular tax regulations and that would like to challenge the validity of these regulations",
        "reference": "I. The Anti-Injunction Act applies only where the taxes that are relied on by the government as the basis for applying the Act are taxes that are \"alleged to be [currently] due\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners have standing to challenge both of CADA's clauses directly.\nA. Petitioners' proposed speech is protected by the First Amendment.\nB. Petitioners' proposed speech at least arguably would violate CADA.\nC. Petitioners face a credible risk of prosecution.\nII. Petitioners independently have standing to challenge the Accommodation Clause because their injury is fairly traceable to that provision.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Because the Publications Clause merely implements the Accommodation Clause, Petitioners' injury is fairly traceable to both provisions.",
        "reference": "A. A plaintiff injured by one provision that merely implements another has standing to challenge both provisions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The police's warrantless intrusion into a home or its curtilage is presumptively unconstitutional\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. An automobile's inherent mobility, in and of itself, is not a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless intrusion on the home or its curtilage",
        "reference": "II. A showing of exigent circumstances is required to justify a warrantless intrusion on a person's home or its curtilage",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Challenged Law Is Not Content-Neutral Just Because it Discriminates Differently Depending on a Sign's Location\nII. Austin's Content-Based Regulation Should Be Subject to Strict or, at the Very Least, Exacting Scrutiny, Neither of Which Austin Can Satisfy\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Underinclusivity Demonstrates the Disingenuousness of Austin's Claimed Interest",
        "reference": "A. Content-Based Speech Restrictions Should Be Subjected to Strict or, at Least, Exacting Scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Nationwide Injunctions Exceed the Power of the District and Circuit Courts\nA. The judicial power extends only to cases and controversies, and that limitation precludes an award of relief to parties who are not before the court\nB. Nationwide injunctions disrupt the normal course of judicial review\nII. The Department of Health and Human Services Had No Authority to Enact a Contraceptive Mandate, With or Without a Conscience Objection\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The First Amendment was meant to protect rights of conscience",
        "reference": "A. Congress never enacted a contraceptive mandate",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-921_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Eviscerates The Religious Autonomy Doctrine\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. This Case Is Exceptionally Important",
        "reference": "II. There Are No Obstacles To This Court's Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1362_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IS TASKED WITH DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT FOR PURPOSES OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 29 U.S.C. section 159(b)\nB. THE FUNCTION OF SERVICE ADVISORS IS CUSTOMER RELATIONS\n1. The Primary Function of Service Advisors is a Communication Link\n2. Service Advisors Do Not Sell or Service Automobiles\n3. Automobile Salesmen are a Separate Appropriate Unit without Inclusion of Service Advisors\nC. DEALERSHIPS IN THE 1960S AND EARLIER EMPLOYED MANY POSITIONS IN THE SERVICE AREA IN ADDITION TO THE TWO SPECIFIED EXEMPT POSITIONS\nD. EVERY SERVICE DEPARTMENT INCLUDES MANY NON-EXEMPT CLASSIFICATIONS OF EMPLOYEES\n1. The Historical Additional Classifications of Service Department Employees\n2. The Modern Classifications of Service Department Employees\n3. Historical Classifications in the Parts Department\n4. Modern Classifications in the Parts Department\n5. Classifications in the Body Shop .. 32\nE. [MISSING]\nIV.",
        "reference": "E. THE DIVERSITY OF JOB FUNCTIONS IN A DEALERSHIP SUPPORTS A LIMITED AND NARROW READING OF THE OVERTIME EXEMPTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.21
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ATDS Ban's Text Prohibits The Tools That Telemarketers And Scammers Use To \"Automatically\" \"Dial\" \"Random\" Or \"Sequential\" Phone Numbers\nII. The Doctrine Of Constitutional Avoidance Forecloses Adopting The Ninth Circuit's Expansion Of The ATDS Ban To Cover Common Tools Of Communication\nA. The First Amendment Bars Overbroadly Prohibiting The Use Of Common Communications Tools\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Approach Also Unconstitutionally Bans Common Tools That Companies Use To Talk With Their Customers, Including Firms Like PRA In The Secondary Debt Collection Market",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Approach Unconstitutionally Makes Modern Smartphones Prohibited ATDSs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Minnesota's tax-foreclosure scheme authorizes commercial transactions for an exchange of less than reasonably equivalent value\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Minnesota tax-foreclosure scheme's provision of a windfall to one creditor at the expense of all others cannot be reconciled with the Bankruptcy Code's priority rules for payment of creditors",
        "reference": "II. Contrary to Minnesota's tax-foreclosure scheme, the Uniform Commercial Code demands \"commercially reasonable\" disposition of collateral for the benefit of all creditors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals did not adopt a \"per se\" rule\nB. The decision below is correct\n1. Administering public forums is a public function\n2. New York has chosen to designate its public access channels as public forums\nC. There is no circuit conflict\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Petitioners misstate the implications of the holding below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Respondent's Brief Underscores the Serious Constitutional Question Provoked by Hernandez II\nIII. Rodriguez Settles the Need for This Court's Intervention",
        "reference": "I. Respondent Does Not Dispute Petitioners' Reading of Hernandez II",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. MALLORY DID NOT PRESERVE HIS HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS\nII. STARE DECISIS FACTORS DO NOT SUPPORT KEEPING PENNSYLVANIA FIRE\nA. Pennsylvania Fire Is Unworkable In Today's Economy\nB. Pennsylvania Fire's Reasoning Is Short And Deeply Flawed\nC. Other Decisions And Recent Legal Developments Commend Overruling Pennsylvania Fire\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. No Reliance Interests Counsel Against Overruling Pennsylvania Fire",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-927_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Respondent's contentions that this court lacks authority to correct the district court's error are similarly baseless",
        "reference": "A. The district court's decision is plainly wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Experience Has Shown that the Minority Rule Effectively Nullifies Arbitration Agreements.\nII. Empirical Data Show that Arbitration Benefits Consumers Who are Actually Injured.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Minority Rule Creates Perverse Incentives and Avoidable Externalities.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1011_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES DICTATE THAT THE IOIA'S \"SAME IMMUNITY\" PROVISION TRACKS THE FSIA\nA. The IOIA Tracks Current Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law.\n1. Text\n2. Structure\n3. Legislative History\nB. [MISSING]\nII. THE GOVERNMENT'S PAST AND CURRENT POSITIONS CONFIRM THAT THE \"SAME IMMUNITY\" PROVISION TRACKS THE FSIA\nIII. THE IFC'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE UNAVAILING.",
        "reference": "B. Even if the IOIA Locked in Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law as of 1945, That Would Still Require Applying the FSIA Today.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-9526_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Creek Nation Had A Reservation\nA. The Creek Were Given A \"Reservation.\"\nB. The Creek Domain Is Not A \"Dependent Indian Community.\"\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Congress Never Disestablished The Creek Reservation\nA. No Text Disestablished The Creek Reservation\nB. Oklahoma's \"Context\" Arguments Fail\nC. Oklahoma's \"Subsequent History\" Arguments Fail\nIII. Congress Did Not Transfer To Oklahoma Jurisdiction Over The Creek Reservation\nIV. Oklahoma's Claims About Consequences Are Overstated",
        "reference": "C. Oklahoma's \"Dependent Indian Community\" Theory Does Not Explain Post-Statehood Events",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-292_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Police Officer's Discharge of A Firearm Is A Quintessential Fourth Amendment Seizure\nII. The Decision Below Risks Eviscerating the Primary Vehicles for Ensuring Accountability for Egregious Police Misconduct\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Law Enforcement Historically Employed Oppressive Practices, Including Use of Firearms, to Control and Intimidate African Americans Before and After Emancipation\nB. African-American Civil Unrest in the Mid-Twentieth Century, a Response in Part to Unconstitutional Police Violence, Led to the Expansive Use of Weaponry by Police\nC. Far Too Many Law Enforcement Agencies Throughout the Country Presently Continue the Excessive Use of Weapons in African-American Communities",
        "reference": "III. Preserving This Court's Longstanding Precedent Regarding Fourth Amendment Seizure Is Especially Important Given Law Enforcement's Historically Oppressive Use of Weapons in African-American Communities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Overrule Grutter Because the Burden of Race-Conscious Admissions Now Falls Largely on Asian-Americans, Another Historically Victimized Racial Minority Group.\nIII. Historical Evidence that Harvard's Holistic Admissions Policies That Were Embraced in Bakke and Grutter Were Instituted to Exclude Jews, Who Were Stereotyped in Much the Same Way as Asians are Today, Shows That Those Decisions Were Founded on a Lie.",
        "reference": "I. The Court Should Overrule Grutter Because the Use of Race to Achieve Diversity Has Led Not to Cross-Cultural Intellectual Stimulation and Understanding But to \"Neo-Segregation.\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eighth Circuit Correctly Applied Gobeille\nII. ERISA Preemption Is Intended To Encourage Employers To Provide Employee Benefit Plans But Permitting The Act To Stand Will Lead to Increased Administrative Costs and Loss of Prescription Drug Coverage\nA. The Act Interferes with Risk Pooling and Pricing Mechanisms In Ways That May Lead to Decreased Pharmacy Coverage\nB. Any Regulation of PBMs Should Be Enacted at the Federal Level To Ensure Consistency, Predictability and Lower Cost\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Congress and the President Are Aware of Policy Issues Related to PBMs and Are Considering Whether and How To Regulate PBMs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Georgia Supreme Court departed from this Court's controlling precedents on the important issue of double jeopardy and the finality of an acquittal\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Repugnant verdicts are a category of inconsistent verdicts and are equally subject to double jeopardy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "FOR DENYING THE PETITION\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Governments Have Long Used Flags To Communicate Messages To The Public And Select Messages With Which The City Chooses To Identify\n2. Observers Of A Flag Flying Above City Hall Would Reasonably Interpret The Flag As Conveying A Message On The City's Behalf And Perceive The City As The Speaker\n3. The City Effectively Controls Messages Broadcast Through Its Flagpole By Exercising Final Approval Authority Over The Flags That Are Raised\n4. Petitioners' Reliance On the Court's Decision In Matal Is Misplaced Where Federal Trademarks Bear Little Resemblance To A Flag Raised On An 83 Foot Tall, City-Owned Flagpole Located In Front Of City Hall\nB. The City Has Not Designated Its Flagpole As A Public Forum\n1. The Facts Do Not Support The Conclusion That The City Hall Flag Pole Is A Designated Public Forum\n2. By Engaging In Government Speech, The City Does Not Implicate The Defendants' Rights Under The First Amendment and Forum Analysis Is Inappropriate\n3. Forum Analysis Is Inappropriate Where The Viewpoint Neutrality And Open Access Mandated By The Forum Doctrine Are Incompatible With The Purpose Of The City's Flagpole",
        "reference": "A. The Selection And Presentation Of Flags By The City On A City-Owned Flagpole Constitutes Government Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. TITLE VII'S EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT IS JURISDICTIONAL\nA. Arbaugh's Clear-Statement Rule Does Not Apply\nB. The Other Side Cannot Distinguish The Precedent Holding Analogous Statutory Exhaustion Requirements Jurisdictional\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. TITLE VII'S PURPOSES ARE BEST SERVED BY A JURISDICTIONAL EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT",
        "reference": "II. EVEN UNDER THE CLEAR-STATEMENT RULE, TITLE VII'S EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT IS JURISDICTIONAL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-130_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF FREYTAG\nII. STJ DECISIONS ARE SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY TAX COURT JUDGES\nA. The FDIC and SEC Employ a Two-Tier Review Procedure\nB. The Tax Court Abolished the Two-Tier Appeal Procedure\nC. The Tax Court Employs a Deliberative Procedure\nD. [MISSING]\n1. STJ declaratory judgment decisions are subject to review\n2. STJ decisions in small tax cases are subject to review\n3. STJ decisions in limited-amount cases are subject to review\n4. STJ decisions in \"any other proceeding\" are subject to review\nIII. STJ DECISIONS ARE SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY JUDGES IN SUPERIOR COURTS OF LAW\nIV. FREYTAG DOES NOT HOLD THAT STJS MAKE DECISIONS INDEPENDENT OF DISCRETIONARY REVIEW BY TAX COURT JUDGES\nV. JUDGES WHO MAKE FINAL DECISIONS FUNCTION AS PRINCIPAL OFFICERS",
        "reference": "D. The Tax Code, Tax Court Rules and Orders Authorize Tax Court Judges to Review STJ Decisions Prior to their Entry as the Decision of the Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. SOUTH DAKOTA SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERSTATES THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL BURDENS PLACED ON REMOTE SELLERS TO COMPLY WITH SALES TAX LAWS AND REGULATIONS\nA. With Almost 10,000 State and Local Jurisdictions in the United States, Sales Tax Compliance is Much More Burdensome Than a Click of the Mouse and Electronically Filed Returns\nB. With States Having Almost Unlimited Power to Estimate Sales Tax Liabilities, Remote Sellers Face \"Guilty Until Proven Innocent\" Sales Tax Audits\nC. By Focusing on \"Gotcha Tax Audits,\" States Target Remote Sellers for Sales Tax Audits, Taking Hundreds of Millions of Dollars a Year from our Nation's Most Valuable Industries\nII. UNLIKE INCOME TAX, SALES TAX IS A TRUST FUND EXPOSING REMOTE SELLERS TO EXTREME CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITIES (100+ YEARS OF JAIL TIME) FOR SIMPLE BUSINESS FAILURES WITH NO BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Criminal Punishment for Not Remitting Sales Tax in the Final Months of Business Are Startlingly Harsh\nC. Remote Sellers Subject to Class Action Lawsuits for Unintentional Over Collection of Sales Tax\nIII. CONGRESS MUST ESTABLISH A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF SALES AND USE TAX REGULATIONS BEFORE STATES CAN BURDEN INTERSTATE COMMERCE",
        "reference": "A. States Have Broad Powers to Impose Significant Civil Penalties and Pierce the Corporate Veil for Even Minor Sales Tax Mistakes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"significant nexus\" test empowers unchecked overreach in Alaska\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. States like Alaska responsibly manage their waters and will continue to do so",
        "reference": "II. The Court should provide jurisdictional certainty by reading the Act in line with text, precedent, and respect for state authority over local matters",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. Campbell's Meaning-or-Message Test Is The Governing Rule Under Settled Precedent\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Second Circuit's Test Violates Campbell And Hollows Out The Fair-Use Defense\nB. Goldsmith's New Test Is Misguided And Waived\nC. The Government's Alternative Approach Is Ill-Defined and Wrong\nIII. Campbell's Meaning-or-Message Test Is Integral To Balancing Copyright's Competing Values",
        "reference": "II. None Of The Proffered Alternatives To Campbell's Meaning-or-Message Test Works",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1495_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Police Officers Deal with Garrity Issues Every Day and Must be Afforded Adequate Fifth Amendment Protection\nA. The present case is illustrative of the daily challenges faced by police officers in asserting their constitutional right against self-incrimination\nB. The Tenth Circuit correctly held that the Fifth Amendment is violated when incriminating statements are compelled and used in a probable cause hearing\nII. The Proper Scope of Garrity and Fifth Amendment Protection Extends to Pretrial Proceedings, Not Just a Criminal Trial\nA. There is substantial precedent supporting pretrial protection under Garrity\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Applying the FOP's position to the present case",
        "reference": "B. The principles expounded in Kastigar serve as a foundation to hold that the right against self-incrimination, as enumerated in the Fifth Amendment and Garrity, attaches to pretrial proceedings",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Contrary to Minnesota's tax-foreclosure scheme, the Uniform Commercial Code demands \"commercially reasonable\" disposition of collateral for the benefit of all creditors.\nIII. The Minnesota tax-foreclosure scheme's windfall to one creditor is irreconcilable with the Bankruptcy Code's priority rules for payment of creditors.",
        "reference": "I. Minnesota's tax-foreclosure scheme authorizes commercial transactions for an exchange of less than reasonably equivalent value.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IS BETTER EQUIPPED TO BEAR ANY \"BURDEN\" ASSOCIATED WITH SUBSTANTIATING CONFIDENTIALITY CLAIMS THAN AN EVERYDAY CITIZEN\nC. SECRECY, OR OVERBROAD ASSERTIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY, CAN MASK CORRUPTION, INEFFIC IENCY, AND WASTE\nD. THE SMALL BUSINESS ACT, WHICH IT IS AMERICAN SMALL BUSINESS LEAGUE'S MISSION TO ENSURE IS FOLLOWED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS PRIME CONTRACTORS, UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NATIONAL PARKS TEST",
        "reference": "A. REAL-LIFE EXAMPLES DEMONSTRATE HOW HOLLOW ASSERTIONS OF CONFIDENTIALITY OFTEN WILT UNDER SCRUTINY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. JUDGE-MADE TORT REMEDIES AGAINST ROGUE FEDERAL OFFICERS HAVE A LONG AND CONSISTENT TRADITION\nA. Before Bivens, Federal Officers Were Routinely Subjected to Judge-Made Tort Liability for Unlawful Conduct\nB. The Choice This Court Faced in Bivens Was Thus Between Judge-Made State and Judge-Made Federal Tort Remedies\nC. Texas Law Expressly Recognizes a Tort Remedy for Petitioners' Allegations Here .. 19\nII. THIS CASE SATISFIES ALL OF THIS COURT'S CRITERIA FOR RECOGNIZING A BIVENS CLAIM\nA. [MISSING]\nB. No \"Special Factors\" Counsel Hesitation\nC. Petitioners Have No Alternative Remedy .. 34\nIII. AFFIRMING THE DECISION BELOW WOULD PROVOKE GRAVE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS AND ALARMING PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES\nA. Denying a Legal Remedy Would Undermine Bivens's \"Core Deterrent Purpose\"\nB. Absent a Bivens Remedy, the Westfall Act's Preemption of State Law Would Raise Serious Constitutional Questions",
        "reference": "A. Excessive Force by a Rogue Federal Law Enforcement Officer is Not a \"New Context\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Blaine Amendments, Which Were Premised on Animus toward Non-Protestants, Are Plainly Unconstitutional\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Critical Importance of Jewish Day Schools\nB. Jewish Day School is Very Expensive and Paying For it Has Been Described as a Community Crisis\nC. Declaring Montana's Blaine Amendment Unconstitutional Would Allow Funding to Alleviate the Communal Crisis",
        "reference": "II. Many Orthodox Jewish Parents Send Their Children to Jewish Day School in Order to Ensure Their Religious Instruction, and to Prepare Them for Future Roles in the Community",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief038.pdf",
        "text": "I. Principles of Equality Mandate Equal Treatment Irrespective of Skin Color\nA. Equality Among Individuals Is a Fundamental Principle of this Nation\nB. Group Preferences Are Inconsistent With the Principle of Equality\nII. Group Preferences Negate the Primacy of Individual Rights\nA. Individual Rights Are Foundational to Our Nation and System of Laws\nB. Preferential Admissions Serve Groups Rather Than Individuals\nIII. Group Preferences Benefit the Powerful Over the Powerless\nIV. Preferential Admissions Have Steep Costs\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Preferential Admissions Divide and Provoke Resentment\nC. Group Preferences Incentivize Dishonesty and Result in Dehumanization",
        "reference": "A. Preferential Admissions Have a Stigmatizing Effect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. Petitioner cannot recover foreign lost profits under 35 U.S.C. 284\n1. Section 284 is subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality\n2. Section 284 does not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the damages petitioner seeks are foreign in nature\nB. Petitioner's and the government's arguments to the contrary are incorrect\n1. Petitioner's arguments lack merit\na. Section 271(f)(2) does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality\nb. Section 284 is subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality\n2. The government's argument lacks merit because the lost-profits award constitutes an extraterritorial application of Section 284\n3. Petitioner's and the government's remaining arguments are unavailing\nC. Petitioner's interpretation of the Patent Act would give rise to significant comity concerns",
        "reference": "The Patent Act does not permit the recovery of lost-profits damages for a third party's subsequent foreign use of a patented invention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-2, should be interpreted and applied as written in accordance with the intent of its Framers\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Statutes\nII. The term \"sex\" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not include sexual orientation\nA. The Word\nB. The Legislative History\nC. The Proposed Equality Act of 2019\nD. The Courts",
        "reference": "A. The Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Severance Does Not Leave a Content-Neutral Statute, But Rather a Statute Riddled With Content-Based Distinctions that Chills Protected Speech\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The TCPA Chills Speech and Harms Consumers\nII. Clarity from the Court Is Needed to Provide a Definition of ATDS that Effectuates Congress's Intent and Brings Uniformity to the TCPA's Fractured Landscape\nA. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Apply Familiar Canons of Construction\nB. The Legislative History Supports the Plain Reading of an ATDS\nC. Marks Ignores the FCC's Pre-2003 Interpretation that an ATDS Must Randomly or Sequentially Generate Numbers\nD. Marks and Duguid Have Created a Split of Authority, Leaving TCPA Compliance Often to Guesswork",
        "reference": "A. The TCPA Is Strewn with Content-Based Distinctions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief041.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress and This Court Squarely Rejected Conscience Exemptions from Federal Antidiscrimination Laws.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. This Court Upheld Title II Against Claims That Laws Mandating Equal Service Are Unconstitutional.\nII. Petitioners' Claimed Conscience Exemption Would Vitiate Public Accommodations Laws.\nA. Under this Court's Precedents, Applying a Public Accommodations Law to Commercial Artisans Like Smith Raises No First Amendment Concerns.\nB. Because Virtually Any Business Activity Can Be Recast as Expressive in Nature, Petitioners' Claimed Exemption Is Unworkable.",
        "reference": "A. In Enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress Rejected the Argument That Laws Mandating Equal Service Violate the Constitution.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. RECONSTITUTING THE BUREAU IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WOULD RESULT IN A STATUTE CONGRESS WOULD NEVER HAVE ENACTED\nA. Congress Prized The Bureau's Independence Over Its Single-Director Leadership\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Congress Insulated The Bureau From Legislative Oversight In A Manner It Would Not Have Approved For An Executive Agency\nD. A Multi-Member Commission Would Have Been Congress's Obvious Second Choice\nII. DODD-FRANK'S SEVERABILITY CLAUSE DOES NOT PERMIT THIS COURT TO ENACT A STRUCTURE CONGRESS WOULD NOT HAVE CHOSEN\nA. Merely Invalidating The Removal Provision Would Be Inadequate To Remedy The Bureau's Structure\nB. Congress's Specific Intentions With Respect To CFPB's Independence Overwhelm Any \"Presumption\" The Severability Clause Could Create\nC. This Court Lacks The Power To Enact An Alternative Congress Would Not Have Enacted\nIII. IF THE BUREAU'S STRUCTURE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE COURT SHOULD STAY ITS JUDGMENT TO ALLOW CONGRESS TO ACT",
        "reference": "B. The Bureau Exercises Powers Congress Has Long Declined To Delegate To The Executive Branch",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1414_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "Tribal officers may reasonably investigate and detain non-Indians on public rights-of-way within tribal reservations for potential violations of state or federal law\nA. Tribes retain inherent authority to reasonably protect persons and property within reservation boundaries from Indian or non-Indian suspects\n1. [MISSING]\n2. This Court's precedents preserve tribal authority to stop and investigate non-Indian suspects on public rights-of-way within a reservation\n3. Historical practice confirms that tribes retain limited policing authority with respect to non-Indians\nB. The Ninth Circuit's approach is legally incorrect and practically unworkable\n1. The Ninth Circuit's approach lacks legal support\n2. The Ninth Circuit's approach unsettles and undermines enforcement of federal and state law within reservation boundaries\na. The Ninth Circuit's approach inappropriately precludes many investigatory stops altogether\nb. The Ninth Circuit's approach inappropriately restricts the scope of investigatory stops and detention\nc. The Ninth Circuit's approach endangers public safety",
        "reference": "1. The tribes' status as dependent sovereigns has not abolished their authority to police state and federal crime by non-Indians on their reservations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1450_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. 18 U.S.C. section 3231 Does Not Extend to Foreign Sovereigns\nA. Congress Has Not Granted Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The FSIA Forecloses Criminal Jurisdiction\nA. Section 1604 Bars Criminal Jurisdiction\nB. The FSIA's Exceptions Are Irrelevant in Criminal Cases\nIII. The Commercial-Activities Exception Does Not Apply Here Anyway",
        "reference": "B. Halkbank Is a Sovereign Instrumentality by Any Metric",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. A court may award disgorgement in a civil action brought by the Commission to enforce the federal securities laws\nA. The courts' power to award the SEC \"any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors\" includes the power to award disgorgement\nB. The statutory context confirms that disgorgement is \"equitable relief\" within the meaning of Section 21(d)(5)\n1. Beginning in the 1960s, lower courts concluded that their injunctive powers under the Securities Act and Exchange Act included the power to order disgorgement\n2. In five statutes enacted between 1988 and 2010, Congress ratified and built upon the prior judicial consensus that disgorgement is an available remedy in SEC enforcement actions\na. The Insider Trading Act\nb. The Remedies Act\nc. The PSLRA\nd. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act\ne. The Dodd-Frank Act\n3. The larger statutory context, and the history of the relevant provisions' development, confirm that disgorgement is a form of \"equitable relief\" authorized by Section 21(d)(5) of the Exchange Act\nII. Petitioners' arguments lack merit\nA. Petitioners' legal arguments lack merit\n1. Statutory provisions that specifically authorize disgorgement orders in other circumstances do not preclude courts in SEC enforcement suits from ordering disgorgement under Section 21(d)(5)\n2. Historical practice does not support petitioners' cramped reading of Section 21(d)(5)\n3. The punitive features of disgorgement do not remove it from the scope of Section 21(d)(5)\n4. [MISSING]\n5. Disgorgement can be an appropriate equitable remedy even when it leaves the defendant worse off than he would have been if the violation had not occurred\nB. Petitioners' practical arguments are unsound",
        "reference": "4. The fact that disgorged funds are not always distributed to victims does not remove disgorgement from the scope of Section 21(d)(5)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.79
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. SOUTH DAKOTA'S EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION UNDERSCORES WHY THE COMMERCE CLAUSE REQUIRES PHYSICAL PRESENCE AS A PREREQUISITE TO THE COLLECTION OF STATE SALES TAX\nA. South Dakota's Law Violates the Commerce Clause Principle of Territoriality\nB. South Dakota's Law Discriminates Against Interstate Commercial Activity\nII. THE PHYSICAL-PRESENCE REQUIREMENT IS AN ESSENTIAL DUE-PROCESS SAFEGUARD\nA. South Dakota Seeks to Impose Obligations on Entities to Whom It Offers No Services\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. A DECISION IN SOUTH DAKOTA'S FAVOR WOULD OBVIATE USE TAXES, WHICH ARE A CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION TO SOUTH DAKOTA'S PROBLEM",
        "reference": "B. Due Process Requires That Businesses Not Be Subject to Onerous Requirements from Jurisdictions Where They Have No Representation and No Intent to Enter",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FRSA, SOX, and More Than a Dozen Other Statutes Use the Same Two-Part Burden-Shifting Framework for Whistleblower Claims\nII. The FRSA's Enactment and Amendments Demonstrate Congress's Aim to Protect the Public Interest by Encouraging Disclosure of Safety and Injury Concerns\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Second Circuit Ignored the Plain Text of SOX and Other Statutes that Use the Contributing Factor Framework",
        "reference": "III. The Text, Structure, History, and Purpose of the FRSA and Other Statutes that Use the Contributing Factor Framework Show that Employees Need Not Prove Retaliatory Intent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ERRONEOUS DEFINITION OF AN ATDS WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES\nA. Mobile Communications With Consumers Are Ubiquitous In Daily Life\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Will Discourage Communications Consumers Want\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Will Spur Even More Abusive TCPA Litigation\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF AN ATDS IS WRONG\nA. The Ninth Circuit Had No Basis For Disregarding Basic Rules Of Statutory Construction\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Raises Serious First Amendment Concerns",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation Is Inconsistent With The Legislative History Of The TCPA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1220_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE UNITED STATES OVERSTATES THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S NARROW HOLDING AND IGNORES THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S EXPLANATION FOR WHY EVIDENCE OUTSIDE OF THE CHINESE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS AT ISSUE AND THE MINISTRY'S EXPLANATION OF THEM WOULD NOT AID IN CONSTRUING THEM\nII. THE CASES CITED BY THE UNITED STATES DO NOT CONFLICT WITH THE HOLDING BELOW\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. ACCEPTING THE UNITED STATES' POSITION WOULD NOT ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Text of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Precedent Under It Indicate a Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment to Congress Alone to Set the Procedures and Standards for Ballot Disqualification\nII. The Inherent Interests in National Uniformity, When Dealing With the Application of Federal Law to the President, Require a Uniform National Standard and Uniform National Procedures to Address Qualifications Under Federal Law for Presidential Ballot Access and Office Holding\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Disastrous Potential For a Single State Judge to Trigger Non-Mutual Offensive Collateral Estoppel Against a Nation-Wide Presidential Candidacy is Inherently Contrary to Our Democratic Values and Counsels Reversal of the Decision of the Colorado Supreme Court",
        "reference": "III. Varying State Definitions of What Constitutes an \"Insurrection\" or \"Rebellion\" Against the United States Are Tantamount to Varying State Definitions and Control Over the Federal Government Which is Constitutionally Impermissible",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-382_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Circuits Are Split On Both Questions\nB. The Importance Of This Case Is Undisputed\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Decision Below Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-804_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Formal reprimands of students based on their constitutionally protected speech violate the First Amendment\nIII. Formal reprimands of public employees based on their constitutionally protected speech may violate the First Amendment",
        "reference": "I. Formal reprimands of licensed professionals based on constitutionally protected speech can violate the First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THIS CASE RAISES IMPORTANT FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The AIA does not preclude pre-enforcement challenges to regulatory reporting requirements.\nA. Direct Marketing makes clear that the phases of assessment and collection are distinct from and follow the phase of information gathering.\nB. The remedy sought here is review of a reporting requirement, not restraint on the assessment and collection of taxes.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The penalty imposed by Notice 2016-66 is a regulatory tax and not a tax that the AIA intends to protect.\nII. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, citizens are permitted to challenge other laws, regulations and administrative guidance on a pre-enforcement basis unless the law clearly preempts such actions.\nA. The APA presumes pre-enforcement review of agency regulations and guidance.\nB. Even when the law appears to preempt the APA, the APA will prevail if the law does not provide an adequate remedy.\nIII. The decision below conflicts with this Court's rejection of Tax Exceptionalism.",
        "reference": "1. The AIA prohibits lawsuits that restrain the assessment and collection of taxes, and CIC's suit does neither.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1782 Applications Impose Significant Burdens on Financial Institution Respondents\nB. Expanding section 1782 to Foreign Arbitrations Would Greatly Exacerbate the Burdens on Respondents\nII. Interpreting \"Tribunal\" To Include Foreign Arbitration Would Exacerbate The Improper Extraterritorial Application Of section 1782",
        "reference": "I. Expanding section 1782 To Foreign Arbitrations Would Exacerbate The Heavy Burdens Already Faced By Discovery Targets",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND ENGAGE IN ELECTION-RELATED ACTIVITY INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO DO SO SAFELY\nA. Threats and Force Have Long Been Used to Intimidate Voters\nB. Voter Intimidation Prohibitions Are Widespread and Important But Do Not Alone Secure Electoral Safety\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Handgun Proliferation Reasonably Creates Fear that Voting-Related Conflict and Unrest Will Turn Violent\nB. The Intimidating Effect of Firearms Potentially Disrupts Every Phase of the Electoral Process\n1. Before Elections\n2. During Elections\n3. After Elections\nIII. THE NEW YORK LAWS UNDER REVIEW ADVANCE THE COMPELLING INTEREST IN SECURING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE SECOND AMENDMENT\nA. New York Law Furthers the Well-Established Compelling Interest in Securing the Electoral Process from Intimidation and Disruption\nB. New York's Laws are Constitutionally Permissible, But Not Required",
        "reference": "II. FIREARM PROLIFERATION IMPERILS THE ELECTORAL PROCESS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. The President Is Not an \"Officer of the United States\"\nII. Former President Trump Did Not Commit Either Act Described In Section 3\nA. This Court should give effect to section 3's two distinct disqualification predicates\nB. President Trump did not commit either of Section 3's disqualification offenses\n1. President Trump did not engage in insurrection or rebellion against the United States\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. Former President Trump did not give aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals decision is incorrect\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The court of appeals decision warrants immediate review by this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-210_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Purely Legal Issues Resolved At Summary Judgment Are Preserved For Review\nA. Legal errors in interlocutory orders, including summary judgment decisions, merge with the final judgment and may be appealed therefrom\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Requiring parties to re-raise purely legal issues would be unnecessary, cumbersome, costly, and error-prone\nII. Nothing In The Seventh Amendment Or The Federal Rules Requires Rule 50 Motions To Preserve Legal Issues Resolved Pre-Trial\nA. The Seventh Amendment safeguards only the jury's role as factfinder\nB. Parties need not file motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 to preserve issues of pure law",
        "reference": "B. Both the history of appellate review and the history of the Federal Rules confirm that no post-trial motion is necessary to preserve purely legal issues for appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contrary to the D.C. Circuit's assertion otherwise, it was settled in 1971 that ANCs were not and never would be sovereign entities\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The State cannot simply step in and provide services to Alaska Natives on an emergent basis in the same way as, and in place of, ANCs",
        "reference": "II. Since 1975, all three branches of the federal government have considered ANCs \"Indian tribes\" under ISDA, and ANCs have acted as such",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1498_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "Article III of the 1855 Treaty does not exempt respondent from paying Washington's motor-fuel tax\nA. Article III of the 1855 Treaty secures the right of the Tribe and its members to free access from the Reservation to public highways and to travel upon the public highways\nB. Washington's motor-fuel tax does not infringe on tribal members' right to travel upon the public highways\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The Washington Supreme Court erred in holding that Article III of the 1855 Treaty exempts respondent from paying Washington's motor-fuel tax",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT SECURES THE INHERENT, INDIVIDUAL AND PRIVATE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS FOR SELF-DEFENSE.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Text of the Second Amendment Protects and Secures the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense.\nII. THE SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTS THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUALS TO CARRY ARMS FOR SELF-DEFENSE OUTSIDE OF THE HOME.",
        "reference": "A. The Bill of Rights Secures Pre-Existing Individual Rights of the American People.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's Intervention Is Necessary to Clarify the Strict Limits on Judicial Creation of ATS Causes of Action\nII. Whether Jesner Permits ATS Liability for Domestic Corporations Is an Exceedingly Important Question That Has Divided the Lower Courts, and That the Ninth Circuit Decided Incorrectly\nA. The Separation-of-Powers Holding of Jesner Forecloses Judicial Creation of Any ATS Cause of Action Against Domestic Corporations\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Additional Grounds Cited By the Jesner Plurality and Concurrences Also Preclude ATS Liability for Domestic Corporations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's compelled disclosure of a charitable organization's donors is constitutional only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest\nA. Free association is a fundamental right closely related to freedom of speech that safeguards charitable donations\nB. Donor privacy is built on venerable precedents protecting anonymous advocacy\nC. The First Amendment protects donors from the devastating consequences of public disclosure\nD. NAACP and its progeny require the government to prove that a compelled disclosure scheme is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling interest\nE. Buckley's exacting-scrutiny standard is tailored to preventing corruption in electoral processes. It has no application to 501(c)(3) charities since they are barred from election involvement\nF. [MISSING]\nII. California's blanket donor-disclosure mandate is unconstitutional under either standard of scrutiny\nA. The mandate is facially invalid\n1. On its face, the mandate fails strict scrutiny because in all its applications it creates an unnecessary risk of chilling speech\n2. On its face, California's blanket-disclosure mandate fails Buckley's exacting-scrutiny standard\na. The Attorney General's charity-policing interest is not sufficiently important to justify the mandate's severe burden on free association\nb. The Attorney General's disclosure mandate is a prophylactic measure of convenience that bears no substantial relation to any interest in policing charities and is not narrowly tailored\nB. At a minimum, the Law Center is entitled to an as-applied exemption because it showed at trial a reasonable probability that disclosure would subject donors to harassment\n1. The Law Center's advocacy has led to threats and harassment\n2. The Law Center's clients have received death threats in response to their religious exercise\n3. Law Center donors and staff have been boycotted and subjected to vile communications\n4. Religious exercise can lead to harassment and even harm to those who try to live their faith in the public square\nC. The Ninth Circuit's version of exacting scrutiny is distorted, free-form, and hazardous to First Amendment rights\nD. The Law Center satisfies the remaining injunction factors\nIII. The Internal Revenue Service does not seek to control charities' speech and its donor-disclosure rule is readily distinguishable from the Attorney General's",
        "reference": "F. At a minimum, compelled-disclosure schemes must be narrowly tailored",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. FNHRA's Rights Against Chemical Restraint and Involuntary Discharge and Transfer Are Enforceable Under section 1983\nA. Rights protected by Spending Clause statutes are \"rights\" \"secured by\" the \"laws\"\nB. [MISSING]\nII. An Adverse Ruling Would Be Disastrous For Federal Safety-Net Programs",
        "reference": "B. FNHRA's chemical restraint and wrongful discharge and transfer rights are individually enforceable rights that section 1983 protects",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The States have standing\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The States are facing direct harm to specific tax revenues\nC. The Program prompted broad loan consolidation causing injury to the States\nII. The Program exceeds the Secretary's authority\nA. This is a major questions case\n1. The key major questions factors are present here\n2. The Government's efforts to avoid the major questions doctrine lack merit\nB. The Secretary lacks colorable, let alone clear, congressional authorization\n1. Keeping borrowers from a \"worse position\" does not permit the mass discharge of loan principal\n2. The Program does not waive or modify the cited statutory and regulatory provisions\n3. The Program rests on a tenuous and pretextual connection to a national emergency\n4. The Program's broad scope exceeds the Secretary's authority\nIII. The Program is arbitrary and capricious",
        "reference": "A. The impending financial harm to MO-HELA will injure Missouri",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "Congress did not bar all judicial review over the USPTO's interpretation of the AIA's statutory scheme\nI. The strong presumption favoring judicial review preserves the courts' traditional role in enforcing statutory limits on agency action\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Section 314(d)'s plain text establishes that Congress did not bar judicial review over the agency's construction of Section 315(b)\nB. The AIA's context and structure confirm that Congress did not bar judicial review over the agency's construction of Section 315(b)\nC. The proper construction of Section 314(d) is compelled by the need for a clear and administrable jurisdictional rule\nD. This Court's decision in SAS Institute has already confirmed that the judiciary retains its traditional reviewing function\nE. Preserving judicial review promotes Congress's objectives and protects the careful balance that Congress struck in the AIA\nF. All else aside, judicial review is available because the agency decided this issue in its final written decision\nG. The government's and petitioner's contrary arguments are meritless",
        "reference": "II. Congress did not grant the USPTO the unreviewable power to define the scope of its own jurisdiction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief039.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Elections Clause Does Not Prevent a State Court from Enforcing State Constitutional Limitations that Constrain a State Legislature's Authority over Federal Elections\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Elections Clause Does Not Prevent State Courts from Enforcing State Constitutional Voting Rights Guarantees\nII. State Constitutions Have Consistently Regulated Federal Elections Since the Founding",
        "reference": "A. State Judicial Review Under State Constitutions Provided the Legal Backdrop and Model for Federal Judicial Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Abood Court improperly applied private sector union cases and provided no analysis of the serious impairment of First Amendment rights of agency fee payers\nA. [MISSING]\nB. State and local regulation of public sector workers is inconsistent\nC. The Abood Court provided no analysis of the serious impairment of First Amendment rights of agency fee payers\nII. Political activity is a core function of labor unions\nIII. Collective bargaining with the government is inherently political",
        "reference": "A. Federal regulation of private sector workers under the Commerce Clause arose from crisis and is relatively uniform",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Prisoners with Unique Medical Conditions Have Routinely Been Able to Successfully Predict the Needless Suffering Imposed on Them by Their State's Execution Protocol\nA. Dennis McGuire\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Alva Campbell\nII. As-Applied Challenges Based on an Inmate's Specific Medical Condition Are Limited in Scope, Easily Evaluated, and Assist the State in Its Attempts to Conduct Humane Executions\nA. As-Applied Challenges Address Specific, Predictable Risks of Severe Pain\nB. As-Applied Challenges Are Administrable and Serve State Interests",
        "reference": "B. Doyle Lee Hamm",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-108_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The CAAF erred in reversing respondent's conviction\nC. This Court's review is warranted",
        "reference": "A. This Court Has Jurisdiction To Review The Question Presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT SHOULD PROTECT THE NATIONAL UNIFORMITY AND RELIANCE INTERESTS PROMOTED BY THE HOBBS ACT\nA. The Hobbs Act Channels Review Of Covered Agency Orders To A Single Court of Appeals Within A Specified Timeframe\nB. The Hobbs Act Promotes National Uniformity And Predictability, Which Fosters Substantial Reliance By Regulated Communities\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE COURT SHOULD ALSO PROTECT PRIVATE DEFENDANTS' DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE REGULATIONS ENFORCED AGAINST THEM, PARTICULARLY IN TCPA CASES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-921_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Violates Fundamental First Amendment Principles\nII. There Is No Obstacle To This Court's Review\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Immediate Review And Relief Are Imperative",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CITY'S CONTRACT COMPORTS WITH THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE\nA. The Free Exercise Clause Grants The Government Greater Authority To Set Rules Of Conduct For Government Contractors Than For The Public At Large\nB. The Non-Discrimination Requirement Restricts CSS's Conduct Exclusively In Its Capacity As A Government Contractor\nC. The Non-Discrimination Requirement Is Generally Applicable And Neutral\n1. The non-discrimination requirement is generally applicable\n2. The non-discrimination requirement is neutral\nD. The Non-Discrimination Requirement Does Not Require CSS To Engage In Conduct Contrary To Its Stated Religious Beliefs\nII. THE CITY'S CONTRACT COMPORTS WITH THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. This Case Is Not A Suitable Vehicle To Revisit Smith\nB. Stare Decisis Favors Retaining Smith",
        "reference": "III. SMITH SHOULD NOT BE OVERRULED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-493_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Texas Exercises Broad Regulatory Authority Over Bingo Gaming\nII. Texas Cannot Enforce Its Regulatory Bingo Regime on the Tribes' Lands\nA. Federal Law Bars State Regulation of Gaming on Indian Lands Absent Congressional Consent\nB. The Restoration Act's Plain Text Only Subjects the Tribes' Lands to Texas Gaming Bans\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Ysleta Never Construed the Restoration Act to Allow State Regulation of Tribal Bingo\nE. The Restoration Act Complements the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act",
        "reference": "C. The Legislative History Does Not Reflect Any Intent to Subject Tribal Gaming to State Regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The tiers of scrutiny were created in the mid-twentieth century as an expedient way of balancing away First Amendment rights\nII. The tiers of scrutiny are inconsistent with the Constitution's original meaning\nIII. The tiers of scrutiny are indeterminate and manipulable\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. The tiers of scrutiny should not be extended into the Second Amendment context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "A. The plain text of 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) requires that a sale makes the claimed invention available to the public\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Respondents' reliance on the doctrine of congressional ratification lacks merit\n3. Section 102(b)(1) does not support respondents' interpretation\nB. The legislative history of the AIA supports the plain-text interpretation\nC. The structure of the AIA further supports the plain-text interpretation\nD. The plain-text interpretation better serves the broader purposes of the AIA and the patent system\nE. Respondents have forfeited any argument that petitioner's claimed invention was available to the public",
        "reference": "1. The catch-all provision in Section 102(a)(1) clarifies the meaning of 'on sale'",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Ninth Circuit's construction of the Stevens Treaties commits the same interpretive errors that this Court rejected in NAHB.\nIII. The Court's resolution of the interpretive question in NAHB should guide the Court's analysis here.",
        "reference": "I. In National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court rejected a \"Super-Statute\" interpretation of the Endangered Species Act because such an interpretation would have broadened the Act to an absurd reach.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1450_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The district court's jurisdiction over \"all offenses against the laws of the United States\" encompasses the offenses alleged here\nA. Nothing in the current or prior versions of 18 U.S.C. 3231 excepts petitioner's alleged offenses from criminal jurisdiction\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Foreign-government-owned corporations lack immunity for their commercial activities\n2. The common law does not recognize foreign sovereign immunity where the Executive Branch determines that immunity is unwarranted\n3. Petitioner's proposed rule lacks meaningful support\nII. The FSIA does not immunize petitioner from criminal prosecution\nA. The FSIA does not apply to criminal cases\n1. The FSIA's text, structure, and history demonstrate that it exclusively addresses civil actions\na. The FSIA's text is directed at civil suits\nb. The FSIA was not designed to address criminal cases\n2. Neither precedent nor policy supports petitioner's reading of the FSIA as implicitly barring federal prosecutions of foreign-government-owned corporations\nB. If the FSIA applies to criminal cases, this prosecution can proceed under the commercial-activity exception\n1. The commercial-activity exception applies in \"any case\" in which the FSIA itself applies and the exception's terms are met\n2. The prosecution here would fall within the commercial-activity exception",
        "reference": "B. No extratextual principle precludes U.S. courts from exercising statutory jurisdiction over foreign-government-owned corporations' violations of U.S. criminal law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.73
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IS CLEAR AND CONSEQUENTIAL\nII. THE MAJORITY VIEW IS WRONG AND IMPRUDENT\nA. Griggs Does Not Support the Majority View\nB. The Majority View Is Imprudent Because It Imposes Substantial Inefficiencies on Litigants and District Courts\nIII. EVEN IF AUTOMATIC STAYS PENDING FAA APPEALS ARE REQUIRED, THEY MUST BE LIMITED TO CASES IN WHICH ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN \"A CONTRACT EVIDENCING A TRANSACTION\" ARE JUDICIALLY INVALIDATED\nA. No Automatic Stay Should Be Imposed Over Arbitration Provisions in Written Contracts Which Themselves \"Evidenc[e]\" No \"Transaction in Commerce\"\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. No Stay Should Be Imposed Where a District Court Determines That the Parties Privately Agreed to Litigate Via an Unambiguous Forum Selection Clause.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "A. Copyright law strikes a balance between incentivizing original expression and facilitating secondary expression\nB. The fair-use inquiry focuses on the specific use \u2014 here, petitioner's 2016 commercial licensing of the Orange Prince image to Conde Nast \u2014 that is alleged to be infringing\nC. Petitioner has identified no sound basis to reject the court of appeals' conclusion that the first statutory fair-use factor favors respondents\nD. The first fair-use factor should not be considered in isolation\nE. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "E. Other uses of Prince Series images or other works of visual art may require different fair-use analyses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Grutter Should Be Overruled Because Its Diversity Rationale Does Not Vindicate First Amendment Principles As Presumed\u2014Rather, It Violates Them\nA. Justice Powell Adopted Harvard's Argument That A Diverse Student Body Promoted A \"Robust Exchange Of Ideas\"\nB. It Was Immediately Apparent That The Politically Expedient Diversity Rationale Conflicted With Basic First Amendment Doctrine\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Racial Preference Programs Since Bakke Have Manifestly Not Led To A More \"Robust Exchange Of Ideas\" On College Campuses\nA. Even Supporters Of Racial Preferences Admit It's Nearly Impossible To Measure The Contribution Of \"Diversity\" To The Exchange Of Ideas\u2014So They Focus Instead On Non-Speech Outcomes To Justify Preferences\nB. In The Real World, Racial Preferences Have At Least Coincided With\u2014If Not Contributed To\u2014A Drastic Reduction In Free Speech On College Campuses",
        "reference": "C. Nevertheless, Five Justices In Grutter Accepted Justice Powell's First Amendment Academic Freedom Rationale\u2014And Compounded The Error By Deferring To The University's Claims About Preferences' Alleged Benefits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-493_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The plain language of section 107(a) federalizes all of Texas's gaming laws\nB. Cabazon Band does not change this outcome\n1. Assuming Cabazon Band applies, its prohibitory/regulatory distinction does not when tribes are subject to federal law\n2. Congress did not incorporate Cabazon Band into the gaming provisions of the Restoration Act\n3. The \"public policy\" test from Cabazon Band should not be expanded because it is unworkable\nC. Because IGRA is inconsistent with the Restoration Act, the Restoration Act controls\nII. The Restoration Act's Structure and History Confirm the Fifth Circuit's View\nA. The structure of the Restoration Act is consistent with Ysleta I's interpretation of section 107(a)\nB. The negotiating history of the Restoration Act demonstrates that Congress federalized Texas gaming law\nC. Congress has reconfirmed Ysleta I by acquiescing in its interpretation of the Restoration Act\nIII. The Lower Courts Correctly Concluded that the Pueblo's Activities Violate Texas Law",
        "reference": "I. The Fifth Circuit Correctly Interpreted the Plain Language of the Restoration Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. A court may not deny class certification on the ground that, as a matter of law, the defendant's allegedly misleading statements were too general to impact price\nB. A court may consider the nature of alleged misstatements in assessing whether, as a factual matter, the statements affected the market price of the relevant security\nII. To overcome the Basic presumption, a defendant must prove a lack of price impact, not simply introduce evidence on the issue",
        "reference": "I. Although no categorical rules apply, a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption may rely on the generic nature of alleged misstatements as evidence they had no actual price impact",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-603_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court of Appeals' Invalidation of a Federal Statute Hinders the United States' Warfighting Ability.\nA. Congress' Progressive Expansion of Servicemembers' Employment Protections Was Intended To Facilitate Effective Warfighting.\nB. Full Application of USERRA is Necessary to Protect the United States' Military Recruitment and Retention Efforts.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. USERRA's Alternative Enforcement Provision is Ineffective.",
        "reference": "C. Veterans Constitute a Great Number of State and Local Government Employees and, Upon Return from Service, Increasingly Face Workplace Discrimination.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "THE PLEADING STANDARD FOR FIDUCIARY BREACH CLAIMS SHOULD NOT PERMIT LITIGATION OVER CHOICES A PRUDENT FIDUCIARY COULD REASONABLY FAVOR\nA. Prudent plan administration requires fiduciaries to make complex discretionary judgments that could result in a wide range of reasonable choices.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The pleading standard must align with the merits standard for these claims.",
        "reference": "B. Courts review discretionary fiduciary judgments deferentially.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1498_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Nothing in the Yakama Treaty Expressly Preempts Application of the Tax Here\n1. Cougar Den's decision to transport fuel by highway does not convert Washington's fuel tax into a restriction on highway travel\n2. That the taxable event here occurred when Cougar Den brought fuel into Washington does not convert Washington's fuel tax into a restriction on highway travel\n3. Nothing in the Ninth Circuit's decisions interpreting the Treaty converts Washington's fuel tax into a restriction on highway travel\n4. The historical understanding of the right to travel creates no right to buy or sell goods tax free\nC. A Ruling for Cougar Den Would Undermine Critical State and Federal Taxing Authority and Is Unnecessary to Protect Tribal Authority",
        "reference": "A. This Court's Precedent Requires Express Federal Law to Preempt Application of Nondiscriminatory, Off-Reservation Taxes Like the Tax Here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1158_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. PAYING A PRIVATE CITIZEN TO LOBBY THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE 18 U.S.C. section 1346\nA. Section 1346 Requires Proof That The Recipient Of A Bribe Breached A Clear Fiduciary Duty That Is \"Beyond Dispute\"\nB. Private Citizens Who Lack Governmental Authority Have No Duty \u2014 Much Less One \"Beyond Dispute\" \u2014 To The Public\nC. Only A Public Official Or Person Authorized To Exercise Governmental Authority Can Take \"Official Action\" Under section 1346\nII. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES REQUIRE A NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF THE HONEST-SERVICES STATUTE\nA. The Margiotta Theory Is Unconstitutionally Vague\nB. The Margiotta Theory Violates The First Amendment\nC. The Margiotta Theory Violates Federalism Principles\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Absent Any Clear Statutory Guidance, The Fiduciary Duty Concept Underlying Honest-Services Fraud Is Indeterminate\nB. Section 1346 Is Unconstitutional As Applied\nIV. AIELLO'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
        "reference": "III. THE HONEST-SERVICES STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-8332_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. There Is No Conflict of Authority on the Question Presented\nIII. The Trial Court Properly Balanced Petitioners' Need for Discovery Against the Harm That Would Result from Disclosure of Execution Participants",
        "reference": "I. The Question on Which Petitioners Seek Review Was Neither Presented to Nor Decided by the Tennessee Courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Boston denied permission based on a misunderstanding of the Establishment Clause\nB. Such misunderstandings remain widespread, even after Town of Greece and American Legion\nC. Government lawyers receive, and then give, bad Establishment Clause advice\nII. The cure for these problems is to replace Lemon with a standard rooted in the text, history, and tradition of the Establishment Clause",
        "reference": "I. The Constitutional errors in this case stem from misunderstandings about the Establishment Clause, and Boston is not alone in making such errors",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22o65_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The River Master's allocation of evaporation losses was clearly erroneous\nA. The United States' cornerstone assertion that all the floodwater was Texas's water is incorrect\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Section C.5 of the Manual likewise does not apply here\nII. The River Master wrongly amended the 2014 calculations years after this Court's deadline\nA. The United States improperly aggrandizes the River Master's authority granted by this Court\nB. Texas did not forfeit its objection to the River Master's error",
        "reference": "B. Article III(a) does not support the River Master's decision, which is presumably why he did not invoke that provision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9560_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 922(g) and Its State Law Counterparts Share a Common History and Development and Have Been Interpreted by Courts in Parallel\nA. The History and Development of Modern Prohibited Possessor Laws\nB. State and Federal Courts Have Interpreted Their Prohibited Possessor Laws in Parallel\nII. State Courts Have Consistently Interpreted their Prohibited Possessor Laws as Not Requiring a Mens Rea for Prohibited Status.\nA. State Courts Have Interpreted Prohibited Possessor Statutes Lacking a Statutory Mens Rea to Require Knowledge of Possession, But Not of Prohibited Status\nB. [MISSING]\nC. State Courts Have Provided A Variety of Reasons for Excluding Knowledge of Status as an Element in Prohibited Possessor Crimes",
        "reference": "B. State Courts Have Also Interpreted Prohibited Possessor Statutes with a Textual Mens Rea Element to Exclude Knowledge of Status",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Earliest-Feasible-Moment Rule Would Be Impractical, as Defendants Often Need Time to Investigate Before Moving to Compel Arbitration\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. An Earliest-Feasible-Moment Rule Would Punish Parties for Unavoidable Delays Caused By Changing Law\nIV. An Earliest-Feasible-Moment Rule Would Unfairly Penalize Defendants for Unavoidable Delays Due to Court Congestion or Routine Case Administration\nV. An Earliest-Feasible-Moment Rule Would Deter Good Faith Settlement Efforts",
        "reference": "II. An Earliest-Feasible-Moment Rule Would Unfairly Penalize Defendants For Raising Preliminary Issues That May Lead to Early Resolution or Otherwise Assist the Parties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-897_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INA PROVIDES BOND HEARINGS FOR PEOPLE DETAINED DURING WITHHOLDING-ONLY PROCEEDINGS\nII. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE COMPELS READING SECTION 1226(a) TO GOVERN DETENTION PENDING WITHHOLDING-ONLY PROCEEDINGS\nA. Detention Without a Hearing of Individuals in Withholding-Only Proceedings Raises Serious Due Process Concerns\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE APPLIES EVEN IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS ARE RAISED ONLY BY PROLONGED DETENTION",
        "reference": "B. DHS's Custody Reviews Do Not Comport with Due Process Requirements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. States have the power to review the qualifications of presidential candidates.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. For more than fifty years, states have determined whether candidates are ineligible and removed ineligible candidates from the presidential ballot.\nC. The Constitution does not expressly or implicitly remove power from states to judge the qualifications of presidential candidates.\nD. States have exercised a similar power in presidential primaries.\nII. States have no obligation to review the qualifications of presidential candidates.\nIII. This Court should be cognizant of other election law issues before addressing the substance of Section 3.\nA. Are the mechanisms to evaluate the qualifications of presidential candidates adequately tailored to the state's interests such that they do not unduly burden voters' opportunity to associate with the preferred candidate of their choice?\nB. Does an adjudication of a qualification that Congress might alleviate in the future constitute an additional (and impermissible) qualification for federal office?\nC. Does any decision that defers to Congress distinguish Congress's power to enact enabling legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, its power to refuse to count electoral votes under the Twelfth Amendment and 3 U.S.C. section 15, and its power to determine whether a president has \"failed to qualify under Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment?",
        "reference": "A. The Presidential Electors Clause grants states broad power over presidential elections.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT HAS SPENT TWO DECADES DISMANTLING BCRA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Subsequent decisions dealt significant blows to BCRA\nII. BCRA'S LOAN-REPAYMENT LIMIT IS THE LATEST UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION TO BE CHALLENGED\nA. BCRA's loan-repayment limit burdens political speech\nB. The FEC fails to show BCRA's loan-repayment limit serves a legitimate interest or is appropriately tailored\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD STRIKE DOWN WHAT REMAINS OF BCRA",
        "reference": "A. McConnell began chipping away at BCRA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should resolve the confusion in its caselaw over what constitutes an unambiguously conferred private right.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Lower court divisions over Medicaid Act provisions highlight the need to clarify that Gonzaga's clear-statement rule controls, not Blessing's multifactor test.\nC. The Court should explicitly discard the discredited Wilder approach and Blessing factors.\nD. When determining whether Congress created a private right, courts should look for clear and unambiguous text.\nII. If Congress wants private individuals to enforce Spending Clause legislation, then Congress must explicitly authorize private remedies.\nA. The public in 1871 would not have understood Section 1983 to create a vehicle that allows private beneficiaries to enforce Spending Clause legislation.\nB. Modern contract principles also prevent third-party beneficiaries from suing to vindicate Spending Clause legislation.\nC. The lower courts' approach threatens the separation of powers.",
        "reference": "A. To create a private right through Spending Clause legislation, Congress must use explicit, rights-creating terms.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The first question regarding the expropriation exception warrants this Court's review\nA. The court of appeals' decision is wrong\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The comity question warrants this Court's review\nA. The court of appeals' decision is wrong\nB. Whether international comity is an available defense under the FSIA warrants this Court's review\nIII. This Court should decline to review the question presented in the conditional cross-petition",
        "reference": "B. The scope of the expropriation exception warrants the Court's review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. At A Time When Antisemitism Is A Serious and Alarming Problem, Including In The Workplace, Title VII Should Be Interpreted In A Way That Discourages, Rather Than Facilitates, Bigotry Against Jews",
        "reference": "I. Hardison's De Minimis Cost Standard Is Not In Title VII's Text, Is Contrary To The Plain Meaning Of \"Undue Hardship,\" And Is Inconsistent With The \"Undue Hardship\" Standard Applied In Other Federal Laws",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Confront The Constitutional Question\nII. The Constitution Requires That Illegal Aliens Be Excluded From The Apportionment Base\nA. Under the Constitution, Only \"Inhabitants\" \u2014 Legal Residents Who Have Their \"Usual Residence\" in a State \u2014 Form the Base for Apportionment\n1. Apportionment Determines Representation of \"the People.\"\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Illegal Aliens Are Not \"Inhabitants.\"\n4. Counting Only \"Inhabitants\" Furthers the Goal of Equal Representation\nB. Any Apportionment That Does Not Use Best Available Means to Exclude Illegal Aliens Is Unconstitutional",
        "reference": "2. \"The People\" Are the \"Inhabitants\" of Each State",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FAITHFULLY APPLIED THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS, AND PETITIONER'S CLAIMS OF INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICT ARE PREMATURE AT BEST\nA. There Is No Conflict With This Court's Decisions\nB. The Court Should Allow the Law in the Circuits to Develop Further Before Deciding Whether Review Is Appropriate\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE CWA'S STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND POLICIES\nIV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION DOES NOT EXPAND THE CWA'S REGULATORY REGIME\nV. IN CONCLUDING PETITIONER HAD FAIR NOTICE, THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPLIED THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD",
        "reference": "II. THE PENDENCY OF EPA REVIEW COUNSELS AGAINST GRANTING THE WRIT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Convention transcripts demonstrate that retention of a no-aid provision was motivated by support for public schools\nB. Montana voters understood Section 6 to prohibit diversion of state funding to nonpublic schools\nC. Section 6 must be read in the context of Article X as a whole, which evidences the delegates' concern for the provision of quality education to all Montana's students\nII. RESEARCH DEMONSTRATES THAT THE DIVERSION OF FUNDS FROM PUBLIC SCHOOLS HARMS STUDENTS\nA. Diverting public money to private schools harms student achievement\nB. Research cited by Amici supporting Petitioners is flawed",
        "reference": "I. ARTICLE X, SECTION 6 REFLECTS MONTANA'S COMMITMENT TO FUNDING PUBLIC EDUCATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Copyright Clause Broadly Empowers Congress To Protect Authors' Natural Right To Intellectual Property\nB. Consistent With The Framers' Far-Reaching Conception Of The Right's Scope And Justifications, The Copyright Act Extensively Protects Authors' Natural Right To Intellectual Property\nII. SOUND TEXTUALIST PRINCIPLES DICTATE THAT ORACLE CODE AND ORGANIZATION ARE PROTECTED BY THE COPYRIGHT ACT\nA. Oracle's Code Is A Protected Literary Work\nB. Section 102(b) Does Not Preclude Copyright Protection For Oracle's Code\nC. The Merger Doctrine Does Not Apply\nIII. WHETHER TO PARE BACK THE COPYRIGHT ACT'S PROTECTION OF COMPUTER CODE IS A QUESTION FOR CONGRESS, NOT THIS COURT",
        "reference": "I. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT CONFER EXPANSIVE PROTECTION OVER THE NATURAL RIGHT TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Implausible ERISA claims are unfairly allowed to proceed against prudent plans and fiduciaries\nA. Industry data demonstrates that excessive fee lawsuits have become excessive\nB. Euclid's experience demonstrates that significant numbers of excessive fee lawsuits are based on implausible allegations\n1. Implausible claims are allowed to proceed based on allegations that are not material to the actual fiduciary process or the investments at issue\n2. Implausible claims are allowed to proceed based on allegations of inaccurate or immaterial fee or performance differences\nII. The pleading standard for ERISA claims should weed out the implausible claims by requiring lower courts to account for the factors that demonstrate plausible claims of imprudence\nA. The pleading standard should focus on comparing the plan at issue with a reliable benchmark of materially identical investments and services\nB. The pleading standard should be informed by factors that tend to indicate whether a reliable benchmark plan charges disproportionately lower fees compared to the fees charged by the plan at issue\n1. A reliable benchmark must include materially identical investments and services\n2. The plan's fees must be disproportionate to the fees of the reliable benchmark\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Courts should consider plan disclosures and public financial information when analyzing excessive fee lawsuits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-481_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I.\"Confidential\" Commercial Information In FOIA Exemption 4 Covers All Information Kept Private And Not Publicly Disclosed\nA.This Court's precedents require a plain-text interpretation of \"confidential\" in Exemption 4\n1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"\n2.Legislative history only confirms the plain-text meaning\nB.The National Parks test is inconsistent with Exemption 4's text\n1.National Parks led the Circuits to an atextual interpretation of \"confidential\"\n2.National Parks has been widely criticized\u2014including by the court that invented it\n3.National Parks' policy justifications cannot overcome the plain text\n4.No other arguments support retaining National Parks' atextual and unworkable reading of Exemption 4\nC.The data that Argus Leader requested is \"confidential\" information that can be withheld under Exemption 4\nII.Even Under National Parks' Atextual Test, The Eighth Circuit's Standard For Substantial Competitive Harm Is Erroneous\nA.Evidence [MISSING]\nB.Under an objective application of National Parks, the SNAP data clearly falls within the ambit of Exemption 4",
        "reference": "A.Evidence of a reasonable possibility that disclosure might harm commercial or financial interests should satisfy the National Parks test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.92
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-540_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. WHEN PHARMACY BENEFIT PLANS ARE ABLE TO INCORPORATE EVIDENCE-BASED MANAGED CARE PHARMACY STRATEGIES INTO PLAN BENEFIT DESIGN, THEY IMPROVE HEALTH AND LOWER COSTS\nII. RELAXING THE SCOPE OF ERISA PREEMPTION TO AUTHORIZE ACT 900 WOULD PUT EFFECTIVE MANAGED CARE PHARMACY STRATEGIES LIKE THESE AT RISK\nA. Act 900 Impermissibly Regulates Plan Administration\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Managed Care Pharmacy Professionals Should Be Permitted To Develop Tools For Patient Outcomes And Management Of Costs Without The Constraint Of Disparate State Regulation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners' claims fail under Section 112(a) because undue experimentation would be required to make and use the claimed antibodies\nC. Petitioners' remaining arguments lack merit",
        "reference": "A. Section 112(a)'s enablement requirement is not satisfied if a person skilled in the art must undertake undue experimentation in order to make and use the invention",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-12_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. A brief explanation of the grounds for summary affirmance will benefit lower courts, potential litigants, and the public\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. A brief opinion from this Court will confirm the rigorousness of closely drawn scrutiny, as reflected in the District Court's decision",
        "reference": "II. This Court should caution against overreliance on Buckley's soft distinctions and emphasize that a court must focus primarily on the real world effect on political speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-210_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Question Presented Warrants this Court's Review\nIII. This Case Is an Optimal Vehicle for Addressing this Deep and Persistent Circuit Split",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1109_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Current Law Applies To All Cases Pending On Direct Review\nB. The Arizona Supreme Court Reopened Direct Review Of McKinney's Criminal Case, Requiring It To Apply Current Law\nC. Under Current Law, McKinney Is Entitled To Resentencing By A Jury\nII. CORRECTION OF EDDINGS ERROR REQUIRES RESENTENCING IN THE TRIAL COURT\nA. The Arizona Courts' Failure To Consider Mitigating Evidence Of McKinney's PTSD Violated Eddings\nB. This Court Has Long Held That Eddings Error Requires Resentencing In The Trial Court\nC. This Court Has Made Clear That Only A Trial-Level Sentencer Can Provide The Consideration Eddings Requires\nD. Cabana And Clemons Do Not Apply To Mitigating Evidence\nE. The Record Is Insufficient To Permit Individualized Consideration Of The Mitigating Evidence In McKinney's Case",
        "reference": "I. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT WAS REQUIRED TO APPLY CURRENT LAW WHEN WEIGHING THE MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING EVIDENCE IN MCKINNEY'S CASE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-846_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court Should Decline the USDA's Invitation to Arrogate Legislative Authority by Imposing a Post-Hoc \"Magic Words\" Requirement on the Manner in Which Congress May Waive Sovereign Immunity",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Whether to Waive the Federal Government's Sovereign Immunity Belongs to Congress",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-500_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Third Circuit's Decision Reaffirms the Court's Application of Federal Admiralty Law to Maritime Contracts and Application of State Law Principles When No Established Federal Admiralty Law Exists\nII. The Third Circuit Follows this Court's Precedent by Holding that Maritime Contract Clauses are Presumptively Enforceable, But Recognizing that Public Policy Considerations of the Forum State Can Overcome the Presumption of Validity and Render Choice-of-Law Provisions \"Unjust or Unreasonable\"\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Application of State Public Policy Considerations Protects Policyholders Against Improper Claims Practices Under Contracts of Adhesion\nV. Bad Faith Laws and Extra Contractual Remedies Are Strong Public Policies of Pennsylvania to Provide Redress Against the Imbalance Between Insurance Companies and Policyholders",
        "reference": "III. New York Law Is Fully Consistent with Measuring the Validity of a Choice-of-Law Clause in Light of Public Policy Concerns",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The circuit split the petitioners identify is shallow and this case would be a poor vehicle to resolve it\nIII. The decision below is correct \u2014 actual knowledge means actual, not constructive, knowledge",
        "reference": "I. The petitioners' question is not presented because they did not disclose \"all of the information relevant\" to the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A WILLFULNESS REQUIREMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH \"THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY\"",
        "reference": "I. A WILLFULNESS REQUIREMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF section 1117(A)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 112 of the Patent Act Establishes a Patent Bargain\nB. Amgen's Purely Functional Antibody Claims Violate the Patent Bargain\nC. Amgen's Patents Preempt Future Research and Innovation\nII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S TEST COMPLIES WITH THE STATUTE AND FURTHERS THE GOALS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM\nA. The Specification Must Enable the Invention Defined by the Claims\nB. The Federal Circuit's Enablement Analysis Was Correct",
        "reference": "I. THE ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENT PLAYS A CRITICAL ROLE IN THE PATENT SYSTEM",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1063_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. RESPONDENTS DO NOT DISPUTE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED BUT DISCOUNT THE MOUNTING CALLS TO RECONSIDER THIS COURT'S ADOPTION OR EXTENSION OF THE \"ACTUAL MALICE\" STANDARD\nB. RESPONDENTS' RELIANCE ON STARE DECISIS IS UNAVAILING\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO DECIDE THE QUESTION PRESENTED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The scientific consensus recognizes religion's important role in mental health therapy.\nB. Despite this recognition, the mental health professions have failed to adequately integrate religion into counseling.\nC. Religious mental health professionals can best fill the gap, but the decision below allows states to censor this critically needed religious-based counseling.\nII. Review is needed to clarify the First Amendment standard for religious speech.\nA. The protection of religious speech is a core concern of the First Amendment.\nB. Nonetheless, this Court's First Amendment precedent is confused, which has led lower courts to fail to accord religious speech special solicitude.",
        "reference": "I. Review is needed because the decision below allows the state to censor vitally important religious speech.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE IS NOT A SUITABLE VEHICLE TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION PRESENTED\nA. Petitioners Seek Review of Just One of the Fourth Circuit's Four Independent Bases for Its Judgment\nB. The Decision Below Does Not Conflict with Other Circuits\nII. THE QUESTION PRESENTED DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW\nA. The Decision Below Does Not Present an Issue of National Importance Because ACP and Other Pipelines Can Still Cross the Appalachian Trail\n1. Existing pipelines are unaffected by the decision below because none were authorized by the Forest Service to cross the Appalachian Trail under the MLA\n2. The decision below does not prevent construction of new pipelines\n3. Atlantic publicly assured investors that even its current route is viable without Supreme Court review\nB. Other Forest Service Authorities and Rights-of-Way Are Unaffected by the Decision Below\nIII. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS CORRECT AND SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD\nA. The Entire Appalachian Trail Is a Unit of the National Park System\nB. The MLA Excludes All Federal Land in the National Park System Owned by Any Federal Agency\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The Park Service Administers the Entire Appalachian Trail",
        "reference": "C. Petitioners' Argument That the Appalachian Trail Is Merely a \"Footpath\" or \"Right-of-Way\" Has No Legal Basis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1712_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents all but concede that ERISA defined-benefit plan participants have Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief to undo conflicted investments\nII. Petitioners have Article III standing to seek make-whole relief for their ERISA plan\nA. Petitioners are not mere bystanders to fiduciary breaches that deplete plan assets\n1. Petitioners' equitable interest in plan assets supplies the necessary personal stake\n2. Independently, petitioners' interest in enforcing respondents' fiduciary duties supplies the necessary personal stake\nB. Petitioners' suit resembles those heard at common law\n1. Beneficiaries have long sued trustees as the trust's representatives\n2. Respondents are wrong about the \"no further inquiry\" rule\nC. Congress plainly authorized petitioners' suit under Section 1132(a)(2) 236733.2 ii\nIII. Petitioners have Article III standing to seek removal of respondents as fiduciaries of their ERISA plan\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. Respondents concede that their position renders ERISA's duties effectively unenforceable by defined-benefit participants",
        "reference": "IV. ERISA authorizes petitioners to seek each remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.42
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Introduction\nA. Two Basic Principles\nB. A Century Old Nisi Prius Precedent\nC. Immunity for Foreign Heads of State \u2014 a Short International Comparison\nD. The King's Immunity in England\nE. Immunity of the Prince of Wales Before Becoming King and the Question of Immunity After Becoming King for Conduct Before Becoming King\nII. Distraction \u2014 The Demand of Office Is Not Unremitting\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Constitutional Article I Section 3 Clause 7 Concerns House Impeachment and Senate Trial, Not a State Investigation\nV. Supremacy Issues\nVI. Enforcement is Not an Issue",
        "reference": "III. Discriminatory Enforcement: A Defense to Criminal Charges but Not an Investigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court has jurisdiction, but the plaintiffs' claims are not justiciable\nA. The plaintiffs lack standing\n1. Plaintiffs lack standing to raise the rights of aliens abroad\n2. Plaintiffs do not \u2014themselves\u2014suffer cognizable religious injury\n3. Aliens abroad lack cognizable rights under the Constitution\n4. [MISSING]\n5. Plaintiffs' economic and other non-religious injuries are speculative\n6. The anti-discrimination rights that plaintiffs claim under section 1152(a)(1)(A) do not redress plaintiffs' injuries\nB. Plaintiffs' hardship-based claims are not ripe\nC. The \"consular nonreviewability\" doctrine precludes judicial review\nD. Sovereign immunity bars relief\nII. The Proclamation is entirely lawful\nA. Plaintiffs lack an INA cause of action, and the Proclamation is lawful under INA\n1. The President acted appropriately under section 1182(f), which is not subject to review\n2. The Proclamation is not subject to courtroom factfinding or judicial second guessing\n3. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not limit the President's authority under section 1182(f)\nB. The Proclamation does not violate the religious freedoms of anyone\n1. Plaintiffs lack a RFRA cause of action\n2. Plaintiffs' religious claims fall under the Free-Exercise Clause, not the Establishment Clause\n3. The Proclamation does not violate religious freedom\nC. Non-record statements\u2014especially ones predating the President's oath of office\u2014do not control here\n1. The plaintiffs have not made an Overton Park showing for going beyond the administrative record\n2. Statements about prior policy iterations are irrelevant\n3. The President's tweets are neither relevant nor anti-Muslim\nIII. The nationwide injunction would be overbroad, even assuming that any plaintiff had a meritorious and justiciable claim\nA. Overbroad nationwide injunctions deprive this Court of the percolating effect of multiple circuits reaching an issue\nB. Providing facial relief in as-applied challenges frustrates this Court's precedents on facial and class actions",
        "reference": "4. Plaintiffs' claimed stigmatic injury is insufficiently concrete",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.63
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS MR. KENNEDY'S PRAYER AND, UNDER A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, DOES NOT PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S SUBSTANTIAL INFRINGEMENT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED LIBERTY\nA. In Resolving this Case and Controversy, the Court Should Apply the Plain Meaning of the Words in the Establishment Clause\nB. This Court Should Abandon the Endorsement Jurisprudence used by the Appellate Court in Interpreting the Establishment Clause\n1. The Appellate Court Exceeded the Scope of the Judicial Power\n2. The Appellate Court, Substituting Endorsement as Establishment, Bypassed Constitutionally Required Processes for Amending the Constitution\n3. Lemon, and its Progeny Relied upon by the Appellate Court, Undermines the Legitimacy of the Judiciary\n4. [MISSING]\n5. The Appellate Court's Decision Fosters Unjustifiable Hostility Toward Religious Identity",
        "reference": "4. This Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Creates Substantial Unpredictability in the Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1606_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Social Security Appeals Council order dismissing a request for review as untimely is judicially reviewable under 42 U.S.C. 405(g)\nA. Section 405(g) does not prohibit courts from reviewing whether a claimant exhausted administrative remedies\nB. The agency issued a final decision after a hearing\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Judicial review of an Appeals Council dismissal order is limited to the stated rationale for the agency's decision",
        "reference": "C. Judicial review of Appeals Council dismissal orders will not impose an undue burden on federal courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Garcetti test appropriately balances First Amendment concerns for public employees engaged in public duties\nII. [MISSING]\nA. This Court has wisely provided equal First Amendment protection to all forms of highly protected speech, including both political and religious speech\nB. Creating a carve-out to Garcetti whenever a public school employee claims to be engaged in religious exercise would be unworkable\n1. School districts need to be able to control their curricula and message\n2. School districts need to be able to prevent public school students from being exposed to religious coercion\n3. A religious speech carve-out to Garcetti would require allowing all religious speech, no matter how inconsistent with the district's curriculum\nC. Weakening or creating a religious exception to Garcetti would both put school districts at risk of liability under discrimination laws and harm students",
        "reference": "II. Within the context of First Amendment speech protection, there should not be special treatment for religious speech as opposed to all other speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. This case is not about the \"automobile exception\" to the Fourth Amendment\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The common law of the founding era required warrants for police searches aimed at uncovering contraband or stolen property in private places\nII. The Court should not recognize a \"garage exception\" to the Fourth Amendment\nA. A \"garage exception\" to the Fourth Amendment would abrogate the time-honored common law protection of the home against warrantless searches\nB. A \"garage exception\" to the Fourth Amendment would abrogate the reasonable expectation of privacy that homeowners maintain in regard to containers on their property",
        "reference": "A. The automobile exception legitimizes warrantless searches of vehicles\u2014not warrantless searches for vehicles that are stolen property or contraband",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-210_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below is Correct\nII. The Question Presented Does Not Warrant This Court's Review Any Differences in Approach Across the Circuits Poses No Obstacle for Parties Litigating in the Federal Courts The Question Presented Is Rarely Outcome Determinative\nIII. This Case Is a Poor Vehicle for Addressing the Question Presented\nA. The Question Presented Is Not Outcome Determinative in This Case\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The New Underlying Issue Is Easily Resolved for Respondent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SCANDALOUS-MARKS PROVISION IMPERMISSIBLY RESTRICTS SPEECH THAT GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS DISLIKE BECAUSE IT MAY CAUSE OFFENSE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Scandalous-Marks Provision, Like The Disparagement Provision Invalidated By Tam, Discriminates Based On Viewpoint And Content\n1. This Case Is More Like Cohen Than The Government Will Admit\n2. The Rationale of Pacifica Does Not Justify The Scandalous-Marks Provision\n3. The Scandalous-Marks Provision\u2014Unlike The Other Provisions Of Section 1052(a)-(e)\u2014Targets A Mark's Expressive Message\nC. The Lanham Act Gives Government Officials Near-Unfettered Discretion To Bar Registration Of Marks They Deem Scandalous, Yielding Incoherent Decisions\nII. THE SCANDALOUS-MARKS PROVISION FAILS STRICT AND INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY\nA. Strict Scrutiny Dooms the Scandalous-Marks Provision\nB. The Scandalous-Marks Provision Fails Intermediate Scrutiny Because It Is Not Narrowly Tailored To And Does Not Directly And Materially Advance A Substantial Government Interest",
        "reference": "A. The Scandalous-Marks Provision Is A Restriction On Speech, Not A Condition On The Availability Of A Government Benefit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. GENDER IDENTITY THEORY IS ROOTED IN IDIOSYNCRATIC, QUASI-RELIGIOUS BELIEFS\nA. Sex is objective and immutable, while gender is socially constructed and is harmful and oppressive to women and girls\nB. \"Gender identity\" and \"transgender\" are inconsistent concepts with no objective definitions\nC. Gender identity ideology elevates a metaphysical gendered soul over the material reality of biological sex, and prioritizes \"affirming\" gender identity above all other considerations\nII. GENDER IDENTITY IDEOLOGY IS HOSTILE AND PARASITIC TO WOMEN AND GIRLS, LGB PEOPLE, AND ANY PERSON WHO DOES NOT CONFORM TO SEX STEREOTYPES\nA. Gender identity is harmful to women and girls\nB. Reduced ability for LGB people to collectively organize politically\nC. Conversion therapy and sterilization of LGB youth via \"gender affirmation\"\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. SB 5722 VIOLATES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE BY PROMOTING AND ADVANCING GENDER IDENTITY IDEOLOGY ABOVE ALL OTHER RELIGIONS, SECULAR BELIEFS, AND SCIENTIFIC FACTS\nA. The primary purpose of SB 5722 is to promote gender identity ideology and its primary effect is to advance gender identity ideology\ni. The primary purpose of SB 5722 is to advance gender identity theory, not to protect minors from ideologically-based interference into their psychosexual development\nii. The primary effect of SB 5722 is the removal of competing perspectives that are critical of gender identity ideology\nB. Endorsement Test\nC. Coercion Test",
        "reference": "D. \"Conversion therapy\" ban effectively bans care for detransitioners",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Software Interface Code Contains Protectable Expression\nA. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)\nB. Courts Must Carefully Scrutinize Whether Software Contains a Non-Copyrightable \"Method of Operation\" or Other Section 102(b) Exclusion\nII. A Proper Fair Use Analysis Is Critical to Preserving the Constitutional Purpose of Copyright\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A Jury's Determination of Fair Use Should Be Afforded Deference",
        "reference": "A. The Four Non-Exclusive Factors of Section 107 Must Be Weighed Together in Light of the Facts of Each Case, with No One Factor Receiving Greater or Lesser Weight in All Cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22o65_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The River Master misapplied the Compact, and that error cannot be excused by the equities, which favor Texas\nA. The Compact does not allow restricting Texas's water-delivery rights based on evaporation of the floodwater held by the Bureau\n1. Even on the River Master's findings, article XII does not apply\n2. [MISSING]\nB. New Mexico's appeal to equity does not excuse the River Master's unauthorized reduction of Texas's water-delivery rights\n1. Interstate water disputes must be resolved in accordance with the governing compact\n2. The equities favor Texas, not New Mexico\nII. The River Master's modification determination flouts the amended decree's procedures\nA. The River Master lacks authority to ignore deadlines in the amended decree\nB. New Mexico's motion for relief was untimely\nC. New Mexico's tardiness is not excused by equitable tolling\nD. The River Master made a prohibited retroactive modification of the River Master Manual",
        "reference": "2. The River Master's factual conclusions are also erroneous",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS DIVERGES FROM OTHER FEDERAL CIRCUITS AND UPENDS THE BALANCE BETWEEN TRADEMARK LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. No Other Circuit Has Applied Rogers To Ordinary Commercial Products, As Traditional Trademark Principles Provide Ample First Amendment Protections.\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Extension Of Rogers Wrongly Tilts The Balance Against The Application Of Trademark Law And Its Protection Of Consumers.\nD. Recent Cases Illustrate The Dangers Of The Ninth Circuit's Departure From the Rogers Conception of \"Expressive Work\" And The Need For A Definition For What Constitutes An Expressive Work.\nII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DILUTION ANALYSIS DISREGARDS THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF 15 U.S.C. section 1125(c)(3)(A).",
        "reference": "A. The Rogers Test Strikes The Right Balance By Granting First Amendment Protection Only To Artistic Works, Not Ordinary Commercial Products.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. Copyrightability does not turn on the supposedly \"functional\" nature of an original work\nA. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test is at odds with the plain text of Section 102(b)\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test would produce results at odds with the Act's purposes\nII. Petitioner misapplies the merger doctrine\nA. Petitioner gerrymanders the key step of its merger analysis\nB. Petitioner's merger analysis focuses on the wrong time period",
        "reference": "B. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test is at odds with historical practice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-457_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The premises of the Trust's arguments are false\nA. A trustee is not the true owner of a beneficiary's trust income\nB. North Carolina taxed the Trust, not the trustee\nII. The Trust misunderstands this Court's decisions on due process and taxation\nA. The Trust's reliance on Pennoyer-era cases is mistaken\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Hanson is inapposite here\n2. Shaffer does not help the Trust here\nIII. The Trust's remaining arguments fail\nA. The Trust's new arguments do not succeed\n1. Tax jurisdiction does not depend on whether trust income is distributed\n2. The Trust's \"no purposeful availment\" argument is mistaken\n3. The Trust's \"absolute discretion\" argument is contrary to trust law\nB. The Trust has not justified its proposed tax shelter",
        "reference": "B. The Court's decisions in Hanson and Shaffer do not control",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.79
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
        "reference": "I. The Logic Behind 20th Century Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Applies Differently in the Present Environment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Grant Review Now To Eliminate Uncertainty Regarding The Constitutionality Of The Bureau's Actions\nII. The Bureau's Structure Violates The Constitution\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Bureau's Structure Violates Fundamental Separation of Powers Principles\nC. Longstanding Historical Practice Confirms That The Bureau Is Unconstitutional",
        "reference": "A. The Bureau Is Not Accountable To The People's Elected Representatives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The right to be secure requires freedom from threats to our persons and property\nII. The right to be secure requires a robust warrant requirement with narrow exceptions\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Extending the community caretaking exception to the home violates the right to be secure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5726_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Rule 60(b)(1) Excludes Legal Errors\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Mistake's Neighboring Terms Exclude Legal Errors\nC. Rule 60's Structure Confirms Petitioner's Interpretation\nD. Regardless, Rule 60(b)(1) Does Not Reach Judicial Errors\nE. Petitioner's Interpretation Is Easily Administrable\nII. The Government's Interpretation Is Incorrect and Unworkable",
        "reference": "A. \"Mistake\" Is a Term of Art in Rule 60",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Second Amendment Has Historically Protected the Right and Ability of Minority Groups to Defend Themselves\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Racially motivated violence against APA has spiked over the past year despite efforts by the authorities to stop it\nB. APA have responded by purchasing firearms for self-defense in increasing numbers",
        "reference": "II. The Second Amendment Continues to Play the Same Role for Minority Groups Today",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-281_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The House Has Standing.\nII. Race Did Not Predominate In These Decades-Old Majority-Minority Districts\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Appellees' District-Specific Defenses Confirm the District Court's Failure to Conduct a Holistic Analysis\n1. Richmond (HD69, HD70, HD71, HD74)\n2. North Hampton Roads (HD92, HD95)\n3. South Hampton Roads (HD77, HD80, HD89, HD90)\n4. Southside Virginia (HD63)\nIII. Each District Would Satisfy Strict Scrutiny",
        "reference": "A. The District Court's Predominance Analysis Was Flawed From the Start",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-635_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court's Intervention Is Unwarranted Because The Decision Below Correctly Resolved A Narrow Question Controlled By This Court's Precedents\n1. This Court's Precedents Establish That A President's Records May Be Subpoenaed In The Circumstances Here\n2. [MISSING]\na. The Question Whether A President May Be Indicted Or Detained Is Irrelevant To The Issue Here\nb. That The President May Be Among Several Potential Subjects Of The Grand Jury's Investigation Does Not Distinguish Nixon\nc. That The Subpoena Was Issued By A State Rather Than Federal Grand Jury Only Confirms Its Propriety\nd. There Is No Basis For Applying A Heightened Need Standard In The Circumstances Here\nB. There Are No Additional Considerations That Counsel In Favor Of This Court's Review\nC. This Court Should Expeditiously Resolve The Petition For Certiorari And, If Necessary, The Merits Of This Dispute",
        "reference": "2. Petitioner's Contrary Arguments Are Meritless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "To maintain a damages claim for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest\nI. The Court's precedents support a probable cause element for section 1983 retaliatory arrest claims\nA. The logic of Hartman's probable cause element for retaliatory prosecution claims applies to retaliatory arrest claims\nB. [MISSING]\nII. A probable cause element for retaliatory arrest claims is consistent with the weight of authority at common law\nIII. A probable cause element that filters strong retaliatory arrest claims from weak ones comports with the purposes and values of the First Amendment",
        "reference": "B. The Court's preference for objective tests to govern police officers' conduct supports a probable cause element for retaliatory arrest claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1484_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. REVIEW HERE WOULD BE ACADEMIC IN LIGHT OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S INDEPENDENT SECTION 1395hh(a)(4) HOLDING\nII. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT WARRANTING REVIEW\nA. The D.C. Circuit's Section 1395hh(a)(4) Holding Is One of First Impression\nB. There Is No Circuit Split on the Section 1395hh(a)(2) Question Warranting Review\nIII. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S DECISION HAS NO IMPACT OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE Warranting REVIEW\nA. The Application of the Medicare Act to the Irregular Facts Here Lacks Prospective Importance\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Government's New Claim of Financial Impact Undercuts the Petition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The States lack standing\nB. Brown and Taylor lack standing\nII. The plan is lawful:\nA. The HEROES Act authorizes the plan\n1. The Act clearly authorizes the plan\n2. The major questions doctrine provides no basis to override the clear terms of the HEROES Act\n3. Respondents' remaining statutory arguments lack merit\nB. The plan is reasonable and reasonably explained\nC. The Secretary's action was procedurally proper",
        "reference": "I. Respondents lack Article III standing:",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FRAMERS VIEWED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A FUNDAMENTAL SAFEGUARD AGAINST UNRESTRAINED GOVERNMENT SEARCHES OF THE HOME\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Decision Below Ignores the Home's Unique Sanctity in the Eyes of the Framers\nB. Extending the \"Community Caretaking\" Exception Would Grant a Discretionary Search and Seizure Power to Police That the Fourth Amendment Was Designed to Protect Against",
        "reference": "II. THE EXTENSION OF THE \"COMMUNITY CARETAKING\" EXCEPTION RECREATES THOSE EVILS THAT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT WAS DESIGNED TO ERADICATE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. FAMILY LANDOWNERS HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE DESIGNATION OF THEIR LAND AS CRITICAL HABITAT\nII. THE ESA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE THE SERVICE'S DESIGNATION OF UNIT 1 AS CRITICAL HABITAT\nA. Unit 1 Is Not \"Habitat\"\n1. The ESA Cannot Be Read, as the Service Insists, To Mean That \"Habitat\" Includes Areas That Cannot Support a Species\na. Section 1532(5)(A) Provides a Single Definition of \"Critical Habitat\" Whose Criteria Are Cumulative, Not Alternative to Each Other\nb. The Service's Occasional Practice of Designating Incomplete Habitat Does Not Rescue Its Illegal Designation of Unit 1\n2. The Service Does Not Offer a Definition of Habitat and Is Not Entitled To Deference\n3. The ESA Limits the Service to Designation of Areas That Are Critical Habitat When They Are Designated\nB. Unit 1 Is Not \"Essential\" for Species Conservation Because It Is Not Even Adequate for Species Conservation\nIII. APA AND ESA ALLOW FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE SERVICE'S DECISION NOT TO EXCLUDE UNIT 1 FROM CRITICAL HABITAT\nA. The Service and Intervenors Ignore the Text of the APA When They Argue in Favor of Unreviewability of the Decision Not To Exclude Unit 1 from the Designation\nB. Neither the ESA's Text Nor Its Legislative History Supports the Arguments That the Decision Not To Exclude Is Unreviewable\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Contrary to the Service's Arguments, the Service Has Developed Meaningful Standards for the Court To Apply When Reviewing Its Decision Not To Exclude Property from a Critical Habitat Designation",
        "reference": "C. Properly Allowing for Judicial Review Here Does Not Run Afoul of TVA v. Hill",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the FCA's plain language, evidence of subjective knowledge is always relevant to scienter.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Congress and federal agencies have provided many ways for service providers and contractors to clarify any uncertainty in laws, regulations, or contractual requirements, and the Seventh Circuit's narrow rule could potentially undermine many of them.\nB. The Seventh Circuit's evidentiary limitations would turn fraud enforcement into a multi-billion-dollar game of Whack-A-Mole.\nIII. Adopting the Seventh Circuit's rule, which requires courts to ignore a defendant's subjective knowledge of falsity, would expose the United States to extensive fraud, while faithfully applying the FCA's text allows for \"rigorous\" application of the False Claims Act's scienter standard.",
        "reference": "II. The Seventh Circuit's evidentiary limitations on what authoritative guidance is relevant to determining whether a company was \"warned away\" from an erroneous interpretation of a statute or regulation does not reflect how the United States expects contractors to handle uncertainty when seeking and receiving taxpayer funds.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Zadvydas Authoritatively Construed Section 1231(a)(6) As Requiring Either (Supervised) Release Or A Bond-Type Determination After Prolonged Detention\nB. The Due Process Concerns At Issue In Zadvydas Apply At Least As Strongly To This Case\nII. SECTION 1231(a)(6) COMPELS EITHER RELEASE OR A BOND HEARING AFTER PROLONGED DETENTION FOR AN INDIVIDUAL PURSUING WITHHOLDING-ONLY RELIEF\nA. Section 1231(a)(6) Did Not Authorize Arteaga-Martinez's Continued Detention Because His Removal Was Not Reasonably Foreseeable\nB. At A Minimum, Section 1231(a)(6) Requires A Bond Hearing After Prolonged Detention For Noncitizens Pursuing Withholding-Only Relief\n1. Interpreting Section 1231(a)(6) to permit prolonged detention without possibility of release on bond raises significant due process concerns\n2. Under the avoidance canon, Section 1231(a)(6) can be read to imply a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker\n3. The government's construction of Section 1231(a)(6) departs from traditional canons of construction and ignores controlling precedent\nIII. NEITHER DHS REGULATIONS NOR OTHER SUPREME COURT DECISIONS WARRANT A DEPARTURE FROM ZADVYDAS\nA. DHS Regulations Cannot, And Do Not, Fix The Due Process Concerns With Section 1231(a)(6)\nB. This Court's Recent Cases Do Not Undermine Zadvydas's Holding As To The Meaning Of Section 1231(a)(6)",
        "reference": "I. ZADVYDAS INTERPRETED SECTION 1231(a)(6) TO PROTECT AGAINST UNREVIEWABLE PROLONGED DETENTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-828_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. English state-secrets cases involved only exclusion of certain evidence and not the assertion of a bar to continued litigation\nB. Early U.S. cases typically involved only the exclusion of evidence and its consequences\n1. Many early U.S. decisions, including Reynolds, involved only exclusion of evidence\n2. Totten involved dismissal premised on a secret government contract\n3. In some criminal cases, exclusion of privileged evidence either required the case to proceed without the evidence or forced the government to cease prosecution\nC. Decisions between Reynolds and the enactment of FISA in 1978 did not dismiss actions based on the state-secrets privilege\n1. Outside of the Totten line, decisions between Reynolds and the enactment of FISA did not dismiss actions based on the state-secrets privilege\n2. Courts emphasized the judiciary's important role in assessing the invocation of privilege\n3. Courts undertook significant steps to avoid dismissalbased on the assertion of state-secrets privilege\n4. Dismissal decisions rested on Totten's government-contracting rule rather than Reynolds's evidentiary-privilege rule\nD. Since FISA's enactment in 1978, courts have consistently recognized limits to the state-secrets doctrine, only rarely finding dismissal warranted\n1. Courts often refuse to dismiss cases based on the state-secrets privilege\n2. Other decisions center only on the evidentiary privilege, whatever the ultimate consequences may be\n3. [MISSING]\n4. Other decisions finding dismissal warranted rest on in camera review of privileged information to ascertain whether the government's defense is meritorious\n5. Courts have sometimes dismissed cases based on the state-secrets privilege, but only after recognizing the severity of that result and searching for alternatives",
        "reference": "3. Most dismissals rest on the plaintiff's inability to make out a prima facie case or carry his burden",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Gingles Framework Gives Effect to Congress' Prohibition in Section 2 Against Actual Discrimination in Redistricting\n1. [MISSING]\n2. States Have Broad Flexibility in How They Draw Section 2-Compliant Maps\nB. The Gingles Framework Ensures that Race Is Used Appropriately in Redistricting",
        "reference": "1. The Gingles Factors Provide Structure to Section 2's \"Totality of the Circumstances\" Test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief057.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Stare decisis requires adherence to Roe and Casey\n1. The viability rule has remained clear and workable\n2. Subsequent legal developments have reinforced the central holding of Roe and Casey\n3. No subsequent factual developments have undermined the central holding of Roe and Casey\n4. Reliance interests powerfully support adhering to Roe and Casey\n5. Overturning Roe and Casey would cause grave harm\nC. Roe and Casey were correctly decided\nD. Petitioners' alternative arguments lack merit",
        "reference": "A. Casey reaffirmed Roe's central holding that a State may not prohibit abortion before viability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner may recover the profits that it would have earned by performing surveys on the high seas if respondent had not infringed its patent\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Judicial precedent and the statutory context confirm that the Patent Act allows recovery of profits that petitioner would have earned abroad absent the domestic infringement\nC. The presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law does not justify the court of appeals' refusal to allow recovery of profits that petitioner would have earned on the high seas if respondent had not infringed its patent",
        "reference": "A. Whether a compensatory damages award is \"adequate\" depends on how much profit the infringement caused the patentee to lose, not where the patentee would have earned that profit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "i. if the a PPO Intme nts clause holding is affirmed, Prospective application of that rule is appropriate\na. according De facto validity to the Oversight board's actions to date was appropriate under Buckley and northern Pipeline\nb. Neither of Aurelius' proposed alternative outcomes is supported by this court's decisions\n1. Buckley and northern Pipeline show that the actions of the Oversight board were not \"void ab initio\"\n2. the special status Aurelius seeks with respect to prospectivity is not available under the court's cases\na. Gerry mandered special retroactivity is impermissible\nb. special treatment for \"successful challengers\" is impossible here\n3. even the de facto officer doctrine rejected in Ryder would not limit the court's equitable discretion to accord de facto validity to past acts recognized in Buckley and northern Pipeline\nii. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "ii. the district court retains discretionary authority to protect some reliance interests upon dismissal reply on a PPO Intme nts clause issue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1116_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PLAN PARTICIPANT HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF INFORMATION THAT PLAN ADMINISTRATORS DISCLOSED TO HIM PURSUANT TO ERISA\nA. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in plan disclosures\nB. The statutory structure and purpose confirm that Section 1113(2) should be construed to mean that a plan participant \"ha[s] actual knowledge\" of information conveyed to him in required disclosures\nII. A PURELY SUBJECTIVE RULE WOULD THWART ERISA'S CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING POLICIES\nA. Sulyma's construction of Section 1113(2) will impose significant burdens on employers, particularly in the class-action context\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. No other consideration justifies the increased burden on plan fiduciaries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1599_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. Statutory text and context show that section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies only when the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the summonsed records or accounts.\n1. Section 7609(c)(2)(D) requires a direct connection between the summons and payment, not just the possibility of obtaining information.\n2. The direct-connection standard's legal-interest test gives full effect to clauses (i) and (ii).\n3. Subsections (a) and (b), the heart of section 7609, show that section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) is a limited exception.\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Congress enacted section 7609 to broadly safeguard privacy in the context of third-party summonses.\n2. Reading section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to swallow the broad notice rule is anathema to congressional intent and legal tradition, and it creates the same opportunity for government abuse that Congress sought to eradicate.\n3. Congress struck a reasonable balance between privacy and enforcement.\nC. The IRS is not entitled to a thumb on the scale in determining section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i)'s scope.\nD. Petitioners have a right to challenge the summonses in federal court.",
        "reference": "B. Statutory history and purpose show that section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) is a limited exception.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "1. SECTION 35(a) ALLOWS COURT BROAD DISCRETION TO CONSIDER DIVERSE EQUITABLE FACTORS, BUT IT DOES NOT MAKE WILLFULNESS A PRECONDITION\n2. [MISSING]\n3. THE 1999 AMENDMENTS ARE NOT DETERMINE\n4. COMPETING POLICY OBSERVATIONS",
        "reference": "2. THERE IS NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR REQUIRING WILLFULNESS AS A PRECONDITION TO AN AWARD OF PROFITS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The right-and-wrong insanity test is not deeply rooted in our history and traditions\nB. As this Court has previously recognized, the Due Process Clause does not mandate a particular insanity test\nC. Kansas has reasonably determined that individuals who voluntarily and intentionally commit a crime are blameworthy, even if they do not believe their actions are wrong\nII. Kansas's Mens Rea Approach to Insanity Does Not Violate the Eighth Amendment\nA. Kahler's Eighth Amendment claim is not properly before this Court\nB. Convicting those who voluntarily and intentionally kill others, even if they do not recognize their actions are wrong, is not cruel and unusual\nIII. Even if Some Version of the Right-and-Wrong Test Were Required, the Failure to Allow that Defense Here Was Harmless",
        "reference": "I. Kansas's Mens Rea Approach to Insanity Does Not Violate the Due Process Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The petition does not present an important question warranting the Court's review in this case",
        "reference": "A. The decision below does not squarely conflict with any decision of another court of appeals or a state court of last resort",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Creates a Circuit Split on the Scope of Protection Afforded by the First Amendment Against Lanham Act Claims.\nA. Courts Have Historically Limited Rogers' Framework to Artistic Works\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Trademark Owners Would Rarely Prevail under the Ninth Circuit's Approach",
        "reference": "B. Misleading Trademark Parodies Used as Trademarks or Trade Dress for Utilitarian Products Should Not Receive Heightened Protection",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-155_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Mr. Hughes Is Eligible For section 3582(c)(2) Relief Because His Sentence Was \"Based On\" A Sentencing Guidelines Range That Subsequently Was Lowered\nA. A defendant who enters into a C-type agreement is sentenced \"based on\" a Guidelines range when the Guidelines bear a reasonably close connection to the sentence\n1. The term \"based on\" invokes standard principles of causation\n2. The sentencing judge's rationale and the parties' agreement each can show that the Guidelines bore a reasonably close connection to the sentence\n3. The Guidelines often but not always will bear a reasonably close connection to the sentence of a C-type defendant\nB. Foreclosing or severely limiting C-type plea recipients' eligibility for relief under section 3582(c)(2) is inconsistent with the Sentencing Act and likely to lead to significant inequities\nC. Mr. Hughes is eligible for relief under section 3582(c)(2)\nII. [MISSING]\nA. An opinion constitutes the \"narrowest grounds\" under Marks when it represents a logical subset of reasoning embraced by a majority of the Court\nB. The test adopted by the decision below is unworkable, and would transform theories rejected by the majority of the Court into binding precedent\nC. The single-Justice concurrence in Freeman is not binding precedent\nD. Alternatively, the Court may wish to revisit Marks's treatment of divided opinions and hold that only opinions joined by a majority of Justices merit precedential status",
        "reference": "II. The Court Of Appeals Erred By Treating The Single-Justice Concurrence In Freeman As Binding Precedent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1442_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners forfeited their Appointments Clause claims\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Under the Court's Appointments Clause cases, parties who fail to raise timely objections have no right to new hearings before new adjudicators\nC. Petitioners have forfeited their Appointments Clause challenges in these cases\nII. Petitioners' arguments lack merit\nA. Courts should continue to apply forfeiture rules\nB. Forfeiture rules apply to Social Security cases\n1. Precedent and practical considerations support the application of standard forfeiture doctrine to Social Security proceedings\n2. Sims v. Apfel does not require a contrary result\nC. Forfeiture rules apply to Appointments Clause challenges to Social Security ALJs\nD. The Court should not excuse petitioners' forfeitures as an exercise of its judicial discretion",
        "reference": "A. Under a general rule of administrative law, parties forfeit objections they never raise before the agency",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. ARIZONA HAS A LONG HISTORY OF VOTER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF NATIVE AMERICANS\nA. State-level discrimination against Navajos and other Native Americans\nB. County-level discrimination against Navajos\nII. NAVAJO VOTERS DO NOT HAVE THE SAME OPPORTUNITIES TO PARTICIPATE IN COUNTY, STATE AND FEDERAL ELECTIONS AS OTHER ARIZONA ELECTORS\nA. Navajo voters lack at-home mail delivery\nB. Mail routes result in delays in receiving and returning mail\nC. Navajo Chapter boundaries do not coincide with county precinct boundaries\nD. Socio-economic factors create challenges for Navajo voters\nE. [MISSING]\nIII. BALLOT COLLECTION LIMITATIONS IMPOSE UNDUE BURDENS ON NAVAJO VOTERS\nIV. ARIZONA'S OUT-OF-PRECINCT POLICY MAKES IT OVERLY BURDENSOME FOR NAVAJO VOTERS TO VOTE\nA. The inconsistent use of precinct voting throughout Arizona creates a disparate impact on Navajo voters\nB. The lack of traditional addresses on the Nation results in a disproportionately high number of Navajo voters being placed in the wrong precinct\nC. Out-of-precinct policy has historically resulted in Navajo votes being rejected at a much higher rate than their non-Navajo counterparts",
        "reference": "E. Navajo voters face language barriers in voting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE DOES NOT PROHIBIT STATE COURTS FROM REVIEWING STATE LAWS REGULATING CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS\nA. The Elections Clause Does Not Displace State Constitutional Rules Governing State Regulations of Federal Elections\nB. The Elections Clause Does Not Deprive State Legislatures of Their Authority to Provide for State Court Judicial Review of Congressional Election Regimes as Part of Their Prescribed Time, Place, and Manner Regulations\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Because the Constitution Assigns Final Decisions about State Law to State Courts, Any Federal Judicial Review Under the Elections Clause Must Be Highly Deferential\nB. State Courts Using Traditional Judicial Approaches When Interpreting State Laws and Conducting Judicial Review Under State Constitutions Are Engaged in Judicial, Not Legislative, Acts\nC. Any Federal Judicial Review of State Decisions About State Election Law Should Involve a Clear and Workable Standard To Prevent Unnecessary Intrusions on State Sovereignty",
        "reference": "II. ANY FEDERAL COURT REVIEW OF STATE COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING STATE LAWS GOVERNING FEDERAL ELECTIONS MUST BE TIGHTLY CIRCUMSCRIBED AND APPLY CLEAR LIMITS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1257_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Lack of Clear Guidance on Vote-Denial Cases Has Resulted in a Patchwork of Standards. Lower Courts Are Unclear what the Proper Evidentiary Standard Is to Prove a Discriminatory Burden. The Seventh Circuit Uniquely Held That Discrimination Must Be Specifically Caused by the Defendant. Lack of a Clear Rule Led to Opposing Section 2 Analyses in Two Fourth Circuit Cases. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of Discriminatory Burden Exemplifies the Conflicting Circuit Standards.\nII. VRA Section 5 Standards Shouldn't Be Imported into Section 2.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Inconsistency in Judicial Outcomes Undermines the Integrity of America's Electoral System and Inhibits State Legislatures.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS MAY NOT DIVEST ITSELF OF THE POWER THAT THE CONSTITUTION VESTS IN IT\nA. The Court Should Abandon the Misleading Term \"Delegation\"\n1. \"Delegation\" Falsely Implies an Easily Revocable Transfer\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The Court Should Repudiate the Three Main Legal Fictions that Have Sustained Congress's Divestiture of Lawmaking Powers to Executive Departments and Agencies\nC. Divesting Legislative Power also Evades Bicameralism and Presentment\nII. SECTION 20913(d) FAILS TO SUPPLY AN \"INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE,\" AS REQUIRED BY THE PRECEDENTS OF THIS COURT\nA. SORNA Fails the Nondelegation Tests Enunciated in Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining\nB. The Court Should Reinvigorate the \"Intelligible Principle\" Requirement If It Will Not Reject It as a Legal Fiction\nIII. SECTION 20913(d) VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION BY EMPOWERING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO ACT AS BOTH LAWMAKER AND LAW ENFORCER\nA. SORNA Is Incompatible with the Attorney General's Duties\nB. SORNA Revives the Constitutionally Forbidden Suspending and Dispensing Powers\nIV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS ARE ESPECIALLY GRAVE WHEN CONGRESS DIVESTS ITSELF OF CRIMINAL LAWMAKING POWERS\nV. THE COURT MAY REMEDY THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS BY JUST INVALIDATING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S RULE",
        "reference": "2. The Court Should Employ the Constitution's Terminology and Should Therefore Conclude that Congress Has \"Divested\" Itself of Legislative Power",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. The flags displayed under the City's flag-raising program are not government speech\n1. The government-speech doctrine allows the government to rely on contributions from private actors, but does not apply when the government creates a forum for a diversity of private views\n2. The City's flag-raising program is a forum for private speech, not government speech\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The First Amendment gives governments ample latitude to develop programs involving private speakers",
        "reference": "B. Because the City's flag-raising program is a forum for private speech, the denial of petitioners' application was impermissible viewpoint discrimination",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-204_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit's Formalistic Approach Improperly Exposes Defendants to \"Pass-On\" Theories of Harm that Lead to Duplicative Damages Claims in Conflict with this Court's Precedents and the Clayton Act\nA. The Ninth Circuit Misunderstood that Apple's Multi-Sided Platform Service Differs Significantly from the Role of the Traditional \"Distributor\"\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Ignores that Respondents Rely on a Pass-On Theory of Harm that Subjects Multi-Sided Platform Services to a Risk of Duplicative Recovery\nII. The Decision Below Converts a Key Virtue of Digital Platform Services into Potential Antitrust Liability in Disregard of Modern Market Realities\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Approach Threatens Digital Platform Services that Connect Sellers and Consumers in Innovative and Efficient Ways\nB. Exposing Companies Offering Digital Platform Services to Duplicative Treble-Damages Claims Would Chill Innovation and Harm Consumers and Sellers",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit Failed to Appreciate that Respondents Are Indirect Purchasers of the Alleged Monopolized Service",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Boston's program to raise flags representing the City's ethnic diversity and in connection with a handful of public observances was government speech, and the City may therefore choose its message, including choosing not to speak on religious issues\nA. The selection and presentation of flags on the City flagpole outside of the seat of City government constitutes government speech\n1. Flags have been historically used to convey government messages\n2. A reasonable observer would attribute the message of a flag on the City's flagpole to the City\n3. The City maintains direct and effective control over the flagpoles and messages conveyed through its flag raisings\nB. The government speech doctrine protects elected officials' ability to decide the topics on which the government will speak, including choosing not to speak on religion\nII. The City of Boston did not intend to, and did not, create a public forum on City-owned and-controlled flagpoles outside City Hall\nA. Petitioners' arguments, and those of their amici, proceed from inaccurate factual premises\nB. The City's decision to fly national flags to represent the City's diverse population and fly non-City flags in association with publicly recognized days of observance does not reflect an intent on the City's part to make the flagpole a public forum\n1. The City's policy and practice do not demonstrate an intent to designate the City flagpole a public forum\n2. The nature of the City flagpole and its essential function is not compatible with unfettered private speech\nC. To the extent the City inadvertently converted the flagpole into a public forum, it is permitted to remove that designation and create a new program\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. Even if the Court determines the City was not entitled to prevail on summary judgment, petitioners are not themselves entitled to judgment as a matter of law",
        "reference": "D. Petitioners' argument concerning a limited public forum is not preserved, but is inapposite in any event",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.79
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. RAMOS DID NOT ANNOUNCE A NEW RULE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE\nII. IF RAMOS ANNOUNCED A NEW RULE, IT IS A UNIQUE WATERSHED RULE\nA. Ramos altered our understanding of a bedrock procedural element essential to the fairness of criminal proceedings\nB. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. AEDPA DOES NOT BAR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF RAMOS",
        "reference": "C. Louisiana's minimal finality interests do not negate the watershed status of Ramos",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1625_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF 17 U.S.C. section 505 TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF \"FULL COSTS\" ADVANCES THE PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT LAW\nA. Awards of \"Full Costs\" in Copyright Cases Have a Long History in the Law\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Making Full Costs Available to Parties in the Digital Age Is More Important Than Ever\nD. The Statute Is Clear and Supports an Award of Full Costs\nII. PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW WOULD UNDERMINE COPYRIGHT POLICY AND SIGNIFICANTLY CHILL COPYRIGHT CLAIMS\nA. Barring a Prevailing Party from Recovering Full Costs Would Discourage Copyright Litigation\nB. The Equities Should Not Favor Wrongdoers",
        "reference": "B. Allowing Recovery of \"Full Costs\" Encourages Parties to Invest in Meritorious Claims That Protect Creators' Rights and Advance the Goals of Copyright Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-783_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioner \"exceed[ed] authorized access\" by searching a restricted law-enforcement database in return for money\nA. Petitioner 's forbidden use of his computer access to obtain confidential database information \"exceed[ed]\" his \"authorized access\"\n1. The statutory definition of \"exceeds authorized access\" unambiguously covers petitioner's search of a restricted law-enforcement database for personal profit\na. Petitioner was not entitled to use access authorized solely for law-enforcement duties to obtain confidential records in return for cash\nb. Petitioner's conduct is not exempt from Section 1030 simply because he would be allowed to query the database in a different circumstance\n2. The statutory and legislative history confirm that Section 1030 covers petitioner's conduct\na. Section 1030 has always been designed to cover insider misconduct like petitioner's\nb. Section 1030 applies traditional property-protection principles \u2014 which would cover insider misappropriation \u2014 to the electronic realm\nB. Petitioner's policy and constitutional arguments are misplaced\n1. Affirming petitioner's conviction would not make routine or innocuous computer use a federal crime\na. The policy concerns of petitioner and his amici are best addressed through separate statutory limitations that are not at issue here\nb. The Court should not hollow Section 1030 by excising core unlawful conduct like petitioner's\n2. Petitioner's constitutional concerns are unfounded\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The rule of lenity does not apply",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1168_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "IMPOSING GENERAL JURISDICTION BY REGISTRATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\nI. Because Railroads Cannot Choose To Shut Down In States Where They Now Operate, Registration-Jurisdiction Has Nothing To Do With \"Consent\"\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Railroads Do Not Have The Unilateral Right To Abandon A Market\nII. Coercing Personal Jurisdiction Through Mandatory Registration Will Reopen The Door To Forum Shopping, Particularly In FELA Cases\nA. FELA Litigation Is Plagued By Forum Shopping\nB. Upholding Pennsylvania's Law Will Breathe New Life Into FELA Forum Shopping",
        "reference": "A. The Nature Of Railroad Operations Makes The Exit Option Impossible",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief037.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The 14th Amendment Balances an Assertion of Rights with Pragmatic Structural Protections\nB. Section 3 is a Vital Tool of Self-Protection for Our Republic\nII. Trump's Insurrection Exemplifies the Threat Anticipated by Section 3\nIII. Applying Section 3 to Trump Serves the Interest of Democracy\nA. Ineligible Candidates Should Not Be Permitted to Run for Office\nB. Applying Section 3 to Trump's Insurrection Will Not Subject Ordinary Protesters to Disqualification",
        "reference": "I. Section 3 Plays a Vital Role in the Overall Architecture and Integrity of the 14th Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari should be denied because the decision below is narrow, fact-bound, and rife with vehicle problems\nA. The Federal Circuit limited its decision to the unusual agreement here and declined to reach the secret-sale issue\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The court concluded that Helsinn's sale was public, and the petition contests that factual determination\n2. Below, Helsinn forfeited key points that it asks this Court to take up\nII. Certiorari should also be denied because, whether public or secret, the invention here was on sale\nA. The AIA's plain text confirms that Congress did not change the settled meaning of \"on sale,\" which Helsinn conceded was a term of art\nB. Helsinn has no answer for section 102(b), which expressly distinguishes between public and private disclosures\nC. Congress repeatedly declined to adopt bills that did what Helsinn wishes\nD. Two centuries of this Court's precedents and the Constitution confirm that the on-sale bar is triggered by all types of sales\nE. Helsinn's policy arguments do not support review",
        "reference": "B. This case is a poor vehicle to decide the scope of the AIA's on-sale bar",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.45
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "Alabama's 2021 congressional redistricting plan violates Section 2 of the VRA\nA. The district court correctly interpreted and applied Section 2\n1. The Gingles framework faithfully implements Section 2's text, history, and purpose\n2. The district court correctly applied the Gingles framework\nB. This Court should reject Alabama's novel interpretation of Section 2\n1. Section 2 requires more than an absence of intentional discrimination\n2. Race-neutral illustrative plans are not required to satisfy the first Gingles precondition\n3. Computer simulations are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a Section 2 violation\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Section 2 is constitutional as applied to single-member districting",
        "reference": "C. Section 2 applies to single-member districting",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals erred in holding that Congress's decision not to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico lacks a rational basis\n1. A court owes Congress substantial deference when it assesses a law under the rational-basis test\n2. Puerto Rico's unique tax status and resulting fiscal autonomy provide a rational basis for the decision not to extend the SSI program to its residents\n3. The interest in advancing self-government and longstanding practice reinforce the rationality of Congress's decision not to extend the SSI program to Puerto Rico\n4. Congress also had rational grounds to treat Puerto Rico differently than the Northern Mariana Islands\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The constitutional text establishes that Congress may treat a Territory differently than the States if it has a rational basis to do so; differently than the States draws additional support from its broader authority to draw rational geographic distinctions\n3. Equal-protection doctrine confirms that Congress may treat a Territory differently than the States if it has a rational basis to do so\nC. The doctrine of stare decisis supports retaining Torres and Rosario",
        "reference": "B. Respondent errs in arguing that the differential treatment of Territories warrants heightened scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals properly denied petitioners' motion to intervene\nA. The state respondents broadly agree with petitioners regarding the legal standards governing intervention\nB. The court of appeals did not err by denying petitioners' motion to intervene\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Under the circumstances of this case, petitioners cannot satisfy the requirements for intervention under Rule 24\n3. Petitioners' Munsingwear arguments do not establish that the court of appeals erred\n4. Petitioners' remaining arguments are unpersuasive\nC. The Court need not address the novel interpretation of Rule 24 advanced by the federal respondents at the petition stage",
        "reference": "1. The underlying appeal is moot",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-601_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Attorney General Cameron has the authority to intervene to represent Kentucky\nA. The federal Constitution does not impose a unitary executive on the states\nB. EMW suffers no prejudice from the Attorney General's defending HB 454 as a nominal party on Kentucky's behalf\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Mullaney represents a commonsense approach to appellate intervention to allow suits to proceed\nB. The Attorney General's intervention meets the Mullaney factors\nIII. This suit's lying under the Young pleading fiction \u2014 and not under section 1983 \u2014 emphasizes the nominal nature of the Attorney General's intervention",
        "reference": "II. Federal Rule 21 \u2014 rather than, or in addition to, Rule 24 \u2014 should guide this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1435_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT REDEFINE THE TERM \"POLITICAL\" NOW\nII. THE GOVERNMENT FAILS TO JUSTIFY ITS BROAD BAN ON ALL POLITICAL APPAREL\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 211B.11(1) Fails to Reasonably Advance the Government's Interests in a Substantial Number of Applications\n1. A Total Political Apparel Ban Does Not Reasonably Advance the Interest in Focused and Smooth Voting\n2. A Total Ban Does Not Reasonably Address the Speculative Fear of Disruption\nC. Banning All Political Apparel Does Not Reasonably Address the Danger of Voter Intimidation\nD. The Statute Cannot Be Considered Viewpoint Neutral Due to Lack of Constraints on Discretionary Application of the Term \"Political\"\nIII. THIS CASE IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR STATE COURT CERTIFICATION",
        "reference": "A. This Case May Be Resolved on the Basis of Whether Section 211B.11(1) Burdens a \"Substantial\" Amount of \"Protected\" Speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-938_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. An Order Denying Stay Relief to Litigate A Claim in State Court Is an Interlocutory Order That Is Not Subject to Immediate Appellate Review\nA. Under the Standard Adopted in Bullard, an Order Denying Stay Relief to Litigate a Claim in State Court Is Interlocutory, Not Final\nB. The History of Section 158 Demonstrates That Congress Did Not Intend Orders Denying Stay Relief That Determine Where the Parties Would Litigate Their Dispute To Be Final and Immediately Appealable\nC. Analogous Orders Denying Motions Involving Litigation Over Where To Litigate Are Not Typically Final\nII. Even If Some Orders Denying Stay Relief Could Be Immediately Appealable, Denial of a Stay-Relief Motion Premised on Bad Faith is Not\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Sixth Circuit's Ruling Violates the Policy Against Piecemeal Appeals and, If Uncorrected, Will Improperly Expand the Types of Proceedings Subject to Immediate Appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-315_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Tolling Provision Of Section 3731(b)(2) Applies To Relators Only When The United States Intervenes\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Applying Section 3731(b)(2) To Relators Would Undermine Government Policy And Interfere With Agency Procurements",
        "reference": "B. Extending The Statute Of Limitations To A Period Of Up To 10 Years Would Impose Significant Costs On FCA Defendants In General And Government Contractors In Particular",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. COERCION, NOT ENDORSEMENT, IS THE PROPER STANDARD FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIMS\nA. No Clear Standard Governs This Case\nB. The Text And History Of The First Amendment Show The Establishment Clause Was Designed To Prohibit Coercion\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Disestablishment In The States Involved Removing Coercive Laws And Allowing Freedom Of Conscience\n3. The Debates In Congress Over The First Amendment Show The Establishment Clause Was Designed To Prevent Coercion\n4. The Conduct Of The Framers Confirms That Non-Coercive Actions Did Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns\nC. Only A Coercion Standard Provides A Workable Approach That Does Not Create Tension Within The First Amendment\n1. The Endorsement Test Is Inconsistent With Practices Accepted By The Framers, This Court's Precedent, And National Traditions\n2. The Endorsement Test Creates Tension Within The First Amendment\n3. The Endorsement Test's \"Reasonable Observer\" Needlessly Complicates The Analysis\n4. The Fact-Specific Approach Of The Van Orden Concurrence Does Not Solve The Problem\nII. THE PEACE CROSS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE BECAUSE IT IS NOT COERCIVE\nIII. THE PEACE CROSS SURVIVES ANY OTHER TEST APPLIED BY THIS COURT\nA. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Cannot Be Reconciled With Van Orden\nB. The Peace Cross Satisfies The Lemon / Endorsement Test The Purpose Or Effect Of Endorsing Religion\n2. Spending Money For Grounds-keeping And Routine Maintenance Of A War Memorial Does Not \"Entangle\" Government With Religion",
        "reference": "1. At The Founding, The Essential Element Of Religious \"Establishment\" Was Coercion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-535_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Secretary's Plan to Forgive $430 Billion in Student Loans Will Further Distort the Incentive Structure in Higher Education that Has Caused a Collective $1.76 Trillion in Student Loan Debt\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Secretary's Student Loan Forgiveness Plan Will Cause Universities to Continue to Spend Wastefully\nII. Congress Is Actively Debating Major Reforms to How the Government Subsidizes Higher Education. The Secretary's Unilateral Student Loan Forgiveness Plan Preempts This Democratic and Deliberative Function",
        "reference": "A. The Secretary's Student Loan Forgiveness Plan Will Cause Students to Incur More Debt, Exacerbating an Existing Debt Crisis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The TCPA is a Content-Based Restriction on Speech\nB. In Buckley and Reed this Court Rejected the \"Manner Restriction\" Argument the Government Advances Here\nC. The Government's Argument Regarding Privacy and Narrow Tailoring is Hopelessly Flawed\nII. This Court's Decision in Reed Controls the Remedy Question",
        "reference": "I. The TCPA Violates the First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioners Misinterpret Pennsylvania Law",
        "reference": "I. Pennsylvania Law Governing Foster Care",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Grant Of Certiorari Is Warranted Given The Critical Importance Of The CRCA's Protections For Copyright Holders\nA. In Light Of Decisions Invalidating The CRCA, Copyright Infringement By States Is A Serious And Accelerating Problem\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Music Creators And Owners Suffer Harm In The Absence Of A Federal Damages Remedy Against State Copyright Infringement\nII. Only This Court Can Resolve The Tension In Its Existing Sovereign Immunity Decisions, Which Is Unduly Constraining Lower Courts",
        "reference": "B. Alternative Remedies For Copyright Infringement Are Not An Adequate Substitute For Monetary Remedies Under Federal Copyright Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FTC's administrative proceedings raise significant due process concerns\nA. The process afforded to regulated parties is vastly different based on whether the DOJ or the FTC handles the enforcement action\nB. The FTC's processes and procedures are stacked in the agency's favor\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Meaningful judicial review can make or break a company\nB. Prompt judicial review is critical to enforce the separation of powers",
        "reference": "II. These due process concerns underscore the need for timely, meaningful judicial review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-227_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Circuit Conflict Is Recent and Shallow, and It May Resolve Without This Court's Intervention\nB. There Is No Broader Circuit Conflict\nC. Petitioners' Claims of Urgency Lack Force\nII. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT\nA. The Court of Appeals Correctly Construed the Bankruptcy Code\nB. Petitioners Fail To Show Any Error by the Court of Appeals",
        "reference": "I. REVIEW IS NOT WARRANTED AT THIS TIME",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should not disturb the lower courts' consensus on severability\nA. Applying the TCPA to calls predating the government-debt exception does not injure Facebook\nB. The severability issue does not merit review\nII. [MISSING]\nA. There is no inter-circuit conflict\n1. ACA International\n2. Dominguez\nB. Marks's holding is correct\nC. The issue is subject to pending agency action\nD. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing the ATDS issue",
        "reference": "II. The ATDS question does not warrant review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. ACCESS TO A ROBUST PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION IS INTEGRAL TO TITLE VII'S EFFECTUATION\nA. Congress Fashioned the Private Right of Action as a Primary Mechanism for Compelling Compliance with Title VII\nB. [MISSING]\nII. RELATED TITLE VII PROVISIONS CONFIRM THAT THE CHARGE-FILING REQUIREMENT IS NONJURISDICTIONAL\nIII. CONSIDERATIONS OF JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS INDICATE THAT THE CHARGE-FILING REQUIREMENT IS NOT JURISDICTIONAL",
        "reference": "B. The History, Purpose, and Role of Title VII's Private Attorneys General Confirm that Presuit Filing Requirements Are Not Jurisdictional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Method Of Enforcement Of Kansas's Identity Theft Law Does Not Conflict With Those Of The Immigration Reform And Control Act",
        "reference": "I. Kansas's Enforcement Of Its Identity Theft Law Presents No Obstacle To Congress's Purpose And Objectives",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1775_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit erred in denying the States' motion to intervene\nA. The States satisfied Rule 24(a)'s standard for intervention as of right\n1. The States' motion to intervene was timely\n2. The States have a significant protectable interest that could be impaired\n3. Respondents no longer adequately represent the States' interests\nB. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit should have granted permissive intervention\nII. Respondents' mootness arguments are unpersuasive\nA. [MISSING]\nB. If Petitioners intervene, they could move for Munsingwear vacatur\nIII. Denying intervention in these circumstances would sow disorder",
        "reference": "A. If Petitioners intervene, they could successfully defend the Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1519_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The MVRA does not authorize restitution for internal investigations and professional fees that were independent of the criminal investigation and unprompted by the government\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Section 3663A(b)(4)'s plain text unambiguously excludes independent internal investigations and separate civil litigation from the MVRA\n2. Section 3663A(b)(4)'s statutory context and history confirm that restitution is unauthorized for these expenses\nB. The contrary interpretation \u2014 embraced by the government and multiple courts of appeals \u2014 is unsupportable\nC. Under the rule of lenity, any statutory ambiguity should be construed against sweeping and unconventional restitution orders\nII. The court of appeals erred in applying the MVRA to the undisputed facts of this case",
        "reference": "A. Section 3663A(b)(4) does not cover private costs that were unprompted by the government, preceded the criminal investigation, and were incurred for the victim's own purposes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1269_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The court of appeals correctly held that the tax refund at issue here is the property of the Bank and therefore is not part of UWBI's bankruptcy estate\nA. The disputed issue in this case concerns interim ownership of the tax refund, because the Bank undisputedly would have been entitled to the refund if no bankruptcy had occurred\nB. Under federal law, a corporate parent's receipt of a tax refund that it is required to transmit to a subsidiary does not give the parent any ownership interest in the funds\n1. In the portion of its Bob Richards opinion relevant here, the Ninth Circuit addressed the federal tax regulations that govern consolidated returns\n2. Bob Richards reflects a correct interpretation of the federal tax regulations and their relevance to disputes like this one\n3. The IRS regulations do not give a corporate parent a claim to interim ownership of a tax refund allocated to a subsidiary, but a consolidated-filing group may confer interim ownership on the parent in its tax allocation agreement\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Petitioner's reading of the Agreement is inconsistent with established principles of agency law and contract interpretation",
        "reference": "C. The tax allocation agreement that governs this case did not transfer ownership of the Bank's tax refund away from the Bank",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointment of Administrative Patent Judges Under Title 35 Does Not Violate the Appointments Clause\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Federal Circuit Improperly Created a Bright Line Rule from Edmond, Despite the Need for a Totality of the Circumstances Analysis\nC. If the Court Believes this is a Close Case, It Should Defer to Congress and Hold that Administrative Patent Judges are Inferior Officers\nII. Because Administrative Patent Judges are Inferior Officers For Purposes of the Appointments Clause, The Court Need Not Address Whether the Arthrex Remedy Was Proper\nIII. A Holding that APJs are Principal Officers and that the Arthrex Remedy Was Not Proper Has Far-Reaching Implications Beyond the Scope of the Present Cases",
        "reference": "A. The Statutory Scheme of Title 35 Confirms Congress's Intent to Establish Administrative Patent Judges As Inferior Officers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Case Presents The First Of Three Petitions From Decisions Holding \u2014Contrary To This Court's Precedent And Decades Of Lower Court Decisions \u2014That Religious School Teachers Who Introduce Children To Religious Teachings, Scriptures, Prayer, And Sacred Observances Are Not Ministers\nII. The Question Presented In Biel, Su, And This Case Is Exceptionally Important\nA. The Ninth Circuit's and California Court of Appeal's Approach Removes Religious Groups' Autonomy to Select and Control Who Can Teach Their Faith and Practices\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Ninth Circuit's and California Court of Appeal's Approach Disfavors Minority Religious Groups",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should not grant any special deference to colleges and universities in their use of racial preferences, and should apply an undiluted strict scrutiny to the practices of Harvard and the University of North Carolina.\nII. The record in the case provides strong support for the plaintiff's case, and not for the opinions below.\nIII. The analysis and holdings of the courts below in SFFA v. Harvard illustrate the ambiguities in the Court's current tests for the permissible use of race, and the need for clearer standards.\nIV. [MISSING]\nV. Conclusion: the consequences of race-neutrality would be beneficial, especially if the Court can craft its ruling to encourage compliance.",
        "reference": "IV. A Growing Literature on the Mismatch Problem Documents the Self-Defeating Nature of Large Racial Preferences.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. Abood Is Consistent with Historical Understandings of the First Amendment\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Early Congresses\nC. State Practices\nD. The Emergence of Modern Merit-Based Hiring\nE. Historical Practice Weighs Against Overruling Abood\nII. The Court's More Recent Precedents Do Not Support Overruling Abood",
        "reference": "A. Early Presidential Administrations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-177_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. Foreign entities operating abroad have no First Amendment right to receive Leadership Act funds free from the conditions Congress established\nB. Respondents' own First Amendment rights do not bar enforcement of funding conditions against legally distinct foreign entities operating abroad\nC. This Court's prior decision in this case does not support the constitutional right respondents assert\nD. No other ground forecloses application of the Leadership Act's funding conditions to foreign entities operating abroad",
        "reference": "The Leadership Act's funding conditions may constitutionally be applied to foreign entities operating abroad, including those having an affiliation with domestic entities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PROPOSED EXEMPTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AS WELL AS CONGRESSIONAL INTENT\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Contraceptive Use Is Nearly Universal\nB. Many Women, Including African-American Women, Would Not Be Able to Afford Contraceptives Without Assistance from Insurance\nC. Other Barriers Limit Contraceptive Access for Women, in Particular, African-American Women\n1. Historic and Social Barriers Limit Access to Contraception for African-American Women\n2. The Lack of Access to Healthcare Facilities Limits Access to Contraception for African-American Women\n3. Economic Barriers Limit Access to Contraception for African-American Women\nD. Given the Barriers to Contraceptive Access for African-American Women That Already Exist, the Proposed Exemption Would Have a Devastating Impact",
        "reference": "II. THE FAILURE TO ALLOW FOR THE PROPOSED EXEMPTION IS JUSTIFIED GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRACEPTIVES TO WOMEN, INCLUDING AFRICAN-AMERICAN WOMEN",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S UNIQUELY EXPANSIVE VIEW OF ATA AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY WARRANTS REVIEW\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit Created A Circuit Split By Holding That A General Terrorist Campaign Could Be The \"Principal Violation\" Defendants Assisted\nC. The Court's Denial Of Certiorari In Weiss And Strauss Cements A Split\nII. THE DECISION BELOW WOULD HAVE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES",
        "reference": "A. Plaintiffs Cannot Reconcile Courts Of Appeals' Divergent Knowledge Standards",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Defendants may not rebut Basic's presumption of reliance by arguing that statements were too generic to move the stock price\nA. The crucial question for purposes of class certification is the predominance of common questions, not the answers to those questions\nB. Halliburton II contemplated that only \"direct\" evidence of a lack of price impact could rebut the Basic presumption\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioners' expert report highlights the pitfalls of considering common, unitary aspects of materiality to rebut price impact at class certification\nA. Limiting rebuttals of price impact to evidence in support of an expert witness will still allow consideration of indirect evidence inconsistent with Halliburton II\nB. Petitioners' expert reports indicate other pitfalls with the use of such evidence\nIII. Expanding the scope of Halliburton II's rebuttal would undermine the orderly processing of securities fraud claims\nA. Expanding the scope of rebuttal undermines the policy against piecemeal appeals and disrupts the relationship between trial and appellate courts\nB. Allowing relitigation of issues already subjected to a dispositive motion undermines the district court and contravenes the law of the case doctrine",
        "reference": "C. Courts can and should readily distinguish between materiality and price impact in limiting rebuttal under Halliburton II",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals' expansive definition of the word \"essential\" ignores the plain text of the Endangered Species Act\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Critical-habitat designations have significant financial effects on States and private parties",
        "reference": "II. The Fifth Circuit's holding that habitat exclusion decisions are nonreviewable contradicts Bennett v. Spear",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Petitioner's Pike claim does not warrant review",
        "reference": "I. Petitioners' extraterritoriality claim does not warrant review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-315_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioners' Interpretation Undermines the Incentives that Congress Created in Limiting Adjustment of Status to Aliens Who Have Been Inspected and Admitted\nA. The Text, History, and Purpose of the \"Inspected and Admitted\" Requirement in Section 1255\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The TPS Statute Does Not Create an Exception to the Threshold Requirement of Admission for Adjustment of Status",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1059_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. A PUBLIC OFFICIAL DOES NOT COMMIT \"MONEY OR PROPERTY\" FRAUD WHEN HE OR SHE ACTS TO FURTHER POLITICAL INTERESTS WHILE PURPORTING TO ACT IN THE BROADER PUBLIC INTEREST\nII. CORE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES REQUIRE THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL FRAUD STATUTES TO BE REJECTED\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The De Minimis Standard Is Not Workable\nIII. The De Minimis Standard Is Grossly Incongruent with Other Areas of the Law and Other Statutory Interpretations of the Words \"Undue Hardship\"\nIV. Hardison Was Egregiously Wrong\nV. Groff v. DeJoy Provides an \"Appropriate Case\" for This Court to Overturn Hardison",
        "reference": "I. Hardison Was Poorly Reasoned",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress did not Grant the Power of Statutory Interpretation to Administrative Agencies\nII. Deference to the Agency in the Interpretation of the Statute Violates Separation of Powers\nA. Deference to the Agency Allows the Executive to Exercise Legislative Power\nB. Deference to Agency Interpretation of Statutory Texts Allows the Executive to Exercise Judicial Power\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Court Should Use this Case to Overrule Prior Cases Requiring Courts to Defer to Agency Interpretation of Statutes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-416_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. RESPONDENTS' CLAIMS THAT PETITIONER AIDED AND ABETTED CHILD SLAVERY FROM U.S. TERRITORY SATISFY KIOBEL'S \"TOUCH AND CONCERN\" TEST\nA. Aiding and Abetting Slavery and Forced Labor Are the Type of Violations Implicating U.S. Responsibility that the Founders Sought to Remedy under the ATS\nB. Violations of Sosa-Qualified Norms from U.S. Soil by U.S. Defendants Sufficiently \"Touch and Concern\" the United States\n1. Kiobel Established a \"Touch and Concern\" Test\n2. [MISSING]\nC. Respondents' Claims Also Meet a Morrison-Based Focus Test\n1. The \"Focus\" of the ATS is Redressing International Law Violations for Which the United States Might be Held Responsible\n2. Respondents' Claims Are Not Extraterritorial Based on the \"Focus\" Test Usually Applicable to Conduct Regulating Statutes\nD. The Court Should Not Exercise its Common Law Discretion Under the Second Step in Sosa to Preclude a Lawsuit for Aiding and Abetting Child Slavery and Forced Labor from the United States by U.S. Defendants\n1. Respondents' Claims Fall Within the Congressional Policies Embodied in the TVPRA\n2. Recognizing These ATS Claims Would Not Infringe on Foreign Policy\n3. These ATS Claims Do Not Undermine the Harkin-Engel Protocol\n4. Recognizing These ATS Claims Will Not Put U.S. Corporations at a Competitive Disadvantage\nE. Respondents' Allegations Displace the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality\nII. THE ATS' TEXT, HISTORY, AND PURPOSE SUPPORT LIABILITY FOR U.S. CORPORATIONS\nA. The Text of the ATS Supports Corporate Liability\n1. \"Tort\" Liability Includes Corporate Liability\n2. Congress Chose Not to Limit the Scope of the ATS' Defendants\nB. The ATS' History and Purpose Support Corporate Liability\nC. The Corporate Identity of an Actor is Irrelevant to Sosa's First Step of Identifying a Norm Supporting an ATS Claim\n1. Corporate Liability Is an Issue for Federal Common Law Not International Law\n2. Corporate Liability is Not Relevant to Sosa's \"Historical Paradigm\" Test\n3. International Norms Prohibiting Child Slavery and Forced Labor Apply to Corporations\n4. International Criminal Tribunals do not Preclude Civil Corporate Liability\nD. Sosa and Jesner Provide No Basis for Immunizing Domestic Corporations for Aiding and Abetting Slavery and Forced Labor\n1. Respondents' Claims Fall Within the Congressional Policies Embodied in the TVPRA\n2. The Torture Victim Protection Act (\"TVPA\") Was Not Intended to Limit the Scope of the ATS\n3. Petitioner's Reliance on Bivens Jurisprudence is Inapt\n4. Recognizing These ATS Claims Would Not Infringe on U.S. Foreign Policy",
        "reference": "2. The Founders' Purpose in Passing the ATS Was That U.S. Defendants Violating the Law of Nations Be Held Liable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.55
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1401_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect in certain important respects\n1. Petitioners plausibly allege that respondents imprudently offered higher-cost investment funds when identical lower-cost funds were available\n2. [MISSING]\nB. The court of appeals' decision warrants review",
        "reference": "2. Petitioners plausibly allege that respondents imprudently failed to use any of several methods to reduce recordkeeping fees",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE QUESTION PRESENTED MERITS REVIEW\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S JUDGMENT IS INCORRECT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-96_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. PROMESA CONTAINS NO CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE LANGUAGE SHOWING A CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO ABROGATE THE BOARD'S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY\nA. To Abrogate Sovereign Immunity, a Statute Must Be Clear and Unmistakable on Its Face\nB. This Court Has Recognized Only Two Ways a Statute Can Express a Clear and Unmistakable Intent to Abrogate, Neither of Which Was Employed Here\nC. The Court of Appeals Improperly Relied on Ordinary Principles of Statutory Construction to Divine Congress's Intent to Abrogate\nII. [MISSING]\nA. There Is No Textual Support for Abrogation in PROMESA\n1. The Exceptions to Exclusive Jurisdiction in section 2126(a) Do Not Show Intent to Abrogate\n2. Section 2126(e) Does Not Show an Intent to Abrogate\n3. PROMESA's References to Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Do Not Show an Intent to Abrogate\n4. The Lack of Reference to Federal Law Does Not Show an Intent to Abrogate\n5. The Court of Appeals' Speculation About Congress's Awareness of the Puerto Rico Constitution Is Baseless and Unsupported by the Statutory Text\nB. There Is No Support for Abrogation in the Legislative History\nC. Abrogation Conflicts with PROMESA's Purpose\nD. The Scope of Abrogation Found by the Court of Appeals Is Unprecedented",
        "reference": "II. EVEN APPLYING ALL THE TOOLS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, PROMESA CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE OF AN INTENT TO ABROGATE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1712_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "Petitioners have demonstrated Article III standing to seek restoration of plan losses, fiduciary removal, and injunctive relief, all of which are remedies that ERISA expressly makes available to participants\nA. Petitioners have a concrete stake in redressing fiduciary breaches through restoration of losses, fiduciary removal, and injunctive relief\nB. The common law of trusts has long permitted beneficiaries to sue for restoration of losses, fiduciary removal, and injunctive relief absent individualized monetary loss 236733.2 iv\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Petitioners have also satisfied the causation and redressability components of Article III standing",
        "reference": "C. Congress unambiguously authorized ERISA plan participants to seek restoration of losses, fiduciary removal, and injunctive relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. Philadelphia violated the First Amendment\nA. Philadelphia's actions are not neutral\nB. Philadelphia's policies are not generally applicable\nC. Philadelphia cannot rewrite CSS's religious beliefs\nII. Respondents' novel government contract theory has no basis in fact or law and would have untenable consequences\nA. Respondents' theory is wrong on the facts\nB. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law\nC. Respondents are wrong on the consequences\nIII. Respondents have no answer to CSS's compelled speech claim\nIV. Philadelphia fails strict scrutiny\nV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "V. Smith should be revisited and replaced",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS INTENDED INTER PARTES REVIEW TO PROVIDE A LESS EXPENSIVE, MORE EFFICIENT, AND FASTER ALTERNATIVE TO COSTLY AND PROTRACTED DISTRICT COURT LITIGATION FOR CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF BAD PATENTS\nA. A Primary Objective of Patent Reform Was to Provide a More Efficient System for Challenging Patents That Should Not Have Issued\nB. Congress Was Concerned About a Significant Increase in Patent Litigation Involving Patent Trolls, and Nonpracticing Entities\nC. Congress Heard Testimony That a Proliferation of Invalid Patents Had Spawned Frivolous Lawsuits\nD. Congress Was Concerned About the High Cost of Proving a Patent Invalid in District Court Litigation\nE. Patent Reform Legislation Was Intended to Provide an Effective Administrative System for Weeding Out Invalid Patents\nII. PERMITTING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A DECISION TO INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW RUNS CONTRARY TO CONGRESSIONAL INTENT\nA. Permitting the Outcome of an Inter Partes Review to Be Set Aside, After the Fact, Based Solely Upon an Error in the Institution Decision, Results in the Inter Partes Review Process Becoming a More Expensive and Wasteful Alternative for Eliminating Invalid Patents\nB. Permitting a PTO Determination That a Patent Is Invalid to Be Set Aside, After the Fact, Based Solely Upon an Error in the Institution Decision, Allows a Patent Troll to Continue to Use the Patent in Frivolous Lawsuits to Extort Tribute from the Public, Contrary to the Strong Federal Policy Favoring Free Competition in Ideas Which Do Not Merit Patent Protection\nC. There Are Many Cases in Which a PTO Determination That a Patent Was Invalid Have Now Been Set Aside, Based Upon an Error in the Institution Decision\nD. A Number of Potential Patent Challengers Now Find Themselves Unable to Petition for Inter Partes Review\nIII. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE DOES NOT PERMIT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF A DECISION TO INSTITUTE INTER PARTES REVIEW\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 318(a) Defines a \"Final Written Decision\" as a Decision on the Patentability of Challenged Patent Claims\nC. Section 319 and Section 141(c) Only Permit Appeal of the \"Final Written Decision\" Defined in Section 318(a)\nD. Section 314(d) Prohibits Appeal of an Institution Decision",
        "reference": "A. An Institution Decision Only Decides Who Will Determine Validity \u2014the PTO or a District Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1086_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Claims In The Current Action Are Not The Same As The Claims In The 2005 Action\nA. The Two Suits Involve Different Conduct, Different Theories of Liability, and Different Periods of Time\nB. Marcel Is Judicially Estopped from Arguing Otherwise\nII. Affirming Would Require Abandoning Nearly 150 Years Of Settled Precedent\nIII. Marcel's Remaining Arguments Fail\nA. This Case is Not a Collateral Attack\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Reversing Will Cause No Unfairness, but Affirming Will",
        "reference": "B. The Current Action is Not a Judgment-Enforcement Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Production And Consumption Of Traditional Foods, Including Manoomin And Freshwater Fish, Are Important To The Ojibwe\n1. Manoomin\n2. Freshwater Fish\nB. The Band's Freshwater Resources Are Sensitive To Water Pollutants, Particularly Sulfate And Mercury\n1. Sulfate\n2. Methylmercury\nC. Large Industrial Point Sources Are Decimating Manoomin With Discharges To Surface Waters That Migrate Through Groundwater\n1. Minntac\n2. PolyMet\nII. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT RESPONDENTS' CLEAN WATER ACT INTERPRETATION BECAUSE IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE AND PROTECTS IMPORTANT TRIBAL RESOURCES\nA. The Clean Water Act's Plain Language Includes Discharges Fairly Traceable To A Point Source\nB. The County's Interpretation Would Not Protect The Band's Important Natural Resources\n1. Dischargers could easily evade the Clean Water Act permit requirement\n2. Petitioner's assertion that other regulatory requirements sufficiently control groundwater-mediated discharges to surface waters is inaccurate",
        "reference": "I. THE BAND RELIES ON THE CLEAN WATER ACT TO PROTECT CRITICAL NATURAL RESOURCES FROM LARGE INDUSTRIAL POLLUTERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.13
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The 574 recognized tribes are the only entities that have a \"recognized governing body of an Indian Tribe\"\nA. Federal recognition of a tribe as a government has been the legal foundational requirement for Federal Indian law since the founding of the United States\nB. Congress' use of the phrase \"recognized governing body of an Indian Tribe\" expressly includes and incorporates the requirement that the tribe must be \"recognized\" as that term is used in federal Indian law\nC. Federal Indian law applies to members of recognized tribes\nD. [MISSING]\nE. No ANC has a recognized governing body of an Indian Tribe\nF. Petitioners' argument that \"recognized\" means \"recognized by the ANCs\" is without merit\nII. The plain language meaning of the ISDEAA\nIII. The Ute Indian Tribe incorporates the Chehalis Tribe's discussion that Congress has not ratified the Petitioners' interpretation of ISDEAA\nIV. The appeals to equity by the ANCs, the State of Alaska, and Alaska's congressional delegation are wrong based upon law and, independently, based upon fact",
        "reference": "D. The settled law discussed above applies to tribes and tribal members in Alaska",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chevron Deference Is Subject To Critical And Constitutionally Compelled Limitations And Requirements\nA. Courts Must Exhaust All Traditional Tools of Statutory Interpretation and Determine Whether the Statute Is Genuinely Ambiguous\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The Court Should Restate And Reinforce Key Limits On Chevron Deference",
        "reference": "B. Even If Genuine Ambiguity Remains, the Agency's Interpretation Must Be Reasonable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-58_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents lack Article III standing\nII. Respondents cannot show that the Guidelines are unlawful\nA. The Guidelines do not violate Sections 1226 and 1231\nB. The Guidelines are not arbitrary and capricious\nC. The Guidelines did not require notice and comment\nIII. The district court's remedy was unlawful\nA. Section 706(2) does not authorize vacatur\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) barred vacatur of the Guidelines",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1233_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Statute's Plain Language Does Not Require Willfulness\nB. Interpreting The \"Principles Of Equity\" Clause To Require Willfulness Contradicts Plain Meaning And Precedent\nII. A Rigid Willfulness Prerequisite Conflicts With How Trademark Law Usually Operates\nIII. Willfulness Is A Relevant Factor, But Making It An Absolute Prerequisite Would Restrict Courts' Discretion To Consider Broader Equities, With No Real Benefit",
        "reference": "I. Section 1117(a) Does Not Require Willfulness To Award A Trademark Infringer's Profits",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 113 Bars Respondents' Restoration Remedy\nA. The Montana Courts Lacked Jurisdiction over Respondents' Claim for Restoration Damages\nB. The Montana Supreme Court's Interpretation of \"Challenge\" Is Flawed\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Respondents Are \"Potentially Responsible Parties\"\nB. The Montana Supreme Court's Interpretation of section 122(e)(6) Is Flawed\nIII. CERCLA Preempts a Restoration Remedy\nA. Atlantic Richfield's CERCLA Cleanup Obligations Directly Conflict with Its Alleged State-Law Duty\nB. A Restoration Remedy Conflicts with CERCLA's Purposes and Objectives\nC. CERCLA's Savings Clauses Do Not Apply",
        "reference": "II. Section 122(e)(6) Bars Respondents' Restoration Remedy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Federal and State Courts Are Divided\nIII. There Are No Obstacles to Reviewing This Important Issue",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Is Incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under the Supremacy Clause, it is only the text and structure of a federal law\u2014not some brooding federal interest or judicial policy preference\u2014that may validly preempt state laws\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Nothing in the text of the FAA demonstrates that Congress intended to preempt California's rule prohibiting prospective waiver of PAGA claims\nA. The prospective-waiver rule does not disfavor arbitration or mandate arbitration that is inconsistent with the parties' contract\nB. Viking's theory that the prospective-waiver rule interferes with arbitration's fundamental attributes has no basis in the FAA's text, and thus is an illegitimate justification for preemption",
        "reference": "II. Consistent with these principles, the scope of implied FAA preemption is cabined by its text",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. State Action Based on Religious Animus Violates the First Amendment\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Failed National Blaine Amendment and Its State-Level Progeny Were Motivated by Animus\nA. The Blaine Amendment Attempted to Enshrine Anti-Catholic Prejudice in the United States Constitution Under the Guise of Promoting \"Non-Sectarian\" Education\nB. Montana's Constitutional Provision Is a Progeny of the Blaine Amendment Animated by the Same Impermissible Purpose",
        "reference": "II. The Legislative History of the Proto Blaine Amendments Is Full of Anti-Catholic Animus",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. MINISTERIAL EMPLOYEES ARE THE \"LIFEBLOOD\" OF A RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION BECAUSE THEY ARE CRITICAL TO THE ORGANIZATION'S ABILITY TO FULFILL ITS MISSION AND DISSEMINATE ITS MESSAGE\nA. The ministerial exception implicates a trilogy of core First Amendment rights \u2014 speech, association, and religion\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A religious school is engaged in speaking a message that is inextricably linked to its mission. The schools must retain the exclusive right to select the messenger\nD. A religious association conveys its message not only through speech, but also the conduct of its representatives\nE. The ministerial exception complements the broad Title VII statutory exemption from religious discrimination\nII. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION IS POTENTIALLY RELEVANT TO OTHER CLAIMS INVOLVING MINISTERIAL EMPLOYEES\nA. The ministerial exception may extend to other aspects of the employment relationship, including wage and hour claims\nB. The ministerial exception bars some breach of contract claims",
        "reference": "B. The schools are religious associations entitled to define and express themselves",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-459_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. At Chevron Step 1, the First Circuit erred by finding the statute ambiguous without applying the governing canons of construction\nA. The First Circuit erred by failing to apply the \"traditional tools of statutory construction\" at Chevron Step 1\nB. The First Circuit erred by failing to apply, at Chevron Step 1, the rule that ambiguities in deportation laws must be construed in favor of immigrants\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Judulang required the First Circuit to account for the purposes of the immigration laws at Chevron Step 2\nB. The stop-time rule serves as a narrow anti-gaming limit to cancellation of removal and the critical humanitarian purposes served by cancellation\nC. The First Circuit and the BIA gave no consideration to the fundamental humanitarian purposes of cancellation of removal\nD. The BIA's interpretation does not advance the anti-gaming rationale of the stop-time rule\nE. The First Circuit erred by ignoring the core purposes of the immigration laws in favor of \"administrative context.\"",
        "reference": "II. At Chevron Step 2, the First Circuit erred by failing to account for the purposes of the immigration laws, in contravention of Judulang v. Holder",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. South Dakota's economic nexus thresholds are not sufficient to prevent the imposition of undue burdens on multistate and international sellers of property and services\nII. A ruling for South Dakota would subject taxpayers to substantial retroactive state tax liability\nIII. Congress, rather than the South Dakota legislature, is the appropriate and best party to legislate the proper nexus standards for balancing the interests of States, businesses, individuals, and taxpayers\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Rewarding South Dakota for passing an unconstitutional law to challenge a Supreme Court precedent could have dangerous consequences for our constitutional order",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Every Federal Court has a Duty to Determine Whether a Plaintiff has Standing\nA. Neither the District Court nor the Circuit Court Determined That Congress Intended to Create a Private Remedy for a Violation of Section 14(a)\nB. This Court Should Answer the Threshold Question\nII. There are Good Reasons to Answer the Threshold Question Now\nA. Answering the Threshold Question Now Promotes Judicial Efficiency\nB. Answering the Threshold Question Now Will Promote Justice\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This Court Should Reinforce the Obligation of the Lower Courts to Faithfully Apply Sandoval",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Reversal Would Assist The Adversarial System In Political Speech And Association Cases\nIII. Relief For Petitioners Will Disincentivize Governmental Gamesmanship\nIV. Petitioners' Proposed Rule Will Undermine Neither Judicial Economy Nor The Dictates of Article III",
        "reference": "I. The Majority View Recognizes that Parties Suffering An Irreparable First Amendment Injury Cannot, By Definition, Be Made Whole",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1498_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. Article III of the 1855 Treaty does not exempt respondent from paying Washington's motor-fuel tax\nB. The decision below is in significant tension with decisions of the Ninth Circuit interpreting Article III of the 1855 Treaty\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. This Court's review is warranted to correct the Washington Supreme Court's determination that the 1855 Treaty exempts respondent from paying Washington's motor-fuel tax",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "A. LOWER COURT OPINION APPEALED FROM\nB. BACKGROUND OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT\nC. THE FOURTEENTH AMEND. section 3 CANNOT PREVENT A CANDIDATE FROM APPEARING ON A PRIMARY ELECTION / NOMINATION CONTEST BALLOT\nD. DOES THE 41st CONGRESS SESSION LAW DEMONSTRATE THAT IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION IS REQUIRED?\nE. THE MINI-TRIAL USED INVALID EVIDENCE FROM SELECT COMMITTEE\nF. SLANDER OF TRENISS EVANS PROVES SELECT COMMITTEE REPORT LACKS CREDIBILITY\nG. THE MINI-TRIAL FAILED TO PROVE TRUMP \"ENGAGED IN\" AN INSURRECTION\nH. CAN ONE \"ENGAGE IN\" AN INSURRECTION BY DOING NOTHING?\nI. TRUMP TRIED TO STOP AN INSURRECTION, NOT CAUSE ONE\nJ. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "J. SINCE THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE CHOOSES A PRESIDENT, BUT U.S. CITIZENS CAN ONLY VOTE FOR ELECTORS THE 14TH AMEND. section 3 CANNOT BAR A CANDIDATE FROM THE ELECTION BALLOT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-23_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. A temporal-nexus requirement cannot be squared with the ordinary meaning of \"obstruction of justice\"\nB. No category of authorities supports interpreting \"obstruction of justice\" to include a temporal-nexus requirement\n1. Contemporaneous dictionaries\n2. Chapter 73 of the federal criminal code\n3. [MISSING]\n4. The federal sentencing guidelines\nC. At a minimum, an offense \"relating to\" obstruction of justice need not involve a temporal nexus\nD. In any event, the Board's reasonable rejection of a temporal-nexus requirement is entitled to deference\nE. Cordero-Garcia and Pugin have not preserved the issues that they propose raising on remand",
        "reference": "3. The Model Penal Code and state criminal codes",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court's Precedents Establish that Laufer Lacks Standing\nA. Laufer Did Not Suffer an Informational Injury\nB. Laufer Did Not Suffer a Stigmatic Injury\nC. Havens Realty Does Not Assist Laufer\nD. Laufer's Injury Is Self-Inflicted\nE. [MISSING]\nII. Laufer's Concerns About ADA Under-Enforcement Do Not Justify Permitting Uninjured Plaintiffs to Sue\nIII. Laufer Has Received the Information She Seeks\nIV. The Court Should Decide the Question Presented",
        "reference": "E. Acheson's Position Does Not Reflect Disability Animus",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. SECTION 5000A CONTINUES TO OFFER A LAWFUL CHOICE BETWEEN ALTERNATIVES\nII. RESPONDENTS LACK STANDING\nA. [MISSING]\nB. State plaintiffs lack standing\nIII. SECTION 5000A IS CONSTITUTIONAL\nIV. IF SECTION 5000A IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT MUST BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE ACT",
        "reference": "A. The individual plaintiffs lack standing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE GOVERNMENT'S PETITION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Arthrex's Forfeiture Raises Important Issues\nC. The Court Should Grant Certiorari In Polaris Only If It Reviews Both Of The Government's Questions\nII. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT ARTHREX'S PETITION\nA. APJs' Removal Protections Are Presumptively Severable\nB. The Constitution Does Not Require Unilateral Review Of Individual Decisions\nC. The Court Has A Variety Of Tools To Redress Any Constitutional Defect",
        "reference": "A. The Federal Circuit's Decision Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-7505_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Eighth Amendment Bars the Execution of an Individual Who Lacks the Ability to Understand Why He Is Being Executed\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Medical and Scientific Advancements Have Allowed for Increased Confidence in the Diagnosis of Mental Disorders that Merit Protection Under the Eighth Amendment",
        "reference": "II. The Penological Objectives of the Eighth Amendment Cannot Be Squared with the Execution of a Prisoner Whose Vascular Dementia and Associated Cognitive Decline Leave Him Without a Memory of the Commission of the Crime or a Rational Understanding of Why He Is to Be Executed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-312_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The district court's orders were not \"final decisions\" under the collateral-order doctrine\n2. Respondents' challenges do not satisfy the criteria for a writ of mandamus\nB. Respondents cannot avoid mootness through assertions of their own future criminality",
        "reference": "A. No Statute Authorizes Interlocutory Review of the District Court's Orders",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Proposition 12 Will Deprive Farmers Of Important Tools For Maintaining A Healthy Herd\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The scientific consensus is that farmers and veterinarians should have flexibility to use individual stalls when the circumstances suggest it\nC. Proposition 12 mandates group pens in circumstances when the science supports flexibility to use stalls\nII. Using Individual Stalls For Sows Has No Negative Effect On Human Health",
        "reference": "A. The scientific evidence shows that both individual stalls and group pens are important tools for sow welfare",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4\nA. [MISSING]\nB. A State May Not Put its Partisan Choice Over Citizens' Effective Representation\nC. The Privileges or Immunities Clause Reinforces that States May Not Abridge Article I Using Any Source of Power\nII. Political Question Doctrine Compels a Judicial Resolution Here\nA. Abstention Would Be Inconsistent with Political Question Doctrine Precedents\nB. Sequential Analysis Using Baker's Second Prong Dispels Any Implied Commitment to a Political Branch",
        "reference": "A. A State May Not Choose the Party of a District's Representative; A Statewide Threshold Could Limit Cases to These Aiming to Sway Control of the House",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Cases Do Not Present The Same Issue And Are Inappropriate Vehicles For Review.\nII. There Is No Circuit Conflict On The State's Question Presented.\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Asserted Nationwide Importance Of The Issue Does Not Support Review.",
        "reference": "III. The Decisions Below Are Correct.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Public-sector \"Collective Bargaining\" Is Indistinguishable from Other Lobbying Activities\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Petition Clause Precludes a Finding that Limiting Competing Voices on a Matter of Public Interest Is a Government Interest that Could Support Infringement of Speech and Association Rights",
        "reference": "II. Compelling Public Employees to Pay Agency Shop Fees for \"Bargaining\" Is Contrary to the Original Understanding of the First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. SMITH DOES NOT CONTEST THAT THERE IS A CLEAR SPLIT\nII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION WAS WRONGLY DECIDED\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE TO ADDRESS AN IMPORTANT QUESTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Establishment Clause Has Long Provided Critical Protection for Religious Minorities\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Government Neutrality Towards Religion, Not Prevention of Coercion, Is the Touchstone of the Establishment Clause\nB. Requiring a Showing of Affirmative Coercion Would Gut the Establishment Clause\nC. The Establishment Clause Was Conceived as More Than a Prohibition against a National Church and Does Not Imply a Coercion Test\nIII. The Purpose and Effect of a Government-Sponsored Passive Display Is the Crux of Determining Non-Endorsement",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Affirm the Decision below to Reinvigorate the Establishment Clause and Reaffirm the Protections It Offers to Religious Minorities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Congress Either Uses the ISDA Definition to Include ANCs or Sharply Different Language to Exclude Them\nC. The D.C. Circuit's Ruling Denies CARES Tribal Relief Funding Entirely for Some Alaska Natives\nD. According ANCs Only Lesser \"Tribal Organization\" Status Frustrates the Self-Determination of Alaska Natives and Their Participation in Specific ISDA-Based Federal Programs",
        "reference": "A. The Statutory Text of ISDA and CARES Includes ANCs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1261_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Modern Qualified Immunity Is at Odds with the Text and History of Section 1983\nII. Modern Qualified Immunity Enables the Very Abuses that Section 1983 Was Meant to Deter\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This Court Should Reform Qualified Immunity by Returning to Statutory Interpretation and the Common Law Backdrop of Section 1983",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-281_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FACTORING OF RACIAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO A DISTRICTING PLAN DOES NOT IN ITSELF TRIGGER STRICT SCRUTINY\nII. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CHALLENGED DISTRICTS WERE SUBJECT TO STRICT SCRUTINY\nA. Expert Evidence Demonstrated that Racial Considerations Predominated\nB. The Challenged Districts Utilized Odd, Non-Contiguous Shapes and Divided Neighborhoods to Enact a Racial Gerrymander\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE CHALLENGED DISTRICTS WERE NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO COMPLY WITH THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Compulsory Disclosure \u2014Even When Disclosure Is Limited to Government Officials \u2014Imposes Burdens on the First Amendment Right of Private Association\nIII. Whether Labeled \"Strict Scrutiny\" or \"Exacting Scrutiny,\" This Court Should Set a High Bar Before Government May Compel Disclosure\nIV. The Burden to Prove Threats and Retaliation Should Shift to the Private Association Only After the Government Has Satisfied Its Demanding Burden",
        "reference": "I. All Compulsory Disclosure Per Se Burdens the First Amendment Right of Association",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The original text of Section 1983 reveals that the 42nd Congress abrogated common-law principles.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Petitioners, like this Court, incorrectly \"presume\" that the 42nd Congress intended to incorporate common-law principles.",
        "reference": "II. The removal of the Notwithstanding Clause in 1874 did not change Section 1983's abrogation of the common law.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Review This Case To Restore The Statutory Definition of Prior Art\nA. The Amended Text Of The AIA Was Erroneously Interpreted By Federal Circuit\nB. The Federal Circuit Misapplied Pre-AIA Law To Interpret The New AIA Text\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The \"Public Availability\" Requirement Reduces Prosecution, Transaction, and Litigation Risk and Expense Created By Secret Sales\nIII. Other Policy Considerations Support The Public Availability Requirement",
        "reference": "C. Secret Prior Art and The Incentives Of The First-Inventor-To-File System",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "Administrative patent judges are inferior officers whose appointment Congress has validly entrusted to the Secretary of Commerce\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Administrative patent judges are inferior officers because their work is subject to significant direction and supervision by two different Senate-confirmed officers\nC. The Federal Circuit's contrary conclusion is incorrect\n1. The court of appeals erred in its application of Edmond\n2. History provides no sound basis for classifying administrative patent judges as principal officers",
        "reference": "A. Under the Appointments Clause, an officer whose work is subject to sufficient direction and supervision by Senate-confirmed officers is an inferior officer",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Immunity for \"double discriminators\" cannot be squared with Dothard v. Rawlinson\nB. Immunity for \"double discriminators\" cannot be squared with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins\nC. Immunity for \"double discriminators\" cannot be squared with the prohibition on associational discrimination\nII. Even under the narrowest definition of \"sex\" in 1964, discrimination against an individual for being lesbian, gay, or bisexual is \"discrimination because of sex\"\nIII. Arguments about post-1964 developments cannot override the plain language of Title VII\nIV. Concerns about the legality of sex-specific workplace policies or the religious beliefs of a subset of employers should not influence this Court's decision",
        "reference": "I. An across-the-board policy of \"sexual-orientation discrimination\" discriminates \"because of sex\" with respect to each worker against whom it is applied",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. There is no contractual bargaining exception or coworker defense for discrimination\nA. Standards that exclude religious employees violate Title VII even if they are otherwise neutral\n1. Congress rejected uniform standards that discriminate against religion\n2. Congress amended Title VII to require religious accommodation and reject pre-amendment neutrality\n3. Hardison defied Congress by rejecting accommodation and reinforcing pre-amendment neutrality\ni. The majority wrongly claimed that neutral rules excuse the duty to accommodate\nii. The majority wrongly claimed that a collective bargaining agreement excuses the duty to accommodate\niii. [MISSING]\nB. Title VII has one exception for undue hardship on the employer's business\n1. Title VII requires accommodations that impose significant expense\ni. Hardison's de minimis standard contradicts Title VII\nii. Hardison's de minimis standard eliminates the duty to accommodate\n2. Title VII does not include a coworker or union discrimination defense",
        "reference": "iii. The majority wrongly claimed that accommodation is discrimination .. 19",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.46
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-459_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Circuit Courts Are Split on the Mental-State Standard for Section 14 Claims\nIII. A Uniform Scienter Standard Should Apply to All Section 14 Private Rights of Action\nIV. A Uniform Scienter Standard Would Best Achieve Congress's Policy Goals",
        "reference": "I. An Analysis of the Applicable Mental State for Section 14 Claims Must Analyze the Statutory Framework As A Whole",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1259_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Miller Invalidated Only Mandatory Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Sentences and Establishes Individualized Sentencing as a Constitutional Requirement for Juvenile Homicide Offenders\nA. Miller Addressed and Invalidated Only Mandatory Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Juvenile Homicide Offenders\nB. Miller Treated Discretionary Sentencing Regimes as a Constitutional Benchmark Against Which to Measure the Risk of Mandatory Schemes\nC. Miller's Rule Requires Individualized Sentencing That Considers Youth and Its Attendant Characteristics Before Imposing a Life-Without-Parole Sentence\nII. Decisions Announcing a New Rule (Miller) are Distinct from Decisions about the Retroactivity of that Rule (Montgomery)\nIII. Montgomery Neither Addressed Nor Invalidated Discretionary Sentencing Schemes\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Miller's Rule is Substantive and Retroactively Applicable Because it is Premised on the Substantive Right to be Free From Grossly Disproportionate Punishment\nC. Neither Miller nor Montgomery Sets Forth a New Rule about Discretionary Life-Without-Parole Sentences\nIV. The Eighth Amendment Requires Only That a Sentencer Consider the Mitigating Circumstances of Youth and Its Attendant Characteristics Before Imposing a Life-Without-Parole Sentence\nV. Mississippi's Discretionary Sentencing Regime, Requiring Sentencing Courts to Consider Youth and Its Attendant Characteristics Before Imposing a Life-Without-Parole Sentence on a Juvenile Homicide Offender, Complies with the Eighth Amendment",
        "reference": "A. Like Miller, Montgomery Involved Only a Mandatory Life-Without-Parole Sentence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Repsis decision binds Herrera and precludes him from asserting an off-reservation hunting right against Wyoming\nB. Herrera cannot evade issue preclusion by pointing to a change in law\n1. Mille Lacs intentionally preserved the interpretation of the specific treaty language in Race Horse, so Herrera cannot argue that Mille Lacs undermined earlier decisions that relied upon that holding\n2. This Court allows a \"change in the applicable legal context\" to defeat issue preclusion only in limited circumstances, and Herrera's interpretation of this exception would be a dramatic expansion\nC. No other exception permits Herrera to escape issue preclusion in this case\n1. Issue preclusion still applies to Herrera even though he is a criminal defendant\n2. The Crow Tribe is precluded from challenging the Tenth Circuit's decision that the Bighorn National Forest is occupied\nII. The Treaty with the Crows does not grant tribal members the right to hunt in the Bighorn National Forest in Wyoming\nA. Article 4 provided authority for the Crow Tribe to seek game outside the reservation boundaries only until non-Indians began to occupy the wilderness surrounding the reservation\n1. The text of Article 4 of the Crow Treaty demonstrates that the Tribe's hunting right is limited to areas of wilderness before the arrival of non-Indians\n2. Wyoming statehood did not abrogate the Tribe's hunting right; it reflected congressional recognition that the land identified in 1851 as \"hunting districts\" had permanently transformed\nB. The historical implementation of the Crow Treaty indicates that the off-reservation right to hunt ended at the time of Wyoming statehood\nC. The Tribe understood land could be \"occupied\" without physical presence\nD. This Court should honor stare decisis by maintaining its current interpretation of the phrase \"unoccupied lands of the United States\"\nIII. By withdrawing the Bighorn National Forest from the public domain, the United States occupied that land within the meaning of the Crow Treaty\nA. President Cleveland's proclamation changed the character of the Bighorn National Forest lands\nB. The United States' proprietary regulation of the Bighorn National Forest demonstrates its occupation of the land\nC. The Crow Tribe understood the Bighorn National Forest was occupied\nD. The Forest Reserve Act \"savings clause\" cited by Herrera is irrelevant",
        "reference": "I. The Tenth Circuit's ruling in Repsis binds Herrera, and he cannot use this case to collaterally attack that final judgment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief064.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Is The Case To Set Abortion Precedent Right\nII. This Court Should Overrule Its Abortion Precedents And Reject A Viability Rule\nA. This Court's Abortion Precedents And A Viability Rule Are Egregiously Wrong\nB. Factual Progress Has Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents And A Viability Rule\nC. [MISSING]\nD. At Minimum This Court Should Reject A Viability Rule",
        "reference": "C. Reliance Interests Do Not Support Retaining This Court's Abortion Precedents Or Embracing A Viability Rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief053.pdf",
        "text": "I. Racial Diversity in Law Firms and the Private Bar Is Essential for a Racially Just Society, and Requires a Racially Diverse \"Pipeline.\"\nA. Since the Founding Lawyers Have Wielded Disproportionate Influence and Power at All Levels and in All Branches of Government.\nB. The Influence and Power of Lawyers Extends Beyond Government.\nII. Law Firms Must Be Racially Diverse to Serve Their Clients, to Succeed in the Marketplace, and to Gain the Confidence and Trust of the General Public.\nA. Clients Seek, Encourage, and Need Racial Diversity in Legal Representation.\nB. Juries, Judges, and ADR Professionals Want and Expect Racially Diverse Lawyers in the Legal Systems.\nIII. Law Firms and the Private Bar Must Be Able to Recruit and Hire from a Wide Pool of Well-Educated Racially Diverse Talent in Order to Succeed.\nA. Racial Diversity Is Essential to Law Firms' Long-Term Success.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Law Firms Must Be Able to Recruit and Hire Racially Diverse Talent.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-328_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The \"Discovery Rule\"\nII. Under the Best Reading of the FDCPA, Petitioner's Lawsuit Was Not Time-Barred and Should Not Have Been Dismissed on That Basis\nA. The FDCPA's Text Does Not Settle Whether the Discovery Rule Applies to Private Civil Lawsuits Under the Statute\nB. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Against the Background of Common Law Principles and Aware of This Court's Decisions\nC. [MISSING]\nD. The FDCPA's Purposes and Structure Suggest the Discovery Rule Applies to Private Civil Lawsuits Under the Statute\n1. Congress Designed the FDCPA to Incentivize Private Civil Lawsuits as the Primary Means For Achieving the Statute's Objectives\n2. Congress Structured the FDCPA to Include Among Its Targets Numerous Specifically Prohibited Actions About Which the Victim Could or Likely Would Be Unaware at the Time of the Violation\n3. Dismissing Lawsuits Filed By \"Blamelessly Ignorant\" Plaintiffs After Discovery of an FDCPA Violation as Time-Barred Is Inconsistent With the Purposes and Structure of the Statute, and Would Yield \"Odd\" Results Eschewed by the Court When Considering Congressional Intent\nE. Applying the Discovery Rule to the FDCPA Is Fully Consistent With the General Purposes Underlying Statutes of Limitation",
        "reference": "C. Congress Reasonably Would Have Believed Courts Would Apply the Discovery Rule to the FDCPA In Light of This Court's Decisions Over the Preceding Decades",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-834_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE TEXT AND HISTORY OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE, AS WELL AS OUR CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE, SHOW THERE IS NO BASIS FOR A PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION",
        "reference": "I. THE COURT SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ANY PRESUMPTION AGAINST PREEMPTION IS INAPPLICABLE IN INTERPRETING AN EXPRESS PREEMPTION PROVISION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1086_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fifteenth Amendment Enfranchised Men Nationwide Regardless Of Race Or Color and Is An Independent Source of Congressional Authority.\nA. Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress Never Imposed Suffrage Qualifications On The States.\nB. The Reconstruction Framers Deliberately Chose a Constitutional Amendment Over a Statutory Solution.\nC. The Reconstruction Framers Openly Discussed Racially Polarized Voting during the Fifteenth Amendment's Drafting and Ratification.\nII. Congress May Pass Rational Legislation Pursuant To Its Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority.\nA. The Reconstruction Congress Conferred Itself Broad Enforcement Authority Under the Reconstruction Amendments, Supporting the Katzenbach Standard.\nB. Boerne's Congruence and Proportionality Test Should Not Be Extended to the Fifteenth Amendment.\nC. Neither Northwest Austin nor Shelby County Extended Boerne to the Fifteenth Amendment.\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Shelby County's Equal Sovereignty Principle Does Not Apply to Nationwide Statutes.\nIII. States May Consider Race in the Redistricting Process Consistent with the Fifteenth Amendment.\nA. The Reconstruction Amendments Do Not Prohibit the Consideration of Race During Redistricting.\nB. Section 2 of the VRA is Appropriate Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Legislation.",
        "reference": "1. Shelby County's Equal Sovereignty Principle Is Distinct From Boerne's Congruence and Proportionality Test.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-637_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Broad Forfeiture Rules Chill Vital Defense Arguments\nII. Broad Forfeiture Rules Force Defendants Into a Hobson's Choice Between Constitutional Rights\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Broad Forfeiture Rules Undermine the Institution of the Criminal Trial",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-334_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE QUESTION PRESENTED DOES NOT WARRANT THIS COURT'S REVIEW\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Fifth Circuit's precedent is in line with Rule 39's text, meaning there is no glaring need to consider new arguments petitioner did not properly develop\nC. The petition mischaracterizes the applicable background principles\nII. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE TO CONSIDER THE RULE 39 STANDARD",
        "reference": "A. Petitioner vastly overstates the existence of any circuit split and, to the extent one exists, it is stale; the cases have been in the same posture for a long time without noticeable consequences for the administration of justice",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE BOARD MEMBERS ARE TERRITORIAL OFFICERS WHO NEED NOT BE APPOINTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nA. The Appointments Clause does not govern congressionally created territorial offices that administer territorial law rather than laws of nationwide application\nB. Board members are territorial officers who need not be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause\nC. Aurelius's \"significant authority\" test is misconceived\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The many contradictory adjustments respondents must make to their \"significant authority\" test make clear that the test is misconceived\nD. Respondents' alternative Lebron test is also misconceived\nII. SHOULD THIS COURT FIND AN APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE VIOLATION, IT SHOULD AFFIRM THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S AWARD OF PROSPECTIVE, BUT NOT RETROSPECTIVE, RELIEF\nA. Prospective, but not retrospective, relief is appropriate in this case\n1. Courts have long exercised remedial discretion to grant prospective relief, but limit retrospective relief, for separation-of-powers defects\n2. The Board's role in filing Title III cases is much like that of a private or municipal bankruptcy petitioner\n3. Purely prospective relief is appropriate in this case\nB. Aurelius's arguments that this Court must invalidate the Board's past actions are meritless\nC. There is no basis for invalidating the Board's actions taken after the First Circuit's decision",
        "reference": "1. Precedent, logic, historical practice, and constitutional principles refute respondents' reliance on Buckley's \"significant authority\" test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ESA dictates that \"critical habitat\" must be habitable\nA. The operative provisions of the ESA plainly state that critical habitat must be habitable\nB. The Fifth Circuit's analysis ignored the operative provisions of the ESA and the plain meaning of the word \"habitat.\"\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Designating areas that are not habitable by a listed species as \"critical habitat\" harms the development and operation of the nation's energy infrastructure\nA. The electric energy industry in the United States is investing heavily in new generation, transmission and distribution facilities and in enhancing the nation-wide electric grid\nB. Energy projects that could have an adverse effect on critical habitat face significant costs, likely delays, and higher operating costs\nC. Energy project developers seek to avoid or minimize the impact of new electricity generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure within critical habitat\nD. Extending ESA \"critical habitat\" protection to lands that cannot sustain a listed species threatens to disrupt the development and operation of the nation's energy infrastructure",
        "reference": "C. The Service's determination that lands may be deemed \"essential to the conservation of a species\" even though not habitable by that species now or in the reasonably foreseeable future is not entitled to Chevron deference",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. The PTO Misstates the Distinction Between Genericness and Descriptiveness\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Denying Registration of BOOKING.COM Frustrates the Purposes of the Lanham Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-7_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The CFPA And Its Removal Provision Are Constitutional\nA. The Constitution Gives Congress Considerable Discretion to Structure Executive Agencies and Offices\nB. Unanimous and Repeated Precedents of this Court Support the CFPB's Constitutionality\nC. The Parties' Efforts to Distinguish Humphrey's Executor and its Progeny Fail, and Indeed Underscore the Single-Director Structure's Constitutionality\nD. The Court Should Decline the Parties' Invitation to Overrule Humphrey's Executor\nIII. At A Minimum, The CFPA Can And Should Be Interpreted To Avoid Any Constitutional Concern",
        "reference": "I. Petitioner Suffers No Injury Traceable To Any Limitation On The President's Removal Authority, And Prudential Factors Counsel Against Deciding The Question Presented Without A Contested Removal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court Should Not Allow the \"Open Fields\" Doctrine to Influence the Protection an \"Effect\" Receives Under the Fourth Amendment\nA. The Open Fields Doctrine Has No Historical Justification and Rests on an Error Made, and Then Compounded, by This Court\nB. Because This Court's Jurisprudence Only Authorizes Officials to Observe When in an Open Field, It Cannot Form a Basis for the Arresting Officer's Warrantless Inspection of the Cover and Motorcycle\ni. This Court has never applied the open fields doctrine to the inspection of effects on private property\nii. A warrant is required for a search of an effect on private property, just as one is required for searches of people, houses, and papers\nIII. Under California v. Carney, the Vehicle Exception to the Warrant Requirement Does Not Apply in This Case",
        "reference": "I. This Court's Recent Rulings in Jones and Jardines Demonstrate Why a Property-Rights Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment Should Control in This Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-493_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Cabazon Band Should Not Guide Analysis of the Restoration Act\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. If Congress Intended IGRA to Govern the Pueblo, It Would Have Said So\u2014and Still Could",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1189_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "Federal Courts Are The Appropriate Forum For Climate Change Tort Suits\nA. State-law tort claims seeking damages or other remedies for global climate change unavoidably implicate federal law\nB. Federal courts are the appropriate forum for determining whether climate change tort claims are justiciable, and if they are, whether federal law displaces such claims, or alternatively, preempts them\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Climate change tort claims should be adjudicated, if at all, by federal courts in order to foster uniformity of decision and preserve interstate federalism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FAIR USE DEFENSE SHOULD TYPICALLY COMPLETE RATHER THAN COMPETE WITH WELL-FUNCTIONING LICENSING MARKETS\nA. The fair use defense plays an important role by allowing copyrighted works to be used when the circumstances indicate that market forces might fail to reach socially desirable results\nB. [MISSING]\nII. FINDING WARHOL'S USE FAIR WILL BE IN TENSION WITH THIS COURT'S FAIR USE CASELAW AND WILL UNDERMINE EXISTING INDUSTRIES\nA. This Court's fair use precedents never allowed users to bypass existing well-functioning licensing markets\nB. Finding Warhol's use fair will undermine the importance this Court places on the Fourth Fair Use Factor \u2014 the harm to the underlying work's market\nC. Allowing unlicensed use of copyright-protected works by simply adding an arguably new meaning or message will undermine a core building block of multiple creative industries",
        "reference": "B. A well-functioning licensing market, which could have served Andy Warhol's needs, operated in this case but was ignored",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1414_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. The authority to police violations of state and federal law is inherent in tribal sovereignty\nB. Respondent offers no sound basis to conclude that tribes have been divested of their inherent authority to police violations of state and federal law\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Respondent's alternative framework is even more debilitating and unworkable than the Ninth Circuit's",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1271_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS' POSITION THREATENS RULE OF LAW PROTECTIONS THAT THE FRAMERS INTENDED TO SAFEGUARD FEDERAL ELECTIONS\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Unchecked Legislative Power Over Elections Would Cripple the Rule of Law\nII. REMOVING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF FEDERAL ELECTIONS WOULD IMPERIL AMERICAN DEMOCRACY\nA. Petitioners' Position Would Permit Unchecked Gerrymandering of Congressional Districts\nB. The Harmful Consequences of Petitioners' Theory Threaten All Aspects of Federal Elections",
        "reference": "A. American Republicanism Depends on the Rule of Law to Make Political Leaders Democratically Accountable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The attack on January 6, 2021, was an insurrection against the Constitution\nB. Trump engaged in the insurrection\nC. The First Amendment does not protect incitement to insurrection\nII. Section 3 Applies to Insurrectionist Presidents\nIII. Courts May Adjudicate Section 3 Under State Ballot Access Laws\nA. States may exclude from the presidential ballot constitutionally ineligible candidates\nB. Section 3 does not require federal enforcement legislation\nIV. The Colorado Supreme Court Did Not Violate the Electors Clause",
        "reference": "I. Trump Engaged in Insurrection Against the Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.44
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. AN ARBITRABILITY APPEAL DIVESTS THE DISTRICT COURT OF AUTHORITY TO PROCEED WITH LITIGATION\nA. The FAA's Text Requires Divestiture During An Arbitrability Appeal\n1. The Divestiture Rule Prevents District Courts From Proceeding To The Merits While An Arbitrability Appeal Proceeds\n2. Section 16(a) Codifies The Divestiture Rule For Arbitrability Appeals\nB. The FAA's Structure Confirms That Divestiture Is Required\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Context Confirms That Divestiture Is Required\nE. Divestiture Is Required In Comparable Immunity Contexts\nII. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIVESTITURE FAIL\nA. Precedent Does Not Support The Ninth Circuit's Rule\nB. The Availability of Discretionary Stays Does Not Support The Ninth Circuit's Rule\nC. Concern Over Frivolous Appeals Does Not Support The Ninth Circuit's Rule",
        "reference": "C. Divestiture Comports With The Purpose Of Section 16",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. THE ACCOMMODATION FAILS TO USE THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS OF FURTHERING A COMPELLING INTEREST AS THE HHS MANDATE ITSELF CONTEMPLATES LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES AND EXEMPTS MILLIONS OF HEALTH PLANS FROM ITS PURPORTED COMPELLING INTEREST\nA. The Accommodation is Not the Least Restrictive Means of Providing Free Contraceptives and Abortion Causing Drugs and Devices\nB. Providing Free Contraceptives and Abortifacients is Not a Compelling Government Interest",
        "reference": "I. THE HHS MANDATE SUBSTANTIALLY BURDENS PETITIONERS' RELIGIOUS EXERCISE BY REQUIRING THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN, FACILITATE, AND TRIGGER THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTRACEPTIVES AND ABORTIFACIENTS IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS' SINCERELY HELD RELIGIOUS BELIEFS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-322_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The injunctions in these cases enjoin the operation of Section 1231(a)(6)\nB. The injunctions in these cases fall outside the exception in Section 1252(f)(1) because they seek classwide, not individual, relief\nII. Section 1231(a)(6) does not require bond hearings\nA. The Ninth and Third Circuits' bond-hearing regime has no basis in the statutory text\nB. The Ninth and Third Circuits' bond-hearing regime conflicts with this Court's precedents\nC. Constitutional avoidance does not justify imposing the Ninth and Third Circuits' bond-hearing regime\nD. Zadvydas does not justify imposing the Ninth and Third Circuits' bond-hearing regime",
        "reference": "I. Section 1252(f)(1) barred the injunctive relief granted by the lower courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "A. The First Amendment prohibits governmental interference with ecclesiastical appointments\nB. The ministerial exception extends to any employee of a religious organization who performs an important religious function\n1. Hosanna-Tabor recognized a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses' special solicitude for religious functionaries\n2. The ministerial exception applies when an employee's job duties or other facts show that the employee performs an important religious function\nC. The ministerial exception bars respondents' employment-discrimination claims\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The counterarguments advanced by the court of appeals and respondents lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1442_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
        "reference": "A. The court of appeals' decision is correct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-742_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. In Rare Circumstances, A Right Is So Clearly Violated That Qualified Immunity Should Be Denied Even Without A Judicial Precedent Previously Addressing Comparable, Egregious Facts\nII. It Is Clearly Established That An Officer Must, At A Minimum, Have Some Valid Law Enforcement Purpose Before Ordering A Person To Stop Praying\nA. A reasonable officer would have understood that the constitutional right to pray is clearly established\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. A reasonable officer would have understood that stopping an individual from praying, without a legitimate purpose for doing so, impermissibly burdens a constitutional right",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Insular Cases \u2014the foundation on which the Government's argument rests \u2014entrenched the unequal treatment of American citizens living in U.S. Territories\nA. The Insular Cases designated the Territories as quasi-\"foreign\" for constitutional purposes\nB. The same racial bias from Plessy was integral to the Insular Cases' rationale\nC. [MISSING]\nII. This Court should affirm the decision below by overruling the Insular Cases and applying heightened scrutiny\nA. The Court can and should revisit the Insular Cases\nB. Irrespective of the Insular Cases, Torres and Rosario must be overruled and discrimination against Territorial residents subjected to heightened scrutiny",
        "reference": "C. The Government relies on the Insular Cases and their progeny in this case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Establishment Clause neither compels nor permits discrimination against religion in the administration of generally available state benefit programs\nA. The Establishment Clause was intended as a federalism protection for the states\nB. If it includes an individual right, the Establishment Clause protects against coercion of individuals and religious institutions\nII. As interpreted by the Montana Supreme Court, the prohibition on aid to \"Sectarian Schools\" violates the Free Exercise Clause\nA. The Religion Clauses prohibit an official policy of state hostility toward religion\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The prohibition on aid to \"Sectarian Schools\" constitutes an official policy of state hostility toward religion in violation of the Free Exercise Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION\nII. OVERRULING ABOOD IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S ORIGINAL MEANING\nA. The Framers Believed It Uncontroversial That The Government Could Condition Public Employment On The Relinquishment Of First Amendment Rights\nB. Respect For The First Amendment's Original Meaning Justifies Reaffirming Abood, Not Overruling It\nIII. OVERRULING ABOOD IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S PREROGATIVE AS EMPLOYER\nA. Neither Strict Nor Exacting Scrutiny Applies When The Government Acts As Employer\n1. Workplace Speech\n2. Political Patronage\n3. Forum Analysis\n4. Compelled Speech and Association\nB. Knox And Harris Do Not Justify Strict Or Exacting Scrutiny When The Government Acts As Employer\nC. This Court's Longstanding Fair-Share Jurisprudence Appropriately Balances Employees' Workplace Speech Rights Against The Government's Legitimate Interests As Employer\n1. Fair-Share Fees Implicate Speech by Government Employees as Employees\n2. The Government Has Legitimate Interests in Preventing Unfair Free-Riding by Non-Members\n3. The Government Also Has Legitimate Interests in a Well-Funded Exclusive Representative\nD. Petitioner's Contention That All Collective Bargaining, Contract Administration, And Grievance Procedures Are Equivalent To Political Lobbying Is False\n1. The Long-Recognized Distinction Between Collective Bargaining and Political Lobbying Is Sound\n2. Contract Administration and Grievance Procedures Are Wholly Unlike Lobbying\n3. In an Appropriate Case, This Court Can Reconsider the Line Drawn in Lehnert\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Stare Decisis Principles Support Affirmance\n1. Abood's Longevity and Repeated Reaffirmance Compel Stare Decisis\n2. Petitioner Does Not Seriously Dispute That Overruling Abood Would Upend Significant Reliance Interests\n3. Abood Has Proved Workable\n4. There Is No Exception to Stare Decisis Applicable Here\nB. Petitioner's Arguments Concerning Abood's Vitality Depend On Assertions Of Contested (And Incorrect) Facts, And This Case Lacks A Factual Record\nC. Overruling Abood Would Disrupt Other Long-Settled First Amendment Doctrines\nV. PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR AN AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT REQUIREMENT SHOULD BE REJECTED\nA. The Scope Of Required Consent Is Outside The Question Presented\nB. Any First Amendment Interest Against Compelled Subsidization Is Properly Protected By A Right To Opt Out",
        "reference": "IV. OVERRULING ABOOD IS INCONSISTENT WITH STARE DECISIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Hardison's De Minimis Standard Is Dictum\nB. The De Minimis Test Clashes With Title VII's Text, Structure, And History\nC. The Government And Lower Courts Have Urged This Court To Reject The Test\nII. THE HARDISON TEST HARMS RELIGIOUS MINORITIES\nA. The 1972 Title VII Amendment Was A Critical Use Of Political Power To Protect Religious Minorities\nB. Hardison's \"De Minimis Cost\" Standard Undercuts Religious Minorities' Hard-Won Protections\nC. Religious Minorities Need Robust Anti-Discrimination Protections And Accommodations",
        "reference": "I. HARDISON'S UNDUE HARDSHIP STANDARD SHOULD BE DISAPPROVED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under Hardison, religious employees are afforded fewer protections from employment discrimination than other protected groups\nA. Hardison's interpretation of undue hardship is inconsistent with other accommodation laws\nB. Nor does Hardison align with judicial decisions interpreting identical language in other statutes\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Jews and other religious minorities are particularly likely to suffer discrimination under Hardison\nB. Hardison makes it easier to conceal anti-Semitic discrimination\nC. The lack of protection for Jewish workers is especially troubling given the recent resurgence of anti-Semitism across the nation and in the workplace",
        "reference": "II. Hardison harms religious workers, particularly Jewish Americans",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ON-SALE BAR DOES NOT DISCOURAGE INNOVATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY\nA. Section 102(a)(1) Retains the One-Year Grace Period for Sales of the Claimed Invention\nB. The Practical Concerns of Petitioner and Supporting Amici are Exaggerated and Untethered to the Realities of the Marketplace\n1. The Existing \"Commercial Offer For Sale\" Requirement Addresses Concerns About the Scope of the On-Sale Bar\n2. The \"Ready for Patenting\" Prong of Pfaff Adequately Protects Innovation\n3. Petitioner and IPO Posit a False Dichotomy\u2014Those in the Marketplace Do Not Face a Choice Between Commercialization and Patenting\n4. Petitioner's Concerns About Uncertainty from the Affirmance of Longstanding Law Are Overstated\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Confidentiality Agreements Could Be Strategically Used to Avoid Triggering the On-Sale Bar\nB. Petitioner's Interpretation Would Encourage Delays In Filing for Patents\nC. Petitioner's Interpretation Wrongly Shifts Focus To The Text of Commercial Agreements, And Ignores Their Subject Inventions",
        "reference": "II. PETITIONER'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 102 OF THE AIA WOULD UNDERMINE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-439_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Because Nance Seeks to Prevent the Execution of His Capital Sentence, His Filing Is Not Cognizable Under section 1983\nA. Prisoners Cannot Use section 1983 to Prevent Execution of a Capital Sentence, Because That Is a Challenge to Custody\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Allowing Prisoners to Bar Execution Via section 1983 Would Increase Gamesmanship, Not Reduce Confusion\nII. Nance's Filing Is Second or Successive Because It Seeks Relief from the Same Sentence He Already Challenged\nA. Habeas Petitions Are \"Second or Successive\" When They Seek Relief From the Same Sentence as a Previous Petition, Even If They Include Previously Unavailable Claims\nB. Nance's Filing Is Second or Successive Even If His Claims Were Previously Unavailable\nIII. The Courthouse Doors Will Remain Wide Open for Habeas Petitioners, Nance Included",
        "reference": "B. Nance's Challenge Would Prevent the Execution of His Capital Sentence, Regardless of Whether Georgia Could Conceivably Impose a Different Punishment in the Future",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. RETROACTIVITY IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE IN THIS CASE\nA. Eight States Enacted Economic Presence Laws Without Safeguards Against Retroactivity\nB. Twenty States Have Existing Laws that Would Permit the Retroactive Application of a Decision Abandoning Quill's Physical Presence Rule\nC. States Could Enact Retroactive Tax Legislation to Adopt the Court's Standard\nII. ALLOWING STATES TO RETROACTIVELY APPLY A DECISION MODIFYING QUILL WOULD RAISE DUE PROCESS CONCERNS AND SUBVERT PRINCIPLES OF SOUND JUDICIAL AND TAX POLICY\nA. Modifying Quill and Allowing States to Apply the Decision Retroactively Would Undermine the Intended Operation of Sales and Use Taxes\nB. Modifying Quill and Allowing States to Apply the Decision Retroactively Would Raise Significant Due Process Concerns\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Principles of Sound Judicial and Tax Policy Require This Court to Address the Retroactivity Issues Described Above if this Court Modifies Quill",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Tenth Circuit's strict scrutiny analysis impermissibly vests Colorado with broad authority to impose content-based and viewpoint-based speech restrictions on any expressive business subject to the Accommodation Clause.\nA. When a business's speech is taken to be the public accommodation, courts must determine whether there is a compelling reason for refusing to give the speaker an exemption.\nB. The Accommodation Clause is an invalid restriction because Colorado has no compelling reason for denying an exemption from CADA for Appellants' custom-designed wedding websites.\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Smith's statement regarding her religious views on marriage is not commercial speech and, therefore, cannot be prohibited under Pittsburgh Press as a restriction on commercial advertising that is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Jose Luis Vaello-Madero qualified for SSI benefits in the State of New York and is entitled to continue receiving those benefits as he does not live in a foreign country. His benefits should thus be reinstated; he should be paid back benefits from his termination date; and his alleged overpayment should be waived or annulled\nIII. The SSA Administrative Legal Framework for an Overpayment\nIV. Jose Luis Vaello-Madero has no standing to bring the claim that Congress violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security Income, but not extending it to Puerto Rico and the Supreme Court and the First Court of Appeals lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear this claim",
        "reference": "I. The Puerto Rico Paradigm: Puerto Rico is Not a Foreign Country",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1201_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "1. Overarching Points\na. Shifting the Issue\nb. The Conduct in Question\nc. [MISSING]\n2. Separation of Powers\na. The Lower Courts Did Not Address Burr\nb. Separation of Powers\nc. Additional Replies\ni. Meyer rejected \"coextensive\" immunities\nii. Dalehite and Varig Airlines\niii. Porto Rico\niv. The uniquely independent TVA has sued the Government\n3. Miscellaneous Replies\na. \"Governmental\" and \"Private\" Conduct \u2014 Misreading Our Position\nb. Rate-Setting and Insurance; No Grave Interference\nc. \"Emergency Response\"\n4. Practical Upshot \u2014 Complete Immunity",
        "reference": "c. Burr Already Contemplates Immunity for \"Policy\"-Laden, \"Governmental\" Work",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.41
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1442_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. Claimants Need Not Challenge the Constitutionality of ALJs' Appointments Before Those ALJs\nA. Sims Forecloses Imposing Implied Issue-Exhaustion Requirements in Non-Adversarial SSA Proceedings\nB. Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles, Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Are Reviewable\nII. The Government's Other Arguments Are Meritless\nA. Sims Rejected the Government's General Issue-Exhaustion Rule\nB. There Is No Appointments Clause Exception to Sims\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. The Court Should Excuse Any Forfeiture",
        "reference": "C. Requiring Issue Exhaustion in SSA ALJ Proceedings Would Be Unworkable and Inequitable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Student Borrowers Face Worsened Economic Conditions Because of the COVID-19 Pandemic.\nA. The COVID-19 emergency set off an unprecedented economic crisis, harming student borrowers' ability to pay their loans.\nB. Student borrowers with children have been diverted from income-producing activity to meet the increased childcare responsibilities caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.\nC. The economic downturn threatens the lifetime earnings of recent graduates.\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. Contracting COVID-19 itself has hampered the ability of many borrowers to meet their loan repayment obligations.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-869_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Statutory Fair Use Factors and Exclusive Rights to Create Derivative Works Are the result of a Long Historical Development and Congressional Judgment\nA. 1840-1870: Fair Use Develops from Fair Abridgment\nB. 1870 \u2014Congress Begins to Recognize Individual Derivative Work Rights; Fair Abridgment is Discarded\nC. 1909: Congress Enumerates Specific Derivative Work Rights\nD. 1917-1976: Fair Use Coalesces into Legislation Including the Factors from Folsom v. Marsh\nE. Congress Formalizes a General Derivative Work Right\nF. 1976-Present: \"Transformativeness\" Threatens to Overwhelm the Statutory Text\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE DECISION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REFLECTS THIS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-269_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A. The \"right of taking fish,\" reserved to the Tribes under the Stevens Treaties, includes a right against substantial degradation of tribal fisheries\n1. The treaty signatories intended to protect tribal fisheries from obstructions that would substantially degrade the resource\n2. Contemporaneous sources of law protected fisheries against obstructions\n3. Precedents of this Court confirm that the \"right of taking fish\" includes protection against substantial depletion of the fisheries\n4. The State mischaracterizes the decisions below as guaranteeing the Tribes a minimum standard of living\n5. The State's other arguments concerning interpretation of the Stevens Treaties are unpersuasive\nB. The courts below properly rejected the State's equitable defenses\n1. The State's equitable defenses do not apply to the United States\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Even if equitable defenses were available in this case, the State's defenses would not succeed\nC. The injunction provides appropriate relief to redress the treaty violation\n1. The record shows that replacing the State's barrier culverts will have a substantial impact\n2. The record contains ample evidence that barrier culverts have affected salmon harvests\n3. Nothing in the record supports the State's untimely suggestion that funds would be better spent on other salmon-recovery efforts\n4. The district court correctly found that the balance of equities favors providing a remedy for the State's treaty violations",
        "reference": "2. This Court's decision in City of Sherrill does not support the State's defenses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Early On, Congress Determined That It Was Not Bound By Structural Constitutional Restraints In Legislating For The Territories, And It Has Since Acted Consistent With That Determination\nA. As Early As 1803, Congress Specifically Considered And Rejected Arguments That It Was Bound By The Appointments Clause And Other Separation-Of-Powers Principles When Dealing With The Territories\nB. Other Congressional Practice From The Early Years Of The Nation Confirms That Congress Did Not Think It Was Bound By The Appointments Clause When Dealing With The Territories\nC. Congress's 1789 Amendment To The Northwest Ordinance Is Consistent With This History\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Executive Branch Has Consistently Maintained That Territorial Officials Are Not \"Officers Of The United States.\"\nIV. Exempting Territorial Officials From The Appointments Clause Is Consistent With This History And The Constitutional Design",
        "reference": "II. This Court Has Consistently Held That Inter-Branch, Structural Separation-Of-Powers Constraints Do Not Apply When Congress Acts In The Territories",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1650_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Courts Are Not Prohibited from Considering Current Facts and Law When Deciding Whether to Impose a Reduced Sentence Under Section 404(b)\nA. The Text of the First Step Act Does Not Prohibit Consideration of Current Facts and Law\nB. The First Step Act's History and Statutory Design Confirm that Current Facts and Law Can Be Considered\nC. Established Principles of Sentencing Law and Judicial Decisionmaking Support Allowing Consideration of Current Facts and Law\nD. The Rule of Lenity Supports Mr. Concepcion's Interpretation of Section 404(b)\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The First Circuit's Two-Step Approach Is Inconsistent with the Statutory Text\nB. The First Circuit's Approach Would Produce Arbitrary and Unpredictable Outcomes\nC. Dillon Does Not Support Limiting District Courts' Authority Under Section 404(b)\nIII. Whether Consideration of Current Facts and Law Is Mandatory or Permissive, Vacatur Is Required",
        "reference": "II. Arguments Against Consideration of Current Facts and Law When Deciding Whether to Impose a Reduced Sentence Are Meritless",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.1
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1164_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Has Never Held That the Quiet Title Act's Statute of Limitations Is Jurisdictional\nA. Block and Mottaz did not hold that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is jurisdictional\nB. Beggerly addressed whether the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations could be equitably tolled, a distinct question from whether the statute of limitations is jurisdictional\nC. As Beggerly confirms, Block and Mottaz did not apply a different, pre-Irwin governing law about how to interpret statutes of limitations\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The 1986 Amendments addressed only whether states had to comply with the statute of limitations\nB. The 1986 Amendments did not change the statute of limitations from a waivable affirmative defense to a jurisdictional bar\nIII. The Distinction Between a Jurisdictional and Nonjurisdictional Statute of Limitation Matters\nIV. This Case Allows the Court to Further Clarify the Standard for Resolving Questions About Whether a Prescription Is Jurisdictional",
        "reference": "II. In Amending the Quiet Title Act, Congress Did Not Acquiesce in an Understanding That the Statute of Limitations Is Jurisdictional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Plain Text And Applicable Canons Of Construction Dictate That \"Using A Random Or Sequential Number Generator\" Modifies Both \"Store\" And \"Produce\"\nII. Respondent Ignores The Targeted Scope Of The ATDS Prohibitions And Renders Their Failure To Reach Residential Lines Inexplicable\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Respondent Cannot Avoid The Untenable Practical And Constitutional Consequences Of His Statutory Reconstruction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The RFS imposes disproportionate economic hardship on small refineries that increases over time\nIII. Congress could not have meant what the Tenth Circuit says it did\nA. Congress did not intend to force small refineries to comply or go out of business\nB. Congress intended to keep small American refineries in business",
        "reference": "I. Small refineries operate with limited access to resources under constrained market conditions, making RFS compliance difficult",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief048.pdf",
        "text": "I. Localized Discretion in Issuing Public Carry Permits Is Essential to Exercising a State's Police Power to Protect the Public\nA. State and Local Governments' Paramount Duty to Protect the Safety of Their Citizens Is Accompanied by Broad Discretion\nB. The Second Amendment Does Not Deprive the States of the Duty, or of the Discretion, to Protect Public Safety Through Firearms Permits\nC. Appropriate, Common Sense Gun Regulations Vary with the Public Safety Needs of Specific Communities\nD. Localized Standards in Concealed Carry Permitting Decisions Are of Importance in Combating Unlawful Handgun Use in the Urban Areas That PAGV Members Serve\nII. Courts Have Recognized the Constitutionality of Discretionary Licensing Regimes Vesting Authority in Local Officials\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. Non-Discretionary Licensing Limits Law Enforcement's Ability to Protect the Public, Including Increasing Risk Inherent in Civilian-Police Encounters\nB. Non-Discretionary Licensing Schemes Would Further Increase the Risk to the Lives of Law Enforcement Personnel\nC. The Empirical Evidence Demonstrates That Non-Discretionary Licensing Laws Would Result in Increased Gun Violence",
        "reference": "III. Non-Discretionary Licensing Improperly Limits the Discretion Required by State and Local Authorities to Fulfill Their Obligation to Protect Their Citizens",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. The NCAA eligibility rules should have been upheld on a quick look.\nA. Quick-look review may be used to reject liability.\nB. The NCAA eligibility rules should have been upheld on a quick look.\n1. Joint action is necessary to define the product.\n2. Board of Regents dictates rejection of liability here.\n3. Judicial experience militates against liability.\n4. History and common sense validate the NCAA eligibility rules.\nII. The courts below misapplied Rule of Reason burden-shifting review\nA. The district court effectively conducted a less-restrictive-alternative inquiry at step 2 of the Rule-of-Reason test.\n1. [MISSING]\nB. The courts below should have upheld the NCAA's rules at step 3 of the Rule-of-Reason test.\n1. Plaintiffs and the government ignore the lower courts' step 3 errors.\n2. The courts below should have upheld the NCAA's reasonable line-drawing.\n3. Key elements of the district court's injunction were a product of its legal errors.",
        "reference": "1. Plaintiffs offer no substantive defense of the step 2 holding.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court should stop the Tenth Circuit's dangerous expansion of \"compelling government interests\" in free speech jurisprudence\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The government will use the decision below to control political speech",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Agencies are applying unconstitutional, unlawful rules, invalidated by this and other courts\n1. The current WOTUS definition is unconstitutionally vague\n2. The current WOTUS definition violates the Commerce Clause\n3. The current WOTUS definition encroaches on the traditional province of the states\n4. The current WOTUS definition violates this Court's Rapanos decision\nB. This Court should provide a clear standard\n1. This Court's precedent provides some support for abandoning Marks\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Tributaries and adjacent waters must be sizeable and hydrologically connected to navigable waters\n4. Interstate waters and isolated intrastate waters are not subject to federal jurisdiction\n5. The final definition should include only navigable waters and their sizeable, interconnected tributaries and adjacent waters",
        "reference": "2. Traditional navigable waters should include only channels of interstate commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.64
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-647_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S STATE LITIGATION REQUIREMENT IS UNWORKABLE IN PRACTICE AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE REMEDIAL NATURE OF THE JUST COMPENSATION CLAUSE\nA. Background Takings Law\n1. Condemnation and Inverse Condemnation\n2. Inverse Condemnation Takings Claims Concern Liability; The Just Compensation Clause Provides a Remedy\nB. Takings Ripeness Doctrine\n1. Finality Rules Controlled Prior to Williamson County's Articulation of the State Litigation Doctrine\n2. Williamson County's State Litigation Dicta\nC. The State Litigation Requirement Is Incapable of Coherent and Just Application\n1. The State Litigation Rule Ripens Nothing, but Instead Strips Federal Courts of the Ability To Hear Takings Claims\n2. The State Litigation Doctrine Is Inconsistent With 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and 28 U.S.C. section 1331\n3. The State Litigation Requirement Deprives Takings Plaintiffs of Reasonable Access to State Courts\nD. The State Litigation Requirement Fails To Account for the Just Compensation Clause Remedy\nII. THE COURT SHOULD RECONFIRM THE PRE-WILLIAMSON COUNTY FINALITY RIPENESS FRAMEWORK AND HOLD MS. KNICK'S CLAIMS RIPE UNDER THAT REGIME\nA. Takings Claims Ripen When the Government Clearly Injures Property Interests\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Ms. Knick's As-Applied Claims Are Ripe\n2. Ms. Knick's Facial Claims Are Also Ripe\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Bar the Court from Correcting Course",
        "reference": "B. Ms. Knick's Physical Takings Claims Are Ripe",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.39
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs' Requested Relief is Barred by Griffin's Case (1869)\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Decisions from Louisiana and North Carolina are consistent with Griffin's Case\nC. The Colorado Supreme Court engaged in improper speculation about Chief Justice Chase's motives\nD. Griffin's Case is consistent with the deeply rooted sword-shield dichotomy in federal courts' jurisprudence\nII. In 1788, 1868, and today, \"Officer of the United States\" in the Constitution extends exclusively to appointed positions and not to elected positions\nA. In the Constitution of 1788, the President did not hold an \"Office under the United States\"\n1. The \"historical background\" of \"Office under the United States\" was \"Office under the Crown\"\n2. The President is covered by the Religious Test Clause\n3. The President and members of Congress are not covered by the Foreign Emoluments Clause\n4. The Elector Incompatibility Clause does not bar the President from serving as an elector\n5. The Incompatibility Clause does not bar the President from holding a seat in Congress\n6. Disqualification after impeachment and conviction does not extend to the presidency\nB. In the Constitution of 1788, the President was not an \"Officer of the United States\"\n1. The President does not appoint himself under the Appointments Clause\n2. The Impeachment Clause distinguishes the President from \"all other Officers of the United States\"\n3. The President does not commission himself\n4. The President does not take an Article VI Oath as an \"Officer of the United States\"\nC. In 1868, the President was not an \"Officer of the United States\" in the Constitution\n1. Section 3 was a compromise that brought the \"old soil\" from 1788 to 1868 for \"Officer of the United States\"\n2. A rigorous textualist analysis from April 1868 demonstrates that the President is not an \"Officer of the United States\"\nD. There is a tradition of authority from the Judicial and Executive Branches demonstrating that the President is not an \"Officer of the United States\"",
        "reference": "A. Griffin's Case is persuasive authority that settled the meaning of Section 3",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.41
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-200_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 11 Requires Plaintiffs to Prove They Bought Registered Shares\nB. Section 12 Requires Plaintiffs to Prove They Bought Registered Shares\nC. The Broader Statutory Context and Structure Confirm the Limited Scope of Sections 11 and 12\nD. The Limited Scope of Sections 11 and 12 Has Been Ratified Over Time\nII. THE ALTERNATIVE READINGS ADOPTED BY THE COURTS BELOW ARE INDEFENSIBLE\nA. Policy Concerns Are No Basis to Rewrite Statutory Text\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Rule Makes for Bad Policy",
        "reference": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1263_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. A State may impose a lien only on the portions of a recipient's recovery that represent compensation for medical expenses paid by Medicaid\n1. The anti-lien clause bars liens against a recipient's settlement or judgment, except as authorized by the third-party liability provisions\n2. The third-party liability provisions entitle the State only to the portions of a recovery that represent medical expenses already paid by Medicaid\n3. It makes sense that Congress would limit the State to the portions of the recovery associated with the expenses paid by Medicaid\n4. [MISSING]\nB. The contrary interpretations lack merit:\n1. The court of appeals' interpretation is incorrect\n2. Florida's interpretation is incorrect\nC. States retain broad discretion to establish procedures for allocating settlements",
        "reference": "4. At a minimum, the federal agency's reading of the statute deserves deference",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-67_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Decision Below Is Incorrect\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Question Presented Warrants Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. Following Masterpiece Cakeshop, Conflict in Authority Persists on Whether the First Amendment Prevents Non-Discrimination and Public Accommodation Laws from Compelling Expressive Works\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Courts in Colorado, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Washington as well as Virginia, reject free speech as the equal of sexual autonomy\nII. Reports of Other Professional Coercion\nIII. This Case Presents an Ideal Vehicle To decisively implement the promise of Obergefell",
        "reference": "A. The Eighth Circuit, Arizona, and Kentucky Support (to Some Degree) Free Speech Protections for Business Operations when Non-Discrimination or Public Accommodations Laws are Invoked",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief031.pdf",
        "text": "I. Act 620's purpose is to protect women who have an abortion procedure\nII. Louisiana abortion providers' egregious practices demonstrate that Act 620 protects women\nA. The legislature heard testimony about\u2014and was concerned with\u2014Louisiana abortion providers' egregious practices\nB. Louisiana abortion providers' egregious practices show that Act 620 helps ensure doctor competence\nC. Louisiana abortion providers' egregious practices show that Act 620 fosters continuity of care and information exchange\nD. Louisiana abortion providers' egregious practices increase the risk of complications and hospitalization\nE. Louisiana abortion providers' egregious practices undermine the veracity of Petitioners' statistics\nIII. Petitioners lack standing to raise the rights of the women they \"represent.\"\nA. [MISSING]\n1. Third-party standing is an Article III issue\n2. This Court should resolve the third-party standing issue even if it was waived below\nB. Litigants lack third-party standing when their interests conflict with the third parties' interests",
        "reference": "A. The third-party standing question is properly before this Court",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-18_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. An officer in hot pursuit based on probable cause to arrest for a misdemeanor may reasonably continue pursuit when the suspect leads him into a residence\nA. This Court has recognized hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect as an exigent circumstance that can justify warrantless entry into a home\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioner's objections to applying the hot-pursuit rule to misdemeanors are unsound\nII. The warrantless garage entry in this case was reasonable under the circumstances and constitutionally permissible",
        "reference": "B. The considerations that support the hot-pursuit rule apply in the misdemeanor context",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-5726_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Circuit Split Should Be Resolved\nIII. This Case Is an Excellent Vehicle\nIV. The Majority View Is Wrong",
        "reference": "I. The Government Concedes that There Is a Fifty-Year-Old Split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1048_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chapter 2 of the FAA and the New York Convention Authorize Non-Signatories to Enforce International Arbitration Agreements\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Chapter 1's Third-Party Enforcement Principles Apply in the International Context Unless Specifically Barred by Chapter 2\nC. Contrary to the Decision Below, the New York Convention Does Not Bar the Enforcement of an Arbitration Agreement by a Third Party Via Equitable Estoppel\nII. International Commerce Will Suffer if Non-Signatories Cannot Enforce International Arbitration Agreements\nA. International Arbitration Provides Numerous Benefits to Contracting Businesses\nB. If Non-Signatories Cannot Enforce International Arbitration Agreements, Businesses Will Lose the Benefits of International Arbitration and International Commerce Will Suffer",
        "reference": "A. The National Policy Favoring Arbitration Has Special Force in the Context of International Commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. COURTS ARE REQUIRED TO CONSIDER AMELIORATIVE MEASURES AS PART OF A GRAVE-RISK ANALYSIS\nA. Consideration of Ameliorative Measures in a Grave-Risk Analysis Tracks the Text and Purpose of the Convention\nB. The State Department Has Long Supported Consideration of Ameliorative Measures in Grave-Risk Cases\nC. International Practice Supports Consideration of Protective Measures as Part of the Grave-Risk Analysis\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RETURN ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6662_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "A [MISSING]\nA. Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)'s text and context show that it covers any state offense whose elements necessarily entail manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance\nB. Petitioner's importation of a generic-analogue approach, and a mens rea requirement, into Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) is unsound\nC. Extending a generic-analogue analysis to Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) would invite practical difficulties and exacerbate geographic disparities",
        "reference": "A state drug offense need not match the elements of a generic analogue offense to qualify as a \"serious drug offense\" under the ACCA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1011_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "THIS [MISSING]\nI. The Parties and the United States Do Not Agree on the Question Presented\nII. The Court Should Not Address the Availability of Extraterritorial Patent Damages for the First Time in a Case Arising Under section 271(f)\nIII. The Federal Circuit Has Not Yet Applied RJR Nabisco in Considering the Availability of Extraterritorial Patent Damages\nIV. The Predicate-Act Doctrine in Copyright Law Does Not Provide a Valid Reason for the Court To Grant Review",
        "reference": "THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE IN WHICH TO ADDRESS THE AVAILABILITY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL PATENT DAMAGES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-96_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Decision Below is Correct and Creates No Split\nIII. The Board Vastly Overstates the Consequences of the Decision Below",
        "reference": "I. Multiple Antecedent Questions Impede Resolution of the Question Presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-177_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court's prior decision does not bar application of Section 7631(f) to foreign entities operating abroad with which respondents claim an affiliation\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Practical and policy considerations support application of Section 7631(f) to foreign entities operating abroad with which respondents claim an affiliation",
        "reference": "B. No other legal principle bars application of Section 7631(f) to foreign entities operating abroad with which respondents claim an affiliation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Challenged Subpoenas Are Well Within The Constitutional Authority Of The House Of Representatives\nA. Congress's Investigatory Powers Are Broad And Deeply Rooted, And Judicial Superintendence Of The Exercise Of Those Powers Is Limited\nB. Under These Well-Settled Principles, The Challenged Subpoenas Are Valid\nC. [MISSING]\nII. The House Has Sufficiently Authorized The Committees To Issue The Subpoenas",
        "reference": "C. The Solicitor General Has Not Justified Special Protections\u2014Based On Hypothetical Circumstances Not Present Here\u2014Against Subpoenas Seeking Materials Relating To The President",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-166_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. Certiorari should be granted because government, under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, must respect, not exploit, vulnerable homeowners\nA. No one, including government, may exploit a tax windfall\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The California Legislature maintains a variant of the problem, also taking property for \"public use,\" and demonstrates no inclination to correct it",
        "reference": "B. Minnesota's tax windfall for county-supervised forest management, parks, and general government services is definitively for \"public use,\" and punishes Ms. Tyler for a lack of funds by taking significantly more than was owed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1432_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\n1. The vindication of contractual rights was of crucial importance to the Framers\n2. The Contract Clause was designed to safeguard the stability of contractual arrangements and promote commerce\n3. The Contract Clause was frequently litigated and vigorously enforced by the courts\nB. Starting in the late nineteenth century, this Court began to create problematic exceptions to the Contract Clause which virtually eliminated it from the Constitution\nC. This case presents an opportunity to correct this Court's Contract Clause jurisprudence\nD. Even if this Court declines to revisit Blaisdell and subsequent decisions, the decision below should be affirmed",
        "reference": "A. The Contract Clause was long one of the most important provisions of the Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE PETITION IMPLICATES A CLEAR SPLIT\nII. THE PETITION OFFERS A CLEAN VEHICLE\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE DECISION BELOW WAS WRONG",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-219_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. STATE-LAW TORT REMEDIES ALLOW INDIVIDUALS TO RECOVER FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS\nA. Plaintiffs Can Sue For Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress\nB. The Court Often Considers Alternative Remedies For Aggrieved Parties\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Even When Congress Provides For A Cause Of Action, Remedies Are Limited To Those Congress Authorized\nB. More Restraint Is Warranted When Considering Remedies For Implied Causes Of Action",
        "reference": "II. EMOTIONAL-DISTRESS DAMAGES FOR SECTION 504 VIOLATIONS IGNORES SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Selection and Writing of Words is Pure Speech that Cannot be Compelled by the State\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. All Opinions in the Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision Unanimously Recognize Words Cannot be Compelled",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. COMPELLED PAYMENT OF MONIES TO A LABOR UNION WITH WHOSE POSITIONS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKPLACE ISSUES THE EMPLOYEE DISAGREES VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT\na. Public sector collective bargaining is essentially political advocacy\nb. [MISSING]\nII. THE INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING \"LABOR PEACE\" AND AVOIDING \"FREE-RIDING\" DO NOT JUSTIFY COMPELLED SUBSIDIZATION OF POLITICAL SPEECH\nIII. An Opt-Out System Does Not Preserve Objectors' First Amendment Rights",
        "reference": "b. The mandatory exaction of dissenters' agency fee money infringes the dissenters' First Amendment rights. 26",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "THE PEACE CROSS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE\nA. A Government Display That Uses Religious Symbolism Is Constitutional If Its Purpose And Objective Meaning Are Secular Or If It Comports With The Nation's History And Traditions\nB. The Peace Cross Is Constitutional\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Peace Cross fits in a long history and tradition of displaying crosses as symbols of sacrifice and military valor\nC. The Peace Cross Is Also Constitutional Under The Lemon Test",
        "reference": "1. The purpose and objective meaning of the Peace Cross are secular",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "A. Section 511 of the Copyright Act is a clear and unambiguous abrogation of state sovereign immunity and this Court should honor Congressional intent and reverse the Fourth Circuit\nB. This Court's precedent supports a finding that 17 USC section 511 validly abrogated sovereign immunity under Congressional Article I powers\nC. Congress's intent to abrogate sovereign immunity is not negated by failure to explicitly refer to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment\n1. Copyright is protected under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the CRCA is enforceable under that Amendment\n2. This Court should defer to Congressional intent to validly abrogate sovereign immunity\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. N.C. Gen. Stat. 121-25(b) is preempted by federal law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-196_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Admitting the modified version of Stillwell's statement did not violate petitioner's confrontation right\nA. The admission of a natural-sounding, anonymized version of Stillwell's statement was consistent with historical practice and this Court's precedents:\n1. The presumption that jurors follow their instructions is a core tenet of our legal system\n2. Courts historically treated jury instructions as sufficient to address the potential prejudice of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession\n3. This Court's later decisions created an arrow exception for a nontestifying co-defendant's facially inculpatory statement\n4. The district court correctly determined that the Bruton exception did not apply here\nB. Petitioner's proposed expansion of the Bruton exception is contrary to precedent, conceptually unsound, and practically flawed\n1. The Bruton exception requires an \"overwhelming probability\" that the jury will disregard its instructions\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Petitioner's approach would introduce the negative \"practical effects\" that the Court avoided in Richardson and Gray\n4. Petitioner identifies no meaningful policy justifications for his proposed expansion of Bruton\nC. Petitioner's convictions should stand in any event",
        "reference": "2. Petitioner's proposed expansion of Bruton is inconsistent with the historical scope of the confrontation right",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1270_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CIRCUITS ARE INTRACTABLY DIVIDED AS TO WHETHER SECTION 363(m) IS JURISDICTIONAL\nII. The Second Circuit's ruling is inconsistent with this Court's precedent\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This case is an ideal vehicle to resolve the circuit split",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-328_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Prejudice dictates whether a defendant may belatedly invoke arbitration in federal litigation\nA. The FAA directs federal courts to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in deciding whether arbitration has been timely raised\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Section 2's saving clause does not apply to waiver by litigation conduct\nD. Even if Section 2 applies, prejudice would still be required\nII. Petitioner's harsh and unpredictable rule would harm the interests of parties to arbitral agreements and invite anti-arbitration discrimination",
        "reference": "B. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the movant to belatedly raise arbitration as a defense, absent prejudice to the nonmovant",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief020.pdf",
        "text": "I. Contraception Is Widely Used\nII. Women Need Access to the Full Range of Contraceptive Options\nIII. Eliminating Contraceptive Costs Leads to Improved Use and Reduced Risk of Unintended Pregnancy\nIV. The ACA's Contraceptive Coverage Guarantee Has Had a Positive Impact\nV. [MISSING]\nVI. Medicaid, Title X, and State Laws Are No Substitute for the Federal Guarantee\nVII. State-Specific Impacts",
        "reference": "V. Expanding Exemptions Would Harm Women",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. CONGRESS PROPERLY AUTHORIZED APJS TO ADJUDICATE IRS IN ORDER TO ADDRESS PERNICIOUS PROBLEMS ARISING FROM DUBIOUS PATENTS\nA. Congress Established The PTAB And IPR To Fix A Broken Patent System\nB. IPR Proceedings Have Repeatedly Survived Constitutional Challenges In This Court And Lower Courts\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Secretary And PTO Director Are Empowered To Supervise APJs To Ensure Adherence To Their Policies And Consistent Review Of Patentability\nB. This Court's Precedent Establishes That APJs Are Inferior Officers\nC. The Federal Circuit's Decision Has Disrupted The Effective Regime That Congress Established",
        "reference": "II. APJS ARE INFERIOR OFFICERS WHO MAY BE CONSTITUTIONALLY APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1566_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "State choice-of-law rules govern the selection of the law that provides the rule of decision in an FSIA suit based on state-law claims:\nA. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances\nB. Application of state choice-of-law rules comports with the normal treatment of state law applied by federal courts\nC. The presence of a foreign state as a defendant in an FSIA suit does not justify the creation of federal common law to govern choice of law\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The reasons advanced by respondents and the court of appeals for developing a federal common law rule lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Ohio's Livestock Care Standards are the Result of Substantial Consideration by the State's Policymakers and Voters\nB. Proposition 12 Threatens to Impermissibly Displace Ohio's Regulation of Activity Which Takes Place Wholly Within Its Own Borders",
        "reference": "I. The Extraterritorial Reach Of Proposition 12 Undermines Our Federalist System",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1363_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Non-releaseable criminal aliens are \"described\" by the \"who\" clause of section 1226(c)(1), not the \"when\" clause\nA. What, who, and when\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The legislative history does not support the notion that Congress intended to grant criminal aliens an exemption from section 1226(c)(1) merely because they were not arrested immediately",
        "reference": "B. The inadmissibles",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. Introduction\nB. The Court has repeatedly allowed room for the Free Exercise Clause to work without interfering with interests protected by the Establishment Clause\nC. In another context, the Court has required an actor to set forth a strong basis in evidence for putting one principle or part of a statute ahead of another one of equal importance\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The Ninth Circuit concern that allowing Petitioner's private prayers will give rise to an Establishment Clause violation fails these tests",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-309_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Incidental Crossing Of State Lines Is Not Sufficient To Trigger The Section 1 Exemption\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Incidental Interaction With Goods Or People Moving In Interstate Commerce Is Not Sufficient To Trigger The Section 1 Exemption",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-260_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. SEPTIC SYSTEMS ARE NOT POINT SOURCES\nII. THE EPA DEEMS SEPTIC SYSTEMS TO BE NONPOINT SOURCES\nA. Clean Water Act Section 319\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Clean Water Act Total Maximum Daily Loads\nIII. LUCAS ILLUSTRATES THAT SEPTIC SYSTEMS ARE NOT POINT SOURCES THAT CONVEY POLLUTION TO NAVIGABLE WATER",
        "reference": "B. Coastal Zone Act Section 6217",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. In SIIA's Experience, Due Process Violations By States Are Widespread\nII. There Is No Requirement That Congress Expressly Invoke Its Fourteenth Amendment Power\nIII. Congress Properly Exercised Its Fourteenth Amendment Power By Passing The CRCA\nA. Exclusive Rights Established By The Copyright Act Are Constitutionally Protected Property\nB. Congress Compiled A Sufficient Record Of States Committing Due Process Violations\n1. Congress Amassed An Ample Record Of Infringing State Activity In A Very Short Period Of Time\n2. Congress Examined State Remedies As An Option\n3. Congress Heard Compelling Evidence Of Both Imminent Harm And Oncoming Technological Change\nC. Congress Properly Tailored The CRCA\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. As Applied To Respondents, The CRCA Is Constitutional Under The Fourteenth Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1039_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Would Create Barriers to Energy Infrastructure Development and to Natural Gas Supplies Throughout the Nation\nII. Pipeline Development Barriers Harm IECA's Members and the National Economy\nA. Manufacturers Need More Pipeline Capacity to Access Natural Gas Supplies\nB. Manufacturers Do Not Have a Comparable Alternative to Natural Gas\n1. Manufacturers have no reliable and environmentally acceptable alternative to natural gas\n2. Electricity does not provide an economic alternative to natural gas for manufacturers\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Without Increased Pipeline Capacity, Some IECA Companies May Need to Move Production and/or Investments to Other Countries With Regulatory Certainty and Better Access to an Economical Natural Gas Supply; Regulatory Certainty is Needed to Encourage Reshoring",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Under Ex parte Young, Petitioners Are Not Required to Wait to Defend Themselves in State Court Lawsuits Enforcing S.B. 8",
        "reference": "I. Ex parte Young Vindicates the Supremacy of Federal Law, and Permitting Texas to Make an End Run Around Ex parte Young by Delegating S.B. 8's Enforcement to Private Parties Would Authorize States to Nullify Federal Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-442_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1983 Was Written to Vindicate the Unique Rights Guaranteed by the Federal Constitution\nII. This Court Has Long Required the Tailoring of Procedural Rules in Section 1983 Cases to the Particular Federal Constitutional Right at Stake\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. The Decision of the Court Below Frustrates the Ability to Vindicate a Procedural Due Process Right Through Section 1983 and Disrespects Principles of Comity and Federalism",
        "reference": "III. The Court Below Failed to Grapple with the Nature of the Right to Procedural Due Process Underlying Reed's Section 1983 Claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief046.pdf",
        "text": "I. Associations lack Article III standing to bring suit based solely on injuries suffered by their members.\nA. [MISSING]\n1. The irreducible requirements of standing are injury, causation, and redressability.\n2. Associational standing allows an organization to establish standing based on a member's injury.\nB. Exercising jurisdiction based on associational standing violates Article III.\n1. An association that claims standing based solely on a member's injury cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.\n2. Associational standing based on a member's injury fails to meet the redressability requirement of Article III.\nC. Associational standing conflicts with historical practice.\nD. Associational standing conflicts with fundamental principles of separation of powers.\nII. SFFA lacks Article III standing.",
        "reference": "A. Article III standing limits federal courts to adjudicating concrete disputes brought by plaintiffs with personal stakes in the outcomes.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-5924_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT'S GUARANTEE OF JURY UNANIMITY IS INCORPORATED IN THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Sixth Amendment Should Be Wholly Incorporated In The Fourteenth Amendment\nC. Stare Decisis Is Insufficient Reason To Preserve Apodaca\nII. A UNANIMITY REQUIREMENT PROMOTES THE RELIABILITY OF JURY VERDICTS AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM\nA. A Unanimity Rule Promotes Better Decision Making By Juries\nB. The Non-Unanimity Rule In Louisiana And Oregon Has Roots In Racial Discrimination",
        "reference": "A. The Sixth Amendment Guarantees Jury Unanimity",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-546_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The text of the FTCA judgment bar does not preclude Bivens claims brought in the same action as an FTCA claim.\nII. The purpose of section 2676 does not support applying the judgment bar to dismiss additional claims brought in the same action as an FTCA claim.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Applying the judgment bar to dismiss claims brought in the same case as an FTCA claim has inequitable consequences.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Roe Court Embraced the Viability Rule in Dictum Without the Assistance of Briefing\nII. The Roe Court Offered No Reason for the Viability Rule\nIII. The Casey Court Failed to Justify the Viability Rule\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The \"Uncertainty of the Viability Determination\" Makes It an Unworkable Regulatory Standard\nC. Earlier Lines Provide Adequate Time to Decide\nIV. Professor Tribe's Justification Falls Short Because a Pregnant Woman Cannot Transfer a Viable Fetus to Other Caretakers\nV. Viability Is an Arbitrary Line for Measuring Abortion Rights\nVI. Stare Decisis Should Not Preserve an Arbitrary Rule Without Constitutional Warrant",
        "reference": "A. The Plurality's \"Independent Existence\" Criterion for State Protection is Conclusory and Unsupported",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The First Circuit's Decision Imperils Home Rule in Unincorporated Territories\nA. The First Circuit's decision is far reaching\nB. Many territorial officers would meet the First Circuit's test\nC. [MISSING]\nII. Guam and the United States Virgin Islands Cannot Shield Themselves With Commonwealth Status\nA. As a Commonwealth, Puerto Rico may have aspects of sovereignty that shield its officers from the First Circuit's rationale\nB. Neither Guam nor the United States Virgin Islands can claim Commonwealth status\nIII. Overruling the First Circuit Has the Least Far-reaching Implications",
        "reference": "C. There is no \"election exception\" to the Appointments Clause",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1363_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "Criminal aliens do not become exempt from mandatory detention if the Department of Homeland Security does not take them into immigration custody immediately upon their release from criminal custody\nI. Section 1226(c) is best interpreted not to reward criminal aliens with the opportunity for release if DHS does not arrest them immediately\nA. Section 1226(c)'s text and structure show that criminal aliens do not become exempt from mandatory detention if DHS fails to arrest them immediately\nB. The BIA's interpretation advances Congress's purpose of preventing flight and recidivism by criminal aliens\nC. The BIA's interpretation avoids serious practical problems\nD. This Court's decisions further confirm that the BIA's decision is correct\nE. [MISSING]\nF. The court of appeals' counterarguments lack merit\nII. The BIA's correct interpretation of the statutory scheme it administers warrants deference",
        "reference": "E. Section 1226(c)'s history shows that Congress intended to prohibit release of all aliens with the requisite criminal history",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-476_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. PASPA'S PROHIBITION OF THE 2014 REPEAL VIOLATES THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE\nA. Commandeering Is Not A Permissible Form Of Federal Preemption.\nB. PASPA Impermissibly Requires New Jersey To Maintain Prohibitions On Sports Wagering.\nC. [MISSING]\nII. \"AUTHORIZE BY LAW\" CANNOT BE SEVERED FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE STATUTE",
        "reference": "C. PASPA's Impermissible Prohibition On Repealing State Laws Cannot Be Avoided.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Decide Whether Congress Intended to Shift Its Understanding of the Quid Pro Quo of Patent Law\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Court Should Decide What Types of Private Agreements are Encompassed by the On-Sale Bar",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-287_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION WARRANTS PLENARY REVIEW.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The court of appeals' decision is wrong.\nC. Respondents do not raise credible vehicle concerns.\nII. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS COURT SHOULD SUMMARILY REVERSE THE COURT OF APPEALS' REFUSAL TO PERMIT PETITIONER TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT.",
        "reference": "A. The decision conflicts with other courts' application of the \"legitimate penological justification\" standard in Eighth Amendment and prison-conditions cases.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-179_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The First Amendment protects reporters from the threat of inchoate liability when they report on or depict unlawful activity.\nIII. The federal bar on encouraging unlawful immigration exceeds the traditional First Amendment limits on inchoate liability.",
        "reference": "I. The government has invoked the bar on encouraging unlawful immigration to justify monitoring reporters at the border.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Incanting \"stare decisis\" does not resolve the questions presented\nA. Hellerstedt was a fact-bound result\nB. Stare decisis does not trump due process\nC. Neither Hellerstedt nor Singleton\u2014nor any other decision\u2014has decided the jus tertii issue presented here\nII. Providers lack jus tertii standing to assert patients' Roe-Casey rights\nA. Providers cannot meet this Court's post-Kowalski test for jus tertii standing\nB. Prudential limits on standing are not \"waivable\" in any way that precludes a court from considering the issue\nC. Enforcing limits on jus tertii standing would merely be an example of the general rule that Roe-Casey litigation must follow the same jurisdictional and prudential rules as other litigation\nIII. The jus tertii issue should be dispositive in this litigation\nA. The presence or absence of jus tertii standing determines what rights Providers can assert\nB. Without jus tertii standing, Act 620 easily survives the rational-basis test\nC. With jus tertii standing, Act 620 survives because Louisiana distinguished Hellerstedt factually\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. This Court should reverse the Roe-Casey-Hellerstedt line of cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A. A before-after analysis is problematic when the before and after periods are far apart and the studied policy's impact is masked by intervening factors\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The flaw in the FCC's before-after analysis can be demonstrated through familiar concepts",
        "reference": "B. The FCC's before-after analysis does not meet the minimal standards for an impact analysis",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-292_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A SIGNIFICANT AND UNJUSTIFIABLE DISPARITY EXISTS BETWEEN TORT AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY STANDARD FOR CIVILIANS VERSUS LIABILITY STANDARDS FOR POLICE OFFICERS",
        "reference": "I. IF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT MS. TORRES, SHE WILL HAVE NO REMEDY AT ALL",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI TO CLARIFY THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF PASSIVE DISPLAYS\nA. The Establishment Clause Is Properly Interpreted Based On Historical Practices And Understandings\nB. The Lower Court's \"Reasonable Observer\" Analysis Poses Particular Risks For Religious Minorities\nII. \"OFFENDED OBSERVER\" STANDING IS INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE III AND CREATES RISKS FOR RELIGIOUS MINORITIES\nA. Lower Courts Continue To Rely On \"Offended Observer\" Standing Even Though It Has No Basis In This Court's Jurisprudence\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. \"Offended Observer\" Standing Harms Minority Religions Like Judaism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts Have The Power To Approve Cy Pres Remedies In Class-Action Settlements\nA. Cy pres is an appropriate exercise of the federal courts' equitable powers\n1. Class actions are an \"invention of equity.\"\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Cy pres converged with the class device in response to the shifting nature of class actions\n4. The use of cy pres in class settlements reflects the fiduciary character of class actions\n5. A settlement providing class members noncash benefits is consistent with a class representative's fiduciary duty\nB. No valid legal principle prohibits cy pres settlements\n1. Cy pres settlements are consistent with the Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure\n2. The First Amendment does not foreclose cy pres settlements\nII. To Be Fair, Adequate, And Reasonable, Cy Pres Relief Must Satisfy Appropriate Conditions, Which This Settlement Did\nA. Payment to class members must be infeasible\n1. Direct payments are most often infeasible when actual injury is modest and intangible, class members are not easily identified, and administrative costs of distribution are high\n2. Petitioners' definition of feasibility would categorically ban cy pres settlements and harm class members\na. A class may be better served by noncash benefits than by tiny payments to a sliver of class members\nb. Superiority should not rest on the size of the settlement amount\n3. Statutory damages, not cy pres settlements, provide incentives to bring low-value claims\n4. Permitting cy pres settlements allows efficient resolution of low-value cases under the uncertainties of actual class-action practice\n5. Both lower courts correctly found that it was not feasible to distribute the settlement fund in this case\nB. Recipients of cy pres funds must commit in detail to use distributed funds in a way that will benefit the class or substantial portions of it\nC. Recipients of cy pres funds must be sufficiently independent from the parties, their counsel, and the court\nD. Any concerns with misaligned incentives can be addressed by providing guidance on attorneys' fees",
        "reference": "2. The cy pres doctrine is likewise rooted in inherent equitable powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.45
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF POWERS\nA. \"Independent Agencies\" That Exercise Executive Power May Not Be Insulated from Presidential Control\nB. The Court Should Overturn Humphrey's Executor to Ensure Agencies Are Not Insulated from Presidential Control\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Justify Maintaining Humphrey's Executor\nII. THIS COURT SHOULD SET ASIDE THE NET WORTH SWEEP\nA. The Administrative Procedure Act Directs Courts to Vacate Unconstitutional Agency Action\n1. Under Section 706 of the APA, a court \"shall .. hold unlawful and set aside\" unconstitutional and illegal agency action\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Section 706's prejudicial error rule does not apply to violations of structural constitutional protections\n4. Section 702 of the APA speaks to justiciability and does not alter the meaning of Section 706\nB. The Fifth Circuit's Remedy Is Inconsistent with the Nature of the Judicial Power Under the Constitution",
        "reference": "2. Section 706 limits a courts' equitable discretion in granting relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. As Properly Construed, H.R. 1249's Statutory \"On Sale\" Bar Can Invalidate A Patent Claim Only If The Subject Matter Defined By The Claim Has Become Publicly Accessible Through The \"On Sale\" Activities\n1. H.R. 1249's Substantial Changes To The Patent Act Require That Newly Enacted Section 102 Be Construed De Novo, Not As A Mere Restatement Of The Old Patent Law\n2. [MISSING]\n3. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98 Eliminates Any Possible Doubt Over The Proper Construction To Be Given To Newly Enacted section 102(a)(1)\n4. The Panel Decision Ignored The Directive In H.R. 1249 That The \"Subject Matter Defined By The Claim\" Must Be \"Available To The Public\" To Invalidate A Patent Claim\nB. The Panel Decision Cannot Properly Be Upheld As A Matter Of Nonstatutory, Judge-Made Law Given Such A Holding Would Do No More Than Contradict What Is In The Statute Itself And Frustrate The Constitutionally Consistent Objectives Of Congress In Enacting The New Patent Law",
        "reference": "2. H.R. 1249's New Statutory Text In section 102(a)(1), If Simply Construed As Written, Sets Out A Single \"Public Accessibility\" Standard That Applies Irrespective Of Whether The \"On Sale\" Activities Are Attributable To The Inventor",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-7739_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "A. A specific request for a lower sentence can satisfy Rule 51's contemporaneous objection requirement\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. This Court should vacate the judgment below",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative powers, particularly in the criminal context\nII. Section 20913(d) of SORNA violates the nondelegation doctrine\nA. Section 20913(d) impermissibly delegates quintessentially \"legislative\" powers\nB. SORNA's delegation to the Attorney General fails the intelligible principle test\n1. To state an intelligible principle, a statute must provide sufficiently clear guidance on fundamental policy questions\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Section 20913(d) is unconstitutional under any formulation of the intelligible principle test\n4. The courts of appeals have not persuasively identified an intelligible principle in Section 20913(d)",
        "reference": "2. Given the character and significance of the power conferred by Section 20913(d), and the absence of guidance, this delegation is unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-108_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. An offense that could \"be punished by death\" under the UCMJ was \"punishable by death\" for purposes of the UCMJ\nB. Military rape would also be \"punishable by death\" as a constitutional matter\nII. The 2006 NDAA independently supports the timeliness of Briggs's rape prosecution",
        "reference": "I. Respondents' rapes were triable \"at any time\" because rape by a member of the military was \"punishable by death\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-200_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "A. There Is No Compelling Reason To Grant The Petition\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Comports With The Statutory Text\nC. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Does Not Conflict With The Decisions Of Other Circuit Courts\nD. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Is Consistent With This Court's Previous Rulings\nE. [MISSING]\nF. This Case Is Not An Ideal Vehicle For Review Of Securities Act Standing",
        "reference": "E. The Ninth Circuit Decision Does Not Have Far-Reaching Effects",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-21_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A plaintiff alleging retaliatory arrest must show the lack of probable cause\nA. Constitutional principles support a probable-cause element\nB. Tort principles support a probable-cause element\nC. The features of retaliatory-arrest cases justify a probable-cause element\nD. A probable-cause element is consistent with the values of the First Amendment\nII. Criticisms of the probable-cause element lack merit\nA. Lozman's doctrinal criticisms of the probable-cause element are wrong\nB. Lozman's practical criticisms of the probable-cause element are wrong\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Lozman's procedural criticisms of the probable-cause element are wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CITY HAS NOT IDENTIFIED ANY INJURY FROM RELIGIOUS ACTORS' PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL SOCIETY\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Duty Drives Participation\nC. The Cheese Stands Alone \u2014 the Public Square with no Public\nII. DIVERGENT STANDARDS DICTATE DIFFERENT OUTCOMES FOR RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT\nA. In Speech Cases, the Burden is on the Government and Tailoring Must be Narrow\nB. The Third Circuit Placed the Burden on CSS to Prove that Infringement was Based on Hostility",
        "reference": "A. Voluntary Association is a Necessary Component of Liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-315_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOT ONLY IS PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS, BUT MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED TO PROTECT RECOVERY OF FEDERAL FUNDS LOST TO FRAUD\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The FCA's Statute of Limitations Must be Strictly Construed to Protect, not Restrict, Recoveries of Taxpayer's Funds Lost to Fraud\n1. Qui Tam Complaints Constitute an Important Government Interest\nC. The Ten-Year Statute of Limitations would not Lead to Absurd Results when Applied to Declined Qui Tam Complaints\n1. The Statute of Limitations would not be Longer for Relators, as Petitioners Suggest\nII. AN \"OFFICIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT\" DOES NOT INCLUDE A RELATOR",
        "reference": "A. The Statute of Limitations is Plain and Unambiguous in Providing a Ten-Year Period for Qui Tam Complaints",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONER'S CSA AND CSA-DEPENDENT CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE A PHYSICIAN AUTHORIZED TO PRESCRIBE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES MAY NOT BE CONVICTED UNLESS SHE ACTS WITHOUT A GOOD FAITH MEDICAL PURPOSE.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The \"Good Faith Medical Purpose\" Standard Accords With The \"Subjective\" Good Faith Standard Adopted By The First, Seventh, And Ninth Circuits.\nC. A Subjective Good Faith Standard Is Essential To The Practice And Progress Of Medicine.\nD. At A Bare Minimum, Any \"Objective\" Good Faith Standard Must Afford Physicians Breathing Room For Honest Departures From Professional Norms.\nII. EVEN UNDER AN \"OBJECTIVE\" GOOD FAITH STANDARD \u2014 INDEED, UNDER ANY CIRCUIT'S LAW BUT THE ELEVENTH'S \u2014 PETITIONER'S CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED.",
        "reference": "A. The CSA's Text, Structure, And History Show That Prescribing Physicians Must Be Permitted To Assert A Defense Of Good Faith Medical Purpose.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in declining to apply the Lanham Act's likelihood-of-confusion standard to petitioner's trademark-infringement claims\nA. [MISSING]\nB. First Amendment concerns do not justify displacing the Lanham Act's likelihood-of-confusion standard when the alleged infringement occurs within the context of an \"expressive work\"\nII. The court of appeals erred in holding that respondent is shielded from liability for trademark dilution under the statutory exclusion for noncommercial use",
        "reference": "A. The Lanham Act's likelihood-of-confusion standard governs the determination whether parodic use of a trademark in commerce infringes the mark",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-5639_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. A DISTRICT COURT MUST BOTH CONSIDER AND EXPLAIN APPLICABLE SENTENCING FACTORS AND POLICY STATEMENTS IN ORDER TO MAKE MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW POSSIBLE\nA. Congress's Incorporation Of Sentencing Factors In section 3582 Requires District Courts to Articulate Reasons For Their Discretionary Choices\nB. Articulating Reasons For Exercising Discretion Under section 3582(c) Is Necessary For Meaningful Appellate Review\nC. [MISSING]\nII. A DISTRICT COURT'S DUTY TO ARTICULATE ITS REASONING IS NOT ABROGATED BY THE LACK OF A CROSS-REFERENCE TO section 3553(c) OR THE \"LIMITED NATURE\" OF section 3582(c)(2) PROCEEDINGS\nA. The Duty To Articulate Is Not Abrogated By The Absence Of A Cross-Reference To section 3553(c)\nB. The \"Limited Nature\" Of section 3582(c)(2) Proceedings Does Not Abrogate The Need For Meaningful Appellate Review\nIII. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN SPECULATION FOR A MEANINGFUL REVIEW OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER\nA. The Tenth Circuit Had To Speculate About Which Factors Were Dispositive In Mr. Chavez-Meza's Sentence Modification\nB. The Duty To Provide Enough Explanation To Enable Meaningful Appellate Review Under An Abuse Of Discretion Standard Is Not Abrogated When Defendants Receive A Within-Guidelines Sentence Modification",
        "reference": "C. Requiring Articulation in the Context of a section 3582(c)(2) Motion Is Particularly Important Given the Purposes Of Amendment 782",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-255_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DECIDE A QUESTION THAT WAS NOT LITIGATED BELOW\nII. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S OPINION, IF LEFT UNDISTURBED, NEED NOT LEAD TO A PARADE OF HORRIBLES\nA. Threats Are Not Protected Speech Either On or Off Campus\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. School Discipline Is Not the Only Tool for Dealing with Speech that Disrupts the Functioning of Schools or Impinges on the Rights of Others",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-863_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The [MISSING]\nA. Under the best reading of the statute, the stop-time rule can be triggered by \"written notice\" in two documents conveying the information required by Section 1229(a)(1)\n1. Section 1229(a)(1)'s text supports the Board's interpretation\n2. Section 1229b(d)(1)(A)'s stop-time rule supports the Board's interpretation\n3. The broader statutory context shows that Section 1229(a)(1) is designed to convey information to the alien, with no reason for it to be in one document\n4. The relevant legislative and regulatory history does not reflect an intent to require all categories of information identified in Section 1229(a)(1) to be served in one document\n5. Practical considerations warrant no departure from the best reading of the text\nB. The Board's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference",
        "reference": "The stop-time rule is triggered when the government serves an alien with \"written notice\" of the substantive information required by Section 1229(a)(1), whether that notice is provided in one document or two",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Federal Courts Have Uniformly Held That the Copyright Remedy Act Is Unconstitutional\nII. The Fourth Circuit's Decision to Recognize the Act's Unconstitutionality Does Not Independently Warrant This Court's Review\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Fourth Circuit Correctly Held That the Copyright Remedy Act Is Unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. AS THE SITUATION IN SOUTH DAKOTA DEMONSTRATED, ICWA WAS ENACTED IN RESPONSE TO THE DISPARATE RATES OF INDIAN CHILD REMOVAL AND THE UNIQUE FAMILY STRUCTURES SHARED AMONG TRIBES\nIII. ICWA WAS GUIDED BY, AND FURTHERED, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S TRUST RESPONSIBILITY TO INDIAN TRIBES AND CONGRESS'S PLENARY AUTHORITY IN INDIAN AFFAIRS",
        "reference": "I. SENATOR ABOUREZK, AS CHAIR OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS AND SPONSOR OF ICWA, HELPED CONDUCT AND PARTICIPATED IN A COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS THAT AFFIRMED THE ACT'S NECESSITY",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The AIA's text and structure, as well as this Court's decision in Cuozzo, establish that the Board's timeliness determinations are not reviewable\nB. The Federal Circuit's and Respondent's arguments to the contrary lack merit\nII. Appellate review of Board decisions based on timeliness will undermine the effectiveness of inter partes review as an efficient and cost-effective alternative to litigation\nA. Congress established inter partes review to provide an efficient means of canceling invalid patents\nB. Judicial review of timeliness determinations would dramatically decrease the efficiency of inter partes review and undermine Congress's intent to improve patent quality",
        "reference": "I. The Board's determination that an inter partes review petition was timely filed is not judicially reviewable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. AFTER CAREFULLY STUDYING THE MATTER, CONGRESS CHOSE TO PROTECT COMPUTER PROGRAMS VIA COPYRIGHT\nA. The CONTU Report\n1. The majority's recommendations\n2. The CONTU dissents\nB. Following CONTU's Recommendations, Congress Amended The Copyright Act To Protect Computer Programs\nII. TRADITIONAL COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES COMPEL THE CONCLUSION THAT GOOGLE'S COPYING OF ORACLE'S APIS INFRINGED ORACLE'S COPYRIGHTS\nA. Copyright Principles Protect Oracle's APIs\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The merger doctrine only applies where there are limited ways to express an idea\n3. Under these principles, Google infringed Oracle's copyrights when it copied Oracle's computer program\na. The functional aspects of Oracle's program do not render it uncopyrightable\nb. The merger doctrine does not apply to Oracle's program\nc. \"Interoperability\" does not apply\nB. The Fair Use Doctrine Does Not Excuse The Copying At Issue Here\n1. The fair use doctrine does not protect works that merely seek to supersede the original\n2. Under settled principles, Google's copying of Oracle's computer program is not a fair use",
        "reference": "1. Functional aspects of a work do not preclude copyright protection of the work as a whole",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution Provides the Fundamental Right to Vote in Federal Elections and That Right Is Protected Against Dilution Involving Any State's Action.\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Twelfth Amendment Provides Presidential Electors the Constitutional Right to Vote for the Candidates of Their Choice.",
        "reference": "II. It Is No Obstacle That the Amicus Curiae Lives in Another State.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1158_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MARGIOTTA THEORY HAS DIVIDED THE CIRCUITS\nII. THE MARGIOTTA THEORY IS INDEFENSIBLE\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE MARGIOTTA THEORY IS TOO DANGEROUS TO IGNORE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-506_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Pandemic Will Have a Continuing Negative Impact on Student Loan Borrowers.\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Pandemic-Connected Student Loan Discharge Program is Reasonably Designed to Mitigate the Pandemic's Impact on Borrowers.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The district court lacked jurisdiction to enter injunctive relief\nB. Section 1252(f)(1) would not bar a properly crafted declaratory judgment in this case\nC. The district court's universal vacatur remedy was not authorized by 5 U.S.C. 706 and was barred by Section 1252(f)(1)\nII. Section 1252(f)(1)'s jurisdictional limit is not forfeitable, and in any event was preserved in this case\nIII. Section 1252(f)(1) does not limit this Court's jurisdiction to decide the questions presented",
        "reference": "I. Section 1252(f)(1) deprived the lower courts of jurisdiction to grant an injunction or vacatur, but would not have barred properly crafted declaratory relief",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-222_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION VIOLATES THIS COURT'S MANDATE THAT DEFENDANTS BE AFFORDED A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO REBUT THE BASIC PRESUMPTION AT CLASS CERTIFICATION\nA. Defendants Must be Permitted to Offer at Class Certification \"Any\" Evidence that \"Severs the Link\" Between an Alleged Misrepresentation and Share Price\nB. Plaintiffs' Invocation of the Inflation Maintenance Theory Significantly Increases the Burden on Defendants to Rebut the Basic Presumption and Has Recently Led to a Number of Significant Settlements Against Retailers\nC. The Second Circuit Contravened Halliburton II in Prohibiting Petitioners' Evidence that Generic and Aspirational Statements Could Not Have Artificially Maintained Share Price\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. AS \"SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY\" DISCLOSURES EXPAND, SO TOO DOES LIABILITY RISK UNDER THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Article 13(b), As Drafted By The HCCH And Ratified By Congress, Reserved Judicial Discretion In The Courts To Return An Abducted Child To The Child's Habitual Residence Even In Cases Where A Grave Risk of Harm May Exist\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Authority To Impose Ameliorative Measures Calculated To Mitigate The Risk of Harm, Or \"Undertakings,\" Is An Inherent Element Of Judicial Discretion under Article 13(b)\nC. When Considering Ameliorative Measures That Might Be Issued To Repatriate A Child, The Courts Must Be Satisfied That The Undertakings Can Effectively Mitigate The Risk Of Harm To A Level That Is Substantially Less Than \"Grave.\"\nD. Undertakings Must Be Enforceable By The Issuing Court, Or Supported By Other Sufficient Guarantees Of Performance If Not Enforceable By The Issuing Court\nII. Proposed Undertakings Must Be Evaluated For Their Capacity to Be Enforced Rigorously, Expeditiously, and Comprehensively, Upon The Child's Return To The Child's Habitual Residence",
        "reference": "A. The Phrase \"Not Bound\" Struck a Deliberate Balance Between the Twin Goals of Deterring Cross-Border Child Abduction And Protecting Children from Physical and Psychological Harm or Intolerable Circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Title VII Prohibits Discrimination Based On Sex Stereotyping\nA. Title VII Prohibits The Use Of Gender Stereotypes In Employment Decisions\nB. Transgender People Are Not Excluded From Title VII's Protections\nC. Title VII Prohibits Sex Stereotyping Even Where The Stereotype Is Not Used To Favor One Sex Over Another\nII. Prohibiting Sex Stereotyping In The Workplace Benefits Both Employers And Employees\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Stripping LGBTQ Employees Of Title VII's Protections Would Harm Businesses",
        "reference": "A. Diverse And Inclusive Workplaces Are Good For Businesses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE GOVERNS THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS FOR REASON THAT THEY EXERCISE \"SIGNIFICANT AUTHORITY,\" AS THAT TERM IS DEFINED IN LUCIA AND ITS ANTECEDENTS; THE BOARD MEMBERS ARE THEREFORE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nII. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE GOVERNS THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS FOR REASON THAT THEY HOLD A CONTINUING OFFICE ESTABLISHED BY LAW, WITH THEIR APPOINTMENT AND DUTIES DEFINED BY STATUTE; THE BOARD MEMBERS ARE THEREFORE OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND SUBJECT TO THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE GOVERNS THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS FOR REASON THAT LIBERTY REQUIRES ACCOUNTABILITY\nV. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS CONFINED TO WHETHER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE GOVERNS THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS; CONCOMITANTLY, THE SUBSIDIARY QUESTION OF WHETHER THE BOARD MEMBERS ARE \"PRINCIPAL\" OR \"INFERIOR\" OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT",
        "reference": "III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE MUST GOVERN THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS FOR REASON THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR RECURRING APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CONTROVERSIES",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1270_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. MOAC'S FORMULATION OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED INCLUDES A HIGHLY FACT-BOUND ISSUE INAPPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW.\nII. HOWEVER FRAMED, THE ISSUES DECIDED BELOW DO NOT IMPLICATE A SPLIT OF AUTHORITY AMONG THE COURTS OF APPEALS.\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. THIS CASE IS AN EXCEPTIONALLY POOR VEHICLE FOR REVIEWING THE ISSUES DECIDED BELOW.",
        "reference": "III. THE DECISION BELOW DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Van Orden's Eschewal of Lemon\nII. Disarray of Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence\nIII. Town of Greece sets forth the appropriate test for deciding Establishment Clause claims\nA. The Historical Foundations Criterion\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Coercion Criterion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1435_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\na. Burson v. Freeman cannot be divorced from its particular concern with preventing electoral fraud and political violence\nb. There is a general presumption, not countered here, that individuals can encounter speech they oppose without recourse to violence\nII. Even if the apparel ban furthered legitimate ends, its application here demonstrates its unconstitutional vagueness\nIII. To avoid \"the shoals of vagueness,\" this Court may apply a construction limiting the apparel ban to speech constituting express advocacy for or against a candidate or issue on the ballot",
        "reference": "I. Burson v. Freeman, which is based on the government's interest in preventing polling places from descending into \"scenes of battle, murder, and sudden death,\" does not control here",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-9493_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. A GUIDELINES MISCALCULATION SATISFIES THE FOURTH PRONG OF PLAIN ERROR REVIEW IN THE ORDINARY CASE\nA. Rule 52 And Olano Recognize That Certain Categories Of Error Ordinarily Satisfy The Fourth Prong\nB. There Is Still Room For Discretion In Particular Cases\nC. Agreeing With The Near-Unanimous View Of The Courts Of Appeals Will Not Wreak Havoc On Plain Error Review\nIII. THE GOVERNMENT'S NEW FOUND APPROACH WOULD EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE PLAIN ERROR REVIEW OF GUIDELINES ERRORS, JUST LIKE THE SHOCKS-THE-CONSCIENCE STANDARD",
        "reference": "I. THE GOVERNMENT AGREES THAT THE FIFTH CIRCUIT APPLIED THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1371_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE RISE OF CAR- AND RIDE-SHARING SERVICES MAKES RELIANCE ON CONTRACTUAL AUTHORIZATION AS THE BASIS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION UNADMINISTRABLE AND OBSOLETE\nII. THE RULE APPLIED BELOW INVITES ABUSIVE ASSET-FORFEITURE PRACTICES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Civil Asset Forfeiture Gives Law Enforcement Financial Incentives To Stop and To Search Vehicles\nC. The Rule Applied Below Magnifies Incentives Created by Civil Asset Forfeiture",
        "reference": "A. Law-Enforcement Officers in Jurisdictions Subject to the Rule Applied Below Are Especially Likely To Detain Rental Car",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE INDICATIONS OF INNOCENCE STANDARD PREVENTS FACTFINDERS FROM REVIEWING POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS SECTION 1983 CLAIMS AGAINST OFFICERS WHO FABRICATE CHARGES AGAINST BIPOC\nA. Police Officers Have Routinely Pursued False Charges to Cover Up Their Use of Excessive Force Against BIPOC\nB. Police Officers Have Pursued False Charges Against BIPOC Who Assert Their Constitutional Rights When Faced with Revenue-Generating Tactics Targeting BIPOC Communities\nC. [MISSING]\nD. False Charges Against BIPOC Are Likely to Result in Dismissal, and Thus Would Be Shielded from Judicial Review Under the Indications of Innocence Standard\nII. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S FINALITY-BASED STANDARD IS ESSENTIAL TO FULFILL THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 1983 AND ADEQUATELY ADDRESS AND DETER THE RACIALIZED PRACTICE OF PURSUING FALSE CHARGES AGAINST BIPOC",
        "reference": "C. Police Officers Have Targeted BIPOC in Large-Scale Scandals Involving False Drug and Gun Charges",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-631_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Fourth Circuit's remedial approach both misunderstands the nature of the AAPC's injury and creates serious due-process problems\nIII. The ruling below undermines the Declaratory Judgments Act",
        "reference": "I. The remedies question in this case has broad implications",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. Locke v. Davey\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Locke was wrongly decided\nB. This Court's other stare decisis considerations do not suggest that Locke should be retained",
        "reference": "II. This Court Should Overrule Locke",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. All members of the certified class in this case have Article III standing to bring reasonable procedures, disclosure, and summary-of-rights claims under FCRA\nA. All class members have standing to assert reasonable procedures claims under 15 U.S.C. 1681e(b)\nB. All class members have standing to assert disclosure and summary-of-rights claims under 15 U.S.C. 1681g(a)(1) and (c)(2)\nII. [MISSING]\nA. In a case where the jury will have significant discretion to consider plaintiff-specific facts when selecting an appropriate statutory damages award, a court must carefully consider whether the typicality requirement is satisfied\nB. The court of appeals' typicality analysis was incomplete",
        "reference": "II. When a putative class representative has suffered injuries not borne by other class members, a court must carefully consider Rule 23's typicality requirement when determining whether to certify a statutory damages class",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-9572_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Judgment below is consistent with this Court's Precedent\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Mississippi Supreme Court correctly decided Petitioner's Batson Claim",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1034_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "1. [MISSING]\n2. The Principle of Uniformity of Interpretation Has More Limited Application for the Article 13(b) Defense\n3. The Leading Opinions from Our Sister Signatories Remain Relevant for the Court's Textual Analysis of the Article 13(b) Defense\n4. The Opinions of Our Sister Signatories Show that the Second Circuit's Judicial Imposition of a Protective Undertakings Requirement Is Wrong\n5. The Second Circuit's Judicial Mandate for Broad Consideration of Protective Undertakings Violates Core Convention Principles and Offends Comity\n6. The Court Should Reverse the Judgment of the Second Circuit and Keep B.A.S. Here at Home",
        "reference": "1. The Court Interprets Treaties Consistent with the Shared Expectations of the Parties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-454_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Framers Designed the Constitution to Grant the Federal Government Broad Power to Address Issues of National Concern\nII. Focused on More than Just Trade or Economics, the Commerce Clause Empowers Congress to Address Problems that Require a Federal Response, Including Pollution of the Nation's Waters\nIII. The Significant-Nexus Test Does Not Raise Commerce Clause Concerns, as It Ensures Any Regulation of Wetlands Fits Within Congress's Traditional Authority to Regulate Problems with Genuine Spillover Effects\nA. The Significant-Nexus Test Implements Congress's Authority to Regulate the Channels of Interstate Commerce\nB. [MISSING]\nC. This Case Presents No Close Constitutional Question",
        "reference": "B. The Significant-Nexus Test Is Also Justified Under Congress's Authority to Regulate Activities with a Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit Applied Established Law to Find Genus Claims Using Functional Language Were Not Enabled.\nA. Enablement Does Not Require Disclosure of All Embodiments for Genus Claims Using Functional Language\nB. Importance of the Enablement Disclosure to the Patent System Requires Strict Adherence to the Statute\n1. Enablement Disclosure Is Central to the Public-Inventor Bargain of the Patent System\n2. Statute's Enablement Requirement Is Directed to Persons of Skill\nII. In re Wands Provides the Correct Framework for Determining \"Undue Experimentation.\"\nIII. Enablement of \"Invention\" Is Informed by the Terms of the Claims.\nA. The Claims' Definition of the Invention Determines the Number of Embodiments That Must Be Disclosed\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Expectations of Inventing Community Weigh in Favor of Retaining Established Rules for Judging Enablement",
        "reference": "B. Failure to Identify a Single Non-Enabled Embodiment Is Not Determinative of \"Undue Experimentation\" Issue",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Appellees fail to satisfy Article III\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The purported apportionment and funding injuries are too speculative to sustain the judgment\nII. The Presidential Memorandum does not violate the legal provisions governing the apportionment\nA. The Memorandum does not violate the procedural requirement that apportionment be based on the results of the census\nB. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
        "reference": "A. The \"chilling effect\" injury is moot and no exception to vacatur applies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1195_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE APPLICATION OF THE NO-AID CLAUSE DID NOT VIOLATE THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE\nA. Petitioners Have Not Identified A Prohibition on Free Exercise\nB. Neither the Montana Constitution, Nor the Montana Supreme Court's Decision, Is the Product of Religious Hostility\n1. The No-Aid Clause Was Enacted in Order to Protect Religious Freedom\n2. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Protects Religious Freedom\n3. The Invalidation of a Generally Applicable Program Reflects No Religious Hostility\nC. The History of the Free Exercise Clause Confirms that There Is No Free Exercise Violation\n1. Contemporary State Constitutions\n2. The Remonstrance\nD. Petitioners' Position Conflicts with Locke\nE. If the Status/Use Distinction Is Relevant, the Montana Constitution Bars Aid Based on Use Rather than Status\nF. Invalidating Montana's No-Aid Clause Would Conflict with National Tradition\nG. Invalidating Montana's No-Aid Clause Would Pose Grave Federalism Concerns\nII. THE APPLICATION OF THE NO-AID CLAUSE DID NOT VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE APPLICATION OF THE NO-AID CLAUSE DID NOT VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-659_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. Petitioner asserts a Fourth Amendment claim most analogous to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution\nB. A Section 1983 claim challenging a seizure pursuant to legal process should include a favorable-termination requirement\nC. A termination may be \"favorable\" to the plaintiff even if it lacks affirmative indications of innocence\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Requiring affirmative indications of innocence is inconsistent with the constitutional values and the purposes served by the favorable-termination element\n3. Reasonable concerns about frivolous Section 1983 claims do not justify an affirmative-indications-of-innocence requirement",
        "reference": "1. The common law did not require a termination that affirmatively indicated innocence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-6086_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. Where Executive Branch actions burden free exercise rights, delegations of power should be strictly construed\nA. For the Framers, Executive Branch actions that interfered with core civil rights would have been subject to narrow construction\nB. This Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that government actions burdening core private rights are forbidden absent express law strictly construed\nII. Strict nondelegation is needed to protect free exercise rights, particularly for religious minorities\nA. Administrative rulemaking is uniquely unresponsive to religious concerns\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Religious minorities in particular are at peril from Executive Branch actions taken with delegated authority",
        "reference": "B. As this Court's cases demonstrate, government officials often use delegated powers to burden religious exercise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-138_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. An objective standard for assessing knowledge is constitutionally sufficient.\n1. Watts, Black, and Elonis\n2. Knowledge and purpose\n3. Federal and state court guidance\nB. The problem of proving subjective intent in stalking cases\nII. The subdivision of the statute at issue is a manner restriction, not a content restriction, and it neither has nor needs a \"threat\" element.\nA. Propriety of considering this issue\nB. Time, place, or manner",
        "reference": "I. Proof of a speaker's subjective intent to threaten another is not required to exclude a \"true threat\" from the protection of the First Amendment.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The succession clause bars the shareholders' challenge to the Third Amendment\nA. The shareholders' challenge to the Third Amendment falls within the scope of the succession clause\n1. The succession clause precludes shareholders from bringing derivative claims during a conservatorship\n2. A claim is derivative if the corporation suffered the alleged harm and would receive the recovery\n3. The shareholders' challenge to the Third Amendment is a derivative claim\nB. The APA does not convert the shareholders' suit into a direct claim\nC. There is no \"conflict of interest\" exception to the succession clause\nII. The anti-injunction clause also bars the shareholders' challenge to the Third Amendment\nA. The anti-injunction clause bars the shareholders' claim because the claim challenges the exercise of conservatorship powers granted by the Recovery Act\n1. Congress granted the conservator broad powers\n2. FHFA as conservator exercised its broad statutory powers in agreeing to the Third Amendment\nB. The court of appeals erroneously imposed several atextual limits on FHFA's conservatorship powers\n1. The Recovery Act's provisions on receivership do not preclude the Third Amendment\n2. The common-law restrictions on conservatorships do not preclude the Third Amendment\n3. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "3. The shareholders' allegations about the purposes and effects of the Third Amendment do not invalidate the Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-303_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Insular Cases represent a broken promise of fundamental rights to Americans in U.S. territories\nB. By their own terms the Insular Cases have no application to national legislation\n1. The Insular Cases are limited to the Territory Clause\n2. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory\nC. [MISSING]\n1. Stare decisis couldn't save Plessy, and shouldn't save the Insular Cases\n2. The Court should finally end this originalist's nightmare\n3. The logic of the Insular Cases is undermined by subsequent decisions",
        "reference": "C. If the Insular Cases do apply here, they must be set aside",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1436_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional.\nA. Congress must provide a clear statement to render a rule jurisdictional.\nB. The text, structure, context, and purpose of Section 1252(d) confirm that it is not jurisdictional.\n1. The text lacks a clear statement that exhaustion is jurisdictional.\n2. Section 1252(d)(2) cuts strongly against a jurisdictional reading.\n3. In neighboring provisions, Congress used far more express language to limit jurisdiction.\n4. Exhaustion requirements are ordinarily nonjurisdictional \u2014 and holding so here is required by separation of powers.\nC. Section 1252(d)(1) contains no issue-exhaustion requirement.\nD. [MISSING]\nII. A noncitizen need not file a motion to reconsider to properly exhaust.\nA. Motions to reconsider are not \"remedies available as of right.\"\nB. The government's construction would require a motion to reconsider in every case, among other absurdities.",
        "reference": "D. Appropriate calibration of the exhaustion requirement is essential to promote judicial efficiency and fair outcomes.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "SECTION [MISSING]",
        "reference": "SECTION 1252(f)(1) POSES NO BARRIER TO ENTRY OF RELIEF UNDER 5 U.S.C. section 706",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "A. Legislatures may reasonably regulate firearms to protect public safety\n1. [MISSING]\n2. A court should uphold an arms regulation if it is validated by text, history, and tradition or if it satisfies intermediate scrutiny\n3. Federal law illustrates the types of regulations that legislatures may constitutionally adopt\nB. New York's licensing regime permissibly regulates the carrying of handguns\n1. New York's proper-cause requirement is well within the traditional line of gun regulation\n2. New York's proper-cause requirement also satisfies intermediate scrutiny\n3. Petitioners' contrary arguments lack merit",
        "reference": "1. Legislatures have broad authority to regulate firearms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-493_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE ACT'S PLAIN TEXT SUPPORTS THE PUEBLO'S READING, NOT TEXAS'S\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE RESTORATION ACT AND IGRA CAN AND SHOULD BE HARMONIZED\nIV. TEXAS LACKS AUTHORITY TO REGULATE BINGO ON THE TRIBES' RESERVATIONS",
        "reference": "II. TEXAS CANNOT WISH AWAY THE IMPORT OF CABAZON OR THE HISTORY OF THE RESTORATION ACT'S PASSAGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF ITS TEXT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1334_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Appointments Clause does not govern the selection of the Board's members\nA. Aurelius and UTIER fail to defend much of the court of appeals' reasoning\nB. The Board's members are territorial officers because Congress has treated them as such and has limited their duties primarily to territorial matters\nC. Aurelius's and UTIER's alternative tests are unsound\n1. An officer's exercise of authority under an Act of Congress does not make him a federal officer\n2. The federal government's role in creating and filling an office does not make the officer federal\nII. Regardless of any violation of the Appointments Clause, the Court should not set aside the Board's acts\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The court of appeals properly applied the de facto doctrine in these cases",
        "reference": "A. Under the de facto doctrine, a court need not redress an unconstitutional appointment by invalidating the appointee's past acts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-431_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT WAS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH RFRA WHEN ISSUING THE FINAL RULE\nA. RFRA Modifies All Federal Statutes and the Government Must Comply with RFRA when Engaging in Rulemaking\n1. RFRA Applies to and Modifies All Federal Statutes\n2. The Government Must Comply with RFRA when Engaging in Rule-making Pursuant to Its Authority Under the ACA\nB. The Government Has Conceded that It Must Comply with RFRA Here\nII. THE PRIOR REGULATIONS VIOLATED RFRA\nA. Brief Background on the Prior Regulatory Scheme\nB. The Prior Regulations Substantially Burdened the Exercise of Religion\nC. The Prior Regulations Were Not the Least Restrictive Means of Furthering a Compelling Governmental Interest\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. RFRA Requires the Government To Exempt Religious Objectors Such as the Little Sisters from the Contraceptive Mandate\nB. The Court Should Hold that RFRA Required the Agencies To Adopt the Final Rule Because Courts Must Decide the Propriety of RFRA Exemptions\nC. The Court Should Hold that RFRA Required the Agencies To Adopt the Final Rule Because that Is the Most Straightforward Way To Decide These Cases\nD. The Court Should Hold that RFRA Requires the Agencies To Adopt the Final Rule To Enforce RFRA's Religious Liberty Protections and End Incessant Litigation over the Contraceptive Mandate Once and for All",
        "reference": "III. RFRA REQUIRES THE GOVERNMENT TO FOLLOW THE APPROACH TAKEN BY THE FINAL RULE AND THE COURT SHOULD DECIDE THESE CASES ON THIS BASIS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1498_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION\nII. CERCLA DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE STATE COURT OF JURISDICTION\nA. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. SECTION 122(e)(6) DOES NOT BAR LANDOWNERS' RESTORATION DAMAGES\nA. Landowners Are Not Potentially Responsible Parties\nB. Landowners Are Exempt As \"Contiguous\"\nC. Remand Would Be Required Regardless\nIV. THE RESTORATION-DAMAGES REMEDY IS NOT PREEMPTED\nA. \"Impossibility\" Preemption Is Inapplicable\n1. Restoration damages impose no restoration duty\n2. Federal law would permit ARCO's remediation\nB. Landowners' Restoration-Damages Request Is No \"Obstacle\" To CERCLA's Purpose",
        "reference": "B. Landowners Do Not \"Challenge\" EPA's Orders",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CATO INSTITUTE'S ORIGINAL IMMIGRATION RESEARCH IS MATERIAL TO KEY LEGAL QUESTIONS IN THIS CASE\nII. THE CATO INSTITUTE'S ORIGINAL RESEARCH SUGGESTS THAT THE PROCLAMATION'S RESTRICTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S STATED BASIS FOR THOSE RESTRICTIONS\nA. The Proclamation's Criteria Do Not Actually Explain the Government's Selection of Designated Countries\nB. The Entry Ban is Based on the False Premise That the Government Needs the Cooperation of Foreign Governments to Process Visa Applications\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Nationals of the Designated Countries Have Not Committed Any Deadly Terrorist Attacks",
        "reference": "C. The Entry Ban Would Not Have Prevented the Entry of Any Terrorists Since 9/11",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "None of the named plaintiffs has Article III standing\nA. The need to demonstrate Article III standing\nB. The named plaintiffs' allegations\n1. Plaintiffs' alleged statutory violation\n2. Plaintiffs' alleged harms\nC. The standing inquiry after Spokeo\nD. The disclosure of plaintiffs' search queries without any identifying information does not constitute a concrete harm\n1. Congress has not expressed a judgment that the harm alleged by the named plaintiffs constitutes a concrete injury\n2. [MISSING]\nE. Plaintiffs' allegations about potential reidentification are too speculative to create standing",
        "reference": "2. The harm alleged by the named plaintiffs would not provide a basis for a suit at common law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.4
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-965_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Respondents' challenge to the Proclamation is not justiciable\nA. Respondents' statutory claims are not justiciable\n1. Congress has not authorized review of respondents' statutory claims\n2. Neither the APA nor principles of equity authorize review of respondents' statutory claims\nB. Respondents' Establishment Clause claim is not justiciable\nII. The Proclamation is a lawful exercise of the President's authority to suspend or restrict entry of aliens abroad\nA. The Proclamation is authorized by 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), 8 U.S.C. 1185(a)(1), and the Constitution\n1. The President validly exercised his statutory authority to suspend entry of aliens in the national interest\n2. The President's authority to suspend entry is not subject to the court of appeals' atextual limitations\n3. The court of appeals' narrow view of the President's constitutional authority is incorrect\nB. The Proclamation is consistent with 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(1)(A)\n1. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not conflict with the President's authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1)\n2. In the event of a conflict, Section 1152(a)(1)(A) does not restrict the President's exercise of his authority under Sections 1182(f) and 1185(a)(1)\n3. [MISSING]\nIII. The Proclamation does not violate the Establishment Clause\nA. The Proclamation is constitutional under Mandel and Din\nB. The Proclamation is constitutional under domestic Establishment Clause precedent\nIV. The global injunction is vastly overbroad",
        "reference": "3. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) cannot justify enjoining the Proclamation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.72
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-511_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Congress Was Concerned About Harm To Emergency Services And Mobile Phones From Random And Sequential Dialing.\nB. Congress Was Also Concerned About Telemarketers, Who Distinctively Relied On Random And Sequential Dialing.\nII. Attempts To Expand The Definition Of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Have Caused A Flood Of TCPA Litigation That Will Only Grow Unless This Court Rejects The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation.\nA. The FCC Indefensibly Departed From Its Original And Correct Interpretation Of \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System.\"\nB. Departures From The TCPA's Text Have Unleashed A Cascade Of Litigation Over Calls That Have Nothing To Do With The Concerns That Led Congress To Enact The Autodialer Ban.\nIII. Expanding The \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Definition Is Not Necessary To Prevent Harassing Calls.",
        "reference": "I. As The TCPA's History Underscores, An \"Automatic Telephone Dialing System\" Must Use A Random Or Sequential Number Generator.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-565_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE AS A WARRANTY MISREADS THE CONTRACTUAL TEXT\nA. The Terms Of The Safe Berth Clause Do Not Provide For Liability Regardless Of Fault\nB. The Parties Did Not Intend For CARCO To Assume Strict Liability\nII. THE COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION OF THE SAFE BERTH CLAUSE AS A WARRANTY IS CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S DECISIONS AND LACKS ANY SOUND LEGAL FOUNDATION\nA. The Warranty Interpretation Conflicts With This Court's Controlling Decisions\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. MARITIME COMMERCE IS BEST SERVED BY INTERPRETING SAFE BERTH CLAUSES AS IMPOSING AT MOST A DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE ON CHARTERERS\nA. Strict Liability Is Unwarranted And Detrimental To Maritime Commerce\nB. The Court Of Appeals' Reasons For Adopting The Warranty Interpretation Are Unsound\nC. The Warranty Interpretation Results In Inconsistent Standards Of Care For Wharfingers And Charterers\nD. The Warranty Interpretation Produces An Inequitable Result In This Case",
        "reference": "B. The Warranty Interpretation Lacks Any Sound Legal Foundation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-660_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. PETITIONER HAS NOT CHALLENGED THE JUDGMENT BELOW\nB. THE ALLEGED CIRCUIT CONFLICT IS SUBSTANTIALLY OVERSTATED AND NOT RIPE FOR REVIEW\nC. [MISSING]\nD. THERE IS NO OTHER REASON TO GRANT REVIEW",
        "reference": "C. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Delaying Review Will Unnecessarily Leave The Entire ACA In Limbo And Harm Insurance Markets, Insurers, Providers, State Governments, And Consumers\nA. Harm to Insurance Markets and Insurers\nB. Harm to Providers\nC. Harm to States\nD. Harm to Consumers\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Economic Data Establishes That The ACA Markets Can Operate Without The Mandate\nB. There Is No Economic Reason Why Congress Would Have Wanted The Myriad Other Provisions In The ACA To Be Invalidated",
        "reference": "II. Review Is Also Warranted Because The Fifth Circuit's Severability Analysis Lacks Any Economic Foundation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. Statutory Text And Context Demonstrate That Private Contractual Arbitrations Fall Outside Section 1782(a)\nA. The 1958 statute creating the Commission shows that Congress was focused exclusively on governmental bodies\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The provisions enacted alongside section 1782(a) further confirm that a private commercial arbitration is not a \"foreign or international tribunal.\"\nII. The Legislative History And Scholarly Commentary Further Confirm That Section 1782(a) Does Not Cover Private Commercial Arbitrations\nA. The 1964 Senate and House Committee Reports show that Congress contemplated only governmental bodies.\nB. Congress made no reference to private arbitrations\nC. Professor Smit's contemporaneous articles confirm that all involved in the 1964 amendment of section 1782(a) were focused on foreign governmental bodies",
        "reference": "B. Congress's changes to the text of section 1782(a) confirm Congress's focus on governmental bodies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief027.pdf",
        "text": "I. Affirming will portend an exponential deterioration of the constitutional liberties most vital to our democracy\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Nominal damages are necessary for proper vindication of the Constitution and the First Amendment specifically\nC. Religious liberty is endangered without the remedy of standalone nominal damages\nII. Treating nominal damages as equitable for mootness but legal for qualified immunity creates a \"heads I win, tails you lose\" government shield against victims of constitutional violations",
        "reference": "A. Orderly society requires proper vindication of constitutional rights lest they exist in vain",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief040.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's disclosure requirement burdens the right of assembly\nA. The Court should analyze this case in accordance with the text, history, and tradition of the Assembly Clause\nB. [MISSING]\nII. Freedom of assembly, including religious assembly, protects the right to associate anonymously\nA. The historical meaning of assembly included the ability to associate anonymously\nB. Modern circumstances reinforce the need for strong protections for freedom of assembly, especially for minority or dissenting groups\nIII. California's disclosure requirement fails strict scrutiny\nA. Because the disclosure requirement inhibits freedom of assembly, particularly religious assembly, it triggers strict scrutiny\nB. Religious assembly demonstrates the danger of the Ninth Circuit's decision to apply the \"substantial relation\" standard from cases addressing electoral integrity\nC. The disclosure requirement fails strict scrutiny",
        "reference": "B. Freedom of assembly is crucial for religious liberty",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Recent technological developments have reshaped our social and legal understandings of privacy\nII. Privacy is a universal human right that international law protects to a high minimum standard, with some nations offering even stronger protections under their domestic law\nA. International human rights law recognizes and protects the right to privacy\nB. Sovereign nations have a duty to implement privacy protections and, in so doing, may afford stronger protections than the floor established by international human rights law\nIII. \"Jurisdiction in cyberspace is hard, but we're working on it\"\nA. Territoriality is the starting point for jurisdiction, online and offline\nB. Territoriality is hard to operationalize in cyberspace\nC. Efforts are underway to solve the problem of jurisdiction in cyberspace\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. Ruling narrowly will respect the privacy interests of other nations and foster international cooperation\nB. Ruling narrowly will permit political efforts to address international jurisdiction over data to proceed unhindered",
        "reference": "IV. In light of the potential impact of this decision on international law and foreign relations, the Court should rule narrowly",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.36
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-930_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY\nII. THE RULE-MAKING PROCESS SHOULD NOT BE IMMUNE FROM REVIEW BY THE MERE PRESENCE OF A POTENTIAL ASSESSABLE PENALTY\na. Brief Historical Context of the AIA and APA\nb. The AIA Does Not Bar a Challenge to Rule-Making That Merely Restrains the Collection of Information\nc. Collection of Information Is Not Protected by the AIA Even When the IRS Subjects Noncompliance to an Assessable Penalty\nIII. [MISSING]\na. An Example\nb. The Example Above is Unfortunately Not a Fanciful Hypothetical\nc. The Administrative Regime Does Not Provide an Adequate Solution",
        "reference": "III. ACTUAL EFFECTS ON LOW-INCOME TAXPAYERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1104_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Only Clear, Workable, and Efficient Rule Is One in Which Bare Metal Manufacturers Are Not Liable for Asbestos Installed by Downstream Third Parties\nA. First principles of tort law do not support liability for parties who retain no control of a product after it moves downstream in the stream of commerce\nB. The history of asbestos litigation does not support expanding liability to bare metal manufacturers\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Protecting bare metal manufacturers from liability for asbestos sold by third parties correctly applies tort principles\nII. A \"Facts and Circumstances\" Standard That Allows Asbestos Liability for Bare Metal Manufacturers Is Cumbersome, Inefficient, and Unworkable\nA. Bare metal manufacturers have no control over the insulation process that would warrant expansion of asbestos liability under a \"reasonably foreseeable\" test\nB. Foreseeability fails to address the lack-of-control problem and creates unnecessary uncertainty\nC. Bare metal manufacturers do not have the ability to craft any intelligent system of warnings",
        "reference": "C. Nearly all jurisdictions have applied the rule that bare metal manufacturers are not liable for downstream conduct by asbestos suppliers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Having Section 1983 claims accrue during the related criminal proceeding will traduce the rights of the accused and waste prosecutorial resources\nIII. Early accrual contravenes the ripeness doctrine and wastes judicial resources\nIV. Having claims accrue at the conclusion of criminal proceedings avoids these problems",
        "reference": "I. The Second Circuit adopted an improperly narrow view of the harm caused by fabricated evidence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-908_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "Section 523(a)(2)(A) bars the discharge of an individual debtor's debt for money obtained through the actual fraud of her business partner\nA. Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge the fraud debt at issue in this case\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Statutory context confirms that petitioner's debt is nondischargeable\n3. This Court has recognized Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s breadth\n4. Section 523(a)(2)(A)'s history confirms that petitioner cannot discharge her fraud debt\nB. Contrary interpretations lack merit\nC. The plain-text reading of Section 523(a)(2)(A) furthers sound bankruptcy policy",
        "reference": "1. The plain text of Section 523(a)(2)(A) precludes petitioner from discharging her debt to respondent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-556_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Meaningful Conflict Between The Kansas Supreme Court And Federal Courts Of Appeals Or Other State Courts Of Last Resort\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Decision Below Was Correct",
        "reference": "II. Any Division Among State Courts Of Last Resort On The Question Presented Does Not Warrant This Court's Review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Split of Authority on Whether Assignor Estoppel Should Be Abrogated\nA. Assignor Estoppel Is Consistent with this Court's Decision in Lear\nB. There Is No Split Over the Continued Vitality of Assignor Estoppel within the Federal Circuit\nC. No Other Court's Controlling Precedent Rejects Assignor Estoppel\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Federal Circuit Has Correctly Refused to Abrogate Assignor Estoppel\nB. The Federal Circuit Correctly Determined that Assignor Estoppel Applies Here\nIII. Minerva's Petition Is a Poor Vehicle for Addressing the Continued Viability of Assignor Estoppel\nA. Independent and Adequate Grounds Support the Decision Below Against Minerva\nB. Hologic's Cross-Petition Is the Superior Vehicle",
        "reference": "II. The Federal Circuit Properly Applied Assignor Estoppel to the '348 Patent",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.9
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-334_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Under every ordinary interpretive metric, district courts have discretion to deny or reduce cost awards under Rule 39(e)\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)\nC. Rule 39's context and history further confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)\nD. The Fifth Circuit's contrary approach would dramatically upset longstanding norms and settled practice in appellate courts nationwide\nII. The Court should reverse the judgment and remand for the district court to exercise its discretion under Rule 39(e)",
        "reference": "A. Rule 39's text and structure establish that district courts have discretion in awarding costs under Rule 39(e)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-463_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Has Provided A Mechanism And A Federal Forum To Ensure That Individuals Can Meaningfully Challenge State Deprivations Of Federal Rights\nII. Petitioners' S.B. 8 Challenge Is Squarely Permitted By Ex Parte Young\nA. Texas clerks and judges are proper defendants under Young\nB. Petitioners' claims against the Texas Attorney General and other state-agency Respondents also satisfy Young\nC. Suit against the government Respondents is necessary to vindicate Petitioners' federal rights and consistent with Young's purpose\nIII. Petitioners Have Article III Standing\nA. Petitioners are suffering an injury-in-fact. 39\nB. Respondents' roles in S.B. 8 enforcement contribute to Petitioners' injuries, which would be redressed by the requested relief\nC. Prudential considerations regarding the clerks and judges do not support declining review\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. This Court Must Stop Texas's Open Attack On Federal Supremacy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1584_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Terms \"Administration\" and \"Management\" Are Used Interchangeably Throughout Public Land Law and Do Not Have Fixed, Independent Meanings\nIII. Congress Has Affirmed the Executive Branch's Consistent Interpretation and Implementation of the Trails Act\nA. The Executive Branch Proposed National Trails Legislation That Embodied the Jurisdictional Approach Supported by Petitioners\nB. Congressional Oversight of Executive Branch Implementation of the Trails Act Reflects the Same Understanding of Agency Jurisdiction\nC. The Level of Congressional Support for the Park Service Confirms the Agency's Limited Role\nIV. The Mineral Leasing Act's Pipeline Right-of-Way Provision Was Intended to Facilitate Pipeline Siting and Should Be Interpreted to Further That Congressional Objective",
        "reference": "I. The Text and History of the Trails Act Provide No Indication That It Was Intended to Transfer Jurisdiction Over National Forest Land",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that this case is justiciable because Tingley showed intent to speak in a way that would prompt enforcement against him\nII. This Court should grant review and resolve the circuit split over the speech question\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit's cavalier treatment of history should be rejected\nC. States can regulate professionals\u2014they just can't censor them based on viewpoint\nD. States cannot censor professionals based on a flawed, supposed \"consensus.\"\nIII. This Court should resolve the circuit split on free-exercise comparability and overturn Smith\nIV. This Court's immediate review is needed",
        "reference": "A. A real and intractable circuit split exists on the validity of censoring counselors' speech based on viewpoint",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The House of Representatives' Subpoenas Violate the Fourth Amendment\nA. The Fourth Amendment Applies to Congress\nB. The House's Search of the President's Financial Records Is Unreasonable\n1. [MISSING]\na. Mazars\nb. Deutsche Bank\n2. The Subpoenas Fail the Relevance Test Because They Are Pretexts\na. Mazars\nb. Deutsche Bank\n3. The Requests Are Too Broad\na. Mazars\nb. Deutsche Bank\nC. Comparison to a Watergate Subpoena\nD. The House's Searches Look More of Bills of Attainder Than Legitimate Exercises of the House's Subpoena Power\nE. Affirming the Lower Courts' Judgments In Spite of the Fourth Amendment Violation Would Be Dangerous for Any American Whom the House of Representatives Wishes to Harass\nII. The President's Refusal to Comply with Unlawful Subpoenas Is Consistent with the Precedent Established by George Washington",
        "reference": "1. The House Committees Are Not Authorized to Make These Demands",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Preliminary Steps\nB. Bargaining at the Table\n1. Ground Rules and Legal Standards\n2. Opening Statements\n3. Bargaining Methods, Proposals, and Solutions\n4. Tentative Agreements\n5. Mediation, Fact-finding, Impasse, and Interest Arbitration\n6. Ratification\nC. Representation and Contract Administration\nD. Union Staffing Practices\nII. Lobbying Laws Do Not Regulate Collective Bargaining Activities",
        "reference": "I. Public Sector Collective Bargaining is a Specific Process, Rooted in Labor Law, By Which the Government Achieves Workforce Stability",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-21_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Retaliatory-arrest claims commonly arise out of everyday police encounters\nII. Without a requirement to show that probable cause was lacking, weak retaliatory-arrest claims can easily survive summary judgment\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Exposing officers to meritless retaliatory-arrest claims risks undercutting their performance and undermining public safety",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1171_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. A BUT-FOR CAUSATION STANDARD ALLOWS FOR THE PERPETUATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION BEGINNING AT CONCEPTION\nA. Eugenics based on race is inexorably linked to the founding of Planned Parenthood\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Planned Parenthood and the abortion industry continue to demonstrate discriminatory intent against Black Americans\nII. A BUT-FOR CAUSATION STANDARD FAILS TO ADEQUATELY REMEDY THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION",
        "reference": "B. Eugenics continues to motivate Planned Parenthood and the abortion industry",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-351_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The United States supports France's efforts to provide reparations for Holocaust victims\nIII. Comity-based abstention permits U.S. courts to defer to robust remedial programs such as CIVS",
        "reference": "I. France has established comprehensive remedial programs to provide compensation to Holocaust victims and their heirs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1678_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. REVIEW BY THIS COURT IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY TO VICTIMS OF CROSS-BORDER VIOLENCE\nII. THE DECISION BELOW MISUNDERSTOOD THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD, THE NATURE OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS, AND MEXICO'S INTEREST IN FAIR TREATMENT OF ITS NATIONALS IN ALL CASES\nA. An Excessive Force Claim Against a Law Enforcement Officer Is Not a \"New Bivens Context\"\nB. An Excessive Force Claim Against a Law Enforcement Officer Is Not a Diplomatic or Foreign Policy Question\nC. This Case Does Not Involve National Security Concerns\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. THE UNITED STATES HAS AGREED BY TREATY TO PROVIDE AN EFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TO INDIVIDUALS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER",
        "reference": "D. This Case Does Not Involve Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals Correctly Concluded \u2014 Based On This Court's Precedent And Considering The Totality Of The Circumstances \u2014 That Morrissey-Berru Was Not A \"Minister\" For Purposes Of The Ministerial Exception\nIV. Unhappy with the Outcome in the Ninth Circuit, Petitioner Now Asks this Court to Effectively Adopt a Different Analysis than What This Court Held in Hosanna-Tabor Just Seven Years Ago",
        "reference": "II. Review Is Unnecessary Because The Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals' Approach Is Aligned With This Court, And It Likewise Does Not Split With Other Circuits Or State Courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. The plaintiffs lack statutory standing to challenge Act 620\nA. The plaintiffs must identify a cause of action that authorizes them to sue state officials who violate the constitutional rights of third parties\nB. There is no cause of action that authorizes abortion providers to sue state officials who violate the rights of their patients\n1. The cause of action established in 42 U.S.C. section 1983 does not authorize abortion providers to sue state officials who violate the rights of their patients\n2. The cause of action established in the Declaratory Judgment Act does not authorize abortion providers to sue state officials who violate the rights of their patients\nC. Stare decisis presents no obstacle to dismissing the third-party claims for lack of statutory standing\nII. If the court is unwilling to repudiate the remainder of its \"prudential standing\" doctrine, then it should hold that the plaintiffs lack prudential standing to challenge Act 620\nA. The plurality opinion in Singleton attracted only four votes, and Justice Stevens's partial concurrence refused to endorse its broad notions of third-party standing in abortion cases\nB. The plaintiffs have not alleged or shown that abortion patients face a \"hindrance\" to protecting their interests\nC. [MISSING]\nIII. If the Court decides to reach the merits, then it should overrule Whole Woman's Health\nIV. If the Court is unwilling to overrule Whole Woman's Health, then it should construe the decision narrowly\nV. The Court should make clear that abortion statutes whose enforcement has been enjoined continue to exist as laws and will become fully enforceable if Whole Woman's Health or Roe v. Wade is overruled",
        "reference": "C. The plaintiffs have failed to allege or show a \"close relation\" with abortion patients",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.69
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8151_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. ROBUST ADVERSARIAL TESTING IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE PROPER FUNCTION OF OUR SYSTEM OF JUSTICE, PARTICULARLY WHERE THE STAKES ARE HIGHEST\nA. Procedural Protections Are Designed To Produce Just Results\nB. Where The Death Penalty Is At Issue, The Need For Reliability Demands Heightened Procedural Protections\nII. IN AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOLS, ADVERSARIAL TESTING IS REQUIRED TO ENSURE THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT SUBJECTED TO UNNECESSARY TORTURE\nA. Challenges To The Implementation Of Lethal Injection In Light Of A Prisoner's Unique Medical Conditions Require Specific Factual Development Of Both Aspects\nB. Counsel's Diligent Efforts To Pursue Adversarial Testing Of The Protocol Were Frustrated By The Lower Courts\nC. Botched Executions Of Medically Infirm Prisoners Underscore The Need For Adversarial Testing In As-Applied Challenges\nIII. BASIC PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS SHOULD APPLY UPON A SUBSTANTIAL THRESHOLD SHOWING THAT AN EXECUTION POSES A HIGH RISK OF EXTREME PAIN WHEN COMPARED TO ITS EFFECT ON A HEALTHY PERSON\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Alternative Method Requirement Has No Place In As-Applied Challenges",
        "reference": "A. The Court Should Require a Full and Fair Hearing, Once a Substantial Threshold Showing Has Been Made",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The challenged Washington law presumes that \"gender affirmation\" is the only ethical way to treat gender dysphoria\nII. Gender affirmation is an unethical therapeutic approach based on faulty anthropology\nIII. Gender affirmation leads to poor outcomes and irreversible harm\nIV. Other countries are increasingly aware of the unethical nature of gender affirmation\nV. [MISSING]\nVI. Washington's law forecloses the most ethical treatment: client-responsive psychotherapy\nVII. The law forces every adolescent down the gender-affirming pathway, towards irreversible medical harm",
        "reference": "V. Many states are likewise expressing caution about the gender-affirmation model",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-586_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL\nII. THE 2013 LEGISLATIVE INACTION WITH RESPECT TO CDS 27 AND 35 DOES NOT SUPPLANT THE 2011 LEGISLATIVE RECORD FROM WHICH THOSE DISTRICTS DERIVED\nIII. CD35 HAS BEEN A RACIAL GERRYMANDER EVER SINCE IT WAS DRAWN IN 2011\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. CD27 Intentionally Dilutes the Vote of Nueces County Latinos\nB. CD27 Violates SECTION 2's Effects Test",
        "reference": "IV. CD27 HAS ALWAYS BEEN AND STILL IS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 2",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-429_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Standing based on informational injury is firmly rooted in this Court's precedents.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. Where a plaintiff claims infringement of a substantive interest in information, Article III does not require proof of additional injuries caused by the withholding of information.\nB. An informational injury sufficient to satisfy Article III requirements does not presuppose a right to information explicitly defined by a statute.\nIII. Respondent had Article III standing to bring this action.",
        "reference": "II. Informational injury may exist regardless of \"downstream consequences\" and be based on legally protected informational interests not specifically defined by statute.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A CY PRES AWARD OF CLASS ACTION PROCEEDS IS PERMISSIBLE ARE NOT GENUINELY IN DISPUTE\nII. THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEASIBILITY OF A DIRECT DISTRIBUTION IN THE INSTANT CASE ARE NOT CONTROVERSIAL\nIII. THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER A DIRECT DISTRIBUTION IS FEASIBLE RESTS WITH THE DISTRICT COURT AS THE TRIER OF FACT AND IS REVIEWABLE ONLY FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION\nIV. DIRECT DISTRIBUTION OF THE GOOGLE REFERRAL SETTLEMENT FUNDS TO INDIVIDUAL CLASS MEMBERS IS ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT FEASIBLE\nA. The Widely Accepted Approach to Evaluating What Class Members Would Likely Receive in a Direct Distribution\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Participation Rates\nD. The Results of Spectrum's Analysis",
        "reference": "B. The Costs That Affect Class Member Recoveries",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The government's use of a collective bargaining system allowing employees to designate a bargaining representative supported by agency fees is a legitimate exercise of its function of managing workplace relations",
        "reference": "I. The government's actions in its proprietary capacity, including its capacity as employer, are subject to less intensive First Amendment scrutiny than its actions as sovereign",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-611_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Constitution Should Not Permit Government Officials to Use Social Media as a Tool to Limit Public Discourse.\nA. Public officials increasingly reap the benefits of interactive communications media.\nB. Public officials too often succumb to the temptation to silence critics.\nC. Government officials can't have it both ways when they use social media.\nII. Public Officials Engage in State Action When They Use Social Media Accounts to Conduct Public Business.\nA. The key issue is whether personal accounts are used as tools of governance.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Sixth Circuit's \"actual or apparent official duties\" test is too narrow.",
        "reference": "B. The First Amendment prohibits viewpoint discrimination on social media sites used to conduct public business.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1576_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Government's Defense Of Its Retrial Rule Lacks Any Grounding In History Or Precedent\nIII. The Government Identifies No Historical Practice That Supports Its Retrial Rule\nIV. The Government's Distinction Between Jury Acquittals And Judicial Acquittals Is Baseless",
        "reference": "I. The Government Misunderstands The Purposes Of The Venue Right",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE HAS BECOME HOPELESSLY UNMOORED FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Text and Context\n1. The Establishment Clause Was Written In A Specific Historical Context And Intended To Protect Against Specific Evils\n2. Evidence From The Early Republic Illuminates How Narrow the Scope of the Establishment Clause Originally Was\nII. REAL AND WIDE-SPREAD CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING\nA. The Town of Taos's Inextricable Link with the Bataan Death March\nB. The Taos Memorial\nC. Broader Implications",
        "reference": "A. The Current State of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence is an Incoherent Quagmire",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Only the members of our national political community should be represented in our national government\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Illegal aliens are not members of our national political community",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-877_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CRCA IS SUPPORTED BY A SUBSTANTIAL RECORD DOCUMENTING THE NEED TO ABROGATE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY FROM COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS\nA. The Copyright Office Serves A Unique Role In Formulating Copyright Policy For The United States\nB. The Copyright Office Carefully Studied The Need To Abrogate Eleventh Amendment Immunity From Copyright Infringement Claims\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The Register's Report Documented A Pattern Of Copyright Infringement By The States And A Lack Of Effective State Remedies\n2. Mr. Oman's Congressional Testimony Further Showed The Need For The CRCA\nD. Congress Made A Predictive Judgment, Which Has Proven Correct\nII. THE CRCA'S RECORD IS NOT FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT TO THE RECORD THIS COURT CONSIDERED IN FLORIDA PREPAID",
        "reference": "C. The Copyright Office Compiled Substantial Evidence Of The Need To Abrogate Eleventh Amendment Immunity From Copyright Infringement Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Crow Tribe's Hunting Right Under The 1868 Treaty Has Not Been Terminated\nA. Wyoming's Admission to the Union Did Not Terminate the Treaty Right\nB. The Establishment of the Bighorn National Forest Did Not Terminate the Treaty Right\nC. Affirmance Would Have Far-Reaching Consequences\nII. Issue Preclusion Does Not Bar Petitioner From Addressing The Treaty Right's Validity\nA. The Determination that Wyoming's Statehood Terminated the Treaty Right Is Not Entitled to Preclusive Effect\nB. The Alternative Determination that Creation of the Bighorn National Forest Rendered the Lands \"Occupied\" Is Not Entitled to Preclusive Effect\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause will provide additional security for rights guaranteed by the First Amendment\nIII. Incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause will protect this Court's complicated campaign finance jurisprudence from misapplication",
        "reference": "I. This Court ought to consider the positive effects incorporation of the Excessive Fines Clause will have on speech and association protected by the First Amendment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. Basic principles of statutory interpretation support the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the FCA.\nA. The text, purpose, and context of the FCA confirm the Seventh Circuit's reading.\nB. [MISSING]\nII. A contrary interpretation would create tremendous practical problems.\nA. Meritless qui tam suits plague companies dealing with the government.\nB. Litigation over an artificial entity's subjective belief would make FCA litigation even more complicated and burdensome.\nC. Petitioners' rule would harm, not protect, the government.",
        "reference": "B. Other canons of construction lead to the same result.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. It Is Appropriate For The Court To Consider EU Domestic Law As It Pertains To Searches Of Data Stored In The European Union\nII. Production Of Data Stored In The European Union Is Addressed By EU Privacy Law\nA. The GDPR's General Rules For Processing Of Personal Data\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The GDPR's Specific Rules For Transfer Of Personal Data To Non-EU States",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT DAMAGES ARE A REMEDY FOR PAST INJURIES, WHICH\u2014BY DEFINITION\u2014CANNOT BE RENDERED MOOT, AND EXCLUDING ONLY NOMINAL DAMAGES FROM THIS INCONTROVERTIBLE PRINCIPLE IS LEGALLY UNSOUND\nII. FINDING THAT A NOMINAL DAMAGES CLAIM ALONE IS NOT JUSTICIABLE UNDERMINES THE VITAL PURPOSE NOMINAL DAMAGES CLAIMS SERVE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. CIRCUIT COURTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT NOMINAL DAMAGES ARE ALONE SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT MOOTNESS IN FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO SECONDARY SCHOOL POLICIES",
        "reference": "III. CIRCUIT COURTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY HELD THAT NOMINAL DAMAGES ARE ALONE SUFFICIENT TO KEEP A CONTROVERSY JUSTICIABLE AND PREVENT MOOTNESS, PARTICULARLY IN FREE SPEECH CASES UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1269_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE BOB RICHARDS RULE IS UNLAWFUL\nA. The Bob Richards Rule Is Not A Valid Rule Of Federal Common Law\n1. The Bob Richards rule does not involve any \"uniquely federal interest\"\n2. [MISSING]\n3. There is no \"significant conflict\" between state law and an identifiable federal policy\nB. The Bob Richards Rule Is Inconsistent With The Tax Laws\nII. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
        "reference": "2. Congress has foreclosed adoption of a federal common law rule",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-43_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The plain text of Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) unambiguously requires suppression\nB. The court of appeals' contrary interpretation of Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) is deeply flawed\nII. Even if Title III imposed a 'core concerns' test, suppression would still be required where an order exceeds the judge's territorial jurisdiction",
        "reference": "I. Title III requires the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a facially insufficient wiretap order",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-157_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. CADY'S \"COMMUNITY CARETAKING\" EXCEPTION PERMITS WARRANTLESS SEARCHES ONLY OF VEHICLES, NOT HOMES\nII. WARRANTLESS HOME SEARCHES PERMITTED BY THE FIFTH AND EIGHTH CIRCUITS CAN BE JUSTIFIED ON OTHER GROUNDS\nIII. THE COURT SHOULD NOT CREATE A NEW EXCEPTION THAT WOULD PERMIT THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY AT ISSUE HERE\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The First Circuit's Decision Is Likely to Have Adverse Consequences",
        "reference": "A. The Exception Recognized By the First Circuit Lacks a Meaningful Limiting Principle",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. PURSUIT OF PARTISAN ADVANTAGE CANNOT BE A LEGITIMATE BASIS FOR REDISTRICTING\nA. This Court has not accepted partisan advantage as a legitimate basis for redistricting\nB. Identifying partisan advantage as an illegitimate basis for redistricting would address the concerns expressed in Vieth\nII. REDISTRICTING TO ACHIEVE A PARTISAN ADVANTAGE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE LONG-RECOGNIZED CONSTITUTIONAL NORM AGAINST GOVERNMENT PARTISANSHIP AS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY\nA. The Court's First Amendment decisions support the norm that government action for partisan advantage is illegitimate\nB. The Court's Fourteenth Amendment decisions support the norm that government action for partisan advantage is illegitimate\nC. The Court's Elections Clause decisions support the norm that government action for partisan advantage is illegitimate\nIII. REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PARTISAN EFFECTS OF REDISTRICTING WERE THE INCIDENTAL RESULT OF ITS PURSUIT OF LEGITIMATE STATE INTERESTS WOULD PROVIDE A CLEAR AND ADMINISTRABLE STANDARD AND A MEANINGFUL CHECK ON ILLEGITIMATE PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING\nA. A constitutional standard based on a rejection of partisan advantage would provide a meaningful and low-burden check on the redistricting process\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Requiring the government to ground its decisions in a legitimate purpose would provide essential support for well-established constitutional norms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.3
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Mr. Olson Filed Suit Under The APA, Because, As A Gay Male, Legal Precedent to File A Title VII Complaint Was Presumed Not To Be An Option In 1999\nB. Mr. Olson's Suit Was Based On The Consular Promotion Board's Violation Of DOS Precepts Against Sexual Stereotyping In Not Promoting Him\nC. Defendants Filed A Motion To Dismiss The Olson Claim As Untimely Under Title VII\nD. The District Court for the District of Columbia Agreed With Defendants' Argument that Mr. Olson's Grievance Was Based A Theory Of Gender Discrimination, Under Title VII, and, Therefore, Dismissed The Grievance As Untimely\nE. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Affirmed the Lower Court's Decision\nII. THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT CORRECTLY ASSUMED THAT TITLE VII APPLIED TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION",
        "reference": "I. THIS COURT SHOULD FOLLOW THE PRECEDENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT AND HOLD THAT TITLE VII PROHIBITS SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-267_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The history of religious autonomy doctrines in general and the ministerial exception in particular shows that religious bodies \u2014not the government \u2014must control religious functions\nB. Because religious bodies must control religious functions, the ministerial exception prohibits government interference where a plaintiff performs important religious functions\nC. Important religious functions include leadership, worship, ritual, and expression\nII. Respondents' claims are barred by the ministerial exception\nA. The ministerial exception applies because Respondents carried out important religious functions\nB. The ministerial exception applies because Respondents bore religious titles and had religious training",
        "reference": "I. The ministerial exception ensures religious groups control who performs important religious functions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.29
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-806_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES MAY NOT INVOKE SECTION 1983 TO ENFORCE SPENDING CLAUSE LEGISLATION\nA. Common-Law Contract Principles Foreclose Implying Section 1983 Rights Under Spending Clause Statutes\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Stare Decisis Does Not Justify Retaining Wilder And Its Predecessors\nII. EVEN IF A SPENDING CLAUSE STATUTE COULD GIVE RISE TO A SECTION 1983 CLAIM, FNHRA DOES NOT DO SO\nA. Congress Intended To Preclude Section 1983 Remedies For The \"Rights\" That Respondent Purports To Find In The Statute\nB. The Supposed Rights At Issue Fail The Gonzaga Test\nC. The Supposed Rights At Issue Fail The Blessing Test",
        "reference": "B. Implying Section 1983 Rights In Spending Clause Statutes Violates The Separation Of Powers And Core Principles Of Federalism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief049.pdf",
        "text": "I. Roe v. Wade is a lawless and unconstitutional act of judicial usurpation\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Supreme Court has no authority to invent constitutional \"rights\" with no textual or historical pedigree\nC. Roe's decision to refer to the unborn child as \"potential life\" is scientifically and legally inaccurate, and the Court should repudiate this terminology regardless of whether it overrules Roe\nII. The Court's faux \"reaffirmation\" of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey has aggravated the lawlessness of the Roe regime and the court-invented right to abortion\nIII. The arguments for retaining Roe and Casey are meritless\nA. The argument that \"reliance interests\" require adherence to Roe and Casey\nB. The argument that overruling Roe will harm the Court's \"institutional credibility\"\nC. The argument that overruling Roe will undermine other precedents of this Court",
        "reference": "A. The Roe opinion flagrantly disregards Article III's case-or-controversy requirement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER ICWA'S PLACEMENT PREFERENCES EXCEED CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY AND COMMANDEER STATES\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. THE QUESTION OF STANDING DOES NOT MERIT A SEPARATE QUESTION PRESENTED\nIV. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER ICWA VIOLATES THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE",
        "reference": "II. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER ICWA'S PLACEMENT-PREFERENCE SCHEME VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION'S GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. HOSPITAL ADMITTING PRIVILEGES INCREASE PATIENT SAFETY BY CREATING THE OPTIMAL CONDITIONS FOR HIGH-QUALITY HOSPITAL CARE THROUGH ENHANCED COMMUNICATION AND BETTER CONTINUITY IN THE PATIENT'S TREATMENT\nA. Admitting privileges create the optimal conditions for communication in the patient transfer process, and Louisiana has long required them for physicians performing common surgeries\nB. Admitting privileges create the optimal conditions for continuity of care by fostering participation of physicians in the course of patient hospital treatment\nC. The district court's findings undermine the longstanding, reasoned judgment of the medical community that admitting privileges help improve patient care\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The privileging process helps ensure the current competence of physicians\nB. The district court's findings undermine the longstanding medical judgment that admitting privileges help ensure current physician competence",
        "reference": "II. ADMITTING PRIVILEGES HELP ENSURE CURRENT PHYSICIAN COMPETENCE BECAUSE HOSPITALS ARE SKILLED IN VETTING FITNESS AND HAVE A STRONG INCENTIVE TO CAREFULLY VERIFY QUALIFICATIONS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1174_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. LIMITING THE REDRESSABILITY OF ARRESTS MADE IN RETALIATION FOR PROTECTED SPEECH WOULD UNDERMINE THE PURPOSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT\nII. IMPORTING A PROBABLE-CAUSE TEST INTO THE RETALIATORY-ARREST CONTEXT IS UNJUSTIFIED AND UNNECESSARY TO WEED OUT INSUBSTANTIAL CLAIMS\nA. The Default Mt. Healthy Test Works Well When Applied To A Range Of Intent-Based Claims And Would Be Equally Effective For Analyzing Claims Alleging Retaliatory Arrests\nB. Hartman's Retaliatory-Prosecution Rule Is Based On Unique Circumstances Not Present In Retaliatory-Arrest Cases\nC. The Common Law Does Not Provide Guidance For The Elements Of A Retaliatory-Arrest Claim Or Support The Addition Of A No-Probable-Cause Requirement\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. IMPORTING A PROBABLE-CAUSE REQUIREMENT WOULD PROVIDE OFFICERS WITH AN AUTOMATIC ESCAPE FROM TOO MANY RETALIATORY-ARREST SUITS, UNDERMINING THE CAPACITY OF SECTION 1983 TO PROTECT FREE SPEECH",
        "reference": "D. The Law Already Includes Ways To Screen Out Insubstantial Retaliatory-Arrest Claims Without Imposing Additional Elements",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.14
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Chike's and Joseph's nominal-damages claims are justiciable.\nA. Nominal damages provide a remedy for injuries that do not cause quantifiable or compensable harm.\nB. A prospective change in policy or conduct cannot moot a damages claim, including one for nominal damages.\n1. A case is moot only when it is impossible to grant any effectual relief.\n2. Nominal damages offer effectual relief for past constitutional injuries.\n3. A change in policy or conduct does not erase a completed constitutional injury.\n4. Because nominal-damages awards remedy past injuries, they are always retrospective and serve a distinct purpose from declaratory judgments.\nC. Chike's and Joseph's nominal-damages claims remain a \"live\" controversy because they seek vindication for past constitutional injuries.\nII. The overwhelming majority of circuit courts uphold the justiciability of nominal-damages claims for good reason.\nA. The majority rule is doctrinally consistent with Article III justiciability.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The majority rule recognizes that nominal damages are crucial to redress one-time violations in many contexts.\nIII. The Eleventh Circuit's rule misunderstands the nature and purpose of nominal-damages awards.\nA. Nominal-damages claims do not need to be paired with compensatory-damages claims to be justiciable.\nB. The constitutional-avoidance doctrine does not justify a refusal to remedy completed constitutional violations.\nC. Nominal-damages awards do not destroy the mootness doctrine.\nD. The rule that nominal-damages claims are justiciable has not opened the floodgates to attorney-fee awards.",
        "reference": "B. The majority rule upholds section 1983's purpose and better protects constitutional rights.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.94
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Declining To Answer The Question Presented Now Will Harm The Energy Economy, In General, And Coal-Fired Energy, In Particular, By Forcing The EPA to Consider Generation Shifting, Creating Unnecessary Uncertainty For Years\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. This Court Should Not Await The EPA's Response To The D.C. Circuit's Mandate Because The Legality Of That Mandate Is Exactly What Is In Dispute In The Question Presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-525_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Title VII's charge-filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit\nA. [MISSING]\n1. A prerequisite to relief is not jurisdictional unless Congress clearly states that it is\n2. Title VII's text and context do not clearly indicate that the charge-filing requirement is jurisdictional\nB. Petitioner's contention that Title VII's charge-filing requirement is an \"exhaustion\" rule exempt from the clear-statement rule lacks merit\nC. The statutory purposes do not require treating Title VII's charge-filing requirement as jurisdictional",
        "reference": "A. Under this Court's clear-statement rule, Title VII's charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional because Congress did not clearly state otherwise",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Ninth Circuit Gutted the Pike Test",
        "reference": "A. The Petition Squarely Raises The Important Constitutional Question Of The Continuing Vitality Of The Extra-territoriality Doctrine, An Essential Part Of The Dormant Commerce Clause's Protection Of Our Federalism",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1423_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Four Judges' Dual Officeholding Violated section 973(b)(2)(A)\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Government's Position Raises Serious Constitutional Questions\nIV. This Court Can\u2014and Should\u2014Reverse All Eight Judgments Below",
        "reference": "II. The Four Judges' Dual Officeholding Terminated Their Military Service",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-472_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED WARRANTS IMMEDIATE REVIEW\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. THIS CASE IS AN IDEAL VEHICLE",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 2.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5410_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The ACCA is a Classic Example of Overcriminalization: a Real Problem that Harms Real People\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The ACCA's Force Clause Unambiguously Distinguishes Between Intentional and Reckless Conduct Resulting in Harm\nB. The Role of Mens Rea in Distinguishing Culpability Levels is Deeply Rooted in Our System of Law\nC. There Should Be a Background Presumption in Favor of a Knowledge or Intent Mens Rea for Statutes Like the ACCA that Expose Defendants to Severe Penalties\nIII. Under the Rule of Lenity, the ACCA's Force Clause Must be Narrowly Construed\nIV. Mass Overincarceration Threatens Public Health",
        "reference": "II. Absent a Clear Statement to the Contrary, Courts Should Presume that Criminal Statutes Require Knowing or Intentional Conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1434_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. Removing APJ Tenure Protection to Make Their Jobs More Political Does Not Validly Remedy the Appointments Clause Violation\nII. This Court Can Devise a Better-Targeted Remedy\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Panel Misread Constitutional Case Law",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-8995_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Government's Overly-Broad Reading of \"In Connection With\" Ignores Settled Rules of Statutory Construction\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Language in section 3624(e) is Plain and Narrowly Circumscribed\n3. By Analogy, Imprisoned as Used in Chapter 229 Supports Mont's Argument\n4. Re-Imagining the Statute as the Government Contemplates is Inappropriate and Unnecessary\nB. United States Code's use of Word \"Imprisoned\" Informs its Meaning\n1. Review of Title 18, United States Code \u2014Imprisoned\nC. No Tolling of Time in Official Detention\n1. Credits Toward Service of a Sentence Do Not Equal Imprisonment\nD. Equity Argument and Purposes of Supervised Release\n1. Detention does not relinquish duties and responsibilities under supervised release\n2. No unfair benefit from being jailed while on supervised release\n3. Remedy for alleged inequity in supervised release statute \u2014section 3583(i)\nE. Backward-Looking Tolling Inapplicable Regardless of When an Adjudication of Guilt Occurs\n1. No Analogous Tolling Statute\n2. 18 U.S.C. section 3583(i) Intended for Precisely these Instances\nF. Petitioner's Supervised Release Term Expired Prior to Any Preservation or Suspension by District Court\n1. Definition of \"Conviction\" in Conjunction with \"Imprisoned\" \u2014Context\n2. Instanced in Titles 18 and 28 where \"Imprisoned\" Used \u2014and Language Relating to Detention",
        "reference": "1. United States v. Roy Lee Johnson, which Thwarts the Government's Attempts at Confusing a Straightforward Statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.21
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Constitution requires apportionment based on total resident population\nB. The Census and Reapportionment Acts implement the constitutional mandate\nC. The Executive Branch has consistently recognized that apportionment must be based on total population\nII. The President's Memorandum Will Produce An Inaccurate Apportionment And Undermine The Integrity Of The House's Composition",
        "reference": "I. The President's Memorandum Violates The Constitutional And Statutory Requirements That Apportionment Be Based On Total Population",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1618_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Plain Language of Title VII Forbids Sexual Orientation Discrimination Because it is a Form of Sex Discrimination\nA. Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Sex Discrimination Because Sexual Orientation is a Sex-Based Classification\nB. Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Associational Sex Discrimination\nC. Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Sex Stereotype Discrimination Under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins\nD. The Court Clearly Held in Oncale that Title VII Prohibits \"Any Kind\" of Sex-Based Discrimination\nII. The Statutory History of Title VII Confirms that it Forbids Sexual Orientation Discrimination as a Form of Sex Discrimination\nA. Congress Rejected Limitations on the Sex Discrimination Prohibition in Title VII and Confirmed the Classification-Based Approach with the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act\nB. Congress Incorporated into Title VII an Expansive Definition of Sex-Based Discrimination from Newport News, Meritor, and Price Waterhouse with the Civil Rights Act of 1991\nC. The Court Unanimously Recognized in Oncale that Title VII Must be Read to Prohibit Forms of Sex Discrimination not Contemplated by Congress in 1964\nIII. Title VII Must be Interpreted to Prohibit Sexual Orientation Discrimination Because the Contrary Interpretation Would Place Different Parts of the Statute in Conflict and is Profoundly Unworkable\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Sex Stereotype Discrimination Based on Gay or Lesbian \"Traits\" and Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Profoundly Unworkable",
        "reference": "A. Title VII Must Be Interpreted to Prohibit Sexual Orientation Discrimination to Give Effect to all the Anti-Discrimination Provisions of the Statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1114_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. HHS' S INTERPRETATION OF THE DISPUTED STATUTE IS NOT ENTITLED TO CHEVRON DEFERENCE\nA. Chevron Step One Requires Courts to Closely Examine Text and Context to Determine Whether a Statute Is Truly Ambiguous\nB. The Appeals Court Improperly Truncated Its Statutory Analysis after Concluding that the Constructions Offered by Both Sides Raised Interpretive Dilemmas\nC. Kisor's Limitations on Auer Deference Are Fully Applicable to Chevron Deference\nII. CHEVRON DEFERENCE SHOULD BE ABANDONED ALTOGETHER BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Agency Deference Violates Due Process by Requiring Judges to Bias Their Decisions in Favor of One Party\nC. The Propriety of Chevron Deference Is Being Questioned with Increasing Frequency by Federal Courts",
        "reference": "A. Agency Deference Violates Article III by Requiring Judges to Abandon Their Duty of Independent Judgment",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-846_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "The Fair Credit Reporting Act does not waive the United States' sovereign immunity for claims under 15 U.S.C. 1681n and 1681o\nA. A waiver of sovereign immunity requires unmistakably clear statutory language\n1. A cause of action is ineffective against the sovereign unless accompanied by a waiver of sovereign immunity\n2. A waiver of sovereign immunity must be unequivocal and unambiguous\nB. FCRA's general remedial provisions do not contain an unmistakably clear waiver of the United States' immunity\n1. Congress has not waived sovereign immunity by directly addressing it in Sections 1681n or 1681o\n2. [MISSING]\na. Construing a cause of action as a waiver of sovereign immunity requires a direct reference to sovereign defendants\nb. A cause of action's cross-reference to a general definition that includes sovereigns is not an unequivocal and unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity\nc. FCRA's definition of \"person\" does not support an unequivocal and unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity against claims under Sections 1681n or 1681o\n3. Sections 1681n and 1681o do not even unambiguously incorporate FCRA's statutory definition of \"person\"\na. The meaning of \"person\" in FCRA is context-dependent\nb. The statutory definition of \"person\" does not apply to Sections 1681n and 1681o\nC. The court of appeals' decision produces inexplicable incongruities",
        "reference": "2. Congress has not waived sovereign immunity by explicitly singling out sovereigns as potential defendants in Sections 1681n or 1681o",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.79
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "i. THE COURT SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER THE AIA CHANGED THE MEANING OF \"ON SALE\"\nii. THIS IS THE PROPER CASE FOR REVIEW\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Statute at Issue Has Multiple Plausible Interpretations\nC. Resolution of the Underlying Questions in this Case has Broad Implications on the Patent System and Its Participants",
        "reference": "A. This Case Presents a Statutory Interpretation Question of First Impression",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-297_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Ramirez Failed To Prove That Any, Let Alone All, Absent Class Members Suffered An Article III Injury\nA. Concrete Injury For Every Class Member In A Damages Class Is Non-Negotiable\nB. Concrete Injury Is Lacking Here\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The reasonable-procedures claim\nII. Ramirez Was Demonstrably Not Typical Of The Class He Sought To Represent",
        "reference": "1. The disclosure claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1029_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "AUSTIN'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN ON AND OFF-PREMISES SIGNS IS A CONTENT-NEUTRAL REGULATION THAT IS VALID UNDER INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY\nI. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND STATE AND LOCAL JURISDICTIONS HAVE LONG IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON \"OFF-PREMISES\" SIGNS\nII. CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS ARE THOSE THAT REGULATE SPECIFIC SUBJECTS OR VIEWPOINTS\nA. Reed Did Not Change The Fundamental Meaning Of Content-Based Regulation\nB. [MISSING]\nC. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Unworkable, Encourages Draconian Speech Regulation, And Risks Diluting Strict Scrutiny\nIII. AUSTIN'S ORDINANCE IS A CONTENT-NEUTRAL PROVISION THAT SATISFIES INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY\nA. Austin's Off-Premises Rule Is Content Neutral\nB. Austin's Off-Premises Rule Meets Intermediate Scrutiny\nC. Austin's Off-Premises Rule Is Constitutional As Applied To Respondents And Is Not Overbroad",
        "reference": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. TRADEMARK OWNERS HAVE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO USE THEIR MARKS FOR EXPRESSIVE PURPOSES\nII. THE PUBLIC HAS A RIGHT TO KNOW THE SOURCE OF SPEECH\nIII. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S TEST DOES NOT CONSIDER THE TRADEMARK OWNER'S OR THE PUBLIC'S INTERESTS IN FREE SPEECH\nIV. COURTS MAY NOT SIMPLY SUBSTITUTE THEIR \"BALANCE\" OF FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS FOR CONGRESS'S CHOICES, AT LEAST WITHOUT A FOUNDATION IN THE TEXT OF THE STATUTE\nV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FAILED TO CONSIDER CONGRESS'S RECOGNITION OF COMMERCIAL PARODIES OR THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS REGARDING COMMERCIAL SPEECH, INFECTING ITS DECISION ON ALL ISSUES\nVI. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "VI. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND DIRECT LOWER COURTS TO RECONCILE THE LANHAM ACT'S PROTECTIONS WITH A PROPER BALANCE OF FIRST AMENDMENT AND STATUTORY INTERESTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-5904_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE TEXT OF THE FIRST STEP ACT MAKES INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED UNDER section 841(b)(1)(C) FOR CRACK-COCAINE OFFENSES ELIGIBLE FOR REDUCED SENTENCES\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act \"Modified\" section 841(b)(1)(C)\nII. CONGRESS'S PLAN WAS TO PROVIDE BROAD RELIEF TO INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED FOR CRACK-COCAINE OFFENSES, INCLUDING THOSE SENTENCED UNDER section 841(b)(1)(C)\nA. Congress Was Especially Concerned with People Sentenced for Low-Level Crack-Cocaine Offenses When It Passed the Fair Sentencing Act\nB. Interpreting the First Step Act to Provide Relief to People Sentenced for Crack-Cocaine Offenses Pursuant to section 841(b)(1)(C) Accords with the Act's Broad Remedial Purpose",
        "reference": "A. The Phrase \"Federal Criminal Statute\" Refers to section 841(a) in this Case",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-938_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S ORDER DENYING RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY WAS FINAL AND IMMEDIATELY APPEALABLE\nA. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14\nB. The relevant \"proceeding\" is the process of resolving a stay relief motion, which becomes \"final\" when the motion is granted or conclusively denied\n1. Stay relief involves a discrete claim, a discrete proceeding, and a discrete decision based on a legal standard\n2. Resolving a motion for stay relief triggers significant consequences\n3. The bankruptcy court did not deny Ritzen's motion without prejudice\n4. Textual clues suggest that a stay relief motion is the relevant proceeding for purposes of appealability\n5. The history of the Bankruptcy Code does not support Ritzen's argument\nC. The majority of circuits have long held that orders denying relief from the automatic stay are \"final\"\nII. PERMITTING AN IMMEDIATE APPEAL FROM THE DENIAL OF STAY RELIEF PROMOTES CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY\nA. Congress intended for courts to conclusively and expeditiously resolve stay relief requests in bankruptcy cases\nB. Providing that the denial of stay relief is immediately appealable promotes judicial efficiency in bankruptcy cases\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Postponing appeal of the denial of stay relief creates practical problems for the administration of bankruptcy cases",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.85
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT CREATED BY THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S INCORRECT DECISION IN MCDONOUGH WILL CAUSE TREMENDOUS HARM TO CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS\nA. The Second Circuit Vitiates The Reasoning Behind The Bright Line Rule Set In Heck And Creates An Unworkable Standard Potentially Shortening The Statute Of Limitations On Section 1983 Claims\nB. Even If Heck Does Not Foreclose Criminal Defendants From Filing A Section 1983 Lawsuit While Their Criminal Case Is Pending, The Second Circuit's Decision Should Still Be Reversed\n1. The Second Circuit's rule is harmful to criminal defendants by hindering their ability to bring meritorious Section 1983 claims\n2. The Second Circuit's ruling creates practical difficulties forcing courts to engage in complicated factual determinations likely to negatively affect criminal defendants\n3. The Second Circuit's standard makes it difficult for defendants to be competently represented by counsel\n4. The Second Circuit's rule encourages unethical state actors to fabricate evidence while harming ethical state actors\n5. The Second Circuit's rule forces defendants to bring partial claims\n6. The circuit split will cause confusion and uncertainty in the lower courts\nII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT REACHED ITS DECISION BY IMPROPERLY TREATING FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE CLAIMS LIKE FALSE ARREST CLAIMS, RATHER THAN MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AS FIVE OTHER CIRCUITS DO\nA. Malicious Prosecution Is The Appropriate Tort Analogue\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. The Second Circuit Improperly Treated Fabrication Of Evidence Claims Like False Arrest Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-15_Brief013.pdf",
        "text": "I. Separation of Powers Is One of the Most Important Structural Features of the Constitutional Design to Protect Liberty\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Auer and Seminole Rock May be Overruled Consistent with Traditional Stare Decisis Principles",
        "reference": "II. Seminole Rock and Auer Deference Violate the Separation of Powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The corpus data undermines Heller's interpretation of the Second Amendment\nA. The data shows Heller to have been mistaken about founding-era usage\n1. bear and arms\n2. bear arms\n3. keep arms\n4. the right of the people\n5. [MISSING]\n6. Other issues\nB. In light of the corpus data (and the analytical framework in Heller) the Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment is untenable\nII. The NRA Fund's criticism of corpus linguistics as an interpretive tool is unfounded\nA. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally\nB. Frequency analysis is also appropriate in the context of Heller and the Second Amendment",
        "reference": "5. the right of the people to bear arms",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1594_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Treating the Government as a Person Best Effectuates Congressional Intent Behind the AIA Post-Issuance Review Provisions\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Treating the Government as a Person for Purposes of Post-Issuance Review Advances This Congressional Intent\nII. Compared to the Alternative, Government Participation in Post-Issuance Review Better Serves Principles of Good Governance\nA. The Executive Can Alternatively Initiate Review of a Patent Through Ex Parte Reexamination\nB. Channeling the Government Instead Toward AIA Review Better Promotes Transparency, Due Process, and Separation of Functions",
        "reference": "A. To Promote Correctness in Patent Grants, Congress Intended to Open Post-Issuance Review to All Stakeholders",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. California's requirement that petitioners grant others physical access to their property violates the Takings Clause\nA. Stable and consistent interpretation of the Takings Clause is essential for business and investment\nB. The Access Regulation effects a per se Takings Clause violation\nC. The duration of the organizers' invasion of petitioners' property goes to the extent of compensation required, not the existence of a per se Takings Clause violation\nD. Neither PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins nor NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. supports granting union organizers physical access to petitioners' private property\nII. A holding that California effected a per se taking here would not threaten traditional regulatory regimes that call for governmental inspectors to access private property\nA. [MISSING]\nB. When the government enforces criminal or regulatory prohibitions, it typically has Fourth Amendment authority to conduct reasonable searches of private property",
        "reference": "A. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, being required to admit government inspectors onto private property is frequently a reasonable condition of a government-issued license",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-174_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. Amicus APWU Takes No Position on the Standard for Accommodating Workers' Right of Free Religious Expression, Which Is Distinct From a Right to Preferential Treatment in Work Assignment\nII. The Right of All Workers to a Non-Discriminatory System for Assigning Weekend Work May Not Be Subjected to a Religious Test: Estate of Thornton v. Caldor\nA. If the Court reconsiders Hardison's statutory focus on employer rights, the Court must consider the independent Constitutional rights of non-religious workers or workers of other faiths passed over in Hardison\nB. Non-religious workers have free exercise rights against forced subsidy of others' exercise of religious observance\n1. [MISSING]\n2. Petitioner's position on Question 2 would abolish the core tenet that the Free Exercise Clause protects non-believers and believers alike from religious tests\n3. Weekends are not an exclusive privilege for the religious\n4. Petitioner is not urging an anti-discrimination law; he is arguing for Title VII as a program of preferential rights for religious believers\n5. Congress' intent in Title VII is irrelevant if it legislated a religious test for preferential employment rights",
        "reference": "1. The issue presented in Question 2 of the certiorari petition has already been answered in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress's Express Recognition Of Housing Assistance Eligibility For ANCs Confirms Their Inclusion Within ISDEAA\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress's Repeated References to ANCs within NAHASDA Confirm that ANCs Are \"Indian Tribes.\"\nII. Alaska Native Corporations Are Integral To The Success Of Federal Housing Assistance To Alaska Natives\nA. Housing Programs Administered by Regional ANC Designees Have Provided Critical Services to Alaska Natives\nB. It Would Be Impossible to Meet the Needs of Alaska Native and American Indian Populations in Alaska without the Regional ANCs",
        "reference": "A. Like ISDEAA, NAHASDA Was Designed to Permit Indian Tribes, Defined to Include ANCs, to Structure Services to Best Fit Their Communities",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-961_Brief028.pdf",
        "text": "Plaintiffs [MISSING]\nA. Plaintiffs must show a concrete harm or certainly impending risk of concrete harm\nB. The complaint does not allege facts that establish the named plaintiffs' standing\n1. Plaintiffs have not alleged an already-recognized tangible or intangible harm or a certainly impending risk of such harm\na. Disclosure of the search terms by themselves could not inflict harm or create a plausible risk of harm\nb. The absence of allegations plausibly linking search terms to the plaintiff conducting the search further confirms the absence of harm or sufficient risk of harm\nc. Even if the alleged search terms could have been linked to the named plaintiffs, disclosure of those terms could not inflict harm or create a sufficient risk of harm\n2. The Stored Communications Act does not elevate the disclosure of every search term to a harm sufficient to establish standing\na. Disclosure of a search term is not analogous to a harm actionable at common law\nb. Congress did not elevate disclosure of every search term to an actionable intangible harm\nC. Even if the complaint's allegations were sufficient, Google would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing to disprove the relevant allegations",
        "reference": "Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Pursue This Action",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.91
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Statistical Evidence is Robust.\nB. The Statistical Evidence of Racial Discrimination is Robust.\nII. The Statistical Evidence of Discrimination Against Asian Americans Makes This an Ideal Vehicle to Clarify the Scope of Title VI.\nA. The court below erred when it suggested the statistical evidence of an Asian American \"penalty\" was not significant.\nB. The court below erred by finding that inclusion of the personal rating was proper.",
        "reference": "I. The Statistical Evidence of Discrimination Makes This an Ideal Vehicle to Revisit Race Discrimination in College Admissions.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1027_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "The Officers Were Required To Obtain A Warrant To Search Petitioner's Vehicle\nA. The Fourth Amendment provides especially strong protection for individuals' homes and surrounding curtilage\n1. Special protection for the privacy of the home has a lengthy historical pedigree\n2. The Fourth Amendment was adopted to safeguard the privacy of Americans' homes\n3. The Fourth Amendment's special solicitude for the home extends to its curtilage\n4. [MISSING]\nB. Warrantless searches of vehicles parked on curtilage would seriously erode the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home\nC. The justifications underlying the Automobile exception do not apply when a vehicle is parked on the curtilage",
        "reference": "4. Protection of the home is an example of the Fourth Amendment's broad protection of private property against unjustified government intrusion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. The BPCIA Was Enacted To Promote The Development Of Affordable, Life-Saving Drugs\nII. Under This Court's Precedents, The BPCIA Should Be Severed From The Individual Mandate And Other Insurance Reforms\nA. There Is A Strong Presumption In Favor Of Severability\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Developments Since 2010 Confirm That The BPCIA Stands On Its Own, Independent Of The Individual Mandate\nD. Respondents' Arguments For Wholesale Invalidation Ignore The Bases For Severing The BPCIA\nIII. At A Minimum, The Court Should Sever The BPCIA From The Individual Mandate Because The Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Challenge It",
        "reference": "B. The BPCIA Is Not Connected To The Individual Mandate Or The Other Insurance Provisions And It Will Operate Exactly As Congress Intended If The Mandate Is Held Unconstitutional",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "The Court should overrule Abood and hold that the First Amendment prohibits compulsory agency fees in public employment\nA. Compulsory agency fees in public employment do not withstand First Amendment scrutiny:\n1. Exacting scrutiny applies to the compelled subsidization of speech on issues of public policy\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Compulsory agency fees in public employment therefore require exacting scrutiny\n4. Compulsory agency fees in public employment do not withstand the appropriate level of scrutiny\nB. Compulsory agency fees in public employment do not withstand Pickering balancing\n1. Pickering balancing does not apply to petitioner's First Amendment challenge\n2. Even if Pickering balancing applies, compulsory agency fees in public employment are unconstitutional\nC. Stare decisis does not require reaffirming Abood",
        "reference": "2. Public-sector collective bargaining necessarily involves issues of public policy",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.7
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "A. This Court's prior precedent is being called into question in lawsuits around the country, and States need clear guidance about how to apply WWH\n1. [MISSING]\nB. The Court should uphold the Fifth Circuit's application of WWH and provide further clarity on how WWH must be applied in future cases\n1. The Court should clarify that abortion regulations are not subject to strict scrutiny\n2. If States must prove their laws confer a \"benefit,\" the benefit should be that the regulation advances the State's purported interest\n3. The Court should reject that WWH articulated a proportional balancing test and should require proximate causation\nC. States must have meaningful space to further their legitimate interests in regulating abortion",
        "reference": "1. If the Court did not intend for WWH to unsettle its prior precedent, it should reaffirm the decisional baselines that States may rely on in abortion jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-9674_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "III. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The State's Insistence That the Challenged Opinion Represents a \"Straightforward\" Application of Strickland Only Underscores the Problem with Strickland",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-96_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Congress Is Not Subject to a Clear-Statement Rule Before Subjecting Territories to Suit in Federal Court\nA. Rules Governing State Sovereign Immunity Do Not Apply to Territories\nB. No Other Clear-Statement Rule Constrains Congress in Subjecting Territories to Suit\nII. Under Any Standard, Congress Abrogated Whatever Immunity the Board Enjoys\nA. At Most, PROMESA Must Evince the Unmistakable Implication that Congress Intended Abrogation\nB. PROMESA Clearly Intended to Eliminate Any Immunity Against Federal-Court Suits\nC. The Board's and Government's Contrary Interpretations Lack Merit\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Remand Is Unwarranted",
        "reference": "D. Abrogation Fits with PROMESA's Design",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1484_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. Only This Court Can Decide Cases Determining Rights to the Mainstream",
        "reference": "A. The Navajo Nation Seeks Rights to the Mainstream",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-10_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The text of the aggravated identity theft statute does not cover Dubin's conduct\nA. Dubin did not \"use\" Patient L's name \"in relation to\" his healthcare fraud violation\nB. Dubin did not use Patient L's name \"without lawful authority\"\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The statute's title\nB. Statutory design\nC. Statutory structure\nIII. The Government's interpretation of Section 1028A contravenes the constitutional avoidance canon and the rule of lenity",
        "reference": "II. The Government's interpretation of Section 1028A is incompatible with the statute's title, design, and structure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-376_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The decisions below erred on each of the questions presented\n1. ICWA does not impermissibly commandeer the States\n2. The individual plaintiffs lack standing to challenge ICWA's third-ranked placement preferences\n3. ICWA's third-ranked placement preferences are rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives\nB. The Court should grant review of the questions presented by the government\n1. The Court should decline to narrow the questions presented\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. The Court should decline to broaden the questions presented",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1712_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The second question presented warrants this Court's review\nA. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Lower courts disagree on this question\nII. The first question presented also warrants this Court's review\nIII. The Court should direct the parties to brief the additional question whether the court of appeals erred in addressing \"statutory standing\" before Article III standing",
        "reference": "B. The court of appeals erred in holding that petitioners lacked \"statutory standing\"",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.17
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-422_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Press Their Partisan Gerrymandering Claims\nII. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Are Not Justiciable\nA. The Framers Delegated the Delicate Task of Federal Oversight of State Regulations Concerning Congressional Elections to Congress, Not Federal Courts\nB. [MISSING]\nIII. The District Court's Tests Are The Antithesis Of Judicially Discernible And Manageable Standards\n1. Equal Protection Clause\n2. First Amendment\n3. Sections 2 and 4 of Article I\nIV. The 2016 Map Is Not An Unconstitutional Partisan Gerrymander",
        "reference": "B. There Are No Judicially Discernible or Manageable Standards for Adjudicating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1606_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. The disability claims process is long, complicated, and can be confusing to claimants\nII. Prior decisions of this court resolve the issue of jurisdiction\nIII. The Appeals Council's wrongful dismissals cause harm to claimants\nA. The stage at which a claim is dismissed arbitrarily determines whether the claimant may obtain review of the dismissal\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Appeals Council has an enormous workload, resulting in hasty and erroneous decisions\nD. Appeals Council denials on the merits are often erroneous, resulting in frequent federal court reversals\nIV. Allowing review of Appeals Council dismissals will cause only a slight increase in federal court filings",
        "reference": "B. Appeals Council dismissals entail less rigorous review than other types of Appeals Council dispositions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IMMUNIZES VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AND SHOULD BE NARROWLY CABINED\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The government must prove intent to speak\nB. A reasonable observer must attribute the speech to the government",
        "reference": "II. THE COURT SHOULD ADOPT A NARROW INTENT AND EFFECT TEST",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-86_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. The FTC's unchecked power is particularly harmful to hospitals\nA. Hospital mergers often reduce costs, improve care, and benefit patients\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The FTC's disproportionate scrutiny deters pro-competitive hospital mergers\nII. FTC enforcement actions raise constitutional concerns that should be promptly addressed by Article III courts, but are not, to the detriment of healthcare providers and patients\nA. FTC enforcement raises due process concerns\nB. These due process concerns are underscored by material differences between DOJ and FTC enforcement actions",
        "reference": "B. The FTC subjects hospital mergers to disproportionate scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-485_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Second Circuit Adopted an Improperly Narrow View of the Harm Caused by Fabricated Evidence\nII. Having Section 1983 Claims Accrue During the Related Criminal Proceeding Will Traduce the Rights of the Accused and Waste Prosecutorial Resources\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Having Claims Accrue at the Conclusion of Criminal Proceedings Avoids These Problems",
        "reference": "III. Early Accrual Contravenes the Ripeness Doctrine and Wastes Judicial Resources",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-290_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. A state-law failure-to-warn claim should not be preempted on impossibility grounds unless the FDA actually rejected the warning at issue\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. In the alternative, if impossibility preemption requires determining the FDA's hypothetical actions, that determination should be made by a jury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1712_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SECOND QUESTION PRESENTED DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW\nII. THE FIRST QUESTION PRESENTED DOES NOT WARRANT REVIEW\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. THE UNITED STATES' PROPOSED QUESTION CONFIRMS CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The exclusion from apportionment of \"Indians not taxed\" does not warrant the exclusion of unauthorized immigrants\nA. The Constitution's text does not support excluding unauthorized immigrants from the apportionment count\nB. The authority cited by amici Congressman Brooks, et al. and amicus Alabama actually supports including unauthorized immigrants in the apportionment count\nC. Attempts to compare unauthorized immigrants to \"Indians not taxed\" misapprehend Indian law and are inapt\nII. Unauthorized immigrants are \"persons\" for purposes of the Apportionment Clauses\nA. American Indians know all too well the sting of being told that they are not \"persons\"\nB. Simplistic attempts to limit the enumeration of \"persons\" to members of the body politic are wholly inconsistent with the Constitution's text\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. The exclusion from the apportionment count of \"corporate persons\" and other legal fictions cannot justify the exclusion of unauthorized immigrants, who are actual, living, breathing persons",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1299_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. THERE IS NO REASON TO DISMISS THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. STARE DECISIS DOES NOT JUSTIFY MAINTAINING HALL",
        "reference": "II. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1410_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. EVEN UNDER THE GOVERNMENT'S (ERRONEOUS) GOOD FAITH STANDARD, PETITIONER'S CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED\nII. [MISSING]\nA. In Light Of The Government's Concession Regarding Alabama Law, The Court Of Appeals Should Be Directed To Dismiss The Case On Remand\nB. At A Minimum, The Court Should Remand For A New Trial At Which The Correct Good Faith Instruction Will Be Given",
        "reference": "II. ON REMAND, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE DIRECTED EITHER TO DISMISS DR. RUAN'S CASE OUTRIGHT OR, AT A MINIMUM, TO ORDER A NEW TRIAL ON ALL COUNTS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-443_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The CCA's Ruling Relies On Lay Stereotypes, Conflicts With Medical Standards, And Is Inconsistent With This Court's Prior Decision\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The Prosecutor And Petitioner Agree That Petitioner Is Intellectually Disabled And May Not Be Executed",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-896_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Third and Ninth Circuits' bond-hearing regime has no basis in the statutory text\nB. The Third and Ninth Circuits' bond-hearing regime conflicts with this Court's precedents\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Zadvydas does not justify imposing the Third and Ninth Circuits' bond-hearing regime",
        "reference": "C. Constitutional avoidance does not justify imposing the Third and Ninth Circuits' bond-hearing regime",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1268_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "Plaintiffs [MISSING]\nA. Plaintiffs invoking the federal cause of action in 28 U.S.C. 1605A(c) may recover punitive damages for pre-enactment conduct\nB. Plaintiffs suing under state or foreign causes of action, in reliance on the exception to foreign sovereign immunity in 28 U.S.C. 1605A(a), may recover punitive damages for pre-enactment conduct",
        "reference": "Plaintiffs suing foreign state sponsors of terrorism under 28 U.S.C. 1605A may recover punitive damages for pre-enactment conduct",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-476_Brief026.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The activity at issue here is pure speech, which is subject to a different legal standard than mere commercial conduct.\nIII. The meaning of speech is inherently contextual, and the meaning conveyed by Ms. Smith's speech is substantively different from the kinds of \"dignitary harm\" combatted by public-accommodations laws.",
        "reference": "I. There is no legitimate or compelling state interest in protecting citizens from exposure to allegedly stigmatizing ideas or concepts.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5410_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. ACCA's Force Clause Does Not Reach Reckless Offenses\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Excluding Reckless Offenses Comports With ACCA's Purpose, In Contrast To The Gun-Control Provision In Voisine\nII. ACCA Should Not Apply To Reckless Offenses Absent A Clear Indication From Congress\nA. The Court Has At Least As Much Reason To Apply Lenity Here As It Did In Leocal\nB. Application Of The Rule Of Lenity Here Would Avoid The Pernicious Effects Of A Broad Reading Of ACCA",
        "reference": "A. The Text Of ACCA's Force Clause, Like The Clause At Issue In Leocal And Unlike The Clause In Voisine, Does Not Cover Reckless Offenses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-571_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE REGISTRATION APPROACH BEST ACCOMPLISHES CONGRESS'S VITAL AIMS\nA. The Registration Approach Best Ensures a Robust Copyright Registry\nB. The Registration Approach Best Conserves Judicial Resources\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THE PETITIONER'S PRACTICAL CONCERNS ARE OVERSTATED",
        "reference": "C. The Registration Approach Best Sustains the Library of Congress",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.2
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-543_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Purported Circuit Conflict Is Illusory\nA. No Circuit Conflict Exists Under the CARES Act\nB. No Circuit Conflict Exists Under ISDA\nC. Any Questions About ISDA Should Be Resolved in an ISDA Case, If One Were To Arise\nD. The Practical Consequences of the Decision Below Are Overstated\nII. The Decision Below Is Correct\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The Legislative History Confirms the Ordinary Meaning of the Text\nC. No ANC Presently Satisfies the Recognition Clause\nD. Congress Has Not Ratified Any Well-Settled Judicial or Agency Interpretation of the \"Indian Tribe\" Definition That Contravenes Its Plain Meaning\nIII. The Court Should Also Deny Review Because Tribal Governments Urgently Need the Remaining Title V Funding To Combat the Pandemic",
        "reference": "A. The Recognition Clause Squarely Applies to ANCs",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-942_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit erred in giving Washington's content and viewpoint-based regulation only rational basis scrutiny.\nB. This Court should grant certiorari to clarify that the \"professional speech doctrine\" was fully abrogated by NIFLA.",
        "reference": "I. The Ninth Circuit upheld a content-based and viewpoint-based regulation in defiance of this Court's holding in NIFLA.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-843_Brief046.pdf",
        "text": "I. New York's Gun Licensing Regime Is Consistent With Longstanding Historical Limitations On The Right To Bear Arms\nII. The Presence Of Firearms In Dense Urban Areas Presents Unique Concerns\nA. New York City's Population Density Makes The Regulation Of Firearms Uniquely Necessary\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. An Unrestricted Carry Right Would Be Harmful To Businesses In New York City And Other Populated Areas",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-107_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Access Regulation Effects a Physical Taking and Violates the Fifth Amendment Because It Takes an Easement From Petitioners Without Compensation\nA. The Uncompensated Appropriation of a Discrete Property Interest Is a Physical Taking\nB. The Access Regulation Effects a Physical Taking Because It Appropriates an Easement in Gross Without Compensation\nC. The Access Regulation's Time Limits Do Not Exempt It From Categorical Treatment\nII. [MISSING]\nA. The Right to Exclude Is Fundamental\nB. Only a Per Se Rule for All Easements Adequately Protects the Right to Exclude",
        "reference": "II. A Per Se Rule Is Needed to Protect the Right to Exclude",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief043.pdf",
        "text": "I. USTELECOM'S MEMBERS ARE BUILDING NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS THAT INCREASINGLY RELY ON SOFTWARE INTERFACES\nA. USTelecom Members and Other Network Providers Have Invested Huge Sums of Money Into Their Networks, and Anticipate Investing Even More\nB. [MISSING]\nII. A HOLDING FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE AND COPYRIGHTABILITY OF \"SOFTWARE INTERFACES\" WOULD UNDERMINE PROVIDERS' ABILITY TO FULFILL KEY LEGAL AND BUSINESS OBLIGATIONS\nA. USTelecom Members Must Ensure Network Security and Resilience\nB. USTelecom Members Must Ensure Their Customers' Privacy\nC. USTelecom Members Must Retain Flexibility to Innovate and Compete as New Business Models Arise\nD. USTelecom Members Would Be Impeded in Achieving These Critical Goals if All Software Interfaces Were Ineligible for Copyright Protection\nE. Alternative Means of Protecting Property Rights in Software Interfaces Are Less Effective or Less Practical Than Copyright",
        "reference": "B. Next-Generation Networks Increasingly Rely on Software",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. PLAINTIFFS PRESENT NO LEGAL ERROR JUSTIFYING FURTHER REVIEW BY THIS COURT\nA. Hellerstedt does not preclude, and affirmatively supports, fact-specific review of the public health benefits of Act 620\nB. Hellerstedt affirmatively supports fact-specific review of Act 620's alleged burdens\nC. [MISSING]\nII. THE CASE IS PROCEDURALLY UNSUITED TO FURTHER REVIEW\nA. Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of citing \"whatever is essential to ready and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration.\"\nB. Multiple complex issues of fact and law would hamper review of the issues Plaintiffs raise\nIII. INSOFAR AS THE CASE MERITS REVIEW, IT IS ONLY TO CLARIFY OR LIMIT HELLERSTEDT",
        "reference": "C. Hellerstedt affirmed and applied the \"substantial obstacle\" test",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.38
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-290_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The court of appeals erred in rejecting petitioner's preemption defense\nA. The meaning and effect of FDA's May 2009 decision present a legal question that a court must resolve\nB. FDA's May 2009 decision rejected a change to Fosamax's Warnings and Precautions because the data at that time was insufficient to justify a change\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. The court of appeals' decision warrants review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-234_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Case Is An Ideal Vehicle To Clarify The Scope Of Clear And Unmistakable Error",
        "reference": "I. The Decision Below Is Incorrect",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-984_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. ALLOWING HOSPITALS TO AVOID OVERTIME FOR THE HIGHEST PAID NURSES WOULD EXACERBATE SHORT STAFFING IN HOSPITALS, NEGATIVELY IMPACTING PATIENT CARE\nA. Nurse Workload Is a Primary Factor in Retention and Patient Care\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Allowing Hospitals to Avoid Overtime for the Most Qualified Bedside Nurses Would Exacerbate Current Negatives Pressures on the Workforce\nD. At the Time the Streamlined HCE Rule Was First Adopted, the DOL Repeatedly Explained that the Salary Basis and Reasonable Relationship Tests Would Prevent the Rule from Negatively Impacting Nurse Overtime",
        "reference": "B. Nurses Face Deteriorating Working Conditions that Are Negatively Impacting Retention and Patient Care",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Health Centers are the Main Source of Accessible Primary Care for Over 28 Million Low-Income Individuals and Medically Underserved Communities\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Health Centers Deliver Quality, Cost-Effective Services While Serving More At-Risk Patients than Other Ambulatory Primary Care Providers\nIV. Completely Repealing the ACA, Including Invalidating Key Health Center Program Provisions such as the CHC Fund, Teaching and NHSC Funding, and Health Center Medicare PPS, and Critical Sources of Revenue that Support Operations such as the Medicaid Expansion and the Subsidized Health Insurance Marketplace Would Severely Jeopardize Health Centers' Ability to Deliver the Primary Care Services Upon Which Over 28 Million Low-Income Individuals and Thousands of Medically Underserved Communities Depend",
        "reference": "II. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Expanded and Strengthened the Health Center Program",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1091_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Fourteenth Amendment Was a Response to Rampant Infringement of Fundamental Liberties by the States, Including Deprivations of Property Rights and the Use of Severe Penalties\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. The Indiana Supreme Court Abdicated Its Responsibility To Enforce the Protections Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment",
        "reference": "II. The Fourteenth Amendment Transformed the Nation's Federal System To Prevent States from Violating the Freedoms Set Forth in the Bill of Rights",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The Rogers Test, as applied by the Ninth Circuit and other Circuits, has resulted in the creation of an unworkable standard\nIII. The Rogers Test is wholly unnecessary",
        "reference": "I. The Rogers Test, which underpins the Ninth Circuit's decision, is judge-made law, unsupported by the Lanham Act",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1702_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S STATE ACTION CASES AND CREATES A NEW, UNWORKABLE STATE ACTION EXCEPTION\nA. There is no Precedent for Skipping the Threshold State Action Analysis\nB. There is no Precedent for the Second Circuit's Public Forum Determination\n1. Denver Area did not Hold That Public Access Channels are Constitutional Public Fora\n2. Where Courts Have Found Public Access Channels to be Public Fora, They Have First Applied State Action Tests\n3. This Court has Consistently Held That Privately-Owned and Controlled Fora are not Constitutional Public Fora\n4. The Majority's Public Forum Determination Effectively Imposes a per se Rule That all Public Access Channels are State Actors\nC. The Second Circuit's Belated State Action Determination is Tautological and Insufficient\nII. HAD THE SECOND CIRCUIT PROPERLY CONDUCTED THE THRESHOLD STATE ACTOR ANALYSIS, IT WOULD HAVE HELD THAT MNN IS NOT A STATE ACTOR OR PART OF THE GOVERNMENT\nA. [MISSING]\nB. MNN Does not Perform a Traditional and Exclusive Government Function, so it is not a State Actor Under the \"Public Function\" Test\nC. There Are no Allegations That the City Compelled or Coerced the Challenged Conduct, and MNN is Therefore not a State Actor Under the \"Compulsion\" or \"Coercive Power\" Test\nD. MNN Does not act Jointly or Enjoy a Symbiotic Relationship With the Government\nE. MNN is not Pervasively Entwined with the Government to Satisfy the Test Articulated in Brentwood\nIII. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS A RADICAL EXPANSION OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE WITH POTENTIALLY FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES\nA. Left Undisturbed, the Second Circuit's Ruling Would Establish an Amorphous, Unworkable State Action Inquiry\nB. The Second Circuit's Ruling may Have Additional Ramifications",
        "reference": "A. MNN is not a Part of the Government Under the Lebron Test Because the Government Does not Control its Board",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.12
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. All Parties Have Properly Asked This Court To Declare What Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment Means\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. Both Federal and State Courts Are Capable of Issuing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Section 3 Cases That Comply with Due Process\nIV. The Right To Vote and the Guarantee of Equal Protection Do Not Allow a Disqualified Candidate To Be Elected President but Not Hold Office",
        "reference": "II. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment Is the Constitution's Enhanced Self-Protection Device",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "RFRA does not authorize damages awards against federal officials in their personal capacities\nA. Damages awards are not \"appropriate relief\" in RFRA suits against individual federal officials\n1. The broader statutory language makes clear that damages awards against federal officials in their personal capacities are not \"appropriate relief\"\n2. Congress did not intend to impose personal liability on individual federal officials through a novel damages remedy in RFRA\n3. Damages awards against federal officials in their personal capacities are not appropriate relief unless Congress clearly indicates that they are\n4. This Court has held that damages are not \"appropriate relief\" under RFRA's companion statute, RLUIPA\nB. The counterarguments lack merit\n1. RFRA's definition of \"government\" does not render damages awards against individual federal officials in their personal capacities \"appropriate relief against a government\"\n2. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "2. Franklin does not require a presumption in favor of personal damages awards against federal officials under RFRA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-532_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Wyoming's Admission to the Union Did Not Abrogate the Crow Tribe's Treaty Right\nB. The Establishment of the Bighorn National Forest Did Not Abrogate the Crow Tribe's Treaty Right\nC. Affirming the Decision Below Would Have Far-Reaching Consequences\nII. Issue Preclusion Does Not Bar Petitioner From Addressing The Treaty Right's Validity\nA. The Repsis Courts' Determination that Wyoming's Statehood Abrogated the Treaty Right Is Not Entitled to Preclusive Effect\nB. The Tenth Circuit's Alternative Determination in Repsis that Creation of the Bighorn National Forest Rendered the Ceded Lands \"Occupied\" Is Not Entitled to Preclusive Effect\nC. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
        "reference": "I. The Crow Tribe's Hunting Right Under The 1868 Treaty Has Not Been Abrogated",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-302_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "A. Strict scrutiny under the First Amendment is unwarranted\n1. The scandalous-marks provision is not a restriction on speech\n2. Content-based distinctions are an inherent part of the federal trademark-registration program\n3. The scandalous-marks provision is viewpoint-neutral\nB. [MISSING]\n1. The scandalous-marks provision is reasonably related to legitimate government interests\n2. Upholding the scandalous-marks provision would not have the adverse consequences that respondent describes\nC. The Court's decision in Tam is not controlling here\nD. The scandalous-marks provision is not unconstitutionally vague",
        "reference": "B. The scandalous-marks provision satisfies First Amendment scrutiny",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.56
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief029.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Stare Decisis Promotes a Consistent and accurate view of the Free exercise Clause\nB. Smith should not be overturned. New York State, and other Governments, have a Strong reliance interest in Keeping Smith\nII. the Consequences of reversal Will have the Most impact on our Most vulnerable\nA. LGBTQ Families Play a Crucial role in America's Foster Care System\nB. Congress has Shown a desire at the Federal level to increase, not decrease, the Number of Foster Families Willing to Care for America's Foster Children\nIII. the requested remedy is unusual and improper for this Case\nA. CSS's Policy, Being impermissibly discriminatory, Cannot be Seen as Being equitable, Nor as Being in the Public interest, and if enacted Would result in Serious Negative Public Consequences",
        "reference": "I. Smith Should Continue to Guide Free exercise decisions under the First amendment to the united States Constitution",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-333_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Appellants Lack Standing Because They Fail to Allege an Invasion of a Legally Protected Interest\na. [MISSING]\nb. Appellants Are Misguided in Their Reliance on Anderson, Rutan, and Gralike\nc. The Concept of \"Vote Dilution\" Cannot Support a First Amendment Retaliation Claim in the Partisan Gerrymandering Context\nII. Partisan Gerrymandering Claims and Racial Gerrymandering Claims Cannot and Should Not be Harmonized\na. Congress Intervened in the Racial Gerrymandering Context and Not the Partisan Gerrymandering Context\nb. Race is a Protected Class Afforded Strict Scrutiny by the Courts While Partisanship Is Not\nc. Partisan Gerrymandering is a Defense to Claims of Racial Gerrymandering",
        "reference": "a. Partisan Gerrymandering Imposes No Burden on an Individual Citizen's First Amendment Rights and Therefore Does Not Cause Any Injury",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-721_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. State law cannot circumvent the Double Jeopardy Clause.\nA. The State cannot relabel an acquittal as not an acquittal to avoid the Double Jeopardy Clause.\nB. Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, an acquittal, even if repugnant to a conviction on another count, precludes retrial.\nII. Reversing the Georgia Supreme Court's decision would not harm defendants.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The possible reaction of Georgia and other states to a ruling in this case does not factor into the double jeopardy analysis.",
        "reference": "A. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not require states to affirm convictions that are repugnant to another verdict.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-2_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. RETRIEVING DATA FROM A \"CLOUD\" DATACENTER IN IRELAND REQUIRES COMPLEX PHYSICAL ACTIONS IN IRELAND\nIII. THE DATA IS PROTECTED IN A DIGITAL SAFE DEPOSIT BOX\nIV. THE CLOSER THE DATA, THE FASTER THE ACCESS",
        "reference": "I. \"CLOUD\" DATA ALWAYS HAS A SPECIFIC PHYSICAL LOCATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1501_Brief009.pdf",
        "text": "I. SEC Disgorgement Is Not An \"Injunction.\"\nII. SEC Disgorgement Is Not \"Equitable Relief.\"\nA. \"Equitable Relief\" Is Relief That Could Historically Be Obtained In The Courts Of Equity\nB. Disgorgement Was Unavailable In The Courts Of Equity\n1. Disgorgement Does Not Resemble Any Remedy Available To The Sovereign In The Courts Of Equity\n2. SEC Disgorgement Cannot Be Analogized To Traditional Equitable Remedies Awarded In Private Litigation\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. Congress Did Not Ratify The SEC's Non-Equitable Disgorgement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.71
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-340_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. COURTS MUST DETERMINE WHETHER THE FAA APPLIES BEFORE RELYING ON IT TO COMPEL ARBITRATION\nII. THE FAA DOES NOT APPLY TO TRANSPORTATION WORKERS' AGREEMENTS TO PERFORM WORK\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Congress Did Not Silently Incorporate into the FAA an Idiosyncratic Definition of \"Contracts of Employment\" that Differs from Its Ordinary Meaning\n1. The Use of the Word \"Employee\" as a Term of Art is Irrelevant to the Ordinary Meaning of the Phrase \"Contracts of Employment.\"\n2. There is No Canon of Statutory Construction that Justifies Ignoring the Ordinary Meaning of the Text\nC. The Purpose and Statutory Context of the Transportation-Worker Exemption Confirm that It Should Be Given Its Ordinary Meaning\nD. Prime's Meritless Policy Concerns Cannot Override the Statute's Plain Meaning\nIII. THE OPERATING AGREEMENT IS A TRANSPORTATION WORKER'S CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT EXEMPT FROM THE FAA",
        "reference": "A. When the FAA was Passed, the Ordinary Meaning of the Phrase \"Contracts of Employment\" was Agreements to Perform Work",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.11
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-9526_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "Oklahoma had jurisdiction over petitioner's crime\nI. The Creek Nation's former territory does not constitute a present-day Indian reservation for jurisdictional purposes\nA. Congress abolished the Creek Nation's domain in preparation for Oklahoma statehood\n1. The Creek Nation's former territory differed in key ways from typical reservations\n2. Congress viewed dismantling the Creek Nation's territory as a necessary predicate to Oklahoma statehood\n3. Congress transformed the Indian Territory and abolished the national domain of the Creek Nation\nB. Contemporaneous understanding refutes the existence of a present-day reservation having jurisdictional significance\nC. Subsequent Acts of Congress and other events confirm that there is no reservation today\nD. Petitioner's contrary arguments lack merit\nII. Oklahoma in any event had jurisdiction over petitioner's crime\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. A decision in favor of petitioner would have significant adverse consequences",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.45
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-418_Brief024.pdf",
        "text": "I. Government Authority to Regulate Employees' Speech is Narrow.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Government Speech Is Not All Speech Made in a Government Setting.\nC. Government Cannot Condition Public Employment on Foregoing Constitutional Rights.\nII. This Court Should Eliminate Any Doubt About The First Amendment's Protection For Academic Freedom.\nA. Free Speech Rights Are Not Shed at the Schoolhouse Gate.\nB. Public Schools Should Uphold Free Speech, Not Chill It, For Students Learn from Adults How to Treat Each Other.\nC. Academic Freedom is Fundamental to Civil Society and This Court Should Place it on Firmer Legal Footing.\nD. Public Engagement Cannot Be Used to Excuse Punishing Speech on Topics of Public Interest.",
        "reference": "A. Employees' Speech May Be Regulated Only While Speaking for the Government or Imperiling Government Operations.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decisions of the Minnesota and Montana Supreme Courts expose automobile manufacturers to nationwide personal jurisdiction.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. These decisions will have a particularly pernicious impact on the due process rights of automobile manufacturers.\nII. The Court should not wait any longer to finally resolve the question presented.",
        "reference": "A. These decisions erase the clear line between general and specific personal jurisdiction.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE MAJORITY RULE BEST FURTHERS section 16'S TEXT AND PURPOSE\nII. THE MINORITY RULE UNDERMINES THE FAA'S CORE POLICIES\nA. The minority rule upends the FAA's goal of streamlined efficiency\nB. The minority rule raises the costs of resolving disputes\nC. The minority rule squanders judicial resources\nD. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "D. The minority rule imperils harmonious business relations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISIONS UPSET SETTLED EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT AND ABOUT FREEDOM TO BUILD COMPATIBLE AND INTEROPERABLE SYSTEMS.\nA. Compatibility and Interoperability Through Programming Interfaces Are Essential Features of Countless Digital Products and Services.\nB. The Use of Others' Interfaces, Including for Compatibility and Interoperability, Without the Need to Ask Permission and Secure Copyright Licenses, Is Ubiquitous and Essential.\nC. A Legal Consensus That Interfaces Are Not Copyrightable, Resting Upon the Explicit Language of Section 102(b), Has Emerged Over Decades.\nD. [MISSING]\nII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISIONS MISAPPLIED THE COPYRIGHT ACT.\nA. Programming Interfaces Are \"Necessary Incidents\" for Other Software to Make Functional Use of the Programs' Capabilities.\nB. The Federal Circuit's Decisions Show That the Fair Use Doctrine Is Not an Acceptable Substitute for a Bright-Line Rule Against Copyright Control over Interfaces.\nC. The Federal Circuit's Decisions Improperly Allow Creators of Software Programs to Use Copyright to Control Unfairly All Uses of Products or Technology That Utilize Their Interfaces.",
        "reference": "D. The Federal Circuit's Disruption of the Legal Consensus Concerning the Free Use of Interfaces Causes Uncertainty Across Many Industries and Threatens Innovation.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief017.pdf",
        "text": "I. LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND\nA. Legal Standards\n1. The Patent Act\n2. This Court's Precedents\n3. The Federal Circuit's Precedents\n(a) \"Undue Experimentation\"\n(b) \"Full Scope\"\nB. Scientific Background\nC. The Federal Circuit's Merits Decision and Denial of Rehearing\n1. Merits Decision\n2. Rehearing Denial\nII. THE GRANT OF CERTIORARI WAS IMPROVIDENT\nIII. [MISSING]\nA. The Federal Circuit Did Not Adopt the Standard Challenged by Amgen\nB. Why Overbroad Claims Are Especially Problematic in the \"Unpredictable Arts\"\nC. The Example of HIV Treatment Shows How Overbroad Claims Can Stunt Innovation\nD. Experimentation-Based Standards Keep Overbroad Claims in Check",
        "reference": "III. ON THE MERITS, THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE AMGEN'S POSITION, IF ADOPTED, WOULD WEAKEN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ABILITY TO POLICE OVERBROAD CLAIMS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.06
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-46_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The question presented warrants review",
        "reference": "A. The Court of Appeals' Decision Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1307_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "INTRODUCTION\nI. States Have a Substantial Interest in Regulating Non-Judicial Foreclosures and the Practice of Law\nII. The FDCPA Does Not Explicitly Apply to Non-Judicial Foreclosure Remedies\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. There Is Not a Sufficient Federal Interest to Apply the FDCPA to State Law Non-Judicial Foreclosure Remedies",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1026_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The Federal Split Over Whether The Flores-Ortega Presumption Applies After An Appeal Waiver Is Apparently Based On Non-Constitutional Circuit Precedent Regarding What Appeal Rights Survived The Appeal Waiver\nC. This Idaho Case Is Unsuitable For Resolving The Federal Split",
        "reference": "A. The Idaho Supreme Court Correctly Held That The Flores-Ortega Presumption Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Does Not Apply Where, Under Idaho Law And Procedure, There Is No Right To Appeal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "I. AN ARBITRABILITY APPEAL DIVESTS THE DISTRICT COURT OF AUTHORITY TO PROCEED WITH LITIGATION\nA. All Parties Agree: Griggs Applies To Section 16(a)\nB. Applying Griggs To Section 16(a) Requires Staying District Court Proceedings\n1. The District Court's Authority To Proceed With Litigation Is The Question On Appeal\n2. Respondents Ask For A Special Exception To The Normal Griggs Rule\nC. [MISSING]\n1. The FAA's Other Sections Confirm That An Arbitrability Appeal Prevents Litigating In District Court\n2. Broader Statutory Context Confirms Congress Did Not Intend Litigation To Proceed During Arbitrability Appeals\nD. Staying District Court Proceedings Furthers Section 16's Purpose\nII. RESPONDENTS' INTERPRETATION OF THE FAA IS UNWORKABLE AND INEFFICIENT\nA. The Discretionary Stay Test Is Unworkable For Arbitration\nB. Section 16(a)'s Automatic Stay Is Efficient\nIII. SUSKI'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE FORFEITED, MERITLESS, AND IRRELEVANT",
        "reference": "C. Statutory Context Confirms Congress Intended To Stay Litigation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.46
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. There Is No Special Justification For Overruling Quill\nA. Retailers Have Justifiably Continued To Rely On Quill\n1. Retailers Were Entitled To Take This Court At Its Word\n2. Reliance In Light Of Continued Compliance Burdens Is Plainly Reasonable\na. Sales Tax Software Does Not Eliminate The Compliance Burdens\nb. Sales Tax Software Adds To The High Costs Of Compliance\nB. Quill Was Correctly Decided\nC. Quill Has Not Been Undermined By Later Decisions\nD. The Physical Presence Standard Is Not Unworkable\nE. Changed Circumstances Do Not Warrant Overturning Quill\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Amount Of Uncollected Tax Is Far Lower Than Previously Estimated And Diminishing Rapidly\nF. No Other Standard Provides A More Workable Rule\n1. \"Economic Presence\" Thresholds Are Fundamentally Flawed\n2. Pike Balancing Cannot Work\nII. Congress Remains The Proper Body To Address Whether, And In What Manner, To Alter The Quill Rule\nIII. Overruling Quill Presents The Risk Of Crippling Retroactive Liability For Retailers In Over 30 States",
        "reference": "1. Changes In Market Conditions Do Not Alter The Existence Of Unconstitutional Burdens On Interstate Commerce",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.82
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-148_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. Rogers v. Grimaldi Should Not Replace the Likelihood of Confusion Analysis for Lanham Act Infringement Claims Involving Ordinary Products\nA. For Parody to Be Found Infringing, Confusion Must Be Likely\nB. [MISSING]\nC. An Assessment More Robust than the Rogers Test Is Required to Assess Infringement Claims for Products\nII. The Lanham Act's Dilution Exclusion for \"Noncommercial Use\" Requires More than Just a \"Humorous Message\"",
        "reference": "B. The Development of the Rogers Test to Address Infringement Claims for Expressive Works",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1496_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "The Court of Appeals' Misinterpretation of the ATA's Aiding-and-Abetting Provision Risks Undermining The Global Distribution of Life-Saving Medicines.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Reversal of the Ninth Circuit's Incorrect Construction of ATA Aiding-and-Abetting Liability Is Necessary to Avoid Undermining Global Public Health.",
        "reference": "A. The D.C. Circuit Erroneously Reversed Dismissal of an ATA Aiding-and-Abetting Claim Against Manufacturers and Suppliers of Medical Goods Based on Legal Errors Similar to Those Presented Here.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-7028_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. Petitioners Failed to Preserve the \"Compelling Interest\" Issue on Appeal\nII. The Lower Courts Appropriately Applied RLUIPA's \"Compelling Interest\" Test.\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Petitioners Fail to Identify Unregulated \"Analogous\" Conduct.\nIII. There is No Conflict Between the Decision Below and RLUIPA's \"Least Restrictive Alternative\" Analysis\nA. Minnesota's SSTS Constitute the Least Restrictive Alternative for Adequately Treating Gray Water within the State.\nB. Petitioners' Proposed Mulch Systems Are Not Suitable For Use Within Minnesota.\nIV. The Court Should Not Stay A Decision on the Petition Pending the Outcome in the Cases Identified by Petitioners.",
        "reference": "A. The Lower Courts Analyzed the Imposition of the Government's SSTS Regulations on Petitioners.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-715_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Disclosure laws applicable to the President do not categorically contravene the separation of powers\nIII. Disclosure laws applicable to the President do not categorically violate the Qualifications Clause",
        "reference": "I. Financial disclosure laws are necessary and proper exercises of Congress's constitutional powers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-105_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Parties choose arbitration because it is more efficient than litigation.\nIII. Staying litigation pending appeal is especially important in putative class actions, where the threat of burdensome discovery is significant.\nIV. Requiring defendants to litigate while pursuing an interlocutory appellate decision on arbitrability deprives them of the benefits of arbitration.",
        "reference": "I. The Federal Arbitration Act reflects a liberal policy favoring streamlined arbitration.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief034.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Categorizations by Race or Ethnicity Have No Lawful Purpose in University Admissions\nIII. The Idea that an Individual's Race Communicates Something Relevant About Him Is Contrary to our Founding Principles",
        "reference": "I. The Grutter Approach Should Be Abandoned",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-248_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "1. States are complex entities deserving special legal interest analysis\na. States are institutionally and politically diverse\nb. States vary in the authority they vest in their attorneys general\nc. [MISSING]\n2. Rule 24 should be applied to states in a manner that respects state choice of litigants and legal counsel\na. States are entitled to designate representatives of \"the State\" when defending state laws, and North Carolina has done so here\nb. States, including individual officials of a state, are entitled to choose their own lawyers\nc. The representational authority of North Carolina's attorney general is limited\n3. Federal courts will benefit from the participation of legislative branches of state governments",
        "reference": "c. North Carolina has limited the scope of its attorney general's representations",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1705_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Hobbs Act barred petitioners from collaterally attacking the validity of the 2006 FCC order in civil litigation outside the Hobbs Act's channels\nA. The Hobbs Act provides the exclusive channel for obtaining judicial review of covered agency orders\nB. [MISSING]\n1. Petitioners' arguments lack a basis in the text\n2. The Administrative Procedure Act does not support petitioners' reading of the Hobbs Act\n3. Petitioners' other statutory arguments also lack merit\n4. Principles of constitutional avoidance do not support petitioners' approach\nII. Petitioners' argument that the 2006 FCC order was not reviewable under the Hobbs Act is not properly before this Court, and lacks merit in any event",
        "reference": "B. Petitioners' contrary arguments lack merit",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.88
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket23-719_Brief012.pdf",
        "text": "I. The president is not an \"officer of the United States\"\nII. President Trump did not \"engage in insurrection\"\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. Section 3 cannot be used to deny President Trump access to the ballot\nV. The Colorado Supreme Court violated the Electors Clause and the Colorado Election Code",
        "reference": "III. Section 3 should be enforced only through Congress's chosen methods of enforcement",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1530_Brief021.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Major Questions Doctrine As Protection Against Agency Overreach\nB. The State of Ohio and Energy Production\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Increased Energy Costs for Ohio Consumers and Manufacturers",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1011_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE IOIA'S \"SAME IMMUNITY\" PROVISION TRACKS THE CURRENT LAW OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, WHICH IS GOVERNED BY THE FSIA\nA. The Text Of The \"Same Immunity\" Provision Requires Tracking The Current Law Of Sovereign Immunity\nB. The Statute's Structure Reinforces That It Incorporates The FSIA\nC. The IOIA's Purpose And Drafting History Confirm That The \"Same Immunity\" Provision Incorporates The Current Law Of Foreign Sovereign Immunity\nII. EVEN IF THE IOIA LOCKED IN THE LAW OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS OF 1945, THAT LAW WOULD REQUIRE TRACKING THE FSIA\nA. The Immunity Rule For Foreign Governments In 1945 Was Not Absolute Immunity But Deference To The Political Branches\nB. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "B. Deference To The Political Branches Would Require Application Of The FSIA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.43
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-1323_Brief022.pdf",
        "text": "I. Abortion providers are not appropriate parties to represent the interests of women in assessing Act 620\nA. Litigants can rely on the constitutional rights of non-parties only in narrow circumstances\nB. Plaintiffs do not fall within the narrow circumstances where third-party standing is appropriate\nC. This Court can and should reach the third-party standing issue\nII. Act 620 is facially constitutional\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Plaintiffs failed to show that Act 620 creates a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion\nC. Act 620's benefits are sufficient to justify its burdens",
        "reference": "A. Under this Court's precedents, a law does not impose an undue burden unless it creates a substantial obstacle to a woman's ability to obtain an abortion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. Judicial Review of the Interpretation of Section 315(b) Is Necessary To Ensure That the PTO Does Not Exceed Its Statutory Authority\nA. [MISSING]\nB. The AIA's Limitations on the PTO's Authority To Institute Inter Partes Review Implement Important Policy Goals\nC. The PTO Exceeds Its Statutory Authority When Instituting Review in Violation of Section 315\nII. Judicial Review of the PTO's Application of Section 315(b) Protects Against Gamesmanship and Promotes Predictability\nA. The PTO's Interpretation of Section 315 Has Encouraged 'Shenanigans' by Patent Challengers to the Detriment of Patent Holders\n1. Joinder as a Means to Thwart Section 315(b)'s Time Bar\n2. Unenforced Restrictions on Petitioners and Time-Barred Defendants\nB. Judicial Review Is the Sole Means To Ensure the AIA Is Applied Correctly and Consistently\n1. Judicial Review Will Promote, Not Undermine, Efficiency\n2. Judicial Review Will Give Inventors and Challengers Valuable Guidance\n3. Judicial Review Will Ensure Consistency in the Face of Policy Shifts and Changing Administrations",
        "reference": "A. The AIA Restricts the PTO's Power To Institute Inter Partes Review of Petitions from Certain Parties in Certain Circumstances",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-442_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. Empirical Evidence Demonstrates the Nexus Between Racial Bias and Wrongful Convictions.\nII. Mr. Reed's Trial Illustrates the Nexus Between Racial Bias and Wrongful Convictions.\nIII. In View of the Substantial Risk of Bias and Error, Fair Procedures for Access to DNA Evidence Are Essential to Remedying Wrongful Convictions.\nIV. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "IV. Failing to Provide Fair Procedures for DNA Testing Undermines the Integrity of Mr. Reed's Conviction and the Courts.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-422_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. NEITHER THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE NOR LACHES JUSTIFIES DENYING PLAINTIFFS A MEANINGFUL REMEDY\nA. Separation of Powers Claims Are Not Subject to the Harmless Error Rule, and the Constitutional Violation in this Case Was Not Harmless\nB. Laches Does Not Defeat Plaintiffs' Claims\nIII. DEFENDANTS' REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AND FAIL IN ANY EVENT\nA. The Succession Clause Does Not Bar Plaintiffs' Constitutional Claim\nB. Defendants' Argument that the President Can Remove the Acting Director For Any Reason is Both Irrelevant and Wrong\nC. FHFA Was Not Acting in a Private Capacity When It Nationalized Fannie and Freddie",
        "reference": "I. FHFA'S STRUCTURE VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF POWERS",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Ninth Circuit violated separation-of-powers principles and contravened this Court's precedent by applying Martinez to override AEDPA.\nII. There is no absurdity in enforcing a procedural bar even if a different bar is set aside.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The cases below are ideal vehicles to address the important and recurring question presented.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-968_Brief023.pdf",
        "text": "I. Nominal Damages Provide Important Relief for Plaintiffs Who Have Suffered Constitutional Injury\nA. [MISSING]\nB. An Award of Nominal Damages Has the Practical Effect of Changing How Future Constitutional Violations Are Judged\nII. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Would Unduly Impair Constitutional Protections for Religious Students\nA. Religious Students Often Graduate Before Their Claims for Prospective Relief Can Be Fully Adjudicated\nB. Religious Students' Claims for Damages Also Face Significant Obstacles",
        "reference": "A. Nominal Damages Provide a Remedy for Completed Constitutional Injuries When No Additional Damages are Incurred",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.83
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1261_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Conflicts With This Court's Precedent And Decisions Of Other Circuits Establishing That Respondents' Conduct Was Obviously Unconstitutional.\nII. The Circuits Are Divided On The Degree Of Factual Similarity To Precedent Required To Clearly Establish A Constitutional Right.\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. This Court Should Abolish Or Reconsider Qualified Immunity.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-429_Brief001.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Not Grant Certiorari To Revisit McGirt\nA. Amici's Misleading Description of Problems in Implementing McGirt Dissolves Upon Examination\nB. [MISSING]\nII. The State Cannot Challenge the Existence of the Cherokee Reservation in this Moot Case\nIII. Under Settled Law, Federal Jurisdiction Over Crimes By Non-Indians Against Indians In Indian Country Is Exclusive Unless Congress Otherwise Provides\nA. Federal Jurisdiction Is Exclusive Over Crimes Committed By Non-Indians Against Indians In Indian Country\nB. The State Lacks Jurisdiction Over Crimes By Non-Indians Against Indians In Indian Country",
        "reference": "B. The Nation is Successfully Implementing McGirt and Hogner",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.57
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-71_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Service properly designated Unit 1 as unoccupied critical habitat\nA. Unit 1 contains \"habitat\" for the dusky gopher frog\n1. The Service found that Unit 1 contains \"habitat\" for the dusky gopher frog\n2. Under the Act, an area may be \"habitat\" even if it does not satisfy the standards for \"occupied\" \"critical habitat\"\n3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference\nB. Unit 1 is \"essential for the conservation of the species\"\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The Act's other conservation tools have no bearing on the Service's duty to designate critical habitat\nC. Petitioner's reliance on constitutional avoidance principles is misplaced\nII. The Service's decision not to exercise its discretionary authority to exclude Unit 1 is committed to agency discretion by law\nA. The Act provides no meaningful standard to evaluate the Service's decision not to exclude land from critical habitat\nB. Petitioner identifies no meaningful standard for reviewing the Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1\nC. To the extent the Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1 is found to be reviewable, it should be upheld",
        "reference": "1. The Service properly determined that Unit 1 is essential for the dusky gopher frog's recovery",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.46
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-96_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. This Court has never held that Puerto Rico or any other territory, like a state, enjoys sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the FOMB's argument that the Eleventh Amendment shields it from litigation in federal court because it is an entity within the Puerto Rico government is meritless.\nII. Even assuming, arguendo, that this Court decides to treat Puerto Rico like a state for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes, Puerto Rico voluntarily waived its sovereign immunity in federal court by establishing a private cause of action against itself and all other territorial entities, including the FOMB, for accessing public records pursuant to the disclosing obligations emanating from Article II, Section 4 of the Puerto Rico Constitution.\nIII. Petitioner's contention that despite its territorial nature it remains immune from suit both in territorial and federal court, even in the face of the territorial government's voluntary waiver, leads to an untenable result: for the first time since the founding of the Republic a territorial entity would enjoy absolute immunity from suit, far greater than the immunity enjoyed by the political branches of the federal government, and any existing state entity.\nIV. [MISSING]\nA. The fundamental right to access and inspect public documents is inseparably entwined with the bundle of expressive rights found in the Puerto Rico Bill of Rights, namely the freedoms of speech and the press, the right of the people to peacefully assemble and to petition the territorial government for the redress of grievances.\nB. Nothing in the text, history, and purpose of PROMESA lends support to the proposition that Congress intended to preempt the fundamental right to access and inspect public documents found under Article II, Section 4 of the Puerto Rico Constitution and Puerto Rico Law No. 141 of August 1, 2019.",
        "reference": "IV. Because in enacting PROMESA, Congress has not explicitly or implicitly preempted the fundamental right to access public information found under Article II, Section 4 of the Puerto Rico Constitution, Puerto Rico's voluntary waiver of its sovereign immunity, including the FOMB's, does not conflict with PROMESA's outer limits nor with the FOMB's autonomy.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. CLARIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISION IS VITAL TO INNOVATION AND COLLABORATION IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY SPACE",
        "reference": "I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISION CREATES SIGNIFICANT UNCERTAINTY CONCERNING THE SCOPE OF THE ON-SALE BAR UNDER AIA section 102(a)(1)",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-401_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Statutory Text, Context, and Structure Show that 28 U.S.C. section 1782(a) Encompasses Foreign Commercial Arbitral Tribunals\nA. The Ordinary Meaning of \"Foreign or International Tribunal\" Includes Foreign Commercial Arbitral Tribunals\nB. The Statutory Context Confirms that a Foreign Commercial Arbitral Tribunal Is a Foreign Tribunal Within section 1782(a)\nC. Nothing in the Statutory Text, Context, or Structure Limits section 1782(a) to Some Subset of \"Governmental\" Tribunals\n1. \"Tribunal\" does not connote \"governmental tribunal\" generally or in section 1782(a)\n2. \"Foreign\" does not connote \"foreign governmental\" generally or in section 1782(a)\n3. Nothing else in the structure of the statute limits \"tribunal\" to foreign-governmental tribunals\nII. If Considered, the Legislative History Confirms that section 1782(a) Encompasses Foreign Commercial Arbitral Tribunals\nIII. Misdirected, Ill-Founded Policy Arguments Provide No Basis to Exclude Foreign Commercial Arbitral Tribunals from section 1782(a)\nA. [MISSING]\nB. There Is No Conflict Between section 1782(a) and section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act\nC. Overstated Burdensomeness Concerns Do Not Warrant Extratextual Limitations on section 1782(a)\nD. The Government's Policy Concerns About section 1782(a) Discovery in the Investor-State-Arbitration Context Have No Bearing on this Case",
        "reference": "A. The Availability of section 1782(a) Discovery Promotes Cross-Border Commercial Arbitration",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.31
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket16-1466_Brief035.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Overrule Abood\nA. Abood Was Wrongly Decided Because There Is No Distinction Between Bargaining with the Government and Lobbying the Government\nB. Abood Conflicts with Harris, Knox, and Other Precedents Subjecting Compelled Association and Speech to Heightened Scrutiny\nC. Abood Is Unworkable\nD. Reliance Interests Do Not Justify Retaining Abood\nE. [MISSING]\nII. Agency Fee Requirements Fail Heightened Constitutional Scrutiny\nIII. The Court Should Hold It Unconstitutional to Seize Agency Fees from Nonmembers",
        "reference": "E. Abood Should Be Overruled",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-757_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. This Court can resolve the policy problems resulting from the Federal Circuit's decision by restoring the standard of reasonableness this Court and lower courts traditionally apply to the statutory text\nIII. Other provisions of the Patent Act address any remaining concerns about non-enablement of functional claim language",
        "reference": "I. The Federal Circuit's \"reach the full scope\" test is unworkable",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-954_Brief019.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 1252(f)(1) Does Not Preclude the Relief Ordered by the District Court\nA. The district court's injunction falls outside section 1252(f)(1)'s scope\nB. Section 1252(f)(1) is a remedial limitation only\n1. Section 1252(f)(1) limits the lower courts' equitable remedies, not their jurisdiction\n2. Section 1252(f)(1) permits vacatur of unlawful administrative action\n3. Section 1252(f)(1) permits declaratory relief\nII. Section 1252(f)(1)'s Limitation Is Subject to Forfeiture\nA. [MISSING]\nB. Even if section 1252(f)(1) were jurisdictional, it would still be subject to forfeiture\nC. Petitioners have forfeited any argument under section 1252(f)(1) in this Court\nIII. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Address the Questions Presented, But It Could Appropriately Dismiss the Writ as Improvidently Granted\nA. This Court has jurisdiction over both questions presented\nB. If the Court doubts the lower courts' jurisdiction, it should enjoin MPP's unlawful rescission\nC. Alternatively, the Court could appropriately dismiss the writ as improvidently granted",
        "reference": "A. Because section 1252(f)(1) is non-jurisdictional, it may be forfeited",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.79
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1450_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Decision Below Deepens an Entrenched Circuit Split and Conflicts with This Court's Decisions\nII. The Question Presented Is Exceptionally Important and Squarely Presented\nIII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "III. The Decision Below Is Wrong",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-71_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "A. RFRA Authorizes Claims Against Petitioners in Their Individual Capacities\n1. The Statutory Definition of \"Government\" Along with the Plain Meaning of \"Official\" and its Context Make Clear that RFRA Provides for Claims Against Federal Officials in Their Individual Capacities\n2. Recognizing that RFRA Permits Claims Against Federal Officials in Their Personal Capacities Avoids Rendering Statutory Text Redundant\nB. RFRA Authorizes Money Damages\n1. This Court's Longstanding Approach to Remedies Permits a RFRA Plaintiff to Obtain Money Damages from Individual Capacity Defendants\n2. The Presumption in Favor of Damages Is Overcome Only by Constitutional Constraints or Express Statutory Language to the Contrary\nC. [MISSING]\nD. Petitioners' Remaining Arguments Lack Merit\n1. Legislative History\n2. Separation of Powers\n3. Bivens",
        "reference": "C. Section 1983 Should Inform the Court's Interpretation of RFRA",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.09
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1229_Brief025.pdf",
        "text": "A. The Federal Circuit's Interpretation of Section 102(a)(1) Is Contrary to the Purpose of the AIA and Destroys Harmony with Foreign Law\nB. The \"Little Guy\" Stands to Bear a Disproportionate and the Most Destructive Brunt of this \"On Sale\" Bar Storm\nC. The Federal Circuit's Opinion Is Contrary to the Plain Language of the Statute\nD. The Federal Circuit's Opinion Is Contrary to the Legislative History of section 102(a)\nE. The Federal Circuit's Opinion Is Contrary to the USPTO Interpretation and Guidelines\nF. [MISSING]\n1. Noscitur a Sociis: The \"On Sale\" Bar Reflects the \"Company It Keeps\"\n2. The \"Last Antecedent\" Canon Is Inapplicable\nG. Confidentiality Obligations Create a Special Circumstance That This Court Has Long Recognized",
        "reference": "F. The Federal Circuit's Opinion Is Inconsistent with Established Canons of Statutory Construction",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.78
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-494_Brief030.pdf",
        "text": "I. PHYSICAL PRESENCE IS NOT THE BARRIER PETITIONER CLAIMS IT TO BE, THEREFORE THIS MATTER SHOULD NOT BE BEFORE THIS COURT\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. QUILL'S EMPHASIS ON THE COMPLIANCE BURDEN SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED OR DIMINISHED\nIV. SIGNIFICANTLY LESS BURDENSOME OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE",
        "reference": "II. QUILL'S PHYSICAL-PRESENCE RULE SHOULD BE UPHELD",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-956_Brief033.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Federal Circuit Properly Analyzed Copyright Protection in This Case.\nII. The Fair Use Doctrine Is a Far More Limited Exception to the Exclusive Protection of Copyright than Google Advocates.\nA. Fair Use Is a Limited Exception to the General Rule That Creativity Is Best Promoted By Granting Exclusive Rights to Creators.\nB. [MISSING]\nC. The Court of Appeals Correctly Held That Google's Use of Oracle's Declaring Code Was Not Transformative.\nD. The Court of Appeals Correctly Viewed the Relevant Market for Purposes of the Fourth Fair Use Factor.\nE. A Reasonable Fair Use Standard Is Particularly Significant for Individual Creators, Small Businesses, and Developing Industries.",
        "reference": "B. Courts Should Take Care That the Concept of \"Transformative Use\" Not Swallow a Copyright Owner's Exclusive Rights.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket22-23_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. Because Chevron's Premises Are Absent, Routine Deference to the BIA Is Precluded\nA. The BIA lacks the expertise relevant here \u2014 legal interpretation\nB. The BIA has no responsibility for making policy decisions\nC. The BIA's interpretations lack consistency and cause confusion\nII. This Court Should Clarify When BIA Decisions, Like the One Here, Are Not Entitled to Deference\nIII. This Court Must Restore the Primacy of the Rule of Lenity in Agency Adjudication\nA. [MISSING]\nB. When the Rule of Lenity Applies to Resolve Statutory Ambiguity, Chevron Deference Is Precluded\nC. The Courts of Appeals Continue to Discard the Rule of Lenity in Favor of Reflexive Deference to the BIA",
        "reference": "A. The Rule of Lenity Requires Any Doubts Be Resolved Against Removal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.89
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-382_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 113(f)(3)(B) covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws\nA. Settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws may trigger Section 113(f)(3)(B)\n1. Section 113(f)(3)(B)'s text covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws\n2. Congress's failure to include the words \"under this Act\" or similar language in Section 113(f)(3)(B) confirms that the provision reaches settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws\n3. The presumption against surplusage confirms that Section 113(f)(3)(B) covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws\n4. The statutory context in which Section 113(f)(3)(B) appears confirms that the provision covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws\n5. Additional considerations reinforce the conclusion that Section 113(f)(3)(B) covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws\nB. Guam's contrary arguments lack merit\n1. [MISSING]\n2. The background principles that generally govern contribution claims do not support Guam's reading\n3. The interplay between CERCLA and other federal regulatory schemes does not support Guam's reading\n4. Guam's remaining arguments lack merit\nII. The consent decree in this case gave rise to a potential contribution claim under Section 113(f)(3)(B)\nA. A settlement \"resolves\" a person's \"liability\" if it settles the person's legal obligations\nB. The 2004 consent decree resolved Guam's liability for at least some of a response action\nIII. Adopting Guam's reading would distort the statutory scheme",
        "reference": "1. Guam misreads the statute",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-468_Brief032.pdf",
        "text": "I. PETITIONERS PLAUSIBLY ALLEGE THAT PROPOSITION 12 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION\nA. The Extraterritoriality Doctrine Is A Core Aspect Of Constitutional Design\n1. The dormant Commerce Clause is not concerned only with protectionism and discrimination\n2. There is no special extraterritoriality rule for the transportation sector\n3. Respondents exaggerate the effect of the extraterritoriality test\nB. [MISSING]\nII. PETITIONERS PLAUSIBLY ALLEGE THAT PROPOSITION 12 EXCEEDS CALIFORNIA'S POLICE POWER\nA. States Must Demonstrate That Laws With Extraterritorial Effects Further Legitimate Local Interests\nB. Proposition 12 Advances No Legitimate Local Interest\nIII. PETITIONERS PLAUSIBLY ALLEGE A CLAIM UNDER PIKE",
        "reference": "B. Proposition 12 Violates The Extraterritoriality Prohibition",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1084_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Eleventh Circuit Maneuvered Past AEDPA By Reading Error Into The State Court's Opinion. Reeves Attempts The Same\nB. Reeves's Claim Also Fails Under De Novo Review\nC. Comity, Finality, and Federalism Further Demand Summary Reversal",
        "reference": "I. The Eleventh Circuit's Opinion Warrants Summary Reversal",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-840_Brief004.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. \"section 5000A [still] need not be read to do more than impose a tax\" because, analogously to NFIB, \"the individual mandate .. need not be read to declare that failing to [purchase health insurance] is unlawful\" even if \"individuals who are subject to the mandate are nonetheless [effectively] exempt from the penalty\" for some tax years because it is zero dollars",
        "reference": "I. section 5000A's \"requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance [still] may reasonably be characterized as a tax\" because \"the shared responsibility payment amount is [not] set at zero\" for all tax years and is revenue-producing",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "I. THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S DECISION DEPARTS FROM THIS COURT'S GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IN A MANNER THAT ENDANGERS TRADITIONAL FORUM ANALYSIS\nA. Protection of Free Speech Requires Limiting the Scope of the Government Speech Doctrine\nB. The First Circuit's \"Summum/Walker Test\" Distorts this Court's Precedent\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. BROADER SOCIETAL CHANGES UNDERSCORE THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH",
        "reference": "II. COURTS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE IS NOT USED AS A PRETEXT FOR INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1326_Brief014.pdf",
        "text": "A. Safeco's \"Objective Reasonableness\" Scienter Standard Should Apply To The False Claims Act\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Appropriately Limits Expansive False Claims Act Liability\nD. Safeco's Objective Reasonableness Standard Reduces Needless And Burdensome Litigation Costs \u2014 Including The Costs Of Litigating Subjective Good Faith",
        "reference": "B. Requiring Proof Of Formal, Binding Guidance To \"Warn Away\" From An Objectively Reasonable Interpretation Encourages Good Agency Practices And Protects Regulated Parties",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1009_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. A prisoner who has shown cause to excuse a procedural default under Martinez is not excused from section 2254(e)(2)'s opening clause\nA. State post-conviction counsel's negligence triggers section 2254(e)(2)'s restrictions\n1. This Court in Williams correctly interpreted section 2254(e)(2), and that decision is dispositive here\n2. [MISSING]\n3. Respondents misread Williams\nB. This Court's modification of an equitable rule can neither supplant an existing statute nor alter its meaning\nC. Applying section 2254(e)(2) as construed in Williams furthers AEDPA's goals\n1. Section 2254(e)(2) plays a key role in advancing AEDPA's goals\n2. Because AEDPA does not prioritize any particular constitutional rights, this Court should not recognize a Sixth Amendment-specific exemption to section 2254(e)(2)\n3. Modifying the \"failure-to-develop\" standard would encourage gamesmanship and impose significant burdens on states\n4. Arizona's efforts to enforce AEDPA are not \"reckless.\"\nII. Section 2254(e)(2) applies to all new evidence, regardless of form\nIII. Arizona has not waived its argument in Ramirez's case",
        "reference": "2. Respondents' interpretation is inconsistent with section 2254(e)(2)'s text, which has not changed since Williams, and with AEDPA's general structure",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.23
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-21_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. SIGNIFICANT DEPRIVATIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS WILL OCCUR IF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR AN ARREST BARS, UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, ALL RETALIATORY ARREST CLAIMS\nII. ABSENT THE SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES TRIGGERING THE HARTMAN EXCEPTION, MT. HEALTHY SHOULD BE APPLIED TO PERMIT VINDICATION OF CRITICAL FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS\nA. Retaliatory Arrest Cases Do Not Present Special Circumstances Requiring Absence of Probable Cause as a Proxy Inquiry\nB. The Mt. Healthy Framework Allows Courts to Determine Whether State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of Its Communicative Impact\nC. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "C. Focusing Only on the Existence of Probable Cause Does Not Allow Courts to Consider Whether a State Action Was Taken to Punish Protected Speech Because of Its Communicative Impact",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1231_Brief010.pdf",
        "text": "I. Section 202(h) Places a Thumb on the Scale in Favor of Freedom\nA. The Divided Panel Ignored Section 202(h)'s Plain Language\nB. This Court Should Not Rely on Any Deference Doctrines\nC. Courts May Not Rewrite Statutes for Policy Reasons\nII. The 2-1 Panel Misapplied the APA Arbitrary and Capricious Standard\nIII. [MISSING]\nIV. This Court Should Reverse the Decision Below on Narrow Straightforward Statutory Interpretation Grounds",
        "reference": "III. The 2-1 Panel's Frustration of Congress's Textual Commands Has Harmed Competition and Hamstrung Innovation",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.86
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-366_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "EXCLUSION [MISSING]",
        "reference": "EXCLUSION OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS FROM THE CENSUS APPORTIONMENT TABULATION MAY CAUSE SEVERAL APPELLEES TO LOSE FEDERAL FUNDING",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. Courts Should Be Wary of Using the Government Speech Doctrine to Chill Private Expression\nII. Factors Considered in Other Contexts Compel the Conclusion That the Flags Are Private Speech\nA. History does not require that flags always be characterized as government speech\nB. The City has intentionally opened a public forum for diverse viewpoints and retained a strictly administrative role\nC. The messages are transmitted by means consistent with private speech\nD. [MISSING]\nE. Observers would readily recognize the flags as private speech\nIII. The Establishment Clause Cannot Salvage the City's Policy. This Court Must Zealously Guard the Right to Religious Speech",
        "reference": "D. Private speakers bear ultimate responsibility for the messages conveyed by the flags",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.62
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket21-1484_Brief007.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Navajo Nation has stated a claim based on breach of treaty obligations\nA. By entering into the 1849 and 1868 Treaties with the Navajos, the United States promised the Navajos sufficient water for the Reservation to serve as the Navajos' permanent home\n1. An Indian treaty must be read to give effect to the parties' intentions and the agreement's purpose\n2. The Court has long applied canons of Indian treaty interpretation to read promises of a permanent homeland to include promises of sufficient water\n3. The 1849 and 1868 Treaties promise sufficient water for the Reservation to serve as the Navajos' permanent home\nB. The 1849 and 1868 Treaties create enforceable rights to water and impose enforceable duties on the United States to secure that water\n1. The United States owes an enforceable duty when a tribe identifies a specific \"rights-creating or duty-imposing\" source of law bearing the key features of a trust relationship\n2. The 1849 and 1868 Treaties are substantive sources of law that establish specific water rights and duties requiring the United States to provide the Navajo Reservation with sufficient water\nC. Petitioners' arguments lack merit\nII. The Nation's breach-of-trust claim does not implicate this Court's retained jurisdiction in the Consolidated Decree\nA. The Nation's claim does not rest on or seek a quantification of its rights to the Colorado River\nB. [MISSING]\nC. Petitioners' arguments lack merit",
        "reference": "B. Granting relief would not require a court to modify the Consolidated Decree",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.46
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-440_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. THIS CASE PRESENTS A N IDEAL VEHICLE FOR THIS COURT TO ADDRESS ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. AT A MINIMUM, THIS COURT SHOULD CONSTRAIN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RUNAWAY ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE",
        "reference": "II. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL IS CONTRARY TO THE PATENT ACT'S TEXT AND PURPOSES AND ONLY THIS COURT CAN CONSTRAIN ITS CONTINUED MISUSE BY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.33
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket17-1717_Brief006.pdf",
        "text": "I. The case is unripe for this Court's review\nII. There is no Circuit split\nA. Every Circuit that has addressed the constitutionality of a cross memorial has held that it violates the Establishment Clause\nB. The three outliers are attributable to exceptionally unique facts, not legal disagreement\nC. The Legion attempts to manufacture a split by relying solely on Ten Commandments cases and misstating the Fourth and Tenth Circuits' reasonable observer analyses\nD. [MISSING]\nIII. The Fourth Circuit properly applied this Court's precedents and reached the correct result\nA. Reversal would create deep tensions with this Court's jurisprudence\nB. The Fourth Circuit scrupulously evaluated the Cross's entire history and context in accord with this Court's precedents\nC. The Fourth Circuit's narrow fact-specific decision does not threaten any other monument\nD. There is no conflict with any Supreme Court decision\n1. Van Orden\n2. Buono\n3. Town of Greece\nE. The Legion seeks to upend decades of settled jurisprudence for a \"per se\" rule that outs vital Establishment Clause precepts",
        "reference": "D. No Circuit split was created by the Fourth Circuit's holding that the government's funding, pervasive monitoring, and ongoing maintenance and renovation of a gigantic Christian cross fosters excessive entanglement with religion",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.47
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1573_Brief018.pdf",
        "text": "I. PAGA Constitutes an Appropriate Exercise of the Police Power by California to Protect Workers Within the State\nII. [MISSING]\nIII. PAGA Claims, like Labor Arbitrations, Are Bilateral Proceedings Notwithstanding that They May Benefit Multiple Employees\nIV. Viking's Arguments Concerning the Cost and Complexity of PAGA Claims Are Better Addressed to the State Legislature than to this Court",
        "reference": "II. Viking's Claim that It May Require Its Employees to Waive Their Right to Bring a PAGA Claim in Any Forum Flies in the Face of this Court's FAA Jurisprudence",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.25
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-512_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. A Three-Tiered Circuit Split Exists Where Petitioners Have Been Erroneously Granted an Implied Antitrust Exemption in Several Circuits\nII. [MISSING]",
        "reference": "II. Certiorari Should be Granted to Reaffirm This Court's Repeated Disfavor of Judge-Made Implied Antitrust Exemptions",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-5807_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "I. The Court Should Revisit Teague's Watershed Exception to Cover New Rules that Replace Rules that Are the Product of Discriminatory Animus.\nA. The Non-Unanimous Jury Rule Is the Product of Discriminatory Animus.\nB. The Interests Underlying Teague's Watershed Exception Support Retroactively Applying New Rules that Replace Rules that Are the Product of Discriminatory Animus.\nII. [MISSING]\nA. A Finding of Retroactivity Would Not Open the Floodgates to Second or Successive Habeas Petitions.\nB. Not Only Will the Number of Impacted Individuals Be Fewer, the Issues Their Petitions Present Will Be Far Simpler.",
        "reference": "II. A Finding of Retroactivity Will Not, as a Practical Matter, Implicate Administrability Concerns in this Case.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-309_Brief011.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Though political affiliation may be a permissible factor for elected officials to consider in evaluating judicial applicants, it cannot be the basis of a categorical legal restriction\nIII. Delaware's categorical bar of independents and members of third parties from its judiciary may undermine more than advance the state interests\nIV. Delaware's partisan balance requirement is more burdensome than party membership requirements for other offices",
        "reference": "I. Delaware severely burdens the expressive association rights of independents and members of third parties by categorically barring them from serving on the state's three highest courts",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-8369_Brief003.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Section 1915(g) Incorporates A Common Legal Phrase With An Established Meaning\nB. The PLRA's Structure Reinforces That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)\nC. The PLRA's Legislative History Further Confirms That Without-Prejudice Dismissals For Failure To State A Claim Are Not Strikes Under Section 1915(g)\nII. Respondents' Interpretation Of Section 1915(g) Unduly Restricts Prisoners' Access To Federal Courts\nA. Respondents' Interpretation Of Section 1915(g) Would Impose Strikes For Legitimate Claims That Suffer From Temporary And Curable Procedural Flaws\nB. Respondents' Interpretation Of Section 1915(g) Raises Serious Constitutional Questions\nC. The PLRA Provides Ample Tools For Courts To Weed Out And Deter Vexatious Prisoner Suits Without Resort To Respondents' Overly Broad Interpretation Of Section 1915(g)\nIII. The Tenth Circuit Erred By Counting Petitioner's Previous Without-Prejudice Dismissals For \"Failure To State A Claim\" As Strikes",
        "reference": "I. A Dismissal For \"Failure To State A Claim\" That Is Entered Without Prejudice Does Not Count As A Strike Under The PLRA's \"Three Strikes\" Provision",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.22
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-251_Brief016.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. The Ninth Circuit's Holding Conflicts With This Court's Precedents\nB. The Ninth Circuit's Holding Creates A Circuit Split\nII. RESPONDENT FAILS TO DISPEL THE EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED\nIII. RESPONDENT'S SUGGESTION OF VEHICLE PROBLEMS IS ILLUSORY",
        "reference": "I. RESPONDENT FAILS TO DISPEL THE CONFLICTS CREATED BY THE DECISION BELOW",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.6
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-916_Brief005.pdf",
        "text": "A. [MISSING]\nB. The second question presented\u2014asking the Court to graft an atextual exception onto Section 315(b)'s one-year time bar\u2014is unworthy of review",
        "reference": "A. The first question presented\u2014asking whether the USPTO has the unreviewable power to define the scope of its own jurisdiction\u2014is unworthy of review",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.5
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1199_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. Race-conscious decisions spread, infecting areas off limits under judicial precedent, under aegis of Grutter's language.\nA. Universities discriminating on the basis of race in allocating post-admission honors.\nB. K-12 school systems reincorporating race into school assignments.\nC. Courts discriminating on the basis of race in appointing class counsel.\nD. Private businesses adopting \"diversity\" as justification for discriminating on the basis of race in hiring and contracting.",
        "reference": "I. Grutter is a grudging exception to the well-defined rule that group classifications based on race are prohibited in all but the most narrowly tailored instances.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.67
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket20-1800_Brief015.pdf",
        "text": "I. Reducing Constitutional Protection For Speech That Is More Heavily Regulated Turns the First Amendment On Its Head\nII. [MISSING]\nA. In General, Viewpoint-Based Government Speech is Constitutionally Suspect\nB. The Government-Speech Doctrine Should Be Limited to Speech That Is Necessary or Intrinsic to a Legitimate Government Function",
        "reference": "II. The Court's Prior Holding That All Government Speech Falls Outside The Free Speech Clause Should Be Revisited",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.75
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-1392_Brief052.pdf",
        "text": "I. Through Erroneous Readings of the Historical Status of Abortion Under the Common Law, Roe Broke Sharply with the Traditional Values of the Common Law\nA. From Roe on, Courts Have Relied on a Deliberately Distorted History of Abortion\nB. From the Beginning of the Common Law, Courts and Other Respected Authorities Consistently Condemned Abortion\nC. English Law Always Prohibited Parents from Killing Unwanted Children, and Parliament and the Courts Took Strong Steps, Gradually Strengthened over Centuries, to Punish Such Acts\nD. The American Colonies Applied Laws Against Abortion Rigorously\nE. [MISSING]\nF. The Prohibitions of Abortion Represented a Widely Shared Consensus on the Value of Fetal Life, a Consensus that Included Nineteenth-Century Feminists and, Thus, Cannot Properly Be Characterized as a Conspiracy by Male Physicians and Others to Suppress Women\nII. Contrary to Roe, the English and American Legal Understanding Before Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment Was That Abortion Killed a Child at Any Stage of Fetal Development, an Understanding Expressed in Case Law and Statutes",
        "reference": "E. When Abortion Became More Common Than Infanticide with the Development of Technical Means with a Lessened Danger to the Mother's Life, English and American Law Came to Emphasize Abortion as the Primary Evil Endangering Unwanted Children",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket18-6135_Brief008.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. Kansas's approach reflects its broad discretion to delineate the circumstances in which mental illness excuses criminal conduct\nB. The Due Process Clause neither forecloses Kansas's mens rea approach nor requires a right-and-wrong test of insanity\n1. The mens rea approach has historical roots in the English common law\n2. American practices likewise permit a mens rea approach to insanity claims\n3. This Court's precedents confirm that Kansas's approach to insanity is constitutional\nC. Legislatures are better situated than courts to make the moral judgments necessary to decide when mental illness should excuse criminal liability\nII. The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit Kansas from adopting a mens rea approach to insanity claims\nA. Petitioner did not preserve the Eighth Amendment argument he advances in this Court\nB. Kansas's approach to insanity claims does not violate the Eighth Amendment",
        "reference": "I. No substantive due process right forecloses Kansas's mens rea approach to insanity claims",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.8
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-368_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nII. The decision below is a straightforward application of this Court's personal-jurisdiction precedents.",
        "reference": "I. No federal court of appeals or state high court has accepted Ford's argument for importing a rigid tort-based causation standard into due process.",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 4.0
    },
    {
        "file": "Docket19-123_Brief002.pdf",
        "text": "I. [MISSING]\nA. This Court looks to original meaning and practice when interpreting the Religion Clauses\n1. Hosanna-Tabor\n2. Town of Greece\n3. American Legion\nB. Smith's interpretive methodology completely lacked historical analysis\nC. Justice Scalia's concurrence in City of Boerne failed to correct Smith's missing original meaning analysis\nII. Review Is Warranted to Interpret the Free Exercise Clause According to its Original Meaning\nA. The Founders protected the free exercise of religion because they recognized duty to God as superior to duty to government\nB. The record of the First Congress supports interpreting the Free Exercise Clause as prohibiting government compulsion to violate religious beliefs\nC. The Oath Clause also supports an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause as prohibiting government compulsion to violate religious beliefs\nD. Historical practices at the time of the founding support an interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause as prohibiting government compulsion to violate religious beliefs\nE. The nation's first case interpreting the Free Exercise Clause\nF. Evidence around the time of the 14th Amendment's adoption\nIII. Review Is Warranted Where the Court's Free Exercise Jurisprudence Has Been Rejected by the Coordinate Branches of Government, Which Have a Shared Responsibility for Interpreting the Constitution",
        "reference": "I. Smith Made No Attempt to Determine the Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, In Tension with This Court's Recent Cases Involving the Religion Clauses",
        "ToC_Avg_judge_score": 3.27
    }
]